Sentencing Factors — No. 1:20-cr-00290 (Dkt. 18, D.D.C.)
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Defendant Angelita Aipoalani's memorandum in aid of sentencing, filed June 23, 2021 as Document 18 in United States v. Aipoalani, Cr. No. 20-CR-290 (RBW), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The memorandum states that on April 1, 2021 she pleaded guilty to a one count Information charging conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 371, that the charged conduct occurred from November 2015 through June 2019, and that she has complied with her release conditions. Going through the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it asks the court to sentence her to probation with community service and states that she intends to make restitution payments.
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“Sentencing Factors — No. 1:20-cr-00290 (Dkt. 18, D.D.C.).”
Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/sentencing-factors-no-1-20-cr-00290-dkt-18-d-d-c-5b85d10740/
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Case 1:20-cr-00290-RBW Document 18 Filed 06/23/21 Page 1 of 8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
v. : Cr. No. 20-CR-290 (RBW)
ANGELITA AIPOALANI, :
Defendant. :
____________________________________
DEFENDANT ANGELITA AIPOALANI’S MEMORANDUM IN AID OF SENTENCING
On April 1, 2021, Ms. Aipoalani pleaded guilty to a one count Information charging her
with Conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 371. She was released on her own recognizance and has
been in full compliance with her release conditions. The criminal conduct charged in the
Information occurred from November 2015 through June 2019. In light of all of the
circumstance of this case, Ms. Aipoalani, through counsel, respectfully requests that the Court
sentence her to probation with community service.
SENTENCING FACTORS
When imposing a sentence, the Court must consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) The need for the sentence imposed B
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner;
Case 1:20-cr-00290-RBW Document 18 Filed 06/23/21 Page 2 of 8
(3) The kinds of sentences available;
(4) The kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for [the applicable
offense and the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the Sentencing
Guidelines];
(5) Any pertinent policy statement [issued by the Sentencing Commission];
(6) The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) The need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
See 18 U.S.C. ' 3553(a); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
Congress has further provided that:
[t]he court, in determining whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment, and, if a term
of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall consider
the factors set forth in Section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing
that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation.
See 18 U.S.C. ' 3582 (emphasis added). With that limitation and considering all of the
purposes of sentencing, the Court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of sentencing].” 18 U.S.C. ' 3553(a) (emphasis added).
Several years after Booker, the Supreme Court made clear that the “Court’s overarching duty” is
to “‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’” Pepper v. United States, 562
U.S. 476, 493 (2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)), to comply with “the four identified purposes
of sentencing: just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation,” Dean v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1175 (2017); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In addition, the
sentencing court may consider any “information concerning the background, character, and
conduct” of the defendant, including age, educational and vocational skills, mental and
emotional conditions, and lack of guidance as a youth. 18 U.S.C. § 3661.
Congress has further provided that:
Case 1:20-cr-00290-RBW Document 18 Filed 06/23/21 Page 3 of 8
[t]he court, in determining whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment, and, if
a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term,
shall consider the factors set forth in Section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (emphasis added).
Since Booker, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Sentencing Guidelines are merely one
factor to be considered by district courts when fashioning a reasonable sentence and that the
Sentencing Guidelines are not to be weighed more heavily than other sentencing factors. See Rita
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). A sentencing
court shall not simply presume that a sentence within the Guideline range is automatically
reasonable or that a sentence within the Guideline range is more reasonable than a sentence outside
of the Guideline range. Rita, 551 U.S. at 338; Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. The sentencing court further
shall not presume that a sentence outside of the Guidelines range is unreasonable. Id. By
considering the Sentencing Guidelines along with all of the factors set forth 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
“the sentencing court subjects the defendant’s sentence to the thorough adversarial testing
contemplated by federal sentencing procedure.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 351.
It is critical for sentencing courts to consider all sentencing factors and to not give undue
weight to the Sentencing Guidelines because, as the Supreme Court has long emphasized that “‘[i]t
has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings
that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.’” Gall, 552
U.S. at 52 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)); see also United States v.
Faison, No. GJH-19-27, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27643, at *4-5 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2020)(“But if
judges are not careful, a rote application of the Guidelines can turn what is often a life-defining
Case 1:20-cr-00290-RBW Document 18 Filed 06/23/21 Page 4 of 8
moment for the defendant into a check-the-box, formulaic calculation devoid of the
individualized sentencing we strive for.”).
Overall, judges are encouraged to resist “anchoring” the sentence on the guideline
numbers. “Anchoring is a cognitive bias that describes the human tendency to adjust judgments
or assessments higher or lower based on previously disclosed external information - the ‘anchor.’
Studies demonstrate ‘that decisionmakers tend to focus their attention on the anchor value and to
adjust insufficiently to account for new information.’” Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive
“Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Sot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for
Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 489, 495 (2014) (citations
omitted).
It is important to distinguish the guidelines' intended, salutary effect - promoting
consistency and proportionality in sentencing - from the unintended anchoring
effect that the guidelines can exert. … Anchoring leads to cognitive error not
insofar as judges intentionally use the guidelines in an advisory fashion, but
instead when judges irrationally assign too much weight to the guidelines range,
just because it offers some initial numbers.
Id. at 524 (inner quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Docampo, 573
F.3d 1091, 1105 n.5 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Not only have
district courts now become used to relying on [the Guidelines], but the Guidelines inevitably
have a considerable anchoring effect on a district court’s analysis”). However, the sentencing
guidelines remain one of the factors that the Court must consider.
(1) The United States Sentencing Guidelines.
Ms. Aipoalani, the government and the Probation Office are in agreement as to
the guideline calculation. At an offense level of 10 and criminal history category I, the
guideline range is 6 to 12 months and Ms. Aipoalani is eligible for a period of probation.
We ask that the Court impose a sentence of probation.
Case 1:20-cr-00290-RBW Document 18 Filed 06/23/21 Page 5 of 8
(2) The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense.
Ms. Aipoalani does not dispute the seriousness of the offense and she makes no excuses
for her criminal actions. The nature and circumstances of the offense have been accurately
portrayed both in the statement of offense she agreed to and in the PSR. She deeply regrets
having engaged in this fraudulent behavior. To her credit, she immediately accepted
responsibility for her behavior and agreed to plead guilty. She acknowledged her wrongdoing
without any hesitation and ultimately pleaded guilty.
(3) The History and Characteristics of the Defendant.
Ms. Aipoalani has no prior criminal conduct whatsoever. She was born in the
Philippines but raised in Hawaii where she lives now with her husband and children as
well as extended family members. Ms. Aipoalani’s mother died when she was just 10
years old, but she had the good fortune to be raised with many siblings and a supportive
family.
Ms. Aipoalani and her husband have been together for 24 years – more than half
her life. They have three children, ages 12 and 16, all of whom are in school in Hawaii.
With Mr. Aipoalani facing a longer term of incarceration, Ms. Aipoalani will have sole
responsibility for the children. As Mr. Aipoalani has opined, she trusted him and relied
upon him, and is now prepared to question what is occurring much more carefully. Her
employment was terminated upon learning of her and her husband’s crimes. However,
she does have a history of employment and is hopeful that she will be able to obtain
employment that will allow her to earn enough to support her family especially while her
husband is in custody.
Case 1:20-cr-00290-RBW Document 18 Filed 06/23/21 Page 6 of 8
As the Court can see from the letters attached to this sentencing memorandum,
Ms. Aipoalani has the support of her family and community despite these charges. She
was a valuable member of her community prior to this conviction and will continue to be
after this sentencing. She wants to make amends by giving back to her community in
whatever way she can while continuing to care for her children.
(4) The Purposes of Sentencing.
The Sentencing Reform Act requires the Court to impose a sentence that not only
will reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law, but also will
provide just punishment, afford deterrence to criminal conduct, and protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant. Here, the Court can fully achieve these sentencing
goals by imposing a non-custodial sentence that couples probation with community
service rather than imposing a term of incarceration.
Ms. Aipoalani is unlikely to recidivate given her age and her lack of any prior
criminal history as well as her role in this offense. The United States Sentencing
Commission has identified increased age as a powerful predictor of reduced
recidivism. U.S.S.C., A Comparison of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Criminal
History Category and the U.S. Parole Commission Salient Factor Score (Jan. 4,
2005), at 13-15, available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/researchpublications/2005/20050104_Recidivism_Salient_Factor_Compu
tation.pdf. The Sentencing Commission has reported that “[r]ecidivism rates decline
relatively consistently as age increase.” U.S.S.C., Measuring Recidivism: The
Criminal History Computation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (May 2004), at
12 & Ex. 9, available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
Case 1:20-cr-00290-RBW Document 18 Filed 06/23/21 Page 7 of 8
publications/research-publications/2004/200405_Recidivism_Criminal_History.pdf.
The same study, and others, find employment, strong family ties, no criminal history,
and a lack of substance abuse problems all lead to a much lower risk of recidivism.
All of these factors weigh in Ms. Aipoalani’s favor.
(5) The Kinds of Sentences Available.
Here, rather than imposing any period of incarceration, the Court could sentence Ms.
Aipoalani to a period of probation with home confinement and/or community service. There is
no mandatory period of incarceration for this charge.
(6) The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Disparities.
The sentence requested by the defense would not result in unwarranted
disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
(7) Restitution.
Ms. Aipolani intends to fully cooperate to make payments toward restitution to
the best of her abilities.
For all of the foregoing reasons, and for reasons to be presented at the sentencing
hearing, Ms. Aipoalani respectfully requests that the Court sentence her to a term of
probation with community service.
Respectfully submitted,
A.J. KRAMER
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
Case 1:20-cr-00290-RBW Document 18 Filed 06/23/21 Page 8 of 8
______/s/____________________
Michelle Peterson
Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender
625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 550
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 208-7500
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