Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Semiannual Report to Congress (April 1, 2025 — September 30, 2025)
Summary
The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration's semiannual report to Congress covers April 1, 2025 through September 30, 2025. During the period TIGTA's Office of Audit issued 37 reports, its Office of Investigations completed 900 investigations and its Office of Inspections and Evaluations issued 15 reports; together they identified, recovered or protected monetary benefits of nearly $759 million. Highlights include audits of gaps in IRS controls over issuing identification numbers used to claim fraudulent employer tax credits, and inspections of Taxpayer Assistance Centers. TIGTA also reports that the IRS reprocessed approximately 7.1 million FAFSA form requests after an error in the data sent to the Department of Education.
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Tr ea s u r y I n s p ec to r G e n e r al For Tax Admi n i s t r at i on
SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
April 1, 2025 — September 30, 2025
To Report Waste, Fraud, and Abuse:
Web:
www.tigta.gov
FAX:
202-927-7002
Toll-Free Hotline:
1-800-366-4484
Information you provide is confidential. You may remain anonymous.
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
VISION
Maintain a highly skilled, proactive, and diverse Inspector General organization dedicated
to working in a collaborative environment with key stakeholders to foster and promote fair
tax administration.
MISSION
Provide quality professional audit, investigative, and inspection and evaluation services that
promote integrity, economy, and efficiency in the administration of the nation’s tax system.
CORE VALUES
Integrity—Maintain the highest professional standards of integrity, personal responsibility,
independence, objectivity, and operational excellence in pursuit of the Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration’s (TIGTA) mission.
Organizational Innovation—Model innovative practices in organizational structure,
operational programs and processes, audit, investigative, and inspection and evaluation
methodologies, and the application of advanced information technology.
Communication—Achieve effective organizational approaches and solutions by
encouraging open, honest, and respectful communication among TIGTA’s executives,
employees, offices, and functions, as well as between TIGTA and its external stakeholders.
Value Employees—Respect the dignity, contributions, and work-life balance of our
employees, and recognize diversity as fundamental to the strength of our organization.
Commitment to Collaboration—Establish and maintain collaborative and professional
relationships with other government and non-government stakeholders.
Message from the Acting Inspector
General to Congress
TIGTA provides independent oversight of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Although TIGTA is placed organizationally within the Department of the Treasury,
which has its own Office of Inspector General, we operate independently
with a specific mandate to oversee all aspects of activity related to the IRS’s
administration of the federal tax system.
I am pleased to submit this Semiannual Report to Congress, which summarizes
our work and accomplishments for the period April 1 – September 30, 2025.
Notably, our work during this period helped identify seven major management
challenges we believe confront the IRS in Fiscal Year (FY) 2026. Some of the
challenges may be amplified by changes the IRS has experienced during
the reporting period, such as a 25 percent decrease in the size of its workforce
and reductions in supplemental funding.
During this period, our Office of Audit issued 37 reports; our Office of Investigations completed 900
investigations; and our Office of Inspections and Evaluations, which provides focused and expedited oversight
of emerging issues impacting tax administration and IRS operations, issued 15 reports. Collectively, TIGTA’s
audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations resulted in the recovery, protection, or identification of
monetary benefits totaling nearly $759 million.
Highlights of our work during the period include:
• Audits that identified gaps in IRS controls over issuing Employee Identification Numbers, which are
targeted and used by unscrupulous individuals to claim fraudulent employer tax credits.
• Investigations that resulted in guilty pleas or convictions of IRS employees abusing the tax system and
individuals threatening IRS personnel or property.
• Inspections that identified several issues at Taxpayer Assistance Centers (TACs), such as inoperable
self-assistance kiosks and safety and security weaknesses.
iii
I am proud of the work we have done and everyone
who undertook it. I look forward to the challenges
that lie ahead, knowing that I have full confidence in
our commitment and ability to fight waste, fraud, and
abuse in the nation’s tax system.
Sincerely,
Heather M. Hill
Acting Inspector General
iv
Table of Contents
Vision, Mission, and Core Values ii
Message from the Acting Inspector General to Congress iii
TIGTA Highlights iii
Table of Contents v
Overview of TIGTA 1
Statutory Mandate 1
Promote the Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness of Tax Administration 2
Assess Emerging Issues Impacting America’s Tax System 10
Protect the Integrity of Tax Administration 15
Office of Investigations Highlights 15
Investigations Statistical Reports 21
Reports with Unimplemented Corrective Actions 25
Appendices
Appendix I – Organizational Structure 30
Appendix II – Other Required Reporting 31
Appendix III – TIGTA Statutory Reviews 32
Appendix IV – Audit and Evaluation Reports Issued 37
Appendix V – Inspector General Peer Review Activity 40
Appendix VI – Data Tables Provided by the IRS 41
IRS Memorandum 41
Report of Employee Misconduct by Disposition Groups 42
Report of Employee Misconduct National Summary 43
Summary of Substantiated I.R.C. Section 1203 Inquiries
Recorded in ALERTS 44
Appendix VII – Section 1203 Standards 45
Reporting Requirements 46
Glossary 47
v
Overview of TIGTA Statutory Mandate
TIGTA provides audit, investigative, inspection,
and evaluation services that promote economy, Investigate IRS employee
efficiency, and integrity in the administration of the
misconduct and external attempts to
Internal Revenue laws. TIGTA provides independent
corrupt or threaten IRS employees.
oversight of the IRS, the IRS Oversight Board,
and the IRS Office of Chief Counsel. Although
TIGTA is placed organizationally within the
Treasury Department and reports to the Secretary Conduct supervise, and coordinate
of the Treasury and to Congress, it functions audits and investigations related to
independently from all other offices and bureaus IRS programs and operations.
within the Treasury Department.
TIGTA oversees all aspects of activity related to
the federal tax system as administered by the Review and make recommendations
IRS. TIGTA protects the public’s confidence in on existing and proposed legislation
the tax system by identifying and recommending
and regulations related to IRS
strategies for addressing the IRS’s management
programs and operations.
challenges and implementing the priorities of the
Treasury Department.
TIGTA’s organizational structure (see page 30) is
Promote economy and efficiency
comprised of the Office of the Inspector General
in the administration of tax laws.
and seven functional offices: the Office of Audit;
the Office of Inspections and Evaluations; the
Office of Investigations; the Office of Mission
Support; the Office of Information Technology; the Prevent and detect waste,
Office of Chief Counsel; and the Office of Data fraud, and abuse in IRS programs
Analytics. and operations.
Inform the Secretary of the Treasury
and Congress of problems and
deficiencies identified and of the
progress made in resolving them.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Audit
Promote the Economy, Efficiency, and
Effectiveness of Tax Administration
TIGTA’s Office of Audit strives to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of tax administration.
We provide recommendations to improve IRS systems and operations and to ensure the fair and equitable
treatment of taxpayers. Our comprehensive and independent performance audits of the IRS’s programs and
operations primarily address statutorily mandated reviews and high-risk challenges the IRS faces.
The IRS’s implementation of audit recommendations results in:
• Cost savings;
• Increased or protected revenue;
• Protection of taxpayers’ rights and entitlements; and
• More efficient use of resources.
Each year, TIGTA identifies and addresses the IRS’s major management and performance challenges. The
Office of Audit places audit emphasis on statutory coverage required by IRS Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998 (RRA 98) and other laws, as well as areas of concern from Congress, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the IRS Commissioner, and other interested parties.
The following summaries highlight significant audits completed during this six-month reporting period. Please
refer to the TIGTA.gov website to view reports in their entirety.
High-Income Individual Examinations Increased in Fiscal Year 2024,
But Key Terms and Methodologies for Compliance With the 2022
Treasury Directive Remained Unresolved
Figure 1: Number of Returns
Report Number 2025-308-030 Over and Under $400,000
Total Positive Income
We reviewed the IRS’s FY 2024 examination plan to ensure that the
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funding was used as intended to increase
enforcement on high-income taxpayers with complex tax filings and
high-dollar noncompliance. The shift to audit more high-income
individuals aligned with a 2022 Treasury Directive ordering the IRS not
to use any additional resources to increase audits on small businesses
or households earning below $400,000 per year.
For FY 2024, the number of examination starts on returns showing
over $400,000 in total positive income more than doubled the average
number of annual starts in FYs 2019 through 2023 combined.
Conversely, the number of starts on returns showing less than
$400,000 dropped by almost 100,000 in FY 2024—or 21.4 percent—
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Audit
from the average in FYs 2019 through 2023. The combination of more high-income examination starts with
substantially fewer lower-income audits increases the likelihood that the IRS will achieve the goals set out in
the 2022 Treasury Directive.
However, the IRS has not defined key terminology or aspects of its methodology for compliance with the
2022 Treasury Directive. Additionally, recent hiring freezes and staff cuts may affect the IRS’s ability to meet
long term goals of the directive, which remains in effect.
We made no recommendations.
Actions Need to Be Taken to Improve Services Provided at Taxpayer
Assistance Centers
Report Number 2025-108-017
TACs provide face-to-face assistance at more than 360 locations to taxpayers who cannot resolve
issues through other methods, or who choose to obtain information and assistance in person. We made
28 unannounced site visits to TACs that offered expanded service hours; we did not receive assistance
at 9 sites due to various reasons, such as TACs being closed or centers reaching capacity.
Figure 2: Reasons TIGTA Auditors Did Not Receive Assistance at a TAC
Source: TIGTA auditors’ observations during unannounced TAC site visits during the 2024
Filing Season.
We were unaware of the closures because IRS.gov was not updated to reflect them. We were also turned
away at some TACs during extended weekday hours because we did not schedule an appointment and were
not provided with an opportunity to wait for an available assistor, even though IRS policy notes that this
should happen when staffing permits. At the 19 sites we obtained assistance, 8 of our auditors received
inaccurate or incomplete answers to their tax law questions.
We made six recommendations.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Audit
Compliance With the Standard for the Fair and Equitable Treatment
of Taxpayers Could Be Improved
Report Number 2025-300-032
The IRS is required by RRA 98 to “use the fair and equitable treatment of taxpayers by employees as one of
the standards for evaluating employee performance.” Known as the retention standard, this requirement
applies to all employees. However, in our assessment, the IRS incorrectly believed that the retention
standard was not applicable to some employees depending on their duties. Current IRS internal guidance
incorrectly allows managers to rate employees as “Not Applicable,” even though this rating is not specifically
authorized by relevant regulations.
We identified nearly 10,900 employees who were rated as “Not Applicable” in an apparent violation of the
retention standard. We also identified 65 IRS employees who received a “Not Met” rating for the retention
standard; at least 62 were not separated from service even though they received the “Not Met” retention
standard rating and an overall rating of “Unacceptable.”
We made three recommendations.
Fiscal Year 2025 Statutory Review of Compliance with Notice of
Federal Tax Lien Filing Collection Due Process Procedures
Report Number 2025-300-034
The IRS files Form 668(Y)(C), Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL), to protect the federal government’s interest
in a delinquent taxpayer’s property. On the first filing of an NFTL for a tax period, the IRS has five business
days to notify taxpayers in writing of their right to a Collection Due Process hearing before the Independent
Office of Appeals.
We found that the IRS generally complied with this requirement. However, we found instances of the IRS not
complying with its notification procedures that require the agency to provide copies of Collection Due Process
notices to the taxpayers’ authorized representatives.
We recommended that the Director, Collection Policy, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, should remind
employees to ensure that the NFTL request includes current information about the taxpayer’s authorized and
designated representative(s).
We made one recommendation.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Audit
Further Improvements Are Needed to Strengthen the Controls for
Issuing Employer Identification Numbers
Report Number 2025-400-036
An Employer Identification Number (EIN) is a nine-digit number assigned by the IRS to identify a business.
EINs are targeted and used by unscrupulous individuals to commit fraud. IRS data shows a significant
increase in EIN issuances from FYs 2020 to 2021 coinciding with the financial relief offered to businesses
during the pandemic. For example, in April 2024, our Office of Investigations announced that it helped
prevent $3.5 billion from potentially being paid to fraudsters. Our special agents identified a scheme where
individuals obtained an EIN for the sole purpose of filing business tax returns to improperly claim pandemic-
related tax credits.
We previously reported that actions were Figure 3: EINs Issued From Fiscal Years 2018 Through 2024
needed to reduce the risk of fraudulent
use of EINs and improve the effectiveness There was a significant
increase in EINs issued
of the online system the IRS uses to after financial relief was
process most of them. However, in this offered to businesses
review, we determined that the IRS needs during the pandemic.
to take additional actions to address
recommendations from our prior report.
For example, programming has not been
implemented to prevent sole proprietors
from receiving multiple EINs and manual
processing errors are allowing businesses
Source: Taxpayer Services Division provided statistics as of
and deceased taxpayers to be listed as a
December 2023 and January 2025.
responsible party.
We made 12 recommendations.
Telephone Level of Service and Average Wait Times Do Not Fully
Reflect the Taxpayer Experience
Report Number 2025-100-040
The IRS tracks and widely reports two customer service performance measures related to its telephone lines:
Level of Service and average wait times.
According to the IRS, the Level of Service measures the taxpayer’s ability to reach a telephone assistor when
requested. For the 2024 Filing Season, the IRS reported a Level of Service of 88 percent and wait times
averaging 3 minutes. However, the reported Level of Service and average wait times only included calls made
to 33 Accounts Management telephone lines during the filing season. These lines handled approximately
two-thirds of all calls.
The IRS separately tracks, but does not widely report, an Enterprise Level of Service, which is a broader
measure of the taxpayer experience because it also includes 27 telephone lines from other IRS business units,
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Audit
which handled approximately one-third of all calls answered by IRS telephone assistors.
The IRS does not widely report an Enterprise-wide wait time as the reported average wait time computation
includes only the 33 telephone lines. According to IRS data, the average wait times for the other telephone
lines were much longer than 3 minutes, averaging 17 to 19 minutes during the 2024 Filing Season.
We made two recommendations and the IRS disagreed with both.
The IRS Transferred Incorrect Federal Tax Information to the
Department of Education for Federal Student Aid
Report Number 2025-2S0-029
A December 2019 law allowed the IRS to disclose certain federal tax information to the Department of
Education. The law streamlined the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) application process by
enabling students to request the IRS disclose their tax information to the Department of Education. However,
in April 2024, the Department of Education publicly announced that the IRS was transferring incorrect data.
We found that the IRS transferred inaccurate federal tax information due to an incorrect business
requirement implemented during development of a programming interface that communicates with the
Department of Education. The IRS subsequently reprocessed approximately 7.1 million previously received
FAFSA form requests and provided the updated federal tax information to the Department of Education.
However, we also determined that the IRS does not have a data dictionary for certain data sources; without
one, the agency cannot ensure that programming errors are
avoided.
We determined that 7.1 million
The inaccurate data exchange with the Department of FAFSA Form requests were
Education represented a fraction of taxpayers and was limited potentially affected by the incorrect
to tax information related to education. A recent executive Federal Tax Information.
order aims to remove barriers and promote interagency
data sharing. We believe it is important that lessons learned
from existing data sharing agreements inform similar future arrangements to help prevent the transfer of
inaccurate taxpayer data. We plan to continue performing reviews in these areas since they could have
potentially profound consequences.
We made no recommendations.
Final Results of the 2025 Filing Season
Report Number 2025-400-048
The 2025 tax filing season was successful with several key improvements. For example, the IRS processed
more tax returns compared to last filing season and exceeded its 85 percent Level of Service goal on its
telephone lines. Several initiatives reduced the IRS workforce since January 2025 but had no significant
impact on the filing season because critical filing season positions were exempted.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Audit
However, we are concerned about how this will impact the 2026 Filing Season. Key IRS functions responsible
for managing the filing season have lost 17 to 19 percent of their workforce. The IRS began a Zero Paper
Initiative to expand scanning and digital processing of paper-filed tax returns, which was expected to
mitigate the impact of some of the staffing losses on the upcoming filing season. However, the initiative is
already delayed.
Figure 4: The IRS Experienced Improvements in Key Filing Season Metrics When
Compared to the 2024 Filing Season
Key Program Metric 2024 Filing Season 2025 Filing Season
Toll-Free Average Speed of Answer 4.1 minutes 3.9 minutes
Taxpayers Assisted In-Person at a
914K 996K
Taxpayer Assistance Center
Source: IRS management information reports and other statistics as of weeks ending May 4,
2024, and May 3, 2025, respectively. Figures are rounded. K = Thousands. M = Millions.
In addition, IRS management projects that it would need to hire approximately 3,500 new employees to
achieve an 85 percent toll-free telephone level of service next filing season. IRS management also projects
that certain inventory (tax accounts that need adjustments) for FY 2026 could grow to approximately 6
million, exceeding pandemic levels by nearly 2 million.
Finally, staffing losses in the IRS’s Information Technology function and recently enacted legislation create
additional challenges for the IRS. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act will require the IRS to make substantial
changes ahead of the 2026 Filing Season, but the agency will have fewer Information Technology resources
to timely update processing systems.
We made no recommendations.
Revenue Officer Compliance Sweeps of High-Income Nonfilers Were
Impactful, but Tracking Data and Training Could Be Improved
Report Number 2025-300-021
Revenue Officer Compliance Sweeps are a strategy the IRS uses either to address an increase in unassigned
high-priority inventory in understaffed locations or support a compliance initiative (e.g., egregious employment
tax cases, high-income nonfilers, or specialty programs). The IRS expanded the use of sweeps between
FYs 2019 and 2022.
High-income nonfiler sweeps from FYs 2021 through 2022 were more impactful for case closures and
dollars collected than similar non-sweeps cases. As a percentage of cases worked, revenue officers secured
more returns under sweeps than non-sweeps and referred significantly more returns to Examination. Sweeps
were conducted throughout the United States and internationally. However, there are several geographic
areas in the continental United States that have a high number of high-income nonfilers where limited or no
sweeps were conducted. For example, there are opportunities for more sweeps in places like eastern New
Mexico, western Texas, northwestern Nevada, and Wyoming.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Audit
Figure 5: Locations Where Limited or No Sweeps were Conducted of High-Income Nonfilers
Source: Analysis of IRS Individual Master File Case Creation Nonfiler Identification Process
data as of August 23, 2023, and IRS sweeps data as of January 12, 2023
Our review also found that sweeps tracking data could be improved. Missing, incomplete, and/or inaccurate
data were found in data fields such as the taxpayer’s name, address, revenue officer identifier, and case
assignment date. We worked with the IRS to make corrections so that the data reviewed for this audit was
accurate and complete.
We made four recommendations.
Assessment of Fiscal Year 2024 Compliance with Improper Payment
Reporting Requirements
Report Number 2025-400-025
We found that the IRS still has not satisfied the Payment Integrity Information Act’s (PIIA) goal of reducing
improper payment rates to less than 10 percent. Additionally, the IRS is not reporting improper payment
rates for pandemic-related programs because the agency believes it would be an inefficient use of
resources given the short-term nature of pandemic programs. As in prior years, the IRS calculated improper
payment rates for four high-risk programs, with improper payments totaling $21.4 billion.
The IRS would need to reduce
erroneous payments by $11.7 billion
to meet PIIA requirements.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Audit
Figure 6: Improper Payment Rates for High-Risk Programs (Fiscal
Year 2024)
Source: FYs 2022 through 2024 Treasury Department Agency Financial Reports.
The Department of the Treasury Agency Financial Report attributes the causes of refundable tax credit
errors to a range of factors, such as the complexity of eligibility rules, the inability to verify taxpayer-provided
information prior to issuing refunds, the lack of correctable error authority, and a requirement to issue
refunds within 45 days.
We made three recommendations.
Although Enterprise Case Management Modernization Has Begun, No
Legacy Systems Have Been Decommissioned
Report Number: 2025-208-050
In 2015, the IRS started the Enterprise Case Management (ECM) program to consolidate more than
60 different case management systems that vary widely in complexity, size, and customization. Some
systems were to be incorporated into the ECM, and then be decommissioned. According to the IRS, the ECM
platform would allow authorized employees to see a taxpayer’s full account, filing history, related case data,
and prior communications to resolve cases more quickly.
In 2020, we reported that the IRS did not have a clear and comprehensive strategy for decommissioning
legacy case management systems. In response, the IRS created a decommissioning strategy.
In this new report, we found that the IRS still has not fully incorporated or decommissioned any legacy
systems. Despite the decommissioning strategy, ECM program leadership did not prioritize decommissioning
legacy systems, focusing instead on providing modernized features for users. In addition, multiple changes
in scope and IRS IT leadership slowed the ECM platform’s progress. As a result, the IRS has not fully
incorporated any case management systems into the ECM platform.
We made two recommendations.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspections and Evaluations
Assess Emerging Issues Impacting
America’s Tax System
TIGTA’s Office of Inspections and Evaluations provides focused and expedited oversight to quickly assess
emerging issues impacting tax administration and IRS operations.
Inspections are intended to:
• Provide factual and analytical information;
• Monitor compliance;
• Measure performance;
• Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of programs and operations;
• Share best practices; and
• Inquire into allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.
Evaluations are intended to:
• Provide in-depth reviews of specific management issues, policies, or programs;
• Address government-wide or multi-agency issues; and
• Develop recommendations to streamline operations, enhance data quality, and minimize inefficient and
ineffective procedures.
The following summaries highlight significant evaluations completed during this six-month reporting period.
Lack of Contract Oversight Led to Inoperable Kiosks at Taxpayer
Assistance Centers
Report Number 2025-IE-R024
In August 2024, the IRS had 100 kiosks—computer terminals taxpayers can use to help themselves to IRS
services—located at 37 TACs throughout the country. We found at the time that 55 were operational, 40 were
inoperable, and the status of 5 were unknown. IRS employees stated that a contractor, receiving $500,000
annually to maintain the machines, was slow to respond to service requests. The IRS said it planned to work
with the contractor to make all kiosks operational by the end of December 2024.
In January 2025, we went back and visited eight TACs with inoperable kiosks and found the machines still
did not work. We also learned the IRS had terminated its maintenance contract and was discontinuing the
kiosk program—steps taken after we had expressed concerns about inoperable machines.
While we support the IRS’s decision to discontinue the current kiosk program, we believe that offering
taxpayers a self-service option could be beneficial as the IRS reduces and restructures its workforce. The
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspections and Evaluations
number of taxpayers using Figure 7: Kiosk Service Tickets Submitted From February 2023
kiosks has drastically Through August 2024
decreased in recent years.
In 2017, for example, more
than 80,000 taxpayers used
kiosks; from January through
July 2024, only 4,600 used
them. However, outdated and
inoperable kiosks may explain
the decline. We therefore
recommended that the IRS
perform a study to determine
whether a new kiosk program
using updated technology,
Source: TIGTA’s analysis of kiosk service tickets from February 2023 through
or deploying laptops to TACs, August 2024.
would provide effective and
efficient self-service options
to taxpayers.
Inflation Reduction Act: IRS Spending on Technology
Transformation Efforts
Report Number 2025-IE-R029
The IRS’s reliance on legacy systems, aged hardware, and outdated programming languages poses
significant risks to the agency’s ability to fulfill its mission. Successfully modernizing its systems and
developing and implementing new IT applications are critical to IRS transformation and how the agency does
business. However, the IRS has a history of cost overruns and delays in modernizing IT dating back to the
1970s. We initiated this evaluation to provide an overview of the IRS’s use of $37.6 billion in IRA funding for
technology transformation projects for FYs 2022 through 2024.
With this funding, the IRS planned to deliver cutting-edge technology and analytics to operate more
effectively. We found that, as of March 2025, IRS had spent approximately $5.7 billion of its IRA funding
on technology transformation efforts. However, in March 2025, the Department of the Treasury announced
a strategic pause of IRS modernization efforts. IRS officials indicated that modernization efforts had
undergone a significant shift under the new administration and work regarding the IRA Strategic Operating
Plan has been put on hold. Under the new direction, the IRS is prioritizing modernization efforts focused on
business outcomes and mission alignment.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspections and Evaluations
Thousands of Notifications to Taxpayers Affected by the Large-Scale
Data Breach Were Returned Undeliverable
Report Number 2025-IE-R019
In 2023, TIGTA’s Office of Investigations determined that
an IRS contractor accessed and stole tax returns and
return information of approximately 406,000 taxpayers,
including some of the nation’s wealthiest. The contractor
was subsequently sentenced to five years in prison, and
the IRS sent notification letters to affected individuals
and businesses, advising them of the breach, the risk of
identity theft, and actions available to them.
As part of a subsequent evaluation to assess the IRS’s
processes and procedures to notify taxpayers affected
by a large-scale data breach, we learned thousands Undeliverable letters stored at the IRS’s campus in
of taxpayers from the 2023 breach did not receive the Philadelphia, PA. TIGTA Photo.
initial notification letter due to incomplete addresses. The
IRS ultimately determined that approximately 12,200
notification letters were undeliverable.
Based on our recommendation, the IRS developed a plan to resend letters to the correct addresses and
developed a data breach indicator to mark the accounts of all taxpayers affected. However, we identified
1,334 affected individual taxpayer accounts that had no indicator. The IRS may not need to place indicators
in certain instances, such as deceased taxpayers or taxpayers with no active accounts. But based on our
recommendation, the IRS reviewed the 1,334 accounts and stated it will add the indicator and mail out
notifications to 20 accounts for individuals who were incorrectly classified as deceased.
In June 2024, Office of Investigations provided the IRS with additional criteria that could be considered when
identifying taxpayers affected by the data breach.
Figure 8: Batches of Information That TIGTA’s OI Provided to the IRS About the Large-Scale Data Breach
Source: TIGTA’s correspondence and lists of taxpayers affected by the data breach.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspections and Evaluations
Snapshot Report: IRS Workforce Reductions (as of May 2025)
Report Number 2025-IE-R027
We initiated this review to provide an update to our previous report on the IRS’s efforts to reduce its
workforce. As of May 2025, the agency had approximately 77,000 employees, down from 103,000 in January,
representing a 25 percent reduction in five months. Most departures resulted from the federal government’s
Deferred Resignation Program, which allowed federal employees to resign immediately with continued pay
through September 30, 2025. The agency also offered other incentives to leave federal service or retire early,
and in April the IRS began Reduction In Force (RIF) actions to further reduce its workforce.
Our May 2025 snapshot shows an array of reductions across multiple areas. For example, approximately
27 percent of tax examiners (who review and process tax returns) and 26 percent of revenue agents (who
conduct audits) left the agency. The Small Business/Self-Employed division experienced the greatest
reduction, with 35 percent of employees departing, followed by the Human Capital Office at 28 percent.
The report provides a detailed breakdown of all reductions.
Figure 9: Top 6 IRS Job Series Affected by the Separations with the Count and Percentage Impact
Source: TIGTA analysis of IRS Human Capital Office data (May 2025).
Authenticating Callers’ Identity on Business and Practitioner
Telephone Lines Needs to Be Strengthened to Combat Fraud
Report Number 2025-IE-R025
We received a referral from Office of Investigations about a scheme involving the filing of false Forms 941
(a tax return filed quarterly by businesses). Based on the referral, we informed the IRS that the scheme had
resulted in more than $93 million in fraudulent refunds issued to 20 different businesses. TIGTA’s Office of
Investigations stopped most payments, but at least $2.7 million was paid out.
We assessed policies, procedures, and actions the IRS implemented to prevent this scheme. We found that
the IRS didn’t adequately verify the identity of callers to the Business Specialty Tax and the Practitioner
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
13
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Inspections and Evaluations
Priority Service telephone lines. As a result, fraudsters were able to not only file false Forms 941, but also
obtain tax refunds and gain access to taxpayer information.
IRS employees alerted management to the risk of erroneous refunds being issued based on fraudulent Form
941 filings. However, management did not take action to prevent the scheme. Furthermore, if identity theft
is an issue on a tax account, IRS employees are required to conduct additional research, including reviewing
history notes on the account. Our review of the history notes showed that IRS employees had documented
fraudsters’ initial requests for tax information. If subsequent IRS employees had reviewed those notes, they
may not have provided the information needed to further the fraud scheme.
IRS Terminated Probationary Employees Without Following Internal
Procedures and Considering Individual Performance
Report Number 2025-IE-R028
As a result of the Administration’s actions to reduce the size of the federal government’s workforce, the
Department of Treasury directed the IRS in February 2025 to begin
sending termination notices to all of its 7,315 probationary employees.
The letters notified employees that they were terminated for performance According to the IRS,
reasons and current mission needs. 7,315 probationary
employees received
Several senior IRS officials raised concerns to us that probationary termination notices in
employees did not have documented performance issues. We also February and March 2025
received letters from several members of Congress requesting that we
review the dismissal of probationary employees to determine compliance with agency policies and whether
performance was considered.
We found that all probationary employees received the same letter that cited performance as a reason
for termination. However, we confirmed that nearly all the terminated employees either did not have a
performance rating on record or were rated as Fully Successful or better. As a result, we concluded that the
IRS did not consider individual employee performance when terminating probationary employees.
In July 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed a federal court’s prohibition on covered agencies implementing
Agency RIF and Reorganization Figure 10: Performance Evaluations of 7,315 Probationary Employees
Plans and issuing or
executing RIF notices. At
the time we published
this report, it was unclear
whether probationary
employees would remain
reinstated or be terminated
in a future large-scale RIF.
Source: Information obtained from IRS HCO, as of May 2025.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
14
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
Protect the Integrity of Tax
Administration
TIGTA is statutorily mandated to protect the integrity of federal tax administration. We accomplish this mission
through the investigative work conducted by the Office of Investigations. Through its investigative programs, we
protect the integrity of the IRS and its ability to collect revenue owed to the federal government by investigating
violations of criminal and civil law that adversely impact federal tax administration, as well as administrative
misconduct by IRS employees. We are guided by a performance model that focuses on three primary areas:
employee integrity; employee and infrastructure security; and external attempts to corrupt tax administration.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
15
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
The Performance Model
TIGTA’s Office of Investigations’ mission is to identify and investigate IRS employees’ misconduct, protect
integrity of IRS programs and operations, and protect IRS from external threats and corruption. We are
guided by a performance model that focuses on three primary areas: employee integrity; employee and
infrastructure security; and external attempts to corrupt tax administration.
IRS employee misconduct undermines the IRS’s ability to deliver taxpayer services, to enforce tax laws
effectively, and to collect taxes owed to the federal government. External threats against the IRS impede
its ability to carry out its role as the nation’s revenue collector fairly, efficiently, and safely. Individuals who
attempt to corrupt or otherwise interfere with the IRS through various schemes and frauds adversely impact
the IRS’s ability to collect revenue.
TIGTA investigates allegations of violations in these areas and refers the findings to the U.S. Department of
Justice or to state authorities for prosecution. We also refer allegations of violations involving IRS employee
misconduct to IRS management.
In each of the following performance areas, we highlight case examples from the current reporting period.1
Performance Area: Employee Integrity Investigation
For our country’s tax system to operate successfully, taxpayers must have confidence in the fair and impartial
administration of federal tax laws and regulations. IRS employee misconduct can erode the public’s trust and
impede the IRS’s ability to effectively enforce tax laws. Employee misconduct can take many forms, such as
the misuse of IRS resources or authority; theft; fraud; extortion; taxpayer abuse; unauthorized access to, and
disclosure of, tax returns and return information; and identity theft.
During this reporting period, employee integrity investigations accounted for 43 percent of our work. We
conducted 283 employee misconduct investigations that were referred to the IRS for action. The IRS took
action, up to and including termination, on 259 investigations and closed 24 investigations without action.
As part of our employee integrity focus, we also conduct proactive investigative initiatives to detect
misconduct in the administration of IRS programs. During this reporting period, we initiated three projects to
detect systemic weaknesses or potential IRS program vulnerabilities. Our most successful integrity project
detects IRS employees who abuse their access to taxpayer information.
The following cases represent our efforts to address employee misconduct during this six-month
reporting period.
1 Facts in the summarized case narratives come from court documents of the jurisdictions named.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
16
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
IRS Employee Abuses System Access and Steals Taxpayer’s Credits
While employed as an IRS Contact Representative, Stephanie Hansen unlawfully accessed and transferred
tax credits from the taxpayer accounts of Amazon Services, LLC, and Meta Platforms, Inc., to a sole
proprietorship taxpayer account she had created years prior. Hansen then unsuccessfully attempted to
transfer the credits from the sole proprietorship account to her individual taxpayer account.
In June 2025, Hansen was sentenced in the District of Utah to probation for six months and ordered to pay a
$1,000 fine for theft of government property.
IRS Employee Used Fraudulent IRS Tax Forms to Defraud Banks
Tierra Scott was an IRS employee in Memphis, TN. Working with two coconspirators, Scott devised a scheme
to file fraudulent Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) applications and agreements. The EIDL was a Small
Business Administration program that provided low-interest financing to small businesses, renters, and
homeowners in regions suffering the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Scott submitted a false and fraudulent EIDL application that overstated business income to obtain a larger
loan amount and claimed the fictitious business had operated in the previous 12 months. Scott’s EIDL loan
application included a fraudulent IRS Schedule C (Form 1040), Profit or Loss from Business, tax return for
the year 2019 that grossly overstated her actual business income.
Scott received $206,000 in EIDL funds and paid her coconspirators $45,000. The submission of the
loan application and receipt of the EIDL funds involved transmission by means of wire communications in
interstate commerce.
In June 2025, Scott was indicted in the Northern District of Mississippi for wire fraud and conspiracy to
commit wire fraud. Her trial is scheduled for October 27, 2025; if convicted, she could receive up to 30
years’ imprisonment.
Former IRS Employee Steals Over $2 million in Tax Credits from
Exxon Mobil
As an account management employee at the IRS Service Center in Ogden, UT, Rodney Quinn Rupe had
access to certain taxpayer accounts and case processing tools in an IRS database. Additionally, he could
adjust tax credits, penalties, and interest to certain taxpayer accounts within those databases.
Rupe created in the databases a business called Ex Xo Exteriors Ltd., and then moved over $2 million in
tax credits from Exxon Mobil’s taxpayer account to the Ex Xo account. He moved tax credits through three
separate transfers, each of which involved interstate wires. As a result of the fraud, the IRS issued a tax
refund check of approximately $2.1 million to Ex Xo in September 2023.
The next month Rupe resigned from the IRS. On multiple dates from January
to March 2024, he unsuccessfully attempted to deposit the refund check at a
financial institution in Utah. In March, TIGTA special agents went to Rupe’s home
and interviewed him; he confessed. In June 2025, Rupe pleaded guilty to wire
fraud. At sentencing, Rupe could receive up to 20 years’ imprisonment, three years’
supervised release, a fine of $250,000, and any applicable forfeiture.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
17
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
Performance Area: Employee and Infrastructure Security
Threats and assaults directed at IRS employees, facilities, and infrastructure impede the effective and safe
administration of the federal tax system and the IRS’s ability to collect tax revenue.
TIGTA receives referrals of all reports of threats, assaults, and forcible interference against IRS employees
while performing their official duties. We also pursue, investigate, and mitigate emerging cyberthreats to the
IRS’s ability to conduct federal tax administration.
Contact with the IRS can be stressful and emotional for taxpayers. While the majority of taxpayer contacts
are routine, some may become confrontational and even violent. TIGTA’s special agents are statutorily
mandated to provide physical security, known as “armed escorts,” to IRS employees who have face-to- face
contact with taxpayers who may pose a danger to the employee, and to ensure that IRS employees have
a secure environment in which to perform their critical tax administration functions. During this six-month
reporting period, we provided five armed escorts for IRS employees.
The Office of Investigations undertakes investigative initiatives to identify individuals who could commit
violence against, or otherwise pose a threat to, IRS employees, facilities, or infrastructure. We also provide
intelligence to IRS officials to assist them in making proactive operational decisions about potential violence
or other activities that could pose a threat to IRS systems, operations, and employees.
Investigative information sharing between TIGTA Investigations and the IRS’s Office of Employee Protection
to identify “potentially dangerous” taxpayers is one example of our commitment to protecting IRS employees.
Taxpayers who meet certain IRS criteria receive a designation as a potentially dangerous taxpayer. Five years
after this designation has been made, we conduct a follow-up assessment of the taxpayer so that the IRS
can determine if the taxpayer still presents a potential danger to IRS employees.
During this reporting period, employee and infrastructure security investigations accounted for 25 percent of
our work.
The following case represents TIGTA’s efforts to ensure the safety of IRS employees during this six-month
reporting period.
Florida Taxpayer Threatens to Kill IRS and TIGTA Employees
Stephane Brice called the IRS about the status of his 2021 federal tax refund, indicating he did not
understand why the IRS would not release his refund. According to court documents, he accused the IRS
employee he was talking to and the entire IRS of stealing his money. Brice also threatened to “kill someone”
before specifically threatening to “kill each person by taking their off their heads sic so that everyone would
know it was me and that would be my signature when I killed.”
A TIGTA special agent contacted Brice and advised him that threatening a federal employee is a violation of
law. Brice then threatened the TIGTA special agent, saying he would “cut” the agent’s “head off’’ and “burn”
the agent’s “house down” with the agent’s children and family inside.
In April 2025, in the Middle District of Florida, Stephane Brice was indicted for threat to a federal law
enforcement officer and for transmitting a threat via interstate commerce.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
18
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
Inmate Threatens IRS Employees Prior to Release from Prison
Timothy Koebert was nearing the end of his prison term for arson at the Pennsylvania State Correctional
Institute when he mailed six letters—three to the IRS, three to an Assistant U.S. Attorney—on various dates in
2021 and 2022.
Koebert knowingly threatened to assault a federal law enforcement officer with intent to impede, intimidate,
and interfere with him while he was engaged in the performance of official duties and with intent to retaliate
against him on account of his performance of official duties.
Koebert mailed a letter that contained a threat to injure an unnamed female victim to the IRS in Austin,
TX. Koebert also mailed a letter containing a threat to injure multiple victims, including an unnamed law
enforcement officer to the IRS in Ogden, UT.
In August 2025, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Koebert pleaded guilty to a nine-count indictment for
mailing threatening communications and threats to a federal law enforcement officer.
Performance Area: External Attempts to Corrupt Tax
Administration
We investigate external attempts to corrupt or impede tax administration. Individuals may attempt to corrupt
or impede tax administration in many ways. They may impersonate IRS employees or misuse IRS seals and
symbols; use fraudulent IRS documentation to perpetrate criminal activity; offer bribes to IRS employees to
influence their tax cases; commit fraud in contracts the IRS awards to contractors; or commit cybercrimes
through the misuse of IRS portals.
In addition, we investigate corruption and criminal activity involving the theft of U.S. Treasury checks, which
can include Social Security benefits, pandemic stimulus checks, and tax refunds.
During this reporting period, investigations into attempts to corrupt or impede tax administration accounted
for 32 percent of our work. The following cases represent the efforts to address external attempts to corrupt
or impede tax administration during this six-month reporting period.
Illinois Man Uses False IRS Tax Filing Forms to Defraud Financial
Institutions
Marvin Reed devised and launched a scheme to defraud financial institutions via loan applications for
the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a relief program created by Congress and administered by the
Small Business Administration during the COVID pandemic. A PPP applicant was required to certify that a
business was in operation on or before February 15, 2020, and that economic uncertainty at the time of the
application made the loan request necessary to support the business’ ongoing operations.
Between May 2020 and April 2021, Reed prepared and submitted 15 applications to financial institutions for
loans under PPP to obtain funds for approximately 13 entities purportedly owned and operated by himself. In
all applications, Reed fraudulently represented each of the purported entities’ number of employees, gross
revenues, payroll, and existence as companies with ongoing operations.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
19
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
As a result, Reed fraudulently obtained more than $760,000 in PPP funds and spent the money for personal
benefit.
In July 2025, in the Northern District of Illinois, Marvin Reed was sentenced to 14 months of imprisonment
followed by 18 months of supervised release for wire fraud. He was also ordered to pay almost $764,000 in
restitution.
Woman Defrauds Financial Institutions of $93,000 with Stolen U.S.
Treasury Checks
Anndraya Stinson acted as a broker in a conspiracy involving checks stolen
from the mail by United States Postal Service employees. Her coconspirators
would make counterfeit identity documents in the names of the victims and
then use the forgeries to negotiate the stolen checks at banks. In one instance,
in February 2024, Stinson delivered to one of her coconspirators a stolen
check for $93,000.
Stinson and her coconspirators ultimately defrauded multiple financial
institutions, including Bank of America, City National Bank, JP Morgan Chase
Bank, Truist Bank, and Comerica Bank.
In June 2025, Stinson pleaded guilty in the Central District of California to
conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Sentencing is scheduled for February 2026.
The maximum sentence the court could impose is 30 years’ imprisonment, five
years’ supervised release, and a fine of $1 million or twice the gross gain or
loss, whichever is greatest.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
20
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
Investigations Statistical Reports
Significant Investigative Achievements
Complaints/Allegations Received by TIGTA
Complaints Against IRS Employees 1,439
Complaints Against Non-IRS Employees 1,098
Total Complaints/Allegations 2,537
Status of Complaints/Allegations Received by TIGTA
Investigations Initiated 437
In Process Within TIGTA2 211
Referred to IRS for Action 853
Referred to IRS for Information Only 2
Referred to a Non-IRS Entity3 0
Closed With No Referral 507
Closed Associated With Prior Investigation 241
Closed With All Actions Completed 286
Total Complaints/Allegations 2,537
Investigations Opened and Closed
Total Investigations Opened 862
Total Investigations Closed 900
Financial Accomplishments
Embezzlement/Theft Funds Recovered $2,047,828
Contract Fraud and Overpayments Recovered $0
Court-Ordered Fines, Penalties, and Restitution $201,693,851
Out-of-Court Settlements $0
Potentially Compromised by Bribery $0
Tax Liability of Taxpayers Who Threaten and/or Assault IRS Employees $344,163
IRS Assets and Resources Protected Against Malicious Loss $59,517
Total Financial Accomplishments $204,145,359
2 Complaints for which final determination had not been made at the end of the reporting period.
3 A non-IRS entity includes other law enforcement entities or federal agencies.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
21
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
Status of Closed Criminal Investigations
Criminal Referral Employee Non-Employee Total
Referred – Accepted for Prosecution 13 134 147
Referred – Declined for Prosecution 172 212 384
Referred – Pending Prosecutorial Decision 9 56 65
Total Criminal Referrals 4
194 402 596
No Referral 176 84 260
Criminal Dispositions 5
Criminal Disposition Employee Non-Employee Total
Guilty (convicted) 0 12 12
Guilty (plea) 3 89 92
Nolo Contendere (no contest) 0 1 1
Pretrial Diversion 2 2 4
Deferred Prosecution 6
1 0 1
Not Guilty 0 0 0
Dismissed 2 8 10
Total Criminal Dispositions 8 112 120
Administrative Dispositions on Closed Investigations7
Removed/Terminated 24
Suspended/Reduction in Grade 38
Resigned/Retired/Separated Prior to Adjudication 52
Oral or Written Reprimand/Admonishment 52
Clearance Letter/Closed, No Action Taken 40
Alternative Discipline/Letter With Cautionary Statement/Other 43
Non-Employee Actions 8
135
Total Administrative Dispositions 384
4 Criminal referrals include both federal and state dispositions.
5 Final criminal dispositions during the reporting period. These data may pertain to investigations referred criminally
in prior reporting periods and do not necessarily relate to the investigations identified as referred criminally in the
previous Status of Closed Criminal Investigations table. This table does not include investigations whose existence
is protected from disclosure by I.R.C. § 6103.
6 Generally, in a deferred prosecution, the defendant accepts responsibility for their actions and complies with
certain conditions imposed by the court. Upon the defendant’s completion of the conditions, the court dismisses
the case. If the defendant fails to fully comply, the court reinstates prosecution of the charge.
7 Final administrative dispositions during the reporting period. These data may pertain to investigations referred
administratively in prior reporting periods and do not necessarily relate to the investigations identified as closed in
the Investigations Opened and Closed table.
8 Administrative actions taken by the IRS against non-IRS employees.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
22
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
Summary of Investigative Reports and Criminal Referrals
Criminal Referral Breakdown
Number of Investigative Reports Issued
Referred to the Department of Justice for Criminal Prosecution 449
Referred to State/Local Prosecuting Authorities 31
Total Complaints/Allegations
Indictments 117
Criminal Informations 31
Source: TIGTA Investigations Criminal Results Management System.
Summary of Activity Relating to Complaints of Human Trafficking
In accordance with the Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2022 (Public Law 117-348) TIGTA is required
to report on its human trafficking investigations.
Activity Relating to Complaints of Human Trafficking
Number of Suspected Violations Reported 0
Number of Investigations 0
Status of Investigations N/A
Outcome of Investigations N/A
Source: TIGTA Investigations Criminal Results Management System.
No-Knock Warrants
During the reporting period, TIGTA did not have any “no-knock” warrants for entries: Pursuant to judicial
authorization; Pursuant to exigent circumstances; or in which a law enforcement officer or other person was
injured during a no-knock entry.
Interference
During the reporting period, there were no attempts by the IRS to interfere with the independence of TIGTA.
Additionally, the IRS did not resist, object to oversight activities, or significantly delay access to information.
Instances of Whistleblower Retaliation
During the reporting period, there were no investigations of whistleblower retaliation.
Suspension and Debarment
The following table represents the number of cases TIGTA has referred to Treasury’s Office of Procurement
Executive, who is the Department’s Suspension and Debarment Official. Cases are referred for potential
suspension or debarment action, including any subsequent action taken by the Treasury Department,
between April 1 and September 30, 2025.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
23
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Office of Investigations
Summary of Suspension and Debarment Referrals
Referred Pending Suspended Debarred Activity
Office of Investigations 3 3 0 0 0
Closed Investigations Involving IRS Senior Government Employees9
Detailed Description of the
Facts and Circumstances of the Criminal Date If Declined, Date
Investigation Disposition Status Referred of Declination
A senior government employee Closed
allegedly engaged in an aggressive Without N/A N/A N/A
workplace action. Action Letter
A senior government employee
Removal / Declined Federal 7/17/2023 4/30/2024
allegedly sexually assaulted an
Termination Declined State 5/2/2024 2/13/2025
employee.
A senior government employee
Resigned Before
allegedly physically touched N/A N/A N/A
Adjudication
another employee.
A senior government employee
allegedly lacked candor during Reprimand N/A N/A N/A
management inquires.
A senior government employee
allegedly inappropriately used Not Referred N/A N/A N/A
government contractors
A senior government employee
allegedly engaged in nepotism,
Suspension Declined 1/30/2024 1/30/2024
lack of candor, and an
inappropriate work relationship.
A senior government employee
Closed Without
allegedly engaged in inappropriate N/A N/A N/A
Action Letter
hiring practices.
9 When TIGTA refers an IRS employee investigation to the IRS, the investigation remains open until all actions are
completed, including any penalty imposed upon the employee by the IRS. TIGTA closes an employee investigation
after receiving notice from the IRS of the administrative action taken in response to that investigation. For this
report, a “senior government employee” refers to an officer or employee in the Executive Branch who occupies a
position classified at or above GS-15 of the General Schedule. 5 U.S.C. § 405(a)(6). This table does not include
investigations whose existence is protected from disclosure by I.R.C. § 6103.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
24
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Reports with Unimplemented
Corrective Actions
The Inspector General Act of 1978 requires that we identify any recommendations described in previous
semiannual reports, including the potential cost savings of those recommendations for which corrective
actions have not been completed. Following is a list of audit and evaluation reports, with unimplemented
corrective actions. The list is based on information from the Treasury Department’s Joint Audit
Management Enterprise System (JAMES). Visit our Reports section on our website to obtain more details
about the recommendations.
Revising Tax Debt Identification Programming and Improvements Are Needed in the Withholding
Correcting Procedural Errors Could Improve the Tax Compliance Program
Refund Offset Program
Recommendation 5
Recommendation 1 Rep. No. 2018-30-072; September 2018
Rep. No. 2016-40-028; March 2016
Additional Actions Are Needed to Further Reduce
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure That Tax Undeliverable Mail
Accounts on the Automated Non-Master File Are
Recommendations 1 and 2
Accurately Processed
Rep. No. 2019-40-074; September 2019
Recommendation 1
Recommendation 2—Potential Increased Revenue: Improvements Are Needed to Ensure That
Consistent Suitability Checks Are Performed for
$354,153
Participation in Internal Revenue Service Programs
Rep. No. 2017-40-037; May 2017
Recommendation 9
Further Actions Are Needed to Reduce the Risk of Rep. No. 2020-40-005; November 2019
Employment Tax Fraud to Businesses That Use the
Services of Professional Employer Organizations The Internal Revenue Service Can Improve Taxpayer
Compliance for Virtual Currency Transactions
Recommendation 3
Rep. No. 2017-40-085; September 2017 Recommendation 1
Rep. No. 2020-30-066; September 2020
Actions Are Needed to Reduce the Risk of
Fraudulent Use of Employer Identification Numbers Security Controls Over Electronic Crimes Labs Need
and to Improve the Effectiveness of the Application Improvement
Process Recommendations 1 and 3
Recommendations 3 and 9 Rep. No. 2021-20-003; December 2020
Rep. No. 2018-40-013; February 2018
Expansion of Self-Correction for Electronic Filers
Active Directory Oversight Needs Improvement and Other Improvements Could Reduce Taxpayer
and Criminal Investigation Computer Rooms Lack Burden And Costs Associated With Tax Return Error
Minimum Security Controls Resolution
Recommendation 3 Recommendation 6
Rep. No. 2018-20-034; June 2018 Rep. No. 2021-40-008; December 2020
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
25
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
**********Platform Management Needs Additional Actions Are Needed to Improve and
Improvement10 Secure the Income Verification Express Service
Recommendation 5 Program
Rep. No. 2021-20-063; September 2021 Recommendation 8
Rep. No. 2023-45-014; March 2023
Increased Availability of Tax Resources and
Information for Limited English Proficient and Actions Are Being Taken to Reduce Risks
Visually Impaired Taxpayers Has Enhanced to Employees Whose Names Are Required
Assistance, but Additional Improvements to Be Included on Internal Revenue Service
Are Needed Correspondence
Recommendations 4, 6, 7, and 8 Recommendations 1 and 2
Rep. No. 2022-40-008; December 2021 Rep. No. 2023-IE-R004; May 2023
Program and Organizational Changes Are Needed Additional Actions Are Needed to Reduce Accounts
to Address the Continued Inadequate Tax Account Management Function Inventories to Below Pre-
Assistance Provided to Taxpayers Pandemic Levels
Recommendations 11 and 18 Recommendations 6 and 10
Rep. No. 2022-46-027; March 2022 Rep. No. 2023-46-026; May 2023
Processing of Recovery Rebate Credit Claims During Plans Were Made to Implement the Taxpayer
the 2021 Filing Season Experience Strategy, but Progress Is Not Monitored
Recommendation 1 Recommendations 1 and 2
Rep. No. 2022-46-032; May 2022 Rep. No. 2023-15-028; May 2023
Physical Security Controls at the Recurring Identification Is Needed to Ensure That
********************11 Employers Full Pay the Deferred Social Security Tax
Recommendations 1, 5, and 6 Recommendation 2
Rep. No. 2023-IE-R001; October 2022 Rep. No. 2023-46-030; May 2023
Fiscal Year 2023 Biannual Independent Assessment Opportunities Exist to Improve the Accuracy of
of Private Collection Agency Performance Information in the Centralized Authorization File and
Recommendation 2 Increase the Use of the Tax Pro Account System
Rep. No. 2023-30-005; December 2022 Recommendation 1
Rep. No. 2023-40-033; May 2023
Opportunities Exist for the IRS to Develop a More
Coordinated Approach to Examination Workplan Additional Actions Are Needed to Improve Data
Development and Resource Allocation Collection and Analysis of Whistleblower Claims and
Recommendations 2 and 4 Ensure Full Compliance With the Taxpayer First Act
Rep. No. 2023-30-008; February 2023 Recommendation 1
Rep. No. 2023-35-031; June 2023
Actions Have Been Taken to Implement Taxpayer
First Act Provisions Related to the IRS Independent American Rescue Plan Act: Continued Review of
Office of Appeals; However, Some Improvements Premium Tax Credit Provisions
Are Still Needed
Recommendations 1, 2, and 3
Recommendation 1 Rep. No. 2023-47-036; June 2023
Rep. No. 2023-15-010; February 2023
10 Redaction due to subject matter that might create a risk of circumvention of the law if publicly released.
11 Redaction due to subject matter that might create a risk of circumvention of the law if publicly released.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
26
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Review of the IRS’s Process to Perform Mandatory Taxpayer Assistance Centers Generally Provided
Annual Examinations of Presidential Returns for Tax Quality Service, but Additional Actions Are Needed
Years 2000 Through 2021 to Reduce Taxpayer Burden
Recommendations 1, 2, 4, and 5 Recommendation 1
Rep. No. 2023-IE-R011; September 2023 Rep. No. 2024-100-022; May 2024
The Internal Revenue Service Has Experienced A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed to Address
Challenges in Transitioning to Electronic Records the Significant Backlog of Adjustment Source
Recommendations 1 and 2 Documentation Inventory
Rep. No. 2023-10-050; September 2023 Recommendation 3
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R013; June 2024
The Enterprise Physical Access Control System
Implementation and Physical Security Controls Some Corrective Actions to Address Reported
Need Improvement Information Technology Weaknesses Were
Recommendation 3 Not Adequately Documented and Effectively
Rep. No. 2023-20-062; September 2023 Implemented
Recommendation 3
The Internal Revenue Service Is Not Fully Complying Rep. No. 2024-200-025; June 2024
With the No TikTok on Government Devices
Implementation Guidance Virtual Currency Tax Compliance Enforcement Can
Recommendations 3 and 6 Be Improved
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R003; December 2023 Recommendations 1, 2, and 3
Rep. No. 2024-300-030; July 2024
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure the Health and
Safety of Employees at the C-site Actions Have Been Taken to Improve Security
Recommendations 5, 6, 11, and 16 Controls for the Planned Expanded Use of
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R006; December 2023 Login.gov; However, Additional Security
Improvements Are Needed
Administration of the Individual Taxpayer Recommendations 2 and 5
Identification Number Program Rep. No. 2024-200-032; July 2024
Recommendation 7—Potential Funds Put to Better
The IRS Does Not Have Specific Plans to Replace
Use: $8,114,040
and Decommission Legacy Systems
Recommendation 8
Rep. No. 2024-400-012; December 2023 Recommendation 1
Rep. No. 2024-200-038; August 2024
Interim Evaluation – Assessment of the IRS’s
Comprehensive Facilities Security Review and Improvements to the Tax Exempt Compliance
Employee Safety and Security Measures Unit Could Reduce Mistakes and Unproductive
Examination Referrals
Recommendations 1, 9, 12, and 13
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R004; January 2024 Recommendation 4
Rep. No. 2024-100-040; August 2024
Assessment of Processes to Grant Access to
Sensitive Systems and to Safeguard Federal Tax Efforts to Oversee State Agency Access to Federal
Information Tax Information Were Generally Successful;
However, Some Improvements Are Needed
Recommendation 1
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R008; February 2024 Recommendations 1 and 2
Rep. No. 2024-100-041; August 2024
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
27
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
The IRS Has Made Limited Progress Developing the Fiscal Year 2024 Statutory Audit of Compliance
Methodology to Comply With the Treasury Directive With Legal Guidelines Restricting the Use of
to Not Increase the Audit Rate for Taxpayers With Records of Tax Enforcement Results
Incomes Below $400,000 Due to Planning and
Recommendations 5 and 6
Implementation Challenges
Rep. No. 2024-300-061; September 2024
Recommendation 4
Rep. No. 2024-308-043; August 2024 The Information Collected by Online Providers and
Shared With Third Parties Is Not Clearly Disclosed to
Actions Need to Be Taken to Improve the Data Loss Taxpayers and Is Unknown to the IRS
Prevention Solution and Reduce the Risk of Data
Recommendation 2
Exfiltration
Rep. No. 2024-400-062; September 2024
Recommendations 1, 2, and 3
Rep. No. 2024-200-048; September 2024 Former Contractor Employees Retained Access to
IRS Facilities, Systems, and Equipment
The Direct File Pilot Deployed Successfully; However,
Recommendation 2
Security and Testing Improvements Are Needed
Rep. No. 2024-100-063; September 2024
Recommendation 4
Rep. No. 2024-200-050; September 2024 The IRS Could Collect Over a Billion Dollars in Taxes
From Unreported Wagering Income
Customer Satisfaction Survey Results Are Not Used
Recommendation 1—Potential Increased Revenue:
Effectively to Improve Taxpayer Service
$1,378,183,554
Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 Recommendations 2, 4, and 5
Rep. No. 2024-100-053; September 2024 Rep. No. 2024-300-064; September 2024
Fiscal Year 2024 Statutory Review of Compliance Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Oversight of
With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies and Increase Participation in the Free File Program
Recommendations 1, 4, and 6 Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7
Rep. No. 2024-300-056; September 2024 Rep. No. 2024-400-067; September 2024
Security Vulnerability Management and Actions Were Not Taken to Timely Strengthen
Configuration Compliance of a General Support Practitioner Priority Service Telephone Line
System and Major Application Need Improvement Authentication Controls
Recommendations 2, 3, 5, and 6 Recommendation 2—Actual Funds Put to Better Use:
Rep. No. 2024-200-057; September 2024 $47,698,849
Rep. No. 2025-IE-R001; October 2024
Review of the IRS Independent Office of Appeals
Collection Due Process Program Governance Efforts Should Be Accelerated
Recommendations 1 and 2 To Ensure the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy
Rep. No. 2024-300-060; September 2024 Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence
Recommendation 2
Rep. No. 2025-IE-R003; November 2024
Final Evaluation - Assessment of the IRS’s
Comprehensive Facilities Security Review and
Employee Safety and Security Measures
Recommendations 1, 4, 6,
Rep. No. 2025-IE-R004; November 2024
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
28
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Improved Secure Document Safeguarding and Inflation Reduction Act: Implementation of the
Destruction Procedures Are Needed Clean Vehicle Tax Credits
Recommendations 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 12 Recommendation 1
Rep. No. 2025-IE-R005; December 2024 Rep. No. 2025-408-014; March 2025
The Tax Offset Program Continues to Allow Millions Inflation Reduction Act: Contract Performance
of Dollars to Be Erroneously Refunded to Taxpayers Oversight and Compliance With Expenditure
Recommendations 1, 5, and 6 Restrictions Need Improvement
Recommendation 2—Potential Funds Put to Better Recommendations 1, 3, 5, and 6
Use: $23,157,344 Rep. No. 2025-208-008; March 2025
Rep. No. 2025-400-002; December 2024
Inflation Reduction Act: Results of the Direct
The IRS Lacks Authority to Independently Verify That File Pilot
Low Income Taxpayer Clinic Grant Recipients Are Recommendations 1 and 5
Meeting Eligibility Requirements Rep. No. 2025-408-015; March 2025
Recommendations 1, 2, and 3
Systems Hosting Sensitive Data Lack Consistent
Rep. No. 2025-100-005; January 2025
Inventory Standards
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure That Taxpayers Recommendations 2, 3, and 4
Are Receiving a Quality Experience When Visiting a Rep. No. 2025-200-009; March 2025
Taxpayer Assistance Center
Recommendations 7 and 8
Rep. No. 2025-IE-R010; February 2025
The Taxpayer Advocate Service Office of Systemic
Advocacy Needs to Improve Program Oversight to
Ensure Taxpayer Problems Are Effectively Identified
and Resolved
Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11
Rep. No. 2025-300-006; February 2025
Improvements Are Required to Promptly Validate
and Issue Manual Refunds Associated With
Deceased Taxpayers
Recommendation 1—Potential Funds Put to Better
Use: $4,681,909
Recommendation 2—Potential Funds Put to Better
Use: $16,804,354
Recommendations 5 and 6
Rep. No. 2025-IE-R012; March 2025
The Unanticipated Large Number of Taxpayers
Created Safety and Security Challenges at Some
Taxpayer Assistance Center Saturday Help Events
Recommendations 1, 2, and 5
Rep. No. 2025-IE-R013; March 2025
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
29
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix I
Appendix I
Organizational Structure
Authorities
TIGTA has all authorities granted under the Inspector General Act of 1978 (Inspector General Act).12 In
addition to the standard authorities granted to Inspectors General, TIGTA has access to tax information in the
performance of its tax administration responsibilities. TIGTA also reports potential criminal violations directly
to the Department of Justice when we deem appropriate.
TIGTA and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner or IRS Commissioner) have established
policies and procedures delineating responsibilities to investigate potential criminal offenses under the
Internal Revenue laws. In addition, the RRA 98 amended the Inspector General Act to give TIGTA the
statutory authority to carry firearms, execute search and arrest warrants, serve subpoenas and summonses,
and make arrests.13
12 5 United States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 401-424.
13 Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 7608(b)(2). Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2, 5, 16, 19, 22, 23, 26, 31, 38, and 49 U.S.C.).
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
30
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix II
Appendix II
Other Required Reporting
The Inspector General Act requires Inspectors General to address the following matters.
Results for the Reporting Period Ending
Topic September 30, 2025
Interference/Access to Information There were no attempts to interfere with TIGTA’s
independence, including:
• budget constraints;
• incidents of resistance or objection to oversight
activities; and/or
• restricted or significantly delayed access to
information.
Management Decisions for Reports TIGTA received no management decisions during
Issued in a Prior Reporting Period the current reporting period for reports issued in a
prior reporting period.
Disclosure No reports were closed and not disclosed to the
public.
Review of Legislation and Regulations TIGTA’s Office of Chief Counsel reviewed 167
proposed regulations and legislative requests
during the reporting period.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
31
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix III
Appendix III
Statutory Reviews
The following table reflects the FY 2025 statutory reviews.
Reference to Statutory Coverage
Explanation of the
Comments/TIGTA Audit Status
Provision
Enforcement Statistics
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)
Requires TIGTA to Rep. No. 2025-300-044; September 2025
evaluate the IRS’s TIGTA found instances of noncompliance with two subsections of the RRA 98
compliance with § 1204 requirements. The violations of these provisions in this review include
restrictions under RRA 29 instances of noncompliance in different IRS business units in which IRS
98 § 1204 on the use of management failed to either maintain the retention standard documentation or
enforcement statistics to ensure that it was appropriately signed (RRA 98 § 1204(b)), and 21 instances
evaluate IRS employees. where 17 managers did not complete at least one Fiscal Year 2024 quarterly
certification in multiple IRS business units (RRA 98 § 1204(c)). TIGTA identified
six Section 1204 employees that failed to complete the Section 1204 briefing in
Fiscal Year 2024.
Restrictions on Directly Contacting Taxpayers
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(ii)
Requires TIGTA to Rep. No. 2025-300-047; September 2025
evaluate the IRS’s TIGTA found that IRS employees did not consistently follow legal and procedural
compliance with requirements related to direct taxpayer contact and representation. TIGTA
restrictions under I.R.C. identified 38 potential violations within 21 of the 75 field examination cases
§ 7521 on directly sampled for review. In 8 of these 21 cases, field examiners committed multiple
contacting taxpayers potential violations. TIGTA estimates there were more than 13,600 cases from
who have indicated July 2023 through June 2024 where the examiner did not consistently follow
they prefer their procedures to protect the taxpayer’s right to representation. Some violations
representatives be were caused by an inconsistency between the Internal Revenue Manual
contacted. (IRM) guidance to employees and other procedural rules. This inconsistency
impacts taxpayers that use Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of
Representative to designate a representative.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix III
Filing of a Notice of Lien
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii)
Requires TIGTA to Rep. No. 2025-300-034; August 2025
evaluate the IRS’s TIGTA reviewed a statistically valid sample of 116 out of 109,531 Notice of
compliance with required NFTLs that the IRS filed from July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024, in which
procedures under I.R.C. § a Collection Due Process lien notice was required to be sent to the taxpayer.
6320(a) upon the filing of TIGTA found that the IRS generally complied with legal requirements to send
a notice of lien. lien notices to the taxpayer’s last known address by certified or registered mail
and within five business days of the lien filing. TIGTA found instances where the
IRS did not provide all the taxpayers’ representatives with a copy of the lien and
hearing notice. From the statistical sample of 116 NFTLs, there were 58 cases
in which the taxpayer designated their authorized representative(s) to receive
notices. The IRS did not provide notices in 5 of the 58 cases to every authorized
representative designated by the taxpayer.
Extensions of the Statute of Limitations for Assessment of Tax
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(C) / I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4)(B)
Requires TIGTA to include Rep. No. 2025-1S0-018; March 2025
information regarding TIGTA selected a statistically valid stratified random sample of 74 out of 6,815
extensions of the taxpayer audit files closed from April 1, 2023 through March 31, 2024, for
statute of limitations for cases in which the IRS extended the assessment statute expiration date.
assessment of tax under TIGTA reviewed 43 of the 74 case files. The remaining cases were paper files.
I.R.C. § 6501 and the TIGTA did not identify any instances in which the IRS failed to provide notice
provision of notice to to the taxpayers of their rights to decline to extend the assessment statute of
taxpayers regarding the limitations or to request that any extension be limited to a specific period of time
right to refuse or limit the or specific issues. Similar to prior reviews, the IRS was unable to provide many of
extension of particular the taxpayer paper audit files requested.
issues or a particular
period of time.
Levies
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iv)
Requires TIGTA to Rep. No. 2025-300-042; September 2025
evaluate the IRS’s TIGTA reviewed levies issued by Field Collection revenue officers for more than
compliance with required 46,182 taxpayers during the period July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024. TIGTA
procedures under I.R.C. § identified 357 instances of noncompliance that resulted in potential violations
6330 regarding levies. of taxpayers’ rights and an estimated 472 instances of noncompliance that
resulted in taxpayers being burdened.
Collection Due Process
I.R.C. §§ 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv)
Requires TIGTA to Rep. No. 2025-300-051; September 2025
evaluate the IRS’s TIGTA previously identified 55 unlawful levies that occurred because the IRS
compliance with required did not timely input the required code that prevents a levy from occurring on
procedures under I.R.C. a taxpayer’s account. TIGTA analyzed these cases to assess whether Appeals
§§ 6320 and 6330 had incorrectly certified that all laws and regulations had been met, despite the
regarding taxpayers’ unlawful levy. In nearly all of the 55 unlawful levy cases, the Appeals hearing
rights to appeal lien or officers did not identify that an unlawful levy occurred and incorrectly verified
levy actions. that all laws and procedures had been complied with for the proposed levy
action to proceed.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix III
Seizures
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iv)
Requires TIGTA to Rep. No. 2025-300-043; September 2025
evaluate the IRS’s TIGTA reviewed 61 taxpayer cases involving 105 seizures conducted by the
compliance with required IRS and found that Field Collection employees generally adhered to applicable
procedures under laws, regulations, and procedures. However, the IRS conducted seizures without
I.R.C. §§ 6330 through following proper procedures in some cases, potentially violating taxpayer rights
6344 when conducting or causing unnecessary taxpayer burden.
seizures.
Taxpayer Designations–Illegal Tax Protester Designation and Similar Designations
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(v)
An evaluation of the Internal Memorandum; May 2025
IRS’s compliance with The IRS complied with the Restructuring and Reform Act § 3707 by removing
restrictions under the Illegal Tax Protester (ITP) designation from the Individual Master File (IMF) in
RRA 98 § 3707 on January 1999. TIGTA’s FY 2025 review determined that ITP codes were not used
designation of taxpayers. on the Master File during the review period of July 01, 2023, through June 30,
2024. TIGTA found no use of an ITP code designation in the review of the IMF
or the Business Master File databases or in the review of current Master File
transactions codes.
Disclosure of Collection Activity With Respect to Joint Returns
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(B) (TIGTA requirement) / I.R.C. § 6103(e)(8) (IRS requirement)
Requires TIGTA to review Rep. No. 2025-300-046; September 2025
and certify whether the TIGTA reviewed 91 case history files from the Small Business/Self-Employed
IRS is complying with Division to determine whether employees followed the joint return disclosure
I.R.C. § 6103(e)(8), requirements on collection information requests. TIGTA determined that
which requires the IRS disclosure requirements were not followed in 29 (32 percent) cases worked by
to disclose information the Automated Collection System, Field Collection, and Specialty Collection, Offer
to an individual filing a in Compromise functions. In most cases, taxpayers or their representatives did
joint return on collection not receive the information related to collection activities of the taxpayers’ joint
activity involving the liabilities to which they were entitled. These taxpayers were either potentially
other individual filing the burdened with additional delays in resolving their respective tax matters or
return. potentially had their right to privacy violated.
Taxpayer Complaints
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(2)(A)
Requires TIGTA to include Statistical results on the number of taxpayer complaints received are shown on
in each Semiannual page 21.
Report to Congress the
number of taxpayer
complaints received; and
the number of employee
misconduct and taxpayer
abuse allegations
received by the IRS or
TIGTA from taxpayers, IRS
employees, and other
sources.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix III
Administrative or Civil Actions With Respect to the Tax Collection Practices Act of 1996
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(G) / I.R.C. § 6304 / RRA 98 § 3466
Requires TIGTA to include Rep. No. 2025-300-045; September 2025
information regarding TIGTA reviewed cases in the IRS’s Automated Labor and Employee Relations
any administrative or civil Tracking System (ALERTS) from July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024, and
actions with respect to identified 38 employee misconduct cases, containing 40 issues that were
violation of the fair debt coded as potential Fair Tax Collection Practices (FTCP) violations (15 issues
collection provision of were substantiated as FTCP violations, 24 unsubstantiated, and 1 did not have
I.R.C. § 6304, including a substantiation code). TIGTA reviewed 116 misconduct cases with 143 other
a summary of such issue codes from the ALERTS database potentially related to FTCP violations
actions and any resulting and found that 19 (in 16 cases) of 143 misconduct case issues should have
judgments or awards been coded as potential FTCP violations. TIGTA also identified 400 potential
granted. FTCP violations (76 potential violations from Field Collection and 324 Campus
Collection) in the IRS’s Embedded Quality Review System, that were not reported
in the ALERTS database.
Denials of Requests for Information
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(F) / I.R.C. § 7803(d)(3)(A)
Requires TIGTA to include Rep. No. 2025-100-027; June 2025
information regarding TIGTA reviewed a statistically valid stratified random sample of 52 of the 892
improper denial of fully or partially denied FOIA requests and determined that the IRS correctly
requests for information withheld information using FOIA exemption (b)(7) for 48 (92 percent) of the
from the IRS, based on a 52 FOIA information requests. In the four remaining cases, the IRS improperly
statistically valid sample withheld information which the requestor was entitled to receive. Based on this
of the total number of year’s sample results, TIGTA estimates that the IRS erroneously applied the (b)
determinations made by (7) exemption on approximately 73 of the 892 FOIA exemption (b)(7) information
the IRS to deny written requests closed between April 1, 2023, and March 31, 2024.
requests to disclose
information to taxpayers
on the basis of I.R.C.
§ 6103 or 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7).
Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019
31 U.S.C. § 3353
Requires TIGTA to assess Rep. No. 2025-400-025; May 2025
the IRS’s compliance For FY 2024, the IRS partially complied with the reporting requirements
with improper payment contained in the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019. As in prior years, the
requirements. IRS calculated improper payment rates for the following four high-risk programs:
Additional Child Tax Credit, American Opportunity Tax Credit, Earned Income Tax
Credit, and Net Premium Tax Credit. However, the IRS still has not satisfied the
goal to reduce improper payment rates to less than 10 percent.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
35
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix III
Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012
Pub. L. No. 112-194, 126 Stat. 1445 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 5701 note, 10 U.S.C. § 2784, and 41
§ U.S.C. 1909)
Requires TIGTA to report Rep. No. 2025-1S0-011; January 2025
on the IRS’s progress in Rep. No. 2025-1S0-039; July 2025
implementing purchase TIGTA’s review of the IRS’s purchase card program found that controls are
and travel card audit generally effective, and the number of purchase card violations identified by the
recommendations. Chief Financial Officer’s Credit Card Services Branch were minimal.
Biannual Independent Assessment of Private Collection Agency Performance
Independently evaluate Rep. No. 2025-300-004; December 2024
the performance of TIGTA’s review revealed that 796 private collection agency employees were
private collection granted access to Personally Identifiable Information. Of those granted access,
agencies. 11 employees received a Proposal to Deny Letter due to security concerns
identified in their background investigation, and staff-like access should have
been immediately suspended. However, the IRS does not readily track when
interim staff-like access is suspended and whether it is immediate. A review
of private collection agency incident logs identified 10 incidents that were
improperly categorized and potentially violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act for disclosing tax debt information to unauthorized third parties
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) Program
Assess that only Fieldwork currently in process.
individuals with a tax
need are assigned an
ITIN.
Adequacy and Security of the Technology of the IRS
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(D)
Requires TIGTA to Information Technology Reviews: Security Reviews:
evaluate the IRS’s Rep. No. 2025-IE-R003; Nov 2024 Rep. No. 2025-200-009; Mar 2025
adequacy and security of Rep. No. 2025-400-002; Dec 2024 Rep. No. 2025-IE-R018; Jul 2025
its technology. Rep. No. 2025-IE-R008; Feb 2025 Rep. No. 2025-2S0-029; Jun 2025
Rep. No. 2025-408-010; Feb 2025 Rep. No. 2025-200-038; Sep 2025
Rep. No. 2025-405-013; Feb 2025 Rep. No. 2025-200-037; Sep 2025
Rep. No. 2025-408-014; Mar 2025 Rep. No. 2025-200-035; Sep 2025
Rep. No. 2025-208-008; Mar 2025
Rep. No. 2025-IE-R012; Mar 2025
Rep. No. 2025-408-015; Mar 2025
Rep. No. 2025-408-016; Apr 2025
Rep. No. 2025-308-022; May 2025
Rep. No. 2025-208-023; May 2025
Rep. No. 2025-2S0-007; Jun 2025
Rep. No. 2025-400-036; Jul 2025
Rep. No. 2025-IE-R029; Aug 2025
Rep. No. 2025-2S8-041; Aug 2025
Rep. No. 2025-208-050; Sep 2025
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix IV
Appendix IV
Audit and Evaluation Reports Issued14 15
View reports in their entirety at TIGTA.gov.
April 2025 Vague and Outdated Guidance Creates Challenges
Actions Need to Be Taken to Improve Services for Tax-Exempt Hospital Oversight
Provided at Taxpayer Assistance Centers 2025-100-019
2025-108-017
The IRS Could Leverage Examination Results in
Final Results of the 2024 Filing Season Artificial Intelligence Examination Case Selection
2025-408-016 Models and Improve Processes to Evaluate
Performance
Revenue Officer Compliance Sweeps of High-Income
Nonfilers Were Impactful, but Tracking Data and 2025-308-022
Training Could Be Improved
Limited Progress Has Been Made Expanding the Use
2025-300-021
of Electronic Signature Services on Non-Tax Forms
Consistent Guidance Could Improve Delivery of 2025-208-023
Payments and Returns Intended for IRS
Snapshot Report: IRS Workforce Reductions as of
Lockbox Sites
March 2025
2025-IE-R015
2025-IE-R017
Automated External Defibrillators Are Not
Thousands of Notifications to Taxpayers Affected
Operationally Ready or Available at Some IRS Posts
by the Large-Scale Data Breach Were Returned
of Duty
Undeliverable
2025-IE-R016
2025-IE-R019
May 2025
June 2025
The IRS Reduced Earned Income Tax Credit
Interim Results of the 2025 Filing Season
Examinations in Fiscal Year 2024, but the Process
2025-400-026
to Mitigate Racial Disparity Needs to Be Defined
2025-308-020 Fiscal Year 2025 Review of Compliance With the
Freedom of Information Act
Assessment of Fiscal Year 2024 Compliance With
2025-100-027
Improper Payment Reporting Requirements
2025-400-025 Improvements to Taxpayer Advocate Case
Processing Would Result in Better Customer Service
2025-100-024
14 Unless otherwise noted, IRS management decisions were made by the end of the reporting period for all audit
products listed in this appendix.
15 Dollar values for any recommendations with Questioned Costs and/or Funds Put to Better Use are available in the
Outcome Measure Appendix of the report, if applicable.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
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TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix IV
Criminal Investigation Trends From Fiscal Year 2019 Criminal Investigation’s Body-Worn Camera Program
Through Fiscal Year 2023 Needs Improvement
2025-3S0-028 2025-IE-R023
Annual Assessment of the IRS’s Information Inspection of Select IRS Operations in Puerto Rico
Technology Program for Fiscal Year 2024 2025-IE-R022
2025-2S0-007
Snapshot Report: IRS Workforce Reductions as of
The IRS Transferred Incorrect Federal Tax May 2025
Information to the Department of Education for 2025-IE-R027
Federal Student Aid
2025-2S0-029 Actions Need to Be Taken to Address Taxpayer
Assistance Center Safety and Security Weaknesses
Improvements Are Needed to Address Inaccuracies 2025-IE-R021
in Unassigned Firearms Inventory Records
2025-IE-R020 August 2025
Progress of Information Technology Modernization
July 2025 Efforts for Calendar Year 2024
High-Income Individual Examinations Increased in 2025-2S8-041
Fiscal Year 2024, But Key Terms and Methodologies
for Compliance With the 2022 Treasury Directive Telephone Level of Service and Average Wait Times
Remained Unresolved Do Not Fully Reflect the Taxpayer Experience
2025-308-030 2025-100-040
Trends in Compliance Activities Through Fiscal Year Fiscal Year 2025 Statutory Review of Compliance
2023 With Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing Collection Due
2025-300-031 Process Procedures
2025-300-034
Review of the Internal Revenue Service’s Purchase
Card Violations Report Most Employers Paid Their Deferred Social Security
2025-1S0-039 Taxes But Some Penalties Were Incorrect
2025-406-049
The Internal Revenue Service University Training Has
Not Been Streamlined and Its Future Is Unknown Snapshot: The IRS’s Inflation Reduction Act
2025-3S8-033 Spending Through March 31, 2025
2025-IE-R026
Compliance With the Standard for the Fair and
Equitable Treatment of Taxpayers Could Be Lack of Contract Oversight Led to Inoperable Kiosks
Improved at Taxpayer Assistance Centers
2025-300-032 2025-IE-R024
Further Improvements Are Needed to Strengthen the Inflation Reduction Act: IRS Spending on Technology
Controls for Issuing Employer Identification Numbers Transformation Efforts
2025-400-036 2025-IE-R029
Improvements Are Needed to Accurately Track and Authenticating Callers’ Identity on Business
Safeguard Seized Digital Assets and Practitioner Telephone Lines Needs to Be
2025-IE-R018 Strengthened to Combat Fraud
2025-IE-R025
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
38
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix IV
IRS Terminated Probationary Employees Without Fiscal Year 2025 Statutory Review of Collection Due
Following Internal Procedures and Considering Process - Independent Office of Appeals
Individual Performance 2025-300-051
2025-IE-R028
Fiscal Year 2025 Statutory Audit of Compliance With
Legal Guidelines Restricting the Use of Records of
September 2025
Tax Enforcement Results
The Infrastructure Supporting the Big Data Analytics 2025-300-044
Platform Has Overdue and Unresolved System
Vulnerabilities Fiscal Year 2025 Statutory Review of Potential Fair
2025-200-038 Tax Collection Practices Violations
2025-300-045
Fiscal Year 2025 Statutory Review of Compliance
With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies Final Results of the 2025 Filing Season
2025-300-042 2025-400-048
The IRS’s Cybersecurity Program Was Not Effective
for Fiscal Year 2025
2025-200-037
Funds Put to Better Use
Although Enterprise Case Management April 1, 2025 – September 30, 2025
Modernization Has Begun, No Legacy Systems Have
2025-208-050
Been Decommissioned
$39,058,495
2025-208-050
2025-IE-R025
The IRS Made Some Progress Implementing
$55,889,446
Effective Protection for the Enterprise Linux Platform
2025-200-035
Fiscal Year 2025 Mandatory Review of Disclosure of Questioned Costs
Collection Activity With Respect to Joint Returns
2025-300-046 None.
Despite Previous Recommendations, Contract
Documentation Issues Persist
2025-108-052
Fiscal Year 2025 Statutory Review of Restrictions on
Directly Contacting Represented Taxpayers
2025-300-047
Fiscal Year 2025 Mandatory Review of Compliance
With Legal Guidelines When Conducting Seizures of
Taxpayers’ Property
2025-300-043
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
39
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix V
Appendix V
Inspector General Peer Review Activity
This appendix implements § 989C of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.16
For the period April 1, 2025 – September 30, 2025:
Peer Reviews Conducted of TIGTA by Another Office of Inspector General
None.
Outstanding Recommendations From Peer Reviews of TIGTA
There are no outstanding recommendations from prior peer reviews of TIGTA.
Peer Reviews Conducted by TIGTA
None.
Outstanding Recommendations From Peer Reviews Conducted by TIGTA
There are no outstanding recommendations from peer reviews conducted by TIGTA.
Most Recent Peer Reviews Conducted of TIGTA
• The Department of Agriculture OIG completed a peer review of TIGTA’s Office of Investigations on
May 11, 2024.
• The Department of Veterans Affairs OIG completed a peer review of TIGTA’s Office of Audit on
September 18, 2024.
• The Department of Labor completed a peer review of TIGTA’s office of Inspections and Evaluations on
March 28, 2024.
16 Codified in 5 U.S.C. § 405(b) subsections (8)-(10).
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
40
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix VI
Appendix VI
Data Tables Provided by the IRS
The memorandum copied below is TIGTA’s transmittal to the IRS. Due to the government shutdown, the IRS
was unable to provide this data. It will be updated when available.
IRS Memorandum
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
41
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix VI
Report of Employee Misconduct by Disposition Groups
Due to the government shutdown, the IRS was unable to provide this data. It will be updated when available.
Employee Employee Tax TIGTA
Administrative Character Compliance Report of
Disposition Case Investigation Case Investigation Totals
Alternative Discipline:
– – – – –
In Lieu of Reprimand
Alternative Discipline:
– – – – –
In Lieu of Suspension
Admonishment – – – – –
Case Suspended Pending
– – – – –
Employee Return to Duty
Clearance Letter – – – – –
Closed- Supplemental
– – – – –
Requested
Closed without Action
– – – – –
Cautionary Letter
Closed without Action Letter – – – – –
Forwarded to TIGTA – – – – –
Indefinite Suspension – – – – –
Oral Counseling – – – – –
Probation/Separation – – – – –
Prosecution Pending for TIGTA’s
– – – – –
Report of Investigation
Removal at Office of Personnel
– – – – –
Management Direction
Removal
– – – – –
(Probation Period Complete)
Reprimand – – – – –
Resignation, Retirement, etc.
– – – – –
(Reason Noted on SF50)
Resignation, Retirement, etc.
– – – – –
(Reason Not Noted on SF50)
Separation of Temporary
– – – – –
Employee
Suspension, 14 Days or Less – – – – –
Suspension, More Than 14 Days – – – – –
Termination For Abandonment
– – – – –
of Position
Written Counseling – – – – –
Totals – – – – –
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
42
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix VI
Report of Employee Misconduct National Summary
Due to the government shutdown, the IRS was unable to provide this data. It will be updated when available.
Cases Closed
Cases
Conduct Merged Non-
Open Cases Conduct With Other Conduct Ending
Inventory Case Type Inventory Received Issues Cases Issues Inventory
Administrative Case – – – – – –
Employee Character
– – – – – –
Investigation
Employee Tax Compliance
– – – – – –
Case
TIGTA Report of Investigation – – – – – –
Totals – – – – – –
Administrative Case—Any matter involving an employee in which management conducted an inquiry into
alleged misconduct.
Background Investigations—Any matter involving a National Background Investigation Center investigation
into an employee’s background that is referred to management for appropriate action.
Employee Tax Compliance Case—Any conduct matter identified by the Employee Tax Compliance program
and becomes a matter of official interest.
TIGTA Investigation—Any matter involving an employee in which TIGTA investigated alleged misconduct and
referred a Report of Investigation to the IRS for appropriate action.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
43
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix VI
Summary of Substantiated I.R.C. Section 1203
Inquiries Recorded in ALERTS
Due to the government shutdown, the IRS was unable to provide this data. It will be updated when available.
Removed In
Resigned/ Probation on Other Penalty Personnel
§ 1203 Violation Removals Retired Separation Grounds Mitigated Process Total
1203(b)(2): False
– – – – – – –
Statement Under Oath
1203(b)(3): Civil Rights/
– – – – – – –
Constructive Violation
1203(b)(8): Willful
– – – – – – –
Untimely Return
1203(b)(9): Willfull
– – – – – – –
Understated Tax
Totals – – – – – – –
Cases reported as “Removals” and “Penalty Mitigated” do not reflect the results of any third-party appeal.
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
44
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Appendix VII
Appendix VII
IRM) for the purpose of retaliating against or
Section 1203 Standards harassing a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or
other employee of the IRS;
In general, the IRS Commissioner shall terminate
any IRS employee if there is a final administrative • Willfully misusing provisions of I.R.C. § 6103 for
or judicial determination that, in the performance the purpose of concealing information from a
of official duties, such employee committed congressional inquiry;
any misconduct violations outlined below. Such • Willfully failing to file any return of tax
termination shall be a removal for cause on charges required under the I.R.C. on or before the date
of misconduct. prescribed therefore (including any extensions),
unless such failure is due to reasonable cause
Misconduct violations include:
and not to willful neglect;
• Willfully failing to obtain the required approval
• Willfully understating federal tax liability, unless
signatures on documents authorizing the seizure
such understatement is due to reasonable
of a taxpayer’s home, personal belongings, or
cause and not to willful neglect; and
business assets;
• Threatening to audit a taxpayer for the purpose
• Providing a false statement under oath with
of extracting personal gain or benefit.
respect to a material matter involving a
taxpayer or taxpayer representative; The IRS Commissioner may mitigate the penalty
• Violating, with respect to a taxpayer, taxpayer of removal for the misconduct violations outlined
representative, or other employee of the IRS, above. The exercise of this authority shall be at the
any right under the Constitution of the United sole discretion of the Commissioner and may not be
States, or any civil right established under Title delegated to any other officer. The Commissioner
VI or VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Title IX may establish a procedure that will be used to
of the Education Amendments of 1972; Age decide whether an individual should be referred to
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; Age the Commissioner for determination. Any mitigation
Discrimination Act of 1975; Section 501 or 504 determination by the Commissioner in these matters
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; or Title I of may not be appealed in any administrative or
the Americans With Disabilities judicial proceeding.
Act of 1990;
• Falsifying or destroying documents to conceal
mistakes made by any employee with respect
to a matter involving a taxpayer or taxpayer
representative;
• Committing assault or battery on a taxpayer,
taxpayer representative, or another employee of
the IRS, but only if there is a criminal conviction
or a final judgment by a court in a civil case
with respect to the assault or battery;
• Violating the I.R.C., the Treasury Department
regulations, or policies of the IRS (including the
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
45
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Reporting Requirements
The table below cross-references the reporting requirements prescribed by the Inspector General Act, as
amended, to the specific pages where they are addressed. The information required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, as amended,
are also cross-referenced to the appropriate pages of the report.
Section Requirement Page Page
405(b)(1) Significant Problems, Abuses and Deficiencies Throughout the report.
405(b)(2) Unimplemented Prior Period Recommendations 25-29
405(b)(3) Significant Investigations Closed iii, 21
405(b)(4) Total Convictions Number 22
405(b)(5) Report Listing with Dollar Values 37-39
405(b)(6) Management Decisions Made on Prior Period Recommendations 31
405(b)(8)-(10) Peer Review Information and Results 40
405(b)(11) Investigative Statistical Tables 21-23
405(b)(12) Investigative Table Metrics 16
405(b)(13) Investigations of Senior Employees with Substantiated Misconduct 24
405(b)(14) Whistleblower Retaliation 23
405(b)(15) Agency Interference with OIG Independence 23, 31
405(b)(16)(A) Non-public Audit, Evaluation or Inspection Reports 31
405(b)(16)(B) Non-public Investigations of Senior Government Employees 24
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
46
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Glossary
ALERTS Automated Labor and Employee ITIN Individual Taxpayer Identification
Relations Tracking System Number
AOTC American Opportunity Tax Credit ITP Illegal Tax Protester
ECM Enterprise Case Management NFTL Notice of Federal Tax Lien
EIDL Economic Injury Disaster Loan PIIA Payment Integrity Information Act
EIN Employer Identification Number PPP Paycheck Protection Program
FAFSA Free Application for Federal RRA 98 IRS Restructuring and Reform
Student Aid Act of 1998
FY Fiscal Year TAC Taxpayer Assistance Center
IMF Individual Master File TIGTA Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration
IRA Inflation Reduction Act of 2022
U.S.C. United States Code
I.R.C. Internal Revenue Code
IRS Internal Revenue Service
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
47
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Inspector General for Tax Administration
901 D Street, SW, Suite 600 • Washington, DC 20024
This report and complete copies of TIGTA audit reports are available online at www.tigta.gov.
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