Smbliq C 053 Hamilton Project Help Small Businesses Covid Crisis
Summary
A Hamilton Project policy proposal, Policy Proposal 2020-14, dated September 2020: From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis, by Steven Hamilton of The George Washington University. The paper states that more than 400,000 small businesses had permanently closed by June and describes the $350 billion Paycheck Protection Program as having had mixed success. It proposes that the PPP not be extended and that the Employee Retention Credit be expanded to cover 80 percent of eligible wages up to $15,000 per quarter for businesses with revenue down at least 30 percent. It also proposes a new Small Business Survival Credit of $5,000 per employee per quarter, up to $50,000 per business per quarter, and increased funding for the IRS. The paper includes background on small business finances and a table of contents.
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POLICY PROPOSAL 2020-14 | SEPTEMBER 2020
From Survival to Revival:
How to Help Small Businesses
through the COVID-19 Crisis
Steven Hamilton
MISSION STATEMENT
The Hamilton Project seeks to advance America’s promise
of opportunity, prosperity, and growth.
We believe that today’s increasingly competitive global economy
demands public policy ideas commensurate with the challenges
of the 21st Century. The Project’s economic strategy reflects a
judgment that long-term prosperity is best achieved by fostering
economic growth and broad participation in that growth, by
enhancing individual economic security, and by embracing a role
for effective government in making needed public investments.
Our strategy calls for combining public investment, a secure social
safety net, and fiscal discipline. In that framework, the Project
puts forward innovative proposals from leading economic thinkers
— based on credible evidence and experience, not ideology or
doctrine — to introduce new and effective policy options into the
national debate.
The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s
first Treasury Secretary, who laid the foundation for the modern
American economy. Hamilton stood for sound fiscal policy,
believed that broad-based opportunity for advancement would
drive American economic growth, and recognized that “prudent
aids and encouragements on the part of government” are
necessary to enhance and guide market forces. The guiding
principles of the Project remain consistent with these views.
From Survival to Revival:
How to Help Small Businesses
through the COVID-19 Crisis
Steven Hamilton
The George Washington University
SEPTEMBER 2020
This policy proposal is a proposal from the author(s). As emphasized in The Hamilton Project’s original
strategy paper, the Project was designed in part to provide a forum for leading thinkers across the nation to
put forward innovative and potentially important economic policy ideas that share the Project’s broad goals
of promoting economic growth, broad-based participation in growth, and economic security. The author(s)
are invited to express their own ideas in policy papers, whether or not the Project’s staff or advisory council
agrees with the specific proposals. This policy paper is offered in that spirit.
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 1
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic poses an existential threat to small businesses, with more than 400,000 lost since the crisis began.
Many small businesses are financially fragile and not equipped to weather a prolonged period of substantially reduced revenues.
Further widespread business failures would destroy jobs and firm-specific capital, and hamstring the recovery. The main existing
source of support, the Paycheck Protection Program, has had mixed success, and is not well suited to what now looks to be a
prolonged contraction. In its place, we should significantly expand the Employee Retention Credit to help cover small businesses’
payroll costs, and introduce a new Small Business Survival Credit to help cover small businesses’ fixed costs. Looking to the
future, we should significantly invest in the capabilities of the IRS so it may better support small businesses in future crises.
2 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT 2
INTRODUCTION 4
BACKGROUND 6
THE CHALLENGE 8
THE PROPOSAL 16
QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS 22
CONCLUSION 23
AUTHOR AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 24
ENDNOTES 25
REFERENCES 26
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 3
Introduction
W
ith so much tragedy to absorb over the past six their capital preserved. When small businesses fail, they tend
months, it has been easy to overlook an emerging to dissolve.
crisis. While our attention has rightly been
occupied by the mounting death toll and record unemployment A large volume of simultaneous business failures constitutes
rate, millions of America’s small business owners have been a systemic risk. The load would swamp bankruptcy processes,
facing the greatest threat to their survival in living memory. and add to an already over-burdened unemployment
But they are not in a silo. These businesses employ almost half insurance (UI) system. And the businesses themselves
of all Americans. Their fate will affect how well our economy represent tremendous value that would be lost. Much of their
bounces back when the pandemic subsides. capital is intangible, and thus nontransferable. The firm-
specific human capital, the matches between businesses and
The impact so far has been catastrophic. During the first two their workers, suppliers, and customers—all would be lost.
months of the crisis, from mid-March to mid-May 2020, more Ending a business is far easier than starting one—a loss of
than 40 percent of all small businesses were closed. These businesses on a large scale would have a scarring effect that
closures caused revenues to plummet, down 40 percent on would slow the recovery.
average. In leisure and hospitality revenues were down more
than 70 percent. Businesses drew on what little cash they had And this is among otherwise-viable businesses that, with
to stay afloat. But by June, just three months into the crisis, the support of insurance and adequate capital, would have
more than 400,000 small businesses had already permanently been spared from such a fate. We should of course be wary
closed—more than typically close in an entire year. of propping up otherwise-unviable businesses. The revenue
required to support small businesses is not free—it comes at
This recession is highly unusual. The scale and speed of the some cost to our future prosperity. And the longer the period
contraction are, of course, unprecedented. But more critical of depressed activity goes on, the less generous the level of
is the unevenness of its effects. Some businesses were forced support should be. All of these considerations suggest some
to close, or lost customers who chose to stay home. Some were restraint.
spared from the immediate effects, while others experienced
a surge in demand. The support provided to date has had mixed success. In late
March 2020 Congress and the White House authorized the
In an ordinary recession, the textbook approach is to pump $350 billion Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). By any
consumers’ wallets full of cash and rely on the economy’s normal standard, that is a lot of money. But it was insufficient
plumbing to get it to the businesses and workers in need. to cover the demand for the program, and an additional
But the pandemic has shut down much of that plumbing. No $310 billion had to be authorized just a few weeks later. And
amount of household stimulus is going to open a bar that local in total, that paid for a program that gave too much to those
authorities shut down, get its bartenders back to work, or pay that did not need it, and not enough to those that did.
its rent. And as those businesses and workers lose income,
the contraction spills over onto the businesses and workers As problematic as the PPP and its rollout were, it succeeded
spared from the first-round effects. in undergirding many small businesses. It replenished cash
reserves. It brought confidence. Early estimates indicate it
It is possible to arrest this downward spiral, but doing so saved at least 2.3 million jobs for several months, with the
requires fiscal support of the small businesses affected. The final number likely to be far higher. But it was a program
case for acting is clear. This was an uninsurable risk for designed in a more optimistic time—back when we thought
small businesses with effects that are highly uneven. Many we could freeze every small business in America to buy time
small businesses lack the access to credit that would help to suppress the virus, and then thaw them all out again as we
them bridge the crisis. When large businesses fail, they tend resumed normal life.
to proceed through an orderly reorganization with much of
4 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
But that is not what happened. Instead, it looks as though we By comparison, the PPP covered 100 percent of all wages
will be living with the virus for some time. Small business up to the equivalent of $25,000 per quarter, with additional
revenues have plateaued substantially below precrisis levels. support for non-payroll costs. But that support lasted only
Many businesses are operating at much-reduced capacity, two months and was granted to almost three-quarters of
while facing higher costs in adapting to life with the virus. all businesses. The support proposed here would be less
The single-most-effective measure to help small businesses generous, as demanded by a longer period of subdued activity,
remains suppressing the virus. There is broad agreement and it would apply to only the worst-affected businesses. But
among public health experts on how to do that. Every other it would last almost four times longer, it would be easier to
advanced country suppressed the virus at some point—we administer, and it would draw in and drop off businesses as
can too, if we choose. local conditions change.
Another critical measure to support small businesses is Many of the problems with the PPP arose from funneling
further broad stimulus. As the crisis has spread from the the money through private banks. This is another respect
directly affected businesses to the broader economy, broad in which the United States is an international outlier. In
stimulus measures gain potency. Generous supplementary UI other countries, wage supports for small businesses were
support, significant funding for state and local governments, administered by their tax authorities. In the United States,
and household cash stimulus all would boost demand, we relied on private banks because we wanted to provide
providing indirect support to many of the small businesses immediate liquidity during a crisis. There is no good reason
still operating. why we should not be able to rely on the IRS to fill that role in
future crises: it is the largest financial institution in the world
As for direct support, the optimal policy today is very and carries out trillions of dollars in transactions each year
different from what it was in mid-March. It is feasible to fully with hundreds of millions of counterparties.
cover businesses’ revenue shortfalls for the duration of a short
lockdown. But doing so for a year or more until we roll out a The IRS has been starved of funding for decades, diminishing
vaccine would be imprudent. The longer the support must last, even its core functions. It lacks the systems necessary to
the less generous it must be. Unfortunately, this will mean not implement a program like the PPP on short notice. Tax
every otherwise-viable business will be saved. But with more authorities in many other countries have such systems. This
tightly targeted support, the businesses that remain will have is yet another example of America’s moribund state capacity
a fighting chance. being laid bare by the crisis. To better prepare for future
crises—indeed, to help the IRS perform its core functions even
Accordingly, the PPP should not be extended. In its place, the in normal times—we should provide significant, sustained
Employee Retention Credit (ERC), a refundable credit against additional funding to the IRS. In particular, this should
the employer’s payroll tax obligations, should be significantly include funding for a real-time electronic payroll reporting
expanded. The credit would apply for three quarters starting system covering every American business and worker.
October 1, 2020. Any small business that has experienced a
30 percent year-on-year decline in revenues in a given quarter The first round of stimulus was an act of uncharacteristic
would be eligible. The credit would cover 80 percent of all bipartisanship, and one that was remarkably effective in
wages up to $15,000 per employee per quarter. In addition, helping to safeguard the livelihoods of millions of Americans.
eligible businesses would receive a Small Business Survival Now that those initial measures have run their course, it is
Credit (SBSC), which would provide $5,000 per employee up past time for us to act again. Both the House and the Senate
to a maximum of $50,000 per business per quarter to cover have passed bills that contain commendable elements. There
non-payroll expenses such as rent, interest, utilities, and is much common ground on small business support in
COVID-19 mitigation costs. particular. This proposal improves on those plans, exhibiting
good qualities of both—generous support for payroll and
adaptation costs, and strong hiring incentives—while adding
the support for non-payroll costs that many businesses have
called for.
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 5
Background: Before the Crisis, Small Businesses Were
Financially Fragile
T
here are around 6 million small business employers in large and sustained hit to their profitability. Small businesses
America, together responsible for more than 60 million lack the access to capital markets of large businesses, and
jobs (US Census Bureau 2020a).1 These small businesses are much more likely than larger businesses to be dissolved
make up more than 99 percent of all businesses, but account for instead of reorganized under bankruptcy.
47 percent of employment due to their smaller size. This policy
proposal does not consider the tens of millions of nonemployer Even in normal times, many small businesses face perilous
small businesses such as the self-employed. They are best served conditions. While on net there is typically small business
by expanded UI, which this proposal recommends extending. creation, this masks substantial turnover. Around a third of
small businesses in US cities are unprofitable at any given
Contrary to some commentary, the sectors most exposed time (Farrell, Wheat, and Grandet 2019), and around a third
to COVID-19 are not served disproportionately by small do not survive beyond the first four years (Farrell, Wheat, and
businesses.2 If anything, the opposite is true. While the Mac 2018).
overwhelming majority of businesses in the affected sectors
are indeed small businesses, that is also true for the economy Many small businesses have only limited access to credit and
generally. Among big businesses, 63 percent serve the very little cash on hand to finance unexpected losses. Around
directly affected sectors, while among small businesses, only half of small businesses in US cities have two weeks or less of
46 percent do. cash on hand (Farrell, Wheat, and Grandet 2019). This differs
considerably by the race of the business owner, with White-
The special focus on small businesses is not because they owned businesses having 19 days of cash on hand on average,
are more exposed to COVID-19, but rather because they are compared to just 12 days for Black-owned businesses (Farrell,
much more financially fragile and therefore vulnerable to a Wheat and Mac 2020).
FIGURE 1.
Total Number of Small Businesses, 1988–2017
7
6
5
Count (in millions)
4
3
2
1
0
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2020e.
Note: Shading corresponds to periods of disrupted business growth coinciding with recessions.
6 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
Fifty-six percent of all small businesses have relied on funds In 2017 Hurricanes Harvey and Irma hit Houston and Miami.
from their personal savings, friends, or family to support The storms caused reductions in cash inflows of 63 percent
operations in the past five years, and 47 percent say they and 82 percent for at least half of all small businesses, but most
would rely on personal funds if they needed to fill a two- recovered within one to two weeks (Farrell and Wheat 2018).
month gap in revenues (Federal Reserve System 2020). These cash shortfalls were substantially, but not completely,
Eighty-eight percent of small business owners rely on their offset by reductions in cash outflows of 54 percent and
personal credit score to secure financing, and only 44 percent 62 percent, with cash balances on net falling by 7.5 percent
of small businesses have obtained funds from a bank in the and 7.4 percent at the height of the disaster.
past five years.
Though severe, the temporary nature of these disasters meant
In an economic crisis this fragility has economic cash flows for most small businesses returned to normal
consequences. During the Great Recession there was a net within one to two weeks. And because the reduction in cash
loss of 6 percent (around 375,000) of all small businesses outflows lasted around a week longer than the reduction in
(see figure 1) (US Census Bureau 2020e). At the same time, inflows, most businesses exited the crisis with more cash on
financial constraints are responsible for having reduced hand than they entered it with.
employment growth among small businesses by 4 to 8
percentage points relative to large businesses (Siemer 2019). One lesson from those hurricanes is that many businesses
can sustain a very large reduction in revenues provided it is
The sharpness and scale of the COVID-19 crisis makes it short-lived. The flexibility that firms have in cutting variable
difficult to draw lessons from past experience about how small costs can shield them substantially from revenue shortfalls,
businesses might weather this crisis. However, the resilience and modest net losses can be weathered by drawing on
of small businesses during natural disasters provides at cash reserves if the disruption lasts only a matter of weeks.
least some context for their ability to withstand a sharp and The initial impact of the COVID-19 crisis on small business
systemic but temporary shock to revenues. revenues is similar in magnitude to that of a natural disaster.
But rather than bouncing back in one to two weeks, revenues
were well down for at least three months and even now
remain substantially below their pre-crisis levels on average
(see figure 2).
FIGURE 2.
Change in Small Business Revenue for Selected Industries, January–July
Lockdowns CARES Act PPP round 1 PPP exhausted PPP round 2
30
15
Percent change in revenue
0 Retail and
transportation
-15 Total
Education and
-30 health
Leisure and
-45 hospitality
-60
-75
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Source: Womply 2020.
Note: Percent changes in revenue are indexed to January 10 revenue.
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 7
The Challenge: COVID-19 Is an Existential Threat to
Many Small Businesses
O
ver the six months since the crisis began, a remarkable nonemployer businesses, the number of active business
volume of real-time data on the state of small owners had fallen 22 percent by April, the largest drop on
businesses in America has emerged. The US Census record (Fairlie 2020). The fall was most extreme among Black
Bureau has produced a new weekly survey gauging the business owners, down 41 percent, because the industries in
experiences of more than 20,000 small businesses, as well as a which those business owners were more likely to operate were
number of other high-frequency data sets. Several academics those hit the hardest by the pandemic.
have rolled out surveys gauging small business experiences,
and a range of financial technology firms with access to small Although the closures were more prevalent in the areas hit
business data have made these available to researchers. Many worse by the virus, no region was spared (see figure 3). In late
of these data overlap; some cover certain time periods and March 54 percent of small businesses were closed in the Mid-
not others. Once collated, a coherent story emerges about the Atlantic region (the most affected area), but 39 percent were
experience of small businesses during the COVID-19 crisis. closed even in the Mountain region (the least-affected area)
(Bartik, Bertrand, Cullen, Glaeser, Luca, and Stanton 2020).
On March 16, 2020, the day before the first lockdowns began, This was still the case for both regions a month later (US
11 percent of small businesses had already closed (Waldman Census Bureau 2020d).
2020). The following day, closures rose to 20 percent. By
late March, more than 40 percent of small businesses were These widespread closures led to widespread revenue losses.
closed (Bartik, Bertrand, Cullen, Glaeser, Luca, and Stanton At the end of March small business revenues were already
2020). A month later, small business closures remained down more than 40 percent (see figure 2) (Womply 2020).
above 40 percent (US Census Bureau 2020d). Including The drop was most extreme in the leisure and hospitality
FIGURE 3A. FIGURE 3B.
Share of Small Businesses Experiencing Share of Small Businesses Experiencing
a Temporary Closure Last Week by State, a Temporary Closure Last Week by State,
May 2 June 27
Share of small businesses experiencing temporary closures (percent) Share of small businesses experiencing temporary closures (percent)
10 to 25 25 to 35 35 to 50 50 to 75 Less than 10 10 to 25 25 to 35 35 to 50
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2020d. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2020d.
8 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
industries, where revenues were down almost 70 percent. At social distancing (both government-enforced and voluntary)
the end of April, around six weeks after the lockdowns began, on economic activity in certain sectors cannot be offset by
74 percent of small businesses reported revenues were down fiscal stimulus—that activity is impossible. Some sectors are
(US Census Bureau 2020d), and by more than 30 percent on not affected directly, while others in fact have experienced a
average (Wompley 2020). In hospitality and leisure, revenues surge in demand, causing shortages and price rises, and an
were still down by almost 60 percent. increase in employment.
These revenue losses substantially depleted cash reserves But for those firms initially spared from the demand
through April. In late March, around a fortnight after the first contraction, the reprieve is short-lived. As the directly
lockdowns began, 25 percent of small businesses reported affected workers and business owners lose income, they
having insufficient cash on hand to cover more than a month reduce spending on goods and services across the whole
of expenses, while 53 percent had only between one and two economy, including in sectors not directly affected. Workers
months’ worth of cash on hand (Bartik, Bertrand, Cullen, are then shed in those sectors, too, and on the vicious circle
Glaeser, Luca, and Stanton 2020). A month later, 41 percent goes (Guerrieri et al. 2020). Just as the virus is passed from
of firms had less than a month’s of cash on hand, and only person to person, so too the economic contagion spreads
29 percent had between one and two months’ of cash on hand from sector to sector. In the end, none is spared.
(US Census Bureau 2020d).
Because the contractions in demand are unevenly spread
The closures also resulted in widespread layoffs. Between across the economy, conventional broad cash stimulus will
March 28 and April 20, 65 percent of small businesses laid off find its way back to some businesses and workers but not
at least one worker (Humphries et al. 2020b). In mid-April, to others. The clogged plumbing limits the ability of cash
on net, small business employment was down by around stimulus to arrest the downward spiral. Unlike in a normal
60 percent (Homebase 2020). At the end of April, 28 percent recession, the only way to help directly affected businesses
of small businesses were continuing to lay off workers (US and their employees is with direct support.
Census Bureau 2020d), with small business employment still
down by more than 50 percent on net (Homebase 2020). Another unusual feature of this crisis is the very sharp but
temporary nature of the economic contraction. The first phase
Based on all of these data, it is clear the COVID-19 crisis poses of full-scale lockdowns lasted less than three months. There
the greatest existential threat to American small businesses in have been renewed restrictions in some cities, but these too
memory. As of August, more than 18 percent of all U.S. small will lift eventually. Given the temporary nature of the crisis,
businesses—and more than 27 percent of those in leisure and there is no clear reason why after the crisis much of the supply
hospitality—remained closed. The critical question for the side of the economy could not in principle return to its pre-
medium-term prospects for the US economy and the path of crisis state. Many businesses that were viable before should be
further fiscal responses is just how many will remain closed viable after.
forever.
If private insurance to cover such a significant reduction in
GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUPPORT SMALL revenue were available, business owners would have been
BUSINESSES WHERE MARKETS CANNOT able to purchase such insurance, allowing them to bridge
In an ordinary recession, broad cash stimulus can be the crisis. Insurance coverage would have subsidized those
businesses unlucky enough to have been adversely affected
dispatched to arrest the vicious circle of falling demand
by a once-in-a-century pandemic, the effects of which were
causing layoffs causing falling demand, and so on. If the
difficult to anticipate. In that case, significant government
economy’s plumbing is functional, that cash can flow to
support would be less defensible. However, no such insurance
where it is needed through the ordinary course of trade and
was available.3 This lack of coverage prevents pandemic risk
commerce. The effectiveness of broad cash stimulus was
from being disbursed throughout the economy. Many of these
a valuable lesson coming out of the Great Recession. In a
same issues arise in insuring against natural disasters, but
standard recession, the justification for direct government
the pandemic is like a natural disaster occurring across the
support for businesses is lessened by the fact that cash
country for months on end.
stimulus serves to support businesses and their employees
indirectly. Government-funded loans would help some firms, in
particular those suffering as a result of limited access to
The COVID-19 crisis has produced a very different kind
credit, but for many they would not be enough. Millions of
of recession. In this environment, the standard suites of
small businesses have taken a significant hit to their net
economic analysis and policy tools have been found wanting
worth, which will render many unviable. These businesses
(Hamilton and Veuger 2020a). Critically, the pandemic has
will rightly deem the resultant debt too great a burden to
clogged the economy’s plumbing. The first-round effects of
carry forward.
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 9
If these were large businesses, the equity holders would be The most prominent form of business support was the PPP,
dissolved, with the remaining assets reorganized under new a subsidized small business loan program. The PPP was a
ownership. Many smaller firms, on the other hand, would bipartisan initiative to give small businesses relief through the
simply disappear. They might otherwise have grown into crisis in exchange for retaining their workers and maintaining
larger businesses, spurred innovation, and contributed to payroll. The program launched on April 3 with $349 billion in
job and productivity growth (Decker et al. 2014). The lack of initial funding.
private insurance to cover these losses calls for the provision
of social insurance that at least partly disperses them across The PPP was implemented by the Small Business
the economy and over time. Administration (SBA). It applied to small businesses with 500
or fewer employees, sole proprietors, independent contractors,
Without a subsidy, the destruction of capital resulting from self-employed persons, nonprofits, veterans’ organizations,
an economic contraction of this size and duration would and tribal businesses that had been in operation on February
be unprecedented. Much of this capital is firm-specific and 15.4 Businesses for which an owner was on probation or
thus nontransferable. The matches between firms and their parole, had been convicted of a felony within the past five
customers, suppliers, and employees would be dissolved. years, or was an undocumented alien were ineligible.5 To
Many unique products would vanish. Much of the learning- be eligible, an applicant had to certify “that the uncertainty
by-doing that is specific to each business would disappear. If of current economic conditions makes necessary the loan
we believe the value of all of this capital at stake exceeds the request to support the ongoing operations of the eligible
economic cost of the taxes and subsidies necessary to save it, recipient” (CARES Act 2020).
then we should provide the necessary fiscal support.
Under the program, the SBA guaranteed loans made by
If provided in a way that encourages businesses to retain their banks and other financial institutions to eligible recipients.
workers (Bishop and Bartik 2009), business support can have The loan amount was limited to two and a half months of
strong macroeconomic benefits too. Discouraging directly the recipient’s average prior-year payroll costs (excluding any
affected businesses from shedding workers, and encouraging annual per employee compensation in excess of $100,000),
them to maintain wages, would help arrest the downward capped at $10 million.6 The loans had a term of five years
spiral that would precipitate a very deep and long recession. and an interest rate of 1 percent.7 Applicants did not have to
Those workers would also take pressure off the UI system. In provide collateral, and the loans were non-recourse.
preserving the productive capacity of the economy, it would
ensure a speedier transition to a steeper long-run growth The key feature of the PPP was that, under certain conditions,
trajectory. The businesses lost during the Great Recession, for the loans would be forgiven entirely.8 The recipient had to
example, left a persistent dent in employment (Sedláček 2020). spend at least 60 percent of the loans on payroll costs,9 and the
remainder on only interest, rent, and utilities, all over a 24-
There will no doubt be some permanent changes in demand week period.10 The proportion of the loans forgiven was equal
that will necessitate permanent changes in supply. Some to the number of full-time equivalent employees on payroll
businesses that were unviable before the crisis will be pushed during the 24 weeks after the loan proceeds were disbursed
over the edge. Such Schumpeterian creative destruction is as a proportion of those on payroll in 2019. If a business
one of the few silver linings of a recession. The nature of the maintained full-time equivalent hours, 100 percent of the
crisis today means fiscal policy will not be able to save every loan amount was forgivable. Allowances in forgiveness were
small business from failure. In March it was reasonable to given if a business faced difficulty rehiring or hiring. Any
believe that most firms could be saved by very generous but salary reductions in excess of 25 percent were deducted from
sharply temporary support, formulated on an expectation of the forgiven amount.
an effective public health response. But with the virus still
spreading six months later, we must be realistic. The length The initial funding allocation of $349 billion was widely
of the crisis suggests some restraint in support for the affected understood to be inadequate to meet the needs of the program.
businesses. Two and a half months of payroll for all of America’s small
businesses totals more than $500 billion (US Census Burear
THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM 2020a), and the program also applied to a range of larger
businesses in certain industries.
In mid-March, in light of the impending calamity, Congress
and the White House formulated the $2.2 trillion Coronavirus On April 16, less than two weeks after the program
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, which commenced, the initial funding allocation was exhausted. In
provided three planks of fiscal support: broad cash stimulus response, on April 24 an additional $310 billion in funding
to households, expanded UI, and direct support to businesses. was added, which became available to applicants from April
The CARES Act was signed into law on March 27, roughly 27. The program was amended again on June 5 in response to
two weeks after the first lockdowns began. criticisms of the loans’ lack of flexibility.
10 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DESIGN OF THE PAYCHECK money on very short notice to millions of businesses on the
PROTECTION PROGRAM basis of certain criteria. Operating via the banks avoided the
The COVID-19 economic crisis has a single source: a liquidity shortfall that would have resulted from any delay.
temporary fall in business revenues caused by a contraction THE TROUBLED ROLLOUT OF THE PAYCHECK
in demand, due initially to government-imposed lockdowns PROTECTION PROGRAM
and voluntary social distancing. The impact varies widely
across affected businesses. And the affected businesses have The initial rollout of the PPP was plagued with problems
a variety of cost structures. The problem is that revenues are (Morrell et al. 2020). The SBA, which in 2019 facilitated just
too low, not that payroll costs are too high. Because of this, $28 billion in loans, was asked to expand more than tenfold
a subsidy equal to payroll inevitably oversubsidizes some in a matter of weeks. JPMorgan Chase, the largest US bank,
businesses and under-subsidizes others. An alternative option initially indicated it would delay its launch because it had
would have been to cover revenue losses directly (Hamilton not received the necessary guidance from the Treasury
and Veuger 2020b). Department. Bank of America, the second-largest US bank,
initially said it would provide PPP loans only to its existing
Nevertheless, many countries, including Australia, the customers. Other big lenders such as Wells Fargo, Citigroup,
Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the and PNC delayed their launches.
United States, tied business support to payroll. That is not
ideal, but it still has the potential to help many businesses, Despite these initial hiccups, over the 13 days following the
and to do so in a way that encourages them to maintain links April 3 launch the SBA processed 1.7 million loans via 4,975
to their workers. It preserves the stock of businesses and lenders (SBA 2020a). The average loan amount was $206,000,
worker–firm matches, which in turn preserves the productive and 74 percent of the loans were for $150,000 or less. However,
capacity of the economy during the recovery phase. It also businesses in the leisure and hospitality industries (i.e.,
provides indirect support to millions of workers, which would accommodation and food services), seemingly the industries
spare them from an already overburdened UI system. most adversely affected by the crisis, received 9 percent of all
loans, while 13 percent went to businesses in construction;
A drawback of tying the subsidy to payroll is that the support 13 percent to professional, scientific, and technical services;
will inevitably be insufficient to keep some businesses afloat. and 12 percent to manufacturing.
Many businesses were operating at reduced capacity so they
did not need to maintain payroll, but their ability to use the Moreover, the entire $349 billion initial funding allocation
loans to defray other costs was limited. Some businesses was exhausted in less than two weeks. Predictably, it proved
could scale back to reduce their variable costs, but still faced wildly inadequate, leaving more than 2 million small
large, unavoidable fixed costs like rent. For businesses with businesses hanging (US Census Bureau 2020d). And the
minimal staff, high fixed costs, and low margins, the program access to first-round funding was strongly related to size (see
would have been of limited use. figures 4a and 4b). As the first round was exhausted, almost
three-quarters of the businesses with more than 100 workers
Another drawback is an almost complete lack of targeting. that would eventually receive funding had received it. By
While businesses had to declare in good faith that they contrast, fewer than a quarter of those with four or fewer
required the support to maintain operations, this was a vague workers had received funding, and fewer than half of those
declaration and difficult to enforce. As a result, the PPP is with between five and twenty workers had received funding.
likely to have made some recipients more profitable during Overall, when the first-round funding ran out, 75 percent
the crisis than before it. To the extent those businesses might of small businesses had requested PPP funding, and only
otherwise have laid off workers, the program will still have 38 percent had received it.
served a purpose. However, the lack of targeting would have
been straightforward to address with an eligibility threshold At least in the first round, funds did not flow on the basis
tied to public health orders or revenue losses. of need. Among those worst affected, the proportion of
applicants denied or still waiting for approval was more
The United States is the only country in the world to than double that among those unaffected (Bartik, Bertrand,
implement a payroll subsidy via banks and financial Cullen, Glaeser, Luca, Stanton, and Sunderam 2020).
institutions. In other countries support has been provided Businesses with more cash on hand were more likely to be
via the tax system. In Australia, for example, businesses approved. And areas that experienced greater declines in
experiencing revenue declines of more than 30 percent hours worked and more business closures in fact received
receive a per employee subsidy of around $500 per week for fewer PPP loans (Granja et al. 2020).
six months (Hamilton 2020). The program relied on banks
because the IRS is not capable of paying out large amounts of
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 11
FIGURE 4A. FIGURE 4B.
Total Number of Approved PPP Loans and Total Distribution of Approved PPP Loans, by
Number of Small Businesses, by Firm Size Employment and Approval Date
PPP round 1 PPP round 2
PPP round 1
3,000
exhausted
2,500
100
Number of firms (in thousands)
Cumulative share of loans (percent)
2,000
PPP round 2
PPP round 1 75
1,500
Total firms
1-4 employees
5-19 employees
50
1,000 20-99 employees
100-500 employees
500 25
0 0
1−4 5−9 10−19 20−49 50−99 100−249 250−500
Apr May Jun Jul
Employees per Firm
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury 2020.
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury 2020; U.S. Census Bureau 2020a.
Note: Firm size for the PPP loans is based on how many employees an
Note: Firm size for the PPP loans is based on how many employees an applicant indicated it
applicant indicated it would retain under the program.
would retain under the program.
With the first round of funding so limited, frictions were Having exhausted the first round of funding on April 16, the
critical to the rationing process. As intermediaries, the banks second round became available on April 27. In its first week,
played the role of gatekeeper. The intensity of PPP lending loans were disbursed to more than a million small businesses
varied widely among banks. If a business was lucky enough (US Census Bureau 2020d). Funding continued to roll out
to be located near a bank processing a high volume of PPP rapidly over the following two weeks. The second round
loans relative to other kinds of loans, it was much more likely went to much smaller businesses, with an average loan size
to obtain a loan (Granja et al. 2020). Having a preexisting of $112,000, around half that in round 1 (see figure 4) (SBA
loan with a bank raised the probability of being approved 2020b). To date, 72 percent of small businesses—or around
by 4.4 percent (Bartik, Cullen, Glaeser, Luca, Stanton, and 4.5 million businesses—have received a total of $512 billion
Sunderam 2020). in funding under the PPP. Less than 3 percent of small
businesses that applied were not approved. In the end, around
Firm size was also an important factor. On March 28, the $130 billion in funds remained unallocated.
day after the CARES Act was passed, businesses with nine
or fewer employees were much less likely to know about the There was some controversy about large public companies
PPP than those with 10–50 employees (Humphries, Neilson, receiving funding. Under public pressure, Shake Shack
and Ulyssea 2020a). By April 5, two days after applications returned the $10 million it had received under the program.
opened, awareness among businesses with five to nine and Following the public discontent, the Treasury Department
a half employees had rapidly increased. Among businesses released guidance advising that public companies receiving
with four or fewer employees, awareness had increased only funding under the PPP were likely to have violated their good
modestly, remaining below 80 percent through April 16 when faith declaration of need and would be penalized if found to
first-round funding was exhausted. Smaller businesses were have improperly accessed the program. In reality, only 424
then much less likely to apply for the PPP, they applied later, public firms accessed the PPP across both rounds, receiving
they waited longer to be approved, and they were less likely to a total of $1.4 billion in funding through July 15 (Cororaton
be approved. and Rosen 2020). Despite the public outrage, this constituted
just 0.2 percent of funds disbursed.
Some small businesses simply were not interested in the
PPP. Twenty-eight percent indicated they would not accept THE EFFICACY OF THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION
a PPP loan if it were offered to them, despite the generous PROGRAM
terms (Bartik, Bertrand, Cullen, Glaeser, Luca, and Stanton It is still too early to comprehensively assess how many
2020). Thirty-five percent of those who would refuse a loan businesses and jobs were saved by the PPP. But the evidence
said they did not need the cash, 30 percent said they did not to date is positive. On being told about the PPP ahead of
think they would qualify, 19 percent said they did not trust its rollout, small businesses responded that they would lay
the government to forgive the debt, and 11 percent thought it off only 6 percent of their employees by December rather
would be too much hassle.
12 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
than 40 percent without the PPP (Bartik, Bertrand, Cullen, first round of funding to $349 billion withheld funding from
Glaeser, Luca, and Stanton 2020). Learning of the PPP also around 2 million of the smallest businesses for weeks. By the
led them to increase their expected probability of being time the funding arrived, the initial lockdowns had been
open in December from 62 percent to 85 percent. In a survey going for six weeks. Small businesses’ limited cash holdings
conducted after the first round of funding but before the and access to credit is well documented. Many will not have
second, receiving funding increased a business’ self-reported been able to bridge that gap.
probability of survival by 14–30 percentage points (Bartik,
Cullen, Glaeser, Luca, Stanton, and Sunderam 2020). Moreover, while the PPP replenished small business cash
holdings drawn down during the lockdowns, the support
Only a few studies to date have considered the effect of the was temporary. The program was reformed to allow firms
PPP on actual outcomes. The most compelling study, relying more flexibility in using the loans, and that is welcome. In
on high-quality, representative ADP payroll data covering particular, the SBA will be more lenient in forgiving loans
26 million workers, finds that the PPP saved 2.3 million where small businesses have faced difficulty in rehiring
jobs through the first week of June (Autor et al. 2020).11 This workers. And the previous Treasury guideline requiring firms
implies a fiscal cost of $224,000 per job directly supported for to spend at least 75 percent of the money on payroll has been
those months. Because the true number of jobs saved is likely loosened to 60 percent. Businesses are now allowed to spread
to be much higher, the true fiscal cost is likely much lower.12 their loans over a much longer period.
There is clear evidence that the rollout of the second funding But, ultimately, the subsidy each business received was
round substantially improved the cash holdings of small limited. As the PPP was being designed, many policymakers
businesses. Through the first three weeks of May, as second- did not expect the lockdowns to last as long as they did and
round funding was being disbursed, an additional 31 percent public health capacity was expected to be built so the virus
of small businesses received funding (see figure 5) (US Census could be suppressed as the lockdowns lifted. This was the
Bureau 2020d). Over those same three weeks, an additional experience in many countries hard-hit by the virus, including
16 percent of small businesses had more than a month’s Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In the United States,
worth of cash on hand. Four percent fewer firms had no cash the lockdowns went on for longer than many expected and
on hand, while 11 percent fewer had less than two weeks of the environment businesses have returned to is far worse than
cash. Meanwhile, 6 percent fewer businesses reported missing many expected. As the lockdowns have lifted, there have been
a loan payment and 7 percent fewer reported missing other renewed outbreaks across large swathes of the country. While
payments. the PPP will have helped many businesses get by at the height
of the initial lockdowns, the support it provided will not have
During the rollout of the second round, the self-reported been nearly enough nor for long enough.
outlook of small businesses was deteriorating substantially.
As the rollout completed, the outlook stabilized. Limiting the
FIGURE 5B.
FIGURE 5A.
Distribution of Small Businesses’ Distribution of Small Businesses’ Expectations
Description of Their Current Cash Regarding When Their Business Will Return
Holdings, May–September to Normal, May–September
100 100
None Never
Under 2 weeks
75 75
Percent of respondents Percent of respondents
3-4 weeks
More than 6 months
50 50
Over 1 month
25 25
2-6 months
1 month or less
0 0
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2020d. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2020d.
Note: These are responses from small business owners to the question, “How would you Note: These are responses from small business owners to the question, “In your opin-
describe the current availability of cash on hand, including any financial assistance or loans?” ion, how much time do you think will pass before this business returns to its normal?”
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 13
OTHER SMALL BUSINESS MEASURES Businesses also received a payroll tax deferral. The employer’s
While the PPP was by far the highest profile support for share of Social Security tax contributions (6.2 percent of
small businesses, a range of other programs were available. A wages up to $137,700 per year) on wages paid during March
little-known alternative to the PPP was the ERC, which was 27–December 31 could be deferred, with half to be paid by
unavailable to small businesses that opted for the PPP. The December 31, 2020, and the other half by December 31, 2021.
ERC is a refundable tax credit equal to 50 percent of qualified This is effectively over $140 billion of interest-free loans of
wages up to $10,000 per employee paid between March 12 and $22,000 per business on average, or $2,200 per employee.
the end of the calendar year. To be eligible, a business must The Federal Reserve has taken a range of actions to support
either have been ordered to shut down or have experienced at small business liquidity during the crisis. It introduced the
least a 50 percent decline in revenues. PPP Liquidity Facility extending credit to eligible financial
To receive funds immediately, firms could draw on their institutions originating PPP loans, taking the loans as
federal tax withholdings. Where these were insufficient to collateral at face value. As of August 5, 2020, the Federal
fund the eligible credit, employers could apply to the IRS for Reserve held around $70 billion of these loans on its balance
an advance. This program applied to businesses of all sizes, sheet (Federal Reserve Board 2020).
but firms with more than 100 employees received the ERC The Federal Reserve also introduced the Main Street Lending
only against the wages of workers not currently working. Program, which provided five-year loans to small and mid-
Those with 100 or fewer employees were allowed to receive the sized businesses with up to 15,000 employees.13 Interest is
ERC also for those still working. deferred for a year and repayment of the principal is deferred
The ERC provided a maximum of $5,000 per employee for two years. The interest rate is around 3.2 percent.14
versus a maximum of $20,833 per employee under the PPP. Loans may be between $250,000 and $300 million.15 Banks
This modesty will have limited its impact on employment retain 5 percent of the value of the loans, selling the rest to
and firm viability. But some small businesses may have the Federal Reserve, which has agreed to purchase up to
preferred the simplicity and speed of delivery of the ERC $600 billion of the loans. Under the CARES Act, the Treasury
relative to the PPP, particularly those without an established Department provided $75 billion in equity to cover potential
banking relationship, and the ERC is not subject to some of losses. As of August 5, 2020, the Federal Reserve held only
the eligibility criteria that might have excluded some small around $38 billion of these loans on its balance sheet (Federal
businesses from the PPP. There is not yet any available Reserve Board 2020), and only 0.2 percent of small businesses
evidence on the efficacy of the ERC. But to date fewer than report having received a loan under the program (US Census
0.4 percent of small businesses have received assistance under Bureau 2020d).
the program (US Census Bureau 2020d). DESPITE SUPPORT, SMALL BUSINESSES HAVE BEEN
The Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program, DECIMATED, AND THE OUTLOOK IS BLEAK
administered by the SBA, is typically used to provide liquidity By the end of March, a fortnight or so after the first lockdowns
to small businesses affected by natural disasters. Following the began and right after the CARES Act was passed, 1.8 percent
president’s COVID-19 emergency declaration on March 13, of small businesses had already permanently closed due to
EIDLs were extended to small businesses adversely affected COVID-19 (Bartik, Bertrand, Cullen, Glaeser, Luca, and
by the pandemic. The loans may be used by small businesses Stanton 2020). By June 15 that had risen to 6.8 percent, and by
to pay fixed debts, payroll, accounts payable, and other bills July 10 to 7.1 percent, or more than 420,000 small businesses.16
they cannot pay because of the disaster. The interest rate is If these businesses are representative of national employment,
3.75 percent with available terms up to 30 years. To date, this means we have lost at least 4 million jobs that will only
22 percent of small businesses have received an EIDL (US return with the creation of new businesses. The situation is
Census Bureau 2020d), suggesting this has been an important particularly bleak in certain industries. As of July 10, more
source of liquidity for small businesses during the crisis. than 57,000 restaurants (more than 13 percent of restaurants
nationally), employing roughly 1.4 million workers, had
The CARES Act also set aside $10 billion to fund an already permanently closed. Another 42,000 restaurants
immediate $10,000 advance to small businesses applying for remained at least temporarily closed.
an EIDL, which they would not have to repay. The advance
would be received within three days of applying for an EIDL, In normal times, there is typically significant turnover among
and the EIDL would not have to be approved in order for the small businesses. From 2012 to 2014, after firm destruction
advance to be paid. The amount of the advance would then during the Great Recession had stabilized, around 380,000
be deducted from any loan amount approved under the small businesses closed each year (US Census Bureau 2020c).
program. This is consistent with the long-run average going back
14 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
decades (see figure 6). Over that same period, more than At the end of March, a fortnight after the lockdowns began and
400,000 new small businesses were created each year, with the right after the CARES Act was passed, many small businesses
stock of small businesses growing by about 25,000 per year reported what has turned out to be optimism about the path
on net. of the crisis. Twenty percent of small businesses expected
the crisis to be over by the end of May, 30 percent between
In just the three months from March to June, 2020, more May and July, and 50 percent beyond July (Bartik, Bertrand,
small businesses were lost than is typical during an entire Cullen, Glaeser, Luca, and Stanton 2020). But as of mid-June,
year. Even if for the remainder of the year losses simply keep almost 40 percent of small businesses were reporting that
pace with those in previous years, we will see a doubling of the crisis was still having a large negative effect and almost
the ordinary annual rate of small business losses to more 45 percent reported a moderate negative effect (US Census
than 700,000 (or 12 percent). That likely optimistic scenario Bureau 2020d).
would see around 50 percent more business losses than at
the peak of the Great Recession, and the largest loss of small And the outlook deteriorated considerably in April, with
businesses since records began in 1977. During the lockdown 25 percent of small businesses reporting they did not expect
period, there was a significant pause in the formation of new to recover within a year, and 5 percent reporting a 90 percent
businesses, but this has since reversed. Through the year to chance they would permanently close or go bankrupt within
date, the formation of new likely employer businesses of all six months (Humphries et al. 2020b). Between March 28 and
sizes is consistent with the trend in the years since the Great April 20, the proportion of small businesses expecting to ever
Recession (US Census Bureau 2020b). recover fell by 10 percentage points.
In net terms, therefore, we look set to lose at least as many The outlook deteriorated further in May as businesses moved
small businesses in this year alone as over the four-year into their third month of lockdown (see figure 5b). Over the
period from peak to trough during the Great Recession (see first three weeks of May, the proportion of small businesses
figure 1). That net loss was partly driven by exits, but more expecting to recover within two to six months fell by 15
substantially by a large drop in entries (see figure 6), while percentage points, from 52 to 37 percent (US Census Bureau
the current crisis looks set to do the opposite. Given that the 2020d). Meanwhile, the proportion expecting their recovery
current crisis is more extreme than the Great Recession, we to take more than six months rose by 11 percentage points
should be prepared for net business losses to mount in the from 31 to 42 percent, and the proportion expecting never
months ahead. This is all the more likely if the deteriorating to recover rose by 4 percentage points from 6 to 10 percent.
outlook among small businesses continues, which could While from late May to mid-June the outlook stabilized,
dampen the formation of new businesses. from mid-June through mid-August it resumed its decline,
with more than half of all small businesses expecting not to
recover within six months.
FIGURE 6.
Small Business Births, Deaths, and Net Rate of Creation, 1978–2014
600 5
Firm birth
Births and deaths of firms (in thousands)
Net rate of creation 4
400
3
Net rate of creation (percent)
2
200
1
0 0
-1
-200
-2
-3
-400
Firm death -4
-600 -5
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2020c.
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 15
The Proposal
T
he more time that passes, the less we should consider In configuring small business support, we should aim for
the policies we would institute in an “ideal” pandemic. responses at two margins. First, we should aim to minimize
American public health outcomes have been a disaster, the failure of otherwise-viable small businesses, which will
and we should not pin our hopes on that being comprehensively preserve valuable firm-specific capital, reduce employment
addressed any time soon. Hopes for a V-shaped recovery losses today and in the medium term, and mitigate a systemic
should long have been abandoned. Ambitions to freeze every shock caused by a large volume of simultaneous firm exits.
small business in the country while suppressing the virus, and And second, we should aim to maximize employment by
then thawing them all out as the economy reopens, are well small businesses, which account for roughly half of all jobs.
past their expiration date. We must respond to the crisis as it These goals apply to those businesses directly affected by the
stands today. pandemic, but also to those hit by the second-round effects of
the economic crisis.
Many hundreds of thousands of small businesses—and the
millions of jobs they are responsible for—are gone. There is ECONOMY-WIDE MEASURES TO SUPPORT SMALL
nothing we can do about that now. But there are millions of BUSINESSES
other small businesses teetering on the brink, and there are The single-most-effective measure to support small
lots of things we can do to help them. In doing so, we must businesses would be to suppress the virus. Evidence from the
recognize that every dollar of fiscal support comes at a cost. United States suggests that much of the economic contraction
And we should be sure our policy responses do not unduly has come from voluntary social distancing measures rather
constrain the recovery. In time, economic resources must be than from the lockdowns themselves (Goolsbee and Syverson
allowed to flow to where they will be of most use. 2020). As shown in figure 7, countries that took more-
FIGURE 7.
Change in GDP and COVID-19 Deaths for Selected OECD Countries
0
South Korea Sweden
Norway
Finland Ireland
-5
Israel
Australia Denmark
Percent change in GDP
-10 Switzerland
Netherlands Belgium
Japan United States
-15
Iceland
Germany Italy
Canada France
-20 Austria United Kingdom
Czech Republic
-25
Spain
-30
-50 50 150 250 350 450 550 650 750 850
Confirmed deaths per million
Source: Hassel 2020; author’s calculations.
Note: Data include the top 22 OECD countries by GDP per capita (excluding New Zealand and Luxembourg due to data limitations). Observations are
colored by region. Change in GDP reflects the change in GDP between the second quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020.
16 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
aggressive steps to suppress the virus—meanwhile financially business employers (those with 500 or fewer employees)
supporting people and businesses—have had less-severe with revenue during the relevant quarter down at least
economic contractions (Hamilton 2020). Because the United 30 percent relative to the most recent corresponding pre-
States did not take adequate steps to suppress the virus, we crisis quarter.
have the worst of both worlds: many deaths and a severe
recession. • The condition tying the ERC to public health orders should
be removed.
There is broad agreement among public health experts on
strategies to suppress the virus. There is a general consensus • Businesses that received forgivable loans under the PPP
on the value of improved testing—in scale but also in should be eligible.
speed. Barriers to improving testing and therapies should • It should cover all workers, regardless of whether or not
be dismantled. Mask use should be mandated where social they are “providing services,” which is a restriction under
distancing is impossible. State governments should roll out the current ERC for businesses with 100 or more employees.
contact tracing apps that leverage the Apple–Google API,
which has been designed to maximize utility while protecting • It should cover 80 percent of eligible wages up to $15,000 per
privacy. Some have proposed a renewed temporary national quarter (for a maximum subsidy of $12,000 per employee
lockdown to bring the contagion down to a manageable level per quarter).
(Osterholm and Kashkari 2020). These are just a few among
many measures recommended by experts. • The ERC should operate for the three quarters beginning
October 1, 2020. The end date of the existing credit should
Another critical measure to support small businesses is to be brought forward to September 30.
support the broader economy via aggressive fiscal stimulus.
The federal government should continue to provide significant • The IRS should continue to allow businesses to request an
additional support to UI recipients, in the order of $400 per advance, and it must build the capacity necessary to fulfill
week. Incentivizing states to develop their systems to better what may be a large volume of such requests.
match workers’ replacement rates is a good idea, but should
• An amount equal to the businesses’ regular Social Security
not prevent the support from being provided. This additional
tax payments that are credited should be paid into the
amount should be phased out slowly over time at a constant
Social Security Trust Fund out of general revenues.
rate so that support is gradually withdrawn as the economy
recovers. The government should also provide additional cash In addition, a new Small Business Survival Credit (SBSC)
support to households, and a significant funding boost to should be introduced to provide additional support
state and local governments. for non-payroll costs. Under the same revised eligibility
conditions as above, this would provide an additional $5,000
The economic contraction has spread beyond the small
per employee per quarter, up to a maximum of $50,000 per
businesses directly affected to those in the broader economy.
business per quarter, to cover rent, utilities, interest, and
Broad stimulus can support demand for these businesses’
COVID-19 mitigation costs.
products and services. With many businesses operating
at necessarily reduced capacity, the demand for labor is The existing ERC is effectively a wage subsidy, covering
unavoidably weak. There is no evidence that businesses 50 percent of wages up to $10,000 between March 12 and
are struggling to find workers, much less that a shortage of December 31, 2020. But this amounts to a maximum subsidy
available labor is driven by the generosity of UI. This will of just $5,000 per worker over a nine-month period and
become an emerging concern if the current, very high levels could not be used in conjunction with the PPP. Moreover, for
of UI are maintained well into the recovery phase, but it is businesses with more than 100 workers, it could be used only
too soon to worry about that. In this climate, we should be to cover the wage costs of idled workers.
far more concerned about the welfare of the unemployed and
the macroeconomic effects of a loss of income than about any The changes I propose would transform the ERC into the
disincentive to work. business support policy we need today. In its first iteration, it
was ill-suited to serve as immediate but temporary life support
EXPANDED REFUNDABLE SMALL-BUSINESS TAX for locked-down businesses. But with these proposed changes,
CREDITS it offers generous, targeted support for the small businesses
The current Employee Retention Credit (ERC) should be suffering through the crisis. This new design is similar to
expanded as follows: that used in other countries, including Australia, where it
has been found to be effective in supporting employment and
• The ERC, which provides a refundable credit against the minimizing business exits (Australian Treasury 2020).
employer’s payroll tax obligations, should apply to all small
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 17
FIGURE 8.
COVID-19 Cases by U.S. Region, March–July
25 South
Rolling 7-day average (in thousands)
20
15
West
10
5 Midwest
Northeast
0
Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2020; author’s calculations.
The PPP has monopolized discussion of small business of initial significant waves in a number of different locations
support during the crisis. Though imperfectly designed and (see figure 8). In the period ahead there will inevitably be
implemented, the PPP was in principle the right kind of tool renewed outbreaks in certain locations. Some businesses may
for providing substantial up-front support to small businesses not qualify in earlier quarters, but will enter the program in
during a national lockdown to suppress the virus. But outside later quarters; as local conditions improve, businesses will
that environment, even if lockdowns still occur in certain drop out.
locations and to varying degrees, the PPP is inappropriate. As
such, it should not be extended. The credit would provide support that is much more generous
than the existing ERC, covering 80 percent of wages for most
By contrast, the existing ERC received almost no attention. workers. This provides businesses with a strong incentive
But with improvements it is far better placed to support small to retain their existing workers and to hire new ones. To
businesses in this new environment. Rather than providing the extent that an increased demand for labor leads to a
money up front via banks and for a prespecified time, with tightening of the labor market, workers will benefit both in
rigid employee retention and other forgiveness conditions, greater employment and higher wages. By covering a large
the existing ERC piggybacks on the payroll tax system to portion of payroll, the program frees up cash to defray other
provide ongoing quarterly support for payroll, and much costs, which will help stem business exits.
more flexibility. This expanded ERC would do the same.
For businesses with a high level of non-payroll costs relative
Targeting is critical. Any future fiscal response will inevitably to payroll costs, the SBSC provides additional support to
be capped. We cannot afford to provide aid to the almost cover those costs. This was a major criticism of the PPP by
three-quarters of all businesses that received funding under small businesses. The contraction in demand has led many
the PPP. Many of those businesses will in fact have profited businesses to scale back operations, necessitating layoffs. But
from the pandemic with this support. Meanwhile, those most other expenses such as rent, utilities, interest, and COVID-19
in need of support did not receive enough. But the 50 percent mitigation costs are unavoidable.
revenue-loss threshold under the existing ERC is too high
for an ongoing program intended to support a broader set of Provided an employer has sufficient non-payroll costs
firms. to exhaust the SBSC, for the first 10 employees the ERC
and SBSC combine to provide a $5,000 per employee base
Tying support to revenue losses each quarter ties that support subsidy, rising at a rate of 80 cents per dollar of wages up to a
to local conditions. The PPP was predicated on the basis of a maximum of $17,000 (see figure 9a). Providing the SBSC on a
temporary, national lockdown, but the virus does not spread per employee basis generates a powerful retention and hiring
uniformly across the country. What appears at a national incentive for the 80 percent of small businesses with nine or
level to have been a second wave was in fact mostly a series fewer employees. A full-time worker on the federal minimum
18 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
FIGURE 9A. FIGURE 9B.
Maximum Quarterly Tax Credit Per Average Quarterly Tax Credit Per
Employee, by Salary Employee, By Firm Size
20 14
Average quarterly tax credit
Maximum quarterly tax credit
12
15 10
8
10
6
per employee (thousands of dollars)
1-10 employees
per employee (thousands of dollars)
11-500 employees 4
5
2
0 0
$0 $5,000 $10,000 $15,000 $20,000 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Quarterly salary Number of employees
Source: Author’s calculation. Source: Author’s calculations.
wage earns $3,872 per quarter—the SBSC would more than Since the measure depends on the distribution of revenue
offset the cost of such a worker. losses and expenses across firms, it is difficult to predict take-
up. But if 10 percent of all small businesses suffered revenue
By being capped, the design also allocates support losses exceeding 30 percent, the ERC would cost around
disproportionately to businesses with fewer employees or $47 billion per quarter.17 If all eligible small businesses had
employees on low wages. A business with five full-time sufficient expenses to exhaust the SBSC, it would cost around
employees earning the federal minimum wage and with $13 billion per quarter.18 Accordingly, for every 10 percent of
sufficient non-payroll costs would receive $25,000 per quarter small businesses that qualify for all three quarters, the ERC
to cover non-payroll costs and around $15,000 per quarter and SBSC combined would cost up to $180 billion. The $130
to cover payroll costs. This amounts to around $8,000 of billion in unused PPP funds could be used to help fund this
quarterly support per employee, or around $2.70 in support spending.
for every dollar of payroll. If each of those workers earned
the national median wage, which is more than double the Even if 30 percent of small businesses were to qualify in all
minimum wage, the business would receive around $12,000 three quarters, the two credits would cost around the same
per employee, or only around $1.70 in support for every dollar as the PPP. This is because in this scenario the credits would
of payroll. go to fewer than half the number of firms that received PPP
funding. While the PPP replaced 100 percent of salaries up
For most businesses, the 30 percent revenue-drop threshold to the equivalent of $25,000 per quarter (versus this ERC
would require a decline in revenue per employee per quarter of proposal, which replaces 80 percent up to $15,000) and
at least $15,000, and for many eligible businesses the drop will provided more-generous support for fixed costs on a monthly
be much larger. Some will be made up for by cost reductions basis, it covered less than a quarter of the timespan of this
in payroll and other variable costs, and by negotiating lower proposal. By prolonging the spread of the virus, we have
rent. But the ERC and SBSC would together help substantially prolonged the contraction in demand, which necessitates
narrow—though not completely close—that revenue gap. a longer duration of support. This reduces the generosity of
support that can be provided.
Quarterly payroll per employee is around $10,000 on average,
so the ERC would provide a bit less than $8,000 per employee The ERC and SBSC are refundable tax credits. Businesses
per quarter on average (it covers 80 percent of wages only up to could draw on their own employer-side payroll tax payments
$15,000 per quarter). The SBSC would provide businesses with to partially finance them in advance, or apply to the IRS for
10 or fewer employees up to an additional $5,000 per employee an advance as under the existing ERC. The IRS must be given
per quarter, taking average total support for these firms to the capacity to fulfill what may be a large volume of such
$13,000 per employee per quarter, or around 80 percent of the requests. Without an advance, businesses would receive the
minimum revenue loss. For the 20 percent of businesses with payments trailing each quarter. The CARES Act also allowed
11 or more employees, the SBSC would provide less support businesses to defer their 2020 Social Security tax payments
per employee (a business with 50 employees would receive from March 12, with the first half to be paid on December 31.
only an additional $1,000 per employee, for example) so larger This ERC proposal would then implicitly be partly funded by
firms would not have as much of their revenue losses covered these deferred tax payments.
(see figure 9b).
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 19
BUILDING CAPACITY IN THE IRS OVER THE LONG money from businesses in advance (implicit borrowing), they
TERM would have paid it out to them in advance (implicit lending).
There should be a significant, sustained increase in With knowledge of prior-year payroll, it would have been
investment in the IRS, in particular in a real-time electronic straightforward to remit two and a half months’ worth to
payroll reporting system. every eligible small business in the country.
Having reflected on what went wrong in the crisis, it is If in possession of real-time payroll information, the IRS
important to consider how we might better prepare our could then easily have assessed loan forgiveness (based on
infrastructure for the future. Many of the problems with the worker retention and pay) over the relevant eight-week period.
PPP stemmed from the delivery mechanism. The Treasury Any non-forgiveness (because workers were not retained
Department was too slow in providing guidance to the banks, or were underpaid) could be reconciled at tax time, which
and then updated their guidance repeatedly. Having the happens quarterly for most businesses. The amount not used
banks act as intermediaries introduced frictions. Many of the for payroll could be taxed back through the ordinary business
biggest banks extended loans only to their existing customers. tax filing process.
The forgiveness process is only beginning, but is sure to be But the value of having the IRS run something like the PPP
fraught. Under the circumstances, the SBA and the banks is not only a matter of efficient administration, important
performed about as well as can be expected. But we should as that is. A key advantage the IRS has over the SBA and
not have had to rely on them. private banks is that it is far better placed to overcome the
The IRS is the largest financial institution in the world, information asymmetries that make it difficult for the banks
collecting more than $3 trillion in annual revenue. Through and SBA to assess loan forgiveness. Much of the necessary
the withholding system, the IRS lends to and borrows from information is already known by the IRS as a matter of
hundreds of millions of businesses and people every year. The course. Obtaining additional information could only enable
IRS holds the financial records of all of these taxpayers. It it to better perform its collection and enforcement functions.
knows their bank details. With the necessary infrastructure, And, importantly, the IRS is better placed than the SBA to
the IRS is uniquely placed to implement a large-scale wage enforce the loan forgiveness terms.
subsidy program, and provide immediate liquidity to every Why did every other country in the world that delivered
small business in the country. a wage subsidy rely on its tax authority while the United
The United States was unique in taking the private bank route States relied on private banks? This choice reveals a lack of
to deliver a wage subsidy. Other countries, such as Australia, capacity in the IRS to deliver such a program. This is not to
the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom all denigrate the IRS, which among other functions performed
delivered their wage subsidies via the tax authority. In fact, admirably in distributing stimulus payments in record time.
the United States did as well, albeit in the limited form of the But for decades, it has been hamstrung by a lack of funding.
original ERC. The reason the ERC could not be the primary Since 2010 the IRS budget has declined by 20 percent in
delivery mechanism—why we instead had to rely on the real terms (Weinberger 2020). This has diminished even its
banks—is liquidity, or a lack thereof. core functions, with the audit rates on both personal and
corporate returns having nearly halved over that decade.
Under the ERC, the IRS directed businesses in the first Critically, information technology spending at the IRS has
instance to draw on their tax withholdings (for both the lagged behind private-sector financial firms and even the
employers’ and employees’ shares of the payroll tax and the Federal Reserve (see figure 10).
employees’ income tax) to fund the subsidy. Payroll taxes
constitute around 15.3 percent of payroll, and income taxes In Australia, as in many other countries, payroll information
a little more. But these add up to far less than the liquidity for every employee is transmitted to the tax authority in
required to fund a more ambitious program like the PPP. If a real time (Australian Taxation Office 2020). As soon as an
business participating in the ERC wanted an advance, it had to employee is paid, all of the relevant payroll information is
fill out and submit a form to the IRS. Given the cumbersome accessible by the taxpayer on the tax authority’s website. This
nature of this process, it seems unlikely the IRS could have real-time information is critical to delivering a program like
managed a large volume of such requests in the mere days it the PPP quickly. It also supports compliance and enforcement,
took to get the PPP up and running. and provides a flow of real-time data to the national statistical
authority, which are then made available to the public. All
Ultimately, the IRS should have been capable of implementing of these should be well within the capabilities of the tax
the PPP, remitting the necessary funds to small businesses in authority of the world’s richest nation.
advance. In an ideal world, the IRS would simply have shifted
business tax withholding into reverse—instead of receiving
20 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
FIGURE 10.
Change in Annual Technology Spending for Selected Institutions, 2001–19
230
Percent change (relative to 2001 spending)
180
JP Morgan
Bank of
130
America
Federal
Reserve Board
80
Citi
30
IRS
0
-20
2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
Source: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 2001–19; Federal Reserve System 2001–18; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2001–19a; SEC 2001–19b; SEC
2001–19c; author’s calculations.
Note: Relative spending growth adjusted for inflation.
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 21
Questions and Concerns
1. What are the drawbacks of tying eligibility to revenue 3. How will new businesses that have not been around for at
losses? least a year but have been adversely affected qualify?
The revenue-loss threshold will inevitably encourage some Roughly 7 percent of businesses are less than 12 months
businesses at the margin to reduce their revenues in order to old (US Census Bureau, 2020c), so this is likely to be fairly
qualify for the credit. A broad literature studying bunching limited. But for this small fraction, an alternative eligibility
around tax thresholds suggests this is likely to be confined measure could be defined. For example, in the Australian
to only a limited set of firms located close to the threshold, wage subsidy, such businesses were allowed to provide
and that this manipulation will mainly occur via reporting evidence to the tax authority that revenues were down relative
or time-shifting of revenues rather than changes in real to the period immediately preceding the crisis, and something
output. The other drawback is that small business revenues similar could be applied in the United States.
are volatile even in the absence of the pandemic, which means
support will inevitably be provided to businesses for which 4. The PPP was applied at the establishment level for some
revenues would have declined anyway. When targeting fiscal industries—should the ERC and SBSC be applied in that way
support, there is always a tradeoff between efficiency and as well?
equity. The policy proposed here is a far better tradeoff in The PPP was primarily an employee-retention program,
this regard than the PPP, and is more easily implemented and designed for a short lockdown period. The program was
more transparent than more elaborate eligibility schemes. made available to larger businesses in certain industries (e.g.,
hotels and restaurants) as long as their employee count at the
2. Is there a risk that the program will cost more than establishment level was below the 500-employee threshold.
indicated? This was designed to encourage the retention of workers
Because eligibility is tied to revenue losses within a given in these industries. The ERC and SBSC proposed here have
quarter, any cost estimate will be subject to significant different goals to the PPP, and as such the same conditions
uncertainty. In the three months from mid-March to mid- should not be applied. Rather than employee retention, the
June, small business revenues were down by around 20 to primary goal of the ERC and SBSC is to maximize small
25 percent on average, while around 40 percent of small business survival through the prolonged period of reduced
businesses on average indicated revenues were flat or up revenue ahead. Businesses in the industries given special
(US Census Bureau, 2020d). This puts a very conservative treatment under the PPP do not face the risks to which many
ceiling of perhaps 50 percent on the proportion of businesses small businesses are exposed, discussed in great detail in this
qualifying during a worst-case-scenario quarter. If 50 percent paper. It is important also to emphasize the funding limits
of businesses were to qualify in all three quarters, the program that are likely to constrain any program—these limited funds
would cost around $900 billion, but this is highly unlikely. If must be allocated to those most in need and those most likely
50 percent qualified in one quarter, 40 percent in another, to be saved by them.
and 30 percent in another, the program would cost around
$720 billion. With 30 percent qualifying in each quarter, the
program would cost $540 billion, almost exactly the cost of
the PPP.
22 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
Conclusion
G
iven the necessary resolve, there is still time to avert millions. Now we must do it again. Both parties—in both
further catastrophe. We can suppress the virus. We chambers of Congress—have put forward plans containing
can roll out additional stimulus. We can build a bridge commendable elements. On small business support, at least,
to help small businesses traverse the abyss. But we must act the gap between the two is not that great.
quickly—the window is closing rapidly. The second wave of
cases has peaked; this time we must not allow them to plateau My key proposal—to provide radically expanded refundable
at an unacceptably high level. The massive boost to incomes tax credits for small businesses—improves on the plans
that came with the first round of stimulus payments—in put forward to date. It offers both the generosity of payroll
expanded UI, cash transfers, and small business support—has support advocated by Democrats and the support for
enabled consumption to coast in recent months, but it will COVID-19 mitigation costs and hiring incentives advocated
soon ebb. The PPP and emergency lending have been a crutch by Republicans. It will support millions of small business
for small businesses, but before long they will resume drawing owners and their tens of millions of employees. It will
down their cash reserves. encourage small businesses to retain their current employees
and hire new ones. It will help protect the economy so that we
The first round of stimulus was born from uncharacteristic can bounce back once we have beaten the virus. It is modest
bipartisanship—Congress and the White House bridged the in fiscal terms relative to many of the other proposals floated.
partisan divide to deliver for America in its hour of need. It The case is clear. We owe it to the millions of struggling small
was a historic achievement, safeguarding the livelihoods of businesses to act.
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 23
Author
Steven Hamilton
Assistant Professor of Economics, The George Washington
University
Steven Hamilton is assistant professor of economics at The
George Washington University. Steven’s primary area of
research is public finance, where he studies the effects of taxes
on behavior with a view to designing better tax policy. Steven
has provided extensive commentary on the economy and
small business support during the COVID-19 crisis to outlets
such as the New York Times, Slate, The Hill, The Atlantic, the
Los Angeles Times, Time Magazine, Newsweek, The Bulwark,
The Dispatch, and NPR. Steven is a former economist at the
Australian Treasury, where he worked on the federal budget,
corporate and international taxation, and government reviews
of climate change policy and flood insurance. Steven holds a
doctorate and a master’s in economics from the University
of Michigan, and a bachelor of economics with First Class
Honours and bachelor of business management from the
University of Queensland.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Mitchell Barnes for his outstanding research assistance, The Hamilton Project team for their support
with all aspects of the paper, Alison Hope for her meticulous copy-editing (though any errors that remain are the author’s own),
and the “author’s conference” attendees for their valuable feedback and insights.
24 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
Endnotes
1. The standard definition of a small business is one with 500 or fewer 12. The study did not account for the fact that employers that did not participate
employees. These businesses are sometimes known as small and medium- in the PPP were instead eligible for an ERC subsidizing 50 percent of wages
sized enterprises, or SMEs. up to $10,000 per employee, which will have encouraged some firms not
2. Those sectors are retail trade; education; health care and social assistance; eligible for the PPP to lay off fewer workers. This would bias downward the
arts, entertainment, and recreation; accommodation and food services; and apparent effect of the PPP. Also, the estimate does not include the jobs saved
other services (except public administration). in the medium term by preventing permanent business closures, nor the
jobs saved throughout the broader economy due to the stimulatory effect of
3. See French (2020) for legal arguments for and against business interruption the 2.5 percent of GDP in PPP support. These all result in fiscal savings due
insurance coverage of pandemic losses, and Organisation of Economic Co- to reduced UI payments.
operation and Development (OECD) for policy proposals on extending
pandemic insurance coverage (OECD 2020). 13. The loan term was originally four years.
4. The program did not apply to passive businesses such as hedge funds or 14. The interest rate is LIBOR (currently around 0.2 percent) plus 3 percent.
private equity firms. For businesses operating in certain industries, the 15. The loan range was originally $500,000–$200 million.
500-employee threshold was applied on a per establishment basis. This 16. Womply (2020) reports that, as of June 15, 16.7 percent of all businesses were
extended eligibility to many large hotel and restaurant chains that would closed, either temporarily or permanently, while Yelp (2020) reports that
otherwise have been ineligible. 41 percent of businesses that were closed had indicated it was permanent.
5. Veuger and Grawert (2020) argue against these restrictions. As of July 10, these figures were 12.9 percent and 55 percent, respectively.
6. The payroll calculation included health insurance and retirement benefits, 17. The revised ERC covers 80 percent of wages up to $15,000 per quarter, which
and withheld federal, state, and local income taxes but not employer-side is around the 70th percentile of the U.S. wage distribution. Assuming this
payroll taxes. applies to small businesses, 1.8 million of the 18 million employees earning
7. The loan term was originally two years. above this amount would attract a subsidy of $12,000 per quarter, totaling
$21.6 billion. Then 4.2 million of the 42 million employees earning less than
8. For an examination of the forgiveness process, see Congressional Research this amount would attract a subsidy equal to 80 percent of their salary. If
Service (2020). we assume that the wage distribution rises linearly to that point, the fiscal
9. The program originally required 75 percent to be spent on payroll costs. cost would be $25.4 billion. Given employment has fallen significantly, and
10. The program originally covered expenses for eight weeks. not all of the laid off workers will be rehired, this is likely an overestimate
of the fiscal cost.
11. Chetty et al. (2020) find that the PPP saved 1.64 million jobs in April and
May with a fiscal cost per job saved of $319,000, but they rely on data from 18. There are 1.3 million businesses with 10–500 workers, 10 percent of which
Earnin that is highly unrepresentative of the population of firms. Bartlett would receive $50,000 per quarter, totaling $6.3 billion. Pre-pandemic
and Morse (2020) consider the effect of the PPP on small businesses in there were 13 million workers at businesses with nine or fewer workers,
Oakland, California, and find that application success increased the 10 percent of whom would attract a credit of $5,000 per quarter, totaling
probability of survival by 20.5 percent, but only among the smallest $6.3 billion.
businesses.
The Hamilton Project • Brookings 25
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The Hamilton Project • Brookings 27
ADVISORY COUNCIL
STEPHANIE AARONSON TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
Vice President and Director, Economic Studies President, Warburg Pincus Distinguished Institute Fellow &
Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, The Brookings Senior Counselor, The Hamilton Project President Emeritus
Institution Urban Institute
JOHN GRAY
GEORGE A. AKERLOF President & Chief Operating Officer NANCY L. ROSE
University Professor Blackstone Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied
Georgetown University Economics, MIT Department of Economics
ROBERT GREENSTEIN
ROGER C. ALTMAN Founder & President DAVID M. RUBENSTEIN
Founder & Senior Chairman Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Co-Founder & Co-Executive Chairman
Evercore The Carlyle Group
MICHAEL GREENSTONE
KAREN L. ANDERSON Milton Friedman Professor in Economics & the ROBERT E. RUBIN
Senior Director of Policy & Communications College Former U.S. Treasury Secretary;
Becker Friedman Institute for Director of the Becker Friedman Institute for Co-Chair Emeritus
Research in Economics Research in Economics Council on Foreign Relations
The University of Chicago Director of the Energy Policy Institute
University of Chicago LESLIE B. SAMUELS
ALAN S. BLINDER Senior Counsel
Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of GLENN H. HUTCHINS Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
Economics & Public Affairs, Co-founder, North Island;
Princeton University; Co-founder, Silver Lake SHERYL SANDBERG
Visiting Senior Fellow, Chief Operating Officer, Facebook
The Brookings Institution. JAMES A. JOHNSON
Chairman; Johnson Capital Partners DIANE WHITMORE SCHANZENBACH
STEVEN A. DENNING Margaret Walker Alexander Professor
Chairman, General Atlantic LAWRENCE F. KATZ Director
Elisabeth Allison Professor of Economics The Institute for Policy Research
JOHN M. DEUTCH Harvard University Northwestern University;
Institute Professor Nonresident Senior Fellow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology MELISSA S. KEARNEY The Brookings Institution
Neil Moskowitz Professor of Economics
CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR. University of Maryland; STEPHEN SCHERR
Co-Founder and President Emeritus Nonresident Senior Fellow Chief Executive Officer
The Opportunity Institute The Brookings Institution Goldman Sachs Bank USA
BLAIR W. EFFRON LILI LYNTON RALPH L. SCHLOSSTEIN
Partner Founding Partner President & Chief Executive Officer, Evercore
Centerview Partners LLC Boulud Restaurant Group
ERIC SCHMIDT
DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF HOWARD S. MARKS Technical Advisor, Alphabet Inc.
Dean & Don K. Price Professor Co-Chairman
of Public Policy Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. ERIC SCHWARTZ
Harvard Kennedy School Chairman & CEO, 76 West Holdings
ERIC MINDICH
JUDY FEDER Founder JAY SHAMBAUGH
Professor & Former Dean Everblue Management Professor of Economics and International Affairs,
McCourt School of Public Policy Elliott School of International Affairs at The
Georgetown University SUZANNE NORA JOHNSON George Washington University;
Former Vice Chairman Nonresident Senior Fellow
JASON FURMAN Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. The Brookings Institution
Professor of the Practice of Co-Chair
Economic Policy The Brookings Institution THOMAS F. STEYER
Harvard University Business Leader & Philanthropist
Senior Fellow PETER ORSZAG
Peterson Institute for International Economics; CEO, Financial Advisory MICHAEL R. STRAIN
Senior Counselor Lazard Freres & Co LLC Director of Economy Policy Studies and
The Hamilton Project Arthur F. Burns Scholar in Political Economy
RICHARD PERRY American Enterprise Institute
MARK T. GALLOGLY Managing Partner & Chief Executive Officer
Cofounder & Managing Principal Perry Capital LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS
Centerbridge Partners, L.P. Charles W. Eliot University Professor
PENNY PRITZKER Harvard University
TED GAYER Chairman & Founder, PSP Partners
Executive Vice President 38th Secretary of Commerce LAURA D’ANDREA TYSON
Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Distinguished Professor fo the Graduate School
The Brookings Institution MEEGHAN PRUNTY University of California, Berkeley
Managing Director, Blue Meridian Partners
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation
WENDY EDELBERG
Director
28 From Survival to Revival: How to Help Small Businesses through the COVID-19 Crisis
Highlights
The COVID-19 pandemic poses an existential threat to small businesses, with more than
400,000 lost since the crisis began. Many small businesses are financially fragile and not
equipped to weather a prolonged period of substantially reduced revenues. In this proposal,
Steven Hamilton of The George Washington University calls for a significant expansion of
refundable tax credits to help support small businesses through this crisis.
The Proposal
Engage in important economy-wide measures to support small businesses. Noting
that the single-most-effective measure to support small businesses would be to suppress
the virus, the author supports calls for effective social distancing measures, improved testing
capacity, and increased mask use. Another critical measure to support small businesses is
to support the broader economy via aggressive fiscal stimulus. Broad stimulus can support
demand for these businesses’ products and services.
Significantly expand the Employee Retention Credit (ERC) to help cover small
businesses’ payroll costs. The ERC should apply to all small business employers (those with
500 or fewer employees) with revenue during the relevant quarter down at least 30 percent
relative to the most recent corresponding pre-crisis quarter. The credit should cover 80 percent
of eligible wages up to $15,000 per quarter (for a maximum subsidy of $12,000 per employee
per quarter).
Introduce a new Small Business Survival Credit (SBSC) to help cover small
businesses’ fixed costs. To help address small businesses’ need to cover non-payroll costs,
the SBSC would provide an additional $5,000 per employee per quarter, up to a maximum
of $50,000 per business per quarter, to cover rent, utilities, interest, and COVID-19 mitigation
costs.
Invest in the capabilities of the IRS so it may better support small businesses in
future crises. Following decades of underfunding, the IRS was unable to administer large-
scale small business support, like the PPP. The proposal calls for increasing IRS funding—
especially on technology necessary to accurately and efficiently administer some of these
support programs—so that the IRS is prepared to act quickly in a future downturn.
Benefits
Through this proposal, the author provides policymakers with a bridge to help small businesses
get through these difficult times. The proposal offers both generous payroll support as well as
support for the non-payroll costs that are a burden for many small businesses. It will encourage
small businesses to retain their current employees and hire new ones. Lastly, it will help protect
the economy so that we can bounce back once we have beaten the virus.
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Printed on recycled paper. W W W. H A M I LT O N P R O J E C T. O R G The Hamilton Project • Brookings 29
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