United States v. Williams (Karnezis et al.), ord No. 3:23-cr-00067, ECF 153: Defendant Williams's motion to suppress statements and evidence
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Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements and Evidence, with Incorporated Memorandum of Law, filed March 16, 2026 as Document 153 in United States v. Fredrico Williams, Case No. 3:23-CR-00067-IM, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, Portland Division. The motion asks the Court to suppress statements and derivative evidence obtained during the custodial interrogation of March 21, 2023, on five grounds. The table of contents lists the grounds under Massiah, Edwards, Seibert and Corley, and the participation of an AUSA. The motion requests an evidentiary hearing and states that oral argument is requested. The signature block names Ernest Warren, Jr. as attorney for Williams.
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“United States v. Williams (Karnezis et al.), ord No. 3:23-cr-00067, ECF 153: Defendant Williams's motion to suppress statements and evidence.”
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Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 1 of 25
Ernest Warren, Jr. OSB #891384
Warren & Sugarman
838 S.W. First Ave., Suite 200
Portland, OR 97204
Tel: (503) 228-6655
E-mail: e.warren@ernestwarrenlaw.com
Attorney for Defendant Fredrico Williams
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Case No. 3:23-CR-00067-IM
)
Plaintiff, )
) DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
v. ) SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND
) EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED
FREDRICO WILLIAMS, ) MEMORANDUM OF LAW
)
Defendant. ) Oral Argument Requested
___________________________________ ) Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
__________________________________________________________________________
Section Page
__________________________________________________________________________
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3
Page 1-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
WARREN & SUGARMAN
Attorneys at Law
838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 2 of 25
Section Page
A. The Sealed Indictment (March 7, 2023) 3
B. The Arrest and Transport (March 21, 2023) 4
C. The Custodial Interview (March 21, 2023,
5
10:46 AM - 2:03 PM)
D. The Rule 5 Delay 9
III. LEGAL STANDARD 10
IV. ARGUMENT 11
A. Ground One: The Entire Interview Must Be
11
Suppressed Under Massiah
B. Ground Two: Statements Must Be
15
Suppressed Under Edwards
C. Ground Three: Pre-Miranda Statements Must
21
Be Suppressed Under Seibert
D. Ground Four: Statements Must Be
23
Suppressed Under Rule 5 and Corley
E. Ground Five: The AUSA’s Secret
26
Participation Warrants Full Suppression
V. REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY
28
HEARING
VI. CONCLUSION 29
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 31
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Case Page(s)
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
12, 14
387 (1977)
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
10
157 (1986)
Corley v. United States, 556
23, 24, 25
U.S. 303 (2009)
County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 24
(1991)
Davis v. United States, 512
16, 17, 18, 19, 20
U.S. 452 (1994)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21
477 (1981)
Fellers v. United States, 540
13, 14
U.S. 519 (2004)
Page 2-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WARREN & SUGARMAN
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND Attorneys at Law
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
MEMORANDUM OF LAW Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 3 of 25
Case Page(s)
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
10
368 (1964)
Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S.
14
586 (2009)
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
12
(1972)
Mallory v. United States, 354
23, 25
U.S. 449 (1957)
Massiah v. United States, 377
11, 12, 13, 14, 15
U.S. 201 (1964)
McNabb v. United States, 318
23, 24, 25
U.S. 332 (1943)
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S.
14
344 (1990)
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498
16
U.S. 146 (1990)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
10, 21, 22
436 (1966)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
21, 22, 23
600 (2004)
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
22
412 (1986)
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
22
(1985)
Rothgery v. Gillespie County,
12
554 U.S. 191 (2008)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
10
412 U.S. 218 (1973)
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91
17
(1984)
United States v. Alvarez-
25
Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994)
United States v. Charley, 396
22
F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2005)
United States v. Crawford, 372
F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) (en 10
banc)
United States v. Garibay, 143
18
F.3d 534 (9th Cir. 1998)
United States v. Henley, 984
13
F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1993)
United States v. Henry, 447
13, 14
U.S. 264 (1980)
United States v. Hernandez,
13
574 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978)
Page 3-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUP2RESS STATEMENTS AND WARREN & SUGARMAN
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED Attorneys at Law
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 4 of 25
Case Page(s)
United States v. Howell, 231
28
F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2000)
United States v. Lares-Valdez,
10
939 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1991)
United States v. Ogbuehi, 18
18
F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1994)
United States v. Rodriguez, 518
17
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2008)
United States v. Tingle, 658
10
F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981)
United States v. Van Metre, 150
24
F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 1998)
United States v. Wilson, 838
25
F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1988)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371
15, 29
U.S. 471 (1963)
Constitutional Provisions
Provision Page(s)
U.S. Const. amend. IV 24
U.S. Const. amend. V 10, 15, 21, 23
U.S. Const. amend. VI 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 26, 27
Statutes and Rules
Statute/Rule Page(s)
18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) 24, 25
Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(A) 23, 24, 25
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C) 1, 10
D. Or. LR 7-1(b) 1
D. Or. LR 10-1 1
Other Authorities
Authority Page(s)
ABA Model Rule 4.2 27
Oregon RPC 4.2 27
DOJ Manual § 9-13.230 27
Page 4-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND WARREN & SUGARMAN
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED Attorneys at Law
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 5 of 25
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Fredrico Antoine Williams respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C), to suppress all statements and derivative evidence
obtained during his custodial interrogation on March 21, 2023, on five independent
constitutional and statutory grounds. This motion is supported by the incorporated
memorandum of law, the Declaration of Counsel filed concurrently herewith, and
the record in this case.
On March 7, 2023, AUSA Meredith Bateman filed a sealed indictment charging
Mr. Williams. (ECF No. 1.) Fourteen days later, on March 21, 2023, six federal
agents arrested Mr. Williams at his workplace in Rancho Bernardo, San Diego
County, and immediately subjected him to a 4.5-hour custodial interrogation —
without counsel, without informing him of the pending indictment, and with AUSA
Bateman secretly listening on speakerphone. Mr. Williams had a private attorney —
Attorney Pride — whom he repeatedly asked to call during the interrogation.
Mr. Williams attempted to invoke his right to counsel no fewer than twelve separate
times. Every attempt was deflected, delayed, or conditioned upon his surrender of
evidence. At one point, agents explicitly told Mr. Williams that he could call his
attorney only after he first emailed them evidence from his phone. (Tr. Lines
6614-6617.)
Before any Miranda warnings were administered, agents conducted a substantive
interrogation of Mr. Williams during the car ride from the point of arrest to the
interview location. Once the recorded interview began, the lead agent immediately
referenced “what we were trying to talk about in the car.” (Tr. Line 127.) No
curative measures separated these pre-Miranda admissions from the subsequent
recorded interview.
Mr. Williams was not presented to a magistrate judge until March 23, 2023 — more
than 50 hours after his arrest — far exceeding the 6-hour safe harbor established by
the Supreme Court in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009). The entire
interrogation was conducted during this period of unreasonable delay.
Each of these five grounds independently requires suppression:
Ground One — Massiah: Mr. Williams was already under sealed indictment when
interrogated. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at indictment and was
violated by deliberate elicitation without counsel present.
Ground Two — Edwards: Mr. Williams invoked his right to counsel twelve times
during the interview. Each invocation was deflected, and interrogation continued in
violation of the bright-line rule of Edwards v. Arizona.
Ground Three — Seibert: Agents conducted a pre-Miranda interrogation in the car,
then re-covered the same ground after administering Miranda warnings, employing
the unconstitutional question-first technique condemned in Missouri v. Seibert.
Ground Four — Rule 5/Corley: The 50-plus-hour delay before presentment
exceeded the 6-hour safe harbor by more than eight times. All statements obtained
during this delay must be suppressed under the McNabb-Mallory rule as codified in
18 U.S.C. § 3501(c).
Page 5-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WARREN & SUGARMAN
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND Attorneys at Law
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
MEMORANDUM OF LAW Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 6 of 25
Ground Five — Prosecutorial Participation: AUSA Bateman — the same
prosecutor who filed the sealed indictment and who knew Mr. Williams was an
indicted defendant — was secretly present on speakerphone during the interrogation,
heard agents cut off Mr. Williams’s first attempt to invoke counsel, and took no
corrective action.
The remedy is straightforward: suppression of all statements obtained during the
March 21, 2023 interview, all derivative evidence, and all fruits thereof.
Mr. Williams requests an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)
(C).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Sealed Indictment (March 7, 2023)
On March 7, 2023, a federal grand jury in the District of Oregon returned a sealed
indictment charging Mr. Williams with three counts of wire fraud. (ECF No. 1.) The
indictment was filed under seal on the same date. AUSA Meredith Bateman was the
lead prosecutor who presented the case to the grand jury and filed the indictment.
The sealed indictment remained sealed until after Mr. Williams’s arrest on March
21, 2023. At the time of his arrest and subsequent interrogation, Mr. Williams had no
knowledge that he had been indicted. The government agents who conducted the
interrogation made no mention of the pending indictment. Mr. Williams was not
informed that formal charges had already been filed against him. Instead, he was led
to believe that his cooperation would influence future charging decisions — that
AUSA Bateman was the “decision-maker” who would evaluate his cooperation. (Tr.
Lines 141-150.)
The PACER docket confirms the critical timeline: the sealed indictment (ECF No. 1)
was filed on March 7, 2023; the arrest warrant was not formally executed until
March 22, 2023 (ECF No. 73); the Rule 5 initial appearance did not occur until
March 23, 2023 (ECF No. 6).
B. The Arrest and Transport (March 21, 2023)
On the morning of March 21, 2023, at approximately 9:30 AM, six federal agents
from four agencies arrested Mr. Williams at his place of employment, General
Atomics, in Rancho Bernardo, San Diego County, California. The arresting agencies
included SBA Office of Inspector General (OIG), Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (NCIS), IRS Criminal Investigation Division (IRS-CI), and the California
Attorney General’s Office.
At the time of his arrest, Mr. Williams had a private attorney, Attorney Pride, whom
he had previously retained. Mr. Williams was not informed that he had been
indicted, and no CJA counsel had been appointed. Throughout the subsequent
interrogation, Mr. Williams’s repeated requests to “call my attorney” referred
specifically to Attorney Pride.
Page 6-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WARREN & SUGARMAN
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND Attorneys at Law
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
MEMORANDUM OF LAW Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 7 of 25
Following the arrest, agents transported Mr. Williams by car to an interview
location. During this transport, before any Miranda warnings were administered,
agents engaged Mr. Williams in substantive conversation about the investigation.
The content of this pre-Miranda car conversation is confirmed by the subsequent
recorded interview, in which lead agent SA Kristopher Pasquale (SBA-OIG) stated:
“At the end of the day, like, what we were trying to talk about in the car
and help you understand . . .”
(Tr. Line 127.)
And later:
“Like I told you in the car, he loves numbers.”
(Tr. Line 460.)
These statements establish that agents discussed the substance of the investigation
with Mr. Williams during the car ride — before Miranda warnings and before the
recorded interview began. No recording of the car conversation has been produced
in discovery. No agent notes documenting the car conversation have been disclosed.
The arrest warrant, though issued under the sealed indictment, was not formally
executed and returned until March 22, 2023 — the day after the arrest and
interrogation. (ECF No. 73.)
C. The Custodial Interview (March 21, 2023, 10:46 AM - 2:03 PM)
1. The Setting and Personnel
The recorded interview began at approximately 10:46 AM and concluded at
approximately 2:03 PM — a duration of approximately 4 hours and 17 minutes. Six
federal agents were present:
Agent Agency Role
SA Kristopher Pasquale SBA-OIG Lead interviewer
SA Andrew Hamilton Smith CA Attorney General Interviewer
SA Brian Bertnik NCIS Financial records
SA Alice Murphy NCIS Present for portions
SA Brandy Lacey IRS-CI Financial investigation
SA John Pelley IRS-CI Processing/marshal
Additionally, AUSA Meredith Bateman was connected to the interview room via
speakerphone from the outset. Her presence was concealed from Mr. Williams. (See
Section II.C.4 below.)
Page 7-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED WARREN & SUGARMAN
MEMORANDUM OF LAW Attorneys at Law
838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 8 of 25
2. Miranda Advisement and Interrupted Waiver
At the beginning of the recorded interview, SA Pasquale administered Miranda
warnings to Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams stated he understood his rights. When asked
whether he had “any issue with talking to us,” Mr. Williams began to qualify his
response:
AGENT: “So you don’t have any issue with talking to us; right?”
MR. WILLIAMS: “No, I don’t have an issue, but I would like to —”
MR. PASQUALE: [Interrupting] “At the end of the day, like, what we were
trying to talk about in the car and help you understand . . .”
(Tr. Lines 124-127.)
Mr. Williams was not permitted to complete his sentence. SA Pasquale immediately
launched into a lengthy monologue about cooperation, invoking AUSA Bateman by
first name as “Meredith” and describing her as “the decision-maker.” (Tr. Lines
141-150.) At this point, AUSA Bateman was on the speakerphone and unmuted —
she heard Mr. Williams attempt to qualify his waiver and heard the agents cut him
off.
The Miranda “waiver” was obtained while agents were simultaneously making
cooperation promises and before Mr. Williams could articulate his reservation.
Under these circumstances, the waiver was not “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent”
as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
3. Twelve Invocations of the Right to Counsel
Over the course of the 4.5-hour interrogation, Mr. Williams attempted to invoke his
right to counsel twelve separate times. Each invocation was met with deflection,
delay, topic-switching, or — in the most egregious instance — an explicit demand
that Mr. Williams first surrender evidence before being permitted to call his
attorney:
# Transcript Line Williams’s Statement Agent Response
Cut off mid-sentence
“I don’t have an issue, but I by Pasquale;
1 Lines 124-125
would like to —” cooperation
monologue
“because I forget who it was Pasquale redirected
2 Lines 2651-2654 earlier, but I was asking, to “Bayless and
when do I get to —” Eric”
“Can we talk about
“I would prefer to do that Eric and Bayless?
3 Lines 2726-2727
with my attorney.” Can we move on to
that piece?”
Pressed forward on
“I would want to ask my
4 Line 4305 narrower evidence
attorney, if that’s okay.”
scope
5 Lines 4548-4549
Page 8-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WARREN & SUGARMAN
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND Attorneys at Law
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
MEMORANDUM OF LAW Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 9 of 25
# Transcript Line Williams’s Statement Agent Response
“Do you know if at some
“We just kind of
point I get to call my
want to get through
attorney, or is that something
this high-level stuff.”
later?”
“if my attorney was to say,
Redirected to
‘You can give him this,’ I
6 Lines 4611-4614 narrower evidence
would feel more
request
comfortable”
Lacey pivoted to
“That I will leave for when
7 Lines 5234-5235 seizure warrant
the attorney comes in.”
discussion
“Yeah. We will
absolutely give you a
minute; right? I just
8 Line 6075 “Can I call my attorney?” want to describe the
process for you real
quick.” (Continued
for ~70 more lines.)
Deflected with
“Do you mind if I call the
9 Lines 6245-6246 discussion of consent
attorney real quick?”
form language
“You absolutely
can.” Then Smith:
“Pull up the next
“Can I call my attorney from
10 Line 6330 conversation that’s
—”
pertinent.” Phone
examination
continued.
“Can you send this
to us first? This is
just kind of, like, a
“Can I call my attorney?
11 Lines 6614-6617 critical piece. Can
Because it’s on this —”
you e-mail that to
Drew first and then
call?”
Finally permitted.
Recording
“Can I just call my attorney terminated. Smith:
12 Lines 6674-6676
real quick?” “We don’t want you
calling your attorney
in front of us.”
Invocation #3 (Line 2727) is the clearest Edwards invocation: “I would prefer to do
that with my attorney.” This is an unambiguous, unequivocal request for counsel.
Under Edwards, all questioning should have ceased at this point. Instead, the agents
immediately changed the subject and continued interrogating Mr. Williams for
approximately 4,000 additional lines of transcript — nearly three more hours.
Page 9-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND WARREN & SUGARMAN
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED Attorneys at Law
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 10 of 25
Invocation #11 (Lines 6614-6617) is the most constitutionally egregious: agents
explicitly conditioned Mr. Williams’s access to Attorney Pride on first surrendering
evidence from his phone. The “critical piece” the agents demanded was a
spreadsheet that a co-defendant had accidentally sent to Mr. Williams. The agents
told Mr. Williams he could call his lawyer only after he emailed them this
spreadsheet. The agents subsequently seized Mr. Williams’s phone. This is coercion
per se — conditioning the exercise of a constitutional right on the surrender of
evidence.
4. AUSA Bateman’s Secret Presence on Speakerphone
AUSA Meredith Bateman was connected to the interview via speakerphone from the
beginning of the recorded interview. She is identified in the transcript only as
“UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER” — her identity was never disclosed to Mr. Williams
during the interrogation.
Bateman is named as “the decision-maker”:
PASQUALE: “I can go to Meredith and Drew can go to Meredith and we
can say, ‘Rico was totally transparent. He played ball.’ . . . And we can tell
her that, and she can look at that. And, like I said, we’re not the decision-
makers. She is.”
(Tr. Lines 141-150.)
First direct exchange with Bateman:
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: “Hey.”
PASQUALE: “Do you want me to put you on mute, or do you want me to
have that available in case you need to jump in, or just put you on mute?”
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: “No. Just put me on mute.”
(Tr. Lines 208-214.)
Mute fumble confirming her identity:
SMITH: “You muted yourself, not Meredith. She has to mute.”
PASQUALE: “I muted the wrong person, Meredith. Sorry. You have to mute
yourself, Meredith.”
SMITH: “God dang it.”
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: “I am going on mute.”
(Tr. Lines 249-259.)
Critically, Bateman was unmuted and on the speakerphone at the time of Invocation
#1 (Lines 124-125). The mute exchange does not occur until Lines 208-259. AUSA
Bateman therefore heard agents cut off Mr. Williams’s first attempt to invoke his
right to counsel — and she took no corrective action.
Page 10-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WARREN & SUGARMAN
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND Attorneys at Law
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
MEMORANDUM OF LAW Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 11 of 25
After going on mute at Line 259, there is no evidence in the transcript that Bateman
disconnected from the call. The recording continues for approximately 6,476
additional lines — over four more hours of interrogation — with no reference to
Bateman hanging up or being disconnected.
The agents actively concealed Bateman’s presence from Mr. Williams:
1. Bateman is labeled “UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER” in the transcript — never
identified to Mr. Williams as the prosecutor.
2. Pasquale presented “Meredith” as someone they would “go to” after the
interview — not as someone already listening.
3. The agents attempted to mute her so her presence would not be detected.
4. Smith’s exasperation (“God dang it”) when the mute failed indicates they
wanted her presence hidden.
5. At no point was Mr. Williams informed: “The prosecutor is listening to this
interview.”
5. Coercive Interrogation Tactics
The agents employed a coordinated pattern of coercive interrogation techniques
throughout the 4.5-hour interview:
• Pre-Miranda framing: Substantive discussion in the car before warnings.
• Military identity exploitation: Agents built rapport by referencing
Mr. Williams’s Marine Corps service, exploiting his military conditioning to
follow authority.
• “Now or never” false urgency: “This is that opportunity”; “won’t have a future
opportunity.” (Tr. Lines 141-150.)
• Minimization: “We’re not judging you”; “We know you’re not the head of the
scheme.”
• “Trust tests”: SA Pasquale explicitly framed early admissions as “trust tests”
(Tr. Line 1045), weaponizing Mr. Williams’s honesty to extract progressively
more damaging statements.
• False cooperation promises: Agents promised that cooperation would
influence charging decisions, while AUSA Bateman — the actual “decision-
maker” — was already listening on the phone and had already filed the
indictment.
• Conditioning attorney access on evidence production: At Invocation #11,
agents told Mr. Williams he must surrender evidence before calling his lawyer.
(Tr. Lines 6614-6617.)
Each of these tactics bears directly on the voluntariness analysis under Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). The totality of the circumstances — a 4.5-
hour interrogation by six agents, the exploitation of military conditioning, false
cooperation promises, concealed prosecutorial participation, and the systematic
denial of twelve attorney requests — establishes that Mr. Williams’s statements were
not the product of a free and unconstrained choice.
D. The Rule 5 Delay
The timeline from arrest to first judicial appearance is as follows:
Page 11-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WARREN & SUGARMAN
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND Attorneys at Law
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
MEMORANDUM OF LAW Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 12 of 25
Event Date/Time Source
Arrest March 21, 2023, ~9:30 AM Arrest report
Recorded interview
March 21, 2023, 10:46 AM Transcript
begins
Recorded interview
March 21, 2023, ~2:03 PM Transcript
ends
Held in San Diego
Not booked until
County jail March 21-22, 2023
morning
overnight
Booked into jail /
Arrest warrant March 22, 2023 ECF No. 73
executed
Rule 5 initial
appearance (S.D. March 23, 2023 ECF No. 6
Cal.)
Arraignment (D.
April 26, 2023 ECF No. 7
Or., by video)
Mr. Williams was arrested on March 21, 2023 at approximately 9:30 AM. After the
4.5-hour interrogation, he was transported to the San Diego County jail, where he
was held overnight without being booked. He was not booked into the jail until the
following morning, March 22, 2023. He was not presented to a magistrate judge
until March 23, 2023 — a delay exceeding 50 hours. The entire 4.5-hour
interrogation was conducted during this period of unreasonable delay, and the
government’s failure to even book Mr. Williams on the night of his arrest
underscores that presentment was not a priority.
There was no physical barrier to prompt presentment. A United States Magistrate
Judge was available in the Southern District of California. The agents had
Mr. Williams in custody, in a room, with a court reporter. They chose to interrogate
rather than present. The government cannot claim that the delay was necessary for
transportation to the charging district (Oregon), because Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(A)
requires presentment before “the nearest available” magistrate judge — which in
San Diego was the S.D. California Magistrate Judge.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Pretrial motions to suppress statements are governed by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)
(C). When a defendant moves to suppress statements obtained during custodial
interrogation, the government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the statements were lawfully obtained. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 168 (1986); United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). This burden rests on the government at all times — the defendant need not
make an initial showing that the Constitution was violated, because it is the
government that must affirmatively demonstrate the constitutionality of its conduct.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (“[T]he prosecution may not use
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statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination.”).
For statements obtained during custodial interrogation, the government must prove
that Miranda warnings were properly given and that any waiver of rights was
“voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966). The voluntariness inquiry requires examination of “the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details
of the interrogation.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
The Ninth Circuit has held that the government’s burden is particularly heavy when
the evidence shows “a lengthy period of questioning, the defendant’s lack of access
to counsel, and coercive police conduct.” United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332,
1336 (9th Cir. 1981). When statements are obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the analysis is distinct from — and cumulative to —
the Fifth Amendment Miranda framework. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Where the defendant raises factual disputes concerning the circumstances of the
interrogation, the court should hold an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Lares-
Valdez, 939 F.2d 688, 690 (9th Cir. 1991).
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Ground One: The Entire Interview Must Be Suppressed Under
the Sixth Amendment — Massiah v. United States
1. The Right to Counsel Attached at Indictment
The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const.
amend. VI. This right “attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment.” Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 198
(2008) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
A sealed indictment triggers the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As the Supreme
Court held in Kirby, the right attaches once “the government has committed itself to
prosecute” through “the filing of formal charges.” 406 U.S. at 689. A sealed
indictment is a formal charge — it represents the grand jury’s determination that
probable cause exists and the government’s commitment to prosecute. The fact that
the indictment is sealed does not delay the attachment of the right; it merely delays
the defendant’s knowledge of it.
Here, the grand jury returned the sealed indictment on March 7, 2023. (ECF No. 1.)
Mr. Williams’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached on that date — fourteen
days before his arrest and interrogation on March 21, 2023. At the time of the
interrogation, Mr. Williams was an indicted defendant.
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2. The Government Deliberately Elicited Statements Without Counsel
In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Supreme Court held that “any
secret interrogation of the defendant, from and after the finding of the indictment,
without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel, contravenes the basic
dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the [Sixth Amendment]
right to counsel.” Id. at 206 (quoting the trial court). The test is whether the
government “deliberately elicited” incriminating statements from the defendant after
the right to counsel attached. Id. at 206; United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270
(1980).
The facts here present a Massiah violation far more egregious than the original case.
In Massiah, the government used a cooperating co-defendant to secretly record the
defendant. Here, the government:
• Knew Mr. Williams was under indictment (AUSA Bateman filed the indictment
herself on March 7, 2023);
• Arrested Mr. Williams and brought him to an interrogation room;
• Deployed six federal agents to conduct a 4.5-hour interrogation;
• Connected AUSA Bateman — the very prosecutor who filed the indictment —
to the interrogation via speakerphone;
• Never informed Mr. Williams that he had been indicted;
• Never informed Mr. Williams that the prosecutor was listening;
• Presented cooperation as an opportunity to influence future charging decisions
that had, in fact, already been made; and
• Continued interrogating for hours despite twelve attempts by Mr. Williams to
invoke his right to counsel.
This is not a close case. This is not passive listening or indirect elicitation. This is
the direct, deliberate interrogation of an indicted defendant by six law enforcement
officers, with the prosecuting AUSA on the phone, without counsel present or even
appointed.
The Ninth Circuit has consistently applied Massiah to suppress statements
deliberately elicited from indicted defendants. United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d
1362, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1978) (suppressing statements obtained from indicted
defendant); United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1993) (Massiah
violated where government agents “deliberately elicited” statements post-
indictment).
In Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment is violated whenever law enforcement officers “deliberately
elicit” information from an indicted defendant without counsel — even where the
officers merely discuss the charges at the defendant’s home without formal
interrogation. Id. at 524-25. Here, the government did far more than “discuss” — it
conducted a full custodial interrogation.
3. AUSA Bateman’s Knowledge and Participation Confirm Deliberate
Elicitation
The Massiah analysis is strengthened by the fact that AUSA Bateman — the lead
prosecutor — was personally connected to the interrogation by speakerphone.
Bateman filed the sealed indictment on March 7, 2023. She knew, beyond any
doubt, that Mr. Williams was an indicted defendant at the time of the March 21
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interview. Her presence on the call was not happenstance; she was identified as “the
decision-maker” (Tr. Lines 141-150) and spoke on the line before being muted (Tr.
Lines 208-259).
The government cannot claim ignorance of Mr. Williams’s indicted status. The very
AUSA who obtained the indictment participated in the interrogation. This eliminates
any possible defense of good-faith mistake or lack of knowledge. See Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400 (1977) (Sixth Amendment violation where police
“deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information” from indicted defendant).
4. The Remedy Is Suppression of All Statements
Under Massiah, the remedy for deliberate elicitation of statements from an indicted
defendant without counsel is suppression of all statements in the government’s case-
in-chief. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593-94 (2009) (statements obtained in
violation of Massiah are inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief but may be
used for impeachment).
Critically, the Massiah remedy is broader than an Edwards remedy. Under Edwards,
suppression typically begins at the point of invocation. Under Massiah, all
statements are suppressible from the moment the Sixth Amendment attached
— which was the moment of indictment on March 7, 2023. Because Mr. Williams
was already indicted when the interview began, the entire interview — from the first
word to the last — was obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
This distinction is dispositive. Even if this Court were to find that some of
Mr. Williams’s attorney invocations were ambiguous (they were not), the Massiah
analysis requires suppression of the entire interview regardless of when any
particular invocation occurred.
B. Ground Two: All Statements After the First Invocation Must Be
Suppressed Under Edwards v. Arizona
1. The Edwards Bright-Line Rule
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme Court established a bright-
line rule: once a suspect in custody has “expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel,” the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. at
484-85. This rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into
waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344,
350 (1990).
The Edwards rule applies whether the underlying right invoked is the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel (Miranda-based) or the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel (Massiah-based). Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). Where,
as here, both rights are implicated, the protections are cumulative.
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2. Mr. Williams Invoked His Right to Counsel Twelve Times
As documented in Section II.C.3 above, Mr. Williams attempted to invoke his right
to counsel twelve separate times during the interview. The agents deflected,
redirected, delayed, or ignored every invocation.
The clearest invocation occurred at Line 2727: “I would prefer to do that with my
attorney.” Mr. Williams was referring to Attorney Pride, a private attorney he had
previously retained.
This statement is unambiguous. It is not a question. It is not equivocal. It is a clear,
affirmative expression of Mr. Williams’s desire to have his identified, existing
counsel present. Under Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam), “an
accused’s postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast
retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself.” Once this invocation
occurred, all questioning was required to cease.
The agents did not cease questioning. Instead, they immediately changed the
subject: “Can we talk about Eric and Bayless? Can we move on to that piece?” (Tr.
Line 2728.) The interrogation continued for approximately four more hours and four
thousand additional lines of transcript.
3. Even Arguably Ambiguous Invocations Required Clarification
Under Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), if a suspect’s reference to
counsel is ambiguous or equivocal — “such that a reasonable officer in light of the
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the
right to counsel” — the officers are not required to cease questioning but should
make “clarifying questions” before continuing the interrogation. Id. at 461-62.
The Ninth Circuit has applied Davis to hold that officers who receive even an
ambiguous request for counsel must clarify the defendant’s intent rather than simply
ignoring the request and continuing interrogation. United States v. Rodriguez, 518
F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ogbuehi, 18 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir.
1994).
Here, even if this Court were to find that some of the twelve invocations were
ambiguous (which Defendant contests), the agents never made any attempt to
clarify. Mr. Williams was not requesting appointment of unknown counsel — he was
asking to call a specific, named attorney he had already retained. The existence of an
identified attorney makes these invocations even less susceptible to the “ambiguity”
defense under Davis. Instead, the agents employed a consistent pattern of immediate
topic-switching — redirecting Mr. Williams to a new area of questioning each time
he raised the subject of an attorney. This pattern demonstrates not ambiguity on
Mr. Williams’s part, but a deliberate strategy by the agents to prevent him from
completing his invocations.
Invocation #1 (Line 124) is particularly significant: Mr. Williams was literally cut
off mid-sentence. He said, “I don’t have an issue, but I would like to —” and SA
Pasquale immediately interrupted. Mr. Williams was never permitted to finish his
thought. Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, “when a suspect makes an ambiguous
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or equivocal reference to counsel, questioning may continue, but only to clarify
whether the suspect is invoking the right to counsel.” United States v. Garibay, 143
F.3d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the agents did not clarify — they steamrolled.
4. The Pattern of Twelve Invocations Establishes Systematic Denial
Viewed in totality, the twelve invocations over 4.5 hours reveal a deliberate
government strategy to extract maximum admissions before counsel could
intervene:
• Hours 1-2 (Invocations 1-3): Mr. Williams’s early attempts to invoke counsel
were cut off or redirected. The agents established a pattern of deflection from
the outset.
• Hours 2-3 (Invocations 4-7): Mr. Williams became more direct in his requests,
but agents consistently responded with “we just kind of want to get through
this” or pivoted to new evidence topics.
• Hours 3-4 (Invocations 8-12): Mr. Williams escalated to direct requests (“Can I
call my attorney?”), which agents acknowledged (“You absolutely can”) but
then continued questioning. At Invocation #11, agents explicitly conditioned
attorney access on evidence surrender.
No court has held that an interrogation may lawfully continue through twelve
separate attorney invocations. The cumulative weight of these invocations — each
deflected, each unanswered — eliminates any argument that Mr. Williams’s desire
for counsel was ambiguous.
5. Invocation #11 Constitutes Coercion Per Se
At Lines 6614-6617, the following exchange occurred:
MR. WILLIAMS: “Can I call my attorney? Because it’s on this —”
AGENT: “Can you send this to us first? This is just kind of, like, a critical
piece. Can you e-mail that to Drew first and then call?”
The agents explicitly conditioned Mr. Williams’s access to Attorney Pride upon the
prior surrender of evidence from his phone — specifically, a spreadsheet that a co-
defendant had accidentally sent to Mr. Williams. This is not a mere deflection — it
is the affirmative obstruction of the right to counsel. The government made attorney
access contingent upon the defendant’s cooperation with the government’s evidence-
gathering objectives. The agents subsequently seized Mr. Williams’s phone.
No court has ever sanctioned conditioning a suspect’s right to counsel on evidence
production. This demand is coercive per se, and any statements or evidence obtained
after this point are independently suppressible regardless of the other Edwards
violations.
6. The Government Cannot Establish Reinitiation
The government bears the burden of proving that Mr. Williams “initiated” further
communication after invoking counsel. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. The
government cannot meet this burden. The record shows that every time Mr. Williams
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invoked his right to counsel, the agents — not Mr. Williams — initiated the next
round of questioning by changing the subject and posing new questions.
Mr. Williams responded to questions asked of him, as anyone in his position would.
Responding to continued questioning does not constitute initiation. Smith v. Illinois,
469 U.S. at 98.
C. Ground Three: Pre-Miranda Statements Must Be Suppressed
Under Missouri v. Seibert
1. The Question-First Technique
In Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the practice
of interrogating a suspect without Miranda warnings, obtaining admissions, and then
administering Miranda warnings and covering the same ground, renders the
midstream warnings ineffective. The plurality held that “the question-first tactic
effectively threatens to thwart Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced
confession would be admitted.” Id. at 617. The key inquiry is whether “the facts
here do not reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings given could have
served their purpose.” Id. at 611-12.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which controls in the Ninth Circuit as the narrowest
ground, held that midstream warnings are ineffective when the question-first
technique was used “in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.” Id. at
622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit has adopted Justice Kennedy’s test.
United States v. Charley, 396 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005).
2. The Evidence Establishes Deliberate Question-First Interrogation
The agents questioned Mr. Williams in the car before administering Miranda
warnings. When the recorded interview began, SA Pasquale immediately referenced
the car conversation:
“At the end of the day, like, what we were trying to talk about in the car
and help you understand . . .”
(Tr. Line 127.)
And later in the interview:
“Like I told you in the car, he loves numbers.”
(Tr. Line 460.)
These references establish three critical facts:
First, the agents conducted a substantive pre-Miranda interrogation in the car. The
phrase “what we were trying to talk about in the car” confirms that agents raised
case-related topics before warnings were given.
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Second, the agents deliberately used the car conversation as a foundation for the
recorded interview. SA Pasquale’s immediate reference to the car conversation at the
outset of the recorded interview demonstrates that the pre-Miranda questioning was
not a casual exchange — it was the opening phase of a coordinated interrogation
strategy.
Third, the recorded interview was a continuation of the car interrogation. The same
agent who spoke to Mr. Williams in the car (Pasquale) referenced those
conversations during the recorded interview, demonstrating continuity of purpose.
The reference to “he loves numbers” (Tr. Line 460) shows specific substantive
content was discussed in the car — not just general pleasantries.
3. No Curative Measures Were Employed
Under Seibert, midstream Miranda warnings are ineffective unless accompanied by
“curative measures” that make it clear to the suspect that the pre-warning statements
cannot be used. Id. at 612 (plurality). The factors include “the completeness and
detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the
overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the
second [round], the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the
interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.” Id. at
615.
Here, every Seibert factor weighs in favor of suppression:
• Overlapping content: The same topics discussed in the car were covered in the
recorded interview.
• Continuity of personnel: The same agents who questioned Mr. Williams in the
car conducted the recorded interview.
• Timing and setting: The car conversation transitioned directly into the
recorded interview at the interview location.
• No curative measures: No agent told Mr. Williams that the car conversation
could not be used against him or that the Miranda warnings created a fresh start.
• Continuity treatment: SA Pasquale explicitly treated the recorded interview as
a continuation of the car conversation (“what we were trying to talk about in the
car”).
Under both the plurality’s totality approach and Justice Kennedy’s deliberate-
circumvention test, the pre-Miranda car conversation and the subsequent “warned”
statements must be suppressed.
At minimum, any statements referencing topics first raised in the car must be
suppressed as fruits of the pre-Miranda interrogation. More broadly, because the
Miranda warnings were rendered ineffective by the question-first technique, all
statements following the tainted warnings are suppressible.
4. The Remedy Under Seibert
Under Seibert, when the question-first technique is employed deliberately, the
remedy is suppression of both the pre-Miranda statements and the post-Miranda
statements that covered the same ground. Because the agents here used the car
conversation as the foundation for the entire recorded interview — and because no
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curative measures were employed — all statements from the March 21, 2023
interview are suppressible under Seibert. This remedy operates independently of,
and cumulatively with, the suppression required under Massiah and Edwards.
D. Ground Four: Statements Obtained During Unreasonable Delay
Must Be Suppressed Under Rule 5 and Corley v. United States
1. The McNabb-Mallory Rule and Its Codification
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)(1)(A) requires that “[a] person making an
arrest within the United States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay
before a magistrate judge.” This requirement reflects the “prompt presentment”
principle established in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory
v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). Under the McNabb-Mallory rule, confessions
obtained during a period of “unnecessary delay” between arrest and presentment are
inadmissible in federal court.
Congress codified and modified this rule in 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c), which provides
that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such
person before a magistrate judge” if it is made “within six hours immediately
following his arrest.” The Supreme Court interpreted this provision in Corley v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009), holding that Section 3501(c) “establish[es] a
safe harbor for confessions made within six hours of arrest” but that “a confession
made outside the six-hour window may still be suppressed under the McNabb-
Mallory rule.” Id. at 322. Both conditions must be satisfied — the safe harbor is a
conjunctive test. Corley, 556 U.S. at 322. Even if the statements were made within
six hours of arrest, they are not shielded if the delay in presentment was itself
unnecessary.
In other words, Corley establishes a two-part framework: (1) confessions made
within six hours of arrest are presumptively admissible (subject to voluntariness);
(2) confessions made outside the six-hour window are subject to suppression if
obtained during “unnecessary delay.”
2. The 50-Hour Delay Far Exceeds the Safe Harbor
Mr. Williams was arrested on March 21, 2023 at approximately 9:30 AM. He was
not presented before a magistrate judge until March 23, 2023. The delay between
arrest and presentment exceeded 50 hours — more than eight times the 6-hour safe
harbor.
The interrogation itself began at 10:46 AM on March 21 — approximately 76
minutes after arrest — and concluded at approximately 2:03 PM. The statements
were therefore made between approximately 1.25 and 4.5 hours after arrest, which
falls within the 6-hour window. However, the statements were obtained during a
period of unnecessary delay that ultimately extended to 50+ hours. Under Corley,
the safe harbor applies only where the confession was “voluntarily made” within the
six-hour window and where the delay was not itself “unnecessary.” Id. at 322.
Here, the delay was unnecessary. A United States Magistrate Judge was available in
the Southern District of California, where Mr. Williams was arrested and
interrogated. There was no impediment to presentment. The government chose to
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interrogate first and present later — precisely the abuse the prompt presentment
requirement was designed to prevent. After the interrogation concluded, agents
transported Mr. Williams to the San Diego County jail but did not even book him
that evening. He was held overnight without being processed and was not booked
until the following morning, March 22, 2023. This failure to book Mr. Williams on
the night of his arrest — despite having completed the interrogation hours earlier —
further demonstrates that presentment was not a government priority.
The Supreme Court in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991),
held that a delay exceeding 48 hours is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The 50-hour delay here exceeds even this generous outer limit.
3. The Interrogation Was Conducted During and Because of the Delay
The purpose of Rule 5 is to ensure that arrestees are brought promptly before a
neutral magistrate who can inform them of their rights, set conditions of release, and
appoint counsel. The agents deliberately chose to interrogate Mr. Williams rather
than present him. The 4.5-hour interrogation was itself the cause of delay.
The Fourth Circuit has held that where “the delay was for the purpose of
interrogation,” suppression is appropriate even where the statements were made
within six hours of arrest. United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir.
1998). The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that “evidence of a deliberate choice to
delay presentment for the purpose of continued interrogation supports suppression.”
United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1988).
Here, the government had no logistical reason for the 50-hour delay. Mr. Williams
was arrested in San Diego County, where a federal magistrate was available. The
arrest warrant had been issued by the District of Oregon, but Rule 5(a)(1)(A)
requires presentment before “the nearest available” magistrate judge — not the
issuing court’s magistrate. The agents chose to spend the first 4.5 hours interrogating
Mr. Williams, then held him for an additional 45+ hours before presenting him to a
magistrate. This delay was unnecessary by any measure.
4. The Delay Supports Suppression Under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)
Even if this Court finds that the statements fall within the 6-hour safe harbor, the
broader delay demonstrates that the interview was part of a deliberate strategy to
extract maximum information before counsel could be appointed. When the
arrestee’s Rule 5 appearance is delayed by more than 50 hours and the interrogation
is conducted at the front end of that delay, the “safe harbor” does not insulate the
government from the broader McNabb-Mallory rule. Corley, 556 U.S. at 320 (“We
hold that § 3501 modified McNabb-Mallory without supplanting it.”).
The government cannot simultaneously maintain that the statements were made
during a timely presentment process (safe harbor) and that a 50-hour delay before
presentment was reasonable. The delay itself demonstrates that the agents’ priority
was interrogation, not presentment.
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E. Ground Five: The AUSA’s Secret Presence Constitutes
Prosecutorial Participation in Constitutional Violations
1. The Significance of Prosecutorial Participation
While the first four grounds independently require suppression, the AUSA’s
participation in the interrogation constitutes an aggravating factor that goes to the
appropriate remedy. As detailed in Section II.C.4, AUSA Meredith Bateman:
1. Filed the sealed indictment against Mr. Williams on March 7, 2023 — and
therefore knew he was an indicted defendant;
2. Was connected to the interrogation room via speakerphone from the outset;
3. Was unmuted during the critical early minutes of the interview, including when
agents cut off Mr. Williams’s first attempt to invoke his right to counsel
(Invocation #1, Line 124);
4. Was presented to Mr. Williams not as the prosecutor already handling his case,
but as a distant “decision-maker” whose favor could be earned through
cooperation — when in fact charges had already been filed;
5. Was the AUSA who would later use the statements obtained in this interview to
prosecute Mr. Williams at trial;
6. Heard agents deflect Mr. Williams’s attempt to invoke counsel and took no
corrective action; and
7. Was never identified to Mr. Williams as the prosecutor.
2. Prosecutorial Duty to Prevent Constitutional Violations
Under DOJ guidelines, prosecutors have an obligation not to participate in or
condone constitutional violations during interrogations. See DOJ Manual § 9-13.230
(governing participation in witness interviews). Under Oregon RPC 4.2 and ABA
Model Rule 4.2, prosecutors are prohibited from communicating with represented
persons about the subject of the representation without counsel’s consent. While
counsel had not yet been appointed at the time of the March 21 interview, the
Massiah right to counsel had already attached by virtue of the indictment.
AUSA Bateman’s presence during the interrogation of an indicted defendant without
counsel present — an interrogation she knew was being conducted in violation of
Massiah — constitutes prosecutorial ratification of the constitutional violations.
Whether Bateman remained on the line throughout or disconnected after going on
mute, she was present during the critical early phase of the interview when the
foundational constitutional violations occurred, including the interrupted first
invocation of counsel.
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3. The Remedy — Full Suppression
Where prosecutorial misconduct aggravates underlying constitutional violations,
courts have imposed broader remedial measures. The government’s conduct here
was not merely overzealous law enforcement — it was a coordinated operation
involving the lead AUSA, six agents from four agencies, and a 4.5-hour
interrogation of an indicted, unrepresented defendant.
The presence of the AUSA strengthens the case for full suppression rather than
partial suppression. The government may argue that only statements made after
specific invocations should be suppressed. But AUSA Bateman’s knowledge that
Mr. Williams was indicted, her secret presence during the interrogation, and her
failure to halt the interview despite witnessing constitutional violations demonstrate
that the entire interview was infected by prosecutorial complicity. Under these
circumstances, partial suppression — which would reward the government for
stopping one violation while committing another — would be an inadequate remedy.
V. REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Mr. Williams respectfully requests an evidentiary hearing on this motion. An
evidentiary hearing is warranted where the defendant raises issues of material fact
that cannot be resolved on the existing record. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d
615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000).
The following factual disputes require live testimony:
First, the pre-Miranda car conversation. The government has produced no
recording, notes, or documentation of the conversation that occurred during
Mr. Williams’s transport from the point of arrest to the interview location. The
content and scope of this conversation are material to the Seibert analysis and can
only be established through testimony of the agents who were present.
Second, AUSA Bateman’s presence and departure. The transcript confirms that
Bateman was connected via speakerphone and went on mute at approximately Line
259. Whether she remained on the line for the duration of the interview, whether she
heard subsequent attorney invocations, and whether she provided any guidance to
the agents are factual questions that bear on the prosecutorial participation analysis.
Third, the agents’ motive for concealing AUSA Bateman’s identity. The transcript
shows that agents referred to Bateman as “Meredith” and “the decision-maker” but
never identified her to Mr. Williams as the AUSA handling his case. The agents’
motive for this concealment is relevant to the deliberate elicitation analysis under
Massiah and to the question-first analysis under Seibert.
Fourth, whether agents were aware of the sealed indictment. The Massiah violation
requires proof that the government deliberately elicited statements from an indicted
defendant. AUSA Bateman’s knowledge of the indictment is established by the fact
that she filed it. Whether the agents were also informed of the indictment’s existence
— and thus knew they were interrogating an indicted defendant — requires
testimony.
Page 23-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND WARREN & SUGARMAN
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED Attorneys at Law
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 24 of 25
Fifth, the completeness of the transcript. The transcript begins at 10:46 AM.
Mr. Williams was arrested at approximately 9:30 AM. The events between arrest and
the start of the recorded interview — approximately 76 minutes — are not
documented in the record.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Fredrico Antoine Williams respectfully
requests that this Court:
1. Suppress all statements made by Mr. Williams during the March 21, 2023
custodial interview, including all statements made during the pre-Miranda car
conversation and the recorded interview from 10:46 AM to 2:03 PM;
2. Suppress all derivative evidence obtained as a result of the statements,
including but not limited to any evidence identified, located, or obtained based
on information Mr. Williams provided during the interrogation;
3. Suppress all fruits of the constitutional and statutory violations under the
doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
4. In the alternative, if the Court does not find that the Massiah violation requires
suppression of the entire interview, suppress all statements made after
Mr. Williams’s first unambiguous invocation of counsel at Line 2727 (“I would
prefer to do that with my attorney”) under Edwards v. Arizona;
5. In the further alternative, suppress all statements made after Mr. Williams’s
first invocation attempt at Line 124 (“I don’t have an issue, but I would like to
—”), which was interrupted by agents before completion;
6. Grant an evidentiary hearing on the factual issues identified in Section V; and
7. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2026.
WARREN & SUGARMAN
/s/Ernest Warren, Jr., OSB No. #891384.
Attorney for Defendant Fredrico Williams
Page 24-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
WARREN & SUGARMAN
Attorneys at Law
838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 153 Filed 03/16/26 Page 25 of 25
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I Ernest Warren, Jr., hereby certify that, on March 16, 2026, I made service of
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Statements and Evidence, with Incorporated
Memorandum of Law. enclosed herein with the Clerk of the U.S. District Court,
District of Oregon in the attached matter upon the parties listed below by notice of
electronic filing using the CM/ECF PACER Electronic Filing System as follows, and
filed the original with the Court on the date listed below:
AUSA Meredith Bateman
United States Attorney's Office
1000 SW Third Avenue, Ste. 600
Portland, OR 97204
Ph: 503-727-1000
Email: Meredith.Bateman@usdoj.gov
DATED this 16th day of March, 2026.
WARREN & SUGARMAN
/s/ Ernest Warren, Jr., OSB No. 891384
838 SW 1st Avenue, Suite 200
Portland, Oregon 97204
Telephone: (503) 228-6655
Email: e.warren@ernestwarrenlaw.com
Attorney for defendant Fredrico Williams
Page 25-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND
EVIDENCE, WITH INCORPORATED
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
WARREN & SUGARMAN
Attorneys at Law
838 SW First Avenue • Suite 200 • Portland, Oregon 97204
Tel (503) 228-6655
ernestwarrenlaw.com
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