United States v. Reis and Hockridge, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cr-00287-O, Doc. 265: Hockridge's motion for new trial (2025-07-28)
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Defendant Stephanie Hockridge's Motion for New Trial in United States v. Reis and Hockridge, Case No. 4:24-cr-00287-O, Document 265, filed July 28, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, the motion seeks a new trial on Count One of the Superseding Indictment. It argues grounds including government interference with defense witness Christabel Warzel, a false assurance that Hockridge was not a target, and a deliberate ignorance jury instruction. It also objects to the omission of requested theory-of-defense instructions and to rulings admitting coconspirator statements and spousal communications. The signature block names Richard E. Finneran of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP as attorney for Hockridge.
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“United States v. Reis and Hockridge, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cr-00287-O, Doc. 265: Hockridge's motion for new trial (2025-07-28).”
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Case 4:24-cr-00287-O Document 265 Filed 07/28/25 Page 1 of 10 PageID 5417
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Case No. 4:24 CR-00287-O
§
STEPHANIE HOCKRIDGE, a/k/a § (02)
STEPHANIE REIS, §
§
Defendant. §
DEFENDANT STEPHANIE HOCKRIDGE’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
COMES NOW Defendant Stephanie Hockridge, by and through the undersigned counsel,
and, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, moves for a new trial on Count One of the
Superseding Indictment. In support of the Motion, and as explained more fully in the
contemporaneously filed memorandum of law in support, Ms. Hockridge respectfully states:
1. In contrast to a motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29, a motion under Rule 33 “‘goes to the fairness of the trial rather than to the question
of guilt or innocence.’” United States v. McRae, 795 F.3d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations
omitted). Accordingly, “if a trial court concludes for any reason that the trial has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice,” Rule 33 vests “the court [with] broad powers to grant a new trial.” United
States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 574 (E.D. La. 2013) (emphasis added), aff’d, 799 F.3d 336
(5th Cir. 2015).
2. “Rule 33 is exercised in two situations. One is when error infects the trial—perhaps
the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, inflammatory comments by a lawyer, or faulty
jury instructions. The other is when the court believes the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
verdict.’” United States v. Crittenden, 46 F.4th 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2022).
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3. Here, both situations contemplated by the Fifth Circuit independently warrant a
new trial for Ms. Hockridge. As explained further below and in Ms. Hockridge’s
contemporaneously filed memorandum in support of her motion, those circumstances include
unconstitutional and improper conduct by the Government both before and during Ms.
Hockridge’s trial; the Government’s last-minute pivot to a deliberate ignorance theory at the end
of its case-in-chief; the Court’s decision not to provide several theory-of-defense instructions that
would have addressed the apparent confusion reflected by the jury’s inconsistent verdict; the
improper admission of inadmissible evidence over Ms. Hockridge’s objection; and the wrongful
exclusion of admissible evidence that would have undermined a finding of guilt on the sole count
of conviction, including the initial exclusion of evidence of Ms. Hockridge’s communications with
Eric Karnezis prior to and during his cross-examination, which had the effect of depriving Ms.
Hockridge of her rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
4. As Ms. Hockridge has further explained in her Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
and supporting memorandum, the Government failed to present evidence that, even drawing
reasonable inferences in its favor, was sufficient to persuade a rational factfinder beyond a
reasonable doubt of her knowing participation in the conspiracy charged in the Superseding
Indictment. But under Rule 33, the Court is not required to draw any inferences in the
Government’s favor; instead, it looks to the record as a whole, asking if the evidence weighs
heavily enough in the defendant’s favor that a new trial is “in the interest of justice.” Crittenden,
46 F.4th at 296.
5. That standard is readily satisfied here. See Mem. in Supp. § I. The evidence at trial
suggesting Ms. Hockridge’s knowledge of material falsity of any borrower applications at the time
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of their submission (rather than after-the-fact) was so sparse as to be incapable of persuading a
rational factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt that she had knowingly joined the conspiracy
alleged by the Government. Such a conclusion was also contradicted by the substantial evidence
of Ms. Hockridge’s considerable efforts to detect and reject fraudulent applications, including the
extensive record of written communications with the Government’s star witness, Eric Karnezis,
that directly contradicted his attempts to implicate Ms. Hockridge in his wrongdoing.
6. The Government further failed to establish that the vast majority of the applications
it introduced contained false statements, let alone material ones. As Special Agent Hagerman
admitted under cross-examination, the Government did not take the ordinary step of obtaining
bank records for most of the borrowers whose applications the Government claimed were
fraudulent, thereby failing to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that any changes to their loan
applications constituted false statements. And especially given that the Government’s own witness
acknowledged under oath that the Small Business Administration did not even look at borrower
applications to determine whether or not to approve the issuance of any loans, the Government did
not present evidence that any misstatements in borrower applications were material to the lending
decision. And even where the Government did present some evidence of falsehoods in borrower
applications, it altogether failed to present evidence that Ms. Hockridge knew that any such
statements were false at the time the applications were submitted.
7. The Government also failed to present evidence from which a jury could rationally
infer that a coconspirator committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy while present in the
Northern District of Texas. Although the Government belatedly acknowledged, the morning of
closing arguments, that venue was only proper if a coconspirator committed an act within this
judicial district in furtherance of the conspiracy, it failed to present evidence to establish venue
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here. The Government’s new theory, which it has evidently developed post-trial, that venue can
be established by a coconspirator’s causing an effect in the district has no support in the law of the
Fifth Circuit and would be contrary to the language of the Sixth Amendment itself, which requires
venue to be placed in the “district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. Const.
amend VI.
Witness Interference
8. Ms. Hockridge intended to call Christabel Warzel as a witness in her defense. Ms.
Warzel was a state prosecutor whom Ms. Hockridge hired to assist with loan processing, and whom
Ms. Hockridge instructed to be on the lookout for potential fraudulent applications. Had she
testified, Ms. Warzel would have informed the jury of the specific steps she took to carry out Ms.
Hockridge’s instructions and supported Ms. Hockridge’s defense that she had acted in good faith
with respect to the loan applications that passed through VIPPP.
9. As explained further in the accompanying memorandum, see Mem. in Supp. § II-A,
Ms. Warzel voluntarily met with the Government on the night of June 16, 2025. No fewer than six
Government representatives met with Ms. Warzel, showed her documents that she had never seen
before, and pressed her for her legal opinion as to whether Ms. Warzel would prosecute a case
based on the evidence presented to her during the meeting. There is no other plausible explanation
for why the Government would confront Ms. Warzel with such documents other than dissuade her
from offering favorable testimony in Ms. Hockridge’s case.
10. When Ms. Warzel’s attorney asked for clarification about the Government’s belief
as to Ms. Warzel’s potential culpability, the Government told Ms. Warzel that she was “not off the
hook,” and that she was closer to a “target” than a “witness.” The Government further suggested
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that Ms. Warzel’s testimony on behalf of Ms. Hockridge could lead to potential liability for Ms.
Warzel.
11. “Substantial government interference with a defense witness’ free and unhampered
choice to testify violates due process.” United States v. Anderson, 755 F.3d 782, 792 (5th Cir.
2014) (citation omitted). Here, the Government’s apparent efforts to intimidate Ms. Warzel on the
eve of her anticipated testimony violated Ms. Hockridge’s due process rights.
False Non-Target Assurance
12. Prior to trial, Ms. Hockridge filed a motion for a hearing regarding the
Government’s false assurance to her during its investigation that she was not a target of the
Government’s investigation. The Court reserved ruling on the motion until after trial. See Order
(Doc. #137) at 2–3. Based on the evidence adduced at trial regarding that issue (and other evidence
that Ms. Hockridge hopes to adduce at a hearing), the Government’s false assurance to her and its
subsequent use of statements she voluntarily made in reliance upon that false assurance, at the very
least merits a new trial, if not an outright dismissal with prejudice.1 Mem. in Supp. § II-B,
13. Ms. Hockridge voluntarily sat for a proffer interview with the Government on
March 21, 2023, pursuant to an assurance, provided both to her counsel prior to the interview and
to Ms. Hockridge at the outset of the interview itself, that she was not a target of the Government’s
investigation. But, at trial, Special Agent Colin Friedemann acknowledged that he had: (1) written
a memorandum in the month prior, in which he described Ms. Hockridge as a “target,” 6/13/25 Tr.
96:23–97:15; and (2) the day before the proffer, sworn out a warrant affidavit in which he accused
Ms. Hockridge of having committed federal crimes, 6/13/25 Tr. 98:19–25. Indeed, Special Agent
1
Ms. Hockridge has contemporaneously filed a motion renewing her request for an evidentiary
hearing on this particular issue.
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Friedeman testified that Ms. Hockridge became a focus of the Government’s investigation as early
as 2022, when Devin Hochberg approached the Government. 6/13/25 Tr. 90:22–91:22.
14. At trial, the Government successfully used Ms. Hockridge’s statements during her
proffer interview to preclude her from arguing that the Government had failed to present evidence
that she signed the 2020 Body Politix loan application. See 6/18/25 Tr. 40:13–41:4, 167:20–18,
171:12–19, 162:23–163:8, 172:20–76:12; 6/20/25 Tr. 82:18–24.
15. This Court has broad discretion to craft an appropriate remedy for prosecutorial
misconduct through a false non-target assurance. See United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796,
801–02 (7th Cir. 1992). At a minimum, a new trial—in which the Government would be precluded
from using Ms. Hockridge’s proffer statements, and any fruits of the investigation resulting from
Ms. Hockridge’s proffer interview, against her—is necessary to remedy the false non-target
assurance.
Last-Minute Shift to Deliberate Ignorance Theory
16. Over Ms. Hockridge’s objection, the Court provided the jury a “deliberate
ignorance” instruction, which the Government requested at the close of its case-in-chief, in an
abrupt departure from its longstanding theory that Ms. Hockridge had actual knowledge of the
alleged fraud. See Mem. in Supp. § III. That improper instruction merits a new trial, for several
reasons:
• First, as the Fifth Circuit has explicitly held, a “deliberate ignorance” instruction
cannot issue where, as here, the Government has alleged that a defendant had
actual knowledge of the alleged falsehoods. See United States v. Oti, 872 F.3d
678, 697–98 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Where the Government relies on evidence of actual
knowledge, the deliberate ignorance instruction is not appropriate.”).
• Second, the trial evidence failed to establish that Ms. Hockridge purposefully
contrived to avoid learning about illegal conduct, and the deliberate ignorance
instruction sowed confusion among the jurors regarding the Government’s
burden of proof.
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• Third, allowing the Government to shift its theory from actual knowledge to
deliberate ignorance, mid-trial, constituted a constructive amendment of (or fatal
variance from) the Superseding Indictment.
Failure to Provide Requested Theory-of-Defense Instructions
17. The jury convicted Ms. Hockridge of conspiracy, but it acquitted her on four counts
that the Government alleged were part of the same conspiracy. There is only one reasonable
explanation for the inconsistent verdict: the jury did not understand the law of conspiracy.
18. Before trial, Ms. Hockridge requested several instructions that the Court omitted
from its jury charge. Each of the omitted instructions were correct statements of the law, would
have mitigated the risk of juror confusion, and likely would have resulted in an acquittal. See Mem.
in Supp. § IV.
19. Those instructions included (1) an instruction that mere knowledge, mere
association, mere marriage, and mere similarity are not sufficient to establish proof of the existence
of a conspiracy, or a defendant’s participation in a conspiracy; (2) an instruction on the law of
multiple conspiracies, and the government’s burden of proof to establish that Ms. Hockridge
knowingly joined a specific conspiracy, such that she would not be impermissibly convicted based
on mere transference of guilt; (3) instructions that the jury should not speculate as to the contents
of any spousal communications and that it not draw an inference against Ms. Hockridge simply
because Mr. Reis did not testify at trial; (4) instructions concerning Ms. Hockridge’s reasonable
reliance on SBA guidance and borrower certifications; and (5) an instruction on venue that
correctly required the jury to find that an overt act must have been committed by a coconspirator
within the district before it could convict her of conspiracy.
20. Because the Court’s decision not to give the requested instructions materially
impaired her ability to present a defense, Ms. Hockridge is entitled to a new trial.
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Evidentiary Rulings Resulting in an Unfair Trial
21. The Court also improperly admitted, over Ms. Hockridge’s objection, statements
that should not have been admitted because (1) the Government failed to establish that the
statements satisfied the requirements for the admission of coconspirator statements under Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and/or (2) the statements were confidential marital communications
protected by the spousal communications privilege, which, contrary to the Court’s pretrial ruling,
is a distinct protection from the spousal testimonial privilege. See Mem. in Supp. § V-A.
22. With respect to the purported coconspirator statements, the lion’s share of the
evidence offered against Ms. Hockridge constituted hearsay that did not satisfy the requirements
for admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Many of the statements were admitted
even though they did not meaningfully advance the particular conspiracy they purportedly
supported. Additionally, numerous such statements that plainly did not further any conspiracy
were admitted into evidence.
23. With respect to the admitted spousal communications, the Government introduced
numerous private communications between Ms. Hockridge and her husband Mr. Reis based upon
the Court’s pretrial ruling that the spousal communications privilege applied only to in-court
testimony, not to out-of-court marital communications. Order (Doc. #137) at 5. The admission of
such evidence was contrary to the well-settled precedent that written “marital communications are
‘presumptively confidential,” extending the communications privilege to out-of-court statements
by either spouse. United States v. Livingston, 272 F. App’x 315, 316 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted).
24. Finally, the Court’s belated admission of certain evidence that supported her
contention that she had acted in good faith with respect to her administration of VIPPP deprived
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Ms. Hockridge of a fair trial. See Mem. in Supp. § V-B. Ms. Hockridge sought—from the outset
of trial—to introduce evidence of her ongoing efforts to detect and reject fraudulent loan
applications. She was denied that opportunity.
25. On the fifth—and last—day of the Government’s case-in-chief, the Court reversed
its prior exclusionary ruling and allowed Ms. Hockridge to introduce a limited number of
exculpatory statements that directly rebutted the self-serving testimony of the Government’s
principal witness, Eric Karnezis. The Court, however, rejected Ms. Hockridge’s request to
introduce additional, materially exculpatory evidence. That error deprived Ms. Hockridge of her
right to mount an effective defense. More problematically, by belatedly admitting the few
statements related to Eric Karnezis, the Court deprived Ms. Hockridge of the ability to effectively
confront Karnezis when he was on the stand, in violation of her Sixth Amendment rights.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
26. Although Ms. Hockridge recognizes that it is uncommon for a court to grant a new
trial after a guilty verdict in a criminal case, the unique circumstances of Ms. Hockridge’s case cry
out for relief. Any of the circumstances described above and in the accompanying memorandum
would have been sufficient on their own to justify a new trial; taken together, they necessitate one.
Allowing Ms. Hockridge’s conviction to stand on the sole count of the Superseding Indictment
upon which the jury returned a guilty verdict, when so many circumstances call into serious
question the fairness of her trial, would work a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ms. Hockridge
therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant her a new trial.
WHEREFORE Defendant Stephanie Hockridge prays that the Court grant her Motion for
a New Trial on Count One of the Superseding Indictment and grant such other and further relief
as the Court deems just and proper.
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Case 4:24-cr-00287-O Document 265 Filed 07/28/25 Page 10 of 10 PageID 5426
Dated: July 28, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP
/s/ Richard E. Finneran
RICHARD E. FINNERAN
MARK A. SRERE
KEVIN H. JENCO
211 North Broadway, Suite 3600
St. Louis, Missouri 63102
Tel: (314) 259-2000
Fax: (314) 259-2020
richard.finneran@bclplaw.com
mark.srere@bclplaw.com
kevin.jenco@bclplaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant Stephanie Hockridge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 28, 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was served on all counsel of record by operation of the Court’s CM/ECF system.
/s/ Richard E. Finneran
RICHARD E. FINNERAN
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