Small Business Administration OIG 24-11 (Maui Wildfires – Initial Disaster Assistance and Recovery Response)
Summary
SBA OIG inspection Report 24-11, dated April 2, 2024, assesses SBA's initial disaster assistance response to the wildfires that broke out on Maui on August 8, 2023. The President declared a major disaster in Hawaii on August 10, 2023. OIG found the response timely and effective: personnel were at the first Disaster Recovery Center and Business Recovery Center on Maui within 6 days of the declaration, and SBA averaged 10 days overall to complete loan applications. Sixty days after the declaration, 3,329 applications had been submitted and 2,792, or 84 percent, had a final decision. OIG suggested that SBA routinely conduct a staffing needs assessment throughout a disaster so recovery centers are staffed to match demand. SBA responded that it regularly examines staffing levels.
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“Small Business Administration OIG 24-11 (Maui Wildfires – Initial Disaster Assistance and Recovery Response).”
Original at www.oversight.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/small-business-administration-oig-24-11-maui-wildfires-initial-disaste-bc426ed7e1/
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U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Maui Wildfires – Initial Disaster
Assistance and Recovery Response
Inspection Report
Report 24-11
April 2, 2024
Make a Difference
To report fraud, waste, or mismanagement, contact the U.S. Small Business Administration’s
Office of Inspector General Hotline at https://www.sba.gov/oig/hotline. You can also write to the
U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, 409 Third Street, SW (5th Floor),
Washington, DC 20416. In accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 407(b) and 420(b)(2)(B), confidentiality of a complainant’s personally
identifying information is mandatory, absent express consent by the complainant authorizing
the release of such information.
NOTICE:
Pursuant to the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023,
Public Law 117-263, Section 5274, any nongovernmental organizations and business entities
identified in this report have the opportunity to submit a written response for the purpose of
clarifying or providing additional context as it relates to any specific reference contained herein.
Comments must be submitted to AIGA@sba.gov within 30 days of the final report issuance date.
We request that any comments be no longer than two pages, Section 508 compliant, and free
from any proprietary or otherwise sensitive information. The comments may be appended to
this report and posted on our public website.
U.S. Small Business Administration
Office of Inspector General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Maui Wildfires – Initial Disaster Assistance and
Recovery Response (Report 24-11)
What OIG Reviewed provided timely disaster loan assistance to
This report presents the results of our inspection survivors. During our site visit, we interviewed
of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) disaster survivors and found they were satisfied
with the customer service and assistance
initial disaster assistance response to the
received.
wildfires in Maui, Hawaii.
While SBA successfully navigated disaster
On August 8, 2023, several wildfires broke out
assistance challenges such as increased
on the island of Maui, causing loss of life and
customer service calls and loan applications,
catastrophic damage. The President declared
this a disaster on August 10, 2023, and SBA we identified an opportunity for improvement
mobilized to provide disaster-related home and that may be beneficial in future disasters –
business loans to qualified recipients within specifically, a standard way to quickly adjust
areas impacted by the wildfires. staffing levels as the volume of activity shifts at
each center.
Our objective was to assess SBA’s initial
response to the Maui wildfire disaster, including What OIG Suggested
staffing, loan application volume, and timeliness We suggested SBA management routinely
of disaster loan approvals. conduct a staffing needs assessment throughout
To answer our objective, we performed an a disaster to ensure recovery centers are
on-site inspection of SBA’s disaster response to adequately staffed based on customer demand
observe its operations and interactions with and workload.
disaster survivors. Further, we interviewed Agency Response
program officials and reviewed public laws,
SBA management provided a formal response
regulations, and SBA policies and procedures.
to this report, stating SBA regularly examines
We also reviewed disaster loan application
staffing levels and will continue to do so as the
processing data and recovery center staffing
agency navigates future disaster assistance
data.
challenges. OIG will continue to assess SBA’s
What OIG Found procedures for routinely conducting staffing
We found SBA’s initial response to the Maui needs assessments in future reviews.
wildfire disaster was timely and effective. On the
day of the Presidential disaster declaration, SBA
placed personnel in locations throughout Hawaii
to support businesses and residents impacted by
the wildfires. Within 6 days of the Presidential
disaster declaration, SBA representatives were
stationed at the first Disaster Recovery Center
and Business Recovery Center on Maui and
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
MEMORANDUM
Date: April 2, 2024
To: Isabel Casillas Guzman
Administrator
From: Hannibal “Mike” Ware
Inspector General
Subject: Maui Wildfires – Initial Disaster Assistance and Recovery Response (Report 24-11)
This report presents the results of our inspection of Maui Wildfires – Initial Disaster Assistance
and Recovery Response. We made one suggestion for SBA management to routinely conduct a
staffing needs assessment throughout a disaster to ensure recovery centers are adequately
staffed based on customer demand and workload.
SBA management disagreed with our suggestion and stated that SBA regularly examines
staffing levels and will continue to do so as it navigates future disaster assistance challenges.
We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have any questions
or need additional information, please contact John Provan, Director of Disaster Assistance
Program Group, or Andrea Deadwyler, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 205-6586.
cc: Francisco Sanchez Jr., Associate Administrator, Office of Disaster Recovery and Resilience
Katie Frost, Associate Administrator, Office of Capital Access
Katherine Aaby, Associate Administrator & Chief Financial Officer, Office of Performance,
Planning, and the Chief Financial Officer
Walter B. Hill Jr., Chief Risk Officer, Office of Performance, Planning, and the Chief Financial
Officer
Therese Meers, General Counsel, Office of General Counsel
John Miller, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Capital Access
Deborah Chen, Deputy Chief Financial Officer, Office of Performance, Planning, and the
Chief Financial Officer
Tonia Butler, Director, Office of Internal Controls
Anna M. Calcagno, Director, Office of Program Performance, Analysis, and Evaluation
Michael Simmons, Attorney Advisor, Office of General Counsel
Peter Meyers, Senior Advisor, Office of Capital Access
Rachel Wilson, Program Analyst, Office of Capital Access
Sheena McShan, Program Analyst, Office of Disaster Recovery and Resilience
409 Third St. SW, Washington, DC 20416 • (202) 205-6586 • Fax (202) 205-7382
Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
Maui Wildfires ........................................................................................................................... 1
Objective ................................................................................................................................... 2
Results ............................................................................................................................................. 2
Customer Service Response ...................................................................................................... 2
Disaster Loan Volume and Timeliness ....................................................................................... 4
Recovery Center Staffing ........................................................................................................... 5
Suggested Action ....................................................................................................................... 6
Evaluation of Agency Response....................................................................................................... 6
Tables
1 Disaster Loan Application Volume................................................................................... 4
2 Recovery Center Customer Volume ................................................................................ 5
Appendices
1 Scope and Methodology .............................................................................................. 1-1
2 Agency Response.......................................................................................................... 2-1
i
Introduction
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) provides low-interest disaster loans primarily for
physical damage and economic injury to individuals and businesses impacted by a declared
disaster to support the recovery of the affected communities. The disaster program
accomplishes its mission through staff members assigned to recovery centers in areas affected
by the disaster, a customer service call center, and a loan processing center. SBA works alongside
the Federal Emergency Management Agency in coordination with state and local government
agencies to establish Disaster Recovery Centers (DRC) throughout disaster-affected areas. The
DRCs assemble representatives from federal, state, and local disaster relief agencies and
organizations to issue program information and provide applications for government assistance.
Additionally, SBA may establish its own recovery centers focused on providing SBA services in
affected areas, as described below:
• Business Recovery Center (BRC) – A facility established and staffed by SBA to assist
survivors with loan applications, answer questions about SBA programs, and close loans.
• Portable Loan Outreach Center (PLOC) – Similar to a BRC but established in an outdoor
setting reliant on solar and generator power to operate its systems. The center
equipment is broken down each night and stored until the following day when it is
reestablished. A PLOC provides the same SBA services as a BRC and DRC.
Maui Wildfires
The Maui wildfire disaster began in the state of Hawaii on August 8, 2023, with wildfires in the
towns of Olinda and Kula (referred to as Upcountry), followed by a wildfire in the coastal
town of Lahaina. The wildfires led to 100 deaths in the community and displaced more than
7,700 residents. Approximately 1,000 acres were burned in Upcountry, and the town of Lahaina
was devastated, with more than 2,000 buildings destroyed and 2,100 acres burned.
On August 10, 2023, just 2 days after the wildfires began, the President declared a major disaster
in Hawaii and ordered federal aid to support recovery efforts in the areas affected by the
wildfires. That same day, SBA established physical damage and economic injury loan application
deadlines and mobilized staff to support the establishment of the Interim Operating Facility in
Honolulu. Six days later, on August 16, 2023, the first DRC and BRC on Maui were opened. SBA
1
extended application deadlines several times. The final day to submit physical disaster loan
applications was January 25, 2024, while the deadline for economic injury loan applications was
May 10, 2024.
This report presents the results of our inspection of SBA’s initial response to the Maui wildfire
disaster.
Objective
Our objective was to assess SBA’s initial response to the Maui wildfire disaster, including staffing,
loan application volume, and timeliness of disaster loan approvals.
Results
We found SBA’s initial response to the Maui wildfires was timely and effective. On the day of
the Presidential disaster declaration, SBA placed personnel in locations throughout Hawaii to
support businesses and residents impacted by the wildfires. Personnel were prepared to assist
disaster survivors at the first DRC and BRC within 6 days of the declaration, well within SBA’s goal
to establish a BRC in 10 days. During our site visit, we interviewed disaster survivors and found
they were satisfied with the customer service and assistance received.
While SBA successfully navigated disaster assistance challenges such as increased customer
service calls and loan applications, we identified an opportunity for improvement that may be
beneficial in future disasters – specifically, a standard way to quickly adjust staffing levels as the
volume of activity shifted at each center.
Customer Service Response
We performed a site visit approximately 6 weeks after the wildfires occurred, allowing us to
interview residents of Maui who were seeking assistance from SBA. During our walkthrough of
the agency’s operations on Maui, we did not observe significant customer wait times. Overall,
the residents interviewed reported positive experiences related to the services provided at the
recovery centers.
2
SBA established several locations beyond the DRCs, such as
BRCs and PLOCs, where survivors could seek assistance from
SBA. On Maui, there were at least eight locations where
Customer Service Representatives were available to provide
disaster loan assistance. This included supporting a recovery
center established by a resource partner because too few
Hawaiians were seeking federal assistance. The center sought
to break down barriers by engaging with, and providing aid to,
wildfire survivors who preferred help from other Hawaiians or
were suspicious of government programs.
To increase accessibility to disaster assistance in the town of
Lahaina, SBA also opened a PLOC near the shelters for
displaced residents.
In addition to SBA’s on-site support, the customer service center was available and had minimal
wait times. This disaster response utilized a recently upgraded phone system. Most calls were
answered within 1 minute and lasted 5 to 7 minutes on average. For longer wait times, the
system activated a callback
function that allowed customers
to maintain their place in line
without having to remain on
hold. We believe this upgraded
phone system alleviated the
issues regarding unanswered
calls discussed in Report 21-05,
Consolidated Results of SBA’s
Initial Disaster Assistance in
Response to Hurricanes Harvey,
Irma, and Maria. 1
1
SBA OIG, Report 21-05, Consolidated Results of SBA’s Initial Disaster Assistance in Response to Hurricanes Harvey,
Irma, and Maria (December 22, 2020).
3
As SBA responded to the wildfires, another major disaster occurred that had the potential to
impact the level of service SBA was providing to the Maui wildfire disaster survivors. On
August 30, 2023, Hurricane Idalia made landfall in the Big Bend region of Florida, causing
flooding and destruction across three states. This disaster caused an increase in demand for
customer service; however, it did not affect call center response times.
Disaster Loan Volume and Timeliness
We evaluated the volume of loans submitted and the time it took for SBA to begin approving
those loans. We found SBA was responsive to the increase of loan applications that resulted
from the Maui wildfires. SBA met its goal of completing loans in 10 days by averaging 10 days
overall to complete loan applications. For example, 60 days after the Presidential declaration,
3,329 applications had been submitted, with 2,792 of them completed with a final decision,
representing 84 percent of all applications submitted by that date. At the earliest stages of the
disaster, the turnaround time to complete loans was slightly slower at an average of 11 days;
however, nearly half of all applications submitted within the first 15 days were completed within
that time (table 1).
Table 1: Disaster Loan Application Volume
Average Days to
Days Since Applications Applications Percentage Complete Loan
Declaration Submitted Completed Completed Applications
15 675 326 48% 11
30 1,603 1,093 68% 11
60 3,329 2,792 84% 10
90 4,549 4,135 91% 10
Source: OIG analysis based on Disaster Credit Management System Maui loan application data through
November 28, 2023
Hurricane Idalia, which occurred shortly after the Maui wildfire disaster, also caused an increase
in demand of disaster loan processing. However, we did not find that it affected processing
timeliness for the Maui wildfire disaster, as SBA continued to meet its processing goals.
4
Recovery Center Staffing
We evaluated staffing levels and customer volume at the recovery centers located on Maui and
found opportunities where staffing levels could have been adjusted as the volume of activity
shifted at each center to meet customer needs even more effectively.
We identified recovery centers with very different activity levels but similar personnel numbers
of Customer Service Representatives during a 2-month period. For example, the Kihei BRC had
12 Customer Service Representatives, 635 customer interactions, and 325 overtime hours during
the months of September and October, resulting in an average of 54 customer interactions per
Customer Service Representative during that 2-month period. In contrast, the Lahaina DRC had
16 Customer Service Representatives, 2,752 customer interactions, and 1,478 overtime hours
during the same period, resulting in an average of 175 customer interactions per Customer
Service Representative. The Lahaina DRC had a significantly higher volume of customers and
operated with longer hours, which resulted in more overtime hours relative to the Kihei BRC
(table 2).
Table 2: Recovery Center Customer Volume
Total Average
Average Total Overtime Interactions
Location Hours of Operation Staff Interactions Hours per Staff
Kihei BRC Mon–Fri 8 a.m.–5 p.m. 12 635 325 54
Sat 10 a.m.–2 p.m.
Lahaina DRC Mon–Sat 8 a.m.–7 p.m.* 16 2,752 1,478 175
* The Lahaina DRC operated on Sundays, 8 a.m.–7 p.m. during the month of September.
Source: OIG analysis of Maui detailed field activity reports for the months of September and October 2023
Due to the proximity of the recovery centers located on Maui, we found opportunities existed
for SBA to adjust staffing levels with minimal impact to the level of service provided at affected
locations. For example, in the town of Lahaina, there were three SBA locations with Customer
Service Representatives within a 3-mile radius. In Kihei, two centers were established within the
same building. Also, as the towns of Kihei and Lahaina are only about 24 miles apart, Customer
Service Representatives could reasonably move between locations.
5
The Disaster Recovery Center Coordinator (DRCC) is responsible for monitoring each recovery
center’s activity to assess the volume and types of activities to ensure appropriate staffing is
maintained. The DRCC was tasked with reassigning staff as necessary based on volume and type
of activity to reduce staffing, travel, and overtime costs.
While a DRCC was assigned to the disaster to manage staffing, operational flexibility could have
been better leveraged to reduce the overtime hours worked by employees at the Lahaina DRC.
On average, Customer Service Representatives at the Kihei BRC assisted less than one customer
per day during the months of September and October 2023. At the Lahaina DRC, Customer
Service Representatives assisted triple the number of customers during the same time period.
We believe a process to routinely assess staffing needs throughout disasters will enable the
agency to meet its mission even more efficiently and effectively.
Suggested Action
We suggest the Administrator direct the Associate Administrator for the Office of Disaster
Recovery and Resilience to:
Suggestion 1: Develop and implement procedures to routinely conduct a staffing needs
assessment throughout a disaster to ensure recovery centers are adequately staffed based on
customer demand and workload.
Evaluation of Agency Response
SBA management provided formal comments to the draft report. We have included those
comments in appendix 2. SBA management disagreed with our suggested action, stating SBA
regularly examines staffing levels and will continue to do so as it navigates future disaster
assistance challenges. Management further stated that a new system is not needed because
of the existing system that is in place.
We will continue to assess the effectiveness of SBA’s procedures to routinely conduct staffing
needs assessments throughout a disaster during future disaster reviews.
6
Appendix 1: Scope and Methodology
This report presents the results of our inspection of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s
(SBAs) initial disaster assistance response to wildfires in Maui, Hawaii. Our objective was to
assess SBA’s initial response to the Maui wildfire disaster, including staffing, loan application
volume, and timeliness of disaster loan approvals.
To answer our objective, we interviewed SBA officials from Field Operations Center-West, the
Processing and Disbursement Center, the Damage Verification Center, and the Customer Service
Center. Further, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and implementing guidance governing
the disaster loans. We also reviewed SBA’s standard operating procedures (SOP), including
SOP 50 30 9, Disaster Assistance Program, and other Field Operations Center-West operational
and training guidance. Finally, we obtained disaster loan application processing and staffing data.
We conducted on-site visits to four Disaster Recovery Centers, a Disaster Assistance Center,
a Portable Loan Outreach Center, and a Business Recovery Center on the island of Maui.
During these site visits, we gained an understanding of how SBA implemented its policies and
procedures to aid disaster survivors. We also interviewed survivors about the accessibility of the
facility, wait times, awareness of available services, and level of customer service received from
SBA when applying for a disaster loan. In addition, we analyzed data to assess loan application
processing times and the volume of loan applications.
We performed this review in accordance with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. Those standards require that we
plan and perform a review to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our conclusions and observations based on our objective. We believe the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions and observations based on our
objectives.
Use of Computer-processed Data
We relied on computer-processed data from SBA’s loan application system and reports prepared
by Field Operations Center-West employees. We received access to the Disaster Credit
Management System, the loan application system, and received reports related to daily field
operations and staffing reports for the Maui wildfire disaster. We conducted limited testing on
data extracts to verify reliability of the data by ensuring consistency between common data
1-1
points on the staffing report, payroll reconciliation report, and the detailed field activity reports.
Based on our limited testing, we believe the computer-processed information is reliable for the
purposes of this inspection.
Prior Audit Coverage
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) performed a review of SBA’s initial response to
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. In fiscal year 2021, OIG issued a consolidated report 1
capturing the results from all three reviews. We reported concerns related to disaster loan
application backlogs and unanswered calls in the Customer Service Center. While the application
backlog was attributed to the three hurricanes occurring within a 30-day period, we identified
concerns regarding the capabilities of the customer service phone system.
The following lists the OIG’s previous audit coverage related to the objective of this report:
Report Number Report Title Report Date
21-05 Consolidated Results of SBA’s Initial Disaster December 22, 2020
Assistance in Response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma,
and Maria
18-19 Inspection of SBA’s Initial Disaster Response to July 19, 2018
Hurricane Maria
18-16 Inspection of SBA’s Initial Disaster Response to April 26, 2018
Hurricane Irma
18-10 Inspection of SBA’s Initial Disaster Response to January 19, 2018
Hurricane Harvey
1
SBA OIG, Report 21-05, Consolidated Results of SBA’s Initial Disaster Assistance Response to Hurricanes Harvey,
Irma, and Maria (December 22, 2020).
1-2
Appendix 2: Agency Response
2-1
To: Hannibal Ware
Inspector General
U.S. Small Business Administration
Subject: Management Response:
Maui Wildfires – Initial Disaster Assistance and Recovery
Response (Project 23805)
Date: March 28, 2024
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) appreciates OIG’s suggested opportunity
for improvement. However, SBA’s Office of Disaster Recovery and Resilience (ODR&R) does
not agree with the OIG’s suggestion to develop and implement new procedures for staffing needs
assessment.
SBA regularly examines staffing levels and will continue to do so as we navigate future
disaster assistance challenges. SBA already has a well-established process to routinely conduct a
staffing needs assessment throughout a disaster to ensure recovery centers are adequately staffed
based on customer demand and workload. A new system is not needed because of the existing
system already in place. When monitoring staffing disparity, SBA considers factors that
influence staffing levels, such as: safety, geography lodging availability, transportation, and
operating hours. SBA activity volume at Business Recovery Centers is historically less than SBA
Disaster Recovery Centers.
Thank you for allowing SBA the opportunity to comment on OIG’s Discussion Draft
Report on SBA's Initial Disaster Assistance and Recovery Response to the Maui Wildfires and
for taking SBA’s views into consideration.
Sincerely,
RAFAELA Digitally signed by RAFAELA
MONCHEK
MONCHEK Date: 2024.03.29 11:11:19 -04'00'
Rafaela Monchek
Deputy Associate Administrator
Office of Disaster Recovery and Resilience
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