The United States' Response and Objection to Relator's Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment, United States ex rel. Stuart Hallam v. Brett Deuter, No. 1:23-cv-00348 (D. Idaho), Doc. 57 (December 5, 2025)
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The United States' Response and Objection to Relator's Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment (Dkt. 51) in United States ex rel. Stuart Hallam v. Brett Deuter, Case No. 1:23-cv-00348-REP (District of Idaho), dated December 5, 2025. The United States argues that the Court must deny the motion because a relator cannot proceed pro se in a False Claims Act case, and that Rule 60 does not provide a mechanism to void the Consent Judgment because the Consent Judgment is fair, adequate, and reasonable. It states that the Consent Judgment entered September 18, 2024 is against Defendants jointly and severally for $850,000, and that Relator is entitled to 19% of what is paid or collected. It also states that Relator alleged fraudulently obtained EIDL and PPP loans of approximately $710,000.
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“The United States' Response and Objection to Relator's Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment, United States ex rel. Stuart Hallam v. Brett Deuter, No. 1:23-cv-00348 (D. Idaho), Doc. 57 (December 5, 2025).”
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Case 1:23-cv-00348-REP Document 57 Filed 12/05/25 Page 1 of 18
BART M. DAVIS, IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 2696
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
WILLIAM M. HUMPHRIES, IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 11709
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
1290 WEST MYRTLE STREET, SUITE 500
BOISE, ID 83702
TELEPHONE: (208) 334-1211
FACSIMILE: (208) 334-9375
Email: Bill.Humphries@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the United States of America
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel.
Stuart Hallam, Case No. 1:23-cv-00348-REP
Plaintiff, THE UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE AND
OBJECTION TO RELATOR’S RULE 60
v. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT (DKT. 51)
BRETT DEUTER, an individual; DEUTER
CONSTRUCTION, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; and ENLIGHTEN, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company d/b/a
Enlighten Construction Services and Enlighten
Home,
Defendants.
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3
LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 3
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 6
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7
I. The Court must deny Relator’s Motion because he cannot proceed pro se in a False
Claims Act case................................................................................................................... 7
II. Rule 60 does not provide a mechanism to void the Consent Judgment because the
Consent Judgment is fair, adequate, and reasonable........................................................... 7
A. The amount of the Consent Judgment is reasonable. ........................................ 8
B. The Consent Judgment provides additional benefits to the Government that
could not be obtained through summary judgment..................................................................... 9
1. The Consent Judgment saved resources. .............................................. 9
2. Defendants admit to wrongdoing and a judgment has consequences. 11
3. The Consent Judgment garnered favorable nondischargeability
admissions for bankruptcy. ................................................................. 11
4. The Consent Judgment allows traditional judgment collection upon
default. ................................................................................................ 12
C. Defendants lack the ability to pay even the Consent Judgment...................... 13
III. Rule 60 cannot provide relief from the consequences of a decision made that may later be
revealed to be unwise. ....................................................................................................... 14
IV. Rule 60(b)(3) is not an appropriate ground for relief. ...................................................... 14
V. Rule 60(b)(6) is not an appropriate ground for relief. ...................................................... 17
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 17
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INTRODUCTION
The Court should deny Stuart Hallam’s Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment (Dkt.
No. 51). In a nutshell, Stuart Hallam (the Relator) was upset with the negotiated Consent
Judgment from the start, apparently because of the Defendants’ inability to pay the judgment.
Defendants’ poor financial condition jeopardized Relator’s ability to recoup expenses from a
separate civil case, so now he asserts (pro se) that the Court should void the Consent Judgment.
The Court should not void the Consent Judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) or (b)(6), or through any
inherent power, for numerous reasons. As a threshold matter, the Relator must be represented;
he cannot proceed pro se. Moreover, voiding the judgment would be an empty exercise because
the Consent Judgment is reasonable, Defendants likely lack the resources to pay even the lower
(already entered consent) judgment, and the Government obtained numerous benefits from the
Consent Judgment, in addition to the monetary amount. Lastly, although the analysis need not
go this far, there was no misrepresentation or fraud. Relator, in coordination with his counsel,
made a calculated decision to agree to the Consent Judgment knowing that the Government
would seek Court approval of the settlement regardless of his objection. While he now regrets
his decision, that is not a sufficient reason to void the Consent Judgment. Thus, the Relator’s
Motion should be denied.
LEGAL STANDARD
“[I]n a qui tam action, the government is the real party in interest.” U.S. ex rel.
Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1994); see also United States, ex rel.
Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 425 (2023). A relator cannot proceed pro se
in a qui tam action. Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Off. of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir.
2007) (“Because qui tam relators are not prosecuting only their ‘own case’ but also representing
the United States and binding it to any adverse judgment the relators may obtain, we cannot
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interpret § 1654 as authorizing qui tam relators to proceed pro se in FCA actions.”); United
States ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot Children's Therapy, LLC, 871 F.3d 791, 800 n.2 (9th Cir.
2017) (“Because a FCA claim is the government’s claim—and not the relator’s claim—and
because the FCA does not allow relators to pursue any interest they might have in the claim
separately from the government, we concluded that a pro se plaintiff could not bring such a
claim.”).
Relator’s Motion cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and (b)(6) as grounds to
void the Consent Judgment. Rule 60 provides:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
...
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
...
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
“Rule 60 is not intended to provide relief from the consequences of a decision
deliberately made by a party or counsel, even though subsequent events reveal that the decision
was unwise.” 12 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 60.02 (2025). Moreover, a precondition to
relief, considered before looking at each subsection, is to see if there is a reasonable belief “that
vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise.” Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1992);
accord Justus v. Clarke, 78 F.4th 97, 105 (4th Cir. 2023); see also Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461,
463 (9th Cir. 1984) (“whether the defendant has a meritorious defense” is a consideration).
“The burden of establishing at least one of the grounds for Rule 60(b) relief is on the
movant,” Osborne v. Belton, 131 F.4th 262, 270 (5th Cir. 2025), and he must do so by clear and
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convincing evidence, Trendsettah USA, Inc. v. Swisher Int’l, Inc., 31 F.4th 1124, 1136 (9th Cir.
2022). See Stein v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 934 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 (D. Haw. 1996) (the
movant “must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse
its prior decision”). A movant’s evidence must be admissible and, thus, not be hearsay. Citizens
for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx, 815 F.3d 1068, 1080 (7th Cir. 2016).
Under Rule 60(b)(3), “[t]o prevail, the moving party must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the verdict was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct and
the conduct complained of prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting the
defense.” De Saracho v. Custom Food Machinery, Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2000).
Rule 60(b)(3) “is aimed at judgments [that] were unfairly obtained, not at those which are
factually incorrect, and it requires that fraud not be discoverable by due diligence before or
during the proceedings.” De Freitas v. Hertz Corp., 720 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1002 (D. Nev. 2024),
aff’d, No. 23-15913, 2025 WL 655058 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2025) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Rule “require[s] that fraud . . . not be discoverable by due diligence before or
during the proceedings.” Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co. v. United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th
Cir. 1991)).
“Although Rule 60(b)(6) is a ‘catch-all’ provision, it does not apply to situations ‘covered
by any of the other reasons set forth in Rule 60.’” Marroquin v. City of L.A., 112 F.4th 1204,
1217 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007)). If a
motion on its face falls under a different provision of Rule 60(b), then Rule 60(b)(6) does not
apply. Id. “Moreover, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances
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. . . .’” Id. (quoting Martinez v. Shinn, 33 F.4th 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 2022) (per curiam)). Rule
60(b)(6) may apply only if no other provision of Rule 60 applies. See id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Relator filed a False Claims Act complaint on behalf of the United States in 2023. Dkt.
No. 1. Relator alleged that Brett Deuter and two of his entities, Deuter Construction, LLC and
Enlighten, LLC (together the “Defendants”), fraudulently obtained an Economic Injury Disaster
Loan (EIDL) and Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans in the amount of approximately
$710,000. Id. Relator sought treble damages, civil penalties, and a relator share under the False
Claims Act on behalf of the United States. Id. On July 2, 2024, the United States intervened for
purposes of settlement. Dkt. No. 8. On August 29, 2024, the United States filed a Joint
Stipulated Motion to Enter Consent Judgment wherein the United States, Relator, and
Defendants agreed to the terms of a Consent Judgment. Dkt. No. 12. On September 18, 2024,
the Court entered the agreed upon Consent Judgment. Dkt. No. 20. The Consent Judgment is
against Defendants jointly and severally for $850,000 and includes post-judgment interest. Id. It
includes an agreement that the judgment is not dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2) and (a)(7). Id. It includes representations and promises as to real property. Id. It
includes payment terms requiring an initial lump-sum of $50,000 and then quarterly payments of
$29,500 until paid in full, but it also allows the United States to file a judgment lien and includes
default provisions where the entire judgment amount is due upon default. Id. It also specifies
that the Relator is entitled to 19% of what is paid or collected (i.e., the Relator’s share). Id.
Lastly, the Consent Judgment includes nine admissions by Defendants to wrongdoing, including
but not limited to, Defendants admitting to knowingly and falsely making misrepresentations to
the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). Id.
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On September 18, 2025, Relator filed his Motion citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(3) and (b)(6) and the Court’s inherent power as grounds for his motion to void the Consent
Judgment. Dkt. No. 51.
ARGUMENT
I. The Court must deny Relator’s Motion because he cannot proceed pro se in a False
Claims Act case.
As a threshold matter, Relator brought his Motion pro se, which is not allowed in a False
Claims Act proceeding; thus, his Motion must be denied. In a False Claims Act case, the
Government is the real party in interest. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. at 425. Therefore, a
realtor must be represented by an attorney. Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126–27. For example, in a case
where a pro se relator filed a motion to reopen a False Claims Act qui tam case after dismissal,
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois held that “[w]ithout counsel, [the
relator] . . . cannot press this case and the Court therefore cannot grant his motion.” United
States v. KBR, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-04230, 2021 WL 2301910, at *2 (C.D. Ill. June 3, 2021).
Here, Relator’s Motion must be denied because he filed his Motion pro se, which is not
allowed in a False Claims Act qui tam case. Although Relator had counsel when he filed the
case and agreed to the Consent Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 1 and 12), Relator discharged his attorneys
before Relator filed the Motion at issue. Dkt. No. 45.
II. Rule 60 does not provide a mechanism to void the Consent Judgment because the
Consent Judgment is fair, adequate, and reasonable.
Before considering each subsection of Rule 60(b), the Court must satisfy itself “that
vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise.” Teamsters, 953 F.2d at 20; accord Justus,
78 F.4th at 105. In an FCA case, “[t]he Government may settle the action with the defendant
notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the court determines, after a
hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the
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circumstances.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B). Because the Consent Judgment is fair, adequate,
and reasonable, vacating the judgment would be an empty exercise. Indeed, the Government
need only offer “a reasonable argument for why the burdens of continued litigation outweigh its
benefits” for the court to approve a settlement over a relator’s objection. Exec. Health Res., Inc.,
599 U.S. at 438. Here, the Consent Judgment “is fair, adequate, and reasonable” for the reasons
stated below. Additionally, and independently, voiding the Consent Judgment is an empty
exercise because a larger judgment will provide no added benefit. Defendants cannot even pay
the Consent Judgment.
A. The amount of the Consent Judgment is reasonable.
The Consent Judgment is for $850,000, which is over $100,000 more than the
Government loans fraudulently obtained. The Government not only obtained single damages,
but a significant penalty. Such a resolution makes the Government whole, requires Defendants
to pay a penalty, and is fair considering Defendants’ financial condition.
Relator seeks to void the Consent Judgment to attempt to recoup previously unsought
costs and fees through a larger judgment. That is not the point of the False Claims Act or Rule
60. The False Claims Act incentivizes relators to file cases by granting a portion of the collected
amount to the relator and allows a relator to seek “an amount for reasonable expenses which the
court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. All such
expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). A
relator must assess the cost of the case versus potential benefits.
Here, Relator “was clear that what led to the FCA claim was the enormous cost [he]
incurred in the state action . . . .” Dkt. No. 51 at 5; see also Dkt. No. 51 at 9 and 11 (other
references to the costs incurred in the state court case). A False Claims Act case, however, is not
meant to recoup expenses incurred in Relator’s separate civil case. Relator presumably
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understood this from his agreement in the Joint Stipulated Motion to Enter Consent Judgment
where the parties agreed that “[n]othing in this Consent Judgment precludes the Relator from
seeking an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs from the Court consistent with 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d)(1) . . . .” Dkt. No. 12 at 7. Relator agreed that he “will submit any such request for
attorney fees and costs to the Court within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Consent
Judgment.” Id. Relator filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs and a bill of costs. Dkt. Nos.
17 and 24. The motion did not seek fees and costs related to the separate civil case. Dkt. Nos.
24 and 24-4 at ¶ 7. The Court granted most of the fees and costs sought. 1 Dkt. No. 28. Relator
can collect the ordered amount.
B. The Consent Judgment provides additional benefits to the Government that
could not be obtained through summary judgment.
1. The Consent Judgment saved resources.
The Consent Judgment preserved the Government’s resources by avoiding protracted
litigation. Relator argues multiple times in his Motion that the case was ripe and ready for a
summary judgment motion. 2 In so arguing, Relator suggests it is an easy, quick, and inexpensive
process to move for summary judgment. However, Relator does not appreciate that summary
judgment motions take substantial time and resources to prepare, especially when prepared well,
even when it appears from the outset that sufficient evidence is available. 3 While this case might
1
Relator repeatedly brings up the cost of this qui tam suit for him, suggesting he never recouped
the costs. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 51 at 2-3. However, the Court’s order granting attorneys’ fees and
costs are for reasonably incurred costs for this case under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). Dkt. No. 28.
2
Relator references his view that the case was ready for a summary judgment motion and that he
had provided everything needed for such a motion in at least the following pages of his Motion:
2, 3, 6, 9, and 11. Dkt. No. 51.
3
An Assistant United States Attorney and staff (or Relator’s attorney and staff if Relator’s
attorney were to draft and file a summary judgment motion) would need to compile and organize
the pertinent evidence, draft the motion, memorandum, statement of undisputed facts, and
organize and include evidence supporting the statement of undisputed facts. The drafting
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have presented a situation where a summary judgment motion could have been successful, the
resources required to prepare and litigate a summary judgment motion were outweighed by the
unlikely possibility of increased recovery.
In the end, the agreement leading to the Consent Judgment saved significant time and
resources of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, even if Relator would have litigated the case on behalf
of the government. See U.S. ex rel., Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151
F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The district court, however, properly noted that the
government can legitimately consider the burden imposed on the taxpayers by its litigation, and
that, even if the relators were to litigate the FCA claims, the government would continue to incur
enormous internal staff costs.”). The time and resources saved by the Government can be used to
address other cases and matters that require attention.
Ironically, the time required to respond to Relator’s Motion has diverted limited
resources of the United States from enforcing and collecting judgments, such as the Consent
Judgment. Moreover, if, for some reason, the Court vacates the Consent Judgment, then the
parties are back at square one and the same result (i.e., a judgment like the Consent Judgment) is
likely, but much delayed. Again, the United States may seek a settlement with Defendants over
the objection of Relator. So, it is likely that the Government and Defendants would bring the
same or a similar proposal to the Court for approval even if Relator objects. Therefore, voiding
process goes through iterations and a review process before finalization. Then, after filing, the
opposing side may respond and raise potential reasons why summary judgment is not
appropriate. Subsequently, a reply brief is usually prepared and filed, again requiring substantial
time and resources. Then, the Court may order an oral argument before deciding the summary
judgment motion. Time and expenses go into preparing for and participating in an oral
argument. In the end, there is no guarantee summary judgment will be granted. One cannot
always foresee counter arguments that might be raised by an opposing party.
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the Consent Judgment is a waste of time and resources (contrary to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1).
2. Defendants admit to wrongdoing and a judgment has consequences.
Defendants admit to wrongdoing in the Consent Judgment, which has repercussions for
Defendants, including public embarrassment (press release). 4 One negative consequence is that
the judgment lien causes ineligibility “to receive any grant or loan which is made, insured,
guaranteed, or financed directly or indirectly by the United States or to receive funds directly
from the Federal Government in any program, except funds to which the debtor is entitled as
beneficiary, until the judgment is paid in full or otherwise satisfied.” 28 U.S.C. § 3201(e).
Defendants’ wrongdoing admissions highlight why the Consent Judgment is fair and reasonable.
3. The Consent Judgment garnered favorable nondischargeability
admissions for bankruptcy.
In the Consent Judgment, Defendants agree that the debt is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (a)(7) and admit to factual false representations that
satisfy the elements of § 523(a)(2). This is significant because otherwise, in a bankruptcy, False
Claims Act single damages are discharged unless the United States files an adversary complaint
within 60 days of the creditor’s meeting and proves the applicable elements of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2). See United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(c)(1); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c). The amounts over single damages are non-dischargeable
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). Here, with Defendants’ agreement in the Consent Judgment,
Defendants cannot discharge the judgment in bankruptcy. In sum, the Consent Judgment
provides important and advantageous bankruptcy nondischargeability provisions that may not
4
https://www.justice.gov/usao-id/pr/two-businesses-and-their-owner-consent-850000-judgment-
resolve-covid-19-relief-fraud
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have been obtained through summary judgment. Substantial time and resources would be
expended in a bankruptcy to obtain such results without the Consent Judgment.
4. The Consent Judgment allows traditional judgment collection upon
default.
With a judgment, the United States may use traditional methods of judgment collection,
which are beneficial to the United States. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3308. As part of the
enforcement authorities, the United States may file liens, obtain garnishments or writs of
execution, and may even seek to unwind fraudulent transfers made before the Consent Judgment
was entered. See id. A judgment must first be entered to seek these remedies.
Relator complains that the United States did not seek to recover money from Defendants’
transferees (see Dkt. No. 51 at 5); however, the United States cannot recover funds from
transferees as part of the process of obtaining a judgment. Seeking recovery from transferees can
occur through collecting a judgment. Also, if this case had been decided through summary
judgment or trial, there would be no order for funds to be disgorged from others or property sold,
as Relator seems to want. A judgment is entered for an amount. That’s it. Then the
Government enforces the judgment.
Relator argues that the Government “extended a deal of all carrot, no stick, which
provided every incentive for Deuter to go into default.” Dkt. No. 51 at 4. This is confusing.
Upon default there is no difference between the Consent Judgment and summary judgment.
Collection applies to both equally. Relator’s frustration seems to be with collection rather than
the Consent Judgment. E.g., Dkt. No. 51 at 5 (“No cogent reason has been offered for the failure
to seek clawback from friends and family.”). If so, that is not a reason to void the Consent
Judgment. Or, perhaps Relator wants a larger judgment amount ordered against Defendants, but
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such a desire must be justified through reasonable chance of collection, not simply a desire to
collect, as further discussed below.
C. Defendants lack the ability to pay even the Consent Judgment.
Vacating the Consent Judgment would be pointless because Defendants cannot pay even
that amount. Relator highlights Defendants’ dismal financial situation repeatedly in the Motion
and notes that he himself knew this during the discussions regarding the consent judgment
proposal. See, e.g., Dkt No. 51 at 2-3 (“Deuter had no ability to pay his existing debts” based on
documents that Relator obtained and provided.); id at 4 (Deuter Construction had negative
account balances and many non-sufficient funds charges); id. at 6 (the Government “knew from
the many financial statements I provided . . . that Deuter was in worse fiscal shape going into the
EIDL and PPP frauds, that he was deep under water already.”); id. (“The multiple years of
personal and business records obtained through my state court action showed that Deuter/entities
ran a significant loss each year, with numerous outstanding judgments and debts. Thus[,] there
was no reasonable hope that Defendants could make one $30/k payment a year, let alone four.”).
Relator staunchly argues that Defendants were in such bad financial condition that they
could not afford to pay the Consent Judgment, even though the Consent Judgment is not for the
maximum civil penalties and treble damages allowed by the False Claims Act. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a). Given Relator’s admission, Defendants’ financial situation does not justify the time
and resources to seek a maximum judgment. Cf. Arctic Circle Enters., Inc. v. Liu, No. CV-02-
538-ST, 2004 WL 2106516, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2004) (“This case cries out for a negotiated
settlement since, to use a well-worn but apt expression, Arctic Circle cannot squeeze blood from
a turnip.”). Seeking a maximum judgment often requires substantial cost through time and
resources. Therefore, with little ability to pay a judgment, voiding the Consent Judgment to seek
a higher judgment through litigation would be an empty exercise.
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III. Rule 60 cannot provide relief from the consequences of a decision made that may
later be revealed to be unwise.
“Rule 60 is not intended to provide relief from the consequences of a decision
deliberately made by a party or counsel, even though subsequent events reveal that the decision
was unwise.” 12 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 60.02 (2025).
Here, Relator regrets his decision to support the Consent Judgment because, in his view,
it was unwise, now that Defendants did not make their initial payments. However, Relator made
a deliberate decision to commence the False Claims Act case and then to agree to the Consent
Judgment, even though Relator had information suggesting Defendants were in a precarious
financial situation and may not pay. In fact, the Joint Stipulated Motion to Enter Consent
Judgment states: “Based on the evidence collected by the United States and the Relator, as well
as financial information submitted to the United States by Defendants, the Parties agree that a
Consent Judgment is the most appropriate way to resolve the claims alleged in the Complaint.”
Dkt. No. 12 at 2. Because Rule 60 does not provide relief from the consequences of a
deliberately decision, Relator may not use it to vacate the Consent Judgment.
IV. Rule 60(b)(3) is not an appropriate ground for relief.
Even assuming that Relator can show that relief is appropriate under Rule 60,
subsection (b)(3) does not apply because Relator fails to show any material misrepresentation.
First, and foremost, Relator asserts that the United States somehow misrepresented to
induce his agreement, but he does not present logical or admissible evidence. His statements and
arguments are not evidence. His filing at Dkt. No. 51-2 (labeled an “Affidavit”) is not notarized
and does not substantially comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 to be a valid declaration. “Substantial
compliance requires the declarant to make two assertions in the declaration: (1) that the
statements in the declaration were made ‘under penalty of perjury,’ and (2) ‘that the contents
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were true and correct.’” Corona v. Quad Graphics Printing Corp., 218 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1071
(C.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Luxul Tech. Inc. v. NectarLux, LLC, No. CV 14–03656 LHK, 2016
WL 3345464, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2016), which quotes Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d
454, 460 n.10 (9th Cir. 1995)). Relator’s motion, memorandum, and “Affidavit” are not under
penalty of perjury and do not state the contents are true and correct; thus, they do not provide
admissible evidence. The declaration of Bett Deuter dated in August 2024 is the only
potentially 5 valid declaration, but it simply shows Defendants were struggling financially, which
Relator and the Government knew leading up to the Consent Judgment. See Dkt. No. 12 at 2.
Importantly, Relator provides an alleged statement that is hearsay within hearsay:
“Wanting to get on with life, I signed only after receiving Wertheim’s assurance through
McCurdy, that ‘Elliott [sic] said if Deuter misrepresented anything in their negotiations the deal
is off.’” Dkt. No. 51 at 3 (emphasis added). This is the crux of Relator’s entire
fraud/misrepresentation argument for voiding the Consent Judgment. However, the statement is
inadmissible hearsay, which is not sufficient. See Foxx, 815 F.3d at 1080. Furthermore, even if
this were sufficient, what would a statement like that even mean? It could easily mean that if
Defendants did not pay according to the payment schedule in the Consent Judgment, then the
Defendants would not get the benefit of delayed collection and collection efforts could start.
Lastly, Relator is interpreting something said by his attorney, which in turn is an interpretation
by his former attorney. It is like a game of telephone.
In sum, Relator fails to provide admissible evidence, so the Government sees no need to
provide admissible evidence in the form of a declaration or otherwise. If the Court seeks
admissible evidence (from Relator or otherwise), the Government will provide admissible
5
It is signed with “/s/” rather than an actual signature, so it is difficult to know its authenticity.
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evidence to rebut Relator’s accusations. Notwithstanding, the Court has no need for evidence to
deny Relator’s Motion because of the previous points made in this response.
Second, Relator was fully informed of all material facts. He knew, apparently better than
anyone, of Defendants’ situation, financial and otherwise. He admits that he knew Defendants
were in no position to pay the full Consent Judgment, 6 so he “wished to have it go before the
Court to have the AAG explain how it had merit.” Dkt. No. 51 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 12 at 2
(recognizing financial information supported the stipulation for a consent judgment). Relator
understood that the United States would present the settlement found in the Consent Judgment
regardless of Relator’s agreement. Dkt. No. 51 at 3 (“Quoting my then counsel Chris McCurdy
to me: . . . the government was going to push through the settlement with the court, even if it
wasn’t the best deal.”). So, he made a calculated decision to agree, likely because, as shown
above, the United States would prevail against Relator’s objection.
Third, Relator inaccurately characterizes and interprets interactions, and the Government
disputes his mischaracterizations and interpretations. 7 Regardless, Relator’s allegations do not
demonstrate (even if one assumed they were true) material misrepresentations that reasonably
induced Relator’s agreement to justify voiding the Consent Judgment. No alleged
misrepresentation mislead Relator to believe that Defendants would pay the Consent Judgment.
6
Relator stated: “The scores of financial documents I secured in the state case showed Deuter
had no ability to pay according to the Consent Agreement.” Dkt. No. 51 at 4.
7
In past separate litigation, after an outcome against Relator, Relator asserted misconduct and
fraud against an opposing party and attorneys, and the trial court in Alaska denied his motions.
Hallam v. Perkins Coie LLP, No. 1:07-cv-00007 JWS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137078, *2 (D.
Alaska Mar. 24, 2008) (“Hallam filed numerous post-trial motions asserting that Alaska Airlines
and its attorneys had committed perjury and fraud before the trial court. The trial court denied all
of Hallam’s motions.”).
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V. Rule 60(b)(6) is not an appropriate ground for relief.
As is articulated in all the explanation and arguments above, there is no “other reason that
justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, Relator’s Motion should be denied.
DATED this 5th day of December, 2025.
BART M. DAVIS
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
By
/s/ William M. Humphries
WILLIAM M. HUMPHRIES
Assistant United States Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 5, 2025, the foregoing UNITED STATES’
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO RELATOR’S RULE 60 MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF
system which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following person(s):
Stuart Hallam
stuart@ltdalaska.net
Plaintiff/Relator, Pro Se
Michael Pogue
Gravis Law, PLLC
mpogue@gravislaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Deuter Construction, LLC and Enlighten, LLC
And, I hereby certify that the following listed non-registered CM/ECF participants were
served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:
Brett Deuter
Ketchum, ID 83340
Defendant, Pro Se
/s/ Chelsie Black
Chelsie Black
Paralegal
THE UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO RELATOR’S RULE 60
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT (DKT. 51) - 18
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