TSA Efforts to Coordinate with Stakeholders on COVID-19 Security Directives (GAO-22-104583)
Summary
A GAO report to congressional committees, GAO-22-104583, dated March 2022, on transportation security. It reports that starting in January 2020 presidential executive actions imposed restrictions on international air travel to the U.S. from certain countries and mandated that face masks be worn on transportation systems because of COVID-19. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued security directives to operators of transportation systems to implement these executive actions. The report examines TSA's efforts to coordinate with stakeholders on the COVID-19 security directives.
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United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees
TRANSPORTATION
March 2022
SECURITY
TSA Efforts to
Coordinate with
Stakeholders on
COVID-19 Security
Directives
GAO-22-104583
March 2022
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
TSA Efforts to Coordinate with Stakeholders on
COVID-19 Security Directives
Highlights of GAO-22-104583, a report to
congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found
In response to the pandemic, the Starting in January 2020, presidential executive actions imposed restrictions on
federal government has been international air travel to the U.S. from certain countries and mandated that face
concerned about how to slow the masks be worn on transportation systems, due to COVID-19. The Transportation
spread of COVID-19, including in the Security Administration (TSA) issued security directives to operators of
transportation sector. TSA, the federal transportation systems to implement these executive actions. TSA expedited
agency responsible for securing the coordination with external stakeholders—other federal agencies and industry—to
nation’s transportation sector, issues develop and issue these directives, due to the urgent nature of the COVID-19
security directives if threat information, pandemic. According to TSA officials, development of security directives can take
events, or significant vulnerabilities
up to several months. However, the executive actions typically gave TSA less
indicate that additional security
than a week to issue the COVID-19 security directives. While selected external
measures are needed. TSA security
directives establish mandatory
stakeholders raised several issues with the security directives, they stated that
measures for transportation operators TSA’s expedited coordination was generally effective.
to implement. TSA Face Mask Security Directive Signage at Airport Security Checkpoints
The CARES Act includes a provision
for GAO to monitor the federal
response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
GAO was also asked to review TSA
efforts to respond. This report
describes TSA’s (1) security directives
issued to address COVID-19, (2)
coordination with interagency and
industry stakeholders on COVID-19
security directives, and (3) efforts to
ensure operators' implementation of
TSA’s COVID-19 security directives as
well as TSA and FAA investigations of
non-masked passengers.
GAO reviewed relevant agency
documents and guidance, and
analyzed data on related enforcement
actions taken from February 2, 2021 to
March 7, 2022 for TSA and from
January 1, 2021 to November 1, 2021 TSA took steps to ensure operator implementation of its security directives and,
for FAA. GAO interviewed TSA, FAA, in addition to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), has investigated
and the Centers for Disease Control incidents of or related to non-masked passengers. For example, TSA conducts
and Prevention officials as well as a in-person inspections of air carriers’ preboarding procedures for U.S.-bound
nongeneralizable sample of flights to confirm that they are following the directives restricting travel from
transportation stakeholders, selected certain countries. It also conducts investigations into incidents reported by
based on transportation mode, region transportation operators of passengers who refuse to comply with the face mask
of operation, and other factors to
security directives and become disruptive or aggressive towards an operator or
obtain insights into stakeholder
others. Of the over 3,800 incidents investigated from February 2021—when the
perspectives on TSA coordination.
face mask security directive was implemented—to March 2022, TSA issued more
than 2,700 warning notices and over 900 civil penalties against passengers.
Separately, the FAA investigates incidents of unruly passengers who interfere
View GAO-22-104583. For more information,
contact Tina Won Sherman at (202) 512-8461 with crew members in their duties, including times when they have been asked to
or shermant@gao.gov. comply with the face mask security directive.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Background 5
TSA Issued Several COVID-19 Security Directives 12
TSA Coordinated with Stakeholders on COVID-19 Security
Directives 19
TSA Took Steps to Ensure Implementation of the Directives and,
with FAA, Supported Investigations of Unruly Non-Masked
Passengers 28
Agency Comments 40
Appendix I List of Transportation Industry Stakeholders Interviewed 44
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46
Tables
Table 1: Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Investigations and Enforcement Actions against
Individuals Causing a Security Incident Related to the
Face Mask Security Directives, from February 2, 2021, to
March 7, 2022 33
Table 2: Transportation Industry Stakeholders GAO Interviewed 44
Figures
Figure 1: Key Steps in the Transportation Security
Administration’s (TSA) Process to Develop and Review
Security Directives 9
Figure 2: Time Line of Key COVID-19 Events and Related
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security
Directives, as of December 2021 18
Figure 3: Issues Concerning the Transportation Security
Administration’s (TSA) Face Mask Security Directives
That Selected Industry Stakeholders Raised to GAO 26
Figure 4: Examples of the Transportation Security Administration’s
Face Mask Security Directive Signage at Airport Security
Checkpoints 30
Page i GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Figure 5: Outcomes of Completed Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Investigations into Unruly Passengers, as of
November 1, 2021 36
Abbreviations
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOT Department of Transportation
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
TSA Transportation Security Administration
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Page ii GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Letter
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
March 14, 2022
Congressional Committees
To help slow the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in
the U.S., the White House issued executive actions starting in January
2020 that imposed new requirements on air and surface transportation
systems. To implement these actions, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) issued a series of security directives that (1)
restricted travel to the U.S. by air for some individuals with recent travel in
countries of high COVID-19 transmission rates and required aviation and
(2) surface transportation operators within the U.S. to implement face
mask requirements for passengers and employees. 1 According to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), multi-person
transportation modes potentially increase the risk of spreading COVID-19
due to the fact that travelers may be in close proximity to others in
enclosed spaces where physical distancing is not possible, sometimes for
extended periods. Further, international air transportation may pose other
unique risks, as its global network and ability to cover long distances in a
short amount of time potentially provide the means for an infection to
move quickly from one part of the world to another.
TSA, a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is
the federal agency responsible for securing the nation’s transportation
sector, including aviation and surface transportation systems. 2 In aviation,
air carriers are responsible for implementing TSA security requirements
predominantly through TSA-approved or accepted security programs,
which describe the policies, procedures, and systems that the air carriers
are to implement and maintain to comply with those security
1We previously reported on the characteristics of TSA’s aviation-related security directives
and its processes for reviewing them. With this information, we recommended that TSA
better define how to coordinate with industry stakeholders and document industry input.
The Department of Homeland Security concurred and implemented all three
recommendations. See GAO, International Aviation Security: TSA Should Improve
Industry Coordination and Its Security Directive and Emergency Amendment Review
Process, GAO-20-7 (Washington, DC: Oct. 3, 2019).
2Aviation transportation systems include U.S. and foreign-flagged air carrier operations to,
from, within, or overflying the U.S. and aircraft operations worldwide. Examples of surface
transportation systems include mass transit, passenger rail, and intercity bus services.
Page 1 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
requirements. 3 TSA may issue new, or revise existing, security
requirements through the publication of security directives if threat
information, events, or significant vulnerabilities, often of an immediate
nature, indicate that additional security measures are needed. 4
TSA may also issue security directives for surface transportation
operators when necessary. 5 However, unlike the aviation environment,
where TSA has operational responsibility for screening passengers and
baggage, the agency has a limited operational role for securing the
surface transportation system. For example, to secure passenger rail,
TSA partners with public and private transportation operators to address
their security needs by conducting vulnerability assessments and sharing
intelligence information and key practices. It does not, however, screen
passengers or baggage riding on surface transportation system modes.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a component agency within
the Department of Transportation (DOT), is the federal agency
responsible for the safety of flight in the U.S. and the safe and efficient
movement of air traffic in the national airspace system, as well as other
things such as the safety of FAA-certificated air crews. As part of its
safety responsibilities, the FAA investigates reports of unruly passengers
onboard aircraft.
The CARES Act, enacted March 27, 2020, includes a provision for GAO
to conduct monitoring and oversight of the exercise of authorities to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from COVID-19 and other related
3In general, U.S. and foreign-flagged air carriers (referred to in this report as domestic and
foreign air carriers, respectively) that operate to, from, or within the U.S. must establish
and maintain security programs approved or accepted by TSA in accordance with
requirements set forth in regulation at Aircraft Operator Security: Air Carriers and
Commercial Operators, 49 C.F.R. pt. 1544 (concerning domestic air carriers), and Foreign
Air Carrier Security, 49 C.F.R. pt. 1546. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903(c), 44906; 49 C.F.R. §§
1544.3, 1544.101-1544.105, 1546.3, 1546.101-1546.105.
4For foreign air carriers (e.g., Lufthansa or Emirates Airways), instead of security
directives, TSA issues “emergency amendments” because of differences in TSA’s
authority over foreign air carriers. For the purposes of this report, we refer to security
directives and emergency amendments collectively as “security directives” unless noted
otherwise.
5TSA has issued a limited number of requirements for mass transit and passenger rail
operators, including that rail carriers designate a rail security coordinator and report
significant security concerns. See Security Coordinator, 49 C.F.R. §§ 1570.201, .203. TSA
surface inspectors are to enforce these regulations through regulatory inspections.
Page 2 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
matters. 6 Further, the Chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee requested that GAO review TSA’s efforts and activities to
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report describes TSA’s (1)
security directives issued to address threats posed by COVID-19 to the
U.S. transportation sector, (2) coordination with interagency and industry
stakeholders to develop and implement COVID-19 security directives,
and (3) efforts to ensure operators’ implementation of TSA’s COVID-19
security directives as well as TSA and FAA investigations of non-masked
passengers.
To identify what security directives TSA issued to address threats posed
by COVID-19 to the U.S. transportation sector, we reviewed and analyzed
the directives related to international travel restrictions due to COVID-19
and the face mask security directives for air carriers, airports, and surface
transportation that were in place as of November 2021. We summarized
information about these security directives including their timing,
applicability, and requirements. To ensure that we were fully and
accurately capturing the extent and requirements of the directives, we
also met with TSA headquarters officials involved in the directives’
development.
To describe how TSA coordinated with and addressed any issues raised
by interagency and industry stakeholders to develop and implement
COVID-19 security directives, we reviewed the coordination requirements
that TSA developed in response to prior GAO recommendations. 7
Further, we interviewed 26 transportation stakeholder entities including a
mix of individual transportation operators and their associations, as well
as labor associations representing workers within the aviation and surface
transportation modes to which the security directives applied (e.g., air
6Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, §
19010(b), 134 Stat. 281, 580 (2020). We regularly issue government-wide reports on the
federal response to COVID-19. For the latest report, see GAO, COVID-19: Significant
Improvements Are Needed for Overseeing Relief Funds and Leading Responses to Public
Health Emergencies, GAO-22-105291 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2022). Our next
government-wide report will be issued in April 2022 and will be available on GAO’s
website at https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus.
7According to TSA’s standard operating procedures, prior to the release of a security
directive, TSA is required to review the initial draft with key stakeholders and
representatives of affected regulated parties, for issues of substance and clarity.
Stakeholder input is to be documented and to include the entity consulted, date, location,
point of contact, and a brief summary of the discussion and specific stakeholder input, to
record concerns. Finally, TSA is to incorporate key stakeholder input into the final draft as
appropriate.
Page 3 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
carriers, airports, and all applicable surface transportation system modes,
including passenger rail, over-the-road bus, and mass transit systems) to
obtain stakeholder perspectives on TSA’s coordination. 8 We selected
these stakeholders based on a variety of criteria, such as type of
transportation mode (e.g., aviation, passenger rail, mass transit, over-the-
road bus) and region of operation. The results of these interviews with
transportation stakeholders are not generalizable, but provided us
insights into how TSA coordinated with them on the security directives.
We analyzed the results of these interviews to identify how each of the
selected stakeholders was involved in the development of the security
directives. In addition, we reviewed the comments that stakeholders
provided to TSA during the development of the security directives to
identify trends in these comments.
We reviewed documentation and interviewed TSA officials to obtain
information on TSA’s practices in implementing the COVID-19 security
directives. Specifically, we reviewed documentation from TSA such as
stakeholder comment logs, outreach plans, and other records related to
TSA coordination activities with industry stakeholders. In addition, we met
with TSA headquarters offices, including Policy, Plans, and Engagement,
the office responsible for coordinating the stakeholder outreach. We also
met with other government agencies involved in implementing the
presidential proclamations on which the security directives are based,
including CDC, DOT, FAA, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Agency (CBP) within DHS to understand how TSA coordinated its
directives with other federal government agencies.
To describe TSA’s efforts to ensure operators’ implementation of TSA’s
COVID-19 security directives as well as TSA and FAA investigations of,
or related to, non-masked passengers, we reviewed and analyzed
enforcement data from TSA and the FAA to understand the extent to
which TSA and other federal agencies were investigating violations of the
COVID-19 security directives, particularly the face mask security
directive. 9 To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed
knowledgeable officials at the relevant agencies about data entry and
quality control processes and determined that the data were sufficiently
8See App. I for a list of these stakeholders.
9Our period of analysis of TSA data on investigations is from when the face mask security
directive went into effect on February 2, 2021, to March 7, 2022. Our period of analysis of
FAA data on unruly passenger investigations is from January 1, 2021, to November 1,
2021. FAA began a special enforcement program against unruly passengers in January
2021, which is discussed later in this report.
Page 4 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
reliable to provide summary numbers of actions taken, as of March 2022.
We also spoke to TSA headquarters officials and federal stakeholders
who assisted in implementing the order, including the FAA. Further, we
met with selected industry stakeholders noted earlier, who were
responsible for or had visibility on the implementation of the security
directives to obtain their perspectives on the guidance that TSA provided.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2020 to March
2022 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
COVID-19 Pandemic As the nation continues to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, response
and recovery efforts have been hampered by periodic surges in COVID-
19 cases. 10 Although the daily number of new cases had begun to decline
earlier in the summer of 2021, the number of new cases reported each
day from the end of July 2021, to September 23, 2021, generally
exceeded 100,000, according to the CDC—a daily case count not seen
since February 2021 and substantially higher than the approximately
8,000 new cases reported per day in mid-June. As a result of the rise in
cases, CDC, state and local governments, and private businesses revised
COVID-19 requirements, including their mask guidance. 11
The COVID-19 pandemic has also had devastating effects on the
economy. For example, serious economic repercussions from the
10As of February 2022, the CDC had listed the Delta and Omicron variants as variants of
concern in the U.S. CDC had previously characterized three other variants (Alpha, Beta,
and Gamma) as variants of concern, but later downgraded them.
11Data from a sample of state and local health departments showed that, in August 2021,
unvaccinated individuals accounted for the majority of new COVID-19 cases in those
states, according to CDC. No vaccine is 100 percent effective. CDC expects that, as the
number of vaccinated individuals increases, so will the number of so-called “breakthrough”
cases. The agency notes, however, that the risks of infection, hospitalization, and death
are much lower in vaccinated individuals compared to unvaccinated individuals. In
addition, vaccinated individuals are less likely to experience severe illness if they do
become infected with COVID-19 after vaccination. As of May 1, 2021, CDC shifted from
providing data on all breakthrough cases to providing data on those cases that result in
hospitalization or death.
Page 5 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
pandemic continue to affect the transportation sector, including reduced
travel to and from the U.S. by air and less usage of surface transportation
like passenger rail. Travel has not fully returned to prepandemic levels
across many of those systems. In fiscal year 2020, the volume of
international air travelers entering the U.S. decreased by about 54
percent as compared with fiscal year 2019. While the volume of
international air travelers increased in fiscal year 2021, it remained below
fiscal year 2019 levels. Similarly, while there were 2.99 million riders on
passenger rail systems in June 2019, ridership declined to 417,000 in
June 2020 before rising to 1.85 million in October 2021.
TSA’s Roles and The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted into law
Responsibilities in shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, established TSA
and gave it responsibility for securing all transportation systems. 12 ATSA
Securing Transportation
does not specifically list health-related issues, such as communicable
Systems diseases, as a security threat. However, federal law granted the TSA
Administrator broad statutory responsibility and authority with respect to
the security of all modes of transportation systems, and, according to
TSA, safety is inextricably intertwined with security. 13 Accordingly, TSA
has stated that the security of the transportation sector involves protection
from any threat that may disrupt transportation or endanger the safety of
individuals in transportation. Therefore, according to TSA, the introduction
or spread of a communicable disease through the transportation sector is
a threat that allows TSA to exercise its authorities as needed, including
the authority to issue security directives. 14
TSA may issue such directives if threat information, events, or significant
vulnerabilities, often of an immediate nature, indicate that additional
security measures are needed and that immediate action is necessary. 15
ATSA grants TSA the authority to issue security directives to any entity in
12Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597
(2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114(d)).
13See 49 U.S.C. § 114(d).
14Such directives are issued under 49 U.S.C. 114(l) if the TSA Administrator determines
that a regulation or security directive must be issued immediately in order to protect
transportation security.
15Under 49 U.S.C. § 114, TSA is authorized to issue security directives. Through such
directives, the TSA Administrator has the discretion to assist another agency in carrying
out its authority in order to address threats to transportation. Further, TSA is given
additional authority when the Secretary of Homeland Security has determined there to be
a national emergency.
Page 6 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
the transportation sector. TSA may also issue directives to carry out
requirements for the transportation sector promulgated through executive
action, such as presidential proclamations and executive orders.
Additionally, TSA can take enforcement actions against regulated entities
such as air carriers as well as individuals (e.g., passengers) that violate
security requirements such as those laid out in security directives. 16
Depending on the violation and an individual’s previous violation history,
TSA may take enforcement action ranging from letters of warning to civil
penalties.
Securing Aviation and Surface TSA’s specific responsibility within the aviation system includes the
Transportation Systems screening of passengers and property transported from and within the
U.S. by commercial passenger aircraft. In accordance with ATSA, TSA is
to screen all passengers, their accessible property, and their checked
baggage pursuant to TSA-established procedures. These procedures
generally provide that passengers pass through security checkpoints
where their person, identification documents, and accessible property, are
checked. Airports and air carriers must implement and maintain
compliance with TSA security requirements. They do so predominantly
through TSA-approved or accepted security programs that describe the
required security policies, procedures, and systems.
TSA conducts inspections of airports and air carriers and their operations
to evaluate airport perimeter security and access control measures to
secure areas to confirm that the airports and air carriers are operating in
accordance with their respective TSA-approved or accepted security
programs and applicable security directives. 17 If an inspector finds that an
airport operator or air carrier is not in compliance with any applicable
security requirements, the inspector is to take additional steps to correct
and record those specific violations, ranging from on-the-spot counseling
16TSA exercises enforcement authority through a delegation of statutory authority from the
Secretary of Homeland Security. Through that delegation, TSA administers the authority
of 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(7) to “enforce security related regulations and requirements” related
to civil aviation security and security in other modes of transportation.
17Along with conducting airport assessments, the same TSA inspection team also
conducts air carrier inspections when visiting a foreign airport to ensure that air carriers
are in compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization standards and TSA
security requirements. See 49 U.S.C. § 44907. In general, TSA procedures require TSA to
inspect all air carriers at each airport annually or semiannually depending on the
vulnerability level of the airport, with some exceptions.
Page 7 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
for minor violations to sending a warning notice or a letter of correction,
and, for more egregious violations, issuing notices of civil penalties. 18
In contrast to the aviation environment, where TSA has operational
responsibility for screening passengers and baggage prior to boarding a
commercial aircraft, TSA has a limited operational role for securing the
different modes within the surface transportation system, such as mass
transit and passenger rail. 19 Therefore, public and private transportation
owners and operators have the principal responsibility to carry out
security measures. TSA coordinates with the entities to identify
vulnerabilities, share intelligence information, and work to mitigate
security risks to the system.
Coordinating with Stakeholders In accordance with the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016
and the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, TSA is to consult with key
external stakeholders and regulated parties who are representatives from
specific transportation systems that will be most impacted by the
proposed security policy. 20 In addition, TSA is to coordinate with other
interagency partners, such as the FAA, CBP, and the State Department.
According to TSA policy, as a step in the coordination process, TSA is to
provide draft policy documents (e.g., security directives) to, and facilitate
meetings with, all relevant stakeholders and document any feedback
received from the stakeholders. Figure 1 shows TSA’s process for
developing and reviewing security directives and the various points at
which it is to coordinate with, and seek input from, stakeholders.
18TSA may initiate a civil penalty action by serving a Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty on
the person charged with a violation of a TSA requirement. See 49 C.F.R. § 1503.413.
19Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597
(2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114(d). To secure surface transportation system modes,
such as passenger rail, TSA primarily partners with public and private transportation
operators to address their security needs by conducting vulnerability assessments and
sharing intelligence information and key practices, among other things.
20FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-190, § 3409(a), 130
Stat. 615, 662; TSA Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 1953, 132 Stat. 3542,
3594. If the TSA Administrator determines that a security directive must be issued
immediately to protect transportation security, the Administrator will issue the security
directive without providing notice or an opportunity for comment. 49 U.S.C. § 114(l).
Page 8 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Figure 1: Key Steps in the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Process to Develop and Review Security Directives
Note: TSA security directives issued to foreign air carriers (e.g., Lufthansa or Emirates Airways) are
referred to as “emergency amendments.”
Includes presidential proclamations and executive orders.
a
b
TSA officials are to obtain input from key stakeholders and representatives of affected regulated
parties (e.g., air carriers, surface transportation operators), as appropriate.
CDC Roles and Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), CDC has a
Responsibilities Related to mission to protect Americans from health, safety, and security threats,
both foreign and in the U.S. 21 As the federal government’s public health
Transportation Systems
agency, CDC creates guidance and information on public health threats
and what actions should be taken to mitigate those threats. For COVID-
19, CDC has issued guidance on infection control practices including
21CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, MISSION, ROLE AND PLEDGE, (Last
reviewed May 13, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/mission.htm.
Page 9 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
physical distancing, as well as testing protocols, quarantines, and
vaccinations. CDC has also issued orders requiring specific actions, such
as that masks be worn while on transportation systems or at
transportation hubs. 22 For travelers, CDC monitors disease data from
foreign countries and provides information and alerts about outbreaks and
steps that travelers can take to protect themselves. For passengers
arriving to the U.S. from foreign countries, CDC also has the authority to
impose quarantines, if necessary, to protect the general population and
respond to disease threats to the United States. 23
The FAA’s Role in As part of its safety responsibilities for the nation’s aviation system, the
Ensuring Aviation System FAA investigates reports of unruly passengers onboard aircraft, including
any alleged assault, threat, intimidation, or interference with a
Safety
crewmember, and any alleged physical or sexual assault or threat of
physical or sexual assault of any individual on an aircraft. 24 Passengers
that the FAA has determined to have interfered with air carrier
22According to TSA officials, the TSA security directives were issued to provide
enforcement support for the CDC orders and aligned directly to the CDC’s orders. The
CDC’s order also specifies that TSA shall enforce the CDC’s orders under appropriate
statutory and regulatory authorities such as 49 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114, 44902, 44903 and
46301; and 49 C.F.R. §§ 1503, 1540.105, 1542.303, 1544.305, and 1546.105.
Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation
Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025 (February 3, 2021).
23The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary of HHS, has statutory
responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable
diseases into the U.S. and between the states. Under section 361 of the Public Health
Service Act ch. 373, title III, § 361, 58 Stat. 703 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 264), HHS is
authorized to make and enforce regulations to prevent the entry and spread of
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the U.S. and among states. The
authority for carrying out these functions on a daily basis has been delegated to CDC.
Under 42 C.F.R. parts 70 and 71, CDC may provide for the detention, medical
examination, and release of persons arriving into the U.S. and traveling among states who
are suspected of carrying these communicable diseases. Quarantinable diseases include
cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral
hemorrhagic fevers (including Ebola), severe acute respiratory syndromes, and flu that
can cause a pandemic ((Executive Order No. 13295, § 1, 68 Fed. Reg. 17255 (April 9,
2003); Executive Order No. 13375, § 1, 70 Fed. Reg. 17299 (April 5, 2005)(amending
Executive Order No. 13295 to include flu that has the potential to cause a pandemic);
Executive Order No. 13674, § 1, 79 Fed. Reg. 45671 (Aug. 6, 2014)(amending Executive
Order No. 13295 to redefine acute respiratory syndromes)).
24Under 49 U.S.C. § 46318, an individual who assaults or threatens to assault a member
of the flight crew of a civil aircraft or any other individual on the aircraft, or takes any action
that poses an imminent threat to the safety of the aircraft or other individuals on the
aircraft is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not more than
$35,000. 14 CFR §§ 91.11, 121.580, 135.120; 49 U.S.C. § 46318.
Page 10 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
crewmembers or assault, or threaten to assault, a crew member or others
on board the aircraft could be subject to civil penalties. 25 The FAA may
also refer these incidents for criminal investigation. 26
Recent Legislative Activity In December 2015, we issued a report on air travel and communicable
Related to Transportation diseases in which we found that the U.S. lacked a comprehensive
national aviation-preparedness plan to limit the spread of communicable
Preparedness Planning for diseases through air travel. 27 Accordingly, we recommended that DOT
Communicable Diseases work with relevant stakeholders, such as HHS and DHS, to develop a
national aviation-preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks.
As we have previously reported, such a plan could establish a
mechanism for coordination between the aviation and public health
sectors and guide preparation for communicable disease nationally and
for individual airlines and airports. While DOT agreed that a plan is
needed, as of May 2020, it had not taken steps to develop one. 28 Given
the absence of any DOT progress to develop a plan and in light of the
unfolding COVID-19 pandemic, in June 2020, we made a matter for
congressional consideration that Congress take legislative action to
require DOT to complete such a plan for the aviation sector. 29 While bills
25For violations of 49 U.S.C. § 46318, the current inflation-adjusted maximum is $36,948
per violation. For regulatory violations, the current inflation-adjusted maximum pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)(5)(A) is $14,074 per violation. A single incident can involve multiple
violations.
26Under 49 U.S.C. § 46504, passengers on an aircraft who assault or intimidate a flight
crewmember or flight attendant of the aircraft, and interfere with the performance of the
duties of the member or attendant or lessen the ability of the member or attendant to
perform those duties, or attempt or conspire to do such an act, shall be fined, imprisoned
for not more than 20 years, or both.
27See GAO, Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Comprehensive Federal Plan
Needed for U.S. Aviation System’s Preparedness, GAO-16-127 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
16, 2015).
28DOT has stated that because HHS and DHS are responsible for communicable disease
response and preparedness planning, those departments should lead any efforts to
address planning for communicable disease outbreaks, including for transportation. We
maintain that DOT is in the best position to lead a multiagency effort to develop a national
aviation-preparedness plan given its oversight responsibilities and ties with relevant
aviation stakeholders, such as serving as the U.S. liaison to the International Civil Aviation
Organization, which has developed standards—including a national aviation pandemic
plan—that member states are obligated to implement. We included this open
recommendation in 2021 as one of 16 high priority recommendations to DOT.
29See GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery
Efforts, GAO-20-625 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2020).
Page 11 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
have been introduced that include such a provision for DOT, none have
been enacted by Congress, as of January 2022. 30
Separately, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022
requires the Secretary of DHS, acting through the TSA Administrator, to
develop a transportation security preparedness plan that, for all
transportation sectors, (1) establishes processes for communicating and
collaborating with interagency task forces and other public and private
stakeholders in the event of a communicable disease outbreak and (2)
includes considerations for assessing the appropriateness of issuing
security directives and plans for ensuring compliance with such
measures. 31 Such a plan could foster a shared understanding and
agreement among all relevant stakeholders on how to respond to prevent
and control a communicable disease threat, as well as provide a
mechanism for the public health and transportation sectors to coordinate
more effectively while minimizing disruptions to the nation’s transportation
system. The act also contains a provision for GAO to assess DHS’s plan
once developed. 32
In response to various executive actions, TSA issued several COVID-19
TSA Issued Several security directives related to international travel restrictions and face
COVID-19 Security mask requirements. Between January 2020 and April 2021, multiple
presidential proclamations were issued that imposed restrictions on
Directives international air travel into the U.S. for individuals with recent presence in
countries with high COVID-19 transmission rates. The proclamations
directed the Secretary of DHS to suspend entry to the U.S. for noncitizens
who had been present in countries with high COVID-19 transmission
30In February 2021, H.R. 884, the National Aviation Preparedness Plan Act of 2021, was
introduced in the House of Representatives. National Aviation Preparedness Plan Act of
2021, H.R. 884, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021). If enacted, this bill would have required the
DOT, in collaboration with DHS, HHS, and other aviation stakeholders, to develop a
national plan to prepare the aviation industry for future communicable disease outbreaks.
In January 2021, S. 82, Ensuring Health Safety in the Skies Act of 2021, was reported
favorably out of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Ensuring Health Safety in the Skies Act of 2021, S. 82, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021).
31National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, §
6412(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)(i), (a)(3)(G), 135 Stat 1541 (2021).
32Id. at § 6412(b), 135 Stat 1541 (2021).
Page 12 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
rates prior to their planned entry into the U.S. 33 Additionally, as part of the
implementation of the presidential proclamations made in 2020, the
Secretary of DHS imposed another requirement that flights carrying
persons who recently traveled to or within the countries or regions
specified in the proclamations, arrive to the U.S. at designated airports to
undergo enhanced health screenings by CDC. 34
During this time, TSA issued the following five sets of COVID-19 related
security directives. Specifically:
• TSA utilized its existing security framework to issue security directives
to air carriers to implement the international air travel restrictions to
the U.S. mandated by the presidential proclamations. 35 In turn, TSA
issued directives that required foreign and U.S.-based air carriers with
last point of departure flights to the U.S. to screen their passengers for
recent travel in countries specified in the presidential proclamations
33In a series of presidential proclamations issued between January 2020 and April 2021,
restrictions were first imposed on mainland China and were subsequently extended to
other countries and regions (i.e., Iran, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Europe’s 26-country
Schengen Area, Brazil, South Africa, and India). Europe’s 26-country Schengen Area
generally functions as a single jurisdiction for international travel purposes and includes
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The
restrictions applied to noncitizen individuals who were physically present within the
specified countries during the 14-day period preceding their expected entry into the U.S.
34For these enhanced screenings, travelers were to be observed for signs of illness, had
their temperature taken, completed a questionnaire about symptoms and exposure to
persons with COVID-19 and provided contact information in the U.S. Ill travelers and
those disclosing exposure to COVID-19 in the previous 14 days were referred for
additional public health assessments by a medical officer or to a local health care facility.
In September 2020, CDC ceased these screenings, stating that it would instead dedicate
resources to other mitigation strategies, such as health education for travelers and
voluntary collection of contact information from travelers. The requirement for flights
carrying passengers with recent presence in relevant countries to arrive at designated
U.S. airports was also discontinued.
35According to officials at TSA, DOT, and CDC, interagency consultations and
deliberations on how to implement the presidential proclamations determined that TSA
was the federal entity best positioned, through its existing security protocols and
framework, to quickly engage industry and carry out the restrictions by issuing security
directives.
Page 13 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
and, accordingly, restrict or redirect passengers boarding U.S.-bound
flights. 36
• In addition to international air travel restrictions, TSA issued security
directives mandating medical screenings of passengers prior to their
departure from select countries. 37 For example, in response to White
House Coronavirus Task Force direction, TSA issued a security
directive that imposed preboarding medical screening requirements
for passengers on flights to the U.S. from last points of departure in
Italy and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). 38 Using the screening,
carriers were to prohibit passengers from boarding U.S. bound flights
36See TSA Security Directive (SD) 1544-20-01 (concerning People’s Republic of China),
TSA Emergency Amendment (EA) 1546-20-01; SD 1544-20-01B (adding Islamic Republic
of Iran), EA 1546-20-01B; SD 1544-20-01C (adding the Schengen Area), EA 1546-20-
01C; SD 1544-20-01D (adding the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland), EA 1546-20-
01D; SD 1544-20-01E (adding Federative Republic of Brazil), EA 1546-20-01E; EA 1546-
20-01G (adding Republic of South Africa); SD 1544-20-01H (adding Republic of India), EA
1546-20-01H. A last point of departure flight is a flight that does not make any
intermediate stops between a foreign and U.S. airport. The requirements of these
directives do not apply to crewmembers, except those off duty and on personal travel. The
first security directives restricting international air travel that went into effect for China in
February 2020 identified 11 U.S. airports to which carriers were to route flights carrying
persons with recent presence in China. 85 Fed. Reg. 6709 (Feb. 5, 2020). DHS
subsequently added two more airports to the list in March 2020 when the restrictions were
expanded to include European countries within the Schengen Area. 85 Fed. Reg. 12855
(Mar. 4, 2020). CBP was the DHS agency responsible for coordinating with airport
operators and CDC for implementing processes to handle arriving passengers and
conduct screenings at the designated airports. In June 2021, we reported on the CBP’s
efforts to implement those processes and some of the challenges CBP faced. For
example, for the first full day restrictions on which travelers from Europe went into effect,
delays in processing arriving travelers at one airport resulted in thousands of travelers
waiting for hours without access to food, water, or bathrooms, according to airport and
CBP officials. See GAO, Border Security: CBP’s Response to COVID-19, GAO-21-431
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2021).
37See SD 1544-20-02, EA 1546-20-02 (requiring medical screenings for Last Points of
Departure to the United States from Italy and the Republic of Korea (South Korea)).
38To conduct these screenings, airlines were required to measure a passenger’s body
temperature to detect fever (a measured temperature of 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit or 38
degrees Celsius), conduct visual observation of the passenger for signs of illness, ask
questions regarding potential COVID-19 symptoms (e.g., coughing, chills, difficulty
breathing), and ask about the potential for recent high-risk exposures to COVID-19 (e.g.,
visiting hospitals or close contact with a COVID-19-infected person). Id.
Page 14 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
if they exhibited any signs or symptoms of illness or indicated they
may be at high risk for recent exposure to the virus. 39
• On January 31, 2021, TSA issued a set of security directives requiring
that face masks be worn by individuals while riding or working on all
transportation systems. 40 TSA issued the security directives in
response to an executive order and a related CDC order mandating
that face masks be worn by passengers and employees while in
aviation and surface transportation stations and on conveyances (e.g.,
airports, commercial aircraft, passenger rail, mass transit, and intercity
bus systems). 41 While the terms of the security directives were the
same, TSA issued separate security directives to the different types of
transportation operators responsible for implementing and enforcing
them such as air carriers, airports, and surface transportation. 42 The
face mask security directives were given an expiration date of May 11,
2021, which TSA has subsequently extended four times. According to
39TSA later amended this directive to discontinue the requirement for Italy once a separate
security directive was issued to restrict travel from the Schengen Area, which includes
Italy. TSA also amended the security directive to allow carriers to use the results of
medical screenings conducted by other entities, such as by the host government when
passengers make their way through the airport to the departure gate, rather than having to
conduct the screenings themselves at the departure gate, as long as TSA has accepted
the level of screening provided by the other entity.
40See SD 1542-21-01 (concerning Airport Operators); SD 1544-21-02 (concerning
Domestic Air Carriers); EA 1546-21-01 (concerning Foreign Air Carriers); SD 1582/84-21-
01 (concerning Surface Modes of Transportation). Specifically, TSA acted in furtherance
of the President’s Executive Order 13,998 to promote COVID-19 safety in domestic and
international travel, 86 Fed. Reg. 7205 (Jan. 26, 2021), and the CDC order requiring that,
subject to limited exceptions, all persons in transportation hubs and on transport
conveyances must wear masks covering their noses and mouths for the duration of travel.
86 Fed. Reg. 8025 (Feb. 3, 2021)
41The executive order was issued on January 20, 2021. 86 Fed. Reg. 7045 (Jan. 25,
2021). On January 27, 2021, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security determined that a
national emergency existed requiring TSA to issue security directives to implement the
executive order and enforce the related order issued by CDC pursuant to the authority of
49 U.S.C. §§114, 44902, and 44903 for the aviation directives and 49 U.S.C. §114 for
surface transportation modes. This action triggered the use of TSA’s specific authorities
under 49 U.S.C. §114(g). CDC issued its order on January 29, 2021. Requirement for
Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg.
8025 (February 3, 2021); see also ORDER: WEARING OF FACE MASKS WHILE ON CONVEYANCES
AND AT TRANSPORTATION HUBS, CDC, (page last reviewed August 20, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/masks/mask-travel-guidance.html.
42Exemptions were provided for private conveyances; people with disabilities who cannot
safely wear a mask; and people for whom wearing a mask would create a risk to
workplace health, safety, or job duty, as determined by the relevant workplace safety
guidelines or federal regulations.
Page 15 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
TSA, the security directive for mask use on public transportation and
transportation hubs will be extended through April 18, 2022. 43 TSA
officials stated that such decisions on extensions are made in
collaboration with other federal agencies such as CDC.
• On November 8, 2021, TSA replaced the security directives restricting
international air travel with new directives implementing vaccine
requirements for noncitizen nonimmigrant air travelers. 44 According to
TSA officials, the new security directives implement the terms of a
presidential proclamation and related CDC orders to move away from
the country-by-country restrictions to an approach that relies primarily
on vaccination to advance the resumption of international air travel to
the U.S. 45 Specifically, the security directives require air carriers to
obtain proof of full vaccination from noncitizen nonimmigrant
passengers prior to boarding them on a U.S.-bound flight. 46 These
security directives are set to expire November 8, 2022.
43See SD 15-82-84-21-01A (extending to September 2021), SD-1544-21-02A, SD-1542-
21-01A, EA 1546-21-01A; SD 1582-84-21-01B (extending to January 2022), SD 1544-21-
02B, SD 1542-21-01B, EA 1546-21-01B; SD 1582/84-21-01C (extending to March 2022),
1544-21-02C, 1542-21-01C, EA 1546-21-01C. Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin.,
Statement Regarding Face Mask Use On Public Transportation (March 10, 2022).
44See SD 1544-21-03 (requiring proof of full vaccination for specified passengers).
45On October 25, 2021, the President issued a proclamation, Advancing the Safe
Resumption of Global Travel During the COVID-19 Pandemic, which rescinded previous
proclamations for COVID-19 related travel restrictions. 86 Fed. Reg. 59603 (Oct. 28,
2021). The proclamation also requires DHS to take steps to ensure that airlines do not
permit noncitizens barred from entry under the proclamation to board an aircraft traveling
to the United States. CDC issued an order on October 25, 2021, and an amendment to
that order on October 30, 2021, providing further instructions on implementing the
presidential proclamation. This requirement was added to the existing CDC requirement
that went into effect on January 26, 2021, that all passengers arriving by air into the U.S.
from any foreign country provide proof of a negative predeparture COVID-19 test result or
documentation of recovery from COVID-19. Amended Order Implementing Presidential
Proclamation on Advancing the Safe Resumption of Global Travel During the COVID-19
Pandemic, 86 Fed. Reg. 61224 (November 5, 2021); Requirements for Negative Pre-
Departure Covid-19 Test Result or Documentation of Recovery From Covid-19 for All
Airline or Other Aircraft Passengers Arriving Into the United States From Any Foreign
Country, 86 Fed. Reg. 69256 (December 7, 2021).
46Exceptions to this requirement are allowed for individuals within certain categories such
as those on diplomatic and official foreign government travel, children under 18 years of
age, and persons unable to receive a COVID-19 vaccine due to medical contraindications.
Individuals claiming such exceptions must provide air carriers with written attestation and
supporting documentation proving their eligibility for such exceptions prior to boarding
U.S.-bound flights.
Page 16 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
• With the detection of a new variant of the COVID-19 virus in South
Africa in November 2021, TSA issued a new security directive
restricting international air travel. 47 As with the previous security
directives restricting international air travel, on November 27, 2021,
TSA issued the directive to implement the terms of a presidential
proclamation restricting the entry of noncitizens to the U.S. who had
been physically present in South Africa or seven other African
countries within 14 days of the date of their entry or attempted entry to
the U.S. 48 These restrictions were subsequently cancelled by TSA on
December 31, 2021 in response to a presidential proclamation which
stated the restrictions were no longer needed to protect public
health. 49
Figure 2 shows a time line of key COVID-19-related events and TSA’s
security directives.
47See SD 1544-21-04 (restricting travel from Republic of Botswana, Kingdom of Eswatini,
Kingdom of Lesotho, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mozambique, Republic of Namibia,
Republic of South Africa, Republic of Zimbabwe).
48In addition to South Africa, the other countries to which these restrictions apply include
Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.
49On December 28, 2021, the President issued a proclamation, Revoking Proclamation
10315, which revoked the travel restrictions previously established for the eight southern
African countries. 87 Fed. Reg. 149 (Jan. 3, 2022).
Page 17 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Figure 2: Time Line of Key COVID-19 Events and Related Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security Directives, as
of December 2021
a
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Department of Homeland Security’s
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, with support from U.S. Customs and Border
Protection implemented enhanced health screenings to detect ill travelers traveling to the U.S. on
Page 18 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
direct or connecting flights from Wuhan, China. These screenings were conducted at three U.S.
airports that receive most of the travelers from Wuhan, China: San Francisco International Airport in
San Francisco, CA; John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, NY; and Los Angeles
International Airport in Los Angeles, CA.
b
A Public Health Emergency of International Concern is an extraordinary event that is determined to
constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and to
potentially require a coordinated international response.
c
Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar, II, Determination that a Public Health
Emergency Exists, https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx.
d
See TSA Security Directive (SD) 1544-20-01 (concerning People’s Republic of China), TSA
Emergency Amendment (EA) 1546-20-01.
e
See TSA SD 1544-20-01B (adding Islamic Republic of Iran), EA 1546-20-01B.
f
See SD 1544-20-02, EA 1546-20-02 (requiring medical screenings for Last Points of Departure to the
United States from Italy and the Republic of Korea (South Korea)). Italy was subsequently dropped
from this security directive on March 13, 2020 when a separate security directive for restrictions on
travelers from the Schengen Area of Europe, which includes Italy, went into effect.
g
See TSA SD 1544-20-01C (adding the Schengen Area), EA 1546-20-01C. The Schengen Area of
Europe includes 26 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak,
85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 18, 2020).
h
See TSA SD 1544-20-01D (adding the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland), EA 1546-20-01D.
See TSA SD 1544-20-01E (adding Federative Republic of Brazil), EA 1546-20-01E.
i
j
CDC issues order requiring all air passengers entering the U.S. to get a viral test (a test for current
infection) within the 3 days before their flight and to provide documentation of the test result to the
airline or provide documentation of having recovered from COVID-19. Under the order, airlines are to
confirm the negative test result for all passengers or documentation of recovery before they are
boarded. If a passenger does not provide documentation, or chooses not to take a test, the airline
must deny boarding to the passenger.
k
See TSA EA 1546-20-01G (adding Republic of South Africa).
See TSA SD 1542-21-01 (concerning Airport Operators); SD 1544-21-02 (concerning Domestic Air
l
Carriers); EA 1546-21-01 (concerning Foreign Air Carriers); SD 1582/84-21-01 (concerning Surface
Modes of Transportation).
m
See TSA SD 1544-20-01H (adding Republic of India), EA 1546-20-01H.
n
See TSA SD 1544-21-03 (requiring proof of full vaccination for specified passengers). All country-by-
country COVID-19 international air travel restrictions were lifted for fully vaccinated noncitizen
nonimmigrants. In place of the restrictions, noncitizen nonimmigrant passengers are to provide air
carriers proof of full vaccination prior to boarding a U.S.-bound flight. Exceptions to this requirement
are allowed for certain individuals such as those on diplomatic and official foreign government travel,
children under 18 years of age, and persons unable to receive a COVID-19 vaccine due to medical
contraindications.
o
See TSA SD 1544-21-04 (restricting travel from Republic of Botswana, Kingdom of Eswatini,
Kingdom of Lesotho, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mozambique, Republic of Namibia, Republic of
South Africa, Republic of Zimbabwe).
In developing and issuing its COVID-19 security directives, TSA generally
TSA Coordinated with coordinated with external stakeholders—including industry partners and
Stakeholders on other federal agencies. Due to the urgent nature of the COVID-19
pandemic and the time frames established in the executive actions, TSA
COVID-19 Security told us they expedited this coordination to quickly issue the security
Directives directives. While industry stakeholders raised some issues with various
Page 19 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
aspects of the directives, such as how to implement the international
security restrictions and concern for the safety of their workforce when
implementing the face mask security directives, selected stakeholders we
spoke with were broadly positive with regard to TSA’s outreach and
coordination efforts.
TSA Coordinated with TSA officials stated that they conducted the required coordination
Stakeholders activities, legal reviews, and documentation for creating security
directives in accordance with its procedures and processes as set forth in
TSA standard operating procedures. TSA officials also provided
documentation related to TSA’s coordination activities, such as agency
outreach plans and logs of comments they received from industry
stakeholders. TSA officials reported coordinating in an expedited manner,
given the urgency of the COVID-19 situation and the time frames
specified in the executive actions. According to TSA officials, under
normal circumstances, the security directive development process can
take up to several months for more broad-scoped worldwide directives.
However, the time frames in the executive actions typically gave TSA less
than a week to fully develop and issue the COVID-19 security directives. 50
To meet the expedited time frames, TSA primarily asked stakeholders to
meet quick time lines to carry out coordination activities, including the
sharing of information about the directives with, and obtaining input from
industry and interagency stakeholders.
Industry Stakeholders Industry stakeholders we spoke with stated that TSA coordinated
positively and effectively overall when issuing the COVID-19-related
security directives. Specifically, TSA officials reached out to industry
stakeholders or entities that TSA has regulatory authority over, including
airlines, airports, and surface transportation operators. This outreach
occurred through a series of conference calls and emails between TSA
and the stakeholders. Through these calls and emails, TSA provided draft
language in the directive for stakeholders to comment on and received
50For the presidential proclamations imposing the international air travel restrictions, the
timeframe for implementation varied from one to four calendar days from the time the
proclamation was signed. The executive order requiring face masks on transportation
systems, signed on January 21, 2021, required agencies to take immediate action, but did
not set a specific implementation deadline. Executive Order 13998, Promoting COVID–19
Safety in Domestic and International Travel, 86 Fed. Reg. 7205 (Jan. 26, 2021); CDC
subsequently issued an order on January 29, 2021, that established the specific
requirements for wearing face masks on transportation systems and set the deadline for
implementation as February 2, 2021. Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on
Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025 (February 3, 2021).
Page 20 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
responses from the stakeholders on concerns they had on the draft
language. For example, when developing the international air travel
restrictions, TSA spoke via conference calls with air carrier associations
and their members as well as associations representing airport operators
about the draft language. Sometimes TSA held multiple conversations
with smaller groups of stakeholders to allow for more manageable
feedback sessions. 51 Due to the scheduling challenges of holding
conference calls with foreign carrier stakeholders in various time zones
abroad, TSA also used its International Industry Representatives as direct
liaisons to foreign carriers in seeking the carriers’ feedback on the
directives, as well as to respond to questions they may have.
Similarly, TSA officials stated that TSA also used its Principal Security
Inspectors as direct liaisons to domestic air carriers in seeking feedback
on directives as well as responding to inquiries that those carriers may
have. The time TSA gave stakeholders to review and comment on the
security directives was likewise accelerated as compared with normal
circumstances as nine of the 21 regulated stakeholders we spoke with
noted that they had less than 24 hours to comment. 52 TSA officials
acknowledged that the time provided to stakeholders for comment was
shortened for the COVID-19 security directives, due to the expedited
implementation time frames mandated by the executive actions.
With regard to coordinating with surface transportation stakeholders for
the face mask security directives, TSA reached out to regulated parties
and their industry representatives, such as associations that represent
specific types of transportation operators. Surface transportation
operators told us that they provided any comments they had to industry
associations that represent operators, such as the American Public
Transportation Association, which helped coordinate and consolidate
51According to TSA officials, the security directives were applicable to a total of 336
domestic and foreign air carriers worldwide.
52For this review, GAO met with a total of 26 industry stakeholders including individual
operators, operator associations, and transportation sector labor associations. See App. I
for a list of these stakeholders. The five labor associations are not considered regulated
parties by TSA and were therefore not coordinated with prior to the release of the security
directives. A “regulated party” is a party operating under a standard security program,
Security Directive, or Emergency Amendment that is approved, accepted, or issued by
TSA and is responsible for compliance under TSA regulations or the terms of the security
directive. For example, an airport operator is a regulated party under 49 C.F.R. Part 1542.
Given this, the total number of stakeholders that we spoke with that are “regulated”
operators or associations that represent such operators and did coordinate with TSA is 21.
Page 21 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
operator input and comments before providing the input and comments to
TSA headquarters officials. 53 Some operators stated that they also
worked closely with local or regional TSA officials to obtain clarification
about how to implement the directives.
For example, one stakeholder stated that they had questions about
exactly when they should remove passengers who refused to comply with
the face mask security directives and took those questions to the TSA
regional security director for their region who helped clarify what the
expectations were for the stakeholder. In addition to working through
associations and TSA representatives at their local offices, TSA provided
some operators that were also members of TSA’s Surface Transportation
Security Advisory Committee, a preview draft of the security directives.
Those operators provided comments directly to TSA. 54
TSA reached out to labor associations on the security directives after they
were developed. According to TSA officials, in January 2021, they
engaged labor associations and law enforcement partners to provide
information on the face mask security directives. For example, TSA
officials stated that FAA and TSA representatives held conference calls
with aviation stakeholders, including labor associations, to discuss the
face mask security directives and how to deal with potentially aggressive
passengers. TSA representatives also attended a meeting hosted by
DOT for surface transportation labor association representatives about
the face mask security directives in the week following the directives’
release. The five labor associations representing transportation workers
that we spoke with stated that it has been a longstanding TSA practice
not to coordinate with labor associations in the development of directives
53According to TSA officials and our review of the comments received, of the 34
comments that TSA received from surface transportation system stakeholders on the face
mask security directive, more than half were provided by industry associations
representing surface transportation operators.
54The Surface Transportation Security Advisory Committee advises the TSA Administrator
on surface transportation security matters, including the development, refinement, and
implementation of policies, programs, initiatives, rulemakings and security directives
pertaining to surface transportation security. Voting members consist of individuals
representing each mode of surface transportation, such as passenger rail, freight rail,
mass transit, pipelines, highways, over-the-road bus, school bus industry, and trucking.
The committee operates in accordance with the provisions of the TSA Modernization Act,
which was signed into law on October 3, 2018. Pub. L. No. 115-254, §1901, 132 Stat.
3186, 3542.
Page 22 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
or other security policies. 55 According to TSA officials, this is TSA’s
practice because TSA does not consider labor associations to be
“regulated” parties. TSA officials further stated that it is the responsibility
of the regulated party to share the contents of the security directives with
their employees with a need to know, including pilots, flight attendants,
and security officers.
Interagency Stakeholders As with the industry stakeholders, interagency stakeholders similarly
reported timely and effective coordination by TSA during development of
the security directives. Officials from CDC, DOT and its component
agencies such as the FAA, and CBP all stated that TSA coordinated
quickly and effectively with their agencies to ensure that their expertise
and equities were considered and reflected in the security directives. This
coordination happened through interagency forums such as the White
House Coronavirus Taskforce, interagency conference calls, and by
inviting other federal agencies to review and comment on draft security
directives before they were finalized. For example, DOT officials stated
that they worked with TSA in order to ensure that disability requirements
were addressed appropriately with exemptions in accordance with federal
regulations, a requirement that DOT must carry out under its statutory
authority. 56 Additionally, when developing and coordinating on the face
mask security directives, TSA waited for the final CDC order before
finalizing the security directives to ensure consistency. According to TSA
officials, TSA made some changes to its draft directives based on the
final CDC order, such as modifying the language for medical exemptions,
which was broader than TSA’s original language.
Officials from DOT and its component agencies stated that they were also
included and participated in TSA outreach efforts to industry stakeholders
about the face mask requirement and also provided additional resources
and information to operators to support effective implementation. For
example, DOT officials stated that they participated in conference calls
with TSA to discuss implementation with operators and to answer
questions. These calls included meetings with surface transportation and
aviation operators in the week leading up to implementation and the week
55Officials from the five labor associations we met with stated that TSA did not consult with
them during the development of the COVID-19 directives. However, the officials told us
TSA did brief them on the directives after they were finalized.
56Under 14 C.F.R. pt. 382, DOT has regulatory authority for monitoring and enforcing
federal requirements for ensuring the nondiscrimination of travelers based on disability in
air travel. 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a).
Page 23 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
after. DOT officials participated in calls with operators to update operators
on revisions to the face mask security directive. 57
Industry Stakeholders
Raised Some
Implementation Issues
with COVID-19 Security
Directives
International Air Travel For the security directives on international air travel restriction and testing
Restrictions requirements, TSA received 273 comments from 117 airline associations
and operators. 58 Of those comments, about half (145 out of 273
comments) were confirming receipt of the security directives, as required
by TSA, and did not raise any substantive issues. Of the remaining 128
comments, 103 asked clarifying questions about how to implement the
requirements. For example, nine stakeholders asked about the
applicability of the security directives to pilots and crewmembers who had
traveled to restricted locations in the previous 14 days. TSA clarified that
working and commuting crewmembers would be exempt from the travel
restrictions, regardless of which carrier they are travelling on, but that
crewmembers who are on personal travel would not.
Face Mask Security Directives For the face mask security directives, TSA received and addressed
comments from both aviation and surface transportation operators and
their related associations about a variety of issues. While there were
distinct issues highlighted by operators, there were also requests for
57In addition to participating in calls with operators, DOT component agencies also issued
additional information to operators within their respective transportation modes on how to
implement the requirement. For example, DOT component agencies such as the Federal
Transit Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, and Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, provided a list of frequently asked questions and answers to common
questions specific to the different transportation modes. DOT also created a “Mask Up
Toolkit” website to provide information on the face mask security directives as well as
other resources such as templates for signs and other media for operators to use to
increase public awareness of and compliance with the requirement. DEPT. OF
TRANSPORTATION, MASK UP TOOLKIT, (last updated Thursday, March 18, 2021),
https://www.transportation.gov/mask-up/tool-kit.
58In November 2019, TSA instituted a process to formally track and document input and
comments received from stakeholders on reviews of security directives. As this process
was implemented just before the COVID-19-related security directives began to be issued
in January 2020, counts of comments for prior security directives are not available for
comparison. According to TSA officials, the security directives applied to 336 foreign and
U.S. air carriers worldwide.
Page 24 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
clarifications on implementation that TSA made through the coordination
process. For example, one operator asked TSA to clarify language such
as TSA’s expectations for operators to remove persons who refuse to
wear a mask at the “earliest opportunity.” TSA officials responded to this
comment by leaving it up to the operator to determine, stating that they
expect owners and operators “will develop appropriate procedures to
disembark passengers at a safe and appropriate location.” TSA also
created a “Frequently Asked Questions” document to provide information
on the face mask security directives to address stakeholder questions.
According to TSA officials, TSA also hosted weekly conference calls with
aviation system stakeholders to provide additional information and
clarification as needed.
Twenty-one of 26 stakeholders we spoke with stated that TSA
coordinated with them in a positive and effective manner when issuing the
face mask security directives. 59 For example, all of these stakeholders
stated that despite the tight time frames, TSA was responsive to their
comments and questions regarding the directives. Further, one
stakeholder specifically noted that TSA was broadly inclusive of a diverse
set of stakeholders and worked hard to reach out to as many
stakeholders as possible.
Issues Raised by Industry Many of the stakeholders we spoke with told us that they had identified
Stakeholders several key issues with the directives and raised them with TSA (See
Figure 3).
59To identify and understand key industry stakeholder concerns or issues related to the
face mask security directives, we interviewed 26 industry stakeholders including individual
operators, operator associations, and transportation sector labor associations.
Page 25 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Figure 3: Issues Concerning the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA)
Face Mask Security Directives That Selected Industry Stakeholders Raised to GAO
Note: This figure reflects the number of industry stakeholders that raised particular issues to GAO
regarding TSA’s face mask directives. For this analysis, GAO met with 26 industry stakeholders
including individual operators, operator associations, and transportation sector labor associations.
TSA’s Authority Regarding Health-Related Issues
Just over one-fourth (seven of 26) of stakeholders we spoke with
questioned whether TSA should have the authority to be the lead agency
on a COVID-19-related requirement because COVID-19 was a health
concern and did not directly relate to TSA’s security-focused mission and
authorities. TSA responded by explaining that the ATSA provides it broad
authority to regulate transportation systems, including taking actions to
address threats such as the introduction or spread of a communicable
disease through transportation systems. Further, on January 27, 2021,
the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security released a determination of
national emergency for the COVID-19 pandemic and directed TSA to use
its authority to address the COVID-19 threat to transportation, recognizing
that such a threat may involve passenger and employee safety. 60
Scope of the Face Mask Security Directives
Just over one-fourth (seven of 26) of stakeholders we spoke with raised
issues related to the scope of the face mask security directive as they
60DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DETERMINATION OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY
REQUIRING ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS USING AND EMPLOYED BY THE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, (2021),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0130_as1_determination-national-
emergency.pdf.
Page 26 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
pertain to workspaces. For example, one stakeholder stated that the initial
interpretation of the directives was that employees were required to wear
a mask alone in their office or while working outside away from other
people, which some industry stakeholders felt was broader than the CDC
guidance. As a result of the feedback, TSA updated its Frequently Asked
Questions document to clarify that employees who were alone in
enclosed offices could remove their masks.
Workforce Safety
Just under one fifth (five of 26) of stakeholders we spoke with expressed
concerns with workforce safety. They stated that employees, such as bus
drivers, train conductors, flight attendants, and public transportation
station managers, do not always have timely access to security officers
for assistance in case a passenger becomes belligerent when asked to
comply with the face mask security directives. Therefore, the
stakeholders were concerned about employee physical safety when
confronting noncompliant passengers who may become belligerent. TSA
stressed that the objective of the security directives is to gain compliance
from passengers in wearing masks, not to take punitive enforcement
action against noncompliant passengers without escalation. TSA further
explained that if a passenger refuses to comply, the operators’ employees
should make their “best effort” to remove the passenger. If the passenger
continues to refuse, the operators should report this to TSA, and TSA will
ensure that appropriate consequences are levied. According to
stakeholders, they worked with TSA on a case-by-case basis to clarify the
meaning of “best efforts” and generally came to the understanding that
the passenger should be removed at the judgement of the operator when
it is safe and practical to do so.
Guidance and Signage
Just under one fifth (five of 26) of stakeholders we spoke with stated that
they would have liked to receive better guidance and signage from TSA
prior to the release of the directives. For example, stakeholders stated
that TSA’s communications guidance and signage were too vague to
properly inform the public that the face mask security directives were a
federal requirement. In response, according to TSA officials, TSA revised
its sample signage and updated the Frequently Asked Questions
guidance to better clarify some of the language.
Page 27 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Medical Exemptions to the Face Mask Security Directives
Four out of 26 stakeholders we spoke with stated that the medical
exemptions to the face mask security directives were too lenient and that
many aviation stakeholders had stricter requirements for granting
exemptions. One stakeholder stated that they did not understand which
exemptions qualified. TSA responded that it developed the exemptions
language to be consistent with CDC guidance and DOT feedback and to
ensure that federal disability requirements were met. 61
According to the stakeholders we spoke with, TSA’s responses to the
concerns raised by associations and operators were generally accepted
by the stakeholders and they were satisfied by the efforts TSA made.
Further, in some instances, such as with the medical exemption
concerns, stakeholders stated that they also understood that TSA was
implementing CDC guidance and did not have the sole authority to make
changes. With this understanding, stakeholders were generally positive
when speaking about TSA’s coordination.
TSA Took Steps
to Ensure
Implementation
of the Directives
and, with FAA,
Supported
Investigations of
Unruly Non-Masked
Passengers
TSA Used Inspections and TSA took steps to monitor and ensure implementation of the directives by
Observations to Ensure transportation system operators and to work with them on areas needing
improvement. It did so using in-person inspections of air carriers for their
Operator Implementation
implementation of the security directives for international air travel
of COVID-19 Directives
61Additionally, according to TSA officials, the Department of Justice advised TSA that any
exemptions to the mandate be narrowly construed. TSA officials said TSA followed that
guidance.
Page 28 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
restrictions and TSA inspector observations of operator implementation of
the security directives.
In-person Inspections For the security directives restricting international air travel, TSA
incorporated steps into existing in-person inspections of air carrier
operations for flights to the U.S. from foreign airports. 62 According to TSA
officials, since the security directives went into effect, inspectors have
been observing carrier processes to confirm that they comply with the
requirements of the security directives, such as reviewing passenger
travel histories, conducting health screenings, and denying boarding to
passengers that fail a health screening or have a high risk of exposure to
COVID-19. TSA officials stated that since the first security directives
restricting international air travel went into effect in February 2020, a total
of 198 carrier inspections had been completed as of September 2021. Of
those inspections, six identified what TSA officials described as minor
deficiencies specific to the COVID-19 security directives, such as carrier
personnel not asking the correct questions of passengers to determine
recent travel histories. In those instances, TSA officials reported that TSA
inspectors provided on-the-spot corrective counseling to the personnel. 63
In-person Observations In implementing the face mask security directives, operators are required
to provide notice to passengers and employees of the requirement and
the potential penalties for not wearing a face mask. 64 To assist operators
with this, TSA developed signage templates that operators can adapt and
62Consistent with the ATSA and in accordance with existing statutory requirements (49
U.S.C. § 114 (2021)), TSA is to conduct inspections of U.S. air carriers and foreign air
carriers servicing the U.S. from foreign airports to ensure that they meet applicable
security requirements. During an air carrier inspection, inspectors are to review applicable
security manuals, procedures, and records; interview air carrier station personnel; and
observe air carrier employees processing passengers from at least one flight from
passenger check-in until the flight departs the gate to ensure that the air carrier is
compliant with applicable requirements.
63For passengers, compliance with the international air travel restrictions is monitored by
CBP from the time passengers begin the travel process through the time they apply for
admission or entry into the United States. In June 2021, we reported on CBP’s processes
for this monitoring. See GAO-21-431.
64See SD 1542-21-01 (concerning Airport Operators); SD 1544-21-01 (concerning
Domestic Air Carriers); EA 1546-21-01 (concerning Foreign Air Carriers); SD 1582/84-21-
01 (concerning Surface Modes of Transportation). According to TSA’s security directives,
operators are to provide prominent and adequate notice that federal law requires wearing
a mask and that failure to comply may result in denial of boarding or removal. In addition,
the notice is to state that refusing to wear a mask is a violation of federal law and could
result in penalties. The directives also state that such notice is to be provided by the
operators, at a minimum, when passengers purchase tickets or book transportation and
after passengers have been boarded.
Page 29 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
use in their own systems and facilities. According to TSA officials, TSA
does not conduct inspections specifically to confirm operator compliance
with the requirements of the face mask security directives, such as
providing adequate signage. However, if a TSA inspector happens to be
on an operator’s conveyance or at an operator’s facility and observes
deficient signage, the inspector is to counsel the operator on
improvements. See figure 4 for an example of TSA face mask signage at
an airport security checkpoint.
Figure 4: Examples of the Transportation Security Administration’s Face Mask Security Directive Signage at Airport Security
Checkpoints
Page 30 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
TSA and the FAA Both TSA and the FAA have investigated incidents of passengers who
Investigated Incidents of become threatening or physically aggressive when asked to comply with
the face mask security directive. TSA investigates incidents across all
Unruly Non-Masked
transportation systems, while the FAA investigates incidents with air
Passengers carriers to combat unruly passengers. 65 Specifically, TSA investigates
violations of the security directives, while the FAA investigates incidents
regarding flight safety and interference with flight crew.
TSA Investigations In addition to requirements for signage and notification to passengers
about face mask requirements, TSA’s face mask security directive
mandates that operators establish procedures to manage passengers
who refuse to comply with the requirement. 66 According to the security
directive, such procedures are to include processes for the operator to
deny boarding to or disembark passengers who refuse to wear masks,
even when prompted or asked, and remove them from transportation
hubs or facilities, such as stations and terminals. According to TSA
officials, this approach is intended to give non-masked passengers an
opportunity to comply without operators immediately initiating punitive
actions or sanctions.
For passengers who continue to refuse to comply with the face mask
security directives and become disruptive or aggressive toward the
operator or others, TSA investigates and pursues more punitive action
against such passengers, as warranted. For example, TSA’s security
directive for surface transportation systems requires operators to report
incidents involving passengers who escalate their refusal to comply to the
point that they create a significant security concern, such as assaulting,
65Under 49 U.S.C. § 46318, An individual who physically or sexually assaults or threatens
to physically or sexually assault a member of the flight crew or cabin crew of a civil aircraft
or any other individual on the aircraft, or takes any action that poses an imminent threat to
the safety of the aircraft or other individuals on the aircraft is liable to the United States
Government for a civil penalty of not more than $35,000. See also 49 U.S.C. § 46504
(providing possibility of fine or imprisonment for passengers who interfere with flight crew
member or flight attendant of the aircraft).
66See SD 1542-21-01 (concerning Airport Operators); SD 1544-21-01 (concerning
Domestic Air Carriers); EA 1546-21-01 (concerning Foreign Air Carriers); SD 1582/84-21-
01 (concerning Surface Modes of Transportation).
Page 31 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
interfering with, or threatening a transportation worker. 67 TSA’s security
directives for the aviation system (air carrier and airport operators) require
the operators to report any incident in which an individual refuses to
comply with the face mask requirement. 68 Once an operator makes a
report to TSA and, if the report contains sufficient information about the
disruptive individual involved, a TSA inspector investigates. 69
TSA has issued warning notices and civil penalty fines against
passengers once TSA has determined that enforcement action is
warranted but began using only civil penalties against such passengers in
September 2021. From the initial implementation of the security directive
in February 2021, TSA officials stated that while the agency typically gave
warning notices to first-time offenders, it utilized its ability to assess civil
penalties against individuals who met certain aggravating factors, such as
repeat offenders who could be assessed civil penalties of up to $1,500.
However, due to continued noncompliance by some passengers with the
face mask requirement, in September 2021, TSA expanded the list of
aggravating factors that qualify a violator for a monetary civil penalty to
include instances of defiant behavior while refusing to wear a face mask
and repeated removal or improper use of a face mask after being
instructed to wear one. TSA also increased the penalties, with first-time
67See SD 1582/84-21-01 (concerning Surface Modes of Transportation). These incident
reports are to be made to the Transportation Security Operation Center, which serves as
TSA’s coordination center for transportation security incidents and operations. The
center’s functions include incident management, coordination, and situational awareness
for all modes of transportation.
68See SD 1542-21-01 (concerning Airport Operators); SD 1544-21-01 (concerning
Domestic Air Carriers); EA 1546-21-01 (concerning Foreign Air Carriers).
69According to TSA officials, because TSA investigates incidents caused by individuals, if
an individual’s identity is not reported and cannot be subsequently determined, TSA is
unable to proceed with an investigation into an incident. TSA officials stated that the lack
of identification of disruptive passengers is most prevalent for reports made by surface
transportation operators (e.g., public transit, passenger rail, intercity bus) who, unlike air
carriers, typically do not require identification or other personal identifying information of
passengers when paying a fare or purchasing a ticket for travel. TSA officials stated that
they are considering ways to help improve incident reporting by operators. For example,
on November 1, 2021, TSA issued an information circular to airport and air carrier
operators that details the type of information needed by TSA to carry out an investigation
and best practices for obtaining needed information, such as from witnesses to incidents.
Officials stated that they are also looking at approaches to help enhance incident reporting
for surface transportation operators, but stated that given the variety of modes within the
surface transportation system and their operation practices, identifying solutions has been
more challenging and was still in process as of January 2022.
Page 32 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
offenders being assessed civil penalties of $500 to $1,000, while repeat
offenders could face up to $3,000 in civil penalties.
Of the incidents that TSA investigated and for which it took enforcement
actions, most involved passengers onboard aircraft. For example,
according to TSA data, from February 2, 2021, through March 7, 2022,
incidents occurring onboard aircraft represented 88 percent of the 3,815
total incidents investigated. Similarly, 88 percent of TSA’s enforcement
actions for passengers who refused to wear a face mask were also for
incidents onboard aircraft. Of the 3,631 enforcement actions taken by
TSA, 75 percent (2,709) were warning notices while 25 percent (922)
were civil penalty assessments (see table 1). 70
Table 1: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Investigations and Enforcement Actions against Individuals Causing a
Security Incident Related to the Face Mask Security Directives, from February 2, 2021, to March 7, 2022
Incidents No Total
investigated by enforcement Warning Civil recommended Average
TSA action notice penalty civil penalties civil penalty
Airport checkpoint 38 0 20 18 $57,065 $3,170
Airport premises 246 13 160 72 $57,795 $803
Onboard aircraft 3,355 159 2,406 788 $501,388 $636
Surface 176 8 123 44 $28,150 $640
transportationa
Total 3,815b 180 2,709 922 $644,398c $699
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. l GAO-22-104583
Includes passenger rail, intercity bus, and public transit operators.
a
b
This number reflects the total number of investigations into incidents related to the face mask
directive that TSA completed as of March 7, 2022. The total number of incidents reported to TSA by
transportation operators as of March 7, 2022 is 7,008. According to TSA officials, enforcement action
determinations for four completed investigations were still in process and are not reflected in these
data. TSA officials stated that they are considering ways to help improve incident reporting by
operators. For example, on November 1, 2021, TSA issued an information circular for aviation
transportation operators that details the type of information needed for an investigation and best
practices for obtaining information, such as from witnesses to incidents.
c
According to TSA officials, collection and processing of the civil penalties are managed on behalf of
TSA by the U.S. Coast Guard’s Financial Center. The Financial Center is a unit within the Coast
Guard that provides professional financial, systems, and business services to multiple components
within the Department of Homeland Security. Consequently, TSA does not collect the fines and does
not have any direct knowledge of payment.
70In approximately 5 percent of the investigations completed, TSA took no enforcement
action. According to TSA officials, no enforcement actions are taken if the investigation
does not find sufficient information to confirm that a violation occurred as reported.
Page 33 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
FAA Investigations For air carrier operators, the FAA receives and investigates reports of
incidents of passengers who become unruly. According to FAA officials,
in 2021, many of those reports involved passengers who become unruly
after being asked repeatedly to wear a face mask onboard an aircraft, in
accordance with federal requirements. 71 According to the FAA, such
behavior can threaten the safety of the flight by disrupting or distracting
the aircraft crew from carrying out their safety duties. FAA officials stated
that while the FAA does not enforce TSA’s face mask security directive,
air carrier crews have reported incidents to the FAA about passengers
who interfere with crewmember duties as a result of repeatedly ignoring
crewmembers’ directions, as well as passengers who become aggressive
toward crewmembers such as when asked to comply with the directive,
sometimes to the point of threatening or assaulting a crewmember. 72
Under the FAA Special Emphasis Enforcement Program initiated January
13, 2021, the FAA has pursued civil penalties against a passenger if their
behavior was determined to violate specific federal regulations or statutes
aimed at unruly passengers. 73 In the past, the FAA addressed unruly
passenger conduct with a variety of actions including counseling or
warning notices as well as civil penalties. However, under the Special
Emphasis Enforcement Program, the FAA instituted what it called a “zero-
tolerance” policy in which it would take civil penalty action against all such
71The FAA conducts investigations into incidents of unruly passengers who interfere with,
physically assault, or threaten to physically assault aircraft crew or others on commercial
aircraft or refuse to follow safety or other federal regulations. These investigations are
carried out by the FAA to enforce Federal Aviation Regulations 14 C.F.R. §§91.11,
121.580 and 135.120 which state that “no person may assault, threaten, intimidate, or
interfere with a crewmember in the performance of the crewmember’s duties aboard an
aircraft being operated.” 14 C.F.R. § 91.11.
72Under the FAA’s processes, such incidents can be reported directly to the FAA or
through the respective air carrier programs by the crewmembers involved in the incident.
Other examples cited by the FAA of unruly passenger behavior include passengers
refusing to stay seated and walking through the cabin while the “fasten seatbelt” sign was
on; making threats to or assaulting other passengers or crewmembers; and consuming
alcoholic beverages that the passenger brought themselves for consumption onboard,
which is against FAA regulations.
73See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.11, 121.580, 135.120.
Page 34 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
passengers. 74 According to FAA officials, in addition to the enforcement
actions the FAA can take itself, the FAA can refer unruly passenger
incidents that appear to involve criminal conduct to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for possible criminal investigation.
The number of unruly passenger incidents reported to and investigations
conducted by the FAA in 2021 increased significantly as compared with
prior years. According to FAA data, for calendar year 2021, air carriers
reported nearly 6,000 incidents of unruly passengers, of which 72 percent
involved passengers whose unruly behavior was due, at least in part, to
the face mask security directives. By comparison, FAA officials stated that
between calendar years 2018 and 2020, air carriers reported an average
of 1,462 unruly passenger incidents a year to the FAA. As of November 1,
2021, the FAA reported that it had completed investigations into 449
passengers for unruly behavior for calendar year 2021. By comparison,
for calendar years 1995 through 2020, the FAA initiated an average of
175 such investigations each year.
Of its completed unruly passenger investigations, the FAA reported taking
enforcement action against some passengers. For example, of the 449
passengers investigated as of November 1, 2021, the FAA reported that it
had issued warnings or assessed civil penalties against 53 passengers. 75
FAA officials reported that the FAA had also initiated hundreds of other
civil penalty actions that are in process and had referred 37 passengers
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for potential criminal investigation.
FAA officials stated that this was unprecedented, compared with past
74The FAA announced the “zero tolerance” policy on January 13, 2021 and it went into
effect the same day. U.S. Dept. of Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin., Order 2150.3C CHG 4,
(2021). According to the FAA, the policy was in response to the increase in incidents of
passengers disrupting flights with threatening or violent behavior, some of which
reportedly stemmed from passenger refusals to wear face masks. Fed. Aviation Admin.,
Zero Tolerance for Unruly and Dangerous Behavior Toolkit, (last edited November 4,
2021), https://www.faa.gov/data_research/passengers_cargo/unruly_passengers/toolkit/.
According to air carrier industry associations we met with, air carriers implemented face
mask requirements for passengers prior to February 2021 when TSA’s face mask security
directives went into effect.
75According to the FAA, it proposed over $1 million in civil penalties against unruly
passengers in 2021. As of November 2021, many of the civil penalty cases are still in
process or awaiting a hearing before the DOT’s Office of Hearings. In those instances, a
final penalty amount has not yet been assessed. As of November 2021, the total value of
civil penalties imposed for cases that have been settled or otherwise adjudicated and
considered final was $549,375. FAA officials stated that most of the warning notices were
issued for incidents that occurred before the FAA started its Special Emphasis
Enforcement Program in January 2021.
Page 35 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
years. 76 FAA officials stated that no enforcement action was taken for 115
passengers, due to a lack of sufficient evidence to proceed with a case
and that the FAA was in the process of assessing civil penalties or
determining the appropriate enforcement action for 281 passengers (see
fig. 5).
Figure 5: Outcomes of Completed Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Investigations into Unruly Passengers, as of
November 1, 2021
Note: According to the FAA, as of November 1, 2021, the total number of passengers for which it had
completed an investigation for unruly behavior was 449.
a
This number includes investigations for which the FAA is in the process of taking civil penalty action.
b
According to the FAA, these referrals are made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Civil Aviation
Security Program and are not exclusive of other enforcement action that may be taken by the FAA.
c
This number includes one passenger that the FAA was unable to locate and for which the FAA
subsequently closed the case without further action.
d
According to the FAA, most of the warning notices were issued for incidents that occurred before the
FAA began its Special Emphasis Enforcement Program in January 2021. Under that program, the
FAA instituted a “zero-tolerance” policy in which it would take civil penalty action against unruly
passengers. Previously, the FAA addressed unruly passenger conduct with a variety of actions
including counseling or warning notices to passengers.
e
According to the FAA, over $1 million in civil penalties has been proposed against unruly passengers
in 2021. As of November 2021, many of the civil penalty cases are still in process or awaiting a
hearing before the Department of Transportation’s Office of Hearings. In those instances, a final
penalty amount has not yet been assessed. As of November 2021, the total value of penalties
imposed for cases that have been settled or otherwise adjudicated and considered final was
$549,375.
f
Of these, six have also been assessed a civil penalty by the FAA.
76For example, FAA officials stated that no criminal referrals of unruly passengers were
made in 2019.
Page 36 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
TSA and FAA Information According to TSA and FAA officials, TSA and the FAA have processes in
Sharing for Investigations place to facilitate information sharing concerning incidents and the
investigations conducted into them. For example, TSA officials stated that
they have formalized a process by which TSA inspectors conducting
investigations into face mask related incidents in the aviation system are
to actively share with their FAA investigative counterparts any information
they have obtained on an incident and the individual involved. The FAA
can then use the information to pursue investigations under the FAA’s
respective authorities to ensure aviation safety and take enforcement
action as appropriate. TSA has also issued guidance to its inspectors
directing them to coordinate with their FAA investigative counterparts on
incident investigations that may also involve violations of FAA regulations,
such as those against interfering with a flight crew, to determine whether
one or both agencies should proceed with enforcement actions. FAA
officials also stated that there is coordination in the field between FAA
investigators and TSA inspectors who carry out the investigations.
Operator and Industry Operators and industry stakeholders we met with noted that TSA’s face
Stakeholder Observations mask security directives were largely consistent with existing face mask
requirements and helped strengthen and harmonize messaging to the
on TSA’s Face Mask
public about the importance and enforcement of those directives.
Security Directives and According to most operators and industry stakeholder associations we
Their Implementation met with, as they or most of their members had already implemented face
mask requirements for their respective operations in 2020,
implementation of TSA’s security directive generally required minimal
changes. These changes involved revising signage and notices to reflect
that face masks were now also a federal requirement and subject to
federal enforcement. The operator stakeholders we met with stated that
the directive was helpful overall in providing a nationwide standard for
baseline face mask requirements and in providing a federal endorsement
of sorts of existing face mask requirements. In addition, one industry
association representing bus operators indicated that even though some
of its charter bus members were not required to follow the directive, they
did so anyway to encourage mask wearing among its passengers.
While industry stakeholders told us that they were supportive of TSA’s
face mask security directives and the importance of ensuring passenger
compliance, they raised concerns about the level of aggressive opposition
they and their employees face from some passengers over the
requirement. For example, multiple industry stakeholders we met with,
such as labor associations that represent transportation workers, stated
that because violence by passengers against workers enforcing the face
mask security directive remains elevated, particularly onboard aircraft,
Page 37 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
more needs to be done to prevent and protect workers against such
violence. Some industry stakeholders also suggested specific additional
actions that TSA or other federal agencies could take to more directly
respond to aggressive passengers, such as increasing the number of
Federal Air Marshals on flights, developing a “do not fly” or “do not drive”
list of known aggressive passengers, and providing additional criminal
prosecution of passengers by the Department of Justice.
TSA officials stated that they have taken additional steps to better support
transportation workers against violence and further encourage
compliance by passengers with the face mask security directives. For
example, TSA officials stated that in July 2021, TSA restarted a voluntary
self-defense training course for crewmembers of domestic air carriers on
how to respond to potential physical altercations both on and off aircraft. 77
In October 2021, TSA officials stated that since restarting the program,
400 air carrier crewmembers had completed the training.
TSA officials stated that they have also made adjustments in their
enforcement approach. For example, they broadened the aggravating
factors that a TSA inspector could consider when investigating an incident
and determining the appropriate penalty. 78 In addition to any enforcement
actions that might be taken against individuals for noncompliance with the
face mask security directives, TSA officials stated that TSA protocols
disqualify individuals who are subject to such enforcement actions from
participating in TSA’s PreCheck® program. 79 TSA has also established a
memorandum of understanding with the FAA for a process to obtain
information on passengers whom the FAA has issued civil penalties
against for unruly passenger conduct, such as interfering with a flight
crew, so that those passengers can also be disqualified for PreCheck
privileges. In addition, TSA will assist the FAA in identifying current
addresses for passengers suspected of engaging in interference with the
flight crew, if the passenger has also applied to the TSA PreCheck
77According to TSA officials, this four-hour training program has been in place since 2004,
and was paused in 2020 due to COVID-19 restrictions. The training is provided at
locations around the country by the Federal Air Marshals who teach crewmembers
techniques for deescalating and defending themselves against attacks.
78An example of an aggravating factor is when an individual has already been subject to
an enforcement action for a previous violation.
79TSA’s PreCheck program provides previously vetted individuals with expedited security
screening when passing through an airport security checkpoint. According to TSA
PreCheck protocols, individuals found in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(1) can be
disqualified from participating in the PreCheck program.
Page 38 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Program or to other TSA-run programs. According to TSA officials, this
will help the FAA initiate the civil penalty process for persons whom it may
otherwise be unable to locate, due to lack of address information.
Beyond those efforts, TSA officials noted that TSA enforcement
authorities are limited. Specifically, TSA is principally responsible for
transportation security, whereas the FAA is responsible for flight safety
and has issued regulations and requirements regarding interference with
flight crew, although these authorities overlap and intersect.
Consequently, TSA investigates violations of the security directives and
takes appropriate action consistent with TSA enforcement policies and
procedures, while the FAA pursues enforcement action regarding flight
safety and interference with flight crew. If a violation solely involves
interference with the flight crew and does not involve compliance with the
face mask security directive, TSA officials stated that only the FAA
investigates and pursues enforcement, including any referrals to the
Department of Justice for potential criminal investigation. TSA officials
also noted that violation of the face mask security directives is not a crime
by itself but, in matters where a crime has also occurred during a violation
of the directives, TSA will support the Department of Justice.
Some operators also indicated that TSA does not keep them informed on
the status of security incidents they have reported. Specifically, three of
10 operators we met with stated that they have not heard from TSA about
the outcomes of any investigations into their reports about security
incidents or concerns caused by passengers refusing to comply with the
face mask security directive, such as whether TSA took action against the
passengers. The operators told us that having such information would
provide better awareness of the usefulness of their reports to TSA and
the enforcement actions TSA has taken, if any. The operators also noted
that such information may help build transportation workers’ confidence
that TSA supports them in their enforcement and that reports to TSA
about such incidents are taken seriously.
TSA officials acknowledged that they do not share outcomes of specific
face mask security incident investigations with operators due to legal and
technical limitations, but make efforts to share aggregated information on
enforcement activity when possible. TSA officials stated that because the
subjects of these investigations are individuals, there are privacy
protections that limit TSA’s ability to share specific case information or
Page 39 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
outcomes, even with the operator that reported a particular individual. 80 In
addition, the entry fields for TSA’s database system to record violations of
TSA security regulations do not link investigations of face mask-related
security incidents to a specific operator. 81 TSA officials stated that while
mention of an operator’s identity may be made in free-form narrative entry
fields in TSA’s database system, compiling information about specific
investigations to share with specific operators would be a labor-intensive
process of manually reviewing investigation report entries to search and
separate out investigations by operator. TSA officials noted that while
they do not share incident-specific information or outcomes, they meet
with some operator stakeholder groups, such as air carriers, on a regular
basis and use the opportunities to share aggregated counts with the
operators. These counts may include the total number of incidents
reported, investigations ongoing and completed, and the enforcement
actions taken to date.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOT for review and
Agency Comments comment. DHS and DOT did not provide formal written comments, but did
provide technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
80Under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)), in general an agency may not disclose any
records about an individual maintained in a system of records without that individual’s
written consent. According to TSA officials, there are exceptions to that general rule when
appropriate to address a threat or potential threat to transportation security or national
security or when required for administrative purposes related to the effective and efficient
administration of transportation security laws. Therefore, TSA would be permitted to share
specific case information or investigation outcomes with an operator, regardless of
whether an operator made the initial incident report to TSA.
81This database is known as the Performance and Results Information System (PARIS)
and is the system that TSA uses to capture reports of violations of TSA security
regulations as well as details of outreach, inspection, incident, and investigation records.
Page 40 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested
parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO
website at https://www.gao.gov/. If you or your staff have any questions,
please contact me at (202) 512-8461 or shermant@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant
contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.
Tina Won Sherman
Director,
Homeland Security and Justice
Page 41 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
List of Committees
The Honorable Patrick Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ron Wyden
Chairman
The Honorable Mike Crapo
Ranking Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair
The Honorable Richard Burr
Ranking Member
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
United States Senate
The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Chairman
The Honorable Rob Portman
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro
Chairwoman
The Honorable Kay Granger
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Page 42 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
List of Committees Continued
The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Cathy McMorris Rodgers
Republican Leader
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
The Honorable John Katko
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney
Chairwoman
The Honorable James Comer
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Richard E. Neal
Chairman
The Honorable Kevin Brady
Republican Leader
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives
Page 43 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Appendix I: List of Transportation Industry Appendix I: List of Transportation Industry
Stakeholders Interviewed
Stakeholders Interviewed
We interviewed 26 transportation industry stakeholders to obtain the
perspectives on the Transportation Security Administration’s efforts to
coordinate and understand concerns or issues related to COVID-19
security directives. The table below lists those stakeholders.
Table 2: Transportation Industry Stakeholders GAO Interviewed
Stakeholder Type of stakeholder
Transportation operators
Delta Air Lines U.S. air carrier
United Airlines U.S. air carrier
British Airways Foreign air carrier
Korean Air Foreign air carrier
Miami International Airport Airport operator
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport Airport operator
Coach USA Intercity bus operator
Greyhound Lines Intercity bus operator
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Public transit operator
Amtrak Passenger rail operator
Metra (Chicago) Passenger rail operator
Transportation labor associations
Air Line Pilots Association, International Labor association
Association of Flight Attendants Labor association
Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations Labor association
Transport Workers Union of America Labor association
Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Networka Airport law enforcement association
Transportation operator associations
Association of American Railroads Railroad operator association
American Bus Association Bus operator association
United Motorcoach Association Bus operator association
American Public Transportation Association Public transportation operator association
Airlines for America U.S. air carrier association
National Air Carrier Association U.S. air carrier association
Regional Airline Association U.S. air carrier association
American Association of Airport Executives Airport operator association
Airports Council International-North America Airport operator association
International Air Transport Association International air carrier association
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104583
Page 44 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Appendix I: List of Transportation Industry
Stakeholders Interviewed
a
The Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network is an association that represents agencies that
provide law enforcement at airports. Given that they do not operate a transportation system, we
classified them as a labor association for the purpose of our analysis.
Page 45 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
Tina Won Sherman at (202) 512-8461 or shermant@gao.gov.
GAO Contact:
In addition to the contact named above, Chris Ferencik (Assistant
Staff Director), Christopher Hatscher (Analyst-in-Charge), Ben Crossley,
Acknowledgements: Dominick Dale, Michele Fejfar, Leslie Gordon, David Hooper, Ryan
Lester, and Mary Turgeon made key contributions to this report.
(104583)
Page 46 GAO-22-104583 Transportation Security
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