The Nomination of General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, USAF for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to Be Commander, United States Transpo, Senate hearing transcript (September 23, 2021), GovInfo CHRG-117shrg63134, PDF
Summary
This printed edition of S. Hrg. 117-985 records the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing of September 23, 2021 on the nomination of General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, USAF, for reappointment to the grade of general and to be Commander, United States Transportation Command. The committee was chaired by Jack Reed. Asked about the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Van Ovost said this was the third time ever it had been activated, in the run-up to Operation Allies Refuge, and that commercial augmentation meets 90 percent of passenger movement. Van Ovost also said that during COVID the command had to coordinate with its service providers on health-protection measures. The transcript includes the nominee's answers to advance policy questions.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
Full text
S. HRG. 117–985
THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL JACQUELINE D.
VAN OVOST, USAF FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COM-
MANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION
COMMAND
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SEPTEMBER 23, 2021
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
(
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63–134 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii TOM COTTON, Arkansas
TIM KAINE, Virginia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JONI ERNST, Iowa
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois RICK SCOTT, Florida
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
MARK KELLY, Arizona JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
ELIZABETH L. KING, Staff Director
JOHN D. WASON, Minority Staff Director
(II)
CONTENTS
SEPTEMBER 23, 2021
Page
THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL JACQUELINE D. VAN OVOST, USAF FOR RE-
APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND ................................................................... 1
MEMBERS STATEMENTS
Reed, Senator Jack .................................................................................................. 1
Inhofe, Senator James M. ....................................................................................... 3
WITNESS STATEMENTS
Van Ovost, General Jacqueline D., USAF for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United States Transportation Command ..... 3
Advance Policy Questions .................................................................................... 24
Questions for the Record ..................................................................................... 40
Nomination Reference and Report ...................................................................... 60
Biographical Sketch ............................................................................................. 61
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire ................................................... 64
Signature Page ..................................................................................................... 66
(III)
This hearing is printed to include all available information
requested or required to be inserted for the record.
(IV)
THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL JACQUELINE
D. VAN OVOST, USAF FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPOR-
TATION COMMAND
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2021
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (
Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gilli-
brand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis,
Scott, and Hawley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman REED. Excuse me. Let me call the hearing to order.
A few administrative announcements. A ten o’clock there will be
two votes for the benefit of my colleagues and to the general.
Also, this will be a hybrid hearing. Some of our colleagues will
be joining virtually; as a result, we will use the seniority rule to
identify speakers, as we have in the past at hybrid hearings.
Good morning. The committee meets today to consider the nomi-
nation of General Jacqueline Van Ovost to be the next Commander
of the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).
If confirmed, General Van Ovost will be the first female genera
to take on this critical role and will also be the first time we have
had two female combatant commanders serving concurrently.
General, I want to welcome you to the committee and I thank
you for your many years of service to our Nation and for your will-
ingness to continue to serve in positions of great responsibility.
We also thank your family for their support and sacrifice and
welcome your husband, Alan.
The men and women of TRANSCOM perform duties that sustain
the whole Department of Defense (DOD) effort in protecting our
nation’s security. We saw that very clearly with the extraordinary
efforts of TRANSCOM to support the withdrawal from Afghani-
stan. Our ability to conduct and support operations around the
globe remains a clear, competitive advantage for the United States
forces.
(1)
2
With its competitive edge in deploying and sustaining America’s
Armed Forces, TRANSCOM provides the Defense Department with
unique capabilities that some may have come to take for granted.
TRANSCOM is busy supporting all the combatant commanders
every day and without these forces, the United States would be at
a significant disadvantage almost everywhere in the world.
TRANSCOM faces a number of daunting tasks. General, given
that you have served previously as Commander of Air Mobility
Command, I believe that these are not new issues for you. One pri-
mary concern is addressing a new set of cyberthreats. TRANSCOM
works extensively with private sector entities in the transportation
and shipping industries to support Defense Department deploy-
ment operations, which creates increased exposure to the commer-
cial, internet, and challenges of operating our strategic transpor-
tation system.
General, I look forward to your views on how to ensure that
TRANSCOM’s network is secure and that sensitive information re-
mains protected.
TRANSCOM has just completed a new Mobility Capability Re-
quirements Study, an MCRS, and a Sealift Tanker Study. These
studies indicate, among other things, a need to keep more C–130
airlift aircraft that are in the Air Force’s plans, and a need for a
program of subsidies for U.S.-flagged fuel tankers, to keep more
tankers in the domestic fleet. I am interested in how you plan to
address these critical shortfalls.
There is also the issue of modernizing the Ready Reserve Force,
the RRF; a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the Maritime
Administration. The RRF is aging and will need to be modernized
over the next decade.
General Van Ovost, I look forward to hearing what criteria you
think we should consider as we undertake this large modernization
program.
The Defense Department also needs to ensure that the Civil Re-
serve Air Fleet, or CRAF program, which provides as much as 40
percent of wartime airlift needs, remains viable after operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan and will be able to provide needed search ca-
pacity in the future. Notably, we saw some of that capacity used
by the Defense Department in activating stage one of the CRAF
program during the Afghanistan withdrawal.
General, I am interested in your views on the state of this fleet
and whether anything needs to be done to ensure its readiness.
Now, finally, I would ask that you share your views on how
TRANSCOM should contract out the management of the Personnel
Property Program, or DP3. DP3 is the program that handles the
movement of household goods for DOD personnel. In this plan, a
contractor team would be responsible for issuing contracts to indi-
vidual movers and carriers, rather than the U.S. Government. Last
year, after a bidding competition, TRANSCOM awarded a contract
to a contractor team; however, the losing bidders protested the
award and GAO upheld the protest. We need to have a clearer pic-
ture of how TRANSCOM will proceed with the DP3 outsourcing ef-
fort.
Thank you, again, for your decades of service. We all look for-
ward to your testimony.
3
Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate having this and, of course, seeing General Van
Ovost.
I have to say this about you, General, I know you never were
privileged to getting your training in Oklahoma, but they don’t
know that in Oklahoma. They think that you are one of us. You
have come to our Coyle breakfast and all of that, so you are a star
there.
I enjoyed meeting Alan for the first time and I look forward to
your testimony, as I always do, and, again, I thank you for all that
you have done for America.
If we learned anything in the last 8 weeks, it is that we can’t
shoot from the hip when it comes to military operations and geo-
political affairs. I am, of course, referring to this Administration’s
botched evacuation of American citizens and allies in the waning
hours of the Afghanistan withdrawal and paving the way for the
Taliban takeover.
While this hearing is not about your current role, it is about
what you will bring to the TRANSCOM, which oversaw a vital por-
tion of the Afghan evacuation. As the current commander of Air
Mobility Command, you had firsthand knowledge of how evacu-
ations were unfolding; you oversaw more than 250 military air-
craft, supporting complex aircraft.
I look forward to hearing your thoughts on the success of the
military portion of the operation and what the limiting factors were
for the withdrawal, since thousands were left stranded to face
Taliban retribution.
Additionally, TRANSCOM has had issues meeting its require-
ments. This is, I think I didn’t check that. I think this is about the
first time a major operation was done and not carried out as we
normally do with the National Defense Strategy Commission, and
we were not able to do that for some obvious reasons. For one
thing, last year’s budget, Congress had to reverse divestments of
thousands of air-refueling tankers because the Air Force made cuts
that would directly hinder TRANSCOM’s ability to refuel aircraft.
I am curious what you think is the right path for combatant com-
mand’s input in the budget process and, finally, I would like to get
your thoughts on the ongoing transition of this issue that keeps
coming up. I will be glad, I think everyone up here will be glad
when it is over, if we bring it to a successful conclusion; that is,
the Global Household Goods Contract.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the meeting.
Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
General, your statement, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACQUELINE D. VAN OVOST, USAF,
NOMINEE TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COM-
MAND.
General VAN OVOST. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Reed,
Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of this com-
mittee. It is my great honor to appear before you today as the
4
President’s nominee to command the men and women of the United
States Transportation Command.
I first want to thank President Biden for his nomination, as well
as Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley for the special trust and
confidence that they have placed in me.
I also want to acknowledge General Stephen Lyons for his stead-
fast leadership of the United States Transportation Command and
thank him for his staunch support of Air Mobility Command.
Here with me today is my husband Alan, who, for the past 30
years, has been an incredible source of strength and inspiration. He
has always kept me grounded in my faith, and like most military
spouses, has exemplified the true meaning of flexibility and resil-
iency. Most notable, however, has been his support and commit-
ment to our military families.
The strength of our servicemen and women starts at home and
the impact Alan has had on service family resiliency and quality
of life is immeasurable. I can unquestionably say that without his
love and support, I would not be here today.
I also want to take a moment to acknowledge the remarkable
men and women I have had the privilege of leading at Air Mobility
Command. Projecting decisive strength and delivering hope 24
hours a day, 365 days a year, this team tackles some of our na-
tion’s hardest missions.
Just last month, AMC played a significant role in the national
and coalition effort to airlift more than 120,000 people out of Af-
ghanistan. It was a difficult and dynamic mission, where some of
our airmen had to make decisions when lives were on the line. I
am so very proud of the work they did there and that they continue
to do every day.
Mr. Chairman, today we face a dynamic and increasingly con-
tested global strategic environment. Determined and emboldened
strategic competitors, like China and Russia, continue rapid and
deliberate development of advanced capabilities and they challenge
international norms with their coercive behavior.
As the National Security Strategic Guidance emphasizes, we
must maintain our military competitive edge by continuing to field
and train the best force, adopt new technologies, and build and
maintain key partnerships. As all components within the Depart-
ment of Defense compete daily across the global to strengthen our
strategic network of allies and partners, advance our national secu-
rity interests, and remain poised to defeat our adversaries, the
unique mission of the United States Transportation Command has
never been more important.
If confirmed, I will ensure United States Transportation Com-
mand continues to provide our nation with one of its most impor-
tant, strategic, and asymmetric advantages over our adversaries:
the ability to rapidly project and sustain joint combat power at
strategically relevant speeds, distances, and scale at the time and
place of our nation’s choosing.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee, our
like-minded allies and partners, our commercial industry partners,
the services and combatant commanders to ensure United States
Transportation Command delivers for the nation, meeting the de-
mands of logistics required by the evolving character of war.
5
I would like for acknowledge and thank the Members of this
Committee for your continued support of the men and women who
so selflessly serve to defend our great nation. Their honor, courage,
and sacrifice is humbling, and their passion for service, inspiring.
They are the foundation to our success and we owe them the very
best our nation has to offer.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for this opportunity. It is my
honor to appear before the committee today and I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman REED. Thank you very much, General.
I have a series of questions which are required for all sitting
nominees and you can simply respond, as appropriately.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Chairman REED. Have you assumed any duties or taken any ac-
tions that would appear to presume the outcome of the confirma-
tion process?
General VAN OVOST. No, Senator.
Chairman REED. Exercising our legislative and oversight respon-
sibilities makes it important that this committee, its subcommit-
tees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive testi-
mony, briefings, reports, records, and other information from the
Executive Branch on a timely basis.
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this com-
mittee when requested?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Chairman REED. Do you agree, when asked before this com-
mittee, to give your personal views, even if your views differ from
the Administration?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Chairman REED. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate commit-
tees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor regarding the
basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such records?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Chairman REED. Will you ensure that your staff complies dead-
lines established by this committee for the production of reports,
records, and other information, including timely responding to
hearing questions for the record?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Chairman REED. Will you cooperate and provide any witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional request?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Chairman REED. Will those witnesses and briefers be protected
from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Chairman REED. Thank you very much, General.
Again, let me commend you on your extraordinary career and
your knowledge and experience as you enter this very demanding,
but as you point out, significant component of our national secu-
rity, one of our advantages.
6
The one issue I wanted to touch upon, I suggested in my opening
comments, is cybersecurity. I was struck once and talked to you or
asking questions of one of your predecessors, who indicated that his
dealing with the commercial airlines, there is some interest, but
the person in charge has no contact with the board of directors or
the senior management, so that it is a complicating challenge.
What can you do to help improve and protect the cyber connec-
tions between yourself and commercial entities?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, cyber operations pose significant
threats to logistics. They target vulnerable supply chain elements
and can interrupt the flow of goods and supplies around the world.
Senator, there has been a lot of work that the United States
Transportation Command has done to develop relationships with
our commercial service providers; one of which, of course, is to en-
sure secure command and control of the assets and ensure secure
data management and IT.
If confirmed, I will continue to thicken the relationships with the
commercial providers to ensure that they understand the threats
and we can remain agile enough to combat these threats as they
come up.
Chairman REED. Thank you, General.
I would like, in the future after you have got your feet on the
ground in this particular job, to inform us either directly or infor-
mally about whether you are getting the kind of cooperation from
the civilian sector that you need. This is a two-way street, so the
commercial entities have to take it as seriously as we do. So, please
let us know as that develops.
Let me shift gears for a moment and talk about the C–130 Force
Structure. The fiscal year 2022 budget would reduce the inventory
of C–130s to a level of 255 total aircraft from our current level of
287 and the new C–130 Air Force fleet size would be inconsistent
with the study that has just been published about capabilities.
So, does this give you a concern?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, the Mobility Capability Require-
ments Study that was just released did provide a more comprehen-
sive assessment of the viability of the Joint Deployment and Dis-
tribution Enterprise, given the new threats that we face. One of the
recommendations of this study was to follow on with a specific
intra-theater lift study, looking at the lift capabilities, not merely
in air, but also in land and surface and preposition, in order to
meet tomorrow’s threats.
So, Senator, while the current C–130 discussion on total aircraft
inventory was your question, the bottom line is I think we need to
take a holistic look on the survivability of these various assets,
given the new threat.
Chairman REED. Well, thank you, General.
So, you are already planning to look at different alternatives to
the number of C–130s that are available and also look at the capa-
bilities of C–130s in a given environment.
Is that fair?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator; in fact, it is very important
that we explore the new technologies as we are looking at the joint
warfighting concept and the new ways that the services are going
to fight, it is becoming apparent that potentially runway, inde-
7
pendent operations might be a keep capability. In that case, we
have to discover how it is that we are going to support and sustain
our runway, independent operations.
Chairman REED. Thank you, General.
A final question. The Ready Reserve Force recapitalization, the
committee has authorized the Department to start a program to re-
capitalize the Ready Reserve fleet by purchasing a number of for-
eign-built vessels and purchasing these vessels to modernize the
RRF has been held up by problems with the contracting effort at
the Maritime Administration.
Can you give us an update on this process, are we making
progress, and do we have to do more here?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, thank you.
This is a critical capacity concern of mine, with respect to U.S.
Transportation Command. We must continue to move forward on
recapitalizing this aging fleet. As you are aware, over 50 percent
of our roll-on/roll-off capability will be aging out in a decade. So,
the time is now to do that recapitalization.
I fully support the Navy’s buy-used strategy. I understand that
a vessel-acquisition manager is in place and is working the contract
and we do expect that there will be a buy in calendar year 2022
of used ships to begin this recapitalization progress.
Chairman REED. Thank you very much, General.
Now, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Biden administration’s horrific attempt at a successful with-
drawal from Afghanistan will go down, in my opinion, and the
opinion of many others, as one of the biggest blunders in American
military history; however, it has given us a great opportunity, and
through your efforts, I would say, in training in lessons that we
have learned.
As Commander of the Air Mobility Command and the Air Com-
ponent Commander for TRANSCOM, you oversaw operations with
over 250 military aircraft; in fact, my staff told me that they had,
the number of sorties were at 2,627. I had them go back and check
the accuracy of that. That is just a huge undertaking of what went
on that included C–17s, C–130s, refuelers, KC–135s, KC–10s,
maybe even the 46, but it was huge.
General, in AMC’s planning for the withdrawal, and specifically
for the airlift, what were the limiting factors in wind and what ad-
vice did you give to your senior leaders on how the withdrawal
would be conducted?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, I am proud of how the airmen of
Air Mobility Command executed this campaign in such a dynamic
situation.
Senator INHOFE. I think they are probably still riding high on
this. You all did such a great, great effort.
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
While my advice was limited to the mission I was tasked with,
which was airlift out of Kabul International Airfield, my goal was
to ensure that airlift and our supporting ground operations were
never a constraint for the Central Command Commander. Due to
the heroic efforts of our airmen, we achieved that goal.
8
Senator INHOFE. Well, that is great and it is really a job well
done.
I mentioned in my opening statement where we are right now
with this Global Household Goods Contract and the fact that I am
hoping we are in a position now to get this behind us. It is my un-
derstanding it is now being competed again with an award date of
this month.
So, what was your feeling about it and do you believe a new sys-
tem is needed? Do you believe that TRANSCOM’s approach is the
best path forward? How do you feel about it now?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, you have hit upon a key ‘‘quality
of life’’ issue for our servicemembers and their families. It is clear
that the current program is really incapable of consistently pro-
viding that quality capacity, accountability, and transparency that
our members and family members deserve.
So, if confirmed, I will ensure, as I assess the contract as we
move forward in letting that contract that all the mechanisms are
in place for the single move manager to be able to effectively exe-
cute and meet the standards that our members and families de-
serve.
Senator INHOFE. We will get it behind us.
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Now, let me recognize Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations, General, we are delighted to have you before us
and to have you as the person nominated to head up TRANSCOM.
I very much appreciated the opportunity to see you in action in
New Hampshire when you came to visit the New Hampshire Air
National Guard, and I know that people were very impressed with
your presentation.
Of course, there, one of the areas of focus of that presentation
was the KC–46. It is the first Guard base to get those planes. Peo-
ple are very anxious for when they can do the fully operational
missions that they are anticipating. That was, obviously, one of the
questions that people had for you.
So, as you are thinking about what we still need to do to make
sure that those are fully operational, how will you continue to push
on that once confirmed?
General VAN OVOST. Thank you, Senator.
Let me commend the men and women of the 157th for being the
first Guard base to help us field the KC–46. They have done some
amazing work within operations and maintenance, and we are able
to take those new tactics, techniques, and procedures, and export
them across the fleet; indeed, even in this Operation Allies Refuge,
they all leaned forward to support us and the KC–46 was in the
fight for this operation.
Now, while I desire to get full operational capability as soon as
possible in the KC–46, as you know, we have moved to an interim-
capability release, where we are providing the U.S. Transportation
Command taskable capacity and we are flying this aircraft around
the world doing drogue refueling and probe-and-drogue, and probe
refueling, I’m sorry, boom refueling with certain aircraft. So I ap-
9
preciate the fact that Pease leans forward and volunteers to con-
tinue to do this work.
Senator SHAHEEN. So, as you are thinking about the challenges
ahead to make sure those planes become fully operational, are you
comfortable with Boeing’s commitment to address the challenges
that we have with the planes and do you have a sense of what the
timeline is going to be?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Again, while I like to move as quickly as possible, and we want
to hold contractors responsible to meet all requirements in different
contracts, I am seeing positive movements on resolving the defi-
ciencies of the KC–46 so that we can achieve FOC as soon as pos-
sible.
With respect to, in particular, the Remote Vision System 2.0, we
are looking for the timeline of 2024 for cutting into production and
retrofitting those aircraft. So, I am hopeful we have achieved agree-
ment on a design that we know will be effective. Our boom opera-
tors have been very engaged, as have yours, and so I look forward
to continuing to push this progress forward as quickly as possible.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.
One of the things that was discussed when you were in New
Hampshire was the partnership that the 157th has with Delta Air-
lines to try and address the real maintenance challenges that re-
duce the aircraft flying time.
So, can you talk about how TRANSCOM can address the overlap-
ping FAA and DOD maintenance requirements, which are really
requiring, I think, a challenge as we look at the future of, really,
not just the KC–46, but aviation?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
You hit on a key thing, again, that the Wing has been very fo-
cused on, is to how to ensure the maximum effectiveness of our
maintenance operations both, in the field and in depot. It is the
United States Air Force’s responsibility with respect to that, so as
a TRANSCOM perspective, I will ensure that the Air Force con-
tinues forward to try to streamline and reduce the maintenance
times on these aircraft, which really turns out to be readiness.
So, as the TRANSCOM Commander, I would be focused on more
fighter readiness and I will absolutely be watching the readiness
of the KC–46.
Senator SHAHEEN. Is that an area where we need to better en-
gage the FAA? Are you comfortable that what the FAA is requiring
is necessary?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, I am comfortable with their proce-
dures. We work with them on a number of issues. We have other
commercial platforms that we work with them, and so I am com-
fortable with the process that we are going to go through to ensure
we have the most effective, technical orders to operate off of.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.
One of the other things we discussed while you were in New
Hampshire was the deterioration of the ramp, the parking ramp at
Pease, and I am out of time, so I will send you a question for the
record, with respect to this, but, again, another critical issue if we
are going to ensure that the 157th continues to complete its mis-
10
sions and that we can have other aircraft going through, be able
to land at Pease. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Let me recognize via Webex, Senator Fischer.
Senator FISCHER. Thank you Senator Reed.
Thank you, General, for being here with us this morning. I en-
joyed the visit that we had yesterday in my office. Thank you for
taking the time to [inaudible] yesterday.
One of the battlefield conditions that the National Defense Strat-
egy presupposes is the increasing prevalence of contested domains,
but I think it is unclear to what extent TRANSCOM has acted on
this guidance.
General, what do you view as the key challenges that
TRANSCOM and the Department of Defense must address, with
respect to planning for a potential conflict in a contested logistics
environment and how can we build a more distributed and resilient
[inaudible]?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, thank you for the conversation.
As I emphasized earlier, the character of war is changing. We
face direct challenges across all domains, particularly in previously
unmatched areas of superiority, like global logistics. So, as I think
about the challenges that we face, we have to be able to project and
sustain the Joint Force along a very long, contested line of commu-
nication, particularly when we think about the distances associated
in the Indo-Pacific area.
One of the key areas for the all-domain threats that we must
overcome is cyber operations because they pose significant threats,
as I previously mentioned. We need secure command and control
and modernized digital infrastructure.
As the AMC Commander, responsible for global command and
control, I prioritized our investments in cyber mission assurance,
secure and resilient communications, and data utilization and man-
agement so that we could achieve decision advantage at the speed
of war. Those are the kinds of things that I would focus on as the
Transportation Command Commander, if confirmed.
Indeed, I understand that USTRANSCOM has a number of dig-
ital modernization initiatives to include some pilot programs with
U.S. Cyber Commands that are very promising, including Zero
Trust.
Senator FISCHER. You know, as we look to a possible conflict, I
know that TRANSCOM may be heavily reliant on commercial part-
ners to participate, for example, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and the
Ready Reserve Force.
How do you view the potential role of these partners if we are
in a contested, operating environment?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, our ability to project and sustain
the Joint Forces are inextricably linked to commercial industry and
those emergency programs that you talked about: Civil Reserve Air
Fleet and Voluntary Intermodal Service Agreement.
As we go forward, at this time, U.S. Transportation Command is
writing into the contracts to ensure some basic cyber hygiene
standards by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
As we go forward, as you probably know, they are required to do
11
a self-assessment every year on their cyber vulnerabilities. My un-
derstanding is TRANSCOM is entering into a pilot program where
they are going to have a third party do that assessment; take a dif-
ferent look at those companies.
So, I think, if confirmed, I would want to deepen those relation-
ships with our commercial partners. I would like to share more so
that we understand each other, we understand where the threat
vectors are, and where that attack surface is, and we have an un-
derstanding of where the risks are across the whole global logistics
complex.
Senator FISCHER. Thank you.
In September of 2019, TRANSCOM conducted the largest no-no-
tice sealift exercise of the wartime sealift fleet in the Command’s
history, and at the end of the exercise, TRANSCOM concluded that
the readiness rate could delay the buildup on combat power in the
theater of operations.
What has the Command done to address these problems and
what, in your opinion, needs to happen? What more needs to be
done in order to correct that?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, warfighting readiness is a key pri-
ority for this command, so as you stated, during the exercise, the
readiness levels were not where we wanted them to be, where
TRANSCOM wanted them to be. Frankly, we have older ships and
some of the Reserve ships are up to 46 years old, and as you know,
older equipment takes longer to maintain and, perhaps, takes
longer to actually bring to the ready for us.
So, the single-most-important thing is I would support the Navy
in their recapitalization effort to buy used.
Senator FISCHER. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Let me recognize Senator Kaine and also ask if Senator Shaheen
could preside while I go and vote. The vote is on, the first vote is
on. Thank you.
Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Ranking Member
Inhofe.
General Van Ovost, I also really appreciated the conversation we
had yesterday. Two topics I just want to raise. One, the controversy
and challenges around the retirement of the old tankers suggest
that maybe we waited too long to begin the process of figuring out
what the new refueling aircraft should be.
So, trying to learn that lesson and taking it over into the airlift
fleet, our C–17 airframes are pretty old; anywhere from 10 to 25
years old. The C–5s are over 30 years old. So, talk to me about
what the Air Force is thinking about doing to start the planning
of the next generation of cargo aircraft so we can avoid any time
crunch that we have felt in the tanker.
General VAN OVOST. Senator, as the AMC Commander, I have
two responsibilities. One, as the Component Commander to the
United States Transportation Command to provide ready capacity
for tasking around the world to project and sustain the force on a
day-to-day capacity; on the other hand, I have an ‘‘organize, train,
and equip’’ responsibility, where I need to look out into the future
to see how our capacity can remain credible in order to defeat the
12
threats in the future, so I can continue to project to sustain the
force with credible capacity.
So, as I think about aging infrastructure, I have to balance both
sides; I have to have capacity today and I must be able to respond
to tomorrow. So, it is a risk between the both. There is not quite
a balance, but there is a risk between the both.
As I look to the strategic airlift fleet, you are exactly correct. We
are looking into the timelines for the C–5 and when it has to retire,
as well as the C–17. They have performed magnificently, both,
frankly, during Operation Allies Refuge. So, what we are doing now
is we are looking through the joint warfighting concept at the new
threats and the new employment concepts, which we will have to
deliver airlift to, and as we think about that, we think about the
capability. We think about survivability, you know, full spectrum
of survivability and, frankly, kinetic survivability, and being con-
nected on to the battlefield so that we have the situational aware-
ness to be able to make decisions.
So, we are gathering these requirements and then we will move
to an analysis of alternatives, a formal process where we will then
finalize those requirements and run them through the Joint Staff
for approval. So, we are moving forward with that, but, basically,
as we look at our warfighting concepts and we are doing these war
games, that is giving us that insight to be able to create those re-
quirements that we can then codify for the next strategic airlifter.
Senator KAINE. Thank you for that answer, General Van Ovost.
The second topic I wanted to ask you about was raised by Rank-
ing Member Inhofe and that was the household moves. You know,
being a senator from Virginia with an awful lot of military mem-
bers, the moving situation is one that often comes up, people have
concerns about.
I was interested when we talked yesterday, tell the committee
how many times you and your family have had to move during
your career.
General VAN OVOST. Senator, we have had to endure 13 moves.
Senator KAINE. So, you have a consumer’s view of this situation
and you know how important it is that it be right. We also talked
a little bit about some of the challenges of managing moves in the
status quo, or the status quo ante environment.
Isn’t it the case that you were dealing with more than 900 dif-
ferent moving contractors? That has kind of been what we have
had to manage, which is pretty difficult.
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator. U.S. Transportation Com-
mand has had to reach out, frankly, during COVID and coordinate
and provide information to all of these service providers to keep
them up to date on the different policies and enforce health-protec-
tion measures that we were trying to take, and to ensure that the
capacity delivered during this incredible time.
Frankly, what we learned in COVID was it really exasperated
the flaws that are in the current contract. Having a single move
manager that would be, with a multi-year contract, they would be
more confident to invest in quality suppliers and digital IT and will
be pressed with the accountability that our family members de-
serve.
13
Senator KAINE. Well, I think the committee knows from earlier
iterations of contracts, like in the housing space, the contract is
only as good as the military’s willingness to exercise deep and in-
tense oversight of the contract.
I appreciate the challenges of the need to make these moves
right to meet families’ needs, and because of your own experience
and having had to endure 13 moves with your family over the
course of your military career, it seems to me like you are the right
person to get this right. So, I encourage you in that.
With that, I yield back.
Senator SHAHEEN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Cotton?
Senator COTTON. General, thank you for your service to our coun-
try and congratulations on your nomination.
We have spoken on several occasions this morning about reports
and studies. A GAO report released earlier this year says that in
the 5 years and across about a dozen classified or sensitive studies,
quote, the Department of Defense has studied contested mobility,
but has not systematically addressed recommendations, end quote.
What, in your opinion, is preventing TRANSCOM from system-
atically addressing the study recommendations and how can you
improve on this assessment?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, facing these, you know, really
threats from China and Russia and strategic competition, we have
learned that we really need to ensure that logistics planning is in-
tegrated with all joint warfighting functions. Logistics planning is
not an add-on and it needs to be part of the deliberate process as
we go forward.
So, if confirmed, Senator, I will work with the other combatant
commanders to ensure that logistics concerns are being addressed
early and we provide options to them for the best use of these
scarce resources.
Senator COTTON. Thank you.
Following on that line, I, too, want to commend our airmen who
performed excellently, a job in Afghanistan that they should never
have had to be perform. They were brave. They were skillful. They
saved many lives.
That is the rare occasion in which we have seen contested logis-
tics play out in the real world in recent years; however, the contest
we faced in Afghanistan would look like child’s play if we had a
conflict with China in the Western Pacific, and it would have us
fighting on all fronts to include, very much, as you say, on logistics.
What have studies, such as the Mobility Capability Require-
ments Study, as well as others, demonstrated regarding the surviv-
ability, efficiency, and reliability of our logistics systems during a
large and contested conflict with China?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, the Mobility Capability Require-
ments Study did provide a very comprehensive assessment on what
the new employment concepts would do to logistics and that infor-
mation was given to the combatant commanders to, overall, assess
the risk to their plans for us having to, essentially, project and sus-
tain along a long, contested line of communication.
14
You are correct, in Afghanistan, early on, the ground line of com-
munication became non-usable and we had to move to air lines of
communication to execute the retrograde.
So, as we move forward, we take the results from the Mobility
Capability Requirements Study and we would like to exercise those
in our upcoming war games and TTXs so that we can better tease
out the insights required to build a stronger Joint Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise so that we can project and sustain through-
out strategic competition.
Senator COTTON. Thank you.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has invested substantially
throughout Asia and Africa, increasingly in Europe, in logistics and
transportation hubs, in particular, in international ports. I would
like your assessment on whether that initiative, and especially its
investment in ports, has created any new access problems for
TRANSCOM or do you foresee it creating access problems, as ports
might be potentially closed to the United States and our partner
forces during a time of crisis.
General VAN OVOST. Senator, you have hit on a key concern.
China has been challenging a stable and open international order,
trying to impose their authoritarian model beyond their borders.
They have been coercing our allies and partners to make different
economic, diplomatic, and even security decisions. Their invest-
ments around the world in ports are something that we are abso-
lutely watching, with respect to how it would change any access,
basing, and overflight that we critically need.
The good news is we have a deep bench of allies and partners
and we can provide multiple options through multiple routes and
nodes, not just from our organic capability, but by relying on our
commercial partners, who have a very extensive network through-
out the world, and in some cases, that we might not have access
to.
So, going forward, Senator, if confirmed, I will continue to assess
our global posture with respect to China, to ensure that we can
meet all the combatant commanders’ requirements.
Senator COTTON. Thank you, I am glad to hear that.
TRANSCOM has a lot of very important responsibilities. I think
the number one priority for TRANSCOM, as all of our combatant
command, needs to be the preparation for, and therefore, hopefully,
the deterrence of a conflict with China.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Next, we have Senator King, via Webex.
Senator KING. Thank you, Madam Chair.
First, General, welcome to the committee, and thank you for your
willingness to take on this incredibly important assignment.
In light of Senator Kaine’s questions, I have to mention that
many years ago, I worked in this area for a moving and storage
company that did a huge amount of work for the military and I will
never forget a military spouse telling me that she considered seven
moves to be equal to a fire in terms of her household goods. So, I
know how serious that problem could be, absolutely, from, literally,
from the ground up.
Let me talk a moment about the time of conflict and cyber. If we
are engaged in a conflict, the very first target will be nuclear com-
15
mand and control by an all-out cyber attack. The second will be
command and control, generally. The third will be you, will be
TRANSCOM.
In your pre-filed remarks, you said something to the effect, well,
you said, the posture of TRANSCOM and the Department is likely
insufficient to deal with a well-resourced, capable, and determined
nation-state adversary.
You just defined China and Russia: well-resourced, capable, and
determined nation-state adversary.
In other words, we are not prepared. I want to hear your views
on what has to be done. This is a ‘‘hair on fire’’ issue. Your whole
infrastructure is not going to be functional if you don’t have com-
mand and control and the ability to allocate your resources.
I want to hear your sense of urgency on this issue.
General VAN OVOST. Senator, you are exactly correct, the ability
to command and control this enterprise is central to making an
executing logistics decisions around the world. We must take ad-
vantage of the significant advances in commercial technology and
integrate that into military technologies, especially when it comes
to exposing and using data to make better decisions.
So, if confirmed, I will focus, I will first assess the digital initia-
tives that U.S. Transportation Command is currently executing
and I will work to accelerate these technologies so that we can al-
ways retain decision advantage.
But to your point, these are determined enemies and technology
is only going to increase; it will never be one-and-done. This is
about risk management, and so I will apply the focus to the areas
that are the most risk first.
Senator KING. Well, in that light, I would urge you to engage, ei-
ther in the private sector or within the Department, your own
hackers to determine where your vulnerabilities are. Every CIO
says, we are okay, boss. They don’t know whether that is true until
you test it, so I urge you to test it. Because I can assure you at
this very moment, our adversaries are figuring out how to hack
your systems and compromise your ability to move our resources
around the world.
Let me change the subject for a minute to tankers. General
Lyons testified a few years ago that he was concerned that there
could be a gap between the deployment of the KC–46s and the re-
tirement of the C–135s, a gap in terms of refueling capability.
Do you feel that that gap has been adequately addressed today?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, a few years ago, that is exactly
where we were headed, but since then, now that we have brought
the KC–46 interim capability release to bear for USTRANSCOM’s
taskings, and in addition, we have amazing support from our total
force volunteerism to increase a taskings of the Guard and Reserve
refueling assets. We have been able to meet, and I foresee that we
will absolutely be able to meet the day-to-day requirements and
any wartime requirements made.
Senator KING. Have the problems with the boom-management
system in the KC–46 been resolved and, if so, what is the time
frame for restarting the significant deployment of those airplanes?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, the boom deficiencies are still in
work and we are satisfied with the design, and we are pushing the
16
contractor to continue to integrate and test. We are looking forward
to a 2024 cut into the line to ensure that in the future, this aircraft
can meet all of the requirements.
But until that point, what we are doing with interim capability
release is we are providing a capability to the U.S. Transportation
Command for select missions for that aircraft; for example, we are
refueling now, B–52s, the C–17s, and I expect we are going to be
refueling F–16s and F–15s in the very near future.
Senator KING. Well, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention when
it comes time to start the reallocation of the KC–46s, don’t forget
the Maineiacs in Bangor who provide incredible refueling support
over the North Atlantic, and we would very much like to have the
KC–46 capability, because most of the airplanes we are flying up
there now are way older than their pilots.
Thank you very much, General, for your testimony. I look for-
ward to working with you.
Chairman REED. [Presiding.] Thank you very much, Senator
King.
I am told that Senator Hawley is on his way, and that would
allow me to ask a question in the interim.
General, with respect to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, did we learn
in lessons, and I presume we are doing an after-action review, from
the operations in Afghanistan, and can you share any of those les-
sons with us.
General VAN OVOST. Senator, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, as you
mentioned, this is the third time ever that we actually activated
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, and we did it in the run-up to Oper-
ation Allies Refuge.
We start with commercial augmentation; in other words, they
voluntarily contract and meet our commitments, which is, frankly,
how we meet 90 percent of our passenger movement. When vol-
unteerism wasn’t there or we didn’t have enough, that is when the
U.S. Transportation Command Commander requested to the Sec-
retary to activate stage one of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, which
is 18 long-haul, international, passenger aircraft.
Because we have deepened our relationships with our Civil Re-
serve, especially over COVID, where we had numerous conversa-
tions with them because, essentially, we were both relying on each
other for our networks, because international rules were changing
during COVID, and so it was a mutual, beneficial relationship that
we had and we kept each other informed of what was going on
around the world, such that in the run-up to this activation, we
kept them informed that we might have to activate and they were
prepared when the decision was made.
Now, nothing goes perfectly, and I look forward to learning, gath-
ering the lessons learned, and worked with the CRAF to make it
a better activation both, from our position and from their position,
but I am so thankful for their partnership.
Chairman REED. Thank you very much.
Let me suspend my questioning and recognize Senator Hawley.
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really
appreciate your willingness to wait for me.
17
General, thank you so much for being here. Thank you for your
years of service to our nation and congratulations on your nomina-
tion.
I want to ask you a question that I have asked all the senior
leaders who have come before this committee. I will preface this by
saying that Secretary Austin has reaffirmed several times now that
China is the pacing threat, emphasis on ‘‘the,’’ for the Department.
Do you agree with that, that China is the pacing threat?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good.
I have also asked the Secretary, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and
just about every other Defense leader if the United States should
maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli with regard
to Taiwan. They have all responded yes.
I want to ask you, I have been, myself, a real pest on this issue
and I don’t want to let my reputation slide, so I want to ask you,
General, if we agree that we need to maintain the ability to defeat
a potential Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good.
Given the importance of this, do you agree that TRANSCOM
needs to prioritize that scenario, the fait accompli scenario, as it
develops plans, concepts, and capabilities?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good.
Now, General, Admirals Davidson and Aquilino have both
warned us that China might attempt a fait accompli against Tai-
wan sooner than previously anticipated. This, I think, was eye-
opening testimony that this committee heard earlier this year.
Do you agree that the threat of a fait accompli against Taiwan
is something we need to be worried about in this decade and not
just in the 2030s and beyond, but potentially sooner than that?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, I am not privy to all the intel-
ligence that the geographic combatant commander would have with
respect to the driving threats, but I would say that the rapid, tech-
nological advances that China makes are very disturbing.
Senator HAWLEY. Would you agree that we need to be able to,
we need to be prepared to blunt and also deny that offensive, any
potential offensive from the beginning, from the start, if China
should attempt it?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, I believe from the U.S. Transpor-
tation Command position that we need to ensure that we have the
favorable, global posture, credible capacity, and ability to securely
command and control so that we can be agile enough to respond
to the INDOPACOM requirements of the [inaudible] plan.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me ask you about some of the logistics re-
quirements for blunting a Chinese fait accompli.
How might those differ from the logistics requirements for fight-
ing and winning a protracted war in INDOPACOM? So, help us un-
derstand the difference, logistically, between denying on the front
end and fighting a lengthy war, by contrast.
General VAN OVOST. Senator, U.S. Transportation Command is
responsible to deliver an immediate force tonight and a decisive
18
force, when necessary, as you pointed out, the blunt versus the con-
tinuation.
As we go forward and look into the plans, our Mobility Capability
Requirements Study of 2020 recently looked at this contested envi-
ronment and validated the requirements for sealift, airlift, and air
refueling to defeat this kind of war. So, where there is a balance,
the other piece that we will be looking into, with respect to the
study, is the posture, you know, where do we need to be postured;
where do our logistics need to be; where does the fuel need to be.
If confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM with the services
and DLA to best posture to meet the INDOPACOM Command re-
quirements.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good.
Let me ask you this, the Joint Force has limited lift capacity and
this past August, we used over half of our available C–17s, if I am
not incorrect, in our inventory to support the evacuation operations
in Afghanistan. Those capacity limits have significant implications
for the force’s ability to manage multiple conflicts at once.
Are you concerned by the threat of simultaneous conflicts, poten-
tial simultaneous conflicts, for instance, in Asia and in Europe, and
TRANSCOM’s ability to satisfy any operational requirements,
should we have kinetic operations in multiple theaters at one time?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator. First, I would say that the
surge for Afghanistan, I want to just say how proud I am of the
airmen, of maintenance, and crew operators, who were able to
surge the fleet and safely and effectively accomplish this operation.
When I look to the Mobility Capability Requirements Study
2020, this is exactly what it looked at: What is the integrated sce-
nario we might be up against should we go against a peer conflict,
and what are the requirements for each of the capabilities, in my
case, that Air Mobility Command brings: the airlift, air refueling,
air medical evacuation, and global mobility support.
It did recognize that we would be stressed to meet the globally
integrated requirement for air refueling and for intra-theater air-
lift.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me ask you how you would approach and
prepare for the possibility of simultaneous conflicts in multiple the-
aters.
General VAN OVOST. Senator, I believe that using the
warfighting construct of our favorable posture, our credible capac-
ity, and secure command and control, we need to constantly re-look
at, given the threat, and we would have to change our posture
based on how the threat changes. I would work with the Secretary
of Defense and with the combatant commanders, again, to meet the
requirements.
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you for being here. I may have a few
more questions for you for the record. Thanks, again, for your serv-
ice.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again. I appreciate you waiting for
me.
Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Hawley.
Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am sorry
I am off the floor, so it is not as quiet as it should be.
19
General, one of the issues that I have heard a lot in my office
that I wanted to check with you about was the fact that a lot of
servicemembers is how COVID delays have negatively affected
their PCSing, including being told to handle their own move, since
there are not enough TRANSCOM contractors and services avail-
able to assist them.
So, if confirmed, can I have your commitment that you will work
to improve the PCSing experience for our personnel?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Senator GILLIBRAND. The second issue is the vaccine gap on the
last mile. I understand TRANSCOM has done a lot to facilitate the
distribution of vaccines worldwide; however, there is still inequity
between developing nations and developed nations. Less than 4
percent of the African population is fully vaccinated, whereas 70
percent of the European population is vaccinated, for instance.
Experts in both, the public and private sectors, have blamed the
last mile problem as the bottleneck. This includes getting the fro-
zen vaccines from logistics hubs.
Can you tell me how you will respond to this, if confirmed?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, U.S. Transportation Command, if
requested, by the Department of State, does contract or deliver
COVID vaccines and personal protective equipment around the
world, and we have done so on various occasions.
If confirmed, I will work with the Department of State and De-
partment of Defense as they give us the tasks, but as you are prob-
ably aware, the Department of Defense does not make the decisions
on where the vaccines go.
Senator GILLIBRAND. Yes. Well, thank you, again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me have time for a few
questions.
I appreciate you both. God bless.
Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Now, I may resume my second round, but, General, there is—
well, I see Senator Kelly arriving and if—oh, excuse me, we have
Senator Duckworth now on the Webex.
So, Senator Duckworth, you are recognized.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to welcome General Van Ovost to this and I want
to commend the General’s leadership and recognize the
servicemembers of Air Mobility Command for conducting the his-
toric, largest, non-combatant rescue, evacuation airlift in history. I
am so proud of TRANSCOM’s monumental efforts in August, as
well as the continued work of servicemembers across the United
States military in providing ongoing airlift support of our Afghan
allies, including volunteers from the 182nd Airlift Wing in Peoria,
Illinois.
I think we are all witnessing real time example of why it is so
important that we plan for and resource our logistics and
sustainment capabilities as much as we plan for and resource our
combat capabilities. Our logistics enterprise is absolutely vital for
responding to emergencies, while preparing for future conflicts.
General Van Ovost, welcome. Based on the finding from the most
recent Mobility Capability Requirements Study, if you are con-
firmed, how will you ensure TRANSCOM is balancing steady state
20
requirements, emergency response missions, and preparation for
future operations in a contested environment?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, thank you for the earlier discus-
sion and thank you for your support of logistics around the world.
We are simply a strategic capability, really, unmatched by any
other nation to be able to project and sustain our force around the
world, and it is very helpful that you bring forward the thoughts
about the critical role that logistics plays, and not simply within an
old plan, but, frankly, from a deterrent value. Our logistics forma-
tions can absolutely deter when we have these deep relationships
with our allies and partners and we become more interoperable
with them and we use their logistics chains, as well as very, very
powerful, when our enemies see that.
Speaking to the Mobility Capability Requirements Study and the
need to project decisive force along a long, contested line of commu-
nication, if confirmed, I will not only assess these results with the
services, but I will work with the combatant commanders on their
operational plans to ensure that we can provide them multiple op-
tions to meet their needs both, for an immediate force tonight and
a decisive force, when needed.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, General.
Following up on that, as the services are looking to divest from
older platforms, like the C–130, for example, what future capabili-
ties are required to meet future challenges, especially in the Indo-
Pacific Region, as far as TRANSCOM is concerned?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, as we look to the joint warfighting
concept and the embedding concepts, in particular, the joint con-
cept for contested logistics, we recognize that we have gaps in our
capabilities in strategic competition. So, I think about ensuring
that we participate from a logistics standpoint in the joint
warfighting, in the games, in the exercises, and tabletop to tease
out those insights where we can then increase the credibility of lo-
gistics around the world.
So, not only from there, the warfighting concepts from the dif-
ferent services, but we, indeed, need to think about doing new
things, with respect to logistics. I think about having and utilizing
data to make better logistics decisions more effective to use our
critical resources better, especially, in a very dynamic situation,
and then ensuring that we can actually execute those orders with
a secure and resilient command and control.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Well, as you are doing that, do you think
that TRANSCOM is adequately represented in the formulation of
the upcoming NDS?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, I understand that U.S. Transpor-
tation Command has provided advice for the new National Defense
Strategy, which is in formulation inside the Department. If con-
firmed, I will continue to provide that advice to the Secretary of
Defense concerning logistics and, again, how logistics formations
can increase deterrence and how logistics needs to be integrated
with all the joint warfighting functions to be most effective for the
warfighter.
Senator DUCKWORTH. I couldn’t agree with you more. I have been
unwavering in my insistence that we cannot build a combat-cred-
ible deterrence if we do not have the logistics capability and capac-
21
ity to realistically support the complex military operational plans
that we are likely to be executing.
You touched on training a little bit. Can you touch a little, can
you expand a little bit more on any training exercises or strategic
planning that TRANSCOM must participate in over the next few
years to get a clear picture of the state of our strategic capabilities,
like the Ready Reserve Force, as well as to ensure that our oper-
ational plans adequately factor in logistics and sustainment con-
cerns.
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator, and you are probably aware
of the several Capstone exercises by INDOPACOM and EUCOM,
Defender series, and various service games that we want to ensure
that we are a part of so that we can, again, tease those insights
out for how we are going to operate better together into the future
and how we are going to increase our interoperability, not just with
the services, but with our allies and partners, who can be of great
benefit to us to ensure that we can capitalize on their capabilities.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, General.
I am over time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
Now, let me recognize Senator Blumenthal. Senator Blumenthal,
please.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service, General, and thanks for being here
today.
I have been very personally involved in assisting individuals with
efforts to evacuate from Afghanistan both, in Kabul and in Mazar-
i-Sharif. After the United States’ withdrawal was completed, as you
know, thousands of Afghan allies, along with Americans, fled to
Mazar-i-Sharif or sought to leave Kabul, despite the absence of the
American airlift or the end of it. A lot of them are currently in hid-
ing. They are desperate. Their situation is urgent.
Yesterday, Simcom canceled further flights to Al Udeid because
of flight manifest discrepancies and I know that the air evacuation
has been impeded by the cancellation of those flights. The flight
manifests that I have seen have been fully vetted numerous times,
far more than the manifests made on flights from Kabul before the
American withdrawal. So the lives of Americans and hundreds of
Afghan allies hang in the balance. I don’t doubt our commitment
to evacuate U.S. citizens and vulnerable allies, but we keep erect-
ing unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles, when time is of the essence.
My question to you as a logistics expert, and I believe, future
combatant commander, can we depend on you to provide any and
all assistance to get the air bridge from Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif
to Al Udeid back open and to keep it open for a sufficient number
of days?
General VAN OVOST. Senator, while I cannot comment on the De-
partment of State or the immigration or flight manifest vetting,
what I can say is that if the refugees do make it to one of our lily
pads, so, for example, Al Udeid, then U.S. Transportation Com-
mand would then be subsequently tasked to provide their airlift
movement to the final destination and we would absolutely support
that effort.
22
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, as you know, even before the with-
drawal in late August, I and other members of the Senate, veterans
groups, NGOs [non-governmental organizations], private citizens
have been working tirelessly, along with the Administration, to
evacuate as many citizens, legal permanent residents, SIB holders,
and other Afghan allies with their families, as quickly as possible.
I hope that you will be committed to participate and to support
that effort, despite our absence; that is American military absence.
Do we have your commitment on that point?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me ask you, assuming you are con-
firmed, do you have specific steps in mind that United States
Transportation Command can play in addressing climate change,
which has been judged to be a national security threat?
General VAN OVOST. Now, Senator, climate change is a threat to
infrastructure and operations, and it absolutely drives instability
around the world. I have seen that firsthand as the Air Mobility
Command Commander, who had been asked to respond to disasters
and provide humanitarian relief. So, it absolutely is a critical con-
cern and climate considerations will be a part of how we inform our
strategies, our plans, and our infrastructure going into the future.
If confirmed, I look forward to looking at the strategies plans and
the infrastructure and evaluating them with respect to the clima-
tology of those locations.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Kelly, please?
Senator KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, great seeing you again. Congratulations on your nomi-
nation.
I would like to follow-up with some of the discussion that we had
last week. General, a concern of mine that I believe you share is
the readiness of our nation’s sealift capabilities. Our competitors
are investing heavily in this area; in fact, the Naval War College
published an assessment this spring, which found that the Chinese
maritime industry is now the largest in the world in nearly every
relevant category, from investment in global ports to shipbuilding,
while our former dominance of this industry is slipping.
Just to put this in perspective, right now, the Chinese have over
5,000 ocean-going merchant vessels. We have less than a hundred.
After years of focus on counterinsurgency, we need to take a
clear-eyed look at the range of scenarios our military must prepare
for. It is absolutely vital that we assess and respond to the unique
demands of engagement in regions as distant as INDOPACOM, the
Indo-Pacific Region.
So, to start, General, can you say a bit about our current state
of readiness and any concerns that you have about our sealift capa-
bility.
General VAN OVOST. Senator, you rightly hit upon a concern.
China has been developing capabilities in order to project combat
power around the world to secure their overseas interests and ob-
jectives. It is concerning, it is concerning from an access, basing,
23
and overflight, and it is concerning with respect to their capabili-
ties to monitor our capabilities around the world.
With respect to warfighting readiness, which is a key to our func-
tioning as a warfighting combatant command, the Mobility Capa-
bility Requirements Study did validate the amount of sealift that
we would need to deliver a decisive force, and I am concerned
about the readiness, given the age of the fleet and the mainte-
nance, and its day-to-day readiness capacity.
So, the first thing I would do is I would continue the great work
by TRANSCOM, working with the Navy, to execute their buy-used
strategy, so that we can get more U.S.-flagged, U.S.-manned, sealift
capability that we can count on. In addition, the recent fuel tanker
study did validate the fact that we had insufficient U.S.-flagged
POL tanker capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense
Strategy.
So, if confirmed, I will work with the Navy and MARAD on a
way forward to try to secure more U.S.-flagged tanker capacity.
Senator KELLY. Yeah, to do that, we have got to get, figure out
a way to get more U.S.-built ships, as well, U.S.-flagged, U.S.-
crewed to meet this need, and I feel we need some rapid progress
on this front. We can’t wait years. This is a national security issue.
If we can’t meet the requirements of the NDS, we put our national
security at risk.
So, I would like to see a plan, and I am going to work with my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle of this, to return our sealift
capability to what it formerly was, where it had the capability to
meet the needs of our nation, because that is not true today.
So, I think it is important that we all understand that this is a
critical investment to make as a nation, and this is going to need
to be a whole-of-government effort, including stakeholders outside
of this committee’s jurisdiction. So, I appreciate your commitment
to this issue and I look forward to working with you more on it
after your confirmation.
With that, I yield back the remainder of my time. Thank you.
Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Kelly.
General, let me resume and ask some additional questions. Some
of our colleagues are trying to get online by Webex and some may
be trying to return, but as I noted initially, there are votes in
progress, also.
It is usually the little things that go wrong and mess up all the
big things we have planned. That is what I learned when I was
wearing the uniform, and U.S. roads and U.S. bridges could be
some of those little things.
I was struck when the Commander of the 4th, the 3rd ID, rather,
at Fort Stewart indicated his real problem is the railroad bridges
can’t sustain the weight of the tanks that he would have to roll out
there to the port of embarkation. So, you could have your ships
ready, down and ready to take them on, but they don’t get there
on time or they never get there.
There is, under TRANSCOM, the Defense Access Road Program,
and it is a cooperation between the DOD and the Department of
Transportation to jointly address surface-transportation issues with
a concern to DOD. It is neglected, frankly.
24
In the fiscal year 2020 and 2021 NDAA [National Defense Au-
thorization Act] legislation, we put in extensive amendments to try
to update the program and energize the program. In one respect,
it was a reflection of the growing concern over rising oceans, et
cetera, and many of our bases are right along the coast and the
roads and railroads are affected by this.
TRANSCOM and associated entities have yet to issue any up-
dates to their guidance and eligibility criteria for projects under the
DAR program, so can you give us an update as to what is hap-
pening with the DAR program, how are our changes being imple-
mented, and the status of coordination between the DOT and the
Federal Highway Administration, et cetera. Again, great strategists
don’t usually think about the road outside the base; they are think-
ing about, you know, do I have enough ships? Do I have enough?
But it is the little things, so any comments, I would appreciate.
General VAN OVOST. Yes, Senator. You pointed to a critical capa-
bility. Our posture is really dependent upon, it starts with the na-
tional infrastructure here and power projection, especially from our
Army, power projection platforms begins with sufficient road and
rail capacity to get to the seaports, as part of the initial marshaling
for projection of that decisive power into the future.
I am not familiar with the Defense Access Road Program, but I
am familiar with the national, the infrastructure bills and the var-
ious strategic highway programs and strategic rail programs. My
understanding is that U.S. Transportation Command has been
working with the Department of Transportation on providing some
advice in the areas of most risk in that area.
So, Chairman, if confirmed, I would look to come back to you
with my assessment of the DAR program.
Chairman REED. Well, thank you very much, General.
Again, this might be seen as details, but as I keep harping, it is
the little stuff that, oops, we forgot that, and the big stuff doesn’t
happen.
We are at a juncture where my colleagues, we have no one, I
think, available on either the Webex or in person; as such, General,
let me thank you for your testimony and I look forward to your con-
firmation and to your service as the next USTRANSCOM Com-
mander.
Thank you very much, ma’am.
General VAN OVOST. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman REED. With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to General Jacqueline D. Van
Ovost, USAF by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES
DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Com-
mander, U.S. Transportation Command?
Answer. The Commander, United States Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM), is responsible for providing air, land, and sea transportation for
the DOD, in peace, crisis and war. USTRANSCOM executes through three compo-
25
nent commands and two subordinate commands to accomplish this mission: Air Mo-
bility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), as well as the Joint Transportation
Reserve Unit (JTRU) and the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The
Commander is assigned five responsibilities in the Unified Command Plan (UCP),
to include: Mobility Joint Force Provider, DOD single manager for transportation,
Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise planning and operations, DOD Single
Manager for Patient Movement, and the Joint Enabling Capabilities provider.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to per-
form these duties?
Answer. Beyond my experience commanding mobility units at multiple levels and
staff experience at USTRANSCOM headquarters, I was the Director for Mobility
Forces in CENTCOM, coordinating with the Combatant Command, Services, and
USTRANSCOM, to ensure the Commander’s operational scheme of maneuver was
supported across the theater. My time on the Joint Staff as the Deputy Director for
Europe, NATO, and Russia Plans and Policy, then subsequently the Vice Director
of the Joint Staff, provided in-depth knowledge and experience with the National
Defense Strategy, roles of the Services, Combatant Commanders, the Chairman, and
the Secretary of Defense to create and execute globally integrated plans and com-
prehensive policies that achieve national interests.
My subsequent time as the Director of the Air Staff provided the experience of
balancing service responsibilities to organize, train and equip ready forces for today
and tomorrow, with meeting the demands of the Combatant Commander as they ful-
fill National Defense Strategy requirements today. This position directly led to my
selection as Commander, Air Mobility Command, the Air Component of
USTRANSCOM.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to en-
hance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command?
Answer. As the current USTRANSCOM Air Component Commander, I am aware
of the breadth of USTRANSCOM’s worldwide responsibilities. If confirmed, I will
engage with all of USTRANSCOM’s component commands, DOD agencies, and com-
mercial partners to ensure I fully understand the range of challenges they face in
order to accomplish USTRANSCOM’s crucial mission.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Commander, USTRANSCOM, performs his or her duties under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The USTRANSCOM
Commander is responsible directly to the Secretary of Defense to carry out the com-
mand’s missions.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has the authority to act for the Sec-
retary of Defense when serving as his designated representative in the Secretary’s
absence. As such, the USTRANSCOM Commander will report to and through the
Deputy Secretary when serving in that capacity.
6. Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense
Answer. Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with
DOD components, including Combatant Commands, which have collateral or related
functions. In practice, this coordination and exchange is normally routed through
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, the Under Secretary of De-
fense for Acquisition and Sustainment provides logistics policy for the Department.
If confirmed as a Combatant Commander, I look forward to continuing these rela-
tionships.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Answer. As specified in Title 10, U.S.C., the Chairman is the principal military
advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman is not, by law, in the chain of com-
mand, which runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to each
Combatant Commander. In his or her role as the Global Integrator, however, the
CJCS plays an important role in a full range of security matters on behalf of the
Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman fully informed regard-
ing USTRANSCOM matters.
Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs
Answer. Each Service Secretary is responsible for equipping, training, and main-
taining ready forces belonging to that Military Department. Close coordination with
26
each Service Secretary providing forces to USTRANSCOM is essential to ensure the
Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) remains ready to meet na-
tional security requirements. In addition, USTRANSCOM is responsible to deliver
service-provided forces to Combatant Commanders. If confirmed as the Commander
USTRANSCOM, I will continue my predecessors’ productive dialogue with the Serv-
ice Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Question. The other Combatant Commanders
Answer. As one of four UCP-designated Combatant Commands with
Transregional responsibilities, USTRANSCOM’s primary mission is to support each
of the Combatant Commanders in accomplishing the responsibilities assigned to
them in the UCP. Given the complexity of today’s security environment, it is essen-
tial all the Combatant Commanders work together to execute U.S. national security
policy. If confirmed, I will continue to build upon the trust and mutual support my
predecessors have fostered with the other Combatant Commanders.
Question. The Director of the Defense Logistics Agency
Answer. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages the global supply chain for
the DOD, other Federal agencies, and partner and allied nations. USTRANSCOM
maintains a strong strategic partnership with DLA. USTRANSCOM includes the
DLA Director in our periodic Component Commanders conferences, and if confirmed
I have every intention of continuing to bolster this relationship. USTRANSCOM and
DLA have ongoing transformational efforts to improve the JDDE operational out-
comes and lay the groundwork for data-related initiatives.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Com-
mander, U.S. Transportation Command?
Answer. USTRANSCOM is a warfighting combatant command that enables the
projection and sustainment of combat power at a time and place of our Nation’s
choosing. As the character of logistics evolves, we increasingly face direct challenges
across all domains, particularly in areas of previously unmatched superiority - in-
cluding our global logistics capability. Accordingly, the Command’s major challenges
are maintaining warfighting readiness and modernizing the DOD’s transportation
assets. The sealift and aerial refueling fleets are aging, demanding recapitalized
fleets capable of operating in contested environments. Additionally, we must main-
tain a competitive edge with our adversaries in the cyber domain. Command and
control is an essential element of our warfighting framework, necessitating steady
focus on cyber assurance and improved cyber security. If confirmed as the next
USTRANSCOM Commander, I will ensure the JDDE remains capable of projecting
decisive military power while preserving the ability to command and control global
mobility operations.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my fellow Combatant Commanders, Service
Chiefs, Defense Agencies, Joint Staff and OSD partners to assess risks and collabo-
ratively develop mitigation strategies. My near-term challenge will be dealing with
the ever-growing number of cyber adversaries. I will continue the Command’s efforts
to pursue several initiatives in cyber resiliency and digital modernization, as well
as partner with the commercial sector to improve JDDE cyber security. Fortunately,
for sealift, there is a recapitalization plan in place to acquire used sealift vessels
over the next 10 years; and I will ensure we continue partnering with the Navy to
ensure we have the necessary Congressional authorities. As the Air Mobility Com-
mand Commander, I am familiar with the aerial refueling challenges, and I support
the USAF’s plan to release KC–46 interim capability for select missions, while care-
fully managing legacy tanker retirements and securing additional Reserve man-days
to meet day-to-day and crisis requirements.
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (NDS)
Question. The 2018 NDS prioritized the ‘‘long-term, strategic competition’’ with re-
visionist powers China and Russia as the primary challenge with which the United
States must contend, while also recognizing the need to deter and counter rogue re-
gimes like North Korea and Iran and move to a more resource sustainable approach
to counterterrorism.
In your view, what, if any, changes should be considered in reshaping the NDS,
taking into account developments since 2018?
Answer. USTRANSCOM has made recommendations to the team preparing the
forthcoming NDS, and most of those inputs can only be shared in a classified envi-
ronment. As Secretary Austin has written and spoken, the need for an integrated
approach to deterrence should be an important concept shaping the future NDS and
27
the Nation’s approach to either potential near peer threats such as China or Russia
or rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran. I recommend that even though the
2018 NDS specified Resilient and Agile Logistics as a key competitive advantage for
the United States, the future NDS should more directly address the very real deter-
rent effect logistics formations and investments have through their demonstrated
ability to project and sustain US power to any point on the globe at a time and place
of our choosing. That can take the form of delivering a combat brigade or pallets
of vaccine doses. Recent cyberattacks on the Colonial Pipeline or supply chain enti-
ties clearly demonstrate that our ability to project power can and (we expect) will
be disrupted and contested. The future NDS should prioritize investments in stra-
tegic mobility assets, changes in operating concepts and investments in our allies
and partners. Those investments speak directly to President Biden’s Interim Na-
tional Security Strategic Guidance requirement, ‘‘to defend access to the global com-
mons, including freedom of navigation and overflight rights, under international
law.’’ Therefore, to reiterate, the 2021 NDS should expand upon logistics, strategic
mobility, and the access, basing and overflight agreements that are the foundation
for our ability to achieve the Nation’s security objectives. Consequently, we should
ensure the NDS recognizes the importance of logistics requirements and challenges
to the Department’s ability to successfully achieve the objectives of the NDS.
Question. What capabilities do you believe the Joint Force needs from the U.S.
Transportation Command to prevail in competition with great power adversaries?
Answer. Our ability to rapidly move forces transoceanic distances is a strategic
comparative advantage, providing a wide range of options in support of the National
Defense Strategy while creating multiple dilemmas for our adversaries. Should de-
terrence fail, USTRANSCOM delivers two capabilities for DOD:
#1, an immediate force tonight, and
#2, a decisive force when needed.
USTRANSCOM’s responsibility to the Secretary of Defense is global power projec-
tion and the ability to prioritize limited resources to the highest strategic priority,
shifting temporally and spatially across the globe to meet the highest national secu-
rity objective.
The NDS’s Global Operating Model and Dynamic Force Employment concepts em-
phasize sustaining capabilities for major combat, while ‘‘providing options for
proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force.’’
Question. How do you intend to work with the services to implement these con-
cepts while balancing the need to rebuild readiness?
Answer. USTRANSCOM will continue to work with military Service Departments
to address air refueling, airlift, and sealift readiness concerns, to provide the capa-
bilities needed to support a modernized Global Operating Model while enabling con-
cepts such as Dynamic Force Employment (DFE). We will continue to fully support
and are actively engaged with the Joint Staff, fellow combatant commands, and the
Services in developing the emerging Joint Warfighting Concept and its supporting
concepts, especially the Joint Concept for Contested Logistics.
USTRANSCOM’s ability to project and sustain military forces is inextricably
linked to commercial industry, which provides critical transportation capacity and
access to global networks to meet requirements in both the competition phase and
times of crisis. We can and do leverage commercial industry creating space for our
organic capabilities to train and rebuild readiness, while maintaining our ability to
support the Joint Force.
As part of its focus on near peer competitors, the NDS disputes the decades-long
assumption that the U.S. military will have uncontested access to international air-
space and sea lanes. Given this new threat:
Question. What areas of operations will be more challenging for the joint distribu-
tion and deployment enterprise, and what would you do, if confirmed, to mitigate
those challenges?
Answer. As accurately described in the NDS, the U.S. military no longer has as-
sured access to international airspace and sea lanes. Beyond the physical challenges
in our ‘‘fight to get to the fight,’’ supply chains are neither robust nor resilient, pre-
senting dilemmas across the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise in
sustainment operations for all commodities, particularly with liquid energy. Addi-
tionally, USTRANSCOM’s partnerships with commercial entities that use unclassi-
fied information systems add to the challenge of ensuring reliable communication,
command, and control systems required to effectively lead global distribution and
sustainment operations across the JDDE.
I will work with DLA, the Services, fellow Combatant Commands, and commercial
partners to attain the agreements and resolutions necessary to reduce these
vulnerabilities while preserving our ability to project and sustain military power
globally. I will leverage existing DOD forums to develop cross functional solutions
28
and action plans, as well as engage in well-established associations with our air,
sea, and surface industry partners to address specific challenges related to our com-
mercial associates. Finally, I will work with the JDDE to ensure solutions are devel-
oped, scrutinized, and prioritized using all available tools at my disposal including,
but not limited to, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) and Integrated Priority List (IPL).
Question. Do these challenges require the services to generate more capabilities
to deal with anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments, where we could face
greater enemy mine or ISR capabilities?
Answer. DOD is in the process of modifying the way we think about mobility oper-
ations to better understand the investment trades required to preserve our ability
to project military power globally. All the Services are pursuing multiple different
capabilities to combat persistent, multi-domain A2/AD challenges, to include adver-
sary mine and ISR capabilities, within the future operating environment. If con-
firmed, I am fully committed to work across the Department and with the Services
to continue this important effort.
CONTESTED LOGISTICS
Question. Over the last several years, DOD and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) have conducted or sponsored several studies on contested mobility
and logistics which have resulted in more than 50 recommendations. However, the
GAO found that DOD has failed to implement many of these recommendations. As
a result, DOD and INDOPACOM may be missing an opportunity to leverage exist-
ing knowledge on mobility challenges in contested environments and increase resil-
ience for major conflicts as envisioned in the National Defense Strategy.
In your opinion, what are the highest priorities and key challenges that DOD
must address in a contested logistics environment in a potential conflict with China
and Russia? Please identify which of those challenges are unique to either China
or Russia and which are common to both.
Answer. Long, contested lines of communications and the tyranny of distance in
the Indo-Pacific region create dilemmas that will require the integration of logistics
planning across all warfighting functions to support the Joint war fight. Common
to both China and Russia, the growth in demand from increasingly dispersed oper-
ations, increasingly complex and lethal kinetic platforms, and extended adversary
anti-access/area denial capabilities place immediate stressors on the Joint Deploy-
ment and Distribution Enterprise to support forward forces immediately, as we rap-
idly build capacity to deploy a decisive force.
Strategic lift (sea and air) assets and the ability to dynamically command and
control those assets remain critical when looking at both great power challenges.
Strategic lift allows us to present a sizeable Joint Force at scale around the globe.
Additionally, air refueling is a key enabler that allows this enterprise to rapidly de-
ploy fighters and bombers, as well as support the employment of those combat air-
craft across strategic distances.
Ongoing recapitalization efforts remain crucial to this enterprise. We need to sus-
tain efforts to recapitalize our sealift fleet to improve our readiness and capacity to
project the Joint Force. The KC–46 is another key investment to recapitalize the
aging AR fleet. However, even when the 179th KC–46 is delivered, there will still
be 300 KC–135s at 67 plus years of age. Investments in air refueling will remain
necessary. In addition to recapitalization efforts, we must also continue to invest in
the readiness and maintenance of some of our older platforms. We have a great rela-
tionship with the Navy and the Air Force and are extremely appreciative of their
efforts to enhance spending for readiness.
Finally, intratheater lift (airlift and sealift) is also critical to sustain and support
the force to meet volume and time-sensitive requirements for cargo, passengers, and
fuel. This is especially the case in the Indo-Pacific region. As captured in both the
Mobility Capability Requirements Study and Fuel Tanker Vessel Study recently pro-
vided to Congress, the Department must continue efforts to identify the types and
mix of intratheater air and sealift assets needed to successfully support and sustain
operations in the future operating environment.
Question. What capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force
present the most significant challenge to supporting U.S. Transportation Command
operations in these contested environments?
Answer. The full capacity of the JDDE relies upon timely access to the Reserve
Components and emergency preparedness programs like the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) that leverage commer-
cial industry augmentation. The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA directed a Mobility Capa-
bility Requirements Study (MCRS) to assess the adequacy of the JDDE’s capacity
29
relative to the current NDS. The study assessed the demands associated with the
National Defense Strategy and factored the implications of contested environments
on degraded mobility outputs. I have reviewed the findings and recommendations
of the recently released MCRS and Fuel Tanker Vessel Study, and if confirmed, I
will work with the Joint community to implement appropriate recommendations
from the study.
Question. Which programs, in your assessment, are the highest priorities for miti-
gating current and emerging warfighting capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the
Joint Force?
Answer. The recently completed Mobility Capability Requirements Study (MCRS)
and Fuel Tanker Vessel Studies provide a great roadmap for challenges facing
USTRANSCOM as the Department looks at the future Joint Operating Environ-
ment. If confirmed, I’m committed to review and implement recommendations stem-
ming from the studies while also conducting my own review and assessment of the
JDDE to ensure the DOD mobility enterprise is prepared to meet current and future
requirements consistent with the Joint Operating Environment described in the
NDS. In my current role as the Commander, Air Mobility Command, I am aware
these priorities may include enhanced cyber mission assurance, improving command
and control capabilities, while also sustaining key ongoing recapitalization efforts,
like air refueling and sealift recapitalization. Finally, as captured in both recently
completed studies, the Department must work to identify the right type and mix of
intra-theater (sea and air) capabilities for the future operating environment.
Given the ‘‘tyranny of distance’’ in the Pacific, there are significant challenges spe-
cifically related to energy requirements in a contested environment, which could be
mitigated by making targeted investments and operational energy improvements to
both military platforms and installations.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you take to reduce contested logistics
vulnerabilities in INDOPACOM and elsewhere, and what specific operational energy
improvements do you envision pursuing?
Answer. USTRANSCOM recently completed the Fuel Tanker Vessel Study to ad-
dress the department’s ability to meet future combatant commander deployment
and sustainment requirements. The study considered both U.S. flagged and foreign
flagged capacity to ensure enough capacity exists to meet NDS requirements. The
study also considered contested environment impacts likely to be encountered in fu-
ture operations. The study concluded that there is insufficient US Flag tanker ca-
pacity to meet NDS requirements. DOD will have an enduring need for foreign flag
tanker augmentation. However, the mission, location, and timing of some fuel deliv-
ery requirements drives the need for U.S. flag tankers. Though there is sufficient
friendly foreign flag capacity, there is substantial risk to mission associated with a
heavy reliance on foreign flag tankers, particularly for intra-theater missions within
a contested environment. The analysis clearly demonstrated the need for a Tanker
Security Program in addition to identifying several other solutions. These solutions,
working together, are important steps toward a comprehensive strategy to increase
U.S. flag tanker capacity, to reduce the risk of reliance on foreign flag tankers for
the most important fuel missions, and to ensure the DOD has sufficient tanker ca-
pabilities to meet NDS objectives.
EXPERIENCE IN MANAGING LOGISTICS OPERATIONS
Question. You have most recently served as the Commander of the Air Mobility
Command, the air component of the U.S. Transportation Command.
What steps do you believe you need to take to achieve a more complete under-
standing of the logistics operations of the other component commands of U.S. Trans-
portation Command?
Answer. As the current Air Component Commander, and having served as a staff
officer in USTRANSCOM, I am familiar with the logistics operations of the compo-
nent commands and the capabilities they bring to bear to accomplish the global mis-
sion. If confirmed, I will engage with the USTRANSCOM components and subordi-
nate command, as well as sister agencies and commercial partners to enhance my
understanding of the capability and challenges they face in their execution of that
global mission.
CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
Question. The military services rely heavily on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
to supplement organic airlift in order to meet the U.S. Transportation Command’s
wartime and peacetime transportation requirements.
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What is your assessment of the CRAF’s ability to meet requirements to transport
any equipment, materials, or commodities for U.S. military operations or to respond
to a humanitarian disaster?
Answer. Today, the CRAF program is fully subscribed with 26 carriers to meet
anticipated DOD needs by guaranteeing wartime commitment through assured
peacetime business. They are well positioned to support humanitarian assistance,
military operations, and peacetime missions. It should be noted, regardless of the
mission profile, employment of CRAF capabilities requires a permissive environ-
ment. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our CRAF partners to ensure they
remain committed and ready to support DOD requirements when needed.
Question. How much should we be relying on CRAF to meet our peacetime and
wartime airlift requirements?
Answer. Consistent with our National Airlift Policy, CRAF is designed to leverage
the commercial air carrier industry to provide capability beyond that available in
the organic military airlift fleet. In peacetime, our reliance should be consistent with
the requirement to maintain the proficiency and operational readiness of the organic
military requirement, while ensuring the capability of our commercial partners to
meet approved requirements for military airlift in wartime. I believe the DOD must
strike a balance between commercial airlift and the organic fleet to ensure our mili-
tary crews are trained, proficient and postured to meet the requirements outlined
in the Mobility Capability Requirements Study for NDAA fiscal year 2020. This
study provides DOD leadership with the analysis required to effectively manage the
DOD’s reliance on commercial augmentation without negatively impacting the mili-
tary force.
Question. What changes, if any, do you think need to be made to CRAF—authori-
ties, requirements, composition—to ensure that CRAF can continue to meet our
needs?
Answer. I greatly appreciate how USTRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command con-
tinuously assess all facets of the CRAF program to ensure it meets our needs and
supports the NDS. In doing so, USTRANSCOM recently concluded the Mobility Ca-
pabilities and Requirements Study 2020 (MCRS 20). Although MCRS 20 found cur-
rent CRAF subscription levels provide sufficient capacity to meet passenger and
cargo requirements above the capacity of the organic mobility fleet, it is worth ex-
ploring the potential to enhance the CONUS aeromedical evacuation component of
CRAF to reduce stress on organic theater airlift and meet NDS requirements. If con-
firmed, I am committed to further exploring this essential capability.
SEALIFT
Question. When the United States goes to war, U.S. Transportation Command
moves approximately 90% of its cargo requirements with the strategic sealift fleet,
which consists of government-owned ships augmented by the commercial U.S.-
flagged fleet.
What is your assessment of current and planned organic strategic sealift capacity?
Answer. Department of Defense mobility studies over the past two decades have
validated the requirement for approximately 20 million square feet of Roll-on/Roll-
off (RO/RO) sealift capacity. The U.S. Navy organic fleet provides approximately
three-fourths of the capacity, and the remainder is sourced commercially through
the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). Over the next 10 years, 33 of
50 USN RO/RO vessels, which deliver the surge force, will retire. The readiness of
this aging fleet is USTRANSCOM’s number one readiness concern. I support OSD
and Navy’s plan to recapitalize the fleet by purchasing used commercial ships to im-
prove readiness to meet the National Defense Strategy. A long-term, stable procure-
ment strategy will ensure we maintain sufficient capacity to deploy the force.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate mix of new construction, used
ship purchasing, and service life extensions that the Department should employ in
the Ready Reserve Force recapitalization plan?
Answer. I defer to the U.S. Navy within the context of their Service responsibil-
ities to retain a viable surge sealift capacity to deliver the decisive force. The Navy’s
plan to purchase used ships is an appropriate, cost-effective approach for the organic
fleet, and includes significant work for the U.S. industrial base to convert/upgrade
the used ships in U.S. shipyards. The health of the ship construction and repair
base is essential to our national interests, and the Navy must ensure its overall
shipbuilding program is sufficient to maintain the U.S. shipyard capacity.
Question. What is your view of the importance of maintaining U.S.-flagged vessels
to participate in strategic sealift, including through the Voluntary Intermodal Sea-
lift Agreement and Maritime Security Program?
31
Answer. The U.S. has long been a maritime nation. I believe it is critically impor-
tant to maintain a viable U.S. flagged sealift capability to support DOD needs. The
vessels within the VISA provide the Department assured access to commercial ca-
pacity, providing approximately twenty-five percent of the Department’s Joint Force
deployment capacity, and the majority of its sustainment capacity. Additionally, the
Maritime Security Program (MSP) provides a fleet that is actively plying our deep-
sea international trades, supporting National Economic Prosperity, while meeting
national defense and other security requirements. These U.S.-flagged commercial
sealift programs employ a pool of trained and ready U.S. Merchant Mariners needed
to crew the U.S. Navy organic fleet when it transitions from reduced operating sta-
tus to fully operational status.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current and qualified,
licensed merchant mariner population who would be available to crew strategic sea-
lift vessels to meet surge and protracted U.S. Transportation Command require-
ments?
Answer. In accordance with Presidential Directives and National Policy,
USTRANSCOM relies on the Maritime Administration to determine whether ade-
quate manpower is available to support the operation of reserve ships during a cri-
sis. The current Department of Transportation/Maritime Administration estimates
there are sufficient Mariners to activate the surge fleet but would be challenged to
concurrently sustain both the organic and commercial fleets through a crew rota-
tion. Any additional decrement to U.S. Merchant Mariner availability increases the
risk to our ability to surge the fleet.
GLOBAL HOUSEHOLD GOODS CONTRACT
Question. For more than two years, U.S. Transportation Command has attempted
to consolidate its Global Household Goods Contract (GHC) into a single prime con-
tractor that would oversee close to 1,000 subcontractors in charge of moving
servicemembers and their families. U.S. Transportation Command contends this
was done due to poor customer service and outcomes under the current model. In
2020, the GAO upheld numerous protests against U.S. Transportation Command
awarding of the Global Household Goods contract citing that it violated federal pro-
curement law. U.S. Transportation Command stated that the GHC would represent
the ‘‘best value’’ for DOD and servicemembers when cost and performance are con-
sidered, yet according to reports, the winning bid was billions more over the life of
the contract. The contract is now being re-competed with an award due in Sep-
tember of 2021.
What is your current assessment of the existing household goods program? Do you
believe a new system is needed, and do you believe U.S. Transportation Command
approach is the best path forward?
Answer. The Defense Personal Property Enterprise exists for one purpose and one
purpose only: to provide quality moving and storage services to DOD and Coast
Guard personnel and their families. As these families have correctly highlighted
over the last several years, the Department faltered on this mission. I assess the
existing household goods program as incapable of consistently generating the qual-
ity capacity DOD personnel and their families deserve or the accountability Con-
gress demands.
I believe change is required in order to keep faith with military families, I believe
the Department of Defense has a thoughtful, deliberate strategy to improve the relo-
cation process, and I believe the reform efforts USTRANSCOM is leading on behalf
of DOD—to include the Global Household Goods Contract (GHC)—will deliver cred-
ible improvements to military families.
In the existing household goods program, each of DOD’s 39 Regional Shipping Of-
fices award business to over 900 Transportation Service Providers on a shipment-
by-shipment basis. The transactional nature of our relationship with a disparate
confederation of suppliers prevents us from capitalizing on existing capacity, limits
industry investment in generating additional capacity, and inhibits us from incor-
porating modern capabilities (to include the convenient technology we take for
granted in every aspect of our personal lives) into the Defense Personal Property
Program. And because DOD does not have a formal contract with any of these pro-
viders, the Department cannot hold them accountable for performance failures in a
meaningful way. This fragmented approach generates the friction, frustration, and
opacity many military families endure during the relocation process.
The GHC is an opportunity to raise the standard for DOD families, attract addi-
tional quality capacity to the program, and introduce a level of accountability absent
in today’s program.
32
I am confident in the approach because it has been transparent, involved broad
collaboration across the Department’s Personnel and Logistics communities, and in-
corporated industry input. Additionally, I appreciate that it is just as focused on im-
proving the Department’s own internal management framework as it is improving
the level of service from commercial providers.
What resonates with me most, though, is the Department’s focus on relocating
people and addressing perennial family pain-points and not simply focusing on mov-
ing their things.
Question. If confirmed, would you continue the awarding of a new GHC prime
contractor with the current scheduled September award date?
Answer. Yes, but only after rigorous reviews are conducted to ensure the rec-
ommendations GAO made in its protest decision were implemented and (as was
done ahead of the previous award) after receiving concurrence from the Services. I
understand the earliest the contract will be awarded is October 2021.
Changing the conditions within which industry operates is required: to improve
access to and management of quality capacity to meet DOD’s peak demand; to im-
prove communication throughout the process; to deliver modern, digital manage-
ment tools to DOD customers; to improve the claims process in the event of loss,
damage, or inconvenience; and to enable the Department to affix the accountability
and responsibility lacking in today’s program. The Global Households Goods Con-
tract delivers that change.
I concur with the ‘Best Value’ acquisition strategy rather than awarding to the
lowest price, technically acceptable bidder. That said, I understand the reports ref-
erenced in the introductory paragraph to be incorrect. As directed by the 2020 Con-
solidated Appropriations Act, USTRANSCOM submitted a cost report detailing the
projected savings by Military Department to the Defense Committees on 22 April
2020. This cost report (based on rates submitted by the initial GHC awardee) pro-
jected savings of $210 million across the FYDP when compared to what DOD pays
under the current program. I commit to updating this cost report and submitting
it to the Defense Committees before awarding a new contract.
Additionally, and just as GEN Lyons has done, I commit to continuing the trans-
parency and close coordination with each of the Defense Committee staffs on the
full range of issues involving the Defense Personal Property Program.
Question. There have been press reports of shortages of movers in areas with a
high military population. Families are getting their PCS orders cancelled at the last
minute. Does this post-pandemic labor shortage change the way you would think
about handling the GHC?
Answer. I believe the labor shortages further highlight the inherent flaws in rely-
ing on a fractured, transactional process to manage the critical business of relo-
cating military families around the globe. If anything, the impacts of the labor
shortages (things like families being stranded at the curb or being served by an in-
competent crew) underscore the necessity of entering in to a multi-year contractual
relationship to 1) provide industry with the confidence and rationale to invest in ca-
pacity and relationships with trusted suppliers to meet DOD’s demand and, 2) pro-
vide DOD with meaningful avenues of accountability, which is lacking in the exist-
ing program.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to provide transparency and information
to families planning moves?
Answer. Communication can make or break the relocation experience for DOD
personnel and their families. The Department must deliver accurate and timely in-
formation directly to families planning moves. Simple, relevant, easily accessible
products must clearly outline what customers can expect during the process and the
business rules in place to protect them. We must be similarly clear on who they can
call for help when things go wrong.
Recent surveys highlight the need for more comprehensive information in a cen-
tral location. I will continue the partnership USTRANSCOM established with OSD
P&R to leverage the Military OneSource platform as the authoritative source for
DP3-related information. Providing a ‘single source of truth’ will reduce the likeli-
hood of families finding out-of-date or conflicting instructions when searching for in-
formation and eliminate customer confusion on where to turn to find the requisite
information to conduct successful moves.
I will also prioritize the work to develop simple, standard products and deliver
them directly to DP3 customers. The Department must evolve beyond static bro-
chures and capitalize on modern communication channels to present customers with
the ‘right’ information when they need it. Recent surveys highlight the need for sim-
ple, modern tutorials explaining the relocation process.
While each service has made improvements to their ‘Help Desks,’ I do see value
in establishing a Department-wide Help Desk staffed with professional customer
33
service representatives that are available 24x7 to address the full range of reloca-
tion issues (such as housing, reporting timelines, travel) as opposed to simply an-
swering personal property questions.
Further, I commit to publishing DP3 metrics on publicly-available websites. The
Government Accountability Office’s sensible recommendation to develop DP3-related
metrics will provide DOD leaders with a clear assessment of the program’s perform-
ance; making these metrics available to all DP3 stakeholders is a critical component
in delivering on the Department’s commitment to transparency.
Finally, I will continue to invest time and resources into hosting the Personal
Property Relocation Advisory Panel (PPRAP) and meeting with the Service-ap-
pointed Family Advocates to identify and solve relocation problems for military fam-
ilies.
CYBERSECURITY
Question. Most of the critical communications and operations of the Defense De-
partment can be conducted over the classified internet service of the Department,
which is not connected to the public internet and is therefore much more protected
against eavesdropping, espionage, and/or disruption by computer network attacks.
U.S. Transportation Command, however, must communicate over the unclassified
internet with many private-sector entities that are essential to the Defense Depart-
ment’s force generation and deployment operations in the transportation and ship-
ping industries in particular.
What actions do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Department
reduces the risk of cyber intrusions that would affect U.S. Transportation Com-
mand’s operations?
Answer. As the USTRANSCOM Air Component Commander, I know that
USTRANSCOM has made significant advancements to reduce the risk of cyber in-
trusions. If confirmed, I will continue to make cyber mission assurance a top priority
for the Command and ensure we make the appropriate investments to protect Com-
mand and Control / Information Technology systems and infrastructure that are
most consequential to mission success. My focus areas will include adopting security
best practices, increasing the emphasis on improving the cybersecurity posture of
our most critical systems, and partnering with the Department to continue progress
on implementing the new information security framework, known as Zero Trust.
With USTRANSCOM’s mission inextricably linked to our commercial industry part-
ners, I will continue to evolve the Command’s cybersecurity contract language, so
it remains aligned with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
cybersecurity framework and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) cybersecurity requirements. In addition, I will work with the Department
to ensure USTRANSCOM has sufficient resiliency and capacity across the JDDE to
operate in a contested cyber environment. If confirmed, I look forward to evolving
the strong relationship USTRANSCOM already has with USCYBERCOM and other
stakeholders to advance the Department’s capabilities to reduce the risk of cyber in-
trusions to preserve USTRANSCOM’s ability to meet our national security objec-
tives.
Question. Do you believe that the current posture of U.S. Transportation Com-
mand and the Department is sufficient to deal with adversaries in cyberspace?
Answer. The posture of USTRANSCOM and the Department is likely insufficient
to deal with a well-resourced, capable, and determined nation-state adversary.
Therefore, we must continue to improve our ability to protect against, detect, and
respond to increasingly sophisticated adversary actions that exploit vulnerabilities.
The recent malicious cyber campaigns against the Nation’s public and private sector
highlight the increasing threat to U.S. national security. For USTRANSCOM, cyber
vulnerabilities present risk to strategic logistics as adversaries continue to dem-
onstrate the willingness and capability to target both military and associated com-
mercial industry partners. In this rapidly changing environment, the Department
continues to improve the resilience of military networks and implement defensive
measures that make it harder for malicious cyber actors to successfully compromise
networks. If confirmed, I will continue the focus on cyber mission assurance and
look forward to building upon existing relationships with USCYBERCOM, DHS, and
other key stakeholders to mitigate the operational impact of any adversary actions.
Question. What do you believe are the critical needs of U.S. Transportation Com-
mand for operating in the presence of cybersecurity threats?
Answer. Cyberspace is a warfighting domain in which capable adversaries con-
tinuously attempt to degrade our Nation’s ability to project the Joint Force globally.
The JDDE, which includes a wide range of commercial dependencies, represents a
large cyber-attack surface for potential adversaries. For USTRANSCOM to operate
34
in the presence of cybersecurity threats, it must continue efforts to develop a deeper
understanding of adversary capabilities and intentions, as well as an understanding
of the cyber terrain most consequential to mission success and the associated
vulnerabilities. I’m aware that over the past year the Command has significantly
improved its understanding of both the threat and key cyber terrain, and if con-
firmed I’ll continue to focus on advancing these efforts. USTRANSCOM must also
continue to invest in technologies and the right cyber talent to modernize Informa-
tion Technology capabilities and defend critical cyber infrastructure, that will in
turn enable mission execution in the face of a persistent cyber threat. With
USTRANSCOM’s mission inextricably linked to our commercial industry partners,
it’s also critical that the Command continue to revise existing cybersecurity contract
language to remain aligned with the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) cybersecurity framework and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) cybersecurity requirements. Furthermore, the Command
needs to ensure it retains sufficient operational resiliency across the JDDE to enable
continued operations in a contested cyber environment. If confirmed, I will continu-
ously work to ensure these needs are met.
Question. How important is it that U.S. Transportation Command be aware of
cyber intrusions by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors into the networks of air-
lines, shippers, and other defense contractors that enable the Command’s oper-
ations?
Answer. Commercial industry partners make up a significant portion of
USTRANSCOM’s capacity. As such, it is extremely important to be aware of APT
intrusions into their networks so the command can rapidly assess potential impacts
to global operations and take response actions to mitigate the risk to mission. It is
also important for us to examine what occurred during the intrusion so we’re able
to apply lessons learned.
Question. When U.S. Transportation Command becomes aware of an APT intru-
sion into an operationally critical contractor, what steps should the Command take
to determine whether operational plans should be adjusted to mitigate the risk of
the intrusion affecting military operations?
Answer. Prior to changing an operational plan, USTRANSCOM would execute a
mission risk assessment process to consider appropriate operational and technical
mitigation actions based on the threat, vulnerabilities, and potential mission impact.
That risk assessment involves identification (step 1), assessment (step 2), risk man-
agement and monitoring (step 3), and reporting (step 4). The outcome of the assess-
ment is to determine the impact or potential impact to the Command’s mission,
identify mitigation actions, determine whether operational plans should be adjusted,
and then take the appropriate actions to implement and increase opportunity for
mission success. The mitigation steps are generally a broad-scope, collaborative ef-
fort across government, industry, and the international community in some situa-
tions. The Defense Transportation System has enough modal and nodal resiliency
that often we do not need to adjust operational plans. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure USTRANSCOM continues to maintain sufficient resiliency and capacity
across the JDDE to mitigate risks.
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
Question. U.S. Transportation Command relies on the services to make strategic
acquisition planning decisions, such as the KC–46 tanker for refueling and the
Rough Terrain Container Handler for port loading.
How is U.S. Transportation Command involved in this process, and do you believe
the Command’s needs are sufficiently taken into account?
Answer. Yes, Department processes provide multiple venues for USTRANSCOM
to voice Joint Force requirements and identify challenges facing this enterprise in
relation to the National Defense Strategy. As a Combatant Command,
USTRANSCOM is responsible to define the joint deployment capability and capacity
requirements to meet the National Defense Strategy. The Mobility Capability Re-
quirements Study and Fuel Tanker Vessel Study are recently completed products
that inform the Department and Congress on how well postured the Joint Deploy-
ment and Distribution Enterprise is with respect to meeting global demands.
The Services are responsible to provide a trained and ready capability consistent
with war plans. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with the military
departments to ensure there is a common understanding of capability requirements
and potential risk associated with investments or lack thereof.
Question. Should the service force providers change their equipment or units to
field better capability to conduct logistics operations in contested environments? If
so, how?
35
Answer. Yes, and I believe the Services are on the path to modifying their equip-
ment and force constructs in recognition of the challenges of the changing contested
battlespace. USTRANSCOM has worked diligently with the Joint Staff and the
Services to highlight the impact of rising operational demands on a historically un-
derfunded logistics enterprise. For example, it has been an active partner with the
Joint Staff and the Services in developing the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) and
associated Supporting Concepts, specifically the Joint Concept for Contested Logis-
tics (JCCL). These family of concepts will guide investment and divestment deci-
sions for the Department to design and develop a more lethal future Joint Force,
capable of conducting assured logistics operations across persistently contested envi-
ronments.
Additionally, emerging Service-level concepts like the Air Force’s ‘‘Agile Combat
Employment,’’ the Army’s ‘‘Multi-Domain Operations,’’ and the Navy/Marine Corps’
emphasis on distributed maritime operations are providing the impetus for re-
looking at how we would organize and fight against capable peer adversaries. These
new concepts all envision a future Joint Force able to employ more lean and agile
units in a distributed construct, reducing target profiles and providing dilemmas to
adversary targeting efforts. I should point out; however, these concepts levy in-
creased requirements on the JDDE. It is also widely understood adversaries con-
tinue to study, and plan against our comparative advantage in logistics and mobility
operations. Recent global war-games and simulations are increasingly highlighting
adversary abilities to degrade our power projection capabilities under persistent, all-
domain attack. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage the Command’s technology
transfer authorities, and research and development funding to assist the Services
and fellow Combatant Commands in exploring, testing, and transitioning advanced
capabilities that will enhance global deployment, distribution, and sustainment op-
erations to meet these challenges.
It is widely understood logistics underpins the success of the Joint Force. If con-
firmed, I will continue to collaborate, as the coordinator of the Joint Deployment
and Distribution Enterprise, with the Services, other Combatant Commands and the
Department to address capability gaps and prioritize investments to enable future
logistics and transportation functions, supporting Joint Force operations in con-
tested environments.
U.S. Transportation Command is the only Combatant Command that sets aircraft
requirements by total aircraft instead of via primary mission aircraft inventory
(PMAI).
Question. Do you believe that the Combatant Commanders should determine total
fleet sizes for the services or should they advocate for specific requirements for their
assigned and apportioned forces? Why or why not?
Answer. I support the department’s current budget process, which is designed to
balance risk and resources with involvement of all relevant stakeholders – to in-
clude the Combatant Commands. It is true that for USTRANSCOM, global trans-
portation capacity is a critical element of our warfighting framework and directly
impacts the success of our power projection capability; from a Program Review per-
spective, I think it is most prudent for our command to think in terms of total fleet
inventories, as I believe that allows us to most rapidly respond within an ever-
changing global environment. It also allows force providers the flexibility to best
manage their respective fleets to meet global requirements.
PEACETIME-WARTIME LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
Question. Our transportation and logistics systems have been significantly altered
over time to reduce organic military air and sealift capacity and to rely instead on
commercial aircraft and sealift as well as commercial supply chains to deliver spare
parts to deployed forces. This was done to reduce costs and increase buying power
and flexibility for the military.
Is there increased risk from this approach? If so, what is the nature of that in-
creased risk?
Answer. Our commercial providers are both a strength and potential vulner-
ability. There is inherent risk regarding the level of responsiveness in relying on
U.S. industry partners to meet wartime deployment and sustainment requirements
when these companies are engaged daily in domestic and international commerce
moving people and goods across the globe. That risk is mitigated by maintaining a
balance of organic and commercial capabilities within the portfolio. Additionally,
commercial providers help mitigate geographic access challenges by leveraging exist-
ing intermodal networks to deliver military materiel.
36
Question. How should U.S. Transportation Command plan for dealing with the
risk inherent in such operations (e.g., providing equipment and logistics to deployed
forces thousands of miles away in potential combat zones)?
Answer. The recently completed Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2020
(MCRS–20) and Fuel Tanker Vessel Study addressed the department’s ability to
meet future combatant commander deployment and sustainment requirements. As
in past studies, these two studies considered both organic and commercial capabili-
ties to ensure outside capacity exists to meet war plan requirements. These studies
also considered the impact of contested environments on the mobility enterprise.
USTRANSCOM’s warfighting framework outlines the overarching elements
USTRANSCOM constantly assesses in reviewing plans and the global strategic en-
vironment. First, our global posture, which includes the nodes and routes critical
to the execution of mobility operations is foundational to be able to deliver the Joint
Force around the globe. Second, our transportation (organic and commercial) and air
refueling capacity, to include the readiness of those forces, enables the deployment
of a winning force at the time of need. Finally, the ability to command and control
those forces around the globe and integrate with other commands and key
warfighting elements is essential to the successful execution of this Command’s mis-
sion. In sum, by maintaining favorable global posture, sufficient transportation ca-
pacity, and the ability to C2 global mobility operations, DOD retains the ability to
project immediate and surge forces required to compete, deter, respond and win in
order to meet U.S. strategic objectives.
USTRANSCOM will continue to work with OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, and the
Combatant Commands to assess operating environments and the ability of the en-
terprise (organic and commercial) to meet Joint Force demands.
Question. How would the nature of the relationship between U.S. Transportation
Command and commercial partners change in a wartime environment?
Answer. TRANSCOM is inextricably linked to our commercial partners, they are
an integral part of providing global assets and capability to support military oper-
ations anywhere in the world. The relationships with commercial partners are nur-
tured by regular engagements in peacetime to ensure lasting support in wartime.
As history has shown, the relationship with our commercial partners strengthens
in wartime. In the buildups for both Operation Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom,
our airlift partners in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program answered the call to acti-
vate and provide additional capacity to meet defense requirements. Similarly, com-
mercial sealift capacity in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan overwhelm-
ingly provided the vast majority of sustainment cargo capability during those con-
flicts. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our commercial partners to ensure
the business relationships remain solid and continue to support DOD requirements.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to find the appropriate balance for logis-
tics capacity between commercial and military logistics systems?
Answer. Today, our ability to project military power is inextricably linked to com-
mercial industry. It is important to strike the right balance between commercial ca-
pabilities such that DOD is not overly dependent on commercial capability for mis-
sion success. The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA Mobility Capability and Requirements
Study (MCRS–20) includes an assessment of the reliance on commercial transpor-
tation capacity in support of joint deployment requirements. Future operations in
contested environments will require greater effort to ensure we minimize the
threats our commercial providers face when transporting military cargo and per-
sonnel in non-permissive (wartime) environments. If confirmed, I will work with
commercial industry, Department of Transportation, and other stakeholders to en-
sure commercial capacity is sufficient and appropriate to meet future demands.
The military relies on an extensive network of logistics facilities overseas to sup-
port our deployed forces. These overseas depots enable our deployed forces to remain
on station longer without having to be supported directly from CONUS. These de-
pots are in host nations, which are U.S. friends and allies.
Question. What is your assessment of the resiliency of these overseas depots, par-
ticularly in places near ongoing political instability?
Answer. USTRANSCOM does not own or operate overseas depots. However, as
lead for the JDDE, USTRANSCOM does collaborate closely with Geographic Com-
batant Commands, Military Services, DLA, and other strategic partners to develop
and maintain an agile, secure and resilient distribution network to support and sus-
tain overseas depots. We constantly monitor the operational environment and re-
spond to challenges, as appropriate, with the use of alternate distribution routes
and logistics nodes to ensure the continued viability of those depots.
37
EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
Question. U.S. Transportation Command’s uniquely complex and data-heavy mis-
sion could present an opportunity to take greater advantage of emerging technology
like data analytics or machine learning.
How do you believe U.S. Transportation Command can most effectively leverage
emerging technology for improved performance?
Answer. I am aware that USTRANSCOM is working towards better leveraging to-
day’s advanced computing power through incremental steps with key data initia-
tives. Acknowledging the criticality of data, a key USTRANSCOM initiative is to de-
velop and implement a cloud-based data architecture to ingest, manage, and govern
JDDE data. This will provide the required data foundation to exploit advanced ana-
lytics, artificial intelligence, and machine learning. If confirmed, I will continue to
support future efforts such as this to enable USTRANSCOM to advance decision
making in support of the warfighter throughout the spectrum of conflict.
SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
Question. The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive policies and
procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual as-
saults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual as-
sault.
What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults
in U.S. Transportation Command, including assaults by and against U.S. civilian
and contractor personnel?
Answer. Sexual assault is destructive and undercuts our ability to keep a mission-
focused, ready force. We are committed to preventing this crime, encouraging in-
creased reporting, caring for victims, and holding offenders appropriately account-
able. From what I understand, the steps taken by the U.S. Transportation Com-
mand have been thorough and successful. I further believe U.S. Transportation
Command has policies, structures, and leadership committed to upholding an envi-
ronment of respect, trust, and dignity to maintain a safe and healthy Command. If
confirmed, I will continuously review the program to ensure it remains effective.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of U.S. Transportation Command
policies and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for re-
porting the assault?
Answer. Retaliation is an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
should not be tolerated. I believe USTRANSCOM has been following Department of
Defense sexual assault prevention and response policies, procedures and applicable
laws. However, I know more work remains to be done to prevent and respond to
sexual harassment and sexual assault, including retaliation against individuals who
report sexual assault, within the DOD and I remain committed to this improvement
journey.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place
in U.S. Transportation Command to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual
assault?
Answer. USTRANSCOM and their partners work together to investigate and re-
spond to allegations of sexual assault. They also train the entire force annually in
the concept of bystander intervention. This training reinforces to all servicemembers
that they owe their fellow servicemembers a duty to step in and stop situations that
could escalate into unwelcome sexual activity. However, more work remains to be
done to prevent and respond to sexual harassment and sexual assault within the
DOD. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on all aspects of sexual assault and har-
assment, including training, education and accountability, to ensure that all U.S.
Transportation Command members serve in a climate of dignity, respect, and inclu-
sion.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to
hold servicemembers accountable for sexual misconduct?
Answer. In my personal experience, commanders demonstrated a willingness to
hold servicemembers accountable for sexual misconduct. Having had the privilege
of serving in the United States Air Force for more than 30 years, at many duty sta-
tions, and with the Joint Force, I have been able to observe many different military
leaders of all services with varied backgrounds. Over the course of those years, we
have made significant progress in building and maintaining a fighting force that is
representative of all Americans. The key to maintaining the strength of that force
is providing an environment where those who engage in wrongdoing, no matter the
offense, are held accountable. A military leader’s responsibility is not only to ensure
the health and safety of those under their command, but also to hold accountable
those who commit misconduct, including sexual misconduct. Military leaders must
38
understand both ends of this spectrum and remain equally committed to under-
taking actions that ensure success.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and pro-
grams in U.S. Transportation Command to provide victims of sexual assault the
medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. The health and welfare of the victim is and will continue to be the fore-
most priority. U.S. Transportation Command teams with partner commands to pro-
vide preventive training and the full spectrum of response, medical services, and
legal support to victims of sexual assault. While I cannot judge the adequacy of care
and legal support in every case, if concerns are brought to my attention, I will take
immediate action to address, if confirmed.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing
necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
Answer. Prevention, response and support of military members who are a victim
of sexual assault or harassment is a leadership issue. A military leader is respon-
sible for the health and safety of those under their command. Anyone who is the
victim of sexual assault must have the full support of their chain of command and
feel safe in coming forward, not only to seek justice but to seek any care they may
need. If confirmed, I will continue to hold leaders and commanders accountable for
prevention, response and support to victims of sexual assault.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing
the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?
Answer. Sexual assault prevention and response programs are Commander’s pro-
grams, thus the chain of command is vital to creating an inclusive and supportive
command culture. It is the role of the chain of command to make it clear, not just
in words but in actions, that crimes including sexual assault will not be tolerated
and to establish a safe environment for victims. Current authority granted to com-
manders allows them to hold accountable not only those who are the perpetrators
of sexual assault but also those who engage in other crimes and misconduct that
we often see when allegations of sexual assault are reported. If confirmed, I am fully
committed to creating an inclusive command culture where members are treated
with value, dignity and respect.
Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals
to remove disposition authority from military commanders over felony-level viola-
tions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assault?
Answer. The Uniform Code of Military Justice exists to provide justice and to
maintain good order and discipline, both of which directly contribute to unit cohe-
sion and military effectiveness in combat. I have not studied in-depth the implica-
tions of removing all disposition authorities from the military commanders over fel-
ony-level violations to clearly understand impacts, positive or negative. Given the
criticality of Commander authority on and off the battlefield, we must thoughtfully
understand the effects these changes would have on readiness, mission accomplish-
ment, good order and discipline, and trust.
The Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military rec-
ommended, and Secretary Austin endorsed, that an independent prosecution author-
ity, rather than military commanders, should decide whether to pursue criminal
charges in sexual assault and related cases. I am supportive of effective solutions
to combatting the scourge of sexual assault, and I am looking forward to reviewing
the Secretary’s implementation plan.
Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, par-
ticularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective?
Answer. Several years ago, the Department instituted restricted and unrestricted
reporting options for victims of sexual assault. These options allowed victims to
choose when to report and whether to pursue a criminal investigation. I believe that
the reporting options, if properly implemented and followed, are effective and allow
the victims to get needed and deserved support services in any case.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess current policies, pro-
cedures, and programs and to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts
to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in U.S. Transportation Command?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to take all actions necessary to ensure cur-
rent policies, procedures and programs as well as senior level direction and over-
sight efforts are complied with, and effective to prevent and respond to sexual as-
saults in U.S. Transportation Command. In my current assignment and in past as-
signments, I have met with the military experts and those charged with special re-
sponsibilities in these areas including the Inspector General, Sexual Assault Re-
sponse Coordinator, Victims’ Advocates, Judge Advocates, and others. If given the
privilege to serve as Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, I will continue to
rely upon these experts and ensure they have unfettered access to myself and all
39
senior leaders to continuously strive towards a workplace safe from the scourge of
sexual assault.
Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging the sufficiency
of component commanders’ efforts in preventing and responding to incidents of sex-
ual assault do you consider appropriate and intend to implement as U.S. Transpor-
tation Command Commander?
Answer. Component Commanders, as commanders do at every level, set the
standards and require our Joint Force professionals to meet them, including estab-
lishing the foundation of military discipline, while ensuring victims receive care, and
holding perpetrators accountable. If confirmed, I will work with each of the Compo-
nent Commanders to gain feedback on sexual assault and harassment trends, and
program performance and effectiveness, to gauge the sufficiency of their efforts.
RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS
Question. What are your views on the state of U.S. Transportation Command’s re-
lationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Con-
gress in general?
Answer. USTRANSCOM has established a good working relationship with the
Committee and Congress in general. I am confident the command is responsive to
Congress’ requests and aggressively works to meet any suspense set by Congress,
whether it be for requests for information, briefings, office calls, or hearings.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and
mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and U.S. Transportation Com-
mand?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the current working relationships already
maintained by USTRANSCOM. I will make myself available to Congress, provide
my personal view when asked, and ensure we continue to strive to meet any and
all deadlines established by Congress on requests to USTRANSCOM.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is im-
portant that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able
to receive testimony, briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
communications) and other information from the Department.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and
testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees
of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this com-
mittee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their re-
spective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records (including doc-
uments and electronic communications), and other information as may be requested
of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this
committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their
respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testi-
mony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communica-
tions, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or
no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this com-
mittee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their re-
spective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of
testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic commu-
nications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?
Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to pro-
vide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information with-
in their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please an-
swer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to
letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from indi-
vidual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
40
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and
other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member,
federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with
this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Con-
gress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN
PEASE AIR NATIONAL GUARD AERIAL PAVEMENT EVALUATION
1. Senator SHAHEEN. General Van Ovost, 11 of 12 apron sections evaluated at
Pease Airbase are owned by the Air National Guard (ANG). The North Apron ac-
counts for 24 percent (683,709 sf) of ANG pavement. Overall, the ANG portion of
the North Apron (A01C1) is the lowest-rated apron and is in serious condition. Can
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) identify and report the impact this
degradation has to future dynamic global operations such as supporting alternate
strategic assets outside of KC–46 and KC–135?
General VAN OVOST. On an annual basis the posture plans for both NORTHCOM
and TRANSCOM are evaluated over the FYDP to ensure adequate infrastructure
exists both in and outside the United States to support operational plans and con-
tingency missions. Pease ANGB is a critical location that is consistently evaluated
against those requirements.
2. Senator SHAHEEN. General Van Ovost, in accordance with the 2016 Aerial
Pavement Evaluation, all aprons at Pease can support assigned KC–135 and future
KC–46 aircraft with no Allowable Gross Load restrictions. Can TRANSCOM coordi-
nate with Air National Guard to report and specify what domestic and international
assets are restricted at the deteriorated aprons such as North Apron and Nose Dock
Apron which are both in very poor to serious condition?
General VAN OVOST. The 2016 Aerial Pavement Evaluation does confirm all
aprons at Pease can support assigned KC–135 and future KC–46 aircraft with no
Allowable Gross Load restrictions. Those responsible authorities for aircraft oper-
ations to include domestic and international assets are provided airfield suitability
information, including apron conditions, from which they can make accurate risk in-
formed decisions on operating their aircraft on the Pease ramps.
3. Senator SHAHEEN. General Van Ovost, can you share how you intend to remain
committed to continue engagement with the New Hampshire National Guard on the
deterioration of the Pease parking ramp and the impact assessment on Pease’s abil-
ity to host strategic assets?
General VAN OVOST. Senator Shaheen, if confirmed, I commit to engaging and
working with my staff and the committee to ensure sufficient and accessible mobil-
ity infrastructure exists, not only in the Northeast, but globally, to meet the Na-
tional Defense Strategy now and in the future. I will ensure Pease ANGB and its
capacity and capabilities are properly evaluated against mobility requirements in
TRANSCOM’s annual posture plan review. Our Air Force staffs to include the Na-
tional Guard Bureau, Air Mobility Command, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Cen-
ter are manned with subject matter experts who will maintain visibility of the Pease
parking ramp conditions. The staffs work together to ensure commanders are aware
of pavement conditions and ability to support assigned missions.
4. Senator SHAHEEN. General Van Ovost, if TRANSCOM finds that restoration of
the parking ramp is in the best interest of supporting global requirements, how do
you intend to ensure that the funding to facilitate the restoration of the parking
apron is executed in a timely manner to mitigate future operational limitations for
Pease?
General VAN OVOST. If current or future mission requirements are identified re-
quiring funding, TRANSCOM will work with the Department of the Air Force and
the National Guard Bureau through the MILCON working group process for project
prioritization and funding allocation. Parking apron restoration would be prioritized
with all Air Force facility restoration, modernization, and repair projects. Air Force
staffs review, prioritize, fund, and execute these projects on an annual basis. Pave-
41
ment evaluations, mission requirements and field commanders will help inform
prioritization of any future Pease ANGB apron restoration projects.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
5. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, as part of my responsibility as a member
of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and to ensure the fitness of nomi-
nees for appointment to senior positions within the Department of Defense, I will
be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on
which I serve. Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted re-
quests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault
of a sexual nature?
General VAN OVOST. No
6. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, have you ever faced discipline, or entered
into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
General VAN OVOST. No
AFGHANISTAN EVACUATION
7. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, I want to thank you and your team at
Air Mobility Command for your extraordinary work executing the around-the-clock,
historic airlift operation to evacuate over 124,000 U.S. citizens and Afghan partners
under extremely dangerous conditions. What are your initial thoughts on the airlift,
and are there any lessons learned you have identified up front you can discuss with
us today?
General VAN OVOST. Our Airmen executed this historic NEO mission with ex-
traordinary skill both in the air and on the ground. Our aircrew, maintainers, logis-
ticians, medical personnel and others continuously amazed the AMC leadership
team with their resourcefulness and skill as they tackled new problems daily. Al-
though this was a relatively short operation, the Airmen and our aircraft operated
at a significant level of stress and we are in the process of reconstituting the force,
regaining readiness, and planning for the future.
The AMC and USTRANSCOM teams are involved in an extensive effort to collect
lessons and move out on actionable items to improve our ability to meet mission re-
quirements. However, there are a number of things that are immediately apparent
from my perspective. First, this operation confirmed that our ability to project and
sustain the joint force is inextricably linked to our commercial industry partners.
Second, we need to improve our data systems to provide the information our mili-
tary commanders, Federal departments, commercial partners, and allies and part-
ners need to make decisions at the speed of relevance. Next USTRANSCOM and
AMC C2 systems need to be more flexible when responding to rapidly changing con-
ditions and scenarios. Finally, we need to pursue a refined common operating pic-
ture and better tools to increase situational awareness.
8. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, if confirmed, will TRANSCOM conduct an
after-action report sharable with Congress so we can understand in more detail
what went right and what went wrong during the operation to inform future mis-
sions of this sort?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, USTRANSCOM is conducting an after-action report and
if confirmed, I will share the report with Congress.
SEALIFT RECAPITALIZATION
9. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, in General Stephen Lyons’ statement to
the Committee at the TRANSCOM posture hearing earlier this year, he pointed out
that 33 of our 50 Roll on/Roll off sealift ships are scheduled for retirement in the
next 10 years. In last year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress
took steps to bolster the Government’s ability to purchase additional used, foreign
vessels currently on the market to augment the ready reserve force. How do you
assess the progress of recapitalizing our sealift fleet?
General VAN OVOST. I am grateful for Congress’ continued support of the U.S.
Navy’s plan to recapitalize the fleet. Although vessel acquisitions were delayed in
FY21, a vessel acquisition manager is now in place. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy and
the Maritime Administration expect to survey candidate vessels in the October 2021
timeframe, and they expect used ship purchases in calendar year 2022, to begin the
42
recapitalization process. If funding for ship purchases continues beyond 2022, I as-
sess that our recapitalization efforts will remain satisfactory.
10. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, do the current sealift recapitalization
plans sufficiently address the potential for attrition during a conflict with a near-
peer competitor like China or Russia?
General VAN OVOST. The FY20 NDAA directed a Mobility Capability Require-
ments Study (MCRS) to assess the adequacy of the Joint Deployment and Distribu-
tion Enterprise’s capacity relative to the current National Defense Strategy (NDS).
The study assessed the demands associated with the NDS and factored in the impli-
cations of contested environments and their impact on mobility forces. I have re-
viewed the findings and recommendations of the recently released MCRS and Fuel
Tanker Vessel Study, and if confirmed, I will work with the Joint community to im-
plement appropriate recommendations from these studies.
11. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, section 3511 of last year’s NDAA pro-
vided authority to establish a Tanker Security Program, subject to the results of a
TRANSCOM Mobility Requirements Study. Do you have sufficient results from that
study to determine whether the Tanker Security Program needs to be implemented?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM recently completed the Fuel Tanker Vessel
Study to address the Department’s ability to meet future combatant commander de-
ployment and sustainment requirements. This comprehensive and thorough study
concluded insufficient U.S. flag tanker capacity exists to meet NDS requirements.
DOD will have an enduring need for foreign flag tanker augmentation. The study’s
analysis clearly demonstrated the need for a Tanker Security Program in addition
to identifying several other solutions. These solutions, working together, are impor-
tant steps toward a comprehensive strategy to increase U.S. flag tanker capacity,
to reduce the risk of reliance on foreign flag tankers for the most important fuel
missions, and to ensure the DOD has sufficient tanker capabilities to meet NDS ob-
jectives.
SPACE MOBILITY
12. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, General Lyons confirmed with me in
April that TRANSCOM is working closely with industry partners like SpaceX on the
viability of using space-based vehicles to rapidly deliver time-sensitive logistics any-
where in the world. This technology is a potential game-changer, especially in the
Indo-Pacific, where commanders are confronted with the tyranny of distance and
time when moving people and parts from one location to another. Can you provide
us a brief progress update on space mobility?
General VAN OVOST. With the recent high-profile successes of commercial rocket
launches, the possibility of rocket cargo point-to-point intra-planetary transportation
is closer to reality than at any other time in the Space Age. USTRANSCOM con-
tinues to investigate rocket cargo transportation, from the end user’s perspective,
as a potentially disruptive fourth mode of transportation in the Joint Deployment
and Distribution Enterprise portfolio. The capabilities of space transportation ap-
pear to offer enhanced supply chain responsiveness as well as improved global ac-
cess. USTRANSCOM is continuing its investigation of space transportation opportu-
nities through cooperative research, with an expanding variety of industry partners.
The command’s preference is to encourage the development of a competitive field of
space transportation sources, offering a spectrum of capabilities from which to
choose for urgent lift supporting future operations. Even in these early stages of in-
quiry, we have learned that more concept development is needed to make space
transportation not just feasible, but practical. Integration with existing supply chain
equipment, materiel handling and packaging concepts, reliable return of reusable
space vehicles from their destinations, and requirements for the supporting infra-
structure remain fundamental, to-be-answered questions. We are still in the early
stages of adding partners, learning feasibility, and planning concept demonstrations.
USTRANSCOM is also in close communication with the DOD’s science and tech-
nology community, including U.S. Space Force and the Air Force Research Labora-
tory, to learn from their own deep dives on the status of enabling space transpor-
tation technologies. If confirmed, I plan to continue the collaborative work with Gov-
ernment and industry to understand the maturity, uses, limitations, and value of
this new transportation opportunity, which is still emerging from industry sources.
13. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, if confirmed, do you plan to prioritize
this capability as the next TRANSCOM Commander?
43
General VAN OVOST. In strategic competition, perpetuation of the Nation’s unpar-
alleled global transportation capabilities in the sea, air, and land domains must suc-
ceed. At the same time, the opportunities to enhance our response to global trans-
portation needs through the emerging dimension of space transportation, must be
explored to determine its reach, speed, and reliability, and feasibility. If confirmed,
I will ensure USTRANSCOM remains a proponent of advancing rocket cargo as a
potentially disruptive transportation capability.
AERIAL REFUELING
14. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, in last year’s NDAA, Congress set limits
on the number of KC–135 and KC–10 tanker aircraft the Air Force could retire over
the next couple years as a result of delays in fielding the new KC–46 aircraft. I
think this year’s final bill will also have some limitations as well, although that’s
subject to change. Are you concerned about the pace of retirements of the Air Force’s
legacy tanker fleet?
General VAN OVOST. I am not concerned with the pace of retirements for KC–10
and KC–135 aircraft, and I support the retirement profile outlined by the DOD leg-
islative proposal submitted for congressional review for the FY22 NDAA.
USTRANSCOM currently has sufficient capacity to meet steady State and crisis re-
sponse demands. With exceptional collaboration between the U.S. Air Force (USAF)
and USTRANSCOM, four positive developments occurred over the last year that al-
lowed USTRANSCOM to arrive at a workable solution with the USAF. First, Boeing
accepted responsibility to fix the KC–46 contract’s ‘‘Category 1’’ deficiencies, ena-
bling the USAF to present a KC–46 Interim Capability Release. Second, the USAF
agreed to lower the KC–10 divestiture profile. Third, the USAF funded additional
MPA to increase the Reserve and Guard air refueling capacity and contributions.
Finally, we are seeing a reduction in air refueling demand in the USCENTCOM
AOR.
15. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, what changes to the limits of retire-
ments, if any, do you recommend Congress make in this year’s NDAA?
General VAN OVOST. I support the retirement profile outlined by the DOD Legisla-
tive Proposal. The exceptional collaboration between the USAF and USTRANSCOM
resulted in an agreed-upon retirement profile for FY22: 36 KC–10 (divest 14 in
FY22) and 376 KC–135 (divest 18 in FY22).
16. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, is the current and projected future tank-
er fleet size sufficient to address the potential for attrition during a conflict with
a near-peer competitor like China or Russia?
General VAN OVOST. The recently completed Mobility Capability and Require-
ments Study 2020 (MCRS–20), directed by the FY20 NDAA, goes into detail on the
sufficiency of this force element. While all the specifics cannot be detailed here, the
air refueling fleet is sufficient, but will certainly be stressed by the various NDS
wartime missions associated with great power competitors.
17. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, this year’s version of the Senate NDAA
would prohibit the Air Force from developing a follow-on to the KC–46 aerial tank-
er—how do you view that issue?
General VAN OVOST. We cannot delay the acquisition process of a follow-on tanker
if the Air Force is to meet the required timelines and budgetary actions necessary
to continue this vital recapitalization effort. When the final KC–46 is delivered by
the current program of record, the remaining KC–135 fleet will be approximately
70 years of age. The air refueling fleet is and will remain critical to this country’s
ability to deploy and employ combat aircraft, intelligence, surveillance and recon-
naissance aircraft, and command and control aircraft during contingency operations.
Continued recapitalization of the aging KC–135 is critical to maintain a ready and
capable air refueling fleet postured to respond and execute National Defense Strat-
egy wartime mission sets.
CYBERSECURITY
18. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, there are benefits to partnering with ci-
vilian carriers to meet TRANSCOM’s missions, but also the risks that come from
partnering with companies who primarily use unclassified networks. What is your
understanding of the current status of TRANSCOM’s efforts to harden its networks
to defend against cyberattacks?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM has made, and continues to make, signifi-
cant efforts to harden its networks from cyberattacks. Cyber mission assurance is
44
a top priority for USTRANSCOM, and USTRANSCOM is making investments to
protect command, control, information technology systems, and infrastructure that
are most consequential to mission success. This includes continued investment in
cloud services, which has led to a more robust infrastructure, increased security pos-
ture, and improved resiliency of mobility systems. USTRANSCOM is also adopting
security best practices, increasing emphasis on improving the cybersecurity posture
of its most critical systems, and partnering with organizations within the DOD to
continue implementing a new information security framework, known as Zero Trust,
to harden its networks.
19. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, if confirmed, will you continue coordi-
nating with CYBERCOM on this effort?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM has a strong relationship with
USCYBERCOM. If confirmed, I will continue to coordinate with USCYBERCOM
and strengthen this relationship.
MILITARY MOVES
20. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, last November, the Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) overturned the Department of Defense’s (DOD) multi-bil-
lion dollar contract award to move service members’ household goods around the
world because of pervasive errors in the contracting process. I don’t believe to date
TRANSCOM has re-awarded that contract, so if confirmed, that decision will fall to
you, General. What is your understanding of the status of re-awarding that con-
tract?
General VAN OVOST. I anticipate award of the Global Household Goods Contract
(GHC) to occur in late October 2021. USTRANSCOM anticipates additional protests
will follow the re-award, which will delay start of the 9-month contract transition
period approximately March 2022, presuming USTRANSCOM prevails in the pro-
test. Following transition, we will begin a 7-month phase-in of moves and will avoid
significant changes during the 2023 peak PCS season. We expect GHC will be at
full performance by December 2023.
After GAO’s recommendations sustaining some of the protest allegations, and in
accordance with GAO’s recommendations, the USTRANSCOM Acquisition Direc-
torate initiated corrective actions and invited the offerors in the competitive range
to submit new proposals. The source selection team, which includes members from
USTRANSCOM, each of the Military Departments and the Coast Guard, evaluated
those proposals from December 2020 through September 2021.
After conducting these proposal evaluations from a ‘‘clean slate,’’ the evaluation
team completed multiple iterations of ‘‘discussions’’ (negotiations) with the offerors
and the Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC), inclusive of USTRANSCOM sen-
ior leaders, each of the Military Departments, and the Coast Guard, who unani-
mously made an award recommendation to the Source Selection Authority. The
SSAC’s recommendation and associated documentation currently is undergoing mul-
tiple levels of review, to include third party reviews by Defense Pricing and Con-
tracting professionals and the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Acquisition,
Fiscal Law, and Litigation Directorate.
21. Senator HIRONO. General Van Ovost, do you plan to take into consideration
the timing of any implementation of that contract to avoid, to the extent possible,
negative effects it might have on military service member and family household
good movements, especially during the summer peak season?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, I do. Improving the ‘‘at the curb’’ experience for service
members and families is the North Star. USTRANSCOM undertook this massive ef-
fort because of their concern for Service members and their families. To minimize
transition impact on service members and families, USTRANSCOM instructed
offerors to avoid volume phase-in during peak season. The Performance Work State-
ment (Appendix A, Para A.1) states: ‘‘Offerors must plan to accommodate work
interruptions should protests warrant, and shift Volume Phase-In Periods as nec-
essary so that a significant phase-in volume does not occur during peak relocation
season (15 May through 31 August).’’
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III
REGIONAL THREATS
22. Senator MANCHIN. General Van Ovost, in April we heard from General Ste-
phen Lyons that the success of the DOD’s power projection capability was contin-
45
gent on three critical elements which were: global mobility posture, global transport
capacity, and global command and control integration. Do you believe there are any
shortfalls in our allies’ capabilities to support these critical requirements if
TRANSCOM is called to respond in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO)?
General VAN OVOST. Deep relationships with our allies and partners are essential
to deterrence and to the access, basing, and overflight capability that underpin
USTRANSCOM operations worldwide. If USTRANSCOM is called upon to respond
in support of NATO in Europe, we would rely on—and we would expect to receive—
NATO host nation support to provide needed access to airfields and port facilities
in Europe and road and rail movement across multiple countries without restrictive
border crossing requirements. While we enjoy excellent access, basing, and over-
flight cooperation with allies and partners currently, future operations will demand
more distributed operating locations given the improved range and precision of our
adversaries’ fires.
23. Senator MANCHIN. General Van Ovost, what shortfalls have you experienced
in your career with interoperability within our own Services, commercial partners,
and allied nations, and how do you intend to solve them at TRANSCOM?
General VAN OVOST. Interoperability is key to operate in today’s security environ-
ment. If confirmed, I intend to advocate to pursue developing common systems to
share data with other services, our commercial partners, allies, and most impor-
tantly other Federal departments. DOD’s ability to decide and act effectively is crit-
ical to our ability to compete, deter and win. Within the framework of Joint All Do-
main Command and Control (JADC2), the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management
System (ABMS) is the cornerstone of our C2 structure for enabling connectivity to
the data to empower rapid decisionmaking. In addition, while USTRANSCOM does
not ‘‘Command and Control’’ the Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft, communication be-
tween Air Mobility Command’s Air Operations Center and the airline operations
centers is critical to being able to effectively utilize the capabilities they bring to
bear.. Specifically, we need to eliminate policies which unnecessarily slow or inhibit
classified or unclassified communication with our industry partners, while training
and equipping those partners to communicate with us to enable USTRANSCOM and
its components to effectively execute their missions in the time of need.
CYBER VULNERABILITIES OF TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
24. Senator MANCHIN. General Van Ovost, cyber threats continue to be a growing
concern and threat to our Nation’s security and infrastructure. General Lyons told
us back in April that TRANSCOM was moving forward with a third-party
verification process to ensure the companies TRANSCOM works with are up to
snuff in their cybersecurity measures. Are you aware of this program, and if so, can
you give us an update?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, I am aware of this program. USTRANSCOM has award-
ed a proof-of-principle contract to have a third party assess our commercial partners’
compliance with Cyber Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Level 3 requirements.
USTRANSCOM is now coordinating with two commercial partners to identify dates
for the third party to conduct the assessment, which will provide indications of com-
pliance with NIST security controls and identify gaps.
25. Senator MANCHIN. General Van Ovost, if not, do you commit to ensuring all
contractor meet the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification if you are con-
firmed?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to incorporating CMMC language
into USTRANSCOM contracts in line with DOD timelines and ensuring all contrac-
tors meet the CMMC requirements.
26. Senator MANCHIN. General Van Ovost, on the topic of increased cybersecurity,
I’ve been hearing for years that the Department of Defense is working toward im-
plementation of a zero-trust network to ensure our systems are as secure as they
can be, but I haven’t seen much progress. Are you familiar with zero-trust concepts,
and can you ensure their implementation will be a priority for you as TRANSCOM
Commander?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, I’m familiar with Zero Trust concepts and know that
USTRANSCOM, in partnership with USCYBERCOM, is implementing a Zero Trust
security model on its classified network that will enhance network traffic visibility
and better position the command to secure sensitive data, systems, and services.
USTRANSCOM will achieve the baseline Zero Trust maturity level, as outlined in
46
the Department’s Zero Trust Reference Architecture, by the end of this calendar
year. If confirmed, I will make advancing the Zero Trust security model beyond the
baseline maturity level a priority.
WORLDWIDE LOGISTICS
27. Senator MANCHIN. General Van Ovost, the level of coordination, fleet readi-
ness, and response to the combatant commanders in light of the COVID pandemic
that TRANSCOM provided is nothing short of amazing. The global threat from ra-
tional and irrational states and actors is ongoing and the rise of humanitarian sup-
port and crisis mitigation is enduring. As a nation ready to support humanity,
TRANSCOM has a critical role in the success of these missions. However, the age
of our surface connectors, computer based systems, and the increasing threat of pre-
cision fires concerns me. What are your concerns if called today to support an armed
conflict in a contested environment while also potentially called to support a human-
itarian mission on opposite sides of the world?
General VAN OVOST. The NDS delineates a shift to great power competition and
potential conflict that will challenge the ability to deploy and sustain the Joint
Force in every segment of mobility operations, especially in divergent geographic lo-
cations. In the homeland, adversary actions in the cyber domain, particularly
against USTRANSCOM’s command and control centers for air refueling, airlift, and
sealift, is a priority concern in terms of consequence to support wartime missions.
Another concern is maintaining and improving our global transportation nodes.
Our mobility posture provides access, basing, and overflight, which are critical in
wartime, but also essential in any global response as recently demonstrated in the
Afghan NEO. Our allies and partners provide the nodes and networks necessary to
connect the globe and provide options that we must protect against malign actions
of our adversaries.
I am also concerned by the long, contested lines of communications against both
China and Russia, and the tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific region. This re-
quires the integration of logistics planning across all warfighting functions to sup-
port the joint warfight. The growth in demand from increasingly dispersed oper-
ations, increasingly complex and lethal kinetic platforms, and extended adversary
anti-access and area denial capabilities place immediate stressors on the Joint De-
ployment and Distribution Enterprise to support forward forces immediately, as we
rapidly build capacity to deploy a decisive force.
Finally, the core mobility assets of strategic and intra-theater sea and airlift, as
well as air refueling capabilities, in sufficient numbers and readiness, remain crit-
ical in supporting national objectives for humanitarian operations and wartime out-
put. Both the Mobility Capability and Requirements Study 2020 (MCRS)–20 and
POL Tanker Study submitted to Congress in June 2021, provide greater detail in
these areas.
28. Senator MANCHIN. General Van Ovost, if you are confirmed, how do you in-
tend to ensure your command review makes sure you’re prioritizing capabilities that
can succeed in a global conflict against near-peer adversaries?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM’s priorities are synchronized with and sup-
port the National Defense Strategy. In terms of access, our regional posture en-
hances the flexibility and warfighting effectiveness of USTRANSCOM assets. If con-
firmed, I will continue to ensure USTRANSCOM invests in partnerships that ex-
pand access and support adaptive basing initiatives critical for success. Checking
the malign influence of Russia and China will be a cooperative effort with the Geo-
graphic Combatant Commands, and our ability to identify critical en-route infra-
structure is a major element of USTRANSCOM’s posture plan. Within the United
States, our domestic road, rail, and seaport infrastructure is also a key component
of power projection. I will leverage our National Defense Programs in partnership
with the Department of Transportation to ensure these remain capable of sup-
porting national defense objectives.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TAMMY DUCKWORTH
JOINT TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
29. Senator DUCKWORTH. General Van Ovost, I understand TRANSCOM seeks to
procure and implement a single integrated system for logistics services known as
the Joint Transportation Management System (JTMS) to ensure our service mem-
bers have access to data faster to make sound decisions. What is the timeline for
JTMS procurement and fielding?
47
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM has been working with the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense on the Joint Transportation Management System (JTMS) as part
of a broad, department-wide transportation business reform effort. The final rec-
ommendation to the department on JTMS is pending solution analysis that is cur-
rently underway. The purpose of JTMS is to leverage commercial transportation and
financial software to integrate financial management and transportation business
operations at the transactional level to improve the department’s ability to record
and provide timely reconciliation of transportation and financial management trans-
actions accurately, which have resulted in long-standing financial management defi-
ciencies. JTMS is intended to contribute to the department’s efforts to close
auditability gaps and meet the statutory requirements identified in Section 103,
Audit of the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2018, in the 2014 National Defense
Authorization Act.
JTMS feasibility analysis currently is in progress so a final timeline for procure-
ment and fielding has not been finalized. USTRANSCOM is actively working with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Departments, and other stakeholders
to ensure, should the department proceed, that JTMS will meet the intended busi-
ness reform requirements.
30. Senator DUCKWORTH. General Van Ovost, is there a plan to test and evaluate
such a system?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM worked with Department stakeholders on
several efforts to test and evaluate the feasibility and applicability of commercial
software to meet Department-wide transportation and financial management busi-
ness reforms requirements to include conducting a limited prototyping effort from
2018 to 2020. While initial results were encouraging, additional analysis and stake-
holder input was needed based on the limited scope of the prototype.
31. Senator DUCKWORTH. General Van Ovost, if testing occurred, what were the
lessons learned?
General VAN OVOST. While the JTMS prototype effort showed commercial trans-
portation and financial software has a degree of applicability and could assist
USTRANSCOM and the Department of Defense achieve a level of business reforms,
commercial software alone cannot solve all desired reforms, and meet all operational
requirements. Additionally, the prototype was of limited scope and duration that ne-
cessitated further analysis. Like any large-scale information technology project,
JTMS will require department wide policy changes, a significant business process
reengineering effort, integration into the existing department IT portfolio, and a
comprehensive change management strategy should the department proceed. Addi-
tionally, USTRANSCOM and the department conduct unique, DOD-specific oper-
ations where no commercial software solution exists.
32. Senator DUCKWORTH. General Van Ovost, finally, when do you anticipate
JTMS to be fully operationally capable?
General VAN OVOST. A fully operational date has not been established. Should
JTMS go forward, however, based on the size, scale, and diverse nature of
USTRANSCOM and the Department’s global transportation mission, roll-out will be
a multi-year endeavor.
CYBERSECURITY
33. Senator DUCKWORTH. General Van Ovost, we must maintain a competitive
edge in the cyber domain as our global command and control underpin our logistics
capabilities. TRANSCOM must be prepared to operate in a contested logistics and
persistent multi-domain attack environment. Could you please provide the progress
made through TRANSCOM’s partnership with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)
to implement a proof of principle using ‘‘Zero Trust’’ security?
General VAN OVOST. In partnership with USCYBERCOM, USTRANSCOM has
made significant progress toward implementing a Zero Trust security model on its
classified network. USTRANSCOM is on track to achieve the baseline Zero Trust
maturity level, as outlined in the Department’s Zero Trust Reference Architecture,
by the end of this calendar year. If confirmed, I will make advancing the Zero Trust
security model beyond the baseline maturity level a priority.
34. Senator DUCKWORTH. General Van Ovost, when will the results become avail-
able?
General VAN OVOST. USCYBERCOM will conduct a Zero Trust validation event
on USTRANSCOM’s classified network no later than mid-January 2022, which will
48
assess whether USTRANSCOM successfully achieved the baseline Zero Trust matu-
rity level.
35. Senator DUCKWORTH. General Van Ovost, in addition to cyber hygiene and
third-party inspections, what efforts is TRANSCOM pursuing to build cybersecurity
and resilience with commercial partners?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM incorporates Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) cyber language into its contracts. In addition,
USTRANSCOM contracts require Transportation Service Providers (TSPs) to per-
form annual cybersecurity self-assessment of the 110 National Institute of Stand-
ards and Technology (NIST) security controls outlined in NIST SP 800–171. During
meetings with TSPs to discuss their self-assessments, and in several other forums,
USTRANSCOM shares information and collaborates with the TSPs, enabling them
to advance their cybersecurity posture and better manage risk. USTRANSCOM also
has a Cyber Working Group that is assessing requirements needed above NIST to
ensure cybersecurity. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen the relationships
with commercial partners to ensure we maintain a shared understanding of threats
so we can be agile enough to combat these threats as they arise.
36. Senator DUCKWORTH. General Van Ovost, what resources are required to en-
sure the security of our data in cyber-contested environments?
General VAN OVOST. Given USTRANSCOM’s unique mission, ensuring data secu-
rity in a cyber-contested environment is paramount. The resources required include
investment in cloud services, implementation of advanced detection and response so-
lutions, and Zero Trust security capabilities. It also requires investment in tech-
nologies such as machine learning and artificial intelligence to both secure the data
and assure data is available at the speed of need. We must also take advantage of
the significant advances in commercial technology and integrate it into military
technologies, especially when it comes to using data to make better decisions.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACKY ROSEN
CYBER INTRUSIONS
37. Senator ROSEN. General Van Ovost, what are the steps you will take as the
head of TRANSCOM to improve the cybersecurity posture of our most critical sys-
tems?
General VAN OVOST. If confirmed, I will continue to make cybersecurity posture
and cyber mission assurance a priority for USTRANSCOM and ensure we make the
appropriate investments to protect command and control and information technology
systems and infrastructure most consequential to mission success. My focus areas
will include adopting security best practices and continued investment in cloud serv-
ices that lead to a more robust infrastructure, increased security posture, and im-
proved resiliency for our mobility systems. I will also ensure we continue progress
implementing Zero Trust security capabilities.
38. Senator ROSEN. General Van Ovost, how will you work with CYBERCOM and
key stakeholders to mitigate the operational impact of any malicious cyber cam-
paigns?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM is already aligned closely with
USCYBERCOM and key stakeholders on a wide array of cybersecurity initiatives
designed to counter the impact of any malicious cyber campaign. USTRANSCOM
also works with USCYBERCOM to execute joint defensive cyber operations in re-
sponse to emerging threats and named operations to mitigate known cyber
vulnerabilities. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure USTRANSCOM remains
aligned closely with USCYBERCOM and key stakeholders on all initiatives and op-
erations.
CLOUD MIGRATION
39. Senator ROSEN. General Van Ovost, can you discuss the key benefits of mi-
grating TRANSCOM’s cyber domain to a commercial cloud and how, if confirmed,
will you share lessons and best practices with other parts of DOD—including how
to move older DOD technologies to a commercial cloud?
General VAN OVOST. The key benefits of migrating USTRANSCOM’s cyber do-
main to a commercial cloud are the ability to make use of the data, security, resil-
iency, and application advantages that cloud technology offers. If confirmed, I will
ensure USTRANSCOM continues to share lessons learned and best practices with
49
other parts of the Department through the existing groups the Command already
participates in, such as the DOD Digital Modernization Executive Committee and
DOD Chief Information Officer Cloud Community of Interest.
RAPID MOBILITY
40. Senator ROSEN. General Van Ovost, can you discuss how you will use your
current experience to build off of the Joint Warfighting Concept to ensure
TRANSCOM can deliver in future mobility operations through better use of data?
General VAN OVOST. My experience as the AMC Commander, as well as our col-
lective experience, tells us that logistics holds the potential to be a pathfinder for
better interoperability, security, and visibility of data across the Joint Force. The
need for defined, secure, and shared logistics data is ubiquitous across all elements
of the Joint Force, and with our industry partners and allies. Competitive advantage
against adversaries through information dominance is a key element of the Joint
Warfighting Concept, and in the supporting Joint Concept for Contested Logistics.
Unlocking the latent potential of trusted, reliable logistics data will not only en-
hance mobility operations, but more importantly, inform joint planning to ensure
operational plans are logistically feasible.
USTRANSCOM remains a strong advocate for, and supporter of, the Joint All-Do-
main Command and Control initiative, which is intrinsically linked to the Joint
Warfighting Concept. This overarching effort will help enable more localized data
management improvement efforts, such as the Aerial Port of the Future Joint Capa-
bility Technical Demonstration. The Aerial Port of the Future may radically change
how we collect, process, and use data within and across aerial ports on a global
scale. Finally, if confirmed, I will continue to advocate for prioritized Department-
wide investments in those data management solutions that enhance global com-
mand and control, mobility capability and capacity, and commercial industry and al-
lied partner data interoperability.
COVID–19
41. Senator ROSEN. General Van Ovost, if confirmed, what is your strategy for
continuing to deliver on TRANSCOM’s promise to support the Department of De-
fense’s operations during the ongoing pandemic, including collaborating with our al-
lies?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM has and will continue to implement OSD
guidance on force health protection for our uniformed personnel, Government civil-
ians, contractors, and our work centers. For our patient movement mission, we will
continue to provide safe transport of COVID–19 positive patients in our biocontain-
ment units for both our C–17s and C–130’s, using specially trained aeromedical
evacuation teams and critical care air transport teams. USTRANSCOM will also
continue to provide force health protection measures for individuals traveling on
USTRANSCOM aircraft, to include 72-hour pre-departure COVID–19 testing for
those who are unvaccinated or for those heading to destinations where our partner
nations require a negative 72-hour pre-departure test before entry into their coun-
try. If confirmed, I will enforce this guidance until OSD and the Geographic Com-
batant Commands provide new guidance.
42. Senator ROSEN. General Van Ovost, can you discuss how you will mitigate the
impact of COVID–19 on TRANSCOM’s long-term operations?
General VAN OVOST. In coordination with OSD, we will implement the Executive
Orders mandating vaccination of our uniformed personnel, Government civilians,
and contractors. For our Component Commands, implementation of the OSD guid-
ance on force health protection will be executed through Military Department chan-
nels. USTRANSCOM has provided guidance to the workforce on telework, virtual
meetings, use of face coverings in accordance with OSD guidance, reinforced regular
cleaning and disinfecting of work and common spaces, and emphasized good per-
sonal hygiene to include frequent handwashing. USTRANSCOM will also continue
to provide force health protection measures for individuals traveling on
USTRANSCOM aircraft. For our patient movement mission, we will continue to pro-
vide safe transport of COVID–19 positive patients in our biocontainment units for
both our C–17s and C–130’s. Finally, we will share best practices with the depart-
ment, industry, the inter-agency, and our allies.
50
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS
AERIAL REFUELING OPERATIONS/PLATFORMS
43. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, the Air Force and TRANSCOM have pre-
viously stated that more than 25,000 hours of aerial refueling missions are not
being supported annually. Given that the KC–46 is still not fully operational, and
the Air Force has already begun retiring some of the legacy tanker fleet, I assume
that there is still a significant shortfall in TRANSCOM’s aerial refueling capacity.
What is the current shortfall?
General VAN OVOST. TRANSCOM currently has sufficient capacity to meet steady
State and crisis response air refueling demands according to the most important pri-
orities articulated by the Joint Staff and NDS.
In April 2020, the Secretary of the Air Force provided Congress with a report ti-
tled ‘‘FY20 NDAA Contractor-Operated Aerial Refueling Aircraft,’’ which assessed
the Joint Force’s request for air refueling to support missions and operations. Re-
quests for air refueling capability vary in criticality and are often unconstrained by
resources. While the air refueling fleet remains stressed, USTRANSCOM manages
the tension between available resources and requests for capability in order to en-
sure warfighting readiness and operational mission support.
With exceptional collaboration between the USAF and TRANSCOM, four positive
developments occurred over the last year, which allowed TRANSCOM to arrive at
a workable solution with the USAF on meeting air refueling demand. First, Boeing
accepted responsibility to fix the KC–46 contract’s ‘‘Category 1’’ deficiencies, ena-
bling the USAF to present a KC–46 Interim Capability Release plan to add needed
air refueling capacity before final discrepancy fixes are implemented. Second, the
USAF agreed to lower the KC–10 divestiture profile from initial planning efforts.
Third, the USAF funded additional MPA to increase the Reserve/National Guard air
refueling capacity and contributions. Finally, AMC is seeing a reduction in air re-
fueling demand in the CENTCOM AOR as witnessed by a drop from 70 deployed
air refueling aircraft on a daily basis in 2017 to less than 30 projected for FY22.
44. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, if the shortfall has been reduced or elimi-
nated, please explain.
General VAN OVOST. While we currently have sufficient capacity to meet steady
State and crisis response air refueling demands, the transition to a new tanker nat-
urally creates a temporary reduction in available aircraft. A significant improve-
ment to air refueling capacity projections was the 2021 release of the KC–46 Interim
Capability Release plan and additional support provided by the Air Reserve Compo-
nent tanker force. The Joint Force has an insatiable appetite for air refueling and
global demands will likely continue to put pressure on the air refueling mission. The
needed air refueling capacity is captured in the recently completed Mobility Capa-
bility Requirements Study and USTRANSCOM will continue to manage available
air refueling assets according to the most important priorities articulated by the
Joint Staff and NDS.
45. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, has the overall aerial refueling require-
ment changed or is the shortfall now being measured differently?
General VAN OVOST. Air refueling requirements have changed for both steady
State demands and when projecting the need to scale for conflict. The Mobility Ca-
pability Requirements Study completed in June 2021 details the changes in these
scenarios. In daily competition, the changes have been the most significant with a
substantial reduction in CENTCOM requirements. Looking forward, air refueling
demand as proscribed by the Joint Staff and NDS appears balanced with expected
capacity, especially with the KC–46 interim capability release plan that began meet-
ing USTRANSCOM operational air refueling requirements in 2021.
46. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, I have serious concerns regarding the Air
Force’s desire to retire a significant number of legacy tankers prior to the KC–46
becoming fully operational. I am particularly concerned by the potential loss of the
KC–10, which provides significantly more fuel offload than both the KC–135 and the
KC–46. I understand that the KC–10 fleet has many more years left in terms of
potential service life and am concerned that prematurely retiring such a strategic
asset would result in a loss of warfighter capability that cannot be regained for
many years to come. Please describe the importance of the KC–10 to TRANSCOM’s
aerial refueling capability, and the potential impact to missions for Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps pilots and aircrews if we cut additional KC–10’s.
51
General VAN OVOST. The KC–10 delivers necessary and relevant capability for all
Joint Staff and NDS wartime missions. Unfortunately, the KC–10 is increasingly ex-
pensive to maintain. I concur with the USAF and USTRANSCOM decision to divest
the KC–10. This divestiture is the best air refueling value assessment that incor-
porates current utility, future capability and cost, as well as facilitation of oper-
ational fielding of the KC–46. Through a deliberate interim capability release plan,
the USAF has made the KC–46 available for USTRANSCOM missions, in combina-
tion with KC–10 and KC–135 aircraft, to ensure sufficient capacity to meet global
air refueling requirements is maintained. In addition, the aircrews and maintainers
needed to field and operate the KC–46 as aircraft are delivered to the USAF rely
on the manpower that will be freed up with KC–10 retirements.
47. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, I understand that, although the KC–46
has been cleared to conduct some aerial refueling missions, the aircraft will not be
considered to be fully operational until major deficiencies such as the Remote Visual
System are resolved, which likely won’t be until 2023 at the earliest. I was sur-
prised to learn that, despite this non-or semi-operational status, the KC–46s being
delivered are being coded into the Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory (PMAI).
Please explain why these aircraft are given the same inventory status as fully oper-
ational KC–10’s or KC–135s.
General VAN OVOST. PMAI aircraft are coded as such to ensure the airframe has
the resources to support flying operations that includes maintenance and flying
crews, weapon system sustainment and support, and programmed flying hours. Fol-
lowing established PMAI guidelines, it is necessary to code the KC–46 as a PMAI
weapon system to generate the flying, maintenance and mission support personnel,
and equipment required to support it. With USTRANSCOM utilizing KC–46 capac-
ity now for operational missions, it is important the weapon system has the
resourcing to sustain and grow operational capacity over time. A trained crew force
allows the growth of the KC 46 capacity that will be needed to execute additional
taskings to support the Joint Force in the future. Utilizing the KC–46 now frees up
unrestricted KC–135 and KC–10 aircraft for other operational taskings or readiness
building activities, thereby adding air refueling capacity for our Joint Force require-
ments.
48. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, I understand that there have been con-
versations regarding possible uses for KC–10 aircraft prior to being fully retired and
sent to the boneyard. I understand that one option is to provide the aircraft to in-
dustry, either through sale or as Government Furnished Equipment, for use in a
commercial air refueling program. I understand that the Navy and Marine Corps
have been successfully utilizing a commercial air refueling program for the last 20+
years. What is the status of those discussions?
General VAN OVOST. Discussions regarding commercial air refueling as a viable
means of support to USTRANSCOM’s mission are ongoing. The U.S. Air Force is
conducting further study of the commercial refueling option, which will be key to
determining its merits.
49. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, shouldn’t KC–10 retirements be halted
until a decision is made on commercial air refueling?
General VAN OVOST. No, through coordination between the U.S. Air Force and
USTRANSCOM, we have developed a sustainable way forward that maintains suffi-
cient air refueling capacity to meet requirements as we bridge to the KC–46. The
U.S. Air Force Interim Capability Release (ICR) process that makes KC–46 capacity
available for limited USTRANSCOM tasking is a key step forward that will help
with the transition to that platform. In addition, the aircrews and maintainers need-
ed to field and operate the KC–46 as aircraft are delivered to the Air Force rely
on the manpower that will be freed up with KC–10 retirements. I support the KC–
10 divestment profile agreed to by the U.S. Air Force and USTRANSCOM, and
which has been submitted by the Department of Defense
50. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, do you believe TRANSCOM and the Air
Force should be pursuing a commercial air refueling program to address current and
future aerial refueling shortfalls?
General VAN OVOST. Commercial air refueling should certainly be considered. The
U.S. Air Force, as the force provider, continually assesses the air refueling enter-
prise to determine cost-effective, legal, and operationally credible alternatives to
meet air refueling requirements. The U.S. Air Force is conducting further study to
assess the commercial option.
52
CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT
51. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, the Mobility Capabilities and Require-
ments Study 2018 Executive Summary identified the need to mitigate mobility im-
pacts of operating in a contested environment. In your view, how well is
TRANSCOM prepared for strategic lift in a potentially contested operating environ-
ment?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM is postured to operate on a global scale in
contested environments; however, adversary capability and capacity to directly or
indirectly disrupt, degrade, or deny our ability to operate is growing.
In the homeland, adversary actions in the cyber domain, particularly against
USTRANSCOM’s command and control centers for air refueling, airlift, and sealift
is a significant concern in terms of consequence to support wartime missions. Within
the United States, USTRANSCOM relies on resilient road, rail, seaport, and airport
critical infrastructure to provide unimpeded power projection with the ability to
fight through disruptions by employing insightful command and control capabilities
and tightly coordinated interagency support to deploy and sustain the Joint Force.
Long, contested lines of communications against both China and Russia, and the
tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific region creates dilemmas that will require the
integration of logistics planning across all warfighting functions to support the joint
war fight. The growth in demand from increasingly dispersed operations, increas-
ingly complex and lethal kinetic platforms, and extended adversary anti-access and
area denial capabilities place immediate stressors on the Joint Deployment and Dis-
tribution Enterprise to support forward forces immediately, as we rapidly build ca-
pacity to deploy a decisive force. Our allies and partners provide the nodes and net-
works necessary to connect the globe and provide options that we must ensure are
not at risk due to malign actions of our adversaries.
Finally, the core mobility assets must be able to operate successfully in the face
of persistent multi-domain attack to achieve wartime output. The support of our full
range of operations during wartime is designed so that our commercial air and sea
transportation partners operate in a permissive environment, whose viability must
be maintained by DOD. Intra-theater sea and air lift is also critical to sustain and
support the force across great distances to meet volume and time-sensitive require-
ments for cargo, passengers, and fuel. Both the Mobility Capability and Require-
ments Study 2020 (MCRS)–20 and POL Tanker Study submitted to Congress in
June 2021 provide details in these areas.
52. Senator TILLIS. General Van Ovost, to the best of your knowledge, has
TRANSCOM conducted attrition analyses of major operations plans using assump-
tions of contested sea lanes, limited ability to degrade anti-access/area-denial (A2/
AD) capabilities, etc.?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, in the last several years USTRANSCOM has developed
and incorporated contested environment impact considerations into the mobility
analysis based on Intelligence Community threat assessments of adversary abilities
and intent to target mobility and logistics operations. Attrition of mobility assets,
as well as combat power lost because of an attack on mobility targets, are included
in this contested environment analysis.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN
GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN THE ARCTIC
53. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, Russia’s and China’s rapid develop-
ment of capabilities in the Arctic has made the region an emerging front-line for
great power competition. Given the National Defense Strategy’s (NDS) focus on
great power competition—if confirmed—will you commit to visiting Alaska with me
in your first year to see first-hand the opportunities Alaska offers TRANSCOM?
General VAN OVOST. I welcome the opportunity to visit Alaska and see first-hand
the incredible Joint Force team executing the multitude of missions necessary to
support the NDS.
54. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, in your personal opinion, what makes
Alaska strategically important for the United States and why would our adversaries
want to limit our presence and power projection capabilities in the Arctic region?
Please elaborate.
General VAN OVOST. From a national security perspective, Alaska’s location on
the North Pacific rim and proximity to Russia makes Alaska strategically impor-
tant. I defer to the USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM Commanders for a more
53
nuanced discussion of Alaska’s strategic importance. Among U.S. adversaries, Rus-
sia in particular considers the Arctic a priority area of strategic interest and funda-
mental to its national security. Russia is especially sensitive to U.S. military pres-
ence and power projection capabilities in the Arctic because Moscow views the Arctic
as a strategic vector through which the United States may attack Russia, to include
nuclear attack.
ARCTIC CAPABILITY GAPS
55. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, over the years senior defense officials
have identified military logistics and mobility gaps within the Arctic region. These
requirements have varied from the need for fuel north of Dutch Harbor, a strategic
Arctic port, polar communications, and additional aerial refueling. Unfortunately,
we haven’t made consistent progress on each of these requirements and other
known capability gaps. That is one of the reasons why I secured in this year’s
NDAA—alongside my SASC colleagues—the need for U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) to produce an independent assessment that identifies the activities
and resources required to implement the NDS and service Arctic strategies in the
Arctic region. Can I get your commitment to closely coordinate and collaborate with
NORTHCOM on this assessment so that TRANSCOM equities—like a Strategic Arc-
tic port—are captured in the final deliverable?
General VAN OVOST. If confirmed, you have my commitment, to closely coordinate
and collaborate with NORTHCOM on USTRANSCOM equities in the Arctic.
56. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, can I also get your commitment to re-
view TRANSCOM capability requirement gaps within the Arctic region within 60
days of your confirmation and sit down with me to discuss how you will work with
the service components to close these gaps?
General VAN OVOST. If confirmed, you have my commitment to assess
USTRANSCOM capabilities in the Arctic region, and to discuss necessary ap-
proaches to close any identified gaps.
KC–46 BASING
57. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, the previous Senate-confirmed Sec-
retary of Defense Mark Esper acknowledged that collocation of 100 5th-generation
fighters with KC–46 tankers would provide our Nation with ‘‘extreme strategic
reach.’’ The current TRANSCOM Commander, General Stephen Lyons, USA, noted
that ‘‘[t]he aerial refueling fleet continues to underpin the Joint Force’s ability to
deploy an immediate force across all NDS mission areas . . . ’’ Given Alaska’s bed-
down of F–35s, access to expansive training ranges, and proximity to several high-
priority regions, would you agree with former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper that
collocation of 100 5th-generation fighters with KC–46 tankers in Alaska would pro-
vide extreme strategic reach to the United States? Please elaborate on how that
kind of air power could affect our power projection posture, strengthen our alliances,
and message to our adversaries.
General VAN OVOST. Air refueling aircraft, by their intended design, provide ex-
treme strategic reach for our other air assets daily around the globe. The home sta-
tion of our air refueling aircraft is but one component of global responsiveness.
Across the broad spans of the Indo-Pacific region, the elements of access, basing,
and overflight to en-route and forward locations are essential to position and employ
combat capability, and as important, if not more so, to where we home station mo-
bility assets. The ability of USTRANSCOM to control and rapidly shift assets any-
where in the world to address emerging and high priority needs is also foundational
to global responsiveness and executing strategic reach. In this context, using the no-
tion of ‘‘extreme strategic reach,’’ mobility assets must operate not only across broad
regions such as USINDOPACOM, but globally with the responsiveness to leverage
the Department’s combat power fully when and where it is needed, which
USTRANSCOM is uniquely capable of performing. I will defer to the U.S. Air Force
and its Title 10 basing responsibilities for determination of where to base aircraft.
LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT IN A CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT
58. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, China has the capability and capacity
to employ thousands of missiles within the first and second island chains. Similarly,
Russia boasts an immense quantity of missiles that easily range all of Europe. Both
countries are likely to expand their missile arsenals over the next several years.
With that in mind, what concerns do you have regarding TRANSCOM’s ability to
conduct logistics and sustainment activities in an increasingly robust anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) environment?
54
General VAN OVOST. The nature of conflict against either China or Russia will
challenge the ability to deploy and sustain the Joint Force in every segment of mo-
bility operations. USTRANSCOM is postured to operate on a global scale in con-
tested environments; however, adversary capability and capacity to disrupt, de-
grade, or deny our ability to operate directly or indirectly is growing.
In the homeland, I am concerned about a cyber-attack against our command and
control centers for air refueling, airlift, and sealift in terms of consequence to sup-
port wartime missions. Our operations centers and the ability to conduct command
and control operations are the centers of gravity for mobility operations.
USTRANSCOM, in conjunction with USCYBERCOM, is taking actions to mitigate
this risk both at the system level and within the DOD Information Networks that
support these operations centers.
I am also concerned with ensuring our constellation of allies and partners pro-
vides the nodes and networks necessary to connect the globe and that we must en-
sure are not at risk due to malign actions of our adversaries. Access, basing, and
overflight are not guaranteed in the emerging complex and intertwined geopolitical
structure. Loss of key nodes under wartime conditions significantly would com-
plicate our ability to rapidly deploy and sustain the Joint Force. This is not limited
to wartime; during contingency operations, our allies and partners are critical to ac-
cess, basing and overflight as recently demonstrated by the Afghan NEO effort.
Finally, core mobility assets must be able to operate successfully in the face of
persistent multi-domain attack. Our commercial transportation partners, for both
airlift and sealift, will operate in permissive environments, which USTRANSCOM
must assure for their viability to support the full range of operations.
USTRANSCOM must work in concert with other elements of the Joint Force to en-
sure we can set conditions to protect key nodes and lines of communication, and
interdict adversaries before they can strike vulnerable transportation and logistics
targets. Intra-theater sea and airlift is also critical to sustain and support the force
across great distances. Both the Mobility Capability and Requirements Study 2020
(MCRS)–20 and POL Tanker Study submitted to Congress in June 2021 provide de-
tails in these areas.
59. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, how is TRANSCOM preparing for stra-
tegic lift in a potentially contested operating environment?
General VAN OVOST. The National Defense Strategy depicts a shift to great power
competition and potential conflict that will challenge the ability to deploy and sus-
tain the Joint Force in every segment of mobility operations. USTRANSCOM is pos-
tured to operate on a global scale in contested environments; however, adversary ca-
pability and capacity to directly or indirectly disrupt, degrade, or deny our ability
to operate is growing.
In the homeland, I am concerned about adversary actions in the cyber domain,
particularly against USTRANSCOM’s command and control centers for air refuel-
ing, airlift, and sealift, in terms of consequence to support wartime missions. Our
operations centers and the ability to conduct C2 is the center of gravity for mobility
operations. USTRANSCOM, in conjunction with USCYBERCOM, is taking actions
to mitigate this risk at the system level and in the DOD Information Networks that
support these operations centers. Within the United States, we rely on resilient
road, rail, seaport, and airport critical infrastructure to provide unimpeded power
projection with the ability to fight through disruptions by employing insightful C2
capabilities and tightly coordinated interagency support to deploy and sustain the
Joint Force.
Long, contested lines of communications against both China and Russia, and the
tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific region, require the integration of logistics
planning across all warfighting functions. The growth in demand from increasingly
dispersed operations, increasingly complex and lethal kinetic platforms, and ex-
tended adversary anti-access/area denial capabilities place immediate stressors on
the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to support forward forces imme-
diately. Our allies and partners provide the nodes and networks necessary to con-
nect the globe and provide options that we must ensure are not at risk.
Finally, the core mobility assets must be able to operate successfully in the face
of persistent multi-domain attack. Our commercial transportation partners, for both
airlift and sealift, will operate in permissive environments which USTRANSCOM
must assure for their viability to support the full range of operations.
USTRANSCOM must work in concert with other elements of the Joint Force to pro-
tect key nodes and lines of communication, and interdict adversaries before they can
strike vulnerable transportation and logistics targets. The Mobility Capability and
Requirements Study 2020 (MCRS)–20 and POL Tanker Study submitted to Con-
gress in June 2021 provide details in these areas.
55
60. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, how is a contested environment ex-
pected to affect TRANSCOM’s ability to use the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Ready
Reserve Force, as well as commercial contracted logistics partners?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM inextricably is linked to our commercial
partners, whether it be those in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the Voluntary Inter-
modal Sealift Agreement, or the merchant mariners manning the Ready Reserve
Force ships. These partnerships enhance our ability to support military operations
anywhere in the world. Historically, relationships with commercial partners
strengthen in wartime situations and scenarios. Contested environments pose
unique challenges for global logistics, and if confirmed, I will continue to work with
our commercial partners and all stakeholders in the Joint Deployment and Distribu-
tion Enterprise to mitigate risk to these high value assets and personnel.
MILITARY SEALIFT
61. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, when the United States goes to war,
TRANSCOM moves approximately 90 percent of its cargo requirements with the
strategic sealift fleet, which consists of government-owned ships augmented by the
commercial U.S.-flagged fleet. In your responses to the advance policy questions, you
said that over the next decade, 33 of 50 Navy roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels, which
deliver the surge force, will retire and that the readiness of this aging fleet is
TRANSCOM’s No. 1 readiness concern. I understand that a 2019 exercise showed
only 40 percent of the sealift fleet would be ready in a crisis and that the average
age of these ships is 45 years. What plans and associated timelines are in place to
mitigate this looming shortfall?
General VAN OVOST. I support the OSD and U.S. Navy plan to recapitalize the
fleet by purchasing used commercial ships to improve readiness to meet the Na-
tional Defense Strategy. The U.S. Navy’s plan is an appropriate, cost-effective ap-
proach for the organic fleet. Currently, a vessel acquisition manager is in place,
market surveys of available used vessels are nearing completion, and ship surveys
are planned for the October 2021 timeframe. USTRANSCOM expects the U.S. Navy
to purchase used ships in calendar year 2022 in order to begin the recapitalization
process.
STRATEGIC HIGHWAY NETWORK IMPROVEMENTS
62. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, during an office call I had earlier this
year, General Stephen Lyons, the current TRANSCOM Commander, brought up the
need for a Military Strategic Transportation Program (MSTP) that would seek to
improve our Strategic Highway Networks (STRAHNET). Why is this initiative nec-
essary?
General VAN OVOST. From the inception of the National InterState and Defense
Highway System in the 1950’s, national defense has been a statutory consideration
in promoting the Nation’s highways. Over time, expansion of the National Highway
System (NHS) has reduced this national defense focus. Since established, the NHS
has grown by over 300 percent compared to only about 50 percent growth in the
STRAHNET. With the STRAHNET making up a smaller proportion of the NHS over
time (now only about 29 percent), investment in highways important to the DOD
has become diluted, affecting national defense interests. The DOD relies on each in-
dividual State’s Departments of Transportation (DOTs) and local Metropolitan Plan-
ning Organizations (MPOs) to operate and maintain the STRAHNET to ensure mili-
tary readiness and protect national security. State DOTs and MPOs, however, cur-
rently are not required to consider national defense needs in project funding deci-
sions using Federal funds. The MSTP proposal, developed in coordination with the
Federal Highway Administration, would provide the necessary incentives and guid-
ance to State DOTs and MPOs to address national defense requirements. In addi-
tion to DOD benefits, the proposed MSTP would also provide appreciable benefits
to freight commerce, manufacturing supply chains, and local communities.
63. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, what strategic risks is the United
States accepting if we don’t make these improvements, particularly improvements
to critical Power Projection Platform (PPP) routes?
General VAN OVOST. The expeditious movement of military equipment on the Na-
tional Highway System (NHS) is central to the DOD’s enduring mission of providing
military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the Nation.
USTRANSCOM has identified 5,000 miles of the most critical highway corridors in
19 states that support the movement of equipment from designated installations to
seaports during national emergencies. These routes must be capable (e.g., be of ade-
quate road/bridge design and condition) of supporting the rapid movement of mili-
56
tary equipment, including oversized and overweight vehicles. Although no single
Power Projection Platform route deficiency presents a significant risk to the safe
and rapid movement of equipment, increased congestion, unaddressed deficient
roadway characteristics, and continued highway infrastructure degradation in the
aggregate will challenge our ability to meet sealift loading timelines at our strategic
seaports.
64. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, can you give me some examples of how
Strategic Highway Networks would be beneficial in a national emergency?
General VAN OVOST. A healthy STRAHNET benefits not only military needs, but
also improves highway safety for the traveling public and benefits the freight trans-
port industry to further advance the country’s economic productivity. It also rep-
resents a capable and resilient network of roadways to support the safe and rapid
movement of DOD personnel, equipment, and relief materials in response to a vari-
ety of plausible national emergencies from Defense Support of Civil Authorities to
large-scale wartime deployments. The STRAHNET traverses all U.S. states and
passes through or near all major metropolitan areas. Any projects on STRAHNET
that address vertical clearance, bridge structural condition and functionality, pave-
ment condition, and roadway configuration would similarly enhance transportation-
related responses to virtually any national emergency.
DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY PROGRAM
65. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, availability of transportation service
provider capacity in the Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) hit all-time lows
during the 2021 peak season. Plagued with labor shortages and reduced third party
partner options transportation service providers struggled to meet the demands of
DOD relocations. According to an industry study 98 percent of companies experi-
enced a reduction in qualified labor and associated labor costs rose 20–40 percent.
How is TRANSCOM addressing and planning for these capacity problems in the
2022 peak season?
General VAN OVOST. The USTRANSCOM staff has heard from our industry part-
ners about their challenges in securing labor in previous years, and this has in-
creased significantly since the COVID–19 pandemic in 2020 and during the 2021
peak season. Based on current economic trends, we anticipate capacity constraints
to persist through the 2022 moving season. While USTRANSCOM cannot alleviate
the labor shortages nationwide, we remain committed to working with our industry
partners to address capacity constraints. Moving into 2022, we will continue our col-
laborative approach with industry.
Since the COVID–19 pandemic began in 2020, USTRANSCOM has worked closely
with industry to adjust program rules in recognition of the impacts of the pandemic
on the supply chain and labor pool. These changes included extensions to our transit
times, the addition of surcharges to account for stop movement impacts during the
start of the pandemic (e.g., canceled moves and changed pickups), and other addi-
tional actions to account for supply chain disruptions. In 2021, we increased crating
compensation due to lumber price increases, reduced containerized bookings to help
with lumber costs, added long delivery compensation for delivery from storage, and
allowed the use of commercial best non-DoD approved storage. USTRANSCOM
made these adjustments in partnership with our transportation service providers
without losing our focus on program improvements to better serve our customers.
In addition to the above efforts with industry partners, USTRANSCOM is taking
active steps within DOD to mitigate the effect on service members and their fami-
lies. We are engaging with the Military Departments to reduce the number of fami-
lies moved during peak season, which would reduce the surge demand of transpor-
tation service providers during peak season.
66. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, are you committed to working with in-
dustry providers to provide flexibility within the program in response to these chal-
lenges?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, if confirmed, I am and will remain committed to work-
ing with our industry partners to deliver the quality capacity and accountability
that our service members and their families deserve.
67. Senator SULLIVAN. General Van Ovost, in August, TRANSCOM released a pro-
posal to require electronic inventories for all DOD shipments starting in April 2022.
A recent industry study shows that 65 percent of current DP3 participants do not
utilize the technology and that 54 percent of those individuals State it would take
them a year or more to purchase and implement the technology. Most concerning
57
is that 76 percent of survey participants stated they would reduce their capacity
within the DP3 program if this timeline is enacted. In light of the severe capacity
problems within the program and concerns over losing a significant portion of the
limited remaining capacity, is TRANSCOM still supporting a mandate of 100 per-
cent electronic inventories starting in April 2022?
General VAN OVOST. For 2022, USTRANSCOM is not making electronic inven-
tories mandatory. USTRANSCOM will not mandate the use of electronic inventories
until the 2023 moving season, giving our industry partners well over a year to pre-
pare. Currently, USTRANSCOM is strongly encouraging transportation service pro-
viders to use them.
USTRANSCOM has had extensive dialog on electronic inventories with industry
partners for the past 3 years. Many have been supportive, as indicated by their col-
laboration on the establishment of an International Organization for Standards
number specific to the electronic inventories (ISO Standard 17451). Some industry
partners, however, have expressed their concerns regarding the challenges you men-
tioned. USTRANSCOM will continue to encourage these partners to replace the leg-
acy process with a more modernized customer service standard.
USTRANSCOM strives to provide our service members and their families with
the best service possible, and view electronic inventories as a major customer service
issue. Hard copy inventories are consistently illegible and can negatively affect a
customer’s ability to account for their property and preexisting damage. Electronic
inventories provide our service members, their families, and moving companies the
ability to read legible inventories and reduce claims disputes. Electronic inventories
also enable electronic transmission and storage by providing an email that is easily
retrievable by service members and their families while in geographic transition.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN
AFGHANISTAN
68. Senator BLACKBURN. General Van Ovost, in light of the TRANSCOM’s role in
Operation Allies Refuge, what examples of both organizational successes and per-
ceived gaps or areas for improvement will inform your perspective as the
TRANSCOM commander?
General VAN OVOST. Authorities inherent to the USTRANSCOM Commander al-
lowed USTRANSCOM to react, mass forces, and streamline communications, which
enabled USTRANSCOM to concentrate airlift capacity and enabler personnel at the
point of need. Some examples include: Task Force Gryphon from the 43d Air Mobil-
ity Operations Group deployed to Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, to
support the launch of the 82d Airborne Division; the use of a Contingency Response
Group at Kabul to run airfield operations and the insertion of Joint Enabling Capa-
bilities Command forces to USCENTCOM and Department of State to facilitate
interagency coordination and NEO movement. Additionally, due to the heightened
demand signal and the expediency required, the temporary relaxing of the use of
both detailed systems of record and normal manifesting procedures drastically in-
creased the speed of operations; however, this expedited throughput caused a sig-
nificant degradation of In-Transit Visibility resulting in a lack of real-time aware-
ness at multiple levels. This is an area for improvement.
69. Senator BLACKBURN. General Van Ovost, please share shortcomings that you
noticed outside of TRANSCOM’s control including, but not limited to, an authority
or permission that could allow TRANSCOM to be more efficient, a particular plat-
form or capability that could have saved more Afghans, or a strategic airlift rela-
tionship with a partner nation that the United States needs to pursue?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM possessed the authorities and capabilities
needed to successfully execute Operation Allies Refuge. Additionally, partner na-
tions supplied essential support throughout the operation, especially in area of ac-
cess, basing, and overflight. USTRANSCOM is in the process of conducting an after-
action report which may identify shortcomings to address for future operations.
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION
70. Senator BLACKBURN. General Van Ovost, how do you envision TRANSCOM’s
role either complimenting or guiding the efforts of Pacific Movement and Coordina-
tion Center (PMCC)?
General VAN OVOST. Over the past 3 years, USTRANSCOM has been engaged in
the efforts of Indo-Pacific Command to develop the Movement Coordination Center
Pacific (MCCP). The MCCP provides an opportunity to increase interoperability, ex-
58
pand training opportunities, leads to greater regional cooperation, and increases lift
sharing options for the U.S. and its Allies and Partner Nations. MCCP is modeling
much of their efforts after the successful Movement Coordination Center Europe
(MCCE). These centers reinforce our global posture while enhancing access, basing
and overflight opportunities.
71. Senator BLACKBURN. General Van Ovost, does an equivalent center exist with-
in other Geographical Combatant Commands?
General VAN OVOST. Yes. USTRANSCOM has been involved with the Movement
Coordination Center Europe (MCCE) for the past 13 years. Utilizing the Air Trans-
port & Air-to-Air Refueling and other Exchanges of Services (ATARES) system, 27
countries currently are MCEE members. United States European Command is the
Executive Agent for MCCE. A similar capability exists within CENTCOM. Although
structured somewhat differently, the CENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Op-
erations Center (CDDOC) performs roughly the same functions as the MCCE in the
CENTCOM AOR.
IMPACT OF FUEL PRICES ON U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
72. Senator BLACKBURN. General Van Ovost, how much of an impact do you an-
ticipate fuel price volatility will have on TRANSCOM’s ability to operate over the
course of the next fiscal year?
General VAN OVOST. Fuel price volatility will not prevent USTRANSCOM from
completing its mission. Fuel accounts for approximately 12 percent of the
USTRANSCOM budget; therefore, fuel pricing changes can drive significant changes
in operating costs. Transportation operations are funded through a Working Capital
Fund, which is designed to absorb this cost volatility.
73. Senator BLACKBURN. General Van Ovost, what kind of impact do you antici-
pate fuel price volatility will have on TRANSCOM’s Defense Working Capital Fund?
General VAN OVOST. Working Capital Funds are designed to absorb price uncer-
tainties, with financial losses passed on to the Military Departments through higher
future rates. If fuel prices rise substantially, however, USTRANSCOM could seek
immediate relief through a cash recovery charge to the Military Departments.
USTRANSCOM last used this cash recovery mechanism for a fuel price increase in
FY14.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY
FAIT ACCOMPLI TIMELINE
74. Senator HAWLEY. General Van Ovost, former U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) Commander Admiral Philip Davidson testified that the threat of a
Chinese invasion of Taiwan ‘‘is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next 6
years.’’ Current INDOPACOM Commander Admiral John Aquilino testified simi-
larly that the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan ‘‘is much closer than most of
us think’’ and could occur well before 2035. When asked if he agreed with Admiral
Davidson’s testimony, Commandant of the Marine Corps General David Berger tes-
tified, ‘‘I do.’’ Likewise, when asked about Admiral Davidson’s testimony, Chief of
Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday stated, ‘‘I don’t think we should ignore
that possibility.’’ Do you agree that the threat of a Chinese invasion against Taiwan
is something we need to be worried about in this decade, not just in the 2030’s or
afterward?
General VAN OVOST. Yes, I concur with the assessments of Admiral Davidson and
Admiral Aquilino.
IMPORTANCE OF PARTNER EXERCISES IN THE PACIFIC
75. Senator HAWLEY. General Van Ovost, partner exercises across the Pacific are
critical to strengthening our relationships in the region and gaining access to key
logistical nodes. How do these kinds of activities help us prepare for logistics and
basing of transportation assets?
General VAN OVOST. Multinational exercises across the Pacific bolster relation-
ships with our allies and partners and are critical events to enabling information
sharing, promoting interoperability, ensuring resiliency, and providing credible de-
terrence. Through exercises and wargaming, partner nations gain a better under-
standing of our deployment and distribution requirements and are more willing to
permit access to mobility nodes. Additionally, these engagements help identify op-
portunities to address construction of common use infrastructure.
59
76. Senator HAWLEY. General Van Ovost, how do you see the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative supporting these kinds of critical activities?
General VAN OVOST. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative reinforces the U.S. role as
a trusted ally and effective competitor in the region. Investments in the Indo-Pacific
region help to establish new relationships and strengthen partnerships in geo-politi-
cally sensitive areas. The initiative also enables our ability to potentially gain access
to, or protect, lines of communication, while supporting transportation and infra-
structure requirements of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise.
SUPPORT TO AIR FORCE AGILE COMBAT EMPLOYMENT
77. Senator HAWLEY. General Van Ovost, how is TRANSCOM working with the
Air Force to support the operational concept of Agile Combat Employment (ACE),
since it appears that TRANSCOM would play a significant role in ACE?
General VAN OVOST. USTRANSCOM engages with all the Military Departments
on their emerging operational concepts, to include the Air Force’s Agile Combat Em-
ployment (ACE). In particular, USTRANSCOM, as synchronizer for the Joint De-
ployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE), supports the geographical COCOMs
and enables concepts like ACE by helping set global posture (infrastructure, equip-
ment, and forces), as well as advocate for access, basing, and overflight (ABO) per-
missions from partner nations. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with the
U.S. Air Force and work to incorporate the concepts articulated in ACE into our
global posture priorities, operations, exercises, wargames, and studies.
[The nomination reference of General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost,
USAF follows:]
60
[The biographical sketch of General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost,
USAF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
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62
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior mili-
tary officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the
advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details
the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee.
The form executed by General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, USAF in
connection with her nomination follows:]
63
64
65
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee question-
naire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to
this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B-E are contained in
the committee’s executive files.]
[The nomination of General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, USAF A
was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on September 28,
2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.
The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on October 1, 2021.]
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