Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss — American Video Duplicating v. Citigroup (C.D. Cal.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · No. 2:20-cv-03815-ODW-AGR · Doc. 131 · 2020-11-16 · Docket on CourtListener

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O 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States District Court 
Central District of California 
 
AMERICAN VIDEO DUPLICATING 
INC. et al.,  
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
v. 
 
CITIGROUP INC. et al., 
 
 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
Case № 2:20-CV-03815-ODW (AGRx) 
 
 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS’ 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS [83] [117] 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court are (1) Defendant Citibank, N.A.’s (“Citibank”) Motion to 
Dismiss (“Citibank’s Motion”) the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), and (2) a joint 
Motion to Dismiss the FAC (“Joint Motion”) filed by Defendants U.S. Bank National 
Association; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; Bank of America, 
N.A.; Live Oak Banking Company; and Harvest Small Business Finance (collectively, 
“Defendants”).1  (Citibank’s Mot., ECF No. 83; Joint Mot., ECF No. 117.)  For the 
following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss the FAC with 
leave to amend.2 
 
1 For purposes of this Order, references to “Defendants” include Citibank unless otherwise noted. 
2 After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with both Motions, the Court deemed the 
matters appropriate for decision without oral argument.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 
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II. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs American Video Duplicating, Inc. (“AVD”), Tush Law, Ltd. (“TLL”), 
and Kenneth M. Hahn dba Cal State Financial (“CSF”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 
provide consulting, legal, accounting and tax preparation services.  (FAC ¶¶ 1–3, ECF 
No. 80.)  They bring this action on behalf of themselves and a putative class, seeking 
“agent fees” from lenders under the Payment Protection Program (“PPP”), which was 
established by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES 
Act”), Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 1102, 134 Stat. 281, 286–294 (Mar. 27, 2020).  (See 
generally FAC.) 
Plaintiffs allege they assisted clients in securing PPP loans from Defendants, 
and Defendants were therefore required to pay Plaintiffs “agent fees” under the PPP.  
(Id. ¶¶ 45–51.)  Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege Defendants received 
lender fees from the federal government and funded PPP loans for borrowers, some of 
whom Plaintiffs represented, yet Defendants failed and refused to pay Plaintiffs any 
agent fees.  (Id. ¶¶ 43–44.)  Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ refusals to pay agent fees 
constitute “unlawful actions” from which Plaintiffs suffered financial harm.  (Id. 
¶¶ 53–54.)  Based only on these general allegations, Plaintiffs assert three causes of 
action against Defendants for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) violation of California 
Business and Professions Code section 17200; and (3) unjust enrichment.  (See id. 
¶¶ 66–96.) 
III. 
REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
 
Both parties request the Court take judicial notice of various documents that are 
publicly available on official government websites.  (Plaintiffs’ RJN, ECF No. 124; 
Defendants’ RJN, ECF No. 117-3.)  Both requests stand unopposed.  The Court may 
take judicial notice of “matters of public record” that are not “subject to reasonable 
dispute.”  Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir.  2001); accord 
Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is 
appropriate to take judicial notice of this information, as it was made publicly 
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available by government entities . . . and neither party disputes the authenticity of the 
web sites or the accuracy of the information displayed therein.”); United States v. 
14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cnty., 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Judicial notice is appropriate for records and ‘reports of administrative bodies.’”).  
Thus, both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ requests are GRANTED to the extent that the 
Court relies on the submitted documents. 
IV. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of a 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Article III case or controversy 
requirement limits a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction, which includes the 
requirement that plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims.  Chandler v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2010).  Rule 12(b)(1) 
jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual.  White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 
(9th Cir. 2000).  When a motion to dismiss attacks subject matter jurisdiction on the 
face of the complaint, the court assumes the factual allegations in the complaint are 
true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.  Doe v. Holy See, 557 
F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009).  Moreover, the standards set forth in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), 
apply with equal force to Article III standing when it is being challenged on the face 
of the complaint.  See Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 
2012).  Thus, in terms of Article III standing, the complaint must allege “sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
A court may also dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a 
cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise 
cognizable legal theory.  Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 
(9th Cir. 1988).  To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the 
minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of 
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the claim.  Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003).  The factual 
“allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  Thus, again, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”  Id. at 679.  A court is generally limited to the 
pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 
true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff.  Lee, 250 F.3d at 679.  
However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted 
deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences.  Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 
266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 
leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 
1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).  Leave to amend may be denied when “the court 
determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading 
could not possibly cure the deficiency.”  Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 
Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).  Thus, leave to amend “is properly 
denied . . . if amendment would be futile.”  Carrico v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 
656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011).   
V. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 
standing and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  (Citibank’s Mot. 7; Joint 
Mot. 1.)  The Court addresses each ground in turn. 
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A. 
Article III Standing 
First, whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims is a threshold matter.  
“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” consists of three elements: 
(1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of; and (3) it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  The injury-in-fact 
element requires a plaintiff to show “‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is 
‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.’”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548, as revised (May 24, 
2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).  And the alleged injury must be “fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant.”  Id. at 1547.  “The party 
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.”  Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 561. 
Defendants insist Plaintiffs lack standing because Plaintiffs’ conclusory 
allegations fail to allege an injury-in-fact traceable to any Defendant’s alleged 
conduct, and “Plaintiffs fail to identify even a single PPP loan application with which 
they assisted and that was submitted to and approved by any of the Defendants.”  
(Joint Mot. 8–9; see Citibank’s Mot. 8–9.)3 
Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge the FAC does not identify a PPP loan 
applicant or application for which any specific Defendant failed to pay agent fees, but 
they contend nonetheless that (1) the FAC adequately sets out the role each Defendant 
played in the alleged general harm; and (2) Plaintiffs provided more specific 
allegations after filing the FAC, as reflected in a Declaration by TLL’s CEO filed 
concurrently with Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Citibank’s Motion.  (Opp’n to Citibank’s 
 
3 Beyond Defendants’ collective argument, Citibank further contends that Plaintiffs’ claims are not 
ripe because, without identifying any instance in which an alleged injury occurred, the claims are 
prospective at best.  (Citibank’s Mot. 10–11.)  However, as the Court finds Plaintiffs fail to allege an 
injury-in-fact fairly traceable to any single Defendant’s conduct, it need not consider whether 
Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe and declines to do so. 
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Mot. 5–7, ECF No. 95 (“While the Complaint standing alone is sufficient to establish 
standing . . . Plaintiffs offered to provide Citi[bank] with the very information it 
claims is missing from the Complaint.” (citations omitted)); see also Opp’n to Joint 
Mot. 5–6, ECF No. 122;4 Decl. of Alan S. Turlington,  (“TLL Decl.”), ECF No. 95-2.)  
Plaintiffs thus contend they have established standing “both through the allegations in 
the Complaint and the information Plaintiffs subsequently offered to provide to Citi.”  
(Opp’n to Citibank’s Mot. 6.) 
What matters here, however, is that the allegations in the FAC are too 
conclusory to say Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are “fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct” of any given Defendant.  See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.  The FAC does not 
inform any Defendant of its particular role in the alleged general harm; it relies merely 
on generalized, conclusory allegations.  Plaintiffs improperly try to retroactively 
bolster their allegations with more specific claims in their Oppositions and 
accompanying TLL Declaration.  Indeed, such specific allegations would have 
perhaps helped demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact traceable to 
Citibank.  But those allegations are not in the FAC.5 
Because Plaintiffs fail to clearly allege facts sufficient to establish Article III 
standing, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action.  See Chandler, 598 F.3d 
at 1121–22.  Therefore, both motions to dismiss the FAC are GRANTED to the 
extent they rely on Rule 12(b)(1). 
B. 
Failure to State a Claim 
Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that Plaintiffs adequately establish 
standing, the FAC must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).  As discussed below, 
Defendants correctly argue that Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because, 
 
4 Plaintiffs do not raise any standing-related arguments in their Opposition to the Joint Motion that 
were not raised in the Opposition to Citibank’s Motion.  (Opp’n to Joint Mot. 5–6 (“As to standing, 
Defendants’ [Joint] Motion to Dismiss directly tracks co-Defendant Citi[bank]’s Motion to Dismiss.  
For purposes of brevity, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference their Opposition to Citi[bank]’s Motion 
to Dismiss . . . as if fully set forth herein.”).) 
5 Moreover, the subsequently provided specific facts pertain only to Citibank, not all Defendants. 
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among other reasons, the CARES Act does not create an entitlement or private right of 
action to collect agent fees.  (See Citibank’s Mot. 12–19; Joint Mot. 9–23.) 
It must be noted at the outset of this analysis that the parties’ dispute turns on 
interpretation of an interim final rule by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), 
issued to provide guidance on the administration of PPP loans.  See Interim Final Rule 
(“IFR”), 85 Fed. Reg. 20,811, 20,816 (April 15, 2020).  The IFR explains that the PPP 
was temporarily added to the SBA’s Section 7(a) Loan Program, and it states, “The 
program requirements of the PPP identified in this [IFR] temporarily supersede any 
conflicting Loan Program Requirement . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
Under the existing Section 7(a) Loan Program, parties must agree to agent fees 
using a “Fee Disclosure and Compensation Agreement,” otherwise known as a “Form 
159.”  See 13 C.F.R. § 103.5(a) (“Any Applicant, Agent, or Packager must execute 
and provide to SBA a compensation agreement . . . .  SBA provides the form of 
compensation agreement . . . to be used by Agents.”); see also SBA Form 159 (rev. 
Apr. 9, 2018).6 
The IFR does not mention Form 159, but it does answer the question, “Who 
pays the fee to an agent who assists a borrower?” as follows: 
Agent fees will be paid by the lender out of the fees the lender receives 
from SBA.  Agents may not collect fees from the borrower or be paid out 
of the PPP loan proceeds.  The total amount that an agent may collect 
from the lender for assistance in preparing an application for a PPP loan 
(including referral to the lender) may not exceed: 
i. 
One (1) percent for loans of not more than $350,000; 
ii. 
0.50 percent for loans of more than $350,000 and less than $2 
million; and 
iii. 
0.25 percent for loans of at least $2 million. 
IFR, 85 Fed. Reg. at 20,816. 
 
6 SBA Form 159 is available online at https://www.sba.gov/document/sba-form-159-fee-disclosure-
compensation-agreement. 
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From this language arises the central issue in this case: whether the IFR calls 
for payment of agent fees on all PPP loans, thereby superseding the existing 
Section 7(a) requirement that agent fees be designated in a Form 159.  This precise 
question has sparked over fifty similar lawsuits across the country with plaintiffs 
alleging unpaid agent fees under the PPP.  See In re Paycheck Prot. Program Agent 
Fees Litig., No. MDL 2950, 2020 WL 4673430, at *3 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 5, 2020) 
(declining to consolidate the present action with others but acknowledging the 
common legal question). 
It appears every court that has decided this issue has held that the CARES Act 
does not require lenders to pay agent fees absent an agreement to do so, nor does it 
create a corresponding private right of action.  See, e.g., Sanchez, PC v. Bank of S. 
Tex., No. CV-20-00139, 2020 WL 6060868, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2020) (“The 
Court joins the preexisting consensus that ‘there is no private cause of action to 
enforce this [agent fee] provision of the CARES Act.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Johnson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV-20-4100 (JSRx), 2020 WL 
5608683, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020)); Sport & Wheat, CPA, PA v. ServisFirst 
Bank, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-05425-TKW-HTC, 2020 WL 4882416, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 
17, 2020) (“The CARES Act does not require lenders to pay the agent’s fees absent an 
agreement to do so . . . .”).  The Court sees no reason to depart from these conclusions. 
Plaintiffs insist the traditional Form 159 requirement is inapplicable here 
because it conflicts with the PPP loan program requirements.  (Opp’n to Citibank’s 
Mot. 14–16; Opp’n to Joint Mot. 2.)  Their primary argument is that the PPP borrower 
application form (SBA Form 2483)7 omits what is normally “Question 10” on a 
Section 7(a) loan application form (SBA Form 1919),8 which asks whether an agent 
assisted with preparing the loan application.  (See Opp’n to Citibank’s Mot. 15–16; id. 
 
7 SBA Form 2483 is available online at https://www.sba.gov/document/sba-form-2483-paycheck-
protection-program-borrower-application-form. 
8 SBA Form 1919 is available online at https://www.sba.gov/document/sba-form-1919-borrower-
information-form. 
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App’x A (“First Comp. Chart”) R15, ECF No. 95-1; Opp’n to Joint Mot. App’x A 
(“Second Comp. Chart”) R16, ECF No. 122-1.)   
But this argument misses the mark.  The question before the Court is whether 
the IFR conflicts with the Section 7(a) requirement that a Form 159 must be executed 
and submitted to the SBA, not whether the application form for a PPP loan appears 
different than the application form for a standard Section 7(a) loan.  See generally 
Sanchez, 2020 WL 6060868, at *8 (“The question is whether the PPP supersedes 13 
C.F.R. § 103.5(a), not the form compensation agreement promulgated under that 
regulation.”).  Moreover, the PPP borrower application Form 2483, which is 
submitted to the lender, need not inquire about an agent because under the PPP, “the 
lender is the party that will have agreed to compensate that third party.”  (Joint 
Mot. 14.)  “By contrast, the Lender Application Form (SBA Form 2484), which a 
lender must complete for each approved loan submitted to the SBA, specifically asks 
whether a third party was used to assist in the preparation of the loan application.”9  
(Id. at 13–14 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  Indeed, the fact that the PPP lender 
application form asks whether the lender used an agent to assist with the application—
in a system where agent fees can only be recovered from lenders, not borrowers—
shows that the SBA contemplated certain PPP loans would not involve agent fees. 
Pressing onward, Plaintiffs argue that Form 159 is not required for a PPP loan 
because it is “only used if the borrower or lender pays the agent fees, which is not the 
case here where the SBA is paying it.”  (Opp’n to Citibank’s Mot. 16.)  Plaintiffs 
further note, “Even if it were determined that the Agent is not being paid by the SBA 
but is being paid by the SBA Lender, Plaintiffs are not required to sign or submit 
Form 159.  The Lender is responsible for completing Form 159 when it pays an 
Agent.”  (Opp’n to Citibank’s Mot. at 16 n.9.)  To start, these arguments are 
unpersuasive because the IFR clearly instructs that “[a]gent fees will be paid by the 
 
9 SBA Form 2484 is available online at https://www.sba.gov/document/sba-form-2484-lender-
application-form-paycheck-protection-program-loan-guaranty. 
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lender.”  IFR, 85 Fed. Reg. at 20,816 (emphasis added).  Moreover, Plaintiffs appear 
to admit that a lender must still submit Form 159 if agent fees under the PPP are to be 
paid by the lender.  (See Opp’n to Citibank’s Mot. at 16 n.9; First Comp. Chart R8, 
R15; Second Comp. Chart R8, R16.)  Tellingly, Plaintiffs’ argument loses sight of the 
relevant question here, which is whether a Form 159 must be submitted at all. 
Beyond this, Plaintiffs advance arguments that merely invite the Court to rule in 
their favor based on conjecture, as none of the purported conflicts are evident on the 
face of the IFR.  For instance, Plaintiffs contend the SBA obviated the need to use 
Form 159 when it deemed 0.25% to 1% agent fees as reasonable under the PPP.  (See 
Opp’n to Citibank’s Mot. 15–16; First Comp. Chart R15; Second Comp. Chart R16.)  
But accepting this argument would require the Court to assume, among other things, 
that the SBA does not care what agent fees are paid in connection with any PPP loan 
as long as the fee falls within the range limits—a proposition for which Plaintiffs 
provide no support. 
In short, the Court agrees with other district courts that have already decided 
that: 
Form 159 does not conflict with the IFR because . . . there is nothing in 
the IFR that prohibits the SBA Administrator from requiring use of the 
form (or the disclosure of agent fees) and the form clearly states that it is 
to be used “whenever an Agent is paid by either the [borrower] or the 
SBA Lender in connection with the SBA loan application.” 
Sport & Wheat, 2020 WL 4882416, at *3–4 (quoting IFR, 85 Fed. Reg. at 20,816).  
“[A]gents must simply comply with 13 C.F.R. § 103.5(a) in executing and delivering a 
compensation agreement, in addition to all other applicable requirements.”  Sanchez, 
2020 WL 6060868, at *9. 
Having concluded there is no private cause of action to retrieve agent fees under 
the PPP absent an agreement between agent and lender, the Court briefly turns to 
Plaintiffs’ individual claims.  First, Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim fails because 
it is premised on the alleged mandatory agent fees discussed above, which are not 
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automatically mandated under the PPP.  See Saterbak v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 
No. 3:15-cv-00956-WQH-BGS, 2016 WL 4430922, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) 
(“A claim for declaratory relief is not a stand-alone claim.”).  Second, absent 
allegations that Plaintiffs entered into agreements with Defendants to receive agent 
fees, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is dependent on a private cause of action in the PPP which 
does not exist.  See Stokes v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. CV 14-00278 BRO (SHx), 2014 
WL 4359193, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014) (a UCL claim “must be ‘tethered’ to 
specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.”); accord Hodsdon v. Mars, 
Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 2018).   
Finally, under California law, unjust enrichment is neither a standalone cause of 
action nor a remedy, but rather a “general principle, underlying various legal doctrines 
and remedies” synonymous with restitution.  Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del 
Rey, 223 Cal. App. 4th 221, 231 (2014); see also Lil’ Man In the Boat, Inc. v. City & 
Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 17-cv-00904-JST, 2018 WL 4207260, at *4 (“When a 
plaintiff lacks a private right of action under a particular statute, she cannot argue 
around that limitation by bootstrapping her cause of action onto an unjust enrichment 
claim or declaratory relief claim based on the same statute.”).  Just as Plaintiffs’ 
declaratory judgment claim must be dismissed for lack of an underlying substantive 
claim, so too must their claim for unjust enrichment. 
For these reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss the FAC are also 
GRANTED to the extent they rely on Rule 12(b)(6). 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Court GRANTS Citibank’s Motion and the Joint Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC.  (ECF Nos. 83, 117).  Because the CARES Act does not 
provide a private cause of action to recover agent fees absent an agreement between 
agent and lender, it appears unlikely that Plaintiffs can overcome the deficiencies 
identified above.  However, because Plaintiffs could conceivably allege more facts to 
support a proper claim for agent fees, the Court cannot say any amendment would be 
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futile.  Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs LEAVE TO AMEND by filing a Second 
Amended Complaint, rectifying the deficiencies identified above, no later than 
twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order.  Failure to timely amend will result 
in dismissal with prejudice and closing of the case. 
 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 16, 2020 
 
 
 
 
     ____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
            OTIS D. WRIGHT, II 
 
 
 
 
        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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gov.uscourts.cacd.780998.131.0.pdf

Size

138,019 bytes

SHA-256

f1fefb51957c4ed2d037ddfbccce5c184186167a4734fcc09d403ae3f1527837

Our copy

gov.uscourts.cacd.780998.131.0.pdf

Original

storage.courtlistener.com