United States v. Karnezis, Williams, Wells and Bennett, ord No. 3:23-cr-00067, ECF 193: Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Williams's motion to suppress
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An Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant Williams's Motion to Suppress, Document 193 in United States v. Karnezis, Williams, Wells and Bennett, No. 3:23-cr-00067-IM, in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, filed July 31, 2026. The opinion states that Williams moves to suppress statements made to law enforcement agents during a post-indictment custodial interrogation. The Court concludes that some asserted invocations of the right to counsel were equivocal or not invocations, and that Williams later invoked the right without limitation. The conclusion states that statements after page 77 of the interview transcript made in response to questions concerning bank accounts, and all statements after page 168, are suppressed.
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“United States v. Karnezis, Williams, Wells and Bennett, ord No. 3:23-cr-00067, ECF 193: Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Williams's motion to suppress.”
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Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 193 Filed 07/31/26 Page 1 of 30
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 3:23-cr-00067-IM
v. OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
ERIC KARNEZIS, FREDRICO DEFENDANT WILLIAMS’S MOTION
WILLIAMS, LYNISHA WELLS, and TO SUPPRESS
NIKKIA BENNETT,
Defendants.
Meredith D.M. Bateman, Christopher L. Cardani, William M. Narus, James A. Killcup, Nicholas
D. Meyers & Suzanne A. Miles, Assistant United States Attorneys, 1000 SW Third Avenue,
Suite 600, Portland, OR 97204. Attorneys for the United States of America.
Ernest Warren, Jr., Warren & Sugarman, 838 SW 1st Ave, Suite 200, Portland, OR 97204.
Attorney for Defendant Fredrico Williams.
IMMERGUT, District Judge.
A grand jury indicted Defendants Eric Karnezis, Fredrico Williams, Lynisha Wells, and
Nikkia Bennett on charges of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18
U.S.C. § 1349, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), for their
involvement in the submission of fraudulent loan applications through the Paycheck Protection
Program (“PPP”). Redacted Superseding Indictment (“Superseding Indictment”), ECF 31 ¶¶ 1–2,
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47–227. Williams now moves to suppress statements that he made to law enforcement agents
during a post-indictment custodial interrogation. Motion to Suppress (“Motion”), ECF 153.
Although Williams raises “five independent constitutional and statutory grounds” to
suppress these statements, id. at 5, the crux of his motion is that the government violated his
constitutional right to counsel by continuing to question him after he invoked his right to
counsel. Williams argues that during his custodial interrogation, he “attempted to invoke his
right to counsel no fewer than twelve separate times.” Id. The government counters that Williams
“overstates what the transcript shows.” Response to Motion to Suppress (“Response”), ECF 162,
at 5. This Court agrees with the government that several of Williams’s asserted invocations of his
right to counsel were either “equivocal” requests that did not require questioning to end, or were
not invocations at all. Michaels v. Davis, 51 F.4th 904, 922 (9th Cir. 2022); Response, ECF 162,
at 5 (describing statements as not “unequivocal”).
However, certain invocations of his right to counsel during the interrogation were “clear
and unambiguous.” Sessoms v. Grounds, 776 F.3d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 2015). Some of these
invocations were “selective invocations of Miranda,” which require suppression only “with
respect to the subject matter . . . as to which the suspect invoked the right.” Michaels, 51 F.4th at
921–22. But Williams eventually invoked his right to counsel without limitation when he asked,
“Can I call my attorney?” Williams Interview Transcript (“Williams Tr.”) 168:25, ECF 162-1 at
168. At this point, “questioning should have stopped until an attorney was present.” Smith v.
Endell, 860 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9th Cir. 1988).
Because federal agents continued to question Williams after this point, any statements
that Williams made during the remainder of the interrogation must be suppressed. In addition,
any statements that Williams made concerning subjects for which he selectively invoked his
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Miranda rights must also be suppressed. But as to the remainder of statements that Williams
made during the interrogation, the government did not obtain them in violation of Miranda. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Williams’s remaining arguments for the suppression
of his statements and any “derivative evidence,” Motion, ECF 153 at 5, lack merit. Williams also
requests an evidentiary hearing on various alleged factual disputes, id. at 6, but Williams fails to
demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing is warranted to resolve any factual issues.
On July 15, 2026, this Court held a combined hearing on Williams’s Motion to Suppress,
ECF 153, and Motion to Compel, ECF 152, and took the motions under advisement. ECF 191.
After reviewing the pleadings and considering the arguments of counsel at the hearing, this Court
GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Williams’s Motion to Suppress, ECF 153.
Williams’s Motion to Compel is addressed in a separate opinion. ECF 192.
BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s Arrest and Interview
On March 7, 2023, a grand jury charged Fredrico Williams with one count of conspiracy
to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
Redacted Indictment, ECF 1 ¶¶ 11–53. On March 21, 2023, at around 9:30 a.m., six federal
agents arrested Williams in San Diego County, California. Motion, ECF 153 at 6. The agents
transported Williams to the IRS facility in the Federal Building, Pasquale Declaration, ECF 190-
1 ¶ 6, and according to Williams, the agents told him during the car ride: “They don’t want
you—they want Karnezis.” 1 Motion to Compel, ECF 152 at 4.
1
The government states it “has no discovery related to the transfer of [Williams] from his arrest
location to his interview location.” Amended Response to Motion to Compel, ECF 166 at 21.
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At the IRS facility, the same six federal agents conducted a recorded interview of
Williams, which took place between 10:46 AM and 2:03 PM. Motion, ECF 153 at 7. At the
outset of the interview, Special Agent Andrew Hamilton Smith administered Miranda warnings
to Williams. Williams Tr. 3:15–4:1, ECF 162-1 at 3–4. After these warnings were given, the
following exchange occurred::
SMITH: [Y]ou may waive your right to advice of counsel and your right to remain silent,
and you may answer questions to make a statement without consulting a lawyer if you so
desire. So you don’t have any issue with talking to us; right?
WILLIAMS: No, I don’t have an issue, but I would like to --
SPECIAL AGENT KRISTOPHER PASQUALE: At the end of the day, like, what we
were trying to talk about in the car and help you understand is that there are many layers
above you and this is that opportunity that we have. We won’t have a future opportunity,
most likely, to be able to discuss with you those most important things.
Id. 4:2–14.
Agent Pasquale proceeded to explain the value of cooperation, and at the end of the
explanation, Williams responded, “Yeah. That’s fine.” Id. 4:15–5:11. Agent Smith soon after
explained to Williams, “And if there’s any questions you don’t want to answer, you can just say,
‘I don’t want to answer that.’ Does that make sense?” Id. 5:16–18. Williams responded, “Yeah.”
Id. 5:19. At that point, the agents provided Williams with a written Miranda waiver form, which
Williams signed. Signed Miranda Waiver (“Waiver”), Ex. 3, ECF 162-2; see Williams Interview
Video (“Williams Video”) 3:48–4:06, Ex. 2, ECF 163; Williams Tr. 6:13–14, ECF 162-1 at 6.
Federal agents commenced the interrogation by asking Williams about businesses that he
owned. Williams admitted that he submitted PPP loan applications for two of his businesses and
these loans were approved for around $145,000 and $147,000. Williams Tr. 12:25–14:11, ECF
162-1 at 12–14; id. 18:7–14. Williams confirmed that he did not pay payroll taxes or file
documentation with the IRS for these two businesses. Id. 14:25–15:3. Williams explained how
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he had to pay “a third” of his PPP loan proceeds to either codefendant Karnezis or alleged
coconspirator Bayless Cobb. Id. 20:22–21:16. Williams also admitted that in his two applications
for COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loans (“EIDL”), he overstated each business’s
revenue. Id. 26:11–30:11; 36:21–37:13. Both applications were approved, and Wiliams received
two EIDLs of around $150,000 and $30,000. Id. 31:23–32:3; 35:13–19. With the money that he
received from PPP loans and EIDLs, Williams purchased cars for himself, his son, and his
daughter. Id. 33:5–34:20. Williams insisted that these cars were purchased for business purposes
to list on Turo, the “Airbnb for cars.” Id. 33:5–34:20.
The interrogation proceeded to delve into Williams’s businesses in greater detail. At the
end of this discussion, Williams made the following confessions regarding his loan applications:
PASQUALE: And you know that what was being applied for wasn’t going to be accurate
because your business didn’t have these revenues. They didn’t have any cost. It didn’t
have employees. They weren’t reporting any payroll. They weren’t paying taxes. You
knew none of this was going to be accurate; correct?
WILLIAMS: Yeah. I didn’t even think about any of that because --
PASQUALE: You saw, “Hey, this is free money, and it will be forgiven. We will be
good”?
WILLIAMS: Yeah.
PASQUALE: “And because I’m giving them this third of it, they’re going to make sure
it’s taken care of”?
WILLIAMS: Yeah.
PASQUALE: Is that accurate? I want you to be able to describe it, right, in your own
words?
WILLIAMS: Yeah. That’s dead-on.
Id. 69:23–70:17. Soon after these confessions, the agents stopped to take a break. Id. 75:23–76:3.
During the break, Williams said, “But so I do not -- because I forget who it was earlier, but I was
asking, when do I get to -- I have no problem with talking to you about any of this.” Id. 76:4–6.
When the questioning resumed, federal agents and Williams had the following exchange:
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SPECIAL AGENT BRIAN BERTNIK: All I want to do is go through and talk about
your EIDLs and say, “Hey, did this one go into this account?” Boom. “Did this one go
into this account?” We kind of already talked about it, but I’m just looking at the actual --
PASQUALE: And if you don’t want to go into the bank accounts, you’re, like “I don’t
want to answer those questions,” then you don’t have to answer the questions.
BERTNIK: Yeah. We can move on.
PASQUALE: You’re perfectly in your right to say that.
WILLIAMS: I would prefer to do that with my attorney.
Id. 77:9–23. Despite this request, federal agents later questioned Williams about information
relating to his bank accounts. For example, Agent Pasquale asked, “So in the accounts, there’s a
bunch of money coming from other people to you. Are those people who received PPP loans?”
83:12–15. Agent Pasquale also asked, “They would pay you directly, all that money would come
into your account, and then you would consolidate it and send it where?” Id. 85:10–13. When
Agent Pasquale later inquired about Williams’s purchase of a business, Pasquale asked, “What
bank account did you pay it from?” Id. 138:17–18.
However, immediately after Williams requested counsel with respect to his bank
accounts, agents shifted their focus onto Eric Karnezis and Bayless Cobb. Id. 77:24–79:9.
Williams explained how individuals requested PPP loans through Karnezis and Cobb.
Individuals would fill out a spreadsheet with personal information, including their first name, last
name, social security number, date of birth, and bank account information, and then they would
send the spreadsheets to an email address associated with Bayless Cobb, who would in turn send
that information to Eric Karnezis. Id. 78:14–79:9; 94:20–95:10; 98:3–19. Williams estimated that
“[i]n the sphere of people” that he knew, about 30 or more individuals requested PPP loans from
Bayless Cobb. Id. 80:6–81:12. Williams also admitted that he helped facilitate the movement of
money for about 15 of these individuals and that Karnezis and Cobb paid him a flat “finder’s
fee” of $5,000 per person. Id. 84:25–87:1. Williams explained how the scheme operated in
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detail, including codefendant Nikkia Bennett’s role in completing and sending spreadsheets. Id.
87:2–100:10.
After questioning Williams about his communications with Karnezis and Cobb, the
federal agents asked to make a “digital copy” of Williams’s phone. Id. 122:13–123:11. Williams
replied, “I think for that one, I would want to ask my attorney, if that’s okay. But as far as the
messages from Eric and Bayless, I can show you that.” Id. 123:12–15. But before Williams
showed any messages, the agents took a break, and Williams asked, “Do you know if at some
point I get to call my attorney, or is that something later?” Id. 130:10–11. An agent responded:
SPECIAL AGENT JOHN PELLEY: I mean, that’s, again, totally up to you. It’s
obviously your right as a, you know, American citizen. It’s your right to an attorney at
any point. So I think the thing is, we just kind of want to get through this high-level stuff.
But obviously, again, if at any point you want to call anyone or your attorney, whenever.
Id. 130:12–18. In response, Williams did not make any request for an attorney. Id. 130:19–21.
After the break, federal agents again asked to copy the contents of Williams’s phone, but
Williams reiterated, “I just need to make sure that, you know, if my attorney was to say, ‘You
can give him this,’ I would feel more comfortable[.]” Id. 132:9–18. The agents then asked
Williams to pull up various text messages on his phone so the agents could photograph them. Id.
132:19–133:2. But first, the agents continued questioning Williams about the flow of money in
the scheme, and at one point, Agent Pasquale asked Williams, “Well, did you use the PPP money
specifically to buy those three cars? Are you sure of that?” Id. 148:17–19. Williams responded,
“No. That I will leave for when the attorney comes in.” Id. 148:20–21. The agents also asked
Williams about his familiarity with several individuals who sent him money or to whom he sent
money, including codefendant Lynisha Wells, who submitted her application through Bennett.
Id. 152:6–168:6.
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Following this discussion, Williams asked, “Can I call my attorney?” Id. 168:25. Agent
Pasquale explained the booking process to Williams, after which agents asked Williams to sign a
waiver to allow them to search his phone. Id. 169:1–174:15. Before signing the waiver, Williams
appeared to question the scope of the waiver and asked, “Do you mind if I call the attorney real
quick?” Id. 174:16–17. After a brief discussion regarding the waiver, the agents allowed
Williams to add additional language to the waiver so that he would agree to sign it, and then the
agents took photos of messages on Williams’s phone. Id. 175:1–177:18. After Agent Smith
asked Williams to “[p]ull up Bayless’ contact,” Williams again said, “Can I call my attorney
from --”. Id. 177:17–21. Agent Pasquale interrupted, “You absolutely can.” Id. 177:22.
But agents continued to take photos of messages and spreadsheets on Williams’s phone
and asked him related questions. Id. 177:3–184:10. When agents asked Williams to send them a
spreadsheet over email, Williams again asked, “[C]an I call my attorney?” Id. 184:25–185:1.
Agents told him, “You can call your attorney,” but they asked him to first send the spreadsheet.
Id. 185:2–6. Due to technical difficulties, Williams was unable to send the spreadsheet, and once
again asked, “Can I just call my attorney real quick?” Id. 185:7–186:16. After this fifth request,
agents ended the interrogation and allowed Williams to call his attorney. Id. 186:17–187:12.
After the interview, Williams was transported to San Diego County jail, where he was
held overnight. Motion, ECF 153 at 12. The next morning on March 22, 2023, Williams was
booked into jail, and the next day, he was presented to a magistrate judge. Id. According to the
government, “[t]his delay was not caused by a desire to interrogate defendant [Williams] but
rather jail and district-required protocol for processing and booking.” Response, ECF 162 at 20
n.4.
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B. Superseding Indictment
On August 21, 2024, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment, charging Eric
Karnezis, Fredrico Williams, Lynisha Wells, and Nikkia Bennett with one count of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, twenty-one counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S. § 1343, and one
count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Superseding Indictment,
ECF 31 ¶¶ 47–227. The grand jury found probable cause that between January 2021 and March
2022, Defendants defrauded the Small Business Administration out of millions of dollars by
submitting fraudulent PPP loan applications. Id. ¶ 1. Karnezis conspired with “recruiters,”
including Williams, to gather false business information from “customers,” such as Wells, and to
submit PPP applications using fabricated documents on behalf of the customers. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.
On March 20, 2025, Karnezis pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. Plea Petition and Order Entering Plea as to Defendant
Eric Karnezis, ECF 86. The remaining three defendants filed motions to sever their joint trial.
Williams Motion to Sever, ECF 110; Bennett Corrected Motion to Sever, ECF 115; Wells
Motion to Sever, ECF 119. On January 9, 2026, this Court denied the motions, ECF 146.
C. Motion to Suppress
On March 16, 2026, Defendant Williams filed a Motion to Suppress, ECF 153. 2 In his
Motion, Williams asserts that during the car ride between his arrest and his recorded
interrogation, “before any Miranda warnings were administered, agents engaged Mr. Williams in
substantive conversation about the investigation.” Motion, ECF 153 at 7. Based on this assertion,
this Court ordered the government to be prepared at the scheduled July 15, 2026 hearing “to call
2
On June 19, 2026, Williams filed a sur-reply in support of his Motion to Suppress. ECF 184.
Although Williams did not seek leave of court before filing a sur-reply, this Court takes notice of
it because it does not alter this Court’s analysis and therefore does not prejudice the government.
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a witness with knowledge of any discussion that occurred during the car ride following
Williams’s arrest and prior to his interrogation.” ECF 187. However, this Court “reserve[d]
ruling on Williams’s request for an evidentiary hearing.” Id.
Prior to the July 15, 2026 hearing, the government filed a Notice Regarding Witness
Availability (“Notice”), ECF 190, and attached a declaration of Agent Pasquale, ECF 190-1. In
the declaration, Agent Pasquale states that while present in the car during Williams’s transport,
neither he nor any other federal officer “ask[ed] [Williams] substantive investigative questions
about the charged conduct, including questions about PPP applications, EIDL applications, PPP
forgiveness applications, loan proceeds, supporting documents, employee accounts, payroll,
gross revenues, cost of goods sold, bank accounts, any co-conspirator, or defendant’s
involvement in the alleged offense conduct.” Pasquale Declaration, ECF 190-1 ¶¶ 10–11.
Moreover, Pasquale states that during the transport, Williams “did not confess to the charged
conduct,” “did not admit involvement in the charged conduct,” and “did not make any
spontaneous incriminating admissions regarding the charged conduct.” Id. ¶¶ 12–14.
DISCUSSION
Williams raises five arguments for the suppression of the March 21, 2023 interrogation:
(1) “the entire interview must be suppressed under the Sixth Amendment,” (2) “all statements
after the first invocation must be suppressed under Edwards v. Arizona,” (3) “pre-Miranda
statements must be suppressed under Missouri v. Seibert,” (4) “statements obtained during
unreasonable delay must be suppressed under [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 5 and Corley
v. United States,” and (5) “the AUSA’s secret presence constitutes prosecutorial participation in
constitutional violations.” Motion, ECF 153 at 13, 15, 18, 20, 22 (citation modified).
With respect to (1), Williams’s argument that the government violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is coextensive to his argument in (2) that the government violated
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his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. With respect to (2), this Court finds that although
Williams did not invoke his right to counsel at the outset of the interrogation, Williams did make
a selective invocation of his right to counsel on page 77 of the interview transcript, pertaining to
discussion of his bank accounts. Therefore, any statements that Williams subsequently made in
response to questions concerning his bank accounts must be suppressed. Moreover, Williams
invoked his right to counsel without subject-matter limitation on page 168, and thus any
statements that Williams made after this point must be suppressed in their entirety.
With respect to Williams’s three remaining arguments for suppression, all three are
unavailing. First, there is no indication that a prior interrogation occurred during Williams’s car
ride that would require the suppression of the recorded interrogation under Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600 (2004). Second, because the recorded interrogation took place within six hours of
Williams’s arrest, any voluntary statements that Williams made fall under the safe harbor
established in 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) and should not be suppressed under Corley v. United States,
556 U.S. 303 (2009). Third, Williams points to no legal authority to support his request for
suppression based on a federal prosecutor’s unannounced presence during an interrogation.
Finally, Williams requests an evidentiary hearing to address various alleged factual
disputes. As to some of these disputes, they are not material to the suppression of his statements,
and thus, an evidentiary hearing is unwarranted. As to other disputes, Williams has not “allege[d]
facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to conclude that
contested issues of fact exist.” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000).
A. Sixth Amendment Claim
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant “the right to have counsel present
at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786
(2009) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227–228 (1967)). “Interrogation by the
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[government] is such a stage.” Id. Therefore, a defendant has the “right to have the assistance of
counsel at his postindictment interviews with law enforcement authorities.” Patterson v. Illinois,
487 U.S. 285, 290 (1988). Under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the government
may not use at trial a defendant’s self-incriminating statements that “federal agents . . .
deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.”
Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (citation modified) (quoting Massiah, 377
U.S. at 206).
However, “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long
as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786.
“As a general matter,” a defendant “who is admonished with [Miranda] warnings . . . has been
sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of
abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and
intelligent one.” Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296. As the Supreme Court explained in Montejo, “the
right to have counsel during custodial interrogation” is “guaranteed (once the adversary judicial
process has begun) by two sources of law,” the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment.
Montejo, 556 U.S. at 795. Consequently, the right to counsel “under both sources is waived using
the same procedure,” and “doctrines ensuring voluntariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver
simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver.” Id. (emphasis added).
Williams overlooks these governing legal principles pertaining to waiver of his Sixth
Amendment rights when he argues that because he “was already indicted when the interview
began, the entire interview — from the first word to the last — was obtained in violation of the
Sixth Amendment.” Motion, ECF 153 at 15. Of course, Williams is correct that during his
interrogation, “the government ‘deliberately elicited’ incriminating statements from [him] after
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the right to counsel attached.” Id. at 14 (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206). But as noted above, a
defendant who waives his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda likewise waives his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 3 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296; Montejo, 556 U.S. at 795.
Therefore, Williams’s Sixth Amendment claim rises and falls with his Fifth Amendment claim
that the government violated his Miranda rights by continuing to question him after he invoked
his right to counsel multiple times. See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298 (“[W]hatever warnings suffice
for Miranda’s purposes will also be sufficient in the context of postindictment questioning.”).
Williams resists this conclusion by citing Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004),
Williams Reply in Support of Motion to Suppress (“Reply”), ECF 172 at 7–8, but Fellers
concerned self-incriminating statements made before a defendant received Miranda warnings.
Fellers, 540 U.S. at 521. In Fellers, the defendant spoke with law enforcement officers at his
home without receiving Miranda warnings. Id. Law enforcement officers did not Mirandize the
defendant until they transported him to the county jail, at which point the defendant “signed a
Miranda waiver form.” Id. at 521–22. Since the discussion that occurred at the defendant’s home
occurred after he “had been indicted, outside the presence of counsel, and in the absence of any
waiver of [his] Sixth Amendment rights,” the Supreme Court concluded that the officers
“violate[d] the Sixth Amendment standards established in Massiah[.]” Id. at 524–25 (emphasis
3
The Supreme Court has qualified this general rule and recognized that not “all Sixth
Amendment challenges to the conduct of postindictment questioning will fail whenever the
challenged practice would pass constitutional muster under Miranda.” Patterson, 487 U.S. 285 at
296 n.9. For example, “where a suspect was not told that his lawyer was trying to reach him
during questioning,” the Supreme Court found that the Miranda waiver would be valid under the
Fifth Amendment, but not under the Sixth Amendment. Id. “Likewise a surreptitious
conversation between an undercover police officer and an unindicted suspect would not give rise
to any Miranda violation as long as the ‘interrogation’ was not in a custodial setting; however,
once the accused is indicted, such questioning would be prohibited.” Id. Neither situation is
present here.
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added). Unlike in Fellers, here Williams does not seek to suppress statements that he made in the
absence of a Miranda waiver. Federal agents Mirandized him at the outset of the custodial
interrogation, and he waived his Miranda rights, as discussed below. Williams Tr. 3:15–5:11,
ECF 162-1 at 3–4. In short, Fellers does not relieve Williams from the general rule that a valid
Miranda waiver is a valid Sixth Amendment waiver.
B. Miranda Violations
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that a “suspect subject to custodial interrogation has
the right to consult with an attorney and to have counsel present during questioning, and that the
police must explain this right to him before questioning begins.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, 457 (1994). In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme Court further held
that the Miranda right to counsel “requires the special protection of the knowing and intelligent
waiver standard.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (citation modified) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 483).
However, “an express verbal or written waiver is not required.” Burney v. Broomfield, 175 F.4th
1089, 1114 (9th Cir. 2026); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (“The
prosecution . . . does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express.”). “A
suspect may waive his rights when,” for example, “he received and understood the Miranda
warnings, did not invoke his Miranda rights, and implicitly waived the rights by making an
uncoerced statement to the police.” Burney, 175 F.4th at 1114 (citation modified).
Even if a suspect initially waives his right to counsel after receiving Miranda warnings, if
the suspect later “requests an attorney during a custodial interrogation, ‘he is not subject to
further questioning until a lawyer has been made available.’” Tobias v. Arteaga, 996 F.3d 571,
580 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 458). To invoke his right to counsel during
interrogation, “the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. Once
an unambiguous request for counsel is made, “responses to further questioning cannot be used to
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cast doubt upon the adequacy of his initial request.” Smith, 860 F.2d at 1529. “But if a suspect
makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in
light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the
right to counsel,” then officers do not have to stop their questioning. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459
(emphasis in original).
In this case, Williams’s purported invocations of his right to counsel require careful
parsing because each involves different considerations. First, as a preliminary matter, Williams
both expressly and implicitly waived his rights after he received Miranda warnings. Although
Williams argues that his Miranda waiver was invalid due to Agent Pasquale’s interruption of an
alleged invocation, Williams expressly waived his rights when he signed the written Miranda
waiver form. Even assuming Williams’s express waiver was somehow defective, Williams
implicitly waived his Miranda rights by answering agents’ initial questions after he signed the
waiver form. Second, Williams’s later invocation of his right to counsel, “I would prefer to do
that with my attorney,” was an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel with respect to his
bank accounts. Williams Tr. 77:22–23, ECF 162-1 at 77. Therefore, any subsequent statements
that Williams made in response to questions concerning his bank accounts must be suppressed.
Third, Williams repeatedly made blanket invocations of his right to counsel near the end of the
interrogation. Any statements that Williams made after the first of these invocations must also be
suppressed. Williams Tr. 168:25, ECF 162-1 at 168; Williams Video 2:51:40–44, ECF 163.
1. Initial Waiver of Miranda Rights
The government has met its “heavy burden” of demonstrating that Williams waived his
Miranda rights at the start of the interrogation. Rodriguez v. McDonald, 872 F.3d 908, 922 (9th
Cir. 2017). After Mirandizing Williams, Agent Smith asked, “So you don’t have any issue
talking to us; right?” Williams Tr. 4:5–6, ECF 162-1 at 4. Williams responded, “No, I don’t have
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an issue, but I would like to --,” but before he completed his sentence, Agent Pasquale started
speaking. Williams Tr. 4:7–8. Williams argues that the interruption prevented him from invoking
his right to counsel. Reply, ECF 172 at 9–10. According to Williams, “[t]here is no innocent
completion of that sentence fragment that does not involve a request for counsel.” Id. But
Williams’s post hoc speculation cannot negate his subsequent signing of a written Miranda
waiver form. Waiver, Ex. 3, ECF 162-2. Williams does not contend that either the verbal or
written warnings failed to “reasonably convey to [him] his rights as required by Miranda.”
Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1002 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,
203 (1989)). Nor could he because they fully apprise him of his rights. Therefore, the
interruption does not negate the validity of Williams’s signed waiver form.
In any event, “an express verbal or written waiver is not required,” and here Williams
also implicitly waived his rights. Burney, 175 F.4th at 1114. Williams does not dispute that “he
received and understood the Miranda warnings.” Id. (citation modified). Although he disputes
whether Agent Pasquale prevented him from invoking his right to counsel by interrupting him, it
is clear that the words he actually spoke, “No, I don’t have an issue, but I would like to --,” do
not constitute an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. Williams Tr. 4:7–8. And because
Williams did not invoke his Miranda rights after receiving and understanding verbal and written
Miranda warnings, he “implicitly waived [his] rights by making . . . uncoerced statement[s] to
the [agents]” following these warnings. Burney, 175 F.4th at 1114 (citation modified).
Williams quotes Smith v. Endell, 860 F.2d 1528, 1530 (9th Cir. 1988), for the proposition
that law enforcement officers cannot “prevent a suspect from making an unambiguous request
for counsel by cutting him off.” Reply, ECF 172 at 9. But neither this quote nor the underlying
proposition appears in Smith. Rather, Smith concerned the application of two black-letter legal
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principles relating to the validity of a defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights: (1) “A
suspect’s responses to further questioning cannot be used to cast doubt upon the adequacy of his
initial request;” and (2) “When the initial request is ambiguous or equivocal, all questioning must
cease, except inquiry strictly limited to clarifying the request.” 4 Smith, 860 F.2d at 1529.
As to (1), the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant “Smith’s initial request for counsel
was not equivocal or ambiguous.” Id. at 1531. Indeed, Smith unequivocally and unambiguously
requested a lawyer when he asked: “Can I talk to a lawyer?” Id. at 1529, 1531. Smith did follow
up this question with the following statements: “At this point, I think maybe you’re looking at
me as a suspect, and I should talk to a lawyer. Are you looking at me as a suspect?” Id. at 1529.
But as the Ninth Circuit explained, although this request was a “conditional” one, “the
investigators knew the condition to be satisfied,” and thus, “questioning should have stopped
until an attorney was present[.]” Id. at 1531–32. In light of this valid invocation, the Ninth
Circuit faulted the trial court for relying on subsequent statements made by Smith to cast doubt
on the invocation. Id. at 1532 n.3. As to (2), the Ninth Circuit found that even if Smith’s request
“were regarded as in some way ambiguous or equivocal,” the officers ran afoul of the rule that
“an equivocal request for counsel permits the police only to ask the suspect questions that seek to
clarify” his request. Id. at 1532–33. Instead of clarifying, the officers “repeated recitations of the
circumstances tying Smith to the murders [that] did nothing to clarify Smith’s desire for
counsel.” Id. at 1533.
4
In United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit recognized that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 457 (1994), “abrogated our
clarification rule only to the extent that our rule required clarification of invocations made post-
waiver.” Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1080. However, to the extent this rule “requires pre-waiver
clarification of a suspect’s wishes concerning his Miranda rights, it has not been superseded by
Davis.” Id. Thus, “[p]rior to obtaining an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver, a duty rests with
the interrogating officer to clarify any ambiguity before beginning general interrogation.” Id.
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Unlike in Smith, here Williams cannot claim that he made any request for his attorney
after being read his Miranda rights, let alone a request that was unequivocal and unambiguous.
In fact, before the interruption, Williams stated that he did not have an issue with talking to the
agents. After Agent Smith asked, “So you don’t have any issue with talking to us; right?”
Williams Tr. 4:5–6, ECF 162-1 at 4, Williams responded, “No, I don’t have an issue.” Id. 4:7–8.
Although Williams proceeded to say, “but I would like to,” before being interrupted, id. 4:8, he
never mentioned anything about contacting an attorney. As the Supreme Court has made clear,
“[i]nvocation of the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’” Davis,
512 U.S. at 459 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)). Williams did not even
mention an “attorney” or “counsel” in his cutoff sentence, and he relies on speculation to claim
that he was attempting to invoke his right to counsel. Speculation cannot transform his statement
into one that a reasonable officer would interpret as “an expression of a desire for the assistance
of an attorney.” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178.
And because Williams did not provide an equivocal or ambiguous invocation of his right
to counsel after he was Mirandized, federal agents did not have “a duty . . . to clarify any
ambiguity before beginning general interrogation.” Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1080. While “an
equivocal request for counsel permits the police only to ask the suspect questions that seek to
clarify,” Smith, 860 F.2d at 1533, here Williams made no request at all, whether equivocal or
unequivocal. Perhaps recognizing that Smith does not support his argument, Williams resorts to
providing a non-existent quotation from the case: “The Ninth Circuit held that officers cannot
‘prevent a suspect from making an unambiguous request for counsel by cutting him off.’” Reply,
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ECF 172 at 9. This Court admonishes Williams’s counsel for misquoting Smith, 5 but at the same
time, this Court does not endorse Agent Pasquale’s interruption of Williams. But, having
reviewed the video of the interview, this Court does not find that Agent Pasquale intentionally
prevented the invocation of counsel by talking over Williams. Agent Pasquale’s tone of voice
and manner were conversational, cordial and low-key, and not demanding or coercive. Williams
Video 1:44–54, ECF 163. The record shows that a reasonable officer in Agent Pasquale’s
position would conclude that Williams was voluntarily waiving his right to counsel when
Williams was read his Miranda rights and said “[n]o, I don’t have an issue [talking to you].”
Williams Tr. 4:7-8. This Court finds that Williams then voluntarily expressly waived his
Miranda rights by signing a written waiver form and implicitly waived his rights considering
“the totality of the circumstances,” as previously discussed. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262,
1271 (9th Cir. 2005). The fact that he was interrupted mid-sentence, having never said anything
about wanting to speak to counsel, was neither an equivocal nor unequivocal invocation of his
right to counsel and does not undermine his knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to
counsel. 6
5
At the hearing, Williams’s counsel stated that this error was not a result of using generative AI
but rather an inadvertent mistake. This Court reminds Williams’s counsel that he is responsible
for not only his own contributions but also his client’s contributions to any of his submissions.
6
Williams also points to his subsequent statement, “because I forget who it was earlier, but I was
asking, when do I get to —,” as an invocation of his right to counsel. Motion, ECF 153 at 8.
However, Williams omits that the full quote is: “because I forget who it was earlier, but I was
asking, when do I get to -- I have no problem with talking to you about any of this.” Williams Tr.
76:4–6, ECF 162-1 at 76 (emphasis added). Williams explicitly expressed his willingness to
speak with agents, and thus his self-interruption was not an unequivocal request for counsel.
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2. Selective Invocation of Right to Counsel
Williams initially waived his Miranda rights, but he later made a selective invocation of
his right to counsel with respect to his bank accounts. “[J]ust as a suspect in custody may refuse
to answer all questions, he may selectively exercise his Miranda rights to silence and to
counsel.” Michaels, 51 F.4th at 921. Therefore, “when a suspect selectively invokes his right to
silence or to counsel, Miranda requires interrogation to end with respect to the subject matter . . .
as to which the suspect invoked the right.” Id. at 922 (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,
103–04 (1975); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74). To make a selective invocation, as with a blanket
invocation, “a suspect must invoke any Miranda right unambiguously and unequivocally.” Id.
On page 77 of the interview transcript, Williams unambiguously and unequivocally
invoked his right to counsel with respect to questions concerning his bank accounts. Williams
made a selective invocation at the end of the following exchange between Bertnik and Pasquale:
BERTNIK: All I want to do is go through and talk about your EIDLs and say, “Hey, did
this one go into this account?” Boom. “Did this one go into this account?” We kind of
already talked about it, but I’m just looking at the actual --
PASQUALE: And if you don’t want to go into the bank accounts, you’re, like “I don’t
want to answer those questions,” then you don’t have to answer the questions.
BERTNIK: Yeah. We can move on.
PASQUALE: You’re perfectly in your right to say that.
WILLIAMS: I would prefer to do that with my attorney.
PASQUALE: Can we talk about Eric and Bayless? Can we move on to that piece?
Williams Tr. 77:9–25, ECF 162-1 at 77 (emphasis added). Even the government concedes that
this “exchange shows a subject-specific limitation.” Response, ECF 162 at 13. Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit has held that a similar, but arguably even more equivocal statement, “I should talk to a
lawyer,” qualified as an unequivocal request for counsel. Smith, 860 F.2d at 1531; see id. (“[H]is
statement was not equivocal; there was no ‘might’ or ‘maybe’ or ‘perhaps.’”). Therefore, the
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dispute here centers on the scope of “that” in Williams’s invocation. Whereas the government
argues that Williams “drew a line around questions concerning whether EIDL funds went into
particular bank accounts,” Response, ECF 162 at 13, Williams argues that he “invoked counsel
with respect to financial topics, specifically bank accounts and fund movement,” Reply, ECF 172
at 11. When considering Williams’s statement in context, this Court finds that the scope of his
selective invocation is broader than the government’s view and narrower than Williams’s view.
Specifically, Williams invoked his right to counsel with respect to questions pertaining to his
bank accounts, not just EIDL deposits into his accounts, and he did not invoke as to all financial
topics. 7
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of a selective Miranda waiver in Michaels v. Davis, 51 F.4th
904 (9th Cir. 2022), is instructive. In Michaels, the defendant Kurt Michaels was arrested for
murder and subject to custodial interrogation. Id. at 915. During the interrogation, the following
exchange occurred after the detectives Mirandized Michaels and he initially agreed to speak with
them. Id. at 919.
DETECTIVE: Well, what’s your side of the story? What happened?
MICHAELS: I don’t know if I should without an attorney. (Laughter.) It ain’t going to
do me no . . . . (Laughter.)
DETECTIVE: Well, we need to know. Let’s put it this way, Kurt. He just advised you of
your rights. And you said, that yeah, you wanted to talk to us. There’s no problem. If at
any time that you do not want to talk with us, you can stop at any particular time. If
there’s any time that we ask you a question that you don't want to answer, you can stop at
any time.
MICHAELS: Okay, that one. (Laughter.)
7
At the hearing, the government appeared to agree with this Court’s determination regarding the
scope of Williams’s selective invocation of his right to counsel as encompassing his bank
accounts.
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Id. at 919–20 (emphasis in original). With respect to Michaels’s first statement, “I don’t know if
I should without an attorney,” the Ninth Circuit found that it was ambiguous. Michaels, 51 F.4th
at 923. However, with respect to Michaels’s second statement, “Okay, that one,” the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that “[i]n context, the phrase ‘Okay, that one’ is susceptible to only one
reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 925. And that one reasonable interpretation was that Michaels
made “an unambiguous invocation of the right that he was just informed of—to ‘stop [talking] at
any particular time’—with respect to the last question he was asked: ‘Well, what’s your side of
the story? What happened?’” Id. (brackets in original). The Ninth Circuit even relied on the
dictionary definition of “that”,” which “refers to ‘a fact, act, or occurrence, or a statement or
question, implied or contained in the previous sentence.’” Id. at 923 (emphasis in original)
(quoting That, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989)). Thus, “the interrogating officers should
have ceased asking him about ‘What’s your side of the story? What happened?’” Id. at 925.
Instead, the officers “proceeded along precisely the same line of questioning,” and consequently,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the detectives’ continued questioning regarding Michaels’s
role in the murder after Michaels’s selective invocation did violate his Miranda rights.” Id.
Applying the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Michaels to Williams’s statement, “I would
prefer to do that with my attorney,” the scope of Williams’s selective invocation is apparent.
When Williams stated he would “prefer to do that” with his attorney, he made “an unambiguous
invocation of the right that he was just informed of,” id. at 925—to not “have to answer the
questions” that relate to “the bank accounts.” Williams Tr. 77:16–18, ECF 162-1 at 77. As the
Ninth Circuit explained in detail, “that” refers to a “statement or question[] implied or contained
in the previous sentence.” Michaels, 51 F.4th at 923 (emphasis added) (quoting That, Oxford
English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989)). Here, the last statement pertaining to any subject matter
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before Williams invoked his right to counsel with respect to that subject matter was Agent
Pasquale’s statement, “And if you don’t want to go into the bank accounts, . . . then you don’t
have to answer the questions.” Williams Tr. 77:15–18, ECF 162-1 at 77 (emphasis added).
Although arguably Agent Pasquale’s reference to “the bank accounts” suggests that the agent
was referencing the prior statement by Agent Bertnik about funds from the EIDLs, this Court
must determine the scope of the waiver that Williams intended. Because there is some ambiguity
here with regard to which of his bank accounts Williams did not want to discuss without counsel,
this Court construes his selective waiver to cover all of Williams’s bank accounts. Therefore, the
federal agents’ subsequent questioning regarding Williams’s bank accounts violated his Miranda
rights. Michaels, 51 F.4th at 925. Williams did later “answer questions regarding the subject he
had declared off-limits, . . . [b]ut an accused’s postrequest responses to further interrogation may
not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of his initial request for counsel.” Id. (citation modified).
As a result, this Court suppresses all statements that Williams made in response to questions
concerning his bank accounts after page 77 of the transcript. 8
3. Blanket Invocation of Right to Counsel
Although the invocations on pages 77 and 148 of the transcript were only selective
invocations, beginning on page 168 of the transcript, Williams made several unequivocal and
unambiguous requests for counsel. 9 See Motion, ECF 153 at 9 (numbering these invocations as
8
In his reply brief, Williams points to a second selective invocation he made later in the
interrogation with respect to what money he used to purchase three cars. Reply, ECF 172 at 12.
Agent Pasquale asked, “Well, did you use the PPP money specifically to buy those three cars?
Are you sure of that?” Williams replied, “No. That I will leave for when the attorney comes in.”
Williams Tr. 148:17–21, ECF 162-1 at 148. The government honored this selective invocation
and did not ask Williams again about the cars. As a result, there are no statements to suppress.
9
Although Williams provides no argument based on his asserted invocation of his right to
counsel on page 130 of the transcript, Williams’s question falls squarely into the category of an
ambiguous request for counsel: “Do you know if at some point I get to call my attorney, or is that
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invocations 8–12). Once again, “[i]f a suspect ‘indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney,’ all questioning must cease.” Sessoms, 776
F.3d at 622 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45). On page 168 of the transcript, Williams
unequivocally and unambiguously invoked his right to counsel when he asked, “Can I call my
attorney?” Williams Tr. 168:25, ECF 162-1 at 168. The Ninth Circuit has specifically determined
that these words verbatim constitute a defendant “clearly invok[ing] the right to counsel.” United
States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1992). And the government does not dispute that
Williams’s request—along with his subsequent identical and similar requests to call his
attorney—are clear invocations of his right to counsel. Therefore, “[q]uestioning should have
ceased after the first request for counsel, which the officers ignored[.]” Sessoms, 776 F.3d at 623.
Because agents did not cease questioning, all statements after page 168 must be suppressed. 10
something later?” Williams Tr. 130:10–11, ECF 162-1 at 130; see Tobias, 996 F.3d at 580–81
(collecting Ninth Circuit cases that have held the following statements to be “ambiguous”
requests for counsel: “I think I would like to talk to a lawyer,” “Maybe [I] ought to see an
attorney,” and “I might want to talk to a lawyer” (citation modified)). Because this ambiguous
invocation occurred after his initial Miranda waiver, federal agents did not have any duty to
clarify whether Williams was requesting counsel. See supra n.4; Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1080.
10
Williams argues in passing that in addition to suppressing any statements that agents obtained
in violation of his Miranda rights, this Court should “[s]uppress all derivative evidence obtained
as a result of the statements.” Motion, ECF 153 at 24. However, Williams misapprehends the
scope of the remedy for a Miranda violation. In the Ninth Circuit’s words, “[t]he Supreme Court
determined in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) that the physical evidence obtained
as a result of a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings is nevertheless admissible.”
United States v. Mora-Alcaraz, 86 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2021). Therefore, Williams is
mistaken that the government must show that any derivative evidence is admissible under the
independent source doctrine or the inevitable discovery doctrine. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 443–44 (1984); Reply, ECF 172 at 17. Although the government represents that the text
messages and spreadsheets taken from Williams’s phone “are available to the government from
independent sources,” Response, ECF 162 at 18, such physical evidence is also admissible
regardless of whether the government proves that the independent source doctrine applies.
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C. Remaining Issues
Williams makes three additional arguments for why all of his statements during the
custodial interrogation must be suppressed, but none of the three arguments have merit.
1. Missouri v. Seibert
Williams argues that because federal agents questioned him in the car before he arrived at
the IRS facility, where he received Miranda warnings, his statements at the IRS facility were
obtained in violation of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Under Seibert, “a trial court
must suppress postwarning confessions obtained during a deliberate two-step interrogation where
the midstream Miranda warnings—in light of the objective facts and circumstances—did not
effectively apprise the suspect of his rights.” United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th
Cir. 2006). To “determin[e] whether the interrogator deliberately withheld the Miranda
warning[s], courts should consider whether objective evidence and any available subjective
evidence, such as an officer’s testimony, support an inference that the two-step interrogation
procedure was used to undermine the Miranda warnings.” Id. at 1158. “Such objective evidence
would include the timing, setting and completeness of the prewarning interrogation, the
continuity of police personnel and the overlapping content of the pre- and postwarning
statements.” Id. at 1159. If the court finds that “an interrogator has deliberately employed the
two-step strategy, Seibert requires the court then to evaluate the effectiveness of the midstream
Miranda warning to determine whether the postwarning statement is admissible.” Id. at 1160.
Here, there is a lack of both objective and subjective evidence to “support an inference”
that any interrogation occurred in the car, let alone that a “two-step interrogation procedure was
used to undermine the Miranda warning[s]” given at the IRS facility. Id. at 1158. Williams
points to two statements by Agent Pasquale during the recorded interrogation as the basis for
arguing that an earlier interrogation occurred during the car ride to the IRS facility. See Motion,
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ECF 153 at 18–19. The first statement occurs on page 4 of the transcript when Agent Pasquale
says: “At the end of the day, like, what we were trying to talk about in the car and help you
understand is that there are many layers above you and this is that opportunity that we have.”
Williams Tr. 4:9–12, ECF 162-1 at 4. The second statement occurs on page 11: “He [Agent
Smith] gets very into the weeds with the tax stuff. Like I told you in the car, he loves numbers.
He’s a numbers guy.” Id. 16:8–10, ECF 162-1 at 16.
These statements fall short of showing that federal agents “deliberately withheld . . .
Miranda warning[s]” while interrogating Williams during the car ride. Williams, 435 F.3d at
1158. This Court agrees with the government that these two statements “reflect[] some
prewarning conversation during transport,” but they “do[] not show a prewarning confession,
substantial overlap between an unwarned confession and a later warned repetition, or any
deliberate two-step strategy.” Response, ECF 162 at 12. The first statement suggests that agents
spoke to Williams about other coconspirators “above” Williams in the PPP fraud scheme, and
the second statement indicates that Agent Pasquale told Williams about Agent Smith’s tax
expertise. The lack of “completeness of the prewarning interrogation” and the lack of
“overlapping content of pre- and postwarning statements” establish that no deliberate two-step
interrogation occurred as to warrant suppression of Williams’s entire recorded interrogation.
Williams, 435 F.3d at 1159. Although there was “continuity of police personnel” and both the
“timing” and “setting” of the car ride conversation were in close proximity to the recorded
interrogation, see id., these factors do not outweigh the dearth of any evidence to support the
inference that agents deployed two-step interrogation tactics against Williams during the car ride.
Moreover, the only evidence this Court does have is the sworn declaration of Agent Pasquale,
which asserts that no such interrogation occurred in the car ride. Pasquale Declaration, ECF 190-
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1. Because this Court finds that no deliberate two-step interrogation occurred, suppression is
unwarranted under Seibert.
2. Corley v. United States
Williams relies on Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009), to argue that his
statements must be suppressed because of the unreasonable delay in his presentment before a
magistrate judge, but Williams ignores the central holding of Corley, which created a safe harbor
for confessions made within six hours of arrest. Corley held that “a district court with a
suppression claim must find whether the defendant confessed within six hours of arrest (unless a
longer delay was ‘reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be
traveled to the nearest available [magistrate judge]’).” 556 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added)
(brackets in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)). “If the confession came within that [six-
hour] period, it is admissible, subject to the other Rules of Evidence, so long as it was ‘made
voluntarily and . . . the weight to be given [it] is left to the jury.’” Id. (brackets and ellipses in
original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)). According to Williams, he was arrested “at
approximately 9:30 AM,” and “[t]he recorded interview began at approximately 10:46 AM and
concluded at approximately 2:03 PM.” Motion, ECF 153 at 6–7. That means the entire recorded
interrogation at the IRS facility falls within Corley’s six-hour safe harbor. See Response, ECF
162 at 18; see Motion, ECF 153 at 6–7 (pointing out the timeline). Therefore, the delay in
presentment to a magistrate judge provides no basis, independent from the Miranda violations
discussed above, to suppress statements that Williams voluntarily made during the interrogation.
3. No Suppression Based on Presence of Prosecutor
Williams next argues that the “secret presence” of an Assistant U.S. Attorney during the
interrogation via speakerphone “strengthens the case for full suppression rather than partial
suppression.” Motion, ECF 153 at 22–23. During the interrogation, the lead federal prosecutor
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on Williams’s case listened to the interrogation over speakerphone, but Williams was not aware
of her presence. Id. at 7. Williams contends that the prosecutor’s “failure to halt the interview
despite witnessing constitutional violations demonstrate[s] that the entire interview was infected
by prosecutorial complicity.” Id. at 23. Williams provides no legal authority to support the
suppression of statements based on a federal prosecutor’s presence, whether known or unknown
to the defendant. In a different case, a federal prosecutor’s words or actions could bear on the
voluntariness of a defendant’s Miranda waiver. But in this case, Williams makes no such
argument that the federal prosecutor affected the voluntariness of his Miranda waiver. Nor could
he because the federal prosecutor only listened—and did not question—Williams during the
interrogation. On these facts, the federal prosecutor’s presence via speakerphone does not affect
the above analysis on the alleged Miranda violations during the interrogation.
D. Evidentiary Hearing
Finally, Williams requests an evidentiary hearing to address five alleged material factual
disputes: (1) “the pre-Miranda car conversation,” (2) “AUSA Bateman’s presence and
departure,” (3) “the agents’ motive for concealing AUSA Bateman’s identity,” (4) “whether
agents were aware of the sealed indictment,” and (5) “the completeness of the transcript.”
Motion, ECF 153 at 23–24. An evidentiary hearing is only warranted “when the moving papers
allege facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to
conclude that contested issues of fact exist.” United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir.
2000); see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (“To mandate an evidentiary hearing,
the challenger’s attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a
mere desire to cross-examine.”). In his briefing and at the July 15, 2026, hearing, Williams has
failed to allege contested issues of facts material to the suppression of his statements “with
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Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 193 Filed 07/31/26 Page 29 of 30
sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity” to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Howell, 231
F.3d at 620.
As to (2) and (3), the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s “secret” presence via speakerphone is
irrelevant to whether any statements must be suppressed. Consequently, there is no reason to
hold an evidentiary hearing to uncover additional details about her presence. Similarly, as to (4),
“whether agents were aware of the sealed indictment” is also irrelevant. Motion, ECF 153 at 23.
As to (1) and (5), in his briefing, Williams only points to Agent Pasquale’s two
statements, which suggest some conversation occurred during the car ride, as the basis for
supplementing the record. As discussed above, these statements alone fall far short of suggesting
that agents deliberately interrogated Williams in the car absent Miranda warnings. And Agent
Pasquale’s sworn declaration demonstrates the lack of any contested issue regarding whether any
deliberate interrogation occurred during the car ride. Agent Pasquale states that while present in
the car during Williams’s transport, neither he nor any other federal officer “ask[ed] [Williams]
substantive investigative questions about the charged conduct, including questions about PPP
applications, EIDL applications, PPP forgiveness applications, loan proceeds, supporting
documents, employee counts, payroll, gross revenues, cost of goods sold, bank accounts, any co-
conspirator, or defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense conduct.” Declaration, ECF 190-1
¶¶ 10–11. Moreover, Pasquale states that during the transport, Williams “did not confess to the
charged conduct, “did not admit involvement in the charged conduct,” and “did not make any
spontaneous incriminating admissions regarding the charged conduct.” Id. ¶¶ 12–14. In short,
“no agent present during the transport deliberately used the transport as an opportunity to obtain
unwarned admissions or a confession, nor were admissions or a confession obtained from
defendant before a later Mirandized interview” that occurred at the IRS facility. Id. ¶ 9.
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Case 3:23-cr-00067-IM Document 193 Filed 07/31/26 Page 30 of 30
However, at the outset of the July 15, 2026 hearing, for the first time in this case,
Williams’s attorney represented that Williams invoked his right to counsel during the car ride.
Nowhere in the record had Williams made this factual assertion, so to supplement the record, this
Court offered Williams the opportunity to provide testimony at the hearing to support this
assertion. Williams initially expressed a desire to testify, but he also requested the ability to
cross-examine Pasquale about matters beyond the car ride, specifically the recorded interview.
This Court declined to expand the scope of any testimony because no contested issue of fact
exists regarding the recorded interview; the transcript and video recording speak for themselves.
Williams subsequently withdrew his request to testify at the evidentiary hearing. Therefore,
Williams fails to “allege facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable” this
Court to find any contested issue of fact exists concerning the lack of any interrogation during
the car ride from Williams’s arrest to the IRS facility. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Williams’s
Motion to Suppress, ECF 153. Any statements that Williams made after page 77 of the interview
transcript, ECF 162-1, in response to questions concerning his bank accounts are suppressed. In
addition, all statements that Williams made after page 168 of the transcript are suppressed. This
Court ORDERS the government to provide Williams with a redacted transcript of his March 21,
2023 interview, reflecting the suppression of statements consistent with this Opinion and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 31st day of July, 2026.
/s/ Karin J. Immergut
Karin J. Immergut
United States District Judge
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