United States v. Reis and Hockridge, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cr-00287-O, Doc. 369: Hockridge's motion for bail pending appeal (2025-11-27)

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Defendant Stephanie Hockridge's Opposed Motion for Release Pending Appeal in United States v. Reis and Hockridge, Case No. 4:24-cr-00287-O, Document 369, filed November 27, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The motion seeks release on conditions of supervision under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), arguing that Hockridge is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. It identifies substantial questions for appeal, including the deliberate ignorance instruction, venue for Count One, the loss calculation and acquitted conduct. It asks the Court to delay the report date until thirty days after any mandate of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction and sentence. The certificate of conference states that the Government opposes the relief.

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“United States v. Reis and Hockridge, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cr-00287-O, Doc. 369: Hockridge's motion for bail pending appeal (2025-11-27).” Original at storage.courtlistener.com. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/united-states-v-reis-and-hockridge-n-d-tex-no-4-24-cr-00287-o-doc-369-397d6af107/, SHA-256 13aba198e059fb69aad584aabb0ecd0cc8ad7853a7d111e8cc76bfeb64ecdeac.

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Case 4:24-cr-00287-O Document 369 Filed 11/27/25 Page 1 of 7 PageID 9458

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Case No. 4:24 CR-00287-O
§
STEPHANIE HOCKRIDGE, a/k/a § (02)
STEPHANIE REIS, §
§
Defendants. §

DEFENDANT STEPHANIE HOCKRIDGE’S
OPPOSED MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL
Defendant Stephanie Hockridge, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby moves

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) for release upon appropriate conditions of supervision pending

the outcome of her appeal. In support of this motion, Ms. Hockridge respectfully states:

1. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3143, the Court “shall” grant release pending appeal where a

defendant shows (1) that she is not a flight risk or a danger to the community, (2) that her appeal

raises a “substantial question of law or fact that is likely to result in” an acquittal, new trial, or a

term of imprisonment shorter than the appeal, and (3) the motion is not made for purposes of delay.

18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). Ms. Hockridge has satisfied all of these elements.

2. In assessing flight and safety risks, district courts within the Fifth Circuit consider

a variety of factors, including defendant’s ties to the community, compliance with bond conditions,

and the nature of the crime. See Redeaux v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 626, 627 (E.D. Tex. 1992);

United States v. Scheur, 626 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (E.D. La. 2009). Ms. Hockridge has previously

been granted pretrial, post-conviction, and post-sentencing release, all of which require a finding

that she is not a flight risk and is not a danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(c), 3143(a).

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3. Nothing in the past five months has altered that calculus. The evidence submitted

in advance of sentencing, shows that she has strong family ties to the district (including her infant

son). See United States v. Stanford, 630 F. Supp. 2d 751, 756 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that “family

ties” are evidence that a defendant is not a flight risk (citing United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d

580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992)). The fact that Ms. Hockridge’s location is already monitored via an ankle

monitor further demonstrates that appropriate release conditions are more than sufficient to ensure

she is not a flight risk.

4. As to Ms. Hockridge’s danger to the community, the Court expressly found at

sentencing that Ms. Hockridge was unlikely to commit any further crimes. That finding makes

sense, in that Ms. Hockridge has no other criminal history, was not convicted of a crime involving

violence or controlled substances, and the conspiracy for which she was convicted ended years

ago.

5. Ms. Hockridge has also raised multiple substantial questions that would require her

conviction to be vacated or her sentence lowered substantially if the Fifth Circuit decides them in

her favor. Some of those issues involve novel and unsettled legal questions, and all of them raise

a substantial doubt about the validity of Ms. Hockridge’s conviction or sentence. Given the

numerous difficult questions of fact and law that the Fifth Circuit will have to answer on appeal,

there is an appreciable likelihood that her conviction will be vacated.

6. Ms. Hockridge’s challenges to her conviction and sentence are well-founded and

sincere, not an attempt at delay. Indeed, permitting her continued release will assist in the just and

speedy disposition of her appeal.

7. The determination of a substantial question is a case-by-case inquiry. United States

v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020, 1024 (5th Cir. 1985). A defendant can show that a question is

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“substantial” by demonstrating that it is “either novel, which has not been decided by controlling

precedent, or which is fairly doubtful.” Id. (emphasis added).

8. The issues stated in summary fashion below are argued more fully in Ms.

Hockridge’s brief in support of this motion, which Ms. Hockridge incorporates by reference.

9. Among the numerous substantial issues that Ms. Hockridge has raised in this case

and is likely to raise on appeal, three stand out as being particularly novel or difficult, thereby

constituting “substantial” questions for purposes of her motion for bail pending appeal:

a. First, Ms. Hockridge objected at trial to the Government’s proposed
“deliberate ignorance” instruction—both because it was improper to provide as an
alternative to an intent instruction and because it was unsupported by the evidence.
Notably, Government attorney Philip Trout began his closing argument by claiming
Ms. Hockridge had actual knowledge of the alleged conspiracy, despite the Fifth
Circuit’s clear instruction that “[w]here the Government relies on evidence of actual
knowledge, the deliberate ignorance instruction is not appropriate,” United States v.
Oti, 872 F.3d 678, 697–98 (5th Cir. 2017). What’s more, the Government had
disclaimed reliance on a deliberate ignorance theory and accused Ms. Hockridge of
“misconstru[ing] the [G]overnment’s case” by suggesting it might pursue such a
theory. Resp. to Mot. in Limine (Doc. #87) at 7. The Court’s decision to nonetheless
provide the instruction will present a substantial question on appeal.

b. Second, there is a substantial question as to whether Ms. Hockridge was
improperly denied the ability to confront Government witness Eric Karnezis. At trial,
Ms. Hockridge attempted to introduce exculpatory evidence of Ms. Hockridge’s good
faith, including evidence that Ms. Hockridge instructed VIPPP loan processors on how
to root out fraud, and messages in which she worked to rectify fraudulent applications
submitted by Karnezis’s associate. While the Court eventually admitted some of that
evidence, it did so only after the Government had rested and Karnezis was off the
stand. On appeal, Ms. Hockridge will argue the delay in admitting evidence, especially
when coupled with the Government’s belated disclosure of potentially impeaching and
exculpatory evidence after trial, violated her Confrontation Clause right to “sufficient
cross-examination” of an adverse witness. United States v. Garza, 754 U.S. 1202,
1206 (5th Cir. 1985) (quotation omitted). Ms. Hockridge’s appeal is likely to show
that “a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [Mr.
Karnezis’s] credibility had defense counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line
of cross-examination.” United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (alterations accepted)).

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c. Third, there is a substantial question whether the Government presented
facts at trial sufficient for the jury to find venue for Count One of the indictment, since
the Government failed to prove that “the agreement was formed or an overt act
occurred” in the Northern District of Texas. United States v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358,
369 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Garcia Mendoza, 587 F.3d 682, 686 (5th
Cir. 2019)). To make up for the lack of evidence, the Government relied on a novel
theory of venue that runs counter to Fifth Circuit precedent—that venue can be
established where a coconspirator outside the district “reaches in” to the district by
performing an act with incidental effects in the district. But no Fifth Circuit case
supports that theory; instead, the Fifth Circuit case law plainly requires that a venue-
predicate act must occur in the district in which the defendant is charged. See United
States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 756 F.3d 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2014). At the very least, the
Government’s inventive venue theory has not previously found approval from the
Fifth Circuit, and its novelty thus demonstrates the existence of a substantial question
on appeal. See Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d at 1024.

10. Ms. Hockridge has also raised numerous other substantial challenges in her prior

motions that could result in reversal of her conviction if successful on appeal. Her challenges

include (1) the decision not to provide Ms. Hockridge’s requested theory-of-defense instructions,

see Mem. ISO Mot. for New Trial (Doc. #269) at 24–31; (2) the admission of dozens of out-of-

court statements under the coconspirator exception, see id. at 32–35; (3) the Government’s

improper efforts to dissuade a defense witness from testifying, see id. at 13–16; (4) the

Government’s false nontarget assurance prior to Ms. Hockridge’s interview, see id. at 16–19;

(5) the Government’s review and admission of confidential spousal communications, see id. at 39–

41; (6) the Government’s failure to prove the materiality of any false statements to the decision to

lend, see Mem. ISO Mot. for J. of Acquittal (Doc. #267) at 20–23; (7) the Government’s failure to

prove a single, unified conspiracy, id. at 25–31; (8) the Government’s improper use of a “filter

team,” including its failure to disclose any exculpatory or impeaching information in its

possession, see Mot. to Compel Filter Team Review (Doc. # 59); (9) the Government’s inclusion

of false statements in its warrant applications, see Mot. to Suppress and for Franks Hearing (Doc.

# 98); and (10) the jury’s evident failure to reach a unanimous verdict beyond a reasonable doubt,

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see Mem. ISO Mot. for New Trial Regarding Juror Conduct (Doc. #263); see also Valera-

Elizondo, 761 F.2d at 1024 (requiring bail pending appeal for a “novel” question, i.e., one that

“has not been decided by controlling precedent”).

11. A favorable ruling from the Fifth Circuit on any of these issues, or on several other

issues that Ms. Hockridge has argued in her pretrial and post-trial motions and discussed further

in her memorandum in support of this motion, would require the reversal of her conviction. And

all are at least debatable by a fair-minded jurist. For those reasons, they present substantial

questions that warrant bail pending appeal.

12. In addition to challenging the rulings that preceded her conviction, Ms. Hockridge

has raised additional challenges to the Government’s loss calculations at sentencing that would

substantially reduce her Guidelines range if her appeal on those issues is successful. Among them

are two questions that the Fifth Circuit has never before addressed and which are therefore “novel,”

thereby meriting bail pending appeal:

a. Ms. Hockridge objected to the Government’s calculation of the loss amount,
which the PSR and the Court adopted, on the grounds that it improperly aggregated
the total amount of money disbursed for allegedly fraudulent loans processed by
VIPPP, despite the plain language of the Sentencing Guidelines stating that “loss” in
a government loan program fraud case is the difference between the loan amounts to
which borrowers were lawfully entitled and the amounts borrowers received due to
the alleged fraud. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(E)(ii) (indicating that, in “a case
involving government benefits,” including “loans,” the loss amount is “the value of
the benefits obtained by unintended recipients. . . . [I]f the defendant was the intended
recipient of foods stamps having a value of $100 but fraudulently received food stamps
having a value of $150, loss is $50.”); accord United States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504,
522 (5th Cir. 2013) (“A defendant’s false statement in seeking government benefits is
insufficient to render him accountable for all benefits received or intended to be
received.”). Because the Government’s summary chart provided no factual
development about the delta between what applicants qualified for and what they
received, Ms. Hockridge will argue on appeal that its loss calculation did not meet the
requirements of the Guidelines. Cf. United States v. McGuire, 151 F.4th 307, 332 (5th
Cir. 2025) (holding a “summary chart devoid of explanation of the underlying
calculations” was insufficient to be relied on at sentencing).

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b. The Court also overruled Ms. Hockridge’s objection to the use of acquitted
conduct—the conduct underlying the substantive counts of fraud on which she was
acquitted—to arrive at the total offense level. Compare Def.’s PSR Objs. (Doc. #298)
at 30, with Order (Doc # 353). The recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines
preclude the consideration of acquitted conduct “unless such conduct also establishes,
in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c). Ms.
Hockridge was acquitted of Counts Two through Five of the Superseding Indictment,
which included the allegation that she had executed the scheme to defraud described
in Count One of the Superseding Indictment. See Superseding Indictment (Doc. #163)
¶ 19. The conduct underlying the alleged execution of the scheme were considered in
determining the loss amount, despite the fact that those acts did not form any element
of the offense in Count One—which required only an agreement to commit fraud, not
any act in furtherance thereof. Since the Fifth Circuit has not yet definitively
interpreted the new Guidelines amendment regarding acquitted conduct, this novel
issue presents a substantial question on appeal. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d at 1024.

13. Even if the Court is not convinced that Ms. Hockridge will more likely than not

prevail on appeal on those or any other issue, it should recognize at least that the issues she raises

are either “novel” or “fairly doubtful,” such that a reasonable jurist could agree with her arguments.

See Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d at 1024. Even if the Court does not believe that any of its prior

rulings were in error, the mere existence of novel or doubtful questions such as those described

above are sufficient to permit Ms. Hockridge to be released on bail pending appeal.

WHEREFORE Defendant Stephanie Hockridge respectfully requests that the Court grant

her release pending appeal on conditions such as those she has observed since her conviction, that

it delay her report date until thirty days after any mandate of the Court of Appeals affirming her

conviction and sentence issues, and that the Court grant such other and further relief as it may

deem just and proper.

Dated: November 27, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP

/s/ Richard E. Finneran
RICHARD E. FINNERAN
MARK A. SRERE

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Case 4:24-cr-00287-O Document 369 Filed 11/27/25 Page 7 of 7 PageID 9464

KEVIN H. JENCO
211 North Broadway, Suite 3600
St. Louis, Missouri 63102
Tel: (314) 259-2000
Fax: (314) 259-2020
richard.finneran@bryancave.com
mark.srere@bryancave.com
kevin.jenco@bryancave.com

Attorneys for Defendant Stephanie Hockridge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 27th day of November, 2025, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served on all counsel of record by operation of the Court’s CM/ECF
system.
/s/ Richard E. Finneran
RICHARD E. FINNERAN

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

I hereby certify that on the 20th day of November, 2025, counsel for Ms. Hockridge
conferred via email with Assistant United States Attorney Matthew Weybrecht, who has indicated
that the Government opposes the relief sought herein.
/s/ Richard E. Finneran
RICHARD E. FINNERAN

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