Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction — Changizi v. HHS

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
COLUMBUS DIVISION 
 
MARK CHANGIZI, 
) 
MICHAEL P. SENGER, 
)  
DANIEL KOTZIN, 
) 
 
)     
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
   ) 
 
             
   ) 
 Civil Action No.: 2:22-cv-01776 
 
v. 
 
    
                           ) 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
   ) 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
   ) 
  
HUMAN SERVICES; 
 
 
   ) 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
VIVEK MURTHY, United States   
   ) 
 
Surgeon General, in his 
) 
  
official capacity, and  
) 
 
XAVIER BECERRA,  
) 
Secretary of the Department 
) 
Oral Argument Requested 
of Health and Human Services 
) 
in his official capacity, 
) 
 
) 
Defendants.   
) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION  
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANGELA LAVIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JAY CARSON 
WEGMANHESSLER 
6055 Rockside Woods Boulevard North 
Cleveland, Ohio 44131 
Telephone: (216) 642-3342 
Facsimile: (216) 642-8826 
 
JENIN YOUNES 
NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE 
1225 19th St. NW, Ste. 450 
Washington, DC 20036 
Telephone: 202-869-5210 
Jenin.Younes@ncla.legal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 

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Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 
FACTS ........................................................................................................................................... 3 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 10 
I. 
LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................................................ 10 
 
Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction against Defendants' initiative, forcing 
technology companies to censor users who offer certain perspectives about COVID-19 that 
differ from the Government's, and the Surgeon General's RFI requiring those companies to 
turn over information about these users by May 2, because they have satisfied all four of 
the requisite factors.  Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS ............ 11 
 
A. The Government’s Action Is Ultra Vires .................................................................. 11 
 
The statute empowering the Surgeon General to make rules and regulations does not permit 
him to determine what constitutes health "misinformation"; to order tech companies to 
censor such "misinformation"; or to demand that these companies turn over private (or 
public) information gathered from users. Accordingly, the Surgeon General's initiative and 
the RFI are unlawful.  See Alabama Association of Realtors v. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 141 S.Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021); Tiger Lily LLC v. U.S. Dep't. of Housing 
and Urban Development, 525 F.Supp.3d 850, 861 (W.D. Tennessee), aff'd, 5 F.4th 666 
(6th Cir. 2021). 
  
B. 
Defendants’ Initiative Constitutes a Flagrant Violation of Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment Rights to Free Speech and Free Expression ............................................... 15 
 
As made clear by countless statements of members of the Biden Administration, 
Defendants are utilizing tech companies to accomplish their goal of suppressing and 
eliminating from the public discourse viewpoints about COVID-19 that differ from the 
Government's.  That transforms Twitter's censorship of Plaintiffs into state action and 
violates their First Amendment Rights.  U.S. Const. amend. I; Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58, 62 (1963). 
 
C. The RFI Constitutes a Warrantless Search, Violating the Fourth Amendment... 20 
 
Defendants' demand that technology companies, including Twitter, turn over private 
information about users who are deemed to be spreaders of "misinformation," constitutes 
a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 
403 (2014). 
 

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III. 
PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT A PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION  ............................................................................................................................. 22 
 
Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. The 
ongoing violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution is in itself an irreparable injury.  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).  
The further infringement of their constitutional rights, posed by the Government's RFI with 
a May 2 deadline, makes the grant of a preliminary injunction all the more urgent.  See BST 
Holdings v. OSHA, No. 21-60845 *18 (5th Cir. 2021).   
 
IV. 
THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES (INCLUDING THE PUBLIC INTEREST) WEIGHS HEAVILY 
IN PLAINTIFFS’ FAVOR ............................................................................................................. 23 
 
There is a strong public interest in vindication of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, while the 
Government has no interest in enforcing and promoting an unconstitutional, unlawful 
initiative.  See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 252 (6th 
Cir. 2006). 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 24 
 
 
 

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INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Michael P. 
Senger, Mark Changizi, and Daniel P. Kotzin seek preliminary injunctive relief with respect to the 
Surgeon General’s initiative, directing technology companies to censor viewpoints that conflict 
with federal executive Government messaging on COVID-19, and demanding information about 
individuals who voice those contrary opinions on social media by May 2, 2022.  The relief sought 
is against the Defendants identified above (collectively, Defendants), the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), Surgeon General of the United States Vivek Murthy, and Secretary 
of HHS Xavier Becerra.  The latter two are sued in their official capacities for prospective 
injunctive and declaratory relief as well as nominal damages and any other relief that may be 
deemed just and proper as this case progresses and information surfaces.   
On March 3, 2022, Defendants issued a Request for Information (RFI) demanding that 
technology companies, including Twitter, provide them with “sources of misinformation” on 
COVID-19 by May 2.  This was the culmination of a nearly year-long public campaign wherein, 
inter alia, President Joseph Biden, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki, and Surgeon General 
Vivek Murthy made countless threatening statements indicating that they blame technology 
companies not only for the dissemination of “misinformation” (which translates into anything that 
diverges from Government-approved messaging on COVID-19), but also American deaths, and 
threatening them with adverse consequences, including regulation, unless they effectuate the 
Government’s bidding. 
Censorship of Twitter (and other social media) accounts such as those belonging to 
Plaintiffs, that center upon questioning Government and public health responses to the pandemic, 
ramped up around the time the Biden Administration made public these beliefs and intentions, 

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beginning in the spring of 2021. Mere days after the March 3, 2022 RFI, Mr. Kotzin was suspended 
from Twitter for 7 days, allegedly for a Tweet stating that the pandemic would end not because of 
vaccination, but when most people have been infected (a view held by many epidemiologists).  
Around the same time, on March 8, 2022, Mr. Senger was permanently suspended—meaning that 
he is never permitted to create another Twitter account—for voicing his opinion that COVID-19 
mitigation measures do not work (which numerous studies, including a recent one from Johns 
Hopkins University, have found to be the case).  Mr.  Changizi was suspended several times 
temporarily, beginning around the time Defendants began their public campaign, and once 
permanently, although he was reinstated following an appeal. 
The timing of these events, along with the one-sided nature of the censorship, establishes 
that Twitter suspended Plaintiffs because it feared reprisal from the Government.  Moreover, the 
RFI (not to mention the Government’s earlier actions), has created a profound chilling effect.  
Aware that Twitter and other technology companies are operating under threats from the 
Government, Mr. Changizi and Mr. Kotzin, who have not lost their accounts, self-censor for fear 
of permanent suspension. 
No statute endows the Surgeon General with the authority to direct social media companies 
to censor individuals or viewpoints that he, or the Biden Administration, considers problematic.  
Indeed, Congress could not adopt such a statute. To the extent the Surgeon General interprets the 
statute that empowers him to issue rules and regulations designed to stem the spread of 
communicable disease, 42 U.S.C. § 264, to encompass this initiative, then he is either 
misconstruing the statute or else the statute violates Article I, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which 
vests all legislative power in Congress.  Such a broad interpretation of the statute would also run 
afoul of the major questions doctrine, which instructs courts not to presume that statutory language 

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implicitly adopts—or authorizes the administrative agency to adopt—such a significant policy.  
Here the policy in question has dramatic First and Fourth Amendment implications.  Accordingly, 
with no statute to support the Defendants’ conduct, this initiative constitutes ultra vires action.   
Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances indicates that—at least since May of 2021 
and likely before that—Defendants are not merely colluding with, but also directing Twitter and 
other technology companies to silence opinions that diverge from the White House’s messaging 
on COVID-19.  That degree of influence transforms the Surgeon General’s initiative, including 
the RFI, into government action. 
Publicly directed censorship strikes at the heart of what the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution was designed to protect—free speech, especially political speech.  So, it 
constitutes unlawful government action.  Likewise, the Surgeon General’s demand that social 
media platforms, including Twitter, turn over information about users to the Government that the 
Government has deemed problematic, constitutes a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.   
 
Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits, for reasons that will be discussed in more detail 
below.  If the Court does not issue a preliminary injunction at the earliest possible date, then 
Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm: Twitter has been ordered to give their private information 
to the Government by May 2.  That cannot be undone. Furthermore, the ongoing violation of their 
First and Fourth Amendment rights in and of itself constitutes irreparable harm.  The balance of 
equities and the public interest both favor Plaintiffs.  The Government has no valid interest in 
implementing unlawful, unconstitutional policies that violate Americans’ constitutional rights. 
Moreover, the public has an interest in seeing Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights vindicated.  This 
Court should halt the unconstitutional search of Plaintiffs’ digital records by issuing a preliminary 

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injunction as soon as is practically possible.  Furthermore, it should cancel the RFI and forbid the 
Surgeon General (or anyone else at HHS) from continuing this unlawful initiative.  
FACTS1 
Twitter is one of the world’s largest social media platforms (Complaint ¶¶ 10, 13).  It allows 
users to electronically send messages of limited length to the public (Complaint ¶ 10).  A Twitter 
user can “post their own messages (referred to as tweeting)” and “may also respond to the messages 
of others (replying), republish the messages of others (retweeting), or convey approval or 
acknowledgment of another’s message by ‘liking’” it (Complaint ¶¶ 10-11).   
Twitter has a private messaging system, wherein users can send direct messages to other 
users, as well as participate in group chats (Complaint ¶ 16).  Users can accrue followers; follower 
size is one indication of an account’s impact and reach, but engagements (likes and retweets) and 
impressions (views) are likewise measures of influence (Complaint ¶ 12). When an individual 
creates an account, Twitter collects information from him or her that is not otherwise public, 
including an email address and telephone number (Complaint ¶ 15).   
Although beginning in March of 2020, Twitter censored some users for content that 
conflicted with “authoritative sources of global and local public health information,” suspensions 
of users for this reason were exceedingly rare (Complaint ¶¶ 17-19).    
Between May of 2021 and March of 2022, several individuals within the Biden 
Administration—most notably President Biden himself, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki, 
and Surgeon General Vivek Murthy—made numerous statements indicating that they consider 
tech companies responsible for American deaths from COVID-19 because they are allegedly not 
 
1 A more detailed statement of facts is laid out in the Complaint, ¶¶ 10-98.  A succinct version of those facts most 
pertinent to the request for a preliminary injunction is offered here. 

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doing enough to stop the flow of “misinformation” related to the virus and surrounding issues.  
These individuals have not only directed the companies to deboost or even ban users whose 
articulated viewpoints on COVID-related matters conflicted with Government messaging, and to 
promote favored accounts via algorithms, but they have also threatened adverse consequences for 
noncompliance (see Complaint ¶¶ 22-46).  
On October 29, 2021, the Surgeon General tweeted from his official account (as opposed 
to his personal one, which remains active), as part of a thread: 2  
We must demand Facebook and the rest of the social media 
ecosystem take responsibility for stopping health misinformation on 
their platforms.  The time for excuses and half measures is long past.  
We need transparency and accountability now.  The health of our 
country is at stake.3 
 
On March 3, 2022, the Surgeon General demanded that major tech platforms submit 
“sources” of COVID-19 misinformation to the government by May 2, 2022 (Complaint ¶ 47).4  
Refusing to provide the information does not carry an explicit penalty, but given the threatening 
atmosphere created by a multitude of statements over the previous 10 months, tech companies 
undoubtedly assume that noncompliance will result in retaliatory action (Complaint ¶ 49). 
The webpage created to facilitate this reporting asks for information from technology 
platforms about “sources of COVID-19 misinformation” including “specific, public actors that are 
providing misinformation” (Complaint ¶ 50). HHS Request for Information on Mar. 7, 2022, 
available 
at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/07/2022-04777/impact-of-
 
2 A thread is a longer message, composed of more than one Tweet. 
 
3 Dr. Vivek Murthy, U.S. Surgeon General (@Surgeon_General), Twitter (October 29, 2021, 4:19PM), 
https://twitter.com/Surgeon_General/status/1454181191494606854. 
 
4 See Davey Alba, The Surgeon General Calls on Big Tech to Turn Over Covid-19 Misinformation Data, The New 
York 
Times 
(Mar. 
3, 
2022), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/technology/surgeon-general-covid-
misinformation.html (last visited March 29, 2022); see also COVID-19 RFI. 
 

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health-misinformation-in-the-digital-information-environment-in-the-united-states. Sources of 
misinformation are defined as “specific, public actors that are providing [‘health information that 
is false inaccurate, or misleading according to the best available evidence at the time’], as well as 
components of specific platforms that are driving exposure to information” dating back to January 
2020. COVID-19 RFI at 4, 5, 7-9.  
The technology platforms covered by the RFI are broad and include “general search 
engines, content sharing platforms, social media platforms, e-commerce platforms, crowd sourced 
platforms, and instant messaging systems” (Complaint ¶ 52).  Id. at 6.  While this RFI purports to 
be a mere information gathering initiative, the language—along with previous and 
contemporaneous statements by Murthy, Psaki, and Biden—establishes that the RFI is a demand 
masquerading as an innocent “request” (Complaint ¶ 53).    Users and technology companies are 
on notice that the Government’s involvement in social media censorship is likely to escalate, 
causing a chilling effect on speech and prompting technology companies to ramp up censorship 
for fear of adverse action against them by the Government, including, but not limited to, regulation 
and antitrust investigations (Complaint ¶ 54). 
All three Plaintiffs maintain(ed) active Twitter accounts since at least March of 2020 
(Complaint ¶ 55).  While the content of each is or was unique, all three Plaintiffs regularly used 
their accounts to: (1) question the wisdom, efficacy, and morality of government responses to the 
pandemic, specifically lockdowns and mask and vaccine mandates; (2) read other users’ views on 
the same or similar subjects; and (3) engage with other users on the same or similar topics 
(Complaint ¶ 56). 
Before his permanent suspension, Mr. Senger had 112,000 followers.  See Declaration of 
Michael P. Senger, Attached to Complaint as Exhibit A ¶ 3.  Mr. Kotzin has 29,700 followers.  See 

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Declaration of Daniel P. Kotzin, Attached to Complaint as Exhibit B ¶ 3. Mr. Changizi has 37,000 
followers.  See Declaration of Mark Changizi, Attached to Complaint as Exhibit C ¶ 5.  All three 
Plaintiffs’ accounts are considered influential given the size of their followings, as well as the level 
of engagement with their accounts (Complaint ¶ 60).   
Mr. Senger was suspended twice for 12 hours, on October 27 and 29, 2021.  See Exhibit A 
at ¶ 4.  On March 8, 2022, Twitter permanently suspended Mr. Senger’s account for a Tweet 
linking to an Atlantic article by Ed Yong that bore the headline: “How Did This Many Deaths 
Become Normal?”  (Exhibit A at ¶ 7).  Mr. Senger had remarked: “How did this many ‘deaths’ 
become normal?  Because, though they may not yet be willing to face it, the vast majority have 
realized that every COVID policy—from the lockdowns and masks to the tests, death coding, and 
vaccine passes—has been one, giant fraud.” Exhibit A at ¶ 7.  That is, he was banned from Twitter 
for publicly criticizing the purported ineffectiveness of the Government’s COVID-19 policies. 
Twitter notified Mr. Senger that his account had been suspended for “violating the Twitter 
Rules” by “spreading misleading and potentially harmful information related to COVID-19.”  The 
notification further stated that “if you attempt to evade a permanent suspension by creating new 
accounts, we will suspend your new accounts.  If you wish to appeal this suspension, please contact 
our support team.” See Exhibit A at ¶ 7; Screenshot 1, Attached to Exhibit A.   
Mr. Kotzin has been suspended twice, once for 24 hours and once for 7 days.  The first 
Tweet that led to a suspension, posted on September 24, 2021, stated: “There is not now, nor has 
there ever been, evidence that the Covid shots reduce infection or transmission.  Vaccine passports; 
vaccine mandates; vaccine requirements—they are all an abomination.” Mr. Kotzin received an 
email notification stating that his account had been locked for “violating the policy on spreading 
misleading and potentially harmful information related to COVID-19.”  He was warned that 

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“repeated violations may lead to permanent suspension of your account.”  See Exhibit B ¶ 4(a), 
(b); Screenshot 1, Attached to Exhibit B.   
The second suspension-producing tweet, posted on March 7, 2022, read: “It is important 
to never lose sight of the fact that the global pandemic is ending not because of the vaccines, but 
because almost everyone on the planet got infected with covid.”  After labeling the Tweet 
“misleading,” Twitter notified Mr. Kotzin that he was being locked out of his account for 7 days 
in an email that was identical to the first one (apart from the duration of the suspension).  See 
Exhibit B ¶ 4(c), (d); Screenshot 2, Attached to Exhibit B. 
Twitter first suspended Mr. Changizi on April 20, 2021, for 12 hours, as a penalty for 
linking to and quoting an article finding that masks were “ineffective, harmful.”  See Exhibit C ¶ 
6.  By way of explanation for the suspension, Twitter stated that his account had been locked for 
“violating the Twitter rules” by “spreading misleading and potentially harmful information related 
to COVID-19.”  See Exhibit C ¶ 6; Screenshot 1, Attached to Exhibit C.  On June 25, 2021, Twitter 
again suspended Mr. Changizi, but he does not know why.  See Exhibit C ¶ 7. 
Around December 1, 2021, Mr. Changizi learned, after followers alerted him, that his 
account was heavily censored and “de-boosted” (this means that the user’s tweets appear in Twitter 
feeds much less frequently and replies to other posts may be hidden).   See Exhibit C ¶ 8.  Mr. 
Changizi aggregated his monthly impressions, establishing that the de-boosting actually began 
much earlier, around May of 2021.  His engagements dropped precipitously at that time and 
continued to decline.  The only explanation for this sudden change was the de-boosting to which 
Mr. Changizi was subsequently alerted. See Exhibit C ¶ 14. 

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Twitter permanently suspended Mr. Changizi on December 18, 2021, again for “spreading 
misleading and potentially harmful information related to COVID-19.”  Twitter informed him that 
it was for tweeting the following: 
Covid is 10 to 20 times less dangerous than flu for kids.  Get. A. 
Grip.  There is NO long[-] term data for the shot.  And even the 
short[-] and medium[-]term data for that age group are ambiguous 
at best. 
 
Asymptomatics rarely spread it ~ Vaccinations don’t slow spread ~ 
unvaxed pose no threat to vaxxed ~ Risks are broadly flu like (and 
safer than flu for < 40) ~ Huge % of unvaxxed have superior 
natural immunity via recovery [sic]. 
 
See Exhibit C ¶ 9, Screenshot 2, Attached to Exhibit C. 
 
The email to Mr. Changizi notifying him of the suspension was identical to that received 
by Mr. Senger. See Exhibit C ¶ 10.  Mr. Changizi appealed the suspension Christmas Day of 2021.  
See Exhibit C ¶ 11.  On December 27, 2021, presumably as a result of his appeal, Twitter 
unsuspended Mr. Changizi without further explanation, although he had to delete the two 
offending Tweets.  See Exhibit C ¶ 12.  Nevertheless, his account remains heavily censored.  See 
Exhibit C ¶ 13; Screenshot 3, Attached to Exhibit C. 
Notably, and as discussed, the Surgeon General’s initiative included the demand that social 
media platforms make their algorithms promote favored accounts (those that endorse the 
Government’s message). 
Given the points at which Mr. Changizi’s account was de-boosted and suspended (May of 
2021, when the Biden Administration became public about the initiative, and April, June, and 
December of 2021, respectively) Mr. Changizi’s de-boosting and suspension apparently resulted 

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from the Surgeon General’s initiative.5  Likewise, the timing of Mr. Senger’s and Mr. Kotzin’s 
suspensions—after officials in the Biden Administration began making statements threatening 
technology companies that did not censor individuals who voiced opinions about COVID that 
differed from the Government’s—establishes that the suspension of their accounts (and entire loss, 
in the case of Mr. Senger) stemmed from the Government’s initiative (Complaint ¶¶ 67, 74, 87). 
Mr. Senger has been permanently stripped of his voice on Twitter, which has negatively 
affected his personal and professional life: he promoted his ideas and his work on the platform, 
and engaged with others—both those with whom he agreed and detractors.  See Exhibit A ¶¶ 8-
12.  Both Mr. Changizi and Mr. Kotzin self-censor constantly on Twitter (and other platforms) for 
fear of losing their accounts. See Exhibit B ¶ 5; Exhibit C ¶¶ 14-16. 
Twitter’s COVID-related suspensions have been one-sided, in favor of the Government. 
Twitter suspends only those who question the wisdom and efficacy of governmental restrictions 
or the government’s messaging on health matters related to COVID-19, especially but not limited 
to the vaccines.  On information and belief, there are no examples of Twitter suspending 
individuals who have spread misinformation from the other side—by, for example, exaggerating 
the efficacy of masks or the threat the virus poses to children (Complaint ¶¶ 92-96). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to issue a preliminary 
injunction after notice has been provided to an adverse party. A preliminary injunction is 
 
5 While the first public statement from someone in the Biden Administration blaming technology companies for 
“misinformation,” instructing them to do more, and threatening action if they do not, occurred in May of 2021, 
commonsense dictates that internal government discussions of this nature had occurred previously.  In all likelihood, 
the technology companies were aware of the administration’s position on the matter. 
 

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appropriate if: (1) the moving party demonstrates a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 
(2) it is necessary to prevent irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm the 
preliminary injunction would cause the other litigant; and (4) the preliminary injunction would not 
be averse to the public interest. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009); Liberty Coins v. 
Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 689-90 (6th Cir. 2014). 
II. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS 
A.  The Government’s Action Is Ultra Vires 
“[A]gency actions beyond delegated authority are ultra vires and should be invalidated.”  
Detroit International Bridge Company v. Government of Canada, 192 F.Supp.3d 54 (D.D.C. 
2016).  Courts look to an agency’s enabling statute and subsequent legislation to determine 
whether the agency has exceeded its authority.  See Tiger Lily LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and 
Urban Development, 525 F.Supp.3d 850, 861 (W.D. Tennessee), aff’d, 5 F.4th 666 (6th Cir. 2021) 
(determining that CDC eviction moratorium was unlawful, as “to hold otherwise would be to 
construe the statute so broadly as to grant this administrative agency unfettered power to prohibit 
or mandate anything, which would ignore the separation of powers and violate the non-delegation 
doctrine.”). “A reviewing court owes no deference to the agency’s pronouncement on a 
constitutional question and must make an independent assessment of a citizen’s claim of 
constitutional right when reviewing agency decision-making.”  Poett v. United States, 657 F.Supp. 
230, 241 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
The only statute which empowers the Surgeon General and HHS to make rules and 
regulations authorizes these entities only to make those that: 
in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, 
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign 
countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or 
possession into any other State or possession.  For purposes of 

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carrying out and enforcing such regulations, the Surgeon General 
may provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, 
sanitation, pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles 
found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of 
dangerous infection to human beings, and other measures, as in his 
judgment may be necessary. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 264(A).6   
 
Nothing in this statute permits the Surgeon General to determine what constitutes health 
“misinformation”; to direct social media companies to censor ostensible “misinformation”; to 
work with social media companies to censor this material and silence or de-boost accounts with 
whom he disagrees; or to demand that these companies turn over to the Government private (or 
public) information collected from users. See Tiger Lily, 5 F.4th at 670  (“We cannot read § 264(a) 
to grant the CDC the power to insert itself into the landlord-tenant relationship without clear textual 
evidence of Congress’s intent to do so.”); Kentucky v. Biden, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 5587446 
(E.D. Kentucky 2021) (“[N]either OSHA nor the executive branch is permitted to exercise 
authority it does not have.”), aff’d 23 F.4th 585 (6th Cir. 2022).  
 
In fact, the CDC eviction moratorium cases, including Tiger Lily and Alabama Association 
of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Services, 141 S.Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021), involved 
CDC attempting to use the same statute at issue here to halt evictions nationwide. In Alabama 
Association, the Supreme Court held that CDC’s claim that this statute granted it authority to halt 
evictions nationwide “strain[ed] credulity.”  141 S.Ct. at 2486.  See also Tiger Lily, 5 F.4th at 670. 
 
This case is very similar to Alabama Association and Tiger Lily.  If it “strains credulity” 
that this statutory language authorizes a nationwide eviction moratorium, a fortiori, it strains 
 
6 As discussed in the Complaint, the undersigned counsel, Ms. Younes, twice contacted the individual at HHS 
designated with responsibility for fielding inquiries about the March 3, 2022 RFI and asked whether there was another 
basis that the agency believed authorized this action and of which she was unaware.  She received no response.  See 
Complaint ¶¶ 100-101; 3/14/22 Email from Jenin Younes to Max Lesko, Attached to Complaint as Exhibit D. 

13 
 
 
credulity to say that this language authorizes the Surgeon General to urge Twitter and other 
platforms to take down speech with which the government disagrees in violation of those speakers’ 
First Amendment rights. HHS and its subordinate agencies—like CDC and the Surgeon General’s 
office—have established a troubling trend, wherein they adopt a tortured interpretation of their 
enabling statutes to justify action that far exceeds their statutory authority. 
 
The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States.”  U.S. Const. Art. I § 1.  “The nondelegation doctrine bars Congress 
from transferring its legislative power to another branch of Government.”  Gundy v. United States, 
__U.S.__, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019).  Congress may seek assistance from another branch, 
provided it establishes through legislation “an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.”  J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. 
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928), but “[a]n agency’s power is no greater than that 
delegated to it by Congress.”  Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986).  “[A]gency actions beyond 
delegated authority are ultra vires and should be invalidated.”  Detroit International, 192 
F.Supp.3d 54.  See National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U.S.___, Nos. 
21A244 and 21A247 (2022) (OSHA vaccine mandate “extends beyond the agency’s legitimate 
reach” evidenced by the “lack of historical precedent coupled with the breadth of authority that the 
Secretary now claims”; internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
Even if § 264 could somehow be construed as granting the Surgeon General power to turn 
over information about individuals accused of spreading “misinformation”—it cannot—the lack 
of an intelligible principle regarding what constitutes misinformation means that such an 
interpretation would violate the Constitution’s nondelegation principle. Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2121. 

14 
 
 
“A construction of the statute that avoids this kind of open-ended grant should certainly be 
favored.” Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). 
 
The Surgeon General’s statutory interpretation would also run afoul of the major questions 
doctrine, which recognizes that Congress is expected “to speak clearly when authorizing an agency 
to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance.”  Alabama Association, 141 S.Ct. 
at 2489.  See National Federation, Nos. 21A244 and 21A247 (finding that vaccine mandate for 
private companies, implemented through OSHA, exceeded the agency’s congressionally delegated 
authority).   
 
 
An initiative that utilizes technology platforms to provide the Government with users’ data, 
that censors speech and viewpoints on important, current events and political issues, and that has 
a profound chilling effect (see Parts II (B), (C)), is precisely such a major question.  See Tiger Lily, 
LLC, 5 F.4th at 672 (rejecting CDC’s contention that it had authority to halt evictions nationwide 
via the same statute at issue in this case, as such a reading “would grant the CDC director near-
dictatorial power for the duration of the pandemic[.]”). The lack of clear language authorizing 
censorship and intrusion demonstrates Congress did not delegate such authority. Alabama 
Association of Realtors, 141 S.Ct. at 2489. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, in the 
many decades since § 264 was enacted, the Surgeon General never before interpreted that statute 
to authorize the regulation of “misinformation.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324, 
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444, 189 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2014) (“When an agency claims to discover in a long-
extant statute an unheralded power to regulate … we typically greet its announcement with a 
measure of skepticism.”). 

15 
 
 
 
Congress did not authorize the Surgeon General or HHS to employ such a program. For 
this reason, the Surgeon General and HHS have vastly exceeded their delegated authority (which 
in fact Congress could not give them), so this action is ultra vires and invalid. 
B. Defendants’ Initiative Constitutes a Flagrant Violation of Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment Rights to Free Speech and Free Expression 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits Congress from making 
laws “abridging the freedom of speech.”  U.S. Const. amend. I.  The “government has no power 
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”  Ashcroft 
v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).7 “The First Amendment gives 
freedom of mind the same security as freedom of conscience …. And the rights of free speech and 
free press are not confined to any field of human interest.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 
(1945); see also Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 
2019) (“As a general matter, social media is entitled to the same First Amendment protections as 
other forms of media.”). Courts have long recognized that “debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open[.]” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); 
see Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“The Free Speech Clause exists 
principally to protect discourse on public matters[.]”). This “profound” commitment to the 
principle of free speech is even more necessary when, as here, the debate may include critical or 
“unpleasantly sharp attacks” on the government or its policies. See id. As Justice Learned Hand 
has explained, the First Amendment “presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be 
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many 
 
7 The prohibition against restrictions on speech applies to all branches of government.  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 
1744, 1757 (2017) (“The First Amendment prohibits Congress and other government entities and actors from 
‘abridging the freedom of speech[.]’”); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding Nixon 
Administration’s attempt to prevent publication of classified information violated First Amendment). 
 

16 
 
 
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.” U.S. v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. 
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
The First Amendment also protects the right to receive information.  See Martin v. U.S. 
E.P.A., 271 F.Supp.2d 38 (2002) (quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“where a speaker exists …, the protection afforded 
is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”)).  This right is “an inherent 
corollary of the rights to free speech and press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution” 
because “the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right 
to send them.”  Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. Number 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 
853, 867 (1982) (emphasis in original).  See also id. (quoting Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 
U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The dissemination of ideas can accomplish 
nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a 
barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”)).  As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, “[a] fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to 
places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.” 
Packingham v. North Carolina, 127 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
It is “axiomatic” that the Government may not “induce, encourage, or promote private 
persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.”  Norwood v. Harrison, 
413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973).  In a similar vein, private actors are considered governmental when 
jointly engaged with state actors to deprive an individual of his constitutional rights. Dennis v. 
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), or where the state compels the act or controls the private actor.  See 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (state action can be found where the state exercises 
coercive power on the private actor, provides “significant encouragement,” or transfers into private 

17 
 
 
hands traditionally state powers); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 937 (1982) 
(“[T]he conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to the 
State.”). 
The only real question here is whether Defendants’ statements directed at technology 
companies suffice to establish that they are “induc[ing], encourage[ing], or promot[ing],” 
Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465, the censorship of Plaintiffs’ Twitter accounts.  Without question, they 
are. Cf. Council for Periodical Distributors Ass’n v. Evans, 642 F. Supp. 552 (July 14, 1986), 
judgment aff’d in pertinent part 827 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding an unlawful system of 
prior restraint where government “knew and intended” that its threats would cause removal of 
constitutionally protected but sexually explicit material). 
 
Defendants have made clear that they blame social media companies for American deaths 
and have threatened the companies with consequences unless those companies censor the views 
of individuals determined to be spreading what the Government deems to be “misinformation,” in 
various ways that the Administration has identified.  It is evident that the technology companies 
fear those consequences, as they have ramped up censorship of users—including Plaintiffs—
deemed to have spread COVID “misinformation” following various public statements of 
individuals within the Biden administration—including Defendants. 
 
The censorship is entirely viewpoint based and one-sided, as only users who oppose 
government-imposed COVID-19 mitigation measures and question the efficacy and safety of the 
vaccines are suspended, de-boosted, or otherwise suppressed.  By utilizing tech companies 
including Twitter—through pressure, coercion, and threats—to censor perspectives that conflict 
with government messaging, the Surgeon General has turned Twitter’s censorship into state action.  
See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 62 (1963) (finding First Amendment violation when 

18 
 
 
a private bookseller stopped selling works that state officials deemed “objectionable” after they 
sent him a veiled threat of prosecution.); Hammerhead Enterprises v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 39 
(1983) (“Where comments of a government official can reasonably be interpreted as intimating 
that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action will follow the failure to accede to the 
official’s request, a valid claim can be stated …. Similarly, claimants who can demonstrate that 
the distribution of items containing protected speech has been deterred by official pronouncements 
might raise cognizable First Amendment issues.”).  See also Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 
141 S. Ct. 1220, 1226 (2021) (granting writ of certiorari, vacating judgment, and remanding to 
Second Circuit to dismiss case as moot) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“if the government coerces or 
induces [a private entity] to take action the government itself would not be permitted to do, such 
as censor expression of a lawful viewpoint,” the First Amendment is implicated.). 
 
Indeed, and quite similar to the facts presented here, in Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 68, the 
Court rejected the Rhode Island Government Commission’s argument that because it merely 
“exhort[ed] booksellers and advise[d] them of their legal rights” with respect to sale of 
pornography, there was no government action: 
This contention, premised on the Commission’s want of power to 
apply formal legal sanctions, is untenable. It is true that appellants’ 
books have not been seized or banned by the State, and that no one 
has been prosecuted for their possession or sale. But though the 
Commission is limited to informal sanctions—the threat of invoking 
legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and 
intimidation—the record amply demonstrates that the Commission 
deliberately set about to achieve the suppression of publications 
deemed ‘objectionable’ and succeeded in its aim.  We are not the 
first court to look through forms to the substance and recognize that 
informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of 
publications to warrant injunctive relief. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  See also Speech First v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756, 765 (6th Cir. 2019) (“The 
Response Team’s ability to make referrals—i.e., to inform OSCR or the police about reported 

19 
 
 
conduct—is a real consequence that objectively chills speech. The referral itself does not punish a 
student …. But the referral subjects students to processes which could lead to those 
punishments.”). 
 
The statements of Defendants and others within the Biden Administration, as well as the 
RFI, are the twenty-first century version of the Commission’s approach.  They are coercing, 
persuading, and intimidating technology companies to suppress views the Government has deemed 
objectionable, inhibiting the circulation of the perspectives of Plaintiffs (and others).  See Schlissel, 
939 F.3d at 765 (“Even if an official lacks actual power to punish, the threat of punishment from 
a public official who appears to have punitive authority can be enough to produce an objective 
chill.”). 
 
But not only that. The Government’s RFI (tantamount to a warrantless search, see infra 
Part B (3)) is unequivocally state action, as Defendants have ordered technology companies to turn 
over private information of users who articulate ideas that the Government has decided constitute 
“misinformation.” This RFI has had a profound chilling effect, evidenced by the suspensions of 
Mr. Senger and Mr. Kotzin just days after its announcement, as well as the attestations of Mr. 
Kotzin and Mr. Changizi that they are now even more afraid to address subjects that the 
Government has deemed controversial.  Government action that chills speech—especially political 
speech—for fear of adverse consequences violates the First Amendment.  See Citizens United v.  
Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (political speech “is central to the meaning and 
purpose of the First Amendment.”); Speech First, 939 F.3d at 765 (“[Plaintiff] maintains that the 
Response Team acts by way of implicit threat of punishment and intimidation to quell speech.  We 
agree.”). See also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (holding that provision prohibiting 
flag-burning “chills constitutionally protected political speech … [which is] at the core of what the 

20 
 
 
First Amendment is designed to protect.”); Penny Saver Publications, Inc. v. Village of Hazel 
Crest, 905 F.2d 150, 154 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Constitutional violations may arise from the chilling 
effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.”).    
 
All three Plaintiffs have been deprived of their First Amendment rights to receive 
information, due to the atmosphere of censorship, and to engage freely with each other (and others 
on Twitter).  That is especially so for Mr. Senger, who has been entirely excluded from 
participating in discourse on Twitter.  See Packingham v. North Carolina, 127 S. Ct. at 1735.  In 
sum, Plaintiffs have been deprived of their First Amendment rights to free speech, free expression, 
and to receive information, as a result of the Government’s actions.  They have shown that they 
will succeed on the merits of this claim. 
C. The RFI Constitutes a Warrantless Search, Violating the Fourth Amendment 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches 
and seizures,” and provides that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause” as it “seeks to 
secure the privacies of life against arbitrary power.”  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 
2214 (2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  By including the Fourth Amendment 
in the Bill of Rights, the Framers sought “to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police 
surveillance.”  United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). 
 
A search occurs when an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy, and that 
expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes is reasonable.  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).  The Supreme Court recognizes that 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in digital records, including those given to 
private companies.  See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2217. “A person does not surrender all Fourth 

21 
 
 
Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.” Id.  On the contrary, “what [one] 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).  Nor does the fact that the 
information in question may have been voluntarily given to third parties mean that the Fourth 
Amendment is inapplicable when the Government seeks that data.  See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 
2219 (rejecting Government’s contention that cell-site records are “fair game” because they are 
“business records” created and maintained by wireless carriers and finding that a warrant is needed 
for such a search); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S.Ct. 2443 (2015) (invalidating Los Angeles 
ordinance permitting warrantless police inspections of hotel guest records).  Furthermore, searches 
conducted by administrative agencies constitute significant intrusions upon interests protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, requiring the safeguard of a warrant.  Camara v. Municipal Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S 523, 534 (1967). 
 
Here, Defendants have demanded that Twitter (and other social media companies) provide 
them with “sources of misinformation” by May 2, without a warrant or probable cause.  See 
Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2221.  Plaintiffs have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the non-public 
information they provided and continue to provide to and on Twitter—and that they did not agree 
to make available to the United States Government.  Such information includes private phone 
numbers and email addresses connected to their accounts, as well as private messages and group 
chats. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (holding that warrants are required to 
search cell phones, as “[w]ith all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many 
Americans the privacies of life … . The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry 
such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for 

22 
 
 
which the Founders fought.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Government’s 
demand therefore constitutes a warrantless search and violates the Fourth Amendment.   
III. 
PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION  
 
To satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that absent 
a preliminary injunction, he is “likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits 
can be rendered.” Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff’s harm 
from the denial of a preliminary injunction is irreparable if it is not fully compensable by monetary 
damages.”  Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 550 
(6th Cir. 2007).   
The deprivation of a constitutional right, “for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.”  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); Connection Distrib. Co. 
v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the loss of First Amendment rights, 
even for a minimal period of time, constitutes irreparable harm); Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 
378 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The Supreme Court has unequivocally admonished that even minimal 
infringement upon First Amendment values constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to justify 
injunctive relief.”). 
 
 As discussed, there is no question that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First and Fourth 
Amendment rights.  See Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs 
may establish irreparable harm based on alleged violation of Fourth Amendment rights); McDonell 
v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that a violation of privacy constitutes an 
irreparable harm); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F.Supp.3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 
2015) (“When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved … most courts hold that 
no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”). 

23 
 
 
Furthermore, if the RFI is not enjoined promptly, Plaintiffs’ information will be given to 
the Government, an action that cannot be undone.  Thus, there is further infringement on Plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights that may not yet already have occurred, making the preliminary injunction all 
the more warranted and all the more urgent.  See BST Holdings, No. 21-60845 * 18 (5th Cir. 2021) 
(granting preliminary injunction because being forced to choose between vaccination and 
employment entailed a loss of constitutional freedoms, even though masking and testing was 
offered as an alternative to vaccination), aff’d National Federation, Nos. 21A244 and 21A247; 
(mandate “substantially burden[s] the liberty interests of reluctant individual recipients put to a 
choice between their job(s) and their jab(s)”.). 
IV. 
THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES (INCLUDING THE PUBLIC INTEREST) WEIGHS HEAVILY IN 
PLAINTIFFS’ FAVOR 
 
A preliminary injunction is proper when “the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and that 
an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “These factors merge when the 
Government is the opposing party.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. “[T]here is a strong public interest in 
requiring that the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights no longer be violated[.]” Laube v. Haley, 234 F. 
Supp. 2d 1227, 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2002); see also Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional 
rights.”); See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 252 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[P]ublic interest lies in a correct application of the" law and “upon the will of the people … being 
effected in accordance with [the] law”); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 753 
(8th Cir. 2005) (“It can hardly be argued that seeking to uphold a constitutional protection ... is not 
per se a compelling state interest.”); Rodriquez, 155 F. Supp.3d at 771 (“enforcing constitutional 
rights serves the public interest and the Court does not find such an obvious point to require much 
more explanation.”).  The Government has no legitimate interest in continuing to enforce and 

24 
 
 
promote an unconstitutional and otherwise unlawful initiative.  Accordingly, the balance of 
equities weighs solidly in Plaintiffs’ favor. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
For the reasons set out above, the Court should grant a preliminary injunction following 
briefing and a hearing, against Defendants’ initiative and RFI. A form of order is attached as an 
exhibit to the preliminary injunction motion. 
March 29, 2022 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
s/ Angela Lavin 
Angela M. Lavin (0069604) 
Jay R. Carson (0068526) 
Local Counsel 
WEGMANHESSLER 
6055 Rockside Woods Boulevard 
North 
Suite 200 
Cleveland, Ohio 44131 
Telephone: (216) 642-3342 
Facsimile: (216) 642-8826 
AMlavin@wegmanlaw.com 
 
s/ Jenin Younes 
Jenin Younes* 
Litigation Counsel 
Jenin.Younes@ncla.legal 
Admitted pro hac vice 
NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE 
1225 19th Street NW, Suite 450 
Washington, DC 20036 
Telephone: (202) 869-5210 
Facsimile: (202) 869-5238 
*Admitted only in New York.  DC   
Practice limited to matters and 
proceedings before United States 
courts and agencies.  Practicing 
under members of the District of 
Columbia bar. 
 

25 
 
 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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