Sentencing Memorandum — USA v. SAINTVIL (Dkt. 189, N.D. Fla.)

Summary

The government's sentencing memorandum, filed December 6, 2021 as Document 189 in United States v. Jeremie Saintvil, Case No. 1:21cr13-AW/GRJ, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. It states that Florida Credit Union noticed red flags in a PPP application submitted in the name of a nonagenarian in an assisted living facility, leading to an investigation by the FBI, IRS-CI and SBA-OIG. The memorandum states the intended loss from the bank fraud scheme is $1,945,625.09 and that the draft presentence report sets a guideline range of 108 to 135 months, plus 24 months for aggravated identity theft. It argues the defendant's unscored prior criminal history warrants an upward departure and variance, and attaches exhibits including an IRS fingerprint laboratory report as Exhibit D.

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Cite this document

“Sentencing Memorandum — USA v. SAINTVIL (Dkt. 189, N.D. Fla.).” Original at ecf.flnd.uscourts.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/sentencing-memorandum-usa-v-saintvil-dkt-189-n-d-fla-888f9c5a41/, SHA-256 d6a46f87a0d46a16165752646d0824ecb07a61e6d141f78f83f60a0a29b1ec26.

Full text

Case 1:21-cr-00013-AW-MAL Document 189 Filed 12/06/21 Page 1 of 49

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Case No: 1:21cr13-AW/GRJ

JEREMIE SAINTVIL
a/k/a “JEREMIE STVIL”
a/k/a “JEREMIE SAINT VIL”
a/k/a “JEREMI STVIL”
______________________________/

GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

COMES NOW, the United States of America, by and through the undersigned

Assistant United States Attorneys, and files the following memorandum in aid of

sentencing:

I. INTRODUCTION

Due to the Defendant’s own greed and sloppiness, Florida Credit Union

personnel noticed red flags in the fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”)

loan application and supporting documentation purportedly submitted by R.J.H., a

nonagenarian who had been residing in an assisted living facility. That discovery

precipitated a federal criminal investigation led by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI),

and the Small Business Administration-Office of Inspector General (SBA-OIG). A

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search warrant was later executed at the Defendant’s home which resulted in the

discovery of a plethora of physical and digital evidence. That evidence helped

investigators identify other victims whose identities were used in additional

fraudulent COVID-19-related loan applications which were submitted to other

financial institutions. The investigation further uncovered evidence of credit card

fraud that predated the pandemic.

This Court no doubt recalls the trial testimony and exhibits, and has also

reviewed the facts set forth in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). Thus,

the Government will not restate the full factual and procedural background of the

case; rather, portions of the PSR will be emphasized herein.

The draft Presentence Investigation Report reflects a guideline imprisonment

range of 108 to 135 months, and a guideline supervised release term of two to five

years for Counts One and Two, one year for Count Three, and one to three years

for Count Four. (Doc. 156 ¶¶ 102-110). The Government concurs with the

calculations in the draft PSR, assuming that the calculations remain the same at the

sentencing hearing.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Since United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), to impose a lawful

sentence, trial courts must start by correctly calculating a defendant’s advisory

United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) range. United States v. Williams,

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435 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). After the Court makes this

calculation, it “may impose a more severe or more lenient sentence as long as the

sentence is reasonable.” Williams, 435 F.3d at 1353 (quoting United States v.

Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005)). That is, the Court is to properly

calculate the defendant’s guidelines range but, after doing so, it must consider the

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) and may tailor the defendant’s sentence

based on those factors. The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the §3553(a) factors:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training and medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.

United States v. Ochoa-Torres, 519 F. App’x 583, 584 (11th Cir. 2013). The

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553 mirror the reasons traditionally recognized for

imposing sentence: (a) retribution, (b) deterrence, sometimes referred to as

“general deterrence” (i.e., the need to deter others from committing like crimes),

prevent the defendant from committing crime), and (d) rehabilitation. Bullington

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v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 443 n.16 (1981); United States v. Godfrey, 22 F.3d

1048, 1058 (11th Cir. 1994).

III. Application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors 1

A. The Nature and Circumstance of the Offense and the History and
Characteristics of the Defendant – 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)

1. The Offense Conduct

The Government urges the Court to rely on the testimony and evidence

adduced at trial, as well as the facts summarized in the draft PSR (Doc. 156) and

the final version that will be filed with the Court, as a complete account of the

Defendant’s offense conduct.

The trial evidence against the Defendant demonstrated that his crimes were

organized, well-planned, and calculated. Further, the evidence shows that the

Defendant’s crimes in this case were on-going for approximately two and a half

years. The majority of the Defendant’s victims, including his own mother, were

elderly. In total, the Defendant’s intended loss as a result of his entire bank fraud

scheme is $1,945,625.09. Doc. 156 at ⁋ 48.

2. The History and Characteristics of the Defendant

The Defendant’s family life and upbringing are set forth in the PSR.

Neither the Defendant’s history nor his personal characteristics justify a sentence

1
This Sentencing Memorandum does not specifically discuss every §3553 sentencing
factor.
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mitigation or a downward variance in this case. Rather, the Defendant’s prior

criminal history – which was not scored pursuant to the USSG – warrants an

upward departure and variance (as discussed, below). Thus, the Government urges

this Honorable Court to impose a term of imprisonment, at least within the

Guideline range, in this case.

B. The Sentence Should Reflect the Seriousness of the Offense,
Promote Respect for the Law, Afford Adequate Deterrence to
Criminal Conduct, Protect the Public from Further Crimes of the
Defendant, and Provide Just Punishment for the Offense - 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)

Reflecting Seriousness of the Offense

Though the Defendant is not being sentenced for a crime of violence, the

Government notes that economic crimes, like those at issue here, are just as serious

as violent crimes and drug offenses. This is especially true when the crime

involves the fraudulent use of the personal identification information and account

numbers of innocent third parties. Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines should not be

ignored or discounted just because the Defendant is being sentenced for what are

typically referred to as “white-collar” crimes.

Section 3553(a)(2)(A) requires that district courts consider “the need for the

sentence imposed” to “reflect the seriousness of the offense.” Stated differently,

“the length of the sentence should reflect the harm done and the gravity of the

defendant's conduct.” United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir.

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2017); see also United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1195 (11th Cir. 2008).

Here, in furtherance of his scheme to defraud financial institutions, the Defendant:

• fraudulently obtained victims’ personal identification documents and

information (including actual state-issued identification cards and social

security cards),

• leased virtual offices and mailboxes at which he received mail in

furtherance of his scheme to defraud,

• fraudulently opened credit cards, bank accounts, and lines of credit using

the names and personal identification information of his victims, and

• submitted false and fraudulent PPP and EIDL loan applications to

multiple financial institutions.

Such egregious conduct, and the greed and manipulation demonstrated by the

Defendant, warrant the imposition of a stiff sentence.

General Deterrence

Further, “[g]eneral deterrence is one of the key purposes of sentencing.”

Walker, 844 F.3d at 1257. Congress has recognized that general deterrence is

particularly important in the context of white collar crime. United States v. Sample,

901 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d

1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Congress that adopted the § 3553 sentencing

factors emphasized the critical deterrent value of imprisoning serious white collar

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criminals, even where those criminals might themselves be unlikely to commit

another offense.”); S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 76 (1983), reprinted in 1984

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259 (“The second purpose of sentencing is to deter others

from committing the offense. This is particularly important in the area of white

collar crime.”)). “In enacting § 3553, Congress was especially concerned that prior

to the Sentencing Guidelines, major white collar criminals often were sentenced to

small fines and little or no imprisonment.” United States v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274,

1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). “White collar criminals may be particularly

susceptible to general deterrence because ‘[d]efendants in white-collar crimes often

calculate the financial gain and risk of loss, and white-collar crime therefore can be

affected and reduced with serious punishment.’” Sample, 901 F.3d at 1200 (citing

United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013)); see also United

States v. Vrancea, 136 F. Supp. 3d 378, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Persons who

commit white-collar crimes like [D]efendant's are capable of calculating the costs

and benefits of their illegal activities relative to the severity of punishments that

may be imposed. A serious sentence is required to discourage such crimes.”).

Further, a district court’s dismissal of the relevance of deterrence to others 2 was

2
Such as by making the following comment: “[I] don’t give much stock in the fact that
others are deterred by the fact that you’re sent to prison for a long time.”
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found to conflict with Congress’s directive to sentencing judges. Walker, 844 F.3d

at 1257.

Further, as a part of the Fifth Circuit’s discussion in United States v.

Hoffman, 901 F.3d 523, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2018), the Court noted that,

Another problem with probation in multimillion dollar fraud cases is
that it undermines public confidence in whether the justice system is
“do[ing] equal right to the poor and to the rich” as our oath requires. 28
U.S.C. § 453. For these reasons, we have repeatedly expressed a
“distaste for sentencing that reflects different standards of justice being
applied to white and blue collar criminals,” United States v. Saleh, 257
F. App'x 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Andrews, 390
F.3d 840, 848 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Mueffelman,
470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting the need to minimize
“discrepancies between white- and blue-collar offenses”).

Purpose and Intent of Sentencing Guidelines

In United States v. Rigas, two defendants were convicted of white-collar

offenses. 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009). On appeal, the defendants noted that their

sentences for their white-collar crimes were only slightly shorter than the sentences

of some admitted or convicted terrorists. Id. The Second Circuit rejected the

argument and affirmed the sentences, finding that they “were procedurally and

substantively reasonable.” Id. at 126. Further, Rigas stated that “stiff Guidelines

sentences for ‘white-collar’ crimes reflect Congress' judgment as to the appropriate

national policy for such crimes.” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 124; see also Martin, 455 F.3d

at 1240 (“The fact that Martin's guidelines range was 108-135 months'

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imprisonment evinces Congress's attempt to curb judicial leniency in the area of

white collar crime.”).

Here, a Guideline term of imprisonment would be consistent with Congress’

intent for such crimes. This case involves the use and possession of the personal

identification information of multiple victims – many of whom were elderly and

who resided in senior assisted living facilities. Therefore, the Defendant’s

Guideline calculation appropriately calls for a term of imprisonment of 108 months

to 135 months, followed by 24 months prison for the aggravated identity theft

count. (PSR at ⁋⁋ 97-102).

C. Avoiding Sentencing Disparities - 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)

The rationale for using loss amount to calculate a Guidelines Sentence was

to “eliminate disparities between white- and blue-collar offenders.” United States

v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Davis, 537

F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008) (“One of the central reasons for creating the

sentencing guidelines was to ensure stiffer penalties for white-collar crimes and to

eliminate disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences for other

crimes.”). Further, “[o]ne of the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines was to give

greater equivalence between penalties for white collar crimes like fraud and violent

crimes like robbery.” Prosperi, 686 F.3d at 38.

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The fact that “some judges have chosen as a policy matter not to sentence

white collar criminals to the harshest permissible punishments, [ ] does not entitle

other white collar criminals to [receive] lighter punishments[.]” United States v.

Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 131 (2d Cir. 2013).

IV. Departures3 and Variances 4 from the Defendant’s Guideline Sentence

A. Sentencing Framework – The Importance of the Guidelines

The sentencing guidelines “are an indispensable tool in helping courts

achieve Congress’s mandate to consider ‘the need to avoid unwarranted sentence

3
“‘Departure’ is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to non-Guidelines
sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines.” Irizarry v. United States, 553
U.S. 708, 714 (2008). “A ‘departure’ is a divergence from the originally calculated sentence
range based on a specific Guidelines departure provision, whereas a ‘variance’ is a divergence
from the Guidelines range based on an exercise of the Court's discretion under § 3553(a).”
United States v. Gorbatenko, 181 F. Supp. 3d 842, 849 (D. Or. 2015) (citing United States v.
Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 317 (3d Cir. 2011)).
4
“A variance must be based on the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v.
Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 684 (8th Cir. 2007). “When the district court correctly calculated the
guidelines range, found that the range did not address adequately the § 3553(a) factors, and did
not cite a specific departure provision, [the Eleventh Circuit] has concluded that the above-
guidelines sentence involved a variance rather than a departure.” United States v. Nelson, 644 F.
App'x 979, 982 (11th Cir. 2016). Where the district court's rationale for a particular sentence
does not refer to the U.S.S.G. and is based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and its finding that
the advisory guidelines range was inadequate, the district court's decision is properly considered
an upward variance, not a departure.” Id. at 983. Because the guidelines are now advisory (post-
Booker), a “departure” is only a “variance” based on the sentencing factors in § 3553(a); thus,
there is no longer a need for strict compliance with Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(h) (requiring prior notice to
the parties) before imposing a variance sentence. See United States v. DuBoc, 2009 WL 150670,
at *4 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2009) (J. Hinkle). In reviewing the sentence, the appellate court must
give due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors justify the variance;
“that the appellate court might have reasonably reached a different conclusion does not justify
reversal.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007).
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disparities’ among similarly situated defendants,” United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d

1180, 1184 (11th Cir. 2006), which is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

Even though not bound by the guidelines, a sentencing court may not give

them so little consideration that it amounts to “not giv[ing] any real weight to the

Guidelines range in imposing the sentence.” Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1200 (11th Cir.

2008); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to

apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account

when sentencing.”); see generally, Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107

(2007) (“[I]t is unquestioned that uniformity remains an important goal of

sentencing. As we explained in Booker, however, advisory Guidelines combined

with appellate review for reasonableness and ongoing revision of the Guidelines in

response to sentencing practices will help ‘to avoid excessive sentencing

disparities.’”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348 (2007) (“The upshot is that

the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission as

carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at

wholesale.”); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2010).

B. There is No Basis to Vary or Depart Downward
from the Defendant’s Guidelines.

Probation has not identified any factors concerning the offense or the

Defendant that would warrant a downward departure from the prescribed guideline

range. (Doc. 156 at ⁋ 134). For the reasons discussed above, the Defendant in this
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case does not deserve any special treatment or leniency. Rather, the Defendant’s

aggravated role in this case – and utter greed – demonstrate the appropriateness of

at least the Defendant’s Guidelines range.

C. An Upward Departure and Variance are Warranted

An Upward Departure is Warranted Pursuant to USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1)

Further, the sentencing court may depart upward if “reliable information

indicates that the defendant's criminal history category substantially under-

represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that

the defendant will commit other crimes.” USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1). Such information

can include “[p]rior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history

category,” and “[p]rior sentence(s) of substantially more than one year imposed as

a result of independent crimes committed on different occasions.” USSG §

4A1.3(a)(2).

Here, the PSR notes that the Defendant was previously convicted of felonies

including unauthorized use of a credit or debit card, false pretense/bogus check/con

game, breaking and entering, and possession of forged instrument. (Doc. 156 at ⁋⁋

75-78). Due to the age of those prior cases and Oklahoma’s pardon laws those

convictions were not used in computing the Defendant’s criminal history category.

(Doc. 156 at ⁋ 134). Nonetheless, the existence of those prior convictions

warrants an upward departure in the instant case for two reasons: 1) they indicate

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that the Defendant is likely to commit other (future) crimes, and 2) with respect to

those prior convictions, the Defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct to falsely

portray himself as the victim of identity theft. (See Doc. 156 at ⁋⁋ 71).

The unique and egregious conduct described in the PSR Section titled,

“Offense Behavior Not Part of Relevant Conduct” (Doc. 156 at ⁋ 71), regarding the

Defendant’s prior felony convictions supports an upward variance in this case.

During the search of the Defendant’s residence, copies of correspondence between

him and the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (“OSBI”) and other

documentation about the Defendant’s prior convictions were found. See Exhibit A.

Upon inquiry by the Government, the OSBI provided information and records

about the Defendant’s claim that he was the victim of identity theft (as it related to

those convictions). See Exhibit B. The Government was advised that the OSBI

compared the fingerprints on file for the prior Oklahoma felony convictions in the

Defendant’s name, See Exhibit C, to the fingerprint card that they received from

the Defendant which purportedly contained the Defendant’s fingerprints taken by

the Pembroke Pines Police Department.5 See Exhibit B at pgs. 4-5. OSBI advised

5
The Defendant’s Florida Driver License record reflects that he lived in Delray Beach,
FL (Palm Beach County) in 2008. See Exhibit B at pg. 3. The fingerprint card received by OSBI
along with the Defendant’s letter claiming to be a victim of identity theft also reflects a residence
address in Delray Beach. Pembroke Pines, Florida, is located over 40 miles away from Delray
Beach, Florida.
https://www.google.com/search?q=pembroke+pines%2C+fl+to+delray+beach%2C+fl (last
accessed on October 28, 2021). In addition to a sheriff’s office, there are multiple municipal
police departments located in Palm Beach County. See
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that the fingerprint comparison determined that the Defendant was not the person

who was convicted in Oklahoma, which resulted a letter stating such being issued

to the Defendant. See Exhibit B at pg. 6. A copy of the same letter was located in

the Defendant’s residence during the search. See Exhibit A at pg. 5.

However, the Government submitted the Defendant’s arrest fingerprints for

this case (taken when he was processed at the U.S. Marshals Office in Gainesville,

Florida, on March 24, 2021) to a fingerprint examiner at the IRS-CI, along with the

Oklahoma conviction fingerprint cards and the print card received by OSBI as part

of the Defendant’s claim of identity theft. A comparison determined that the

fingerprints bearing the name “Jeremie Pierre Saintvil” from the OSBI [the

Defendant’s Oklahoma prior convictions] and the fingerprints taken when the

Defendant was processed at the U.S. Marshals Office [the instant case] “were

made by the same individual.” See Exhibit D at pg. 1. Moreover, the comparison

determined that that fingerprint exemplars (bearing the name Jeremie Saintvil and

taken by the Pembroke Pines Police Department) which were submitted to OSBI

were actually made by “Tameshar Arjoon.” Id. at pg. 2. That same (unique) name

appears at the bottom of the Pembroke Pines Police Department receipt (for the

https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/CJSTC/Documents/Agency-Addresses/Police-Department-
Directory.aspx (last accessed on October 28, 2021) and
https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/CJSTC/Documents/Agency-Addresses/Sheriff-s-Office-
Directory.aspx (last accessed on October 28, 2021). It defies logic that the Defendant would
have had to travel almost an hour away from his home to get a set of his fingerprints rolled.
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payment of a fingerprint card) which was located in the Defendant’s residence

during the search. See Exhibit A at pg. 1. This is not a mere coincidence.

Recently, the Defendant engaged in making more false statements – even

more reason for this Honorable Court to impose an upward variance in this case.

As noted during the detention hearing in this case, the Defendant’s passport was

seized during the execution of a search warrant at his residence in June 2020.

(Detention Hr’g Tr., Doc. 21 at pg. 15, lines 16-18). About two months later, the

Defendant’s prior defense counsel emailed the undersigned asking for the return of

the Defendant’s passport. (See Gov’t Hr’g Exh. 3C; See also Doc. 21 at pg. 15,

lines 9-14). After the Government refused to return the Defendant’s passport, in

September 2020, the Defendant applied for a replacement passport from the United

States Department of State along with an affidavit/statement indicating that he had

“lost” his passport. (See Gov’t Hr’g Exhs. 3A & 3B; see also Doc. 21 at pgs. 15-

17). The Defendant’s claim that he “lost” his passport – and not that it was

actually in the custody of the federal government pursuant to a search warrant –

constituted a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542. See United States v.

Bruteyn, 373 F.App’x 247 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Conners, 441 F.3d 527

(7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Sotelo, 940 F.2d 1537 (9th Cir. 1991); United

States v. Hack, 2009 WL 577762 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2009).

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Caselaw Supports an Upward Variance

The instant case falls “outside the heartland” of fraud cases because of the

Defendant’s manipulative nature, the preparation that went into his scheme to

defraud, and the circumstances surrounding the fraud — i.e., specific use of

personal identity information belonging to nursing home residents and other

elderly individuals to commit fraud. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1182

(11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (explaining that a case falls “outside the heartland”

when “there [is] something unusual, either about the defendant or the

circumstances surrounding the crime,” that warrants a sentence outside of the

guidelines range). A district court's decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines

may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case

outside the heartland to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to

apply. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109.

Upward variances are routinely applied in white-collar cases where the §

3553(a) factors justify them. See, e.g., United States v. Lantigua, 749 F. App'x 875

(11th Cir. 2018) (affirming sentence of 168 months' imprisonment – an 81-month

upward variance from the top of the applicable guidelines range – for conspiracy to

commit mail fraud and wire fraud, bank fraud, passport fraud, and aggravated

identity theft); United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1274, 1280-81 (11th Cir.

2007) (affirming 240–month sentence for, inter alia, conspiracy to steal U.S. mail,

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theft of U.S mail, and money laundering, despite guidelines range of only 51–63

months and Defendant's lack of criminal history, where the district court expressed

its belief that crimes presented “a very serious matter,” that the advisory range was

“inadequate,” and where the court noted that the lengthy sentence was imposed to

“provide adequate deterrence” and “to protect the public”); United States v.

Barnes, 288 F. App'x 683 (11th Cir. 2008) (120–month sentence, which

represented an upward variance from Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months'

imprisonment, was not unreasonable for filing false tax returns, identity theft, and

theft of government property where district court concluded that the sentence it

imposed was necessary to protect the public from future crimes by defendant, deter

others from similar crimes, and communicate the seriousness of defendant's

crimes); United States v. Green, 497 F. App'x 894 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming a

sentence of 120 months – an upward variance – for bank fraud and aggravated

identity theft where district court believed the Guidelines range underrepresented

the defendant's criminal history); United States v. Mitchell, 789 F. App'x 774 (11th

Cir. 2019) (upward variance affirmed for possessing 15 or more counterfeit credit

cards where court noted significant number of fraudulent cards and sensitive

personal information involved, and the minimal deterrent effect prior penalties had

on the defendant); United States v. Rodriguez, 486 F. App'x 30 (11th Cir. 2012)

(affirming sentenced of 144 months in prison – an upward variance – for

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possession of counterfeit or unauthorized devices, possession of device-making

equipment and aggravated identity theft based on need for future deterrence);

United States v. Coffie-Joseph, 637 F. App'x 752 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming total of

120 months' imprisonment for wire fraud, money laundering, passport fraud, and

aggravated identity theft where district court “considered maximum sentence

provided by Congress on all of defendant's counts, explicitly stated that Guidelines'

focus on amount of monetary loss did not sufficiently take into account

consequences of crime or purposes of sentencing factors, and stated that sentence

imposed was necessary to promote respect for the law and deter conduct, and

district court focused on defendant's history, characteristics, and need to protect

public from further crimes by defendant”); United States v. Weathers, 581 F. App'x

273 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming 259 months’ imprisonment – an upward variance

from Guidelines range of 140-175 months – for conspiracy to commit bank fraud,

bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft); United States v. Biyiklioglu, 716 F.

App'x 270 (5th Cir. 2017) (affirming sentence of 192 months' imprisonment for

wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, tax evasion, and money laundering); United

States v. Thomas, 2021 WL 245275 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 2021) (bank fraud,

aggravated identity theft, and passing a Treasury check with a falsely made and

forged endorsement); United States v. Bricker, 574 F. App'x 906 (11th Cir. 2014)

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(upward variance for mail theft, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft affirmed

in light of the statutory sentencing factors).

The Court can rely on certain aspects of a defendant’s conduct that it has

considered in imposing an enhancement, particularly where a defendant’s conduct

was egregious or extraordinary. See United States v. Jenkins, 677 F. App’x 566,

569 (11th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (citing United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823,

833-34 (11th Cir. 2007)). As established by the evidence introduced at trial, the

Defendant’s criminal conduct was indeed “egregious” and “extraordinary.” Not

only did the Defendant’s scheme negatively impact the financial institutions which

he defrauded, his fraud and identity theft caused financial harm and emotional

distress to the elderly victims and their family (who managed their finances and

affairs).

V. CONCLUSION

The record reflects that the Defendant has been a fraudster for decades. The

facts of this case demonstrate the lengths that the Defendant will go to in order to

defraud banks, credit card companies, and vulnerable victims. Moreover, the

Defendant employed sophisticated means to carry out his scheme to defraud.

Examples of his sophistication in this case include the Defendant’s use of: 1)

several virtual offices opened in the names of his victims posing as those victims

when picking up mail at the offices, 2) multiple fake email accounts to portray

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himself as the victims whose personal identifying information he used to

fraudulently apply for and obtain loans and credit cards, 3) driver’s licenses and

identification cards which were fraudulently obtained without permission or

knowledge of the victims, and 4) false tax forms and other financial documents

which were created as supporting documentation for the loans that the Defendant

fraudulently sought from financial institutions.

Before this Honorable Court for sentencing is man who, despite his

educational background, previous business experience, and prior incarceration,

obtained the personal identification information of elderly victims – many of which

were vulnerable due to their advanced age and infirmities of aging – which he used

to carry out his scheme to defraud banks, credit card companies, and others. In

doing so, the Defendant weaved a web of lies and deceit to carry out his scheme

for years. But for the keen attention of the Florida Credit Union personnel who

caught the red flags in the Defendant’s fraudulent PPP loan application, the

Defendant almost certainly would still be carrying out his scheme to defraud

today. 6 The Defendant endeavored to fraudulently obtain almost $2 million and

6
A search warrant for the Defendant’s residence was obtained in this investigation and
executed on June 18, 2020, resulting in the seizure of the Defendant’s computers, hard drives,
cell phones, and tablets. Additional, seizure warrants were obtained in the investigation which
resulted in several bank accounts being frozen. These investigative actions essentially cut off the
Defendant from his means of carrying out his scheme to defraud (i.e. personal identification
information, and documents and financial templates stored on his electronic devices, and emails),
and the fraud proceeds thereof.
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successfully received over $1.5 million in fraud proceeds. In sum, the Defendant’s

greed and years of skullduggery necessitates a lengthy prison sentence.

WHEREFORE, the United States urges this Honorable Court to impose a

prison sentence at the top of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, or even

above such range as an upward variance (consistent with the §3553(a) sentencing

factors).

Respectfully submitted,

JASON R. COODY
Acting United States Attorney

/s/ Justin M. Keen
JUSTIN M. KEEN
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar Number: 021034
111 North Adams Street, Fourth Floor
Tallahassee, FL 32301
Justin.Keen@usdoj.gov
(850) 942-8430

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1(F)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this memorandum complies with the type-

volume limitation of Local Rule 7.1(F) because this pleading contains

approximately 5,037 words.

/s/ Justin M. Keen
JUSTIN M. KEEN
Assistant United States Attorney

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has

been filed via the Court’s CM/ECF system on this 6th day of December, 2021,

which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record, and which

will send a copy via U.S. Mail to Jeremie Saintvil (pro se defendant) at the Dixie

County Jail.
/s/ Justin M. Keen
JUSTIN M. KEEN
Assistant United States Attorney

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Exhibit A
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Exhibit C
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Lab Number: 21-0189
Request Number: 0001

Identification on Item 1 and the fingerprint exemplars bearing the name Jeremie Pierre Saintvil, Submission UCN:
526571DB0, Event ID: 40376214530 on Item 3 to the fingerprint exemplars bearing the name Jeremie Saintvil purportedly
from the Pembroke Pines Police Department on Item 2 revealed that they were not made by the same individual.

An AFIS evaluation revealed one (1) patent print on Item 2 that was suitable for AFIS processing.

Searches of the FBI NGI database and subsequent comparisons revealed:
·The fingerprint exemplars bearing the name Jeremie Saintvil purportedly from the Pembroke Pines Police Department on
Item 2 were made by Tameshwar Arjoon (FBI# 517117DG2).

Remarks
The listed items are only those which have been examined in this specific request and may not be a comprehensive
list of all evidence submitted in the case.
Exemplars used for comparisons in this case were obtained electronically. If the subjects are taken into custody, please
submit the subjects' current exemplars to the laboratory for authentication.

Items 1, 2, and 3 were submitted electronically and those files will be retained at the IRS National Forensic Laboratory.

John Gorski
Senior Fingerprint Specialist

Any conclusions, interpretations and/or opinions in this laboratory report are those of the author.

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