Senate hearing (117th Congress), NOMINATIONS OF THE 117TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION - PART I
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[Senate Hearing 117-288]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-288
NOMINATIONS OF THE 117th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION_PART I
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
Part I
January 19, 2021 thru July 20, 2021
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
NOMINATIONS OF THE 117TH CONGRESS,
FIRST SESSION--PART I
S. Hrg. 117-288
NOMINATIONS OF THE 117TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION_PART I
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
Part I
January 19, 2021 thru July 20, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-861 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Jessica Lewis, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Responses to additional questions from the committee and any
other material submitted for the record are located at the end
of each hearing transcript.
PART I
January 19, 2021--Blinken, Hon. Antony J., of New York, nominated
to be U.S, Secretary of State--hearing transcript printed as a
separate document in two parts:
Part I: https://bit.ly/3yKm75m
Part II: https://bit.ly/3OIPCd6
January 27, 2021--Thomas-Greenfield, Hon. Linda, of Louisiana,
nominated to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations--
hearing transcript printed as a separate document: https://
bit.ly/3AsQRsH
March 3, 2021.................................................... 1
Sherman, Hon. Wendy R., of Maryland, nominated to be Deputy
Secretary of State......................................... 9
McKeon, Hon. Brian, of the District of Columbia, nominated to
be Deputy Secretary of State (Management and Resources).... 13
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 60
March 23, 2021................................................... 171
Power, Hon. Samantha, of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development................................................ 176
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 207
April 15, 2021................................................... 263
Nuland, Hon. Victoria, of Virginia, nominated to be Under
Secretary of State (Political Affairs)..................... 269
Zeya, Uzra, of Virginia, nominated to be Under Secretary of
State (Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights)..... 272
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 292
April 28, 2021................................................... 353
Jenkins, Hon. Bonnie D., of New York, nominated to be Under
Secretary of State (Arms Control and International
Security).................................................. 357
Fernandez, Hon. Jose W., of New York, nominated to be Under
Secretary of State (Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment); Alternate Governor of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development; Alternate Governor of
the Inter-American Development Bank; and Alternate Governor
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.... 360
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 379
(iii)
May 19, 2021..................................................... 425
Nichols, Hon. Brian A., of Rhode Island, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (Western Hemisphere Affairs).. 431
Sison, Hon. Michele Jeanne, of Maryland, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (International Organization
Affairs)................................................... 434
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 462
June 9, 2021..................................................... 493
Andre, Hon. Larry Edward Jr., of Texas, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Somalia.............. 498
Brewer, Hon. Maria E., of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho....................... 500
Mushingi, Hon. Tulinabo S., of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Angola, and to serve
concurrently and without additional compensation as
Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and
Principe................................................... 503
Aubin, Hon. Elizabeth Moore, of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria.. 505
Young, Eugene S., of New York, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Republic of Congo...................................... 508
Lamora, Christopher John, of Rhode Island, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon..................... 510
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 520
June 15, 2021.................................................... 549
Robinson, Hon. Todd D., of New Jersey, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs)................................... 552
Holmgren, Brett M., of Minnesota, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Intelligence and Research)............. 555
Kritenbrink, Hon. Daniel J., of Virginia, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (East Asian and Pacific
Affairs)................................................... 558
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 583
July 13, 2021.................................................... 617
Smith, Gentry O., of Virginia, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Diplomatic Security)................... 622
Bitter, Hon. Rena, of the District of Colombia, nominated to
be Assistant Secretary of State (Consular Affairs)......... 625
Medina, Monica P., of Maryland, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs).................................... 628
Knapper, Marc Evans, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam............ 631
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 647
July 20, 2021.................................................... 669
Adams-Allen, Paloma, of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (Management and Resources)....... 672
Donfried, Dr. Karen, of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be Assistant Secretary of State (European Affairs and
Eurasian Affairs).......................................... 675
Phee, Hon. Mary Catherine, of Illinois, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (African Affairs) and a member
of the Board of Directors of the African Development
Foundation................................................. 677
Witkowsky, Anne A., nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
State (Conflict and Stabilization Operations), and to be
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development............. 680
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 695
----------
PART II
July 27, 2021.................................................... 739
Gifford, Hon. Rufus, of Massachusetts, nominated to be Chief
of Protocol and to have the rank of Ambassador during his
tenure of service.......................................... 745
Satterfield, Lee, of South Carolina, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (Educational and Cultural
Affairs)................................................... 748
Coleman, Hon. Isobel, of New York, nominated to be Deputy
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (Policy and Programming)....................... 751
Lu, Hon. Christopher, of Virginia, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the U.N. for U.N. Management and Reform,
and to be the Alternative Representative to the Sessions of
the General Assembly of the U.N............................ 753
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 768
July 28, 2021.................................................... 789
Salazar, Hon. Kenneth Lee, of Colorado, nominated to be
Ambassador to the United Mexican States.................... 795
Lewis, Jessica, of Ohio, nominated to be Assistant Secretary
of State (Political-Military Affairs)...................... 798
Lu, Hon. Donald, of California, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (South Asian Affairs)................... 801
Escobari, Hon. Marcela, of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (Latin America and the Caribbean) 803
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 823
August 5, 2021................................................... 859
Raynor, Hon. Michael, of Maryland, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Senegal, and to serve concurrently and
without additional compensation as Ambassador to the
Republic of Guinea-Bissau.................................. 863
Ostfield, Marc, of Pennsylvania, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Paraguay................................ 866
Fitrill, Troy Damian, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Guinea.................................. 868
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 879
September 15, 2021 (a.m.)........................................ 889
Noyes, Hon. Julieta Valls, of Virginia, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (Population, Refugees, and
Migration)................................................. 896
Bauer, Hon. Denise Campbell, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the French Republic, and to serve
concurrently and without additional compensation as
Ambassador to the Principality of Monaco................... 899
Smith, Julianne, of Michigan, nominated to be U.S. Permanent
Representative to the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, with the rank and status of Ambassador....... 902
Leaf, Hon. Barbara A., of Virginia, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Near Eastern Affairs).................. 905
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 929
September 15, 2021 (p.m.)........................................ 997
Kang, Dr. C.S. Eliot, of New Jersey, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (International Security and
Nonproliferation).......................................... 1000
Scheinman, Hon. Adam, of Virginia, nominated to be Special
Representative of the President for Nuclear
Nonproliferation, with the rank of Ambassador.............. 1002
Bernicat, Hon. Marcia Stephens Bloom, of New Jersey,
nominated to be Director General of the Foreign Service.... 1005
Crocker, Hon. Bathsheba Nell, of the District of Columbia,
nominated to be U.S. Representative to the Office of the
U.N. and other International Organizations in Geneva, with
the rank of Ambassador..................................... 1007
Carpenter, Dr. Michael, of the District of Columbia,
nominated to be U.S. Representative to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, with the rank of
Ambassador................................................. 1010
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1028
September 22, 2021............................................... 1067
Nides, Hon. Thomas R., of Minnesota, nominated to be
Ambassador to the State of Israel.......................... 1079
Cohen, David L., of Pennsylvania, nominated to be Ambassador
to Canada.................................................. 1082
Telles, Dr. Cynthia Ann, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Costa Rica................... 1084
Udall, Hon. Tom, of New Mexico, nominated to be Ambassador to
New Zealand and without additional compensation to be
Ambassador to the State of Samoa........................... 1115
Margon, Sarah, of New York, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.. 1118
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1130
September 28, 2021............................................... 1249
Markell, Hon. Jack A., of Delaware, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, with the rank of Ambassador............... 1256
Gitenstein, Hon. Mark, of Washington, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the European Union, with the rank of
Ambassador................................................. 1259
Flake, Hon. Jeffrey Lane, of Arizona, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey....................... 1262
McCain, Cindy Hensley, of Arizona, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Agencies for Food and
Agriculture with the rank of Ambassador during her tenure
of service................................................. 1265
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1285
September 29, 2021............................................... 1311
Sullenberger, Capt. C.B. III, of Texas, nominated to be U.S.
Representative on the Council of the International Civil
Aviation Organization with the rank of Ambassador during
his tenure of service...................................... 1318
Gawande, Dr. Atul A., of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development.................................. 1321
Cronin, Hon. Claire D., of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Ambassador to Ireland...................................... 1323
Logsdon, Kent Doyle, of Pennsylvania, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Moldova...................... 1336
Cromer, Sharon L., of New York, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Republic of The Gambia................................. 1339
Palmer, Hon. Virginia E., of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Ghana........................ 1341
Van Vranken, Howard A., of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Botswana..................... 1344
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1352
September 30, 2021............................................... 1411
Holgate, Hon. Laura S.H., of Virginia, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
with the rank of Ambassador, and to be U.S. Representative
to the Vienna Office of the U.N. with the rank of
Ambassador................................................. 1415
McClelland, Caryn R., of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to Brunei Darussalam............................ 1418
Young, David John, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Republic of Malawi..................................... 1420
Pierangelo, Claire A., of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and to serve
concurrently and without additional compensation as
Ambassador to the Union of the Comoros..................... 1423
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1431
----------
PART III
October 5, 2021 (a.m.)........................................... 1455
Stewart, Mallory A., of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be Assistant Secretary of State (Verification and
Compliance)................................................ 1458
Bondy, Steven C., of New Jersey, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Kingdom of Bahrain.................................. 1461
Carty, Lisa A., of Maryland, nominated to be U.S.
Representative on the U.N. Economic and Social Council,
with the rank of Ambassador, and to be Alternate
Representative to the Sessions of the U.N. General Assembly
during her tenure of service............................... 1463
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1485
October 5, 2021 (p.m.)........................................... 1525
Hovenier, Jeffrey M., of Washington, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Kosovo....................... 1529
Murphy, Michael J., of New York, nominated to be Ambassador
to Bosnia and Herzegovina.................................. 1532
Pantaleon, Hon. Julissa Reynoso, of New York, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Spain, and to serve
concurrently and without additional compensation as
Ambassador the Principality of Andorra..................... 1535
Kennedy, Victoria Reggie, of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Austria...................... 1538
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1558
October 20, 2021 (a.m.).......................................... 1583
Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Ambassador to the People's Republic of China............... 1587
Emanuel, Hon. Rahm, of Illinois, nominated to be Ambassador
to Japan................................................... 1626
Kaplan, Jonathan Eric, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore.................... 1630
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1651
October 20, 2021 (p.m.).......................................... 1735
Mahoney, Hon. Patricia, of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Central African Republic................. 1739
Vrooman, Hon. Peter Hendrick, of New York, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Mozambique................... 1741
Haas Peter D., of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador to the
People's Republic of Bangladesh............................ 1744
Chung, Julie, of California, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka............. 1747
Shukan, Brian Wesley, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Benin................................... 1756
Fitzsimmons, Elizabeth Anne Noseworthy, of Delaware,
nominated to be Ambassador to the Togolese Republic........ 1759
Gilmour, Hon. David R., of the District of Columbia,
nominated to be Ambassador to the Republic of Equatorial
Guinea..................................................... 1762
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1771
October 26, 2021................................................. 1837
Stanley, Marc R., of Texas, nominated to be Ambassador to the
Argentine Republic......................................... 1840
Rashad, Hussain, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador-at-
Large for International Religious Freedom.................. 1846
Wong, Chantale Yokmin, of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be U.S. director of the Asian Development Bank, with the
Rank of Ambassador......................................... 1849
Kugler, Dr. Adriana Debora, of Maryland, nominated to be U.S.
Executive Director of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development for a term of two years..... 1852
Toloui, Hon. Ramin, of Iowa, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Economic and Business Affairs)......... 1857
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1873
November 2, 2021................................................. 1941
Barrett, Hon. Thomas, of Wisconsin, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg................ 1947
Harpootlian, Jamie L., of South Carolina, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Slovenia..................... 1950
Miller, Scott, of Colorado, nominated to be Ambassador to the
Swiss Confederation, and to serve concurrently and without
additional compensation as Ambassador to the Principality
of Liechtenstein........................................... 1952
Ramanathan, Erik D., of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Sweden........................ 1955
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1968
December 1, 2021................................................. 1985
Nathan, Scott, of Massachusetts, nominated to be Chief
Executive Officer of the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation........................................ 1990
Bass, Hon. John R., of New York, nominated to be Under
Secretary of State (Management)............................ 1993
Brzezinski, Hon. Mark, of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Poland....................... 1995
Adler, Michael M., of Florida, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Kingdom of Belgium..................................... 1998
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 2024
December 14, 2021 (a.m.)......................................... 2067
Blome, Hon. Donald Armin, of Illinois, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan............. 2074
Garcetti, Hon. Eric M., of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of India........................ 2077
Gutmann, Dr. Amy, of Pennsylvania, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Federal Republic of Germany......................... 2080
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 2094
December 14, 2021 (p.m.)......................................... 2151
Hill, Hon. Christopher R., of Rhode Island, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia....................... 2156
Taylor, Michele, of Georgia, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Council with the
rank of Ambassador during her tenure of service............ 2159
Albright, Alice, of the District of Columbia, nominated to be
Chief Executive Officer of the Millennium Challenge
Corporation................................................ 2162
Donnelly, Hon. Joseph, of Indiana, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Holy See............................................ 2164
Whyche-Shaw, Oren E., of Maryland, nominated to be U.S.
Director of the African Development Bank for a term of five
years...................................................... 2180
Ebong, Enoh T., of the District of Columbia, nominated to be
Director of the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.......... 2182
Nucete, Leopoldo Martinez, of Virginia, nominated to be U.S.
Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank
for a term of three years.................................. 2185
Jorge, Maria Fabiana, of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the Inter-
American Development Bank.................................. 2188
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 2196
NOMINATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present. Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen,
Risch, Rubio, Romney, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, Rounds, and
Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
We are here today to consider nominees for two critical
positions, Wendy Sherman, to be Deputy Secretary of State and
Brian McKeon to be Deputy Secretary of State for Management and
Resources.
They are both foreign policy veterans with deep experience
in Congress and the executive branch. Ms. Sherman has held a
series of positions at the State Department and is well versed
in international affairs.
And I would be remiss if I did not mention Mr. McKeon's
long service as chief counsel and deputy staff director of this
committee under then-Chairman Biden. And we appreciate your
willingness to return to government service.
We thank your families as well because, inevitably they are
part of the sacrifice. And I understand before I begin my
opening comments that Senator Cardin would like to introduce
Ambassador Sherman.
So I will recognize him for that purpose.
Senator Cardin?
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much,
and Ranking Member Risch, thank you for the opportunity for me
to introduce a fellow Marylander, a person I deeply admire, a
seasoned diplomat, and, I think a person eminently qualified to
take on the responsibilities as Deputy Secretary of State, and
that is Wendy Sherman.
On a personal note, I have known Wendy Sherman and her
family for my entire adult life. Her family represents the
values of giving back to the community, and Wendy has chosen a
career in public service for all the right reasons. to make our
nation and world safer and to enhance opportunities for all.
So first, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Wendy Sherman and
her family for their willingness to continue in public life. We
recognize the sacrifices and we thank you for being willing to
serve our country.
Ambassador Sherman is extraordinarily qualified to be the
Deputy Secretary of State. She started as a social worker and
rose to become the chief of staff for Senator Barbara Mikulski.
She knows how to work with senators.
She was the Secretary for Children and Youth in Maryland,
and also in Maryland the director of the Maryland Office of
Child Welfare. She has executive experience. She knows how to
manage and she knows how to lead.
She has incredible experience in the State Department as
the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, a counselor
for State under Secretary Albright with the rank of ambassador,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the first woman
to hold that position.
And if confirmed, she would be the first woman to hold the
Deputy Secretary of State position. She knows the strength of
diplomacy and how to use it to advance U.S. interests. I cannot
think of a person better suited for this position at this
moment.
We are at a critical junction. We have the opportunity to
rebuild America's diplomacy, to strengthen relations with
allies around the world, and to promote our reputation as a
global leader for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
In order to seize this opportunity, we need competent
compassionate leaders with deep expertise and integrity at the
helm of the U.S. foreign policy. Ambassador Sherman is just
such a leader. She is, first and foremost, a dedicated public
servant.
Ambassador Sherman has spent her career advocating for
people and the public good. Ambassador Sherman is a tested
diplomat with particular experience in many of the most urgent
challenges that face our global community today. She has gone
toe to toe with our adversaries from North Koreans to Iranians,
and represented the United States with dignity, strength, and
poise.
Her achievements in community organizing and her experience
in both the public and private sector give her the knowledge
that she needs to carry out these responsibilities.
I want to just mention one example of why I think
Ambassador Sherman is the right person for this position, and
that is the Iran nuclear agreement. I was ranking member in
2015 when we took up the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, and
let me just set the stage because I think many of us knew at
that time that there was the threatened veto by the Obama
administration.
There was a deep partisan division in the Senate as to how
we should review the act. And we worked together, Democrats and
Republicans, with the Obama administration. Ambassador Sherman
was extremely helpful in making this a reality.
And at the end of the day, that Review Act passed the
United States Senate by a 98 to 1 vote and Ambassador Sherman
was key in involving Congress as we reviewed that Act. She gave
each of us, Democrats and Republicans, a meaningful role in how
we could improve the Iran nuclear agreement. She was totally
engaged with complete transparency and trust.
Ambassador Sherman and I came out with different sides on
the final agreement. But I could not stress enough how
impressed I was of her commitment to include all of us in the
process. She gave us the opportunity to fully participate in
the best traditions of the executive and legislative branches
working together to strengthen U.S. foreign policy.
Ambassador Sherman is the type of leader we need at the
State Department, who knows how to work with Congress and will
always put the national security of America first.
I strongly endorse her nomination to be the next Deputy
Secretary of State. And, Mr. Chairman, if I might, I would ask
unanimous consent that a letter signed by a hundred former
ambassadors endorsing Ambassador Sherman's nomination to be
Deputy Secretary of State be made part of our record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to is located at the end of this
transcript.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
As an esteemed and respected senior member of the
committee, you are well served, Ambassador, by that glowing
introduction. So thank you, Senator Cardin.
Let me start off with a few remarks to set the scene and
then I will turn to the distinguished ranking member.
Ambassador Sherman and Mr. McKeon, before diving into some
of the many regional and global issues we face, I want to
address the serious challenges facing the department and its
workforce. Our career Foreign and Civil Service are an
invaluable resource for this nation. Their dedication,
professionalism, and sacrifice deserve our gratitude and our
support.
But the last few years have been trying for the department.
There has been a stunning loss of expertise, steep declines in
morale, little accountability for those at the top, and the
department still has not achieved a workforce that reflects the
diversity of this great country.
It is clear that Secretary Blinken is setting a tone and,
critically, an example that will help restore trust and empower
career experts. In particular, I appreciate his commitment to
ensuring the department's leadership and workforce reflect the
diversity of our nation, including the recent announcement of a
chief diversity officer.
It will, of course, take more than just a good example and
hard work from the Secretary to rebuild the department and its
workforce. So I look forward to hearing from both of you how
you will contribute to that cause.
You also both know the importance of a strong relationship
between the department and Congress, and the value of engaging
and securing congressional support on major foreign policy
decisions.
In recent years, that relationship has suffered. I
appreciate the Secretary's acknowledgement of the problem and
commitment to productive engagement with this committee.
I expect to work with him and you to solidify this
relationship so it does not vacillate from one administration
to another.
While restoring and rebuilding the department, it is
essential we face a series of pressing challenges around the
world, and I will just highlight a few.
Iran. As I am sure you remember, I was not a proponent of
the JCPOA. But I also believe that the Trump administration's
decision to withdraw without a serious strategy involving our
allies would, ultimately, leave us less safe and Iran
emboldened.
Unfortunately, my belief has been realized by Iran's
continuing aggression across the Middle East, and the recent
IAEA report that Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is now more
than 14 times over the JCPOA limit.
Public reports suggest that they are three months away from
crossing the nuclear threshold. I support this administration's
plan to return to diplomacy. But returning to the JCPOA without
concrete actions to address Iran's other dangerous and
destabilizing activities will be insufficient.
I believe there is bipartisan support to find a
comprehensive diplomatic approach with Iran that includes
working closely with our European and regional partners, and I
urge you to do everything possible to find this sweet spot
because without bipartisan support, no deal will be durable.
Russia continues to challenge the U.S. and our allies
around the world. I welcome the President's commitment to lead
again on areas requiring cooperation like strategic stability
and arms control.
But the U.S. is also obligated to counter the Kremlin as it
uses its military to attack neighbors, its media to lie to the
world, its oligarchs to corrupt our economies, and its security
forces to repress peaceful democratic opposition.
Many on this committee are focused on the Nord Stream 2
pipeline. I have supported the legislation to stop the
pipeline. It is the congressional will as is evidenced by its
passage, and I urge the administration to act with urgency to
block this effort.
In our own hemisphere, democratic governance is under deep
strain. Cuba remains under the rule of an entrenched
dictatorship, Venezuela has been kidnapped by a brutal criminal
regime, and fraudulent deeply flawed presidential elections
have led to political crises in multiple countries.
Across the region, irregular migration has skyrocketed as
citizens face diminished prospects, crime, and lose hope in
their home countries. More than 5 million people have fled
Venezuela, and hundreds of thousands are abandoning El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Addressing these crises
require effective leadership.
I am very concerned about the viability of the peace
process in Afghanistan. The Taliban is, clearly, not abiding by
all of its commitments under the February 29th agreement,
calling into question the future of Afghan security and
governance. We need senior level focused attention from the
department.
On Africa, this was another casualty, in my view, of the
previous administration. We are losing the Sahel. The 2020
Global Terrorism Index found that seven of the 10 countries
with the largest increase in terrorism were in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Fragile democratic transitions are in jeopardy in Ethiopia
and Sudan, while there is significant democratic backsliding in
Uganda, Tanzania, Mali, and the Ivory Coast. Here, too, we need
senior level attention and an effective strategy.
I will save China for questions, but it is, clearly, the
single most significant foreign policy challenge to the United
States. We must not only confront China, but we must compete
with it, and I look forward to hearing some of your views in
that regard.
Finally, I would be remiss not to note that there are
American citizens being held hostage or otherwise unlawfully or
wrongfully detained in many countries around the world. Iran is
among the worst offenders, including the wrongful detention of
Siamak Nimazi, and more recently, Emad Sharghi.
As the lead sponsor of the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery
and Hostage Taking Accountability Act, which was signed into
law last year, I want and expect to work with you to make sure
the administration is doing everything possible to bring these
Americans home now and to implement the Levinson Act quickly
and effectively. There is nothing more critical to our foreign
policy than the safety of Americans abroad.
With that, I look forward to hearing your remarks and I
turn to the distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Risch, for
his comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I sincerely
appreciate that. And thank you to our two nominees. I want to
thank you both personally for spending the time you did meeting
with me.
Mr. McKeon, I really--on a personal note, I really
appreciate your personal history of my office, since your
attachment to that office goes back a long ways, and the way we
open the closets and find things in there, your history has
helped explain a lot of things as we occupy that office.
So thank you for that. I understand you worked there with
then Senator, now President Biden in that office and it was--
the history was interesting. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Ranking Member, can you expound upon what
you meant?
Senator Risch. I will not.
[Laughter.]
Senator Risch. But that is a question for you--Senator Lott
also had that office, and I have had many interesting
conversations with Senator Lott about the office and
attributing certain things to certain people is important to
me. So that is why I have appreciated Mr. McKeon's
enlightenment in that regard and it explains a lot of things.
Well, the two nominations that we have before us today are
really of considerable importance to our foreign policy and to
the effectiveness, certainly, of the State Department. The
Deputy Secretary of State will serve as chief advisor to
Secretary Blinken and serve as Secretary in his absence.
The Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources
will serve as the lead officer for the management of personnel
and resources at the department. We all know on this committee
how important that is.
Neither job is a small task, but both serve critical
functions. While the deputy secretaries will face a broad array
of foreign policy issues during their tenure at the department,
there is a few pressing matters I would like to talk about and
I would like to focus on specifically today.
Obviously, I am not going to touch on them all. I think
Senator Menendez did an outstanding job of underscoring the
hotspots around the world and places that are of real concern
to us.
I also want to say that I fully agree with Senator Menendez
that China and the Indo-Pacific are critically important
regions in the world for United States interests and are going
to be the challenge of the 21st century.
The region is home to some of our strongest alliances and
partnerships, and it also is the primary arena of competition
with the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Communist
Party routinely engages in actions that deliberately undermine
U.S. interests and values, as well as the world order based on
free markets and the rule of law.
This includes anti-competitive economic statecraft,
aggressive military posture and coercion, and undermining the
tenets of free and open societies.
These are huge challenges for you and for all Americans.
The State Department's highest priority must be to
prioritize resource and respond to the challenges posed by the
Chinese Government.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is currently
negotiating a legislative package on China. There are a number
of bills kicking around already on the issue. Both sides of the
aisle are robustly engaged, and the American people deserve a
bill that is truly bipartisan and includes concrete and
effective proposals.
I look forward to continue working with Senator Menendez,
my other colleagues on the committee and off of the committee
as they are--the jurisdiction cuts across several committees on
the bill that would strengthen the U.S. position in this
competition, and I hope we can put forward a strong final
product.
China is not and cannot be a partisan issue. It is a common
issue for all Americans. A central theme for this
administration is rebuilding U.S. alliances in the Indo-
Pacific. The Biden team has, in fact, already inheriting strong
relationships, including with Japan, India, Australia, Taiwan,
and other nations.
In addition to the lofty discussions by the current
administration on that, I would really like to hear specific
steps that the administration is pursuing to support and
strengthen U.S. alliances.
One area that is particularly important to our alliances is
extended deterrence, which is fundamental and foundational to
the health and strength of U.S. alliances. The Biden
administration should commit to our declaratory policy and
nuclear posture will continue to reflect that reality. A
failure to modernize or an embrace of policies that dilute or
reduce our extended deterrence commitments will make the Indo-
Pacific more dangerous for us and for our allies.
Finally, on the Indo-Pacific, North Korea's nuclear and
ballistic missile programs continue to threaten both regional
stability and U.S. forces and allies in the region.
Ms. Sherman, I would appreciate your assessment of the
North Korea issue and your views on sanctions, the role of
high-level diplomacy, and other matters relevant to the Biden
administration's North Korea strategy, at least as much as we
can in an open setting like this. We did not get a chance to
talk about that much when we met. So I will be interested in
hearing that from you.
Another issue of acute concern for all of us is Iran. It is
really unfortunate that the Iran issue has divided us
frequently more than it has brought us together, and it is
absolutely critical to our relations in the region.
And my views on Iran are well known. I was robustly
engaged, as Mr. Chairman knows, when we talked about this years
ago, and several of my colleagues joined me in a letter to
President Biden last week outlining the Republican consensus on
an appropriate policy, moving forward.
I do not know if you have seen that or not, Ms. Sherman,
but it does detail mine and other members of this committee's
views on that. Those of us that signed it were Republican, but
that does not mean that those views are strictly Republican.
There are a number of us that have worked across the aisle on
this issue.
The Iranians are testing this administration. They tested
it again this morning, as most of you know, with an attack on
American facilities in the region, and the response at the
outset is going to be very important.
I have no doubt that all of you are at the present time
discussing that and, I would hope, creating a very worthwhile
appropriate response to the testing that is done. This testing,
I think, that the Iranians are doing is emblematic of the
mindset of these people. We are at a juncture here when people
are talking more and more about sitting down and trying to
resolve the issues and what do they do but ratchet up actual
kinetic attacks against Americans.
These people, as you told me, Ms. Sherman, are not to be
trusted and I agree with you on that, in that regard, and I
doubt there is many people sitting around the table here that
would think otherwise.
Rejoining the old nuclear accord is a nonstarter, as far as
I am concerned, and it does not meet U.S. national security
interest. The scope is too narrow and the sunsets have passed
or remain dangerously close.
Any new deal with Iran must address its regional terrorism,
ballistic missiles, and detention of U.S. persons, issues that
should be addressed now while the United States has leverage.
Additionally, there must be no sanctions relief or
unfreezing of assets as a precondition for negotiation.
Negotiations--I am troubled by what I hear are discussions
between the administration and South Korea, as far as
unfreezing some of those assets. That will not be helpful, I do
not believe.
To think you can enter into so-called follow-up agreements
on the issues that I just discussed--terrorism, ballistic
missiles, and detention of U.S. persons--anyone who would think
that you could enter into follow-up agreements with Iran after
a nuclear agreement I really believe is delusional.
We were--it has been proven in the past that that did not
work. It did not work then. It is not going to work now, and it
is all because of the Iranian mindset on these issues.
If you enter into a nuclear deal without dealing with these
other malign activities, that is a delusional activity, and I
believe, once again, we will walk away bamboozled by the
Iranians.
I assure you, Chinese, Russian, and diplomats--excuse me.
Finally, I want to--I want to address and I hope that the
Biden administration has demonstrated it has learned from the
mistakes of the past. I know we are going to struggle again
with if we get to an agreement point how that agreement is
ratified by America.
I know everyone here has seen what has happened in the
past. If, indeed, this is a partisan agreement, three years
from now we will see a cadre of Republicans trying to get the
nominee for the--to run as the party standard bearer, and once
again, you will go along the line and they are going to say,
what will you do with it, and they will say, well, I am going
to set it on fire. The next guy will say, well, I am going to
shred it. The next guy will say, well, I am going to put it on
the floor and stomp on it.
That is what happened last time and, of course, we wound up
where we wound up with that. This needs to be something that is
embraced by all of us, not one of the parties, and we will wind
up again where we are.
When I was--I cannot tell you how many times--I think all
of us had this experience--where our European partners and
others would come in and say, well, you know, America, you
breached your agreement that you entered into.
And I kept telling them, you did not have an agreement with
America. You had an agreement with Barack Obama and with John
Kerry. An agreement with America is a treaty that goes through
the United States Senate and is ratified by a vote by the
United States Senate.
Now, I understand that they have already--the
administration has already said that is a nonstarter. I am
unhappy to hear that. But, hopefully, at least we will have
very close to unanimous agreement on--agreement that--as we go
forward.
Well, finally, I want to briefly address the administrative
role of Deputy Secretary positions. If we did not appreciate
the importance of U.S. global health security before, we
certainly must now.
As the deputy is charged with coordinating policy and
resources, it will be incumbent upon you to ensure that the
department is organized and resourced to lead global health
diplomacy and coordinate the implementation of a coherent
global health security strategy overseas.
I cannot underscore enough how important this is on global
health.
It will also be imperative that you seek reforms to the
department where necessary. My staff and I have heard from
numerous current and former diplomats over the last few years
about how difficult it is to get outside of our embassies and
consulates abroad to meet with the locals.
The department's approach has been so cautious that it
often stops our diplomats from doing their jobs. I assure you,
the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian diplomats are not having
these issues, and in order to stay ahead of our adversaries and
advance our interests, the State Department needs to rebalance
its risk tolerance as far as ambassadors and other people being
able to get out from the embassies to do their jobs.
I also look forward to working with you as the department
establishes an Office of Sanctions Coordination pursuant to the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021. That should strengthen
the role of the department in development and implementation of
sanctions policy.
This has been a matter of tension between the first and
second branch for some time. Hopefully, the Act will smooth
that out.
I welcome your views on all these important issues. Again,
I thank you both for being here today and I look forward to
hearing your thoughts on these important matters.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
We will now proceed to the testimony of both of our
nominees for the committee's information. At some point,
Senator Cardin and I will rotate here because we have a vote in
the Senate Finance Committee for the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.
So if we get up at one point, it is not because of what you
said but because we need to go cast a vote.
So we will turn to our nominees.
Ambassador Sherman, as to both of you, your full statement
will be entered for the record. We ask you to summarize it more
or less in about five minutes. And then we will get to a pre-
agreed with the ranking member round of seven-minute questions
for each member.
Ambassador Sherman?
STATEMENT OF HON. WENDY R. SHERMAN OF MARYLAND, NOMINATED TO BE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and thank you, Senator Cardin for your very kind and
generous introduction.
I am grateful to my husband, Bruce, who sits behind me, for
his love and support, and my daughter, Sarah, who inspires me
with her work. Bruce, Sarah, my grandsons, Ezra and Oscar,
seven and five, watching in Boston, and my sister, Andrea, her
husband, Kevin, their son, Eric, along with numerous friends
and colleagues have sustained me in their love and counsel.
I am also deeply grateful to President Biden, Vice
President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for their trust in
nominating me to be Deputy Secretary of State.
If confirmed, I pledge to work every day to sustain that
trust and the trust of this committee and the Senate. President
Biden has outlined a foreign policy vision that puts diplomacy
center stage where we lead not just by the example of our power
but the power of our example, and where our foreign policy
benefits and serves the American people.
This vision is one that is deeply personal to me. In 1945,
my parents were present at the founding of the United Nations.
My father, then an active duty Marine still recovering from
injuries he suffered at Guadalcanal, thought it was important
that he and my mother attend the founding of a forum to prevent
war and spare future generations from suffering their
generation endured.
This same sentiment led him to help found what later became
the American Veterans Committee. My parents instilled in me a
profound commitment to making a safer better world for the
American people. That commitment led me to social work and
community advocacy, and later to politics and public service as
a means of providing improving the lives of my fellow citizens.
As the President has emphasized, diplomacy must be the tool
of first resort of American leadership in a more interconnected
and competitive world. From the pandemic to the climate crisis
to nuclear proliferation, the challenges that threaten the
prosperity and security of the American people will only be
solved by working together in common purpose with our allies
and partners.
To do so, we have to rebuild alliances and partnerships,
strengthen our democratic institutions, increase economic
opportunity, and enhance respect for democratic principles,
including freedom of the press, religious liberty, human
rights, and the rule of law.
Engaging in the broadest way possible not only with
government officials but with the private sector and all of
civil society--youth, women and girls, journalists, and opinion
leaders--is critical to our success in this effort.
When I served as the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, I traveled to 54 countries to advance Americans'
interests and values. I went to Burma in support of further
democratic and economic reforms, and met with both Aung San Suu
Kyi and Min Aung Hlaing.
I traveled to Bangladesh after the horrific garment factory
accidents to press on worker safety and labor rights. In
Africa, I pushed on countering Chinese investment and welcomed
rising leaders on the continent as part of the Young African
Leaders Initiative.
I traveled to almost every conflict zone and engaged
extensively with our transatlantic and Indo-Pacific allies and
international partners who work with us to resolve those
conflicts.
If confirmed, I will bring a breadth of experience and
relationships to bear on the challenges that face our country
today. Among all of these challenges posed by the ambitions of
China to rival the United States, the determination of Russia
to damage and disrupt our democracy, and the nuclear and other
threats posed by Iran and North Korea, to compete and win the
strategic competition with China we have to invest in America
and confront and challenge Beijing where we must, including on
human rights and democratic values.
We will act firmly in defense of our national interests in
response to actions by Russia that harm us or our allies.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, ask for one more moment. Thank you.
With respect to Iran, as the lead of the U.S. negotiating
team for the JCPOA, I remain clear eyed about the threat that
Iran poses to our interests and those of our allies.
I am ready to address your questions about the JCPOA. But I
would note that 2021 is not 2015 when the deal was agreed, nor
2016 when it was implemented. The facts on the ground have
changed, the geopolitics of the region have changed, and the
way forward must similarly change.
Moving forward on the challenges that our country faces
will not be easy. But I firmly believe in the capacity of the
United States to meet those challenges through renewed global
leadership and the exceptionally talented staff of the State
Department.
During my prior service, I experienced the unparalleled
professionalism of the State Department civil servants, Foreign
Service officers, locally engaged staff, and contractors. I
also saw the personal sacrifices and contributions of their
families. I hope I will have the opportunity again to work with
these extraordinary women and men.
Of course, our diplomacy to be successful in any issue we
must engage with you, with Congress. I am honored to now be
participating in my fourth nomination hearing before this
committee. The first time was as the nominee to be the State
Department's Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs in
1993.
I have learned firsthand the need for close and
constructive coordination with Congress with consultation, not
just with notification. As a former congressional chief of
staff, I have a deep appreciation for the role of the Congress
and the executive branch.
Secretary Blinken has spoken to this committee of his and
the President's commitment to restoring Congress' traditional
role as a partner in our foreign policy making, and if
confirmed, I pledge to play a leading role in that effort.
With that commitment, I welcome your questions and look
forward to our discussion today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Wendy R. Sherman
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
And thank you Senator Cardin for your kind introduction.
I am grateful to my husband Bruce for his love and support and my
daughter Sarah, who inspires me with her work. Bruce, Sarah, my
grandsons Ezra and Oscar, and my sister Andrea, her husband Kevin,
their son Erik, along with numerous friends and colleagues, have
sustained me in their love and counsel.
I am also deeply grateful to President Biden, Vice President
Harris, and Secretary Blinken for their trust in me in nominating me to
be Deputy Secretary of State. If confirmed, I pledge to work every day
to sustain that trust and the trust of this committee and the Senate.
President Biden has outlined a foreign policy vision that puts
diplomacy center stage, where we lead not just by the example of our
power but the power of our example, and where our foreign policy
benefits and serves the American people. This vision is one that is
deeply personal to me. In 1945, my parents were present at the founding
of the United Nations. My father, then an active-duty Marine still
recovering from injuries he suffered at Guadalcanal, felt it was
important that he and my mother attend the founding of a forum to
prevent war and spare future generations from the suffering their
generation endured. This same sentiment led him to help found what
later became the American Veterans Committee.
My parents instilled in me a profound commitment to making a safer,
better world for the American people. That commitment led me to social
work and community advocacy, and later, to politics and public service
as a means of improving the lives of my fellow citizens.
As the President has emphasized, diplomacy must be the tool of
first resort of American leadership in a more interconnected and
competitive world. From the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear
proliferation, the challenges that threaten the prosperity and security
of the American people will only be solved by working together and in
common purpose with our allies and partners.
To do so, we have to rebuild alliances and partnerships; strengthen
our democratic institutions; increase economic opportunity; and enhance
respect for democratic principles, including freedom of the press,
religious liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. Engaging in the
broadest way possible, not only with government officials, but with the
private sector and all of civil society--youth, women and girls,
journalists and opinion leaders--is critical to our success in these
efforts.
When I served as Under Secretary of State, I travelled to 54
countries to advance American interests and values. I went to Burma in
support of further democratic and economic reforms and met with both
Aung San Suu Kyi and Min Aung Hlaing. I traveled to Bangladesh after
the horrific garment factory accidents to press on worker safety and
labor rights. In Africa, I pushed on countering Chinese investment, and
welcomed rising leaders on the continent as part of the Young African
Leaders Initiative. I traveled to almost every major conflict zone, and
engaged extensively with our Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific allies and
international partners who work with us to resolve those conflicts. If
confirmed, I will bring a breadth of experience and relationships to
bear on the challenges that face our country today.
Among those challenges are those posed by the ambitions of China to
rival the United States, the determination of Russia to damage and
disrupt our democracy, and the nuclear and other threats posed by Iran
and North Korea. To compete and win the strategic competition with
China, we have to invest in America and confront and challenge Beijing
where we must, including on human rights and democratic values. We will
act firmly in defense of our national interests in response to actions
by Russia that harm us or our allies. With respect to Iran, as the lead
of the U.S. negotiating team for the JCPOA, I remain clear-eyed about
the threat that Iran poses to our interests and those of our allies. I
am ready to address your questions about the JCPOA, but would note that
2021 is not 2015 when the deal was agreed, nor 2016 when it was
implemented. The facts on the ground have changed, the geopolitics of
the region have changed, and the way forward must similarly change.
Moving forward on the challenges our country faces will not be
easy, but I firmly believe in the capacity of the United States to meet
these challenges through renewed global leadership and the
exceptionally talented staff of the State Department. During my prior
service, I experienced the unparalleled professionalism of the State
Department's civil servants, foreign service officers, locally engaged
staff, and contractors. I also saw the personal sacrifices and
contributions their families make for our nation. I am grateful that,
if confirmed, I will again have the opportunity to benefit from the
expertise and dedication of all of the women and men who advance
American interests every day in all of the 180 countries with which we
have diplomatic relations.
Of course, for our diplomacy to be successful on any issue, we must
engage with Congress. I am honored to now be participating in my fourth
nomination hearing before this committee. The first time was as the
nominee to be the State Department's Assistant Secretary for
Legislative Affairs in 1993.
Since then, in three decades of work in foreign policy and national
security, I have learned first-hand the need for close and constructive
coordination with Congress. As a former Congressional Chief of Staff, I
gained a deep appreciation of the Senate's responsibility to provide
oversight of the Executive Branch. Secretary Blinken has spoken to this
committee of his and the President's commitment to restoring Congress's
traditional role as a partner in our foreign policy making, and if
confirmed, I pledge to play a leading role in that effort.
With that commitment, I welcome your questions and look forward to
our discussion today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Sherman.
Mr. McKeon?
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN MCKEON OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
NOMINATED TO BE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, members of
the committee, it is an honor to appear before you as the
President's nominee to be the Deputy Secretary of State for
Management and Resources.
I want to start by thanking President Biden, Secretary of
State Blinken, for selecting me for this position. It is
particularly gratifying to appear before this committee, which
was my professional home for 12 years when I worked for the
Democratic staff supporting then Senator Biden when he was
chairman or ranking member from 1997 to 2009.
I spent a lot of hours sitting in confirmation hearings up
in 419 and I never imagined I would be on the side of the dais
as the President's nominee.
I would not be here without the strong support of my
family, particularly my parents and my wife. My parents were
both children of the Depression. They are no longer with us,
but they taught us the value of hard work and perseverance.
My father, who was a lawyer by training but spent most of
his time in politics, sparked my interest in public service and
taught me that politics is a noble profession.
My wife, Liz, who worked in this chamber for 25 years for
five different senators, has, simply put, made me a better
person, giving me unstinting love and support and advice and
helping me in tolerating all the long hours that go with
government service.
My over 20 years of service in this chamber and eight years
in the executive branch have given me a strong appreciation for
the many challenges confronting our country, long experience in
national security, and a deep knowledge of how the two
political branches operate.
I believe I have demonstrated an ability to manage large
organizations to get things done and to work across party
lines, including on this committee with the staffs of Senator
Helms and Senator Lugar.
I also have a great respect for the role of Congress and
foreign affairs. The debates in this chamber on the Gulf War,
the Iraq War, the Balkans conflicts, the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance
were, for me, among the most memorable and important of my time
here, because in a democratic society matters of war and peace
must be publicly debated and require the informed consent of
the American people through their representatives here in
Congress.
I know from this experience that not all wisdom resides in
the executive branch. I firmly believe that we share the same
commitment to protecting and advancing the security and well
being of our country, although I know we will always--not
always agree.
As Secretary Blinken has made clear in his recent message
to the workforce, the department must consider Congress to be a
full partner in its work.
My first priority, if confirmed, is to help the department
build back better to meet the diplomatic and security
challenges of this century.
This starts with investing in our greatest asset, the over
75,000 public servants who work in Washington at over 270 posts
around the world and in dozens of facilities in the United
States.
Our diplomats are on the frontlines of America's security
and interests, and they deserve our support and efforts to
strengthen their ranks. We must ensure that we recruit,
develop, and retain a diverse and professional workforce that
is prepared and empowered to advance not only our traditional
diplomatic interests but also to address the pressing
challenges of this era, such as climate change, global health
security, irregular migration, advanced technology, increased
economic competitiveness, threats to democratic governance, and
not least the long-term strategic competition with China.
Let me say a few words about diversity, which will be a top
priority for all of our senior leadership. Stated simply, the
Department of State cannot fully represent America unless the
workforce is fully representative of America.
We must make real gains in advancing diversity, equity, and
inclusion through concrete actions to dismantle structural
barriers at the department. Meaningful change requires
sustained focus on three key areas. talent management,
transparency, and accountability.
Secretary Blinken has made clear he will have such a focus
and so will I, if confirmed. If confirmed, I also intend to
devote considerable attention to ensuring that we are aligning
our resources with our policy priorities, both investments in
State operations and in State and USAID foreign assistance
programs, and that we are good stewards of the taxpayer
dollars.
For the last several years, Congress has, on a bipartisan
basis, protected the international affairs budget from
requested cuts, which has, thankfully, provided a solid
foundation on which to build.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to ensure
the department has the resources and authorities it needs to
meet the challenges we face.
I am committed to ensuring the effective management of
these resources. But we will need your help to make necessary
investments in our workforce and information technology, and
building and maintaining safe and secure embassies and in our
foreign assistance programs.
With that, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today
and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Brian P. McKeon
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, it is
an honor to appear before you as the President's nominee to be Deputy
Secretary of State for Management and Resources.
I would like to start by thanking President Biden and Secretary of
State Blinken for selecting me for this position. It is particularly
gratifying to appear before this committee, which was my professional
home for 12 years, when I worked on the Democratic staff supporting
then-Senator Biden during his tenure as Chairman or Ranking Member from
1997 to 2009. I spent many hours sitting in confirmation hearings; I am
not sure that I ever imagined sitting on this side of the dais as the
President's nominee.
I would not be here without the strong support of my family,
particularly my parents and my wife. My parents, both children of the
Depression, taught me the value of hard work and perseverance. My
father, a lawyer by training whose main avocation was politics, sparked
my interest in public service, and taught me that politics is a noble
profession. My wife, who spent 25 years working in this chamber for
five different senators, has, simply put, made me a better person. She
provided unstinting love, support, and advice, and patiently endured
the long hours that I spent away from home over the years, for which I
am deeply grateful.
My over 20 years of service working in the Senate, and eight years
in the Executive branch, have given me a strong appreciation for the
many challenges that confront our country, long experience in
international affairs and national security policy, and a deep
knowledge of how the two political branches operate. I believe I have
demonstrated an ability to manage large organizations, to get things
done, and to work across party lines, including through close
collaboration with the staffs of Senators Helms and Lugar on this
committee.
I also greatly respect the role of Congress in foreign affairs. The
debates in this chamber on the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the Balkan
conflicts, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the expansion of the
North Atlantic Alliance were among the most memorable and important of
my time here--because in a democratic society, matters of war and peace
must be publicly debated and require the informed consent of the
American people, through their representatives in the Congress.
I know intuitively from this experience that not all wisdom resides
in the Executive Branch. I firmly believe that we share the same
commitment to protecting and advancing the security and well-being of
our country, and that we must work together. As Secretary Blinken made
clear in a recent message to the workforce, the Department of State
must consider the Congress a full partner in its work.
My first priority, if confirmed, is to help the Department of State
build back better to meet the diplomatic and security challenges of the
21st century. That starts with investing in its greatest asset--the
over 75,000 public servants who work in Washington, at over 270 posts
around the world, and in dozens of facilities around the United States.
Our diplomats are on the front lines of America's security and
interests. They deserve our support and efforts to strengthen their
ranks. We must ensure that we recruit, develop and retain a diverse and
professional workforce that is prepared and empowered to advance not
only our traditional diplomatic interests, but also to address the
pressing challenges of this era, such as climate change, global health
security, irregular migration, advanced technology, increased economic
competitiveness, threats to democratic governance, and, not least,
long-term strategic competition with China.
Let me say a few words in particular about diversity, which will be
a top priority for all of the senior leadership. Stated simply, the
Department of State cannot fully represent America unless its workforce
is fully representative of America. We must make real gains in
advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion through concrete actions to
dismantle structural barriers at the Department. Meaningful change will
require sustained focus on three key areas: talent management,
transparency, and accountability. Secretary Blinken has made clear he
will have such a focus, and so will I, if confirmed. As an initial
action, the Secretary has followed through on his commitment to this
committee by creating a Chief Diversity and Inclusion Office, reporting
directly to him.
If confirmed, I also intend to devote considerable attention to
ensuring that we are aligning our resources with our policy
priorities--both investments in our operations and in State and USAID
foreign assistance programs--and that we are good stewards of taxpayer
dollars.
For the last several years, the Congress has, on a bipartisan
basis, protected the international affairs budget from requested cuts,
which has thankfully provided a solid foundation on which to build as
we undertake the collective work to revitalize the Department of State.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to ensure the
Department has the resources and authorities it needs to meet the many
challenges we face. I am committed to ensuring the effective management
of the resources made available to us, but we will need your help to
make the necessary investments in our workforce, in information
technology, in building and maintaining safe and secure embassies, and
in our foreign assistance programs that seek to advance our national
interests.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today. I look forward
to your questions.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both.
We will start our round of seven minutes for members. I am
just going to ask you some generic questions on behalf of the
full committee, and I will reserve the balance of my time to
intercede as I believe is appropriate.
When I met with both of you, we discussed the department
will need to rebuild and repair its relationship with the
committee after the last few years.
Based on our discussion and the points that you have made
in your opening statement, I am confident you understand the
importance of a constructive relationship between the
department and Congress. So I have a few quick questions along
these lines and I would just appreciate a yes or no answer to
them.
Do you agree that the State Department is accountable to
Congress and the American people?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. I do.
The Chairman. Do you commit that the department will keep
this committee fully and currently informed on the department's
activities?
Ms. Sherman. I do.
Mr. McKeon. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you understand and agree that a
constructive relationship between the department and this
committee requires meaningful engagement and consultation with
the committee while policies are being developed, not after the
fact, and do you commit to ensuring that type of meaningful
engagement?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. Yes, I do.
The Chairman. And do you commit to working with this
committee to provide answers on outstanding requests that your
predecessors withheld from Congress through years of
stonewalling?
Ms. Sherman. Yes, to the extent that I know what they are,
Senator.
Mr. McKeon. Same answer, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
With that, I will turn to Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
Ms. Sherman, let us get right to the heart of the thing to
begin with. Your comments about this not being 2015 are greatly
appreciated.
I think we all understand that. You say you are clear eyed
about the challenge in front of you and I--in your defense, I
will say that you are carrying water for different people this
time than you were last time. I and a lot of my colleagues here
were deeply, deeply disappointed, as you know, in your
performance in negotiating in getting to the JCPOA, and I got
to tell you, one of the most surreal experiences I have had in
the United States Senate is the hearing we had where I was
asking you about the annexes or whatever you call them, the
supplements to the JCPOA, and you would not tell me what was in
them.
And as you know, I serve on the Intelligence Committee so I
got the same national security clearance that you do and did at
the time. And yet, you wanted me to support the agreement but
would not tell me what was in part of the agreement.
And I could not do that and I will not do that, and I will
not do that in the future.
So what--you say you are clear eyed on this. We are all
clear eyed, we hope. But tell me, what are your thoughts about
putting in front of us another agreement that has got annexes
or agreements that we cannot see, and yet you want us to
support them? Are we headed down that road again?
Ms. Sherman. Well, Senator, thank you very much for your
candor and for recalling a situation that was uncomfortable all
the way around.
Senator Risch. I bet it was.[Laughter.]
Ms. Sherman. What I want to say to you and to all the
members of the committee today is that President Biden has been
very clear about what he wants to achieve as has Secretary
Blinken with regards to Iran, and it is along the lines of both
the letter that you and Republicans sent as well as the
sentiments that have been expressed by the Democrats.
And that is that we have to ensure that Iran does not
obtain a nuclear weapon, that there be compliance-for-
compliance, as the President has said, and Iran is a long way
from compliance, as we all know.
The President and the Secretary have also said that we must
work with you and with our partners and allies to address all
the other issues of concern regarding Iran, and there are many.
their ballistic missile production, their state sponsorship of
terrorism, their really concerning behavior in the region,
their arms sales, their human rights abuses of their own
people, putting American citizens in Evin Prison. I can go on
and on about all of the range of concerns.
So, in my view, Senator, and I do not have access to
intelligence right now, which is considerably important in this
situation. I do not have access to all of the thinking of the
administration because I am not in it.
But if confirmed, I would want to learn all of that. So in
the Deputies Committee, I can bring my experience. But the
decisions that need to be taken will be along the lines of
those laid out by the President of the United States and the
Secretary of State, and indeed have to be decided on the merits
of where we are today, not nostalgia for what might have been.
I think this is a very tough problem set. I think it will
require serious discussions, as the chairman said, with the
United States Senate on both sides of the aisle to get your
views, to understand.
I do think we have the same objectives and I think the
issue is how to achieve them, how to sequence various steps to
get there, how to work with our allies and partners to make it
real.
So I think we have a tough road ahead. You will be very
important to that policymaking, as the chairman laid out and as
you and I discussed in your office, and I look forward to those
conversations and to working in this administration, if
confirmed, to deal with what is a very difficult challenge.
Senator Risch. Well, I agree it is a difficult challenge.
As you and I discussed when you were in my office, I consider
the malign activity of Iran just as important as the nuclear
aspects of it.
And as I told you, the nuclear aspects of it, for me,
become less important when I know that there is a country on
this planet which has a tolerance that is substantially lower
than ours for Iran developing a nuclear weapon.
Indeed, they consider it existential and they have said to
me over and over and over again they will never allow that to
happen. You guys can sign any agreements you want. You can do
whatever you want. But Iran is not going to have a nuclear
agreement, and these people mean it when they say it.
So, to me, it is all well and good to talk about enrichment
and all that sort of thing. But the other thing is the
terrorism, the ballistic missiles, the human rights, and on and
on and on, as you have said to me are equally important to the
nuclear aspects of this.
The enrichment thing really bothers me. We argued about
this last time, and I could not believe that the JCPOA allowed
enrichment. There is only one reason that Iran wants to do
enrichment and that is if it eventually wants to pursue a
nuclear weapon.
I do not believe them when they say, oh, well, this is for
peaceful nuclear energy. I know you do not believe them in that
regard. I do not think anybody believes them in that regard.
But they say those kinds of things frequently.
Is it still the position of the--of the administration that
they are going to go it alone and you are not going to submit
an agreement as a treaty under the Constitution of the United
States to the Congress?
Ms. Sherman. I do not know what the ultimate decision will
be, Senator, because I do not know where we will be. I think
that the Biden administration is absolutely committed to
following the law and doing what is appropriate and necessary
to whatever gets decided.
But since I do not know, none of us today know what the
ultimate outcome will be here, it is hard to make a commitment
in advance. And I am not in a position--I am not an
administration official. Hope to be, if confirmed by this
committee and by the United States Senate, to give you a
definitive answer.
Senator Risch. My time is up. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McKeon, thank you for your willingness to serve,
continue to serve, returning to the political life. We
appreciate it very much. I appreciate the opportunity that we
had to talk about the management at the State Department.
I want to give you an opportunity to talk about the
commitment, if confirmed, to deal with the diversity at the
State Department. This committee has for many years been
concerned about the opportunities within the State Department
for all people, diversity, so our State Department looks like
our nation and can represent a global community more
effectively.
I was pleased to hear that Secretary Blinken announced a
new Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer. I do not believe
that person has been named yet.
Could you just share with the committee your commitment and
strategies to improve diversity at the State Department if you
are confirmed?
Mr. McKeon. Yes. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.
The President has made his commitment and he has made it
clear that he wants to have a government that looks like
America and that, of course, includes the Department of State.
The department does okay in recruiting underrepresented
communities. It is not doing well in retention and promotion,
and the data of officials at senior levels bear that out.
The GAO just did a report, I believe, for this committee in
the House committee that emphasizes that once again. As you
said, the Secretary has appointed or he has announced he will
have a Chief Diversity Office. There is, I believe, a person
who has tentatively been chosen and is probably embedding. So I
hope that announcement will be made soon.
We really need to make it a priority across the board in
everything that we are doing and emphasize to all of our
leaderships that this has to be a priority in the bureaus and
in overseas missions.
What we really need to focus on, among other things, on the
retention and promotion side is transparency, giving people
opportunities to advance in a fair and objective way and making
opportunities available for people to show that they have
leadership skills and the capabilities.
And we need to understand why are people leaving, why are
they not finding the Foreign Service to be a good professional
home.
So the department has done some work on that. There is a
lot more that needs to be done, and you can be sure that I am
going to spend a lot of time with the Chief Diversity Officer
drilling down on this and working to make material progress.
Senator Cardin. I can assure you that there is great
interest in this committee in this, your efforts, and I would
ask that, if confirmed, you share with us your strategies and
work with us, so we can have accountability at the end of the
day.
Mr. McKeon. Definitely will do that, Senator. As the
Secretary said in his confirmation hearing, we will be measured
in significant part on this issue if we have succeeded or
failed to make significant progress in the next few years.
Senator Cardin. Ambassador Sherman, I want to talk about
one of the issues that we have talked about before and that is
President Biden's commitment to embrace our values in our
foreign policy. We just saw with the report released in regards
to the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi some transparency,
which I think was very much appreciated.
But there is also frustration that because of the position
of the Crown Prince, there may not be full sanctions imposed
against him under--using Magnitsky sanctions or the like.
So I want to give you an opportunity to express how we will
advance U.S. values. There is legislation that Senator Wicker
and I have put in to make the Global Magnitsky statute a
permanent statute. It is, certainly, gaining global
credibility.
We have also, with Senator Young, introduced legislation
that would provide a clearer direction on dealing with anti-
corruption around the globe.
Can you just share with me your commitment to advance U.S.
values as we embrace countries that we have to have strategic
relations with? We recognize that. But it needs to be under the
umbrella of advancing U.S. values.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin, and thank
you for your leadership and working with Senator Young as well
on both the Global Magnitsky Act and trying to figure out how
to better deal with the challenge of corruption around the
world, which is, certainly, a very difficult and very critical
challenge in so many ways.
Where the horrifying murder of Jamal Khashoggi is
concerned, the administration, the Biden/Harris administration,
has made it very clear from the start, as has Secretary
Blinken, that the administration is recalibrating its
relationship with Saudi Arabia.
It has done that by making public the report that had been
kept nonpublic for so long about the murder and the
accountability for that murder. The President took a very
important step by saying that we would no longer sell offensive
weapons to Saudi Arabia because we want to see an end to the
Yemen war, which is, in fact, a very bipartisan view up here in
the Senate, that that conflict should end, that it is a
humanitarian disaster.
I think that we will, in other ways, and I think that when
the President spoke to the King of Saudi Arabia he was quite
clear that we will not be silent on human rights. We will speak
up and we have, in fact, sanctioned many people in Saudi Arabia
and we have said that many are barred from visas, though that
visa list is not made public, Senator, given the rules of
privacy around visas.
Senator Cardin. And I understand that, and the Magnitsky
statute is a statute that involves the Congress and the
executive branch together, and we will be making
recommendations to the administration. In many cases, this will
be nonpublic correspondence in order to investigate before
sanctions are considered or imposed.
Will you commit to consider the names that we present to
you for sanctions in a deliberative manner and work with us to
make sure that the intent of the Global Magnitsky statute is in
fact carried out?
Ms. Sherman. I certainly believe, Senator, that on all
issues we should make a commitment to be open to your ideas,
your thoughts, your counsel, your advice, and so yes.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you both for being here,
for your willingness to serve.
Ms. Sherman, let me just ask you quickly as we start out,
what is your understanding of former Secretary Kerry's role? Is
he going to be involved in Israeli-Palestinian issues? Is he
going to be involved in negotiating the Iran issue? Or is he
solely going to be focused on the climate issues?
Ms. Sherman. My understanding, Senator, is that former
Secretary Kerry is the President's Special Envoy on climate and
that is his sole responsibility and it is quite a large one.
Should take up most of his time.
Senator Rubio. Since January 2017, have you met with any
Iranian Government officials?
Ms. Sherman. I have met with Iranian officials. I cannot
remember the last time that it happened, Senator.
Senator Rubio. Who did you meet with?
Ms. Sherman. I have met with Foreign Minister Zarif. I have
met with my former counterparts, Abbas Araghchi and Majid
Ravanchi, who is now the ambassador to the United Nations.
And when I had such meetings, they were on the margins of
the Munich Security Conference, where, as you know, everyone
attends from all over the world.
Before and after these meetings, Senator, I was, I think,
most of the time if not every time in touch with then Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Hale to let him know that I was
having such a meeting and to let him know that I would
certainly stay in touch.
I would represent America's policies, whether I agreed with
them or not, and in those meetings my sole purpose was to urge
the Iranians not to take actions that were against the deal
that would escalate the security situation.
And most importantly, Senator, I am appealed to by almost
every family who has someone detained in Evin Prison, and so my
major purpose, quite frankly, in those meetings was to urge the
Iranians that I know to get Americans out of Evin Prison
because it is the most heartbreaking set of meetings anyone can
have is to sit with families and hear how horrifying the
situation is.
Senator Rubio. And I would agree with that, and I
appreciate your work on that and I appreciate your answer on
having been in touch with members of the previous
administration.
And let me--you did write an article in July of 2020 where
you wrote, among other things, an area I care about is, as a
result of Trump's failure people, you know, inside--the people
of Cuba and Venezuela face a bitter future.
So I wanted to explore, in particular, just a number of the
changes that were made under the Trump administration to see if
you think that those were bad ideas. One of them was a measure
that prohibited doing business with entities controlled, owned,
and operated by the Cuban military, and in particular, one of
them was the one that controls all the remittances. They take
10 percent right off the top.
So you can send remittances to Cuba. You just have to do it
through a bank. It just cannot be through the hands of this--
that takes--skims off 10 percent and you can do business with
individual private Cubans. You just cannot do business with
entities controlled by the Cuban military and the regime.
Was that a bad idea?
Ms. Sherman. I do not know the details well enough,
Senator, but I do agree that we should take measures that say
to the Cuban Government that we do not support their way
forward and that we support the freedom of the Cuban people.
Senator Rubio. Well, I only--the details are as follows.
The goal of this strategy was to say, if you want to do
business with an individual, a private Cuban, in fact, the
Trump administration made it easier to send remittances to
Cubans who are using that money to open up a private business,
to the extent that they are allowed to do it. You are allowed
to send remittances.
If they can do it through a bank you can, obviously, take
the cash in yourself as an individual. The one thing they said
is you cannot send it through this entity, which skims 10
percent off the top. And that is just the beginning of how they
take the money that you also have to spend it at their stores.
And you cannot do business, not even with the Ministry of
Tourism, per se, in some cases, but with the entities
controlled by the Cuban military.
The gist of it is if individual Cubans are allowed to
engage in commercial activity, the United States can do a lot
of things with them. But if it is going to be run through the
clearing house of an entity controlled by the military in Cuba,
they cannot. That is the prohibited entity.
So I am curious. I mean, that was the heart and soul of the
Trump policy. Yet, you say somehow it leads to a bleak future
for the Cuban people. And so I am curious of those things you
thought were bad ideas as I have described it to you.
Ms. Sherman. So, Senator, I believe that it is very
important that we support the Cuban people and that we take
actions that increase their chances for freedom, their chances
for private commercial activity, their ability to get
remittances, which increases their own economic power.
The ability that--the primary objectives, is my
understanding of the Biden/Harris administration, is to move
forward on the freedom and the need for democracy in Cuba, and
the greatest emissaries for that are the American people led by
Cuban Americans.
And, quite frankly, Senator, you and I have not had a
chance to talk. I know how much you know about Cuba. I know how
much you know about what we need to do to help support the
Cuban people, and I look forward to further discussions with
you about that.
So yes, if there are ways to support the Cuban people, I am
all for it.
Senator Rubio. Okay. And you also mentioned Venezuela in
that piece. The cornerstone of the Trump approach was the
recognition of Juan Guaido, the legitimately elected president
or the President of the legitimately elected National Assembly,
and imposing sanctions that he and almost the entire opposition
supported, which sanctioned how the regime stole money.
Was that a bad idea?
Ms. Sherman. I think it was a very good idea to support
Guaido as the legitimate leader of Venezuela. What I would have
hoped for, Senator, difficult to do, is that we would have done
more work to bring together our allies and partners in the
region and around the world, quite frankly, not just in Latin
America but around the world, to increase the pressure and to
support and recognize Guaido to try to end the horrible saga
for the Venezuelan people and --
Senator Rubio. Well, the overwhelming majority of countries
in the region did recognize Guaido and did come together via
the Lima Group.
Ms. Sherman. Yes, indeed, and beyond the Lima Group and
around the world. I just think there were more steps that we
could have taken. It is a very difficult situation and, again,
you and I have not had a chance to talk about this and I look
forward to your counsel. I know we share the same objective,
and that is for the people of Venezuela to have a life, and
right now they do not.
Senator Rubio. Well, I will just close by saying this.
Beyond the Lima Group, the only countries really left at that
point at that time were Nicaragua, Cuba, and Argentina under--
and Bolivia under Morales. Good luck with that.
Ms. Sherman. Beyond Latin America, Senator.
Senator Rubio. Well, that is--the EU just sanctioned
Venezuela as well, and many of those countries did. So thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you both for being here
this morning, for your willingness to be considered for these
very important posts and for your ongoing willingness to serve
this country.
I think you are both the perfect choices for this difficult
time, based on your understanding of both the executive branch
and Congress, of the State Department, and your commitment to
restoring America's role in the world.
So I want to begin and, really, appreciate both of you
taking the opportunity to talk with me before we got to this
hearing, and one of the issues that I discussed with both of
you was how we are going to continue to treat those public
servants from the State Department and other parts of our
Government who have been affected by what is known as the
Havana Syndrome, the attacks against our diplomats in Cuba,
China, and other parts of the world.
And there are--as I see it, there are two parts to this
problem. One is to ensure that those people who have been
attacked are treated properly, are believed, and that they get
the medical attention and benefits that they deserve, and
Congress has worked on that. We passed legislation in the last
Defense Authorization Act to try and better level the playing
field for those people who were affected.
But the other piece of that is ensuring that we get to the
bottom of who is responsible, and I hope the State Department
will work with DOD, who, as I understand, has been designated
the lead agency to try and come to understand what is
happening.
So I would ask that, if confirmed, will you both commit to
addressing the recommendations of the National Academy of
Sciences report, and more generally, to providing more
transparency with Congress and the public on this issue?
Mr. McKeon. Senator Shaheen, as we discussed yesterday,
protecting the people we send overseas is our top priority. We
have to take care of them. We send them out on behalf of the
United States.
And so we are very grateful for the work that you have done
and the committee has done and the Congress has done to make
sure that benefits are being provided to those who have
suffered.
But we do, obviously, need to do work to find out what is
the cause of this. I do not really understand why, between the
FBI and the CIA and DOD and State Department, we have not been
able to figure it out. That is not a slight against anybody who
is doing the work. It is just--it is kind of confounding.
So, as you know, the Accountability Review Board on this
matter pointed out there was not leadership at the top of the
department paying attention to this issue.
So I intend to take on this issue in coordination with
Ambassador Sherman. But this will be a high priority to get
after this and we will be happy to continue to talk to you
about this.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Ambassador Sherman?
Ms. Sherman. I completely agree with what Mr. McKeon has
said, and I must say, Senator, it is very disturbing that we
have personnel who have gone through this and continue to
suffer from it.
It is critical that they get the medical attention that
they deserve and that we find out what happened so that it does
not happen again.
So thank you for your leadership on this, along with others
across the aisle. And I know that Secretary Blinken is
committed to getting to the bottom of this as well.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for that.
One of the challenges we continue to face is the ongoing
war in Afghanistan. One of the reports that did not get as much
attention as the Khashoggi report in recent weeks was the
Afghanistan Study Group that made a number of recommendations
that I think are particularly relevant as we see the recent
assassination campaign against civil society leaders in
Afghanistan and, particularly, against women.
But what that report recommended is that the administration
should slow the withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan, abandon
the May 1st exit deadline, reduce American forces further only
as security conditions improve.
And I wonder if you could respond to that, Ambassador
Sherman.
Ms. Sherman. Certainly. I have been briefed on the Iraq/
Iran study--sorry, the Afghanistan Study Group. It is hard to
keep all the study groups straight. And I think they just did
extraordinary work that I am sure the administration will take
into account as it is undertaking its own review.
There is no question that Secretary Blinken believes that
diplomacy has to be at the core of a just and sustainable
settlement in Afghanistan, that the role of our troops is
really to ensure that we do not have the recreation of al-Qaeda
in the future or even a new ISIS foothold as a safe haven.
And so there is very careful deliberation going on with our
Defense Department colleagues, it is my understanding, and
ultimately, a decision by the President as we approach May 1st
about how to proceed.
To your point about women, and I told you this story --I
will share it with the other senators--one of the most searing
meetings I have ever been in as a diplomat was with Secretary
Albright in a Peshawar refugee camp after the Taliban had
driven people out of Afghanistan.
And Secretary Albright and I were able to meet with the
women in that camp because we were women, and my daughter was a
teenager at the time and a teenager about her age told the
story of watching her sister being raped and thrown out the
window.
These were women who were doctors and teachers and
professionals and homemakers and moms who are just trying to
keep their family together, and I was horrified. And I know
there is a deep commitment to ensure that whatever ultimately
happens for the people of Afghanistan that women never find
themselves in such a position again.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you for that. I think there is
some anxiety around the administration's announcement of Zalmay
Khalilzad continuing as the Special Representative for the U.S.
in Afghanistan. He has been distinctly unresponsive to the need
to include women in any of the negotiations.
Now, that may have been a function of the previous
administration. But I can tell you, in my discussions with him
he did not hear me at all when I said this needs to be a
priority for the United States.
So I hope you will take that back to the State Department
and to the Biden administration and make it clear that in any
work that he is doing on our behalf that he is including women
at the table.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Sherman. Senator, if confirmed, there will be no doubt
that in everything I do at the State Department on behalf of
the people of this country, I will make sure women are
included.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Senator Cardin. [Presiding.] Senator Romney is recognized.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Sherman, as the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs under President Obama, you, obviously, were
very much involved in the development of the JCPOA and
negotiating the JCPOA.
You know that people like myself and many in my party were
very, very concerned that that was not an agreement that was
effective in preventing Iran from, ultimately, having a nuclear
weapon.
As a matter of fact, my read of that agreement is that it
would delay Iran from being able to develop a nuclear weapon
but that, ultimately, they would be permitted to develop a
nuclear weapon and have the missiles necessary to deliver that
to targets of their interest.
Am I correct in that understanding that the agreement would
delay but not prohibit Iran from ever having a nuclear weapon?
Ms. Sherman. Senator, people read the agreement
differently. The objective of the agreement, and the--I believe
the outcome of that agreement was that Iran would never obtain
a nuclear weapon.
I do completely understand why many senators and many
people in Congress and many people in the world believe that if
Iran can continue to create fissile material, the stuff that
goes inside a nuclear weapon, that they would be concerned that
having that ability gives them the option should they choose to
go there.
So I see the problem quite clearly and what I have said
this morning, I think, is very important, which is that we are
now where we are, which is outside of the agreement.
The Iranians have increased their enrichment capacity. They
have increased their development of ballistic missiles. They
have increased their bad behavior. The Maximum Pressure
campaign may have put chips on the table, but it has not
stopped. In fact, they have gone further than they had at the
end of the Obama administration.
So we will all have to work together on what is the best
strategy, going forward. The President and the Secretary have
said that they want to reenter the deal if there is compliance-
for-compliance. The Iranians are far away from compliance so
there is a long way to go here.
Senator Romney. With time, I am anxious to get your
perspective as to how it is this agreement prohibits Iran from
ever having a nuclear weapon. My understanding is the agreement
allows them to enrich and to create fissile material down the
road, and that they, obviously, had the capacity at some point
to use that fissile material to develop a nuclear weapon under
that agreement.
It does strike me that the purpose of our strategy with
regards to Iran's nuclear program is twofold. Number one is to
try and to dissuade them from ever having a nuclear weapon and
that that is the ultimate objective, and number two, to exact a
very high price on Iran such that they, as well as other
nations thinking of going nuclear, would understand the
consequence of taking that step, that the price is going to be
very, very heavy, indeed.
I do not understand how reentering the JCPOA in any way
either, number one, dissuades Iran from ever having a nuclear
weapon, or makes the price sufficiently high to keep them from
pursuing that course.
So I guess I am anxious to get your perspective as to what
the purpose would be of reentering an agreement which does not
prohibit them from having a nuclear weapon.
Ms. Sherman. The Biden administration, is my understanding,
Senator, has said that they want to create a deal that is
longer and stronger, but is part of a comprehensive strategy
that deals with all of the elements of concern with Iran,
including delivery systems for a nuclear weapon, and to ensure
that any agreement ensures that Iran will not obtain a nuclear
weapon.
I would be glad to but I think it probably will get us into
the weeds to talk about why the JCPOA did create the assurance
that you are looking for. But it is really beside the point now
because we are at a very different place. The geopolitics are
very different in the region.
There were many things that I disagreed with the previous
administration on. But the normalization of relations of
countries with Israel, known as the Abraham Accords in the
previous administration, was a very good thing. It has changed
the geopolitics of the region, and that means that one has to
think about this in a different way because there are different
elements on the table.
So I think we have to start where we are now and figure out
the best way forward, and I would hope that if I am confirmed
that I have an opportunity to get your views on this.
And as was laid out at the beginning of this when the
chairman asked for commitments from Mr. McKeon and me, that
Congress and the Senate and this committee will be there at the
takeoff, not just at the landing.
Senator Romney. Do you have any optimism about the prospect
of Iran bowing, if you will, to our demands to pull back from
their enrichment program and otherwise return to the JCPOA as,
perhaps, adjusted in some ways, making it tougher?
With the attack last night by Iranian-backed militias in
Iraq, it would suggest that they are flexing their muscle, not
showing their weakness. Are we reading that wrong? Is there any
prospect for them agreeing to a course which is more consistent
with our objectives?
Ms. Sherman. I hope so, Senator, but I do not know. I am
not privy to intelligence. I am not privy to all of the
deliberations in the administration.
But, if confirmed, one has to dig into the details and into
the intelligence and into consultations with you, with our
allies, with our partners, with Israel, with the Gulf Arab
states, with countries around the world that might have
information that is useful to making those assessments.
So I cannot give you a definitive answer today. I certainly
hope so because the other routes the President, the Vice
President, and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, all of us, all of you, are committed to ensuring that
Iran does not present an existential threat to anyone not able
to deter our and our allies and partners' actions, and if they
had a nuclear weapon that would change that calculus in very
significant and very bad ways.
Senator Romney. Like you, Ambassador, I do not have access
to that intelligence. I am not a member of the Intelligence
Committee, as is Ranking Member Risch.
But I would hope you study very carefully the conditions
there in Iran, the health and well being of their leadership,
the state of their economy, the public attitudes there.
I think there is some prospect that the Maximum Pressure
campaign is actually delivering the kind of impetus that we
might be looking for, and that before we bend and provide to
Iran the hoped for reduction of our sanctions that we might
consider the option of continuing with the Maximum Pressure
campaign. I offer that only as a request on my part.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney.
Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and thank you, Ambassador Sherman and Mr. McKeon. Thank
you for your willingness to serve our nation again, and my
thanks to your families as well.
I am particularly pleased to have the two of you with such
experience, such skills, such background in the executive
branch and State and DOD and the White House, and here in the
Senate so that we can help work together to make sure that the
foreign policy priorities and agenda of the executive branch
are supported or at least well understood, in close
consultation with this committee, going forward.
And I look forward to being partners in demonstrating to
the American people how foreign policy and the foreign policy
of this administration actually improves their lives, advances
their security and prosperity, whether it is from keeping
COVID-19 variants from spreading through doing robust
vaccination around the world to mitigating threats from our
adversaries to addressing the existential threat of climate
change.
And I hope you will be partners in working through some of
our nation's most urgent national security challenges, from
building an enduring and bipartisan strategy for confronting
China, cooperating where necessary and possible but being
prepared for a robust and sustained competition with China,
addressing Iran's nuclear program and its other threats to the
region and to the world, recalibrating the U.S.-Saudi
relationship in light of the release of the ODNI report on the
Crown Prince's role in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and
reviewing authorizations of the use of military force to
strengthen and ensure congressional oversight on critical
issues of war and peace.
I look forward also in my new role as the chairman of the
State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee to
aligning resources with policy and commitments, and
prioritizing the protection of human rights, the defense of
democracy, the revitalization of the State Department and
promoting the diversity of the workforce.
It is my hope the President's budget request will increase
funding to what has been a stagnant foreign affairs budget to
restore our leadership by fulfilling climate pledges,
strengthening global health and security, and addressing our
arrears at the United Nations.
So, Ambassador Sherman, just a brief question. You will be
called on to travel the world to continue your service overseas
on behalf of the American people. I hope you will also spend
time traveling within our nation, speaking to the American
people.
Do you agree diplomats in Washington, leaders in the
administration, have to do a better job of explaining foreign
policy not just abroad but here at home?
Ms. Sherman. I quite agree with you, Senator.
When Secretary Blinken asked me and the President agreed
for me to be nominated as Deputy Secretary of State, one of the
things I said to the Secretary--he was not yet Secretary at
that point--but said to the Secretary that I thought it was
critical that not only he but myself, if confirmed, Mr. McKeon,
if he was confirmed, anyone who was a leader in the State
Department ought to be spending as much time in America talking
to the American people as we did abroad.
Jake Sullivan, who is the National Security Advisor, said
very early on that every day in consideration of national
security and foreign policy we need to ask, what does this mean
for the American people? What does this mean for working
people? What does this mean for the middle class in America?
People do not understand why we do what we do and how it
has anything to do with their day-to-day lives. So I thank you
for laying out this very critical issue. I think this is
something that Democrats and Republicans can agree on, which is
that the American people deserve to hear from us why we are
doing what we are doing and why it matters to them.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you. And I think as we work to
combat the pandemic, we have right in front of us an example of
how the health of the world impacts the health of the American
people.
As we work to confront climate change, we have an
opportunity to look at how our competition with China, our
realignments around trade, may well end up also advancing our
goal of combating the existential threat of climate change.
I know you have both heard of the Global Fragility Act. We
discussed it in our constructive conversations before today. I
just want to urge that this bipartisan tool that is available
to address the real security challenges in the Sahel mentioned
by the chairman in his comments is taken full advantage.
It is something that a group of us worked hard to get
introduced and marked up and passed and signed into law, and it
gives an opportunity for the State Department, along with AID
and DOD, to really lead a strategy.
But it will only work if done in consultation with this
committee and with robust funding from Congress. So it is my
hope that you will let us know what you need to implement it
effectively and that you will utilize, in particular, the
multi-donor fund that it has authorized to leverage resources
from public and private sector partners elsewhere.
If confirmed, you will have critical influence over whether
we stand up for democracy and human rights at a time when
China's authoritarian model is posing an increasing challenge
to our principles.
How do we balance the need to impose consequences on
Beijing for its horrific actions in Xinjiang and its oppression
in Hong Kong while also, perhaps, cooperating in some areas
like nonproliferation or climate change?
And in my view, our response to China has to bring in
domestic policy, robust investments in manufacturing, IP
protection, and labor, but include engagement with our allies.
I would be interested, Ambassador Sherman and Mr. McKeon,
if you might, in the minute and a half I have left, just some
brief comment on how the Foreign Relations Committee can best
help in shaping a sustained bipartisan policy with regards to
China.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator.
I agree. I think this is an area where Democrats and
Republicans agree. China is a major challenge for the United
States, and I think there are three elements to it. We have to
compete with China, and President Biden, Vice President Harris,
the Secretary have said that begins with investment here at
home in infrastructure and 5G and quantum computing and
artificial intelligence and jobs for Americans that will take
them into the next decades ahead.
We have to compete and win. That includes ensuring that
China cannot hack our networks, cannot steal our trade secrets,
and cannot steal our corporate secrets.
We need to challenge and confront China where we must in
the South China Sea. Certainly, what they do on human rights.
Secretary Blinken said, in his view, that the treatment of the
Uighurs was genocide. I would agree with him on that and we
should not shy away from saying things as they truly are.
And third, there will be some small areas in which we will
have to cooperate, and as strange as it may sound, global
health may be one of them, starting with getting the real facts
about what happened in the pandemic.
And I will turn the last 15 seconds over to my colleague.
Mr. McKeon. As you know, Senator Coons, the President said
in the campaign and since that he wants to put democracy and
human rights back at the center of our foreign policy. So that
means it is integral and it will inform all the decisions we
make.
At a minimum, we are going to speak out about China's
outrageous behavior and treatment of its citizens in
international fora or as well as directly, and we need to look
at new tools to amplify what is happening there.
One of them is Radio Free Asia that is funded by the U.S.
Agency for Global Media. You may not know that Senator Biden
was the author of the legislation to create it and it is one of
the things I am proud of having worked on.
So we definitely would want to collaborate with you on the
best ways to come to grips with the China challenge because it
is going to be a generational one.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you both.
And, Mr. Chairman, if I might just, in conclusion, across
questioning and exchanges with a wide range of members of this
committee, it is clear that close consultation, briefings both
classified and open, and debate with this committee around the
path forward on Iran, around the path forward on authorizations
of the use of military force, are critical to our success and
our ability to craft something that will win bipartisan support
here.
And I look forward to working with you on Africa as well,
something the chairman mentioned, and I know we have great
promise for making progress in this administration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] Thank you.
Senator Paul?
Senator Paul. One of the things I agreed with candidate
Barack Obama on was that he said in an interview with a Boston
paper we should not go to war without congressional
authorization unless under imminent attack.
I had the chance to ask him about this after the
administration chose to launch attacks on Libya and he said,
well, I said unless under imminent attack and Benghazi was
under imminent attack. And I said, really? You were talking
about imminent attack of a foreign city, not the United States?
I think nobody interprets the idea of a president going to war
unless under imminent attack to be anything other than a U.S.
city or a U.S. interest, at the very least.
So I was shocked by that. What was your position in the
Obama administration about the Obama administration's decision
to go to war in Libya, Ms. Sherman?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
These decisions, as you know, are incredibly difficult to
make, and when Libya began I was the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs. And I think that most people thought that we
were providing support to Europe for a humanitarian
intervention.
It turned out to be quite something different. I am glad
that today, some years later, we are now potentially facing
elections in Libya, that Libya is getting back, perhaps,
hopefully--fingers crossed--to a better place for Libyan
people.
I will be the first to say, and I think President Obama has
said so in his own memoir, that we did not have a full
understanding--we have learned from this--that Gaddafi had not
built any institutions. He had not created any government.
So when Gaddafi disappeared in Libya, there was nothing.
There was absolutely nothing except the potential for a civil
war and for an ongoing conflict. So I think we have to be very
careful.
Senator Paul. I appreciate the understanding. In
retrospect, it may not have been the best activity. But one of
the lessons we might learn, and we might learn from Iraq also,
is that regime change does not work, that Thomas Jefferson is
not waiting in the wings and American-style democracy is not
going to blossom, and when we get rid of a tyrant maybe you get
another tyrant.
But I guess the reason I question whether there was a
lesson learned is that immediately many people in the Obama
administration, the Hillary Clinton camp, et cetera, Samantha
Power, Susan Rice, and I am not sure you, were then advocates
of going into Syria in a big way.
In fact, your boss basically said, well, the problem was we
just did not go in big enough into Syria. What was your opinion
on Syria during the Obama administration on sending arms in and
getting involved in their civil war?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator. I want to correct the
record a minute, as I was thinking about this. I was not
actually in the Government at the time of the Libya decision.
The reason it is so much in my mind is I was on the Defense
Policy Board at the time and we had a big discussion about
Libya. And the Policy Board believed we should not create a no-
fly zone in Libya. We should not help out. We had breakfast
with Secretary Gates on a Wednesday morning. He said, we are
absolutely not going to do this. And on Thursday, we did it. So
that is why it is very fresh in my mind. But I was not in
government at the time.
On Syria, I was very torn. I thought there was a disaster
happening in Syria and happening for the Syrian people.
President Obama was very cautious because he understood that
this was a slippery slope, that the American people were tired
of war in the Middle East. And so he moved very, very
carefully.
It is a struggle in those situations when you see terrible
suffering of people, so not an easy decision. I think he tried
to be very cautious.
Senator Paul. But, you know, I think we have to learn some
lessons sometime. I mean, many in the Democrat side of things
learned the lesson very quickly. Maybe just for partisan
reasons they did not like the Iraq war, and it was a disaster.
But, really, it was a disaster. I mean, it is still an ongoing
disaster. The whole tipping of the balance between Iran and the
rest of the Middle East was tipped by, you know, getting rid of
the regime in Iraq.
And so it is this idea that we are going to make the world
this great place for democracy, this Wilsonian idea of us,
naivete that, you know, we are going to get rid of a regime and
it is going to get better, even in Syria.
So we did not go all the way in, you know, with the full
might of the U.S. We went partway in. But you could argue that
had we not gotten involved and had we discouraged the other
Arab nations from getting involved that it would have still
been a disaster but maybe 10,000 people die instead of 500,000
people.
So I think the misguided notion that we helped anybody in
Syria, it would be easy to argue. The evidence shows that a
half a million people died and millions of people are
dislocated because we did the half-ass approach to it. We went
halfway in there.
And so then Blinken's response, in conclusion, is we should
have gone all the way in there. And from my perspective, is we
need to stay the hell out of these wars and toppling, you know,
one strong man, one tribal leader, we get another one or we get
worse.
And all along the Syrian civil war, the fiercest fighters,
we would pretend that there were lawyers and doctors fighting,
that there were these moderates over there fighting. Al Nusra
were the fighters. Al-Qaeda were the fighters. The fiercest
fighters were the jihadists.
And so I have never thought that the jihadists would be
better than Assad, and I am not a fan of Assad either. But we
have to learn some lessons, and I do not think we adequately
learn the lessons. We go from Iraq and the power vacuum of
Iraq. People say, oh, ISIS came about because we left too soon.
Well, maybe ISIS came about because we got rid of Hussein. I
mean, what is the original domino that leads to that? It is
destabilizing in having no government.
You may be optimistic about Libya. But I see it as one of
the biggest terrorist havens in the world. You got competing
governments. The last administration was never really clear who
they were supporting, whether it was this General Haftar or the
U.N. government.
And the thing is, is it is muddled, and we have all these
people we give arms to who are then giving arms to both--you
know, to opposite sides in this Libyan civil war.
Maybe we would have been better off not getting involved,
not bombing Gaddafi into oblivion, not thinking that he was
some great saint but knowing that there was at least some
stability there. And I wonder if chaos is worse, you know, a
worse scenario.
And all I would ask is that we have got to learn these
lessons. And I am not so positive--I do not think Blinken has.
He is already sending us back into Syria. What do you think of
sending more convoys into the conflict in Syria?
Ms. Sherman. Well, my understanding, Senator, is that is
not what Secretary Blinken is about. What he is about is
looking at what our interests are regarding ISIS and a de-ISIS
campaign, and to make sure that we have a very small footprint
and an appropriate one that is only in our interests.
But I do appreciate, Senator, the issues you raise. These
are very hard decisions. You are correct that we should learn
lessons of history and try not to repeat them, that regime
change is rarely, if ever, successful.
So on some of your points, I would agree with you. I think,
nonetheless, we do have American interests that compel us
sometimes to use very precious blood and treasure.
But no President, no Secretary of State, no Secretary of
Defense, makes these decisions without enormous consideration,
and I hope as this administration goes forward with more and
more consultation with Congress, as I think the chairman knows,
finally, long overdue, there are now Title 10 notifications--
pre-notifications to this committee, and I think that is a step
in the right direction.
Senator Paul. I hope you will be a constructive voice. All
I will say is that we are bombing now again in Syria without
congressional approval and we are sending more convoys in there
without congressional approval to a messy war.
It has been going on forever. There is nothing good that is
going to come out of our involvement. People say, well, U.S.
lives are at risk. Yeah, because we put them there. You know,
we put them in the middle of a civil war that is, largely,
over, but can continue if we keep putting troops there--to put
our troops as a tripwire to get involved in a further
escalation of this war.
So I hope there will be sane voices and I hope you will be
one of those. But I do not have a great deal of confidence that
we have actually gone away from John Bolton. I think we have
gone to a liberal form of John Bolton with your new boss and
that is something I am very concerned with.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to you both for your continued willingness to
serve your country. Senator Paul and I do not always agree on
the answers to these weighty questions but I do think he brings
a healthy caution regarding American hubris, particularly in
the Middle East and I appreciate his line of questioning.
I am hoping to squeeze in three questions here, two, for
you, Ambassador Sherman, one for you, Mr. McKeon.
I wanted to come back to the topic of Venezuela. I remember
shortly after Elliott Abrams was appointed to be President
Trump's envoy, he came into my office and he talked about the
big chance that the administration was taking, essentially,
sort of playing all of our cards right at the outset, including
the recognition of Juan Guaido, and he predicted that if Maduro
had not fallen, had not left power by May of 2019, then our
chance that we had taken would have been perceived as a
mistake.
Last week, the Europeans, essentially, de-recognized Juan
Guaido as the leader of Venezuela, essentially confirming that
two years later our policy has not worked.
Maduro is still in power. Russia, China, and Cuba are more
deeply involved in Venezuela and the United States, having
played all those cards early on, we look feckless, not just in
Venezuela but throughout the region.
And so does it make sense to continue a policy that by all
objective measures has not worked and, if not, what should a
new policy look like?
Ms. Sherman. If I knew the answer this morning to that
question, Senator, you should confirm me quickly without
hesitation.[Laughter.]
Ms. Sherman. I think this is a very thorny and very
difficult situation. I think that the United States and the
world community was right to recognize Juan Guaido. I do not
think that the previous administration took advantage of all of
the things that it might have to try to push that agenda
forward.
I do not think we have supported Colombia in the way that
we perhaps needed to for taking in all of the refugees out of
Venezuela. I think that we have given Maduro a platform to, in
fact, say that everybody is feckless and he gets to do whatever
he wants to do.
There are ways, perhaps, that we can communicate with the
Venezuelan people that we have not. But I do not--I will be the
first to say I do not this morning--I am filled with humility
in saying that I do not know that there is an easy answer to
this problem.
What I can say to you, Senator, is I think it is a very
critical one. It is absolutely wrapped up in China's investment
in Latin America, Russia's investment in Latin America, about
sort of the triad with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and we
have to think through what a strategy going forward might be.
And, if confirmed, I look forward to speaking with you and
with everyone on this committee with your ideas and thoughts
about the best way we might crack this very difficult
challenge.
Senator Murphy. I hope it is also a prism through which the
administration can take a review of American sanctions policy.
I think there is an argument to be made that in this case the
sanctions may have, ultimately, accrued to the benefit of
Maduro to the detriment of Venezuelan citizens, and not gotten
us the political return that we had hoped and still hoped for.
On Iran--I know we keep on coming back to this, but I just
wanted to clarify an answer that you gave to Senator Romney in
your exchange with him. You listed out a number of malevolent
behaviors by the Iranians, the things that we hope that they
eventually come to the table on.
But I just wanted to confirm that it is still your
understanding that the administration's position is that we
should get back into the nuclear deal, get back on the same
page with the P5+1 and use that as a platform through which to
put pressure on the Iranians with respect to its ballistic
missile programs, its support for terrorist groups.
I think the Maximum Pressure campaign was built on a
fantasy, this idea that we could have a comprehensive
negotiation where the Iranians would come to the table on
everything all at once. In fact, during the last four years,
despite these intense sanctions the Iranians came to the table
on none of Secretary Pompeo's list of 12 demands.
So it is still our belief that we should get back into the
nuclear agreement and as quickly as possible, understanding
that that will take negotiation, and use that as a platform
with which to bring together the world community around other
behaviors that we object to by Tehran.
Ms. Sherman. Yes, it is my understanding that the Biden/
Harris administration, Secretary Blinken, want to get back into
the deal but to make it longer and stronger, and to use it as a
platform to have negotiations on the other issues of concern
that we have with Iran.
Senator Murphy. And it makes me a little nervous when we
sort of hear terms like longer and stronger. Again, I think
many of us supported that deal on its terms. We understand that
we always had to have a follow-on negotiation to make sure it
was lengthened.
But by expanding out the number of things that we want to
talk about at this negotiating table, I worry that, you know,
we may be setting ourselves up for failure. But I look forward
to continuing that discussion with you.
Thank you again for your service. I am really looking
forward to supporting your nomination and working with you.
Mr. McKeon, I wanted to expand the conversation that you
and I had privately and that is the question about the
effectiveness of our diplomacy abroad when we have such
difficulty getting outside the wire.
Diplomacy does not just happen in embassies. It needs to
happen in communities. And in the wake of Benghazi, we have
become much shyer, much more reluctant, much more cautious
about putting our diplomats out, especially in dangerous
places, and the work that Senator Coons has done on fragile
states, I think, is part of the answer here.
But, you know, we also have a review process for incidences
abroad that tends to, you know, make people very, very hesitant
to do anything that might put any diplomat at risk.
The risk tolerance in State is fundamentally different than
the risk tolerance we have in the Department of Defense, and I
think that is a mistake.
I think we should pursue some congressional reforms to the
Accountability Review Board process to make people less fearful
of punitive action and more willing to learn from mistakes.
What is your thoughts on how we can try to push diplomacy
back outside our embassy compound walls?
Mr. McKeon. Senator Murphy, thank you. It is a hard
challenge, and I appreciate you being willing to dive into it.
You know, there is no such thing as perfect security. The
diplomats that work for our country are in a dangerous
business, and evidence of that is on the walls of the C Street
lobby in the State Department, the names of those who have been
killed while serving the government overseas.
As you said, we have the statute that mandates
accountability review. Our board process was enacted in the mid
'80s. It does not apply in the same way to DOD or the
intelligence community. So I appreciate if you and other
members of committee are willing to take a look at that. We
should have a conversation about it.
The department began a review under the last Secretary,
being led by very senior diplomat, to look at this question
which they put it under the framework of risk mitigation.
Though I do not know the timing of his work, but that will also
inform our conversation.
Senator Murphy. Great. I look forward to working with you
on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty. Put your microphone on, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. There we go. I was saying thank you very
much for scheduling this important hearing for two very
important positions in the State Department.
Also, Ambassador Sherman, I appreciate your acknowledgement
of the success of the Abraham Accords. A tremendous amount of
work went into that. I know you had been critical of the
previous administration about this earlier.
But I appreciate your acknowledgement of the success
because, indeed, it has changed the dynamic in the region. And
I encourage the Biden administration to strongly consult with
our allies in the Middle East as you consider reentry into the
JCPOA.
I would like to turn now, Ambassador Sherman, to a
discussion on the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, if I
might. You mentioned earlier that the Biden administration will
follow the law. I would just like to follow up on Ranking
Member Risch's comments here, if I might, because I think it is
very important that we talk about the oversight dynamic here.
The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 requires the
executive branch to submit to Congress any and all agreements
that are related to the nuclear program of Iran. Those need to
be submitted for congressional review.
Ambassador Sherman, can you imagine any scenario in which
the Biden administration would decide to participate again in
the JCPOA concerning Iran's nuclear program or modifies any
aspect of the current sanctions regime on Iran and you would
not submit this to Congress for review?
Ms. Sherman. It is always hard, Senator. I am not a lawyer.
But any lawyer would tell you and has told me never to make a
completely universal comment about such a question.
But what I will say to you is that this administration, the
Biden/Harris administration, Secretary Blinken, are committed
to following the law. And if, indeed, whatever is decided falls
within the terms of INARA, then we must, indeed, come to
Congress.
Senator Hagerty. I think this is the concern that Ranking
Member Risch and I have right now and that is looking at a very
specific legal interpretation of the document and not looking
at the purpose of the Act.
The purpose of the Act is to ensure congressional review,
not to find weasel words or ways to get out of complying with
it. So I encourage this administration and you, if you are
confirmed, to find a way to comply with the purpose of this
Act.
Ms. Sherman. I think that is a fair point that the intent
is to make sure that Congress has a say, and I think what is
and, as Senator Cardin pointed out earlier, I was very engaged
with both Senator Cardin and Senator Corker to ensure that
INARA, in fact, happened, and that there was a congressional
review process. I thought it was terribly important, and very
grateful to then Chairman Corker and Senator Cardin, who was
ranking at the time, for moving forward on a congressional
review process.
What I would hope this time is that we have happen what is
happening here, which is that you all are there at the takeoff
that you are reviewing the considerations of this
administration throughout the process, and that the review does
not just come at the end but the review happens throughout any
process that goes forward.
And if I am confirmed, you have my commitment, not just
regarding any agreement with Iran but with what we are doing in
foreign policy and national security, writ large.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Ambassador.
Can we turn to the Central Bank of Iran now? That is
another source of concern. U.S. policy has sought to deny the
Iranian regime, including the Central Bank of Iran, the money,
especially the hard currency that it uses to fund terrorism and
many other malign activities that threaten the national
security of the United States, of Israel, and our partners in
the Gulf.
The Treasury Department has concluded that, since at least
2016, Iran's IRGC Quds Force, the terror outfit that exists
there, has received the vast majority of its foreign currency
from the Central Bank of Iran.
Ambassador Sherman, do you commit to maintaining sanctions
on the Central Bank of Iran and hold it accountable for its
activities to support terrorism, including any secondary
sanctions that are now in place?
Ms. Sherman. Senator, I do not know all the ins and outs of
the current sanctions that are in place because I have been out
of government now for some time.
But I, certainly, do not want to do anything that supports
the IRGC to continue its activities in the region that are
vastly destabilizing and put our allies and our partners and
ourselves at tremendous risk.
Senator Hagerty. I think these sanctions have taken a great
deal of time and effort. I was personally involved in some of
the aspects of this. And I would encourage you and I would
encourage the Biden administration not to grant sanctions
relief to the Central Bank of Iran without a thorough review
and make certain that these sanctions are--continue to stay in
place until they have stopped in all aspects supporting
terrorism.
A further question, Ambassador Sherman. The Iranian regime,
clearly, wants the United States to lift sanctions against the
Central Bank of Iran. Please, and I would love for your
commitment on this to not provide any form of sanctions relief,
including through the use of waivers or licenses to the Central
Bank of Iran unless we can verifiably ensure that they cease
all of their malign activities.
Ms. Sherman. I appreciate your view and I will, certainly,
want to talk with you further, if confirmed, and as I learn
more about the sanctions that are currently in place and how
they affect different activities by Iran. Thank you for that.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you very much.
Turn to North Korea for just a minute, you and I have
spoken about this before. As you know, when I was ambassador to
Japan, I was there when Kim Jong-un launched two
intercontinental ballistic missiles over Japan and, at a
different time, tested a hydrogen bomb.
I have no doubt that North Korea is going to remain one of
the most critical national security challenges that the United
States will have to face this decade. And as we learned during
the Trump administration, subordinates come and go in the
negotiations, sometimes permanently, perhaps.
Kim Jong-un takes the decisions on the nuclear program. It
is critical to strengthen the Maximum Pressure campaign to
sharpen the choices for the Kim regime.
Ambassador Sherman, do you support additional sanctions
against the Chinese companies that are doing business with
North Korea?
Ms. Sherman. Again, because I have been out of government,
I do not know all that is in place now. But, certainly, we do
want to ensure that North Korea understands that unless it
comes to the table to really make progress in denuclearization
that we will use every tool that we have to prevent them from
doing so and, certainly, want China not to be playing an
adverse role in that process.
Senator Hagerty. Yeah, they have been playing a tremendous
role, as you and I both know, and I hope we can continue to
work toward that goal.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you. I look forward to it, Senator, if
confirmed.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses. I want to follow up on Senator Hagerty's line of
questions with respect to congressional approval of forward
steps on Iran.
I have a very different opinion about the JCPOA than the
Republican members of this body, and Senator Risch and I have
done this often. But I have exactly the same opinion as all the
members of the body about congressional review, and I was the
original--sort of one of the original drafters of INARA.
Because the Obama administration--the plan was to do a deal
with Iran and do it pursuant to waiver authority under the
congressional sanctions and not bring it to Congress for eight
years.
Eventually, at year eight, they would have to come to
Congress to have a statutory lifting of the sanctions. That was
the original plan. And even though I thought the negotiation
was coming up with a deal that I thought was much better than
the status quo ante, and Senator Corker did not think so, we
both thought because congressional sanctions were being used as
leverage to get the deal that Congress had to be involved. And
whatever the forward steps on the deal might be, Congress needs
to be involved because you are using a congressional statute
that imposes sanctions as leverage in this topic. So I just
want to associate myself with the comments that he made.
Now I will go to associating myself with topics raised by
Senator Paul. You talked about your parents being there at the
founding of the U.N. because your dad was a Marine veteran who
had suffered war injuries at Guadalcanal, and he wanted to be
there at the founding of an organization that was designed to
prevent war.
Sadly, we, as humans, cannot prevent war. No organization
can. But we should try to prevent unnecessary war.
And it is interesting the way the Framers of the
Constitution and then even the architects of Senate procedures
have tried to help us figure out a way to prevent unnecessary
war.
So the United States, unlike virtually anywhere else in the
world, has a founding document, the Constitution, that says it
is not for the executive to decide to go to war. It is for the
legislative branch.
Nobody does that. I mean, war is for the king, the monarch,
the emperor, the dictator. But not here. The initiation of war
is supposed to be by Congress with the President then managing
the war because the last thing you need is 535 commanders in
chief.
And then within the rules of this body decisions about
going to war come out of the Foreign Relations Committee, not
out of the Armed Services. I am on the Armed Services
Committee.
Most people guess that that is where war resolutions start.
They do not, because as you said, prefer diplomacy first, and
if diplomacy fails, war can be a sad necessity. But prefer
diplomacy first. So it has to start in the Foreign Relations
Committee.
Let me ask you this, Ms. Sherman, and I have very high
regard for both of you and I will support both your
nominations. Iraq right now, are they an enemy or are they a
partner?
Ms. Sherman. I hope they are a partner, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Yeah, they are a partner. They are not an
enemy anymore. There are some challenges with our partner, with
Iraq, especially the activities of these Iranian-backed militia
groups, which the successive prime ministers have tried to
figure out how to control without completely satisfying us.
But they are not an enemy. We still have two war
authorizations against the nation of Iraq that have not been
repealed. Gulf War 1991, Iraq War Resolution 2002. Boy, how is
that to treat a partner and have a war authorization against
them?
Today, Senators Lee, Paul, Young, Grassley, Kaine, Durbin,
Coons, Duckworth, we are introducing a bill to repeal the two
Iraq AUMFs.
And I am not going to ask you for a commitment on that. You
are not part of the administration yet. But I would think
Congress should not just allow war authorizations to exist in
perpetuity.
But we often do. We pass them and then they are just out
there and they can be used in mischievous ways.
The President undertook on his own initiation without
congressional approval missile strikes against militia
positions in Syria that are connected to Iran last Thursday.
At the same time that this happened, the U.S. had an offer
on the table with Europeans for Iran to come back to a table
for a no-preconditions discussion about what do we do about the
JCPOA. Iran was considering that offer.
The administration, from my conversations, was actually
pretty optimistic that Iran was going to accept that offer.
Then missile strikes happened on Thursday, and then Iran turned
down the offer on Sunday.
The President asserted, as a rationale for the missile
strikes, that he had unilateral power under Article 2 to do
them. He did not refer to the AUMFs, which was good because
those would be fig leaves. He just said, I have Article 2
power.
But the challenge is if you allow presidents unilaterally
to do things, even things that are prudent, okay, president
takes a step with a missile strike. Iran then turns down an
opportunity to explore diplomacy.
I cannot imagine anybody at the Pentagon or at the State
Department was surprised with the militia airstrikes back at
the Air Force--at the Air Force Base where U.S.-led coalition
forces were yesterday.
When one side decides, I can do this unilaterally, then the
other side decides, I can do this unilaterally because you
started it. No, you started it. No, you started it. And then we
are in the midst, potentially, of a significant military
engagement of war without a discussion in Congress.
I do not care how prudent unilateral executive action is.
It can lead to counteraction and counteraction and reaction,
and then suddenly, we are in the middle of something that has
not been discussed in front of Congress, has not been discussed
in front of the American people.
And I just think, again, even the events of the last couple
of days since, Ms. Sherman, you and I talked on our Zoom call
have demonstrated that the Framers were not really wrong when
they said decisions about war and the initiation of war should
be sort of aired before the people's legislative body and have
an imprimatur. If we are going to do it, it should have an
imprimatur on it of more than just one person.
I have shared this view about the missile strikes last
Thursday and about the at least temporary collapse of this
diplomatic opportunity Sunday, and then the Iraqi strikes
against the base with the U.S.-led coalition.
This is the kind of thing that happens and there is no
guarantee it will not happen if you have more dialogue with
Congress and the public. But you reduce the risk. I think you
reduce the risk of unnecessary and uncontemplated escalation if
you have the kind of consultation that, I think, both Democrats
and Republicans on this committee would expect of you.
I know you believe that and I am confident you will push
for that to all your might, and that is one of the reasons that
I have the confidence that I will support you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young?
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. McKeon, I enjoyed visiting this week. When we spoke,
you outlined how examining the resourcing of America's
development enterprise and our foreign assistance would be one
of your top priorities, if confirmed.
This is an area of particular interest to me. It dates back
several years. In fact, I co-chaired a CSIS task force in 2017
with Senator Shaheen on reforming our foreign assistance
programming.
And one of the recommendations that we made in that
convening of former career Foreign Service officers and USAID
professionals and other experts was to take a hard look at the
overlapping responsibilities and, thus, the duplicative efforts
and budgets of the State Department, USAID, and various
development finance organizations and to empower USAID to have
a bigger voice in the conversation and more of a leading role
in American foreign policy.
So that starts with strategic direction from the top. From
the outside, what do you find, sir, most concerning about how
our foreign assistance is organized?
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Senator. I will have to dig out the
task force report from 2017 because I am not familiar with it.
As you know, the USAID administrator reports to and is
under the direct authority of the Secretary of State. But I
think, from experience in the last 20 years, that relationship
has probably had more--marked more by tension than
collaboration.
So I think one of the first priorities would be to try to
reset that working with Ambassador Power, if she is confirmed.
She is going to be a great spokesperson for the mission and is
not shy.
So I am sure that she will assert her views about the
relationship and the direction of our program. So I think first
priority is to get the relationship between State and AID in
the right place and make sure that the programs are aligned and
not duplicative.
Then, as you mentioned, the other agencies. The Secretary
of State chairs the board of the Millennium Challenge
Corporation and the Development Finance Corporation.
And so we, at the State Department, if I am confirmed and
the Secretary, we need to make sure we are using that role to
ensure that everyone is rowing in the same direction on our
programs and are aligned with the President's priorities and
strategies.
You have given us great tools with the--with these
agencies, the DFC being the newest one, but we need to put them
to greatest effect, and I would like to talk to you more about
it as I dig into it, if I get into the job.
Senator Young. While I move to our diverse array of various
agencies that are tasked with foreign assistance, it is one of
the things I discovered when I became a member of this
committee is just the constellation of different agencies.
And one avenue to explore is how we can task some of these
agencies with operating in countries with lower incomes or
worse health outcomes while directing others to specifically
address more developed economies and societies, rather than
throwing our resources from the various agencies at the same
countries.
For instance, how can the United States better utilize our
more independent development organizations like the Millennium
Challenge Corporation or the Development Finance Corporation
and make them more strategic in their investments?
I would like you to sort of speak to that generally, and
then answer this specifically. Can the Development Finance
Corporation be more focused on middle income countries that
face more pressure from Russian and Chinese influence?
Mr. McKeon. Senator I need to dig into the DFC statute. My
understanding from a briefing paper is they are supposed to
prioritize their investments in lower income countries. I think
there is some exception for middle or higher income countries
in some respects. But the primary focus is supposed to be on
the lower income countries. If I have that wrong, please tell
me.
Senator Young. Respectfully, I think that is just been the
construction of the statute. The statute actually does call for
development assistance to lower income countries, and then
there is--in the same charge, it indicates that the resources
may also be deployed strategically.
So it is like so many of our statutes. It is a vaguely
written statute, which I lament, but my own views, which you
might have sort of inferred by the question, is that we have an
opportunity here to perhaps use DFC in a more strategic fashion
vis-`-vis some of our strategic competitors, like Russia and
China.
So I would look forward to working with you or others
within the administration to--on that effort.
Ambassador Sherman, I do not want to neglect you, and I am
grateful for your long-standing service and for your appearance
here today.
President Biden has signaled that working with our partners
and allies is going to be a foundation of his foreign policy
and that he will seek to renew relations with our European
partners.
In fact, in his recent address before the Munich Security
Conference, he called the transatlantic relationship the
cornerstone of all we hope to accomplish in the 21st century.
I agree that we must be engaging with our democratic allies
in order to reach agreements on security and trade and
technology development and health resiliency and all manner of
other things.
But we also have to be willing to embrace our own ability
to shape these areas and not the other way around, right. So
there is a balance to be struck.
So if the leaders of Europe are unwilling to confront the
threats emanating from around the globe, most especially the
threats emanating from China and Russia, how would you
recommend the United States adjust its strategy to engage with
them?
In 10 seconds or less, please.
Ms. Sherman. I think it is absolutely critical that we
engage with the transatlantic relationship around China and
Russia. We are so much stronger together than we are apart, and
I think that it will take vigorous diplomacy, which Secretary
Blinken is going to lead, and, if confirmed, I hope to help him
do exactly what you are suggesting, that we help to drive that
agenda.
Europe is not always excited about us being back at the
table because they are wary, given some years of us being away.
But they also respect and understand the power of the United
States of America, and I think that it is time that we lead by
our example by what we are doing to compete and build our own
infrastructure to do that competition.
But doing it together will make us much more powerful in
challenging China, competing with China, and dealing with all
of the threats that are put forward by Russia.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
I understand we have Senator Markey virtually.
Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much,
and thank both of you for your long-term service to our country
and we hope that you will be given the opportunity to continue
because I think you would be enormous assets to ensuring that
we have a safer better world that we are living in for everyone
in our society.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, just want to go through a few bits
of facts from the past so that we can just establish it as part
of this hearing record.
Before you helped to get the world's major powers and Iran
to the negotiating table, Iran was about two months away from
producing enough highly-enriched uranium for its first nuclear
bomb.
Is that correct?
Ms. Sherman. Yes, that was the assessment.
Senator Markey. And after all sides began implementing the
Iran nuclear deal, that breakout time extended to more than a
year. Is that correct?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Senator Markey. And Senator Risch asked you about
enrichment, so I would like to go back to that. As part of the
Iran nuclear deal, Iran reduced, reduced, its stock of low-
enriched uranium by 98 percent to 300 kilograms.
But as a result of the Trump administration's unilateral
exit from the Iran nuclear deal, that number increased to 12
times over that 300-kilogram limit.
Is that correct?
Ms. Sherman. That is my understanding. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. Okay. So, again, while many of my
colleagues have spent time criticizing the Iran deal, the
effect of that arrangement did dramatically reduce the ability
of Iran to have a quick breakout time towards producing a
nuclear weapon.
And I just want to make sure that all of that is out on the
table, and again, you played an instrumental role in ensuring
that that would be part of that agreement.
So compliance-for-compliance is what President Biden is now
saying his goal is. So can you just, again, expand a little bit
more on what the Biden administration's policy will be in terms
of compliance-for-compliance in ensuring that we do go back to
a position where Iran's breakout time is lessened dramatically?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator.
It is my understanding what the Biden/Harris administration
hopes to do is to get Iran to come back into full compliance
with the deal.
Then we would be in compliance with the deal and that we
would build from that to get a longer and stronger agreement,
given that the deal is now some years old and, as you have
pointed out, Iran has now increased its stockpile, increased
the depth of its enrichment, increased many of its capabilities
more--using more sophisticated centrifuges as a result of our
leaving the deal, and that we would not only get back to where
we were but we would build a better, stronger, longer platform.
And then we would address the other issues of concern.
And as you pointed out, Senator, that one-year breakout
time is critical because it allows us if for some reason Iran
is able to cheat, though there were the most extraordinary
verification and monitoring mechanisms, we would have time to
slap back on sanctions or even to take military action.
So we would maintain all of our options to ensure that Iran
not obtain a nuclear weapon.
Senator Markey. Yeah, and I agree with you. A one-year
breakout time gives us time to put additional pressure on, but
if it goes down to only two months or one month as a breakout
time, our capacity to respond is, obviously, diminished
dramatically.
So I think the approach which the Biden administration is
taking is the correct one.
If I could just move over to Burma, that recent coup
carried out by the Burmese military against the democratically-
elected civilian government has been condemned by the Biden
administration, and I welcome the steps which the
administration has already taken, including imposing targeted
sanctions against the military.
What role do you think China should play in partnering with
the United States and do we have a capacity to get China to
partner with us in order to put pressure on the military in
Burma to allow for the civilian democratically-elected
government to return to power?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you for that really important question,
Senator.
It is my understanding that Linda Thomas-Greenfield, our
ambassador now to the United Nations, is going to use our
platform since we are in the presidency in the month of March
to have a more serious discussion in the U.N. Security Council
about Burma and encouraging China to urge a return to a
democratically-elected government and to end the military coup,
which in its wake is just having a horrifying impact on the
rights and the freedoms of the Burmese people.
We have lots of issues with Burma even before this coup,
given the treatment of the Rohingya. But now it is of great
concern for all of the people of Burma and their freedom and
their way forward.
I applaud Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield for taking
this subject up as one of the first things that she does, and
Secretary Blinken has made it very clear this is a very high
priority for him and to not only look at those sanctions but
see that we get everyone engaged in ensuring that we return the
government.
Senator Markey. Okay, thank you. And I do believe we have
to put much more pressure on those military leaders and I hope
that that is part of the Biden plan. And no one has done more
thinking about the North Korean nuclear program than you have,
historically. You have just a rich history of the three
generations of the Kim family and their attitudes about this
issue.
Could you give us your sense of what the steps should be
that are taken by the Biden administration in conjunction with
the regional allies, especially in order to reduce this ever-
increasing nuclear threat from North Korea?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator. It is my understanding
that a review is going on in the administration to decide on
how best to proceed with North Korea. Very tough challenge.
Quite agree with you it needs to be done with partners and
allies in the region, particularly Japan and South Korea. But
with everyone who has a stake in ensuring that Kim Jong-un does
not develop even more nuclear weapons, greater delivery
systems, and pose even a greater threat to the region and to
the world.
So I understand that review is ongoing and, if confirmed, I
would be glad to be talking with everyone here more about it to
get your views and ideas as well.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Markey. Do you--okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to the both of you. Congratulations on your
nominations.
In the last six weeks, the Biden administration has
embraced China, has bombed Syria, has empowered Russia and
Putin, has refused to stand with Israel on the Golan Heights,
and has lifted sanctions on Iranian-backed terrorists.
That is not an encouraging opening for the foreign policy
of this country for the next four years. I want to focus on a
couple of those areas.
Let us start with an area that should be a potential for
bipartisan cooperation. It is a topic that I discussed with
both of you at length in the past week, and that is Nord Stream
2.
Nord Stream 2, in the last year, was an incredible
bipartisan victory for the United States. The pipeline was over
90 percent completed from Russia to Germany. Congress acted not
once but twice, passing strong bipartisan sanctions.
Sanctions supported by Republicans and Democrats on this
committee passed it into law, and despite mountains of Russian
disinformation, the pipeline ceased minutes before those
sanctions were signed into law.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration has been sending
mixed signals and those signals have been heard by Putin. And
so Putin, after ceasing building the pipeline for a year, has
gone back to building the pipeline because Putin and Russia
believe the Biden administration will not hold them
accountable, will allow them to complete this pipeline, which
would put billions of dollars in Putin's pockets to be used
against America, against Europe.
The European Parliament, by the way, in December 2018 voted
433 to 105 to oppose Nord Stream 2, and in January 2021, after
Putin attempted to murder Navalny, they voted again to condemn
it, this time 581 to 50.
Let me start with both of you. Do both of you agree that
allowing Nord Stream 2 to be completed would be terrible policy
for the United States?
Ms. Sherman. Senator, the President of the United States,
the Secretary of State, have both said they oppose Nord Stream
2 and do not believe it should be completed.
Mr. McKeon. Senator that is my understanding as well. The
President has said it is a bad deal.
Senator Cruz. Well, if they oppose it, they are not very
effective at opposing it because when their administration came
into office, suddenly it commenced, and to be particular, last
month the State Department transmitted a mandatory and overdue
report to Congress about who is helping Putin build the
pipeline. The report included one ship and its owner, which the
Trump administration had already sanctioned.
So it simply reiterated what the Trump administration had
done. It did not include any entities that are plainly in
violation, not even the company that is actually constructing
the pipeline Congress has instructed the President to sanction.
Then, yesterday, the Biden administration imposed sanctions
for the poisoning of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, but
those sanctions went out of their way not to touch the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline.
That was not an accident. Now that construction is resumed,
we have precious little time. I told both of you that if the
Biden administration does not change course, we are going to
wake up in six months or a year and this pipeline is going to
built because the Biden administration failed to act.
And so I want to ask you, Ms. Sherman, if confirmed, will
you move immediately to ensure that the Biden administration
meets its mandatory obligation imposed by Congress to name and
sanction all of the entities that are engaged in pipe laying,
pipe laying activities, certification, or insurance related to
Nord Stream 2?
Ms. Sherman. Well, Senator, even if confirmed, I will not
have the authority to make those decisions unilaterally. But I
can say to you that I will do everything I possibly can to
ensure that Nord Stream 2 does not go forward, and I know that
the administration will welcome advice and counsel from you and
from the Senate and we will move forward on everything that
they can do legally to stop the pipeline.
Senator Cruz. Well, I want to be very clear so that no one
in the administration is surprised. This was an incredible
victory for U.S. foreign policy and an incredible loss for
Putin and Russia.
The sanctions legislation was supported by virtually the
entirety the committee when we voted on it. The vote was 20 to
2, an overwhelming bipartisan majority.
The administration has all of the tools to stop the
pipeline, as evidenced by the fact that we stopped it for a
year that it worked, that we know it worked.
And it has only been in the last few weeks with the new
administration that Putin has felt he has the green light to go
ahead. I understand that the Germans want the pipeline built,
that the German Government does.
But going soft on Russia is a serious mistake, and once it
is built, it likely is impossible to unwind. So the window and
the urgency is now.
Ms. Sherman. Senator, we share the sense of urgency, and I
just want to say although I am not yet a part of the
administration and will not be unless confirmed by the Senate,
that I do not believe that the Biden/Harris administration has
been soft on Russia in any way, shape, or form.
I know we disagree when it comes to Nord Stream 2. But they
are very clear. As we heard, Ambassador Burns, who is, I hope,
about to be confirmed to be the director of the CIA, said and
who is our ambassador to Russia, that we all should be very
clear eyed about Russia being an adversary. Secretary Blinken
has spoken at length about ways in which Russia threaten our
country and I think there is a commitment to move in a tough
way.
Senator Cruz. Ambassador Sherman, with all due respect--
with all due respect, words are cheap. And so if the Biden
administration wishes to not be soft on Russia, rather than
saying we do not want to be soft on Russia they could actually
follow the mandatory law and stop the pipeline.
The test is going to be real simple. If Putin has billions
of dollars and Europe is energy dependent on Russia because the
Biden administration refused to comply with mandatory
bipartisan sanctions, that will be the test and not any
political rhetoric about we are tough on Putin.
If you are tough on Putin, do not give him billions of
dollars. The State Department needs to file a supplemental
interim report on Nord Stream 2 that sanctions every entity and
they are refusing to do so.
And if this pipeline gets completed, it will be the fault
of this administration. I do not want this to happen. I want
that to be a bipartisan victory and a victory for the United
States. You both have the opportunity to make sure that happens
and so I implore you to do that.
Thank you.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you. Just since the chairman reserved
his time I am going to take a moment of that time.
President Trump could have used sanctions for the course of
his four years in office on Nord Stream. He did not need
congressionally-approved sanctions to affect the pipeline.
Would that be from your experience a fair statement?
Ms. Sherman. That is a fair statement, Senator.
The Chairman. And yet he did not do that. So I join my
colleague in my concern for Nord Stream. I mentioned it in my
opening remarks, and I urge the administration to do everything
they can to stop Nord Stream.
But it would be intellectually unfair to suggest that the
Biden administration is going to be the reason why Nord Stream
gets built when four years were lost with no sanctions
whatsoever.
I understand that Senator Schatz is up next virtually.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both of you for being willing to serve again.
My first question is for Ambassador Sherman. You know, as
people think of Asia, the mind races across the Pacific to
China and not the nations in between us and them, and so I want
to talk a little bit about Oceania.
It has got 12 million people, 14 island states, 17
territories, and 6 percent of the votes that we may need at the
United Nations. And so how do we step up engagement in Oceania?
Ms. Sherman. It is a great question, Senator, and you
probably understand this part of the world better than most of
us do, representing Hawaii, where it is very much a part of
your neighborhood in many ways.
I think that it is critical to engage with Oceania and with
the island states. They are often, as you point out, critical
votes at the United Nations and, certainly, in the General
Assembly.
And I know that in the Obama administration we, in fact,
created a special forum to have those conversations and to
ensure that we had diplomats who traveled to those island
nations. That often does not happen because they are far away.
Sometimes the travel is difficult. But it is quite critical.
So I thank you very much for raising it and, if confirmed,
I certainly will commit to you to pay attention to what is
often a swing vote.
Senator Schatz. Thank you. And I think one area for
potential cooperation, you know, we think of climate action as
an objective of American foreign policy.
But climate action is a shared response to the climate
crisis, especially in the disaster preparation, disaster
response space, and as we look at more long-term impacts of sea
level rise, especially in island nations and coastal nations,
there are opportunities to step up what USAID is doing and
other sort of, as you like to use the term, avenues of smart
power.
And so I am particularly excited about the opportunities
for us to deploy those resources throughout island nations for
selfish reasons but also for good humanitarian reasons.
Can you talk a little bit about what is going to be the
climate action strategy? I know we have got, you know, a lot of
horsepower behind this, including the President of the United
States, the former Secretary of State.
But how does that get operationalized in the international
context? And I am particularly interested not just in Paris but
how we use shared climate response as a tool of diplomacy.
Ms. Sherman. So let me make a couple of comments and then
Mr. McKeon may want to add to it as well in terms of how we are
organizing to tackle this very critical challenge.
The President of the United States, the Secretary, the vice
president have made clear that climate and our response to the
changing climate is a whole-of-government approach and it is
also a whole of State Department approach.
So as much as we have a special presidential envoy for
climate in former Secretary Kerry, every part of the
department, every bureau of the department, will have a focus
on climate as well because, as you well know, some of these
island nations are at risk of even disappearing, let alone the
changes in the ecosystem of the oceans, which affects fishermen
and the ability to have maritime and fishery economies. So it
is a critical issue that we will all have to pay attention to.
And your point, Senator, about disaster preparedness is
often a place where countries even with whom we do not agree on
everything can work together because it is such a necessity,
and the United States brings, really, unparalleled capabilities
in disaster preparedness and response.
Mr. McKeon, I do not know if you want to add to that.
Senator Schatz. Mr. McKeon, before you answer, I would like
you to perhaps provide some emphasis on those areas where we
can make some permanent structural change within the department
so that our climate strategy becomes so embedded into American
foreign policy objectives that it does not swing in one
direction or the other depending on the partisan affiliation of
the President herself or himself.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Senator.
As Ambassador Sherman said, we really have to integrate the
emphasis on climate action throughout the department. It is not
just going to be Secretary Kerry's team, but, of course, they
will be leading the diplomacy.
But it has to be front of mind for the work of everyone in
the department in all of the regional and functional bureaus to
think about how in pursuit of their programs and their planning
they are integrating a climate action dimension to it, not just
in our diplomacy but also in our assistance programs, as you
suggested.
So I think we owe you more thinking on this and I am not
sure what planning has gone on already because we are not in
the department.
But we will come back to you once we are--once we are in
the seat, if confirmed, to give you more detail about how we
are moving forward on this.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
My final question for Ambassador Sherman, global press
freedom is on the decline. Reporters Without Borders found that
the protection of rights for journalists has decreased 12
percent since it started reporting on such things in 2013.
What can we do to reverse this trend?
Ms. Sherman. Really important, Senator, and we have already
had some discussion here this morning about our response on the
horrifying death of Jamal Khashoggi. I think it is critical
that we engage with journalists around the world, that we talk
about press freedom wherever we go.
Yes, journalists are separate and apart, and they are part
of holding us accountable and administration accountable. But
they are also citizens. They are also standing for freedom.
And, in fact, one of the great parts of the United States
is when we find ourselves challenged, as we have in many ways
over the last years, it is often the press who hold all of us
accountable for what we are doing.
And so we have heard Secretary Blinken speak of the
importance of press freedom and making it essential to our
human rights agenda around the world and our agenda on
democracy.
Senator Schatz. Thank you to you both for testifying, for
being willing to serve again. And I just want to thank the
chair and the ranking member and all the staff for welcoming me
on to the committee.
The Chairman. It is very good to have you with us, Senator
Schatz.
Senator Van Hollen?
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member, and I want to thank both of you for your prior public
service and your willingness to serve again.
Mr. McKeon, I want to associate myself with the remarks
from my fellow Maryland senator, Senator Cardin, about the
importance of your commitment to greater diversity in the
Foreign Service and the State Department.
Senator Sullivan and I are the co-chairs of the Foreign
Service Caucus and will soon be reintroducing legislation we
introduced last year, the Foreign Service Families Act.
It is to provide Foreign Service spouses and families
serving overseas with the same opportunities that we rightly
provide now to military spouses and families serving overseas.
I am just looking for your commitment that you will review
this legislation and provide us with your feedback as soon as
possible.
Mr. McKeon. Senator, you definitely--you have that
commitment. I have already looked at the bill and it looks, on
its face, very straightforward. I am sure colleagues in the
department will tell me we might need a tweak here or there to
make it more workable for--from the perspective of the
department. But we can work with you on that.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. One of the benefits
of going last here is you also get to associate yourself with
some of the prior comments, and I do want to associate myself
with the comments of Senator Young and Senator Coons, and I
know the chairman shares this, about better coordinating all
the tools available in our both diplomatic arsenal and our
development arsenal. USAID, the International Development
Finance Corporation. You and I spoke about that and I look
forward to working with you on that as well.
Ambassador Sherman, I teamed up with Senator Toomey to pass
two pieces of legislation. One is the BRINK Act, to apply
secondary sanctions against entities doing business with the
North Korean regime, and the Hong Kong Accountability Act to
apply sanctions to those Chinese officials who are tasked with
implementing the crackdown on democracy and human rights in
Hong Kong.
I would like your commitment to work with us to both fully
and effectively apply the sanctions under both those pieces of
legislation.
Ms. Sherman. It is an easy commitment to make, to make sure
that whatever sanctions we have we use them effectively and
efficiently.
Senator Van Hollen. So let me turn now to a little bit of
the Middle East, and JCPOA has been well covered here.
President Biden has made clear that he supports what had been
for a long time a bipartisan objective of U.S. foreign policy,
which is a secure State of Israel and a viable Palestinian
state--a two-state solution.
The Biden administration has also indicated that it would
oppose unilateral steps by either party that undermines the
prospects of a two-state solution, and we need to hold
everybody accountable there.
You would agree with, would you not, that expanding
settlements in East Jerusalem of the West Bank are unilateral
measures that do not serve the interests of protecting the
prospects of a two-state solution, would you not?
Ms. Sherman. It has been a long-standing position that
settlements, is my understanding, do not help to achieve a two-
state solution when they go beyond the current outlines of the
two states--the potential for two state.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate it. Well, one of them
under consideration is an area called E-1, which the Bush
administration made clear, Secretary Condoleezza Rice made
clear would be a very clear violation of our efforts to
preserve the opportunity for a two-state solution. So I hope
you will look into that right away.
While ISIS no longer controls any substantial territory,
you would agree that it remains a very potent threat to the
United States and our allies, would you not?
Ms. Sherman. I do agree it remains a threat.
Senator Van Hollen. And you would also agree, I believe,
that our Syrian Kurdish allies have been absolutely essential
partners in our fight against ISIS and have been a major part
of why we have been able to diminish ISIS' influence in the
region, would you not?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. So can you commit to working with us to
work with Turkey to stop trying to, essentially, kill and
destroy our Syrian Kurdish allies who have been such key
partners in that fight against ISIS?
Ms. Sherman. You know, Senator, I certainly understand
why--Turkey's concerns. But, nonetheless, I agree with you that
the Kurds have been immensely helpful partners to us and that
we need to work with Turkey to find a way forward for them to
understand that that partnership does not threaten them if we
all manage it in a sane kind of way.
Our relationship with Turkey is very complicated and one in
which I think, if confirmed, I would certainly pay some
considerable attention to.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that, and the chairman and
the ranking member and I have been very involved in the
legislation to impose the CAATSA sanctions on Turkey for their
purchase and deployment of the S-400. Turkey is talking about
another round of purchasing S-400 from Russia. So I hope you
will work with us and with Turkey to discourage them from
moving forward there.
On the JCPOA, I just want to underscore the fundamental
principle behind it, which is it is our policy to prevent Iran
from getting a nuclear weapon, right?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. And it is also our view, your view, my
view, that resolving that through diplomatic means is better
than going to war with Iran, right?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. And the United States has lots of
troops in Iraq right now, do we not?
Ms. Sherman. We do indeed.
Senator Van Hollen. And I actually agree with Senator
Paul's analysis of the consequence of the--our actions with
respect to Iraq, which is the biggest geopolitical winner was
Iran, which, of course, neighbors Iraq.
If we were to go to war with Iran, our troops in Iraq would
be put in grave danger, would they not?
Ms. Sherman. It is my belief that they would be, yes,
Senator.
Senator Van Hollen. I think it is pretty clear that they
would be right in the line of fire. So I encourage you to
continue your efforts with respect to JCPOA compliance-for-
compliance and I hope that we can get to that position as soon
as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
I would like to jump in. Ms. Sherman, I am grateful to see
you here and very excited to support your nomination on the
floor of the Senate.
You and I talked a lot about the Horn of Africa and some of
the challenges we see going on within Ethiopia that are really
painful and discouraging. Amnesty International said over the
weekend and CNN has reported that there have been massacres by
Eritrean forces, which have killed hundreds of civilians in the
Tigray region of Ethiopia.
It is really a point that I think we are at the level of a
major humanitarian crisis affecting millions of people, and
that there is the possibility of a famine, and I know you are
aware of it.
I really did appreciate Secretary Blinken's receptiveness
to appointing a special envoy to the Horn of Africa in a
statement last week, and I really do hope that we move forward
in that direction.
But the Government of Ethiopia continues to deny that there
is even ongoing fighting there, and this puts us in a difficult
situation. They are even putting out a lot of misinformation
that makes it hard to understand what is happening.
And so understanding that the U.S.-Ethiopia relationship is
important, as we know, could you just maybe give some more,
publicly in this hearing, some more thoughts on how you would
engage Prime Minister Abiy to cease hostilities and ensure that
humanitarian access is in the region and how we create better
governmental accountability?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you
for your concern about the Horn of Africa and about what is
happening in Ethiopia, which is quite horrifying.
Secretary Blinken, is my understanding, spoke to the prime
minister yesterday and made it very clear that we expect him to
ensure humanitarian access.
He had said that he would, but the Secretary wanted to make
sure that he understood that there would be consequences if he
did not, that he has responsibility for ensuring peace in the
Tigray region of Ethiopia, that Eritrean troops should leave
and others who are not helpful actors should not be in the
region.
I think we will have to follow this up, working with our
diplomatic presence in Ethiopia, to ensure that that
humanitarian access continues, that this conflict ends, and the
Ethiopian prime minister understands that the United States is
not only watching but we will take action.
And I am very grateful as a citizen, as a person who cares
about the rights of people around the world, that Secretary
Blinken was so forthright yesterday with the prime minister.
Senator Booker. I am really grateful. Can we shift to Libya
and Somalia as well, another really difficult area of conflict?
[Senator Booker requested and was granted permission to
submit the material referenced above for inclusion in the
hearing record. That information is located at the end of this
transcript beginning on page 144.]
And we can see that this was an internationalized conflict
with more countries being involved. Libya, UAE, Russia, Turkey,
have all fueled this conflict that I believe is another strike
point on the continent.
In Somalia, you see these other groups that are pursuing,
really, their own interests that are really to the detriment of
Somalia's Government and federalized system.
And so could you maybe give some insights on what you will
do to address the issues of foreign interference in a situation
that is really fragile and could destabilize even more, and how
you will help the regional bureaus of the State Department
cross between their silos?
That is the challenge you have in the Near East and Africa
bureaus that I am a little concerned about, that structurally
we are not really organizationally prepared for the conflict
that we are seeing there.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator. On Libya, I actually have
a small sliver of hope, given the pending elections and the
peace process that has begun in Libya. It is very fragile, as
you say, led by the Europeans.
And yes, I agree with you there. Lots of it became a proxy
place for conflict, and that those who represent those proxies
should be out of Libya and let the Libyan people decide their
own future.
I was in Libya right at the point where Hadi was about to
run as the only presidential candidate. It was fragile then. It
remains fragile now, and--I am sorry, Hadi is Yemen. Long in
the process here. I apologize.
But I was in Libya at the point of the conflict and before
we had to shut down our embassy in Libya. So I hope that there
is a more--a chance for peace in Libya, led by Europe with our
support.
In terms of Somalia, which I also visited when I was Under
Secretary for Political Affairs, and I thought we were on the
road to a better future for the Somali people. It has, clearly,
gone backwards in just terrible ways.
And so I think we have to engage across bureaus, as you
suggest, to make sure that we bring all of our resources to
bear. I know that our ambassador to the U.N. will also play a
role both in the Libyan and the Somalia circumstances.
And I do not know whether my colleague has something he
wants to add on sort of how we are organized to become a better
matrix organization and less siloed.
Senator Booker. I appreciate you opening the door to Mr.
McKeon and maybe I will turn to him. I had this incredible
couple paragraphs written here, knowing you are a Notre Dame
graduate, to remind you of my exploits as a football player
against your school and defeating them soundly. But I am going
to----
Mr. McKeon. After we talked the other day, I watched the
video of you making that catch and avoiding tackle from the
all-star NFL star.
Senator Booker. I appreciate you saying that because my
chairman, I am not sure if he even knows that I played.
Mr. McKeon. I texted some friends, and they were just
wondering how you got away from Lou Holtz.
[Laughter.]
Mr. McKeon. So they would like to hear the story.
The Chairman. The chairman recognizes that the junior
senator from New Jersey excels in everything.[Laughter.]
Senator Booker. Thank you very much. I am actually going to
just ask you--I just want to maybe say it on the record. You
were so gracious. But I have a lot of concerns about diversity,
paid internships.
I am going to introduce a bill today about paid internships
in the State Department because that is just an issue to me
that has always troubled me, as I have traveled around the
world, seeing our State Department, these amazing heroic
frontline folks, but they do not really reflect the diversity
of our country.
And I just would love to just maybe get in the five, 10
seconds I have left maybe some thoughts from you on that
effort.
Mr. McKeon. Yes, thank you.
As I said to you the other day, the department has scraped
together a few million dollars to start paying interns. It is
not for the entire program. And it appears that I need to dig
into it some more.
We might need some legislative authority to facilitate this
in addition to the resources. So we will come back to you and
look forward to working with you on this legislation.
Senator Booker. I look forward to supporting you as well on
the Senate floor, and thank you both for your extraordinary
service to our nation.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Booker.
So the Chair will reclaim his time, and we appreciate that
you have been through two and a half hours without relief. So
we will try not to make this too prolonged.
But, Ambassador, is it fair to say that the Trump
administration's maximum effort campaigns did cause economic
consequences to Iran?
Ms. Sherman. Yes, I would say that it did.
The Chairman. Yeah. But it is also fair to say that Iran is
now closer to crossing the nuclear threshold than it was before
and during the Maximum Pressure campaign?
Ms. Sherman. Yes, it is.
The Chairman. Is it also fair to say that we could not get
one vote for many of our major allies at the United Nations to
extend the arms embargo that ceased?
Ms. Sherman. That is my understanding, Senator. Yes.
The Chairman. Is it also fair to say that the Maximum
Pressure campaign has done nothing, ultimately, to get Iran to
stop its nefarious activities throughout the region?
Ms. Sherman. That is my assessment as well.
The Chairman. Or, for that fact, to diminish its support
for terrorism in the world?
Ms. Sherman. It appears so, yes, Senator.
The Chairman. So I say these only because I recognize that
the Maximum Pressure campaign cost Iran financially, but it did
not meet the goals that I think we, collectively, want. So let
me ask you this.
There is no question--well, let me ask you, do you believe
that a nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat to the State
of Israel?
Ms. Sherman. I do.
The Chairman. And I share that view, and I also believe
that it is a threat to the United States of America, not just
about Israel or our allies in the region. So, therefore, I
believe that it is President Biden's view that Iran cannot be
allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Ms. Sherman. That is correct.
The Chairman. Now, in that regard, how we achieve that goal
is really the question, and so I appreciate the phrase
``stronger and longer.'' Longer, I get what it means. Stronger,
I am hoping for definition.
Because the reality is if all--from my perspective, and I
have heard my colleagues on both sides here--from my
perspective, if all we do is return to the JCPOA, that
certainly is not stronger.
And if we extend it, it might be longer, but it is not
stronger because there are still sunset issues that are now
more prevalent today than they were in 2016 when the agreement
went into effect.
And so it also will not have dealt with the ballistic
missiles. It will not have dealt with the destabilization of
the region. It will not have dealt with its support for
terrorism or the violation of its own people's human rights.
And so, you know, the question in my mind is not so much
JCPOA. The question is, what is the JCPOA Plus or what do we
do, but how do we, in fact, ensure that we have more than
illusory promise in terms of what comes, the follow-on, and the
connection between any return to some form of the JCPOA with
some clearly determined process to deal with these other
issues.
Otherwise, my own view will be that we will have failed.
And so this--I drive this because while I also, in fairness,
for the record, you are not going to be the lead on the Iran
portfolio. That has already been designated to others.
But upon confirmation as a deputy you are going to be in
all the deputy meetings, and you also have expertise and
experience in this regard and you will be called upon to
express both the Secretary and the administration's view but
also on your expertise.
So could you give me a sense of what that would be in broad
strokes, understanding--and I appreciate your comments in
response to other questions about looking at the intelligence
when you have access to it again because I think a deep dive
into the intelligence will be very important to understand what
Iran has and has not complied with in its actions and its
intentions.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator.
I do not know all of the answers at this point because not
only have I not made a deep dive into the intelligence because
I am not in the administration, I do not know what
deliberations have gone on so far in the administration as they
try to think through the strategy that is best here.
You know, I have seen what others see from press reports
about our offer to open diplomacy, which I think should be the
first resort always. I have seen the strike in Syria in
retaliation for the threat against Americans.
I have seen the response, perhaps, or just a separate
action against Al Asad Airbase. I, you know, read in some of
the Iranian press what is going on politically in their
country. But I do not know all the pieces of the puzzle
anymore. You have to be really inside to get the fingertips for
what is going on.
But I do agree with you, Senator, that there has to be very
careful deliberations which will include, and I hope already
have begun to include, you and the members of this committee
and other senators who have interest in this arena to get your
advice and counsel, as I have said in this hearing, at the
takeoff, not just at the landing, to have true consultation,
not just notification, how we sequence sanctions, how we
sequence any lifting of sanctions, what we expect from the
Iranians, what those who are in the negotiation and in the
JCPOA yet believe we need to do going forward.
So there are a myriad of puzzle pieces here and, if
confirmed, I would look forward to extensive discussion with
you and with others who have interest in this to sort through
how the administration goes forward.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. If we were still in the
agreement and Iran had done what it has done today, would that
not be subject to snap back?
Ms. Sherman. Absolutely.
The Chairman. And I would consider that it would be a set
of actions that would require snap back, from my own
perspective.
Let me ask you this. Sanctions relief for whatever deal may
come forward, clearly, we have to be very careful. There are
sanctions which I helped fashion that are not about the nuclear
portfolio and issue, but about terrorism and other things.
Iran likes to try to claim that all sanctions that we levy
are just about their nuclear portfolio. We cannot tolerate that
or else we will have nothing in our arsenal of peaceful
diplomacy to deal with Iran's other nefarious activities.
Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Sherman. It is a fair statement that we have to keep
sanctions on that deal with human rights abuses, state
sponsorship of terrorism, arms sales, et cetera, what we have
done in terms of Hezbollah and Hamas.
So, yes, I think there are many things that need to stay in
place.
The Chairman. Let me turn to another subject for a moment.
First of all, my dear friend and colleague, Senator Rubio, on
Venezuela, you know, I agree with him and our cause in
Venezuela.
I think what you meant in response to his question, and
correct me if I am wrong, that one of the things you thought
should have been done is to take the international recognition
of Guaido and, ultimately, maximize that recognition beyond
simple recognition, but an effort to multilateralize sanctions
against the Maduro regime. Or am I wrong?
Ms. Sherman. No, very well said. Wish I had said it as
well.
The Chairman. Okay. So, but--and let me refer to Senator
Murphy, who said that the European Union no longer recognizes
Guaido.
The European Union never recognized Guaido. Individual
member states of the European Union recognized Guaido and some
of them have a concern because the basis of that recognition
was under the Venezuelan Constitution.
The President of the National Assembly, in the absence of
the President or a legitimate president, ultimately is
recognized as the interim president of Venezuela.
He is, according to the view of some, no longer the
President of the National Assembly because we had an
internationally-condemned false elections in Venezuela that
elected a new National Assembly.
But it is not because he lost his title. It is because they
had an election that has been internationally condemned. Is
that a fair statement?
Ms. Sherman. I believe so, yes, sir.
The Chairman. And so how we internationalize this is
incredibly important.
Let me turn to Cuba for a moment, which is, along with
Iran, one of my passions. You know, do you know that a Cuban
worker in Cuba cannot be employed directly by a foreign entity?
Ms. Sherman. I did not.
The Chairman. Hotels in Cuba, or a U.S. company that gets
created in Cuba, cannot directly hire a Cuban worker. They go
to the state employment agency controlled by the regime. The
regime sends the worker, for example, to the hotel. The regime
gets paid in dollars by the foreign company and then gives the
worker a fraction of their wages in return.
Do you know that Cuban doctors that are sent abroad,
ultimately, have their passports taken from them so that they
cannot leave the country they are sent to, and that payment for
their service by that country is sent to the regime and not
paid to a Cuban doctor?
Ms. Sherman. I had been aware about the passport issue and
I better understand now from you how the payment system works.
The Chairman. Do you understand that when we talk about we
want to help the Cuban people, of which I am all in favor, but
when we send a remittance to Cuba as a U.S. citizen for one of
our family members that the regime takes 10 percent of it right
off the bat, and you do realize that?
Ms. Sherman. I had heard of that.
The Chairman. And then after that, they turn the balance of
the remittance not in dollars, which have a far more vibrant
buying ability within the island, but they turn it into
worthless pesos.
So when we send money, we allow money to be sent under
these circumstances, what we are doing is empowering the
regime.
Do you realize that a U.S. company that wants to open up in
Cuba has to go through one of Castro's two relatives in order
to be able to open up and the state becomes a co-owner with
them?
Ms. Sherman. I had not realized that, sir.
The Chairman. That is exactly what happens, in tourism and
whatnot. You have Castro's son and son-in-law. Both heads of
the Cuban military are parts of the Cuban military and they
direct the two corporate entities that do all these.
So I share these with you because I find it interesting,
you know, lying on the beach in Veradaro and sipping a Cuba
Libre, which is an oxymoron, is not going to liberate the Cuban
people.
Have you heard of the San Isidro movement?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
The Chairman. Okay. The San Isidro movement is a bunch of
artists and writers who just want freedom of their expression.
The Government cracked down on all of those, and so they
started a movement in what is a black majority part of Havana
to, ultimately, denounce their artistic and freedom of
expression movement.
The Government has viciously attacked them and arrested
them. These are the realities of Castro's Cuba, not the
romanticism that some people seem to have, and I personally
have a problem--I like to be consistent. In this town,
consistency is not a great virtue. But I like--I try to be
consistent.
My advocacy for human rights and democracy globally is not
subject to where it lies. So whether it be in Burma, whether it
be in Venezuela, whether it be on the Uyghurs and human rights
in China, whether it be about the Rohingya, my view is pretty
universal.
And the problem I have with some is that when it comes to
certain places in the world they are enormous advocates of
democracy and human rights; but when it comes to other places
in the world, they are willing to look totally the other way
and act in a different way than we would seek to act in other
places. And I think that is problematic.
I understand the world. There is not a single way we can--
do not get to treat everybody in a cookie cutter fashion.
By the same token, when we send different messages--that
here is where we will promote human rights and democracy, here
is where we will not, here is where we will sanction the
consequences of violations of human rights and here is where we
will not--then it becomes a really problematic area to stand up
for what I believe President Biden is about, which is about
standing up for democracy and human rights--based upon the time
I served with him on this committee.
So I hope we are thinking about that, whether it is about
Cuba or any other place. I want to help the Cuban people,
ultimately, live a better life. I would like them to be free. I
would like them to choose who governs them. I would like them
to be able to worship at the altar that they choose.
But that is not, for the most part, the reality of life in
Cuba. So we need to understand the realities, not the
romanticism, and when we seek to help; what we cannot do is,
ultimately, help a regime that oppresses them.
Finally, I hope you will pay some attention to, upon your
confirmation, to the eastern Mediterranean region. I passed
into law with Senator Rubio the Eastern Mediterranean Security
and Energy Partnership Act of 2019. It is incredibly important
that we look at Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and others in an
eastern Mediterranean strategy that is both about energy, but
at the--and that can diversify and, therefore, not have the
pipeline issue as important as issue as it is, but at the same
time deals with security.
Several of these countries host us in very significant
ways, are our security partners. With Turkey being under
Erdogan, the--not the reliable NATO ally that we have aspired
it to be, not to be the bridge between East and West, not to
be--you know, there are more lawyers and journalists jailed in
Turkey than in any other place in the world. That is an
extraordinary statement about a NATO ally.
And so what we do as it relates to Turkey but also in our
own interest. Even if Turkey was a perfect partner, which it is
not, the East Med is an incredibly important area and I want to
commend that to your attention as you look forward to take
duty.
And then, very finally, I hope the President will keep his
commitment to recognize the Armenian genocide. The United
States Senate by unanimous consent passed it last year. I was
proud to sponsor that. The House of Representatives has passed
it.
It is time for the President of the United States to do
what the rest of the Congress of the United States has
represented to the American people, which is to recognize the
genocide. Let us call history for what it is.
And in that regard, I also hope that we will look to help
the people of Armenia and help to facilitate the release of
POWs that the Azerbaijanis have. It is in violation of
international law what they are doing.
We need to speak out, which the previous administration did
not, and we need to work to try to get that region to look
forward to what the Minsk process was. There is some suggestion
that this is all over. No, it is not, and we need to get--
released the POWs and we have to help Armenia as it gets all of
these people, refugees, back into their country.
With that, before I close, I am introducing into the record
a letter written by 19 of Brian McKeon's former Republican
colleagues during his time on this committee expressing
enthusiastic support for his nomination and complete confidence
in his character and abilities.
I am quoting from the letter. They note their deep respect
for Brian as a leader who exhibits unfailing integrity,
fairness, professionalism, devotion to our national interest.
[The information referred to is located at the end of this
transcript.]
The Chairman. Due to COVID precautions, my staff will email
the letter directly to the clerk.
With that, and thanks to the committee for your attendance,
the record will remain open until the close of business
tomorrow, March the 4th.
I urge both of you, if there are questions for the record,
to respond to them in--as quickly as possible so that your
nominations can be considered at a business meeting of the
committee.
And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
----------
Letter in Support of Hon. Wendy R. Sheman's Nomination, Signed by
Former Ambassadors and National Security Officials
Letter in Support of Hon. Brian McKeon's Nomination, Signed by 19
Republican Former SFRC Staff Members
Responses to Additional Questions
Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. The FY 21 NDAA includes a requirement for the Secretary
of State to develop and implement a strategy for countering white
identity terrorism globally. The attack on Congress earlier this month
underscores the importance of this issue. Do I have your commitment
that you will submit this strategy on time if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to developing a Department of State
strategy for countering white identity terrorism globally, in line with
the NDAA requirement. Countering white identity terrorism and other
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE) is a top
priority for the Biden-Harris Administration. The State Department has
an important role to play on these issues, as we are seeing increasing
transnational links between white identity terrorists and other REMVE
actors. If confirmed, I will prioritize working closely with the
interagency and our partners around the world to address the threat of
white identity terrorism and other REMVE, as well as all forms of
terrorism and violent extremism--offline and online.
Question. How specifically will you ensure that the State
Department prioritizes this issue?
Answer. ``white identity'' terrorism, including terrorism
designations as appropriate, and foreign partner engagement. The United
States developed effective tools to counter the spread of ISIS and al-
Qa'ida that can be adapted to address this threat. Among these tools,
public diplomacy programs that promote people-to-people engagement help
increase awareness and build international consensus to counter white
identity terrorism.
Question. I am a strong supporter of the U.S.-India relationship,
which will be critical in addressing 21st century challenges ranging
from climate change to China. In light of this, I introduced the
Prioritizing Clean Energy and Climate Cooperation with India Act to
boost U.S.-India cooperation on clean energy. If confirmed, what
aspects of the Trump Administration's work on energy in India will you
continue and what will you change?
Answer. In view of Prime Minister Modi's announced target of
installing 450 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, if confirmed, I
would support the work advancing cost-effective strategies to enhance
the flexibility and robustness of India's electricity grid to encourage
India's clean energy transition over the next decade. In contrast to
the previous administration's approach, in order to support India
raising its climate ambition, if confirmed, I would prioritize lower
cost alternatives to carbon-intensive energy such as coal-fired power,
including by promoting renewable energy, battery storage, and load
shifting.
Question. I also believe that the U.S.-India partnership is
strongest when based on shared democratic values, and I am concerned by
the recent trend away from those values in India. From the recent
crackdowns on farmers peacefully protesting the new farming laws and
corresponding intimidation of journalists and government critics, to
the rising anti-Muslim sentiment and related government actions like
the Citizenship Amendment Act, to the continued repression in Kashmir
nearly a year and a half after the abrogation of Article 370, there are
a significant number of human rights and democracy issues facing India.
Do I have your commitment that you will actively raise human rights and
democracy issues with the Indian Government, at your level and all
levels of the Department?
Answer. I share your belief that the U.S.-India relationship is
underpinned by a common commitment to democracy and democratic
institutions. The Biden-Harris administration will ensure human rights
and religious freedom remain core pillars of U.S. foreign policy, and
if confirmed, my engagement with the Indian Government will reflect our
values and commitment to human rights.
Question. What is your plan for ensuring that discussion of these
important issues does not get lost amidst other priorities in the
bilateral relationship?
Answer. The U.S.-India strategic partnership is one of our most
critical relationships in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will work
with counterparts in the U.S. and Indian Government to deepen our
comprehensive partnership based on mutual interests including regional
security and economic growth, promoting shared values of democracy and
human rights, and cooperation on shared challenges including climate
change, COVID-19 response efforts, and trafficking in persons. By
prioritizing our shared interests and values, we can advance broader
U.S. national security interests for regional peace and stability in
the Indo-Pacific.
Question. A democratic, stable and resilient Ukraine is in the
national security interest of the United States, and efforts towards
that end receive broad bipartisan support in the Senate. If confirmed,
how will your policy approach to Ukraine differ from the approach taken
during the Obama and Trump Administrations?
Answer. I am committed to revitalizing our bilateral relationship
with Ukraine. If confirmed, I will continue to oppose Russia's
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic
efforts to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia
will remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and
aggression in eastern Ukraine. Further, if confirmed I will work with
Congress to continue providing the security assistance, including
lethal defensive weapons, Ukraine requires to defend itself against
Russia's aggression. I will support Ukraine's chosen Euro-Atlantic
path, including by pushing for progress on rule of law and economic
reforms that strengthen Ukraine's institutions and lead to a brighter
future for all Ukrainians.
Question. Do you support the provision of lethal security
assistance for Ukraine, beyond providing Javelin missiles?
Answer. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress
to continue providing the assistance Ukraine requires to defend itself
against Russia's aggression, including lethal weapons, based on a U.S.
and Ukrainian assessment of Ukraine's defense requirements. This
includes the provision of defensive lethal assistance that has already
expanded beyond Javelin missiles, such as armed Mark VI patrol boats
this year, for instance.
Question. How will you work to urge Ukrainian officials and its
private sector to deny Chinese efforts to take over significant
military production capabilities in the country?
Answer. The United States is prepared to work with our Ukrainian
partners to advance our shared interests and protect Ukraine's
sensitive industries. I was pleased to see Ukraine's decisive action to
sanction Chinese firm Skyrizon, which has attempted to take control of
Motor Sich, on January 29. This action protects U.S. and Ukrainian
national security. The administration has urged and will continue to
urge Ukraine to remain vigilant about People's Republic of China (PRC)
influence in its strategic industries and to pass legislation creating
a mechanism for reviewing investment. If confirmed, I would work
closely with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to
support U.S. investors as alternatives to predatory PRC investors.
Question. Do you believe that our Indo-Pacific strategy ought to be
a function of our China policy, as was the case with the Trump
administration, or that our China policy ought to be a function of our
Indo-Pacific strategy? Put another way, can we get China ``right'' if
we don't get the region right, first?
Answer. Our global policy to compete with China and the U.S.
commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific are complementary
strategies. Our relationship with China will be competitive when it
should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must
be. The common denominator is the need to engage China from a position
of strength. To do that, the United States needs to support a free and
open Indo-Pacific, where our engagement builds broad cooperation with
allies and partners in pursuit of common interests, including advancing
COVID-19 recovery and returning to sustained economic prosperity,
dealing with the climate crisis, upholding international law and
multilateral institutions, and reinforcing democracy, human rights, and
good governance. As the President has said, how the United States and
Asia work together to secure the peace, defend our shared values, and
advance our prosperity across the Indo-Pacific, including how we
address the China challenge, will be among the most consequential
efforts we undertake.
Question. With regards to China and the broader Indo-Pacific
region, aside from words of condemnation and economic sanctions: What
other tools does the Biden Administration have to counterbalance
China's growing influence around the world, including in contentious
regions such as the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Tibet?
Answer. If confirmed, I will promote Department efforts to re-
engage with allies, partners, and international organizations to create
a level playing field for U.S. businesses across the globe, support
those who fight for democracy and human rights in China and across the
Indo-Pacific, maintain our technological edge, protect U.S.
intellectual property from theft, promote freedom of navigation and
overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and continue to work with
Congress to spotlight and combat malign PRC actions and human rights
violations, including in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.
Question. There is little question that the Trump administration's
failed North Korea policy has left us worse off than we were before.
North Korea's nuclear and missile programs are unconstrained, our
alliance with the Republic of Korea has been put under great stress,
and the sanctions regime is in tatters. President Trump's diplomatic
failure with North Korea is the latest in a long-line of failed efforts
to achieve a denuclearized North Korea. How will the Biden
administration approach North Korea?
Answer. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program and
proliferation activities constitute a serious threat to international
peace and security and undermine global nonproliferation efforts. If
confirmed, I plan to join the Biden-Harris Administration's ongoing
policy review, in consultation with our allies, of the state of play on
North Korea. I support the U.S. commitment over the long term to the
complete denuclearization of North Korea, while also focusing in the
near term on limiting the threat to the United States and our allies.
Question. What is the pathway to denuclearization and a stable,
peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula?
Answer. Denuclearization of North Korea must remain a top national
security priority for the United States. I support the Administration's
plan to evaluate and adopt, in consultation with our allies, a strategy
to keep the American people and our allies safe and that takes into
account pressure options and the potential for future diplomacy with
North Korea. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress
on efforts to limit the dangers posed by North Korea's WMD and
ballistic missile programs.
Question. What does success with North Korea look like?
Answer. Foremost, success entails achieving the complete
denuclearization of North Korea and a durable peace on the Korean
Peninsula, which would promote stability for our allies, the region,
and the world. Further, success would entail an end to malign North
Korea-linked actions globally, including cyber-enabled malicious
activities and arms trafficking, and involve greater respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms in North Korea. If confirmed, I plan to
join the Biden-Harris Administration's ongoing policy review, in
consultation with our allies, of the current state of play on North
Korea.
Question. The war in Yemen is about to enter its 6th year and, in
spite of the efforts of UN special envoy Martin Griffiths, little
progress has been made toward ending a conflict that has killed more
than 17,000 civilians and created the world's worst humanitarian
crisis. Iran continues to ship weapons, including ballistic missiles,
which have allowed the Houthis to menace Saudi Arabia and continue
their war against the internationally recognized Yemeni Government.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continues to hit civilian targets in Yemen with
U.S.-made warplanes and munitions. I am pleased to see that the
Administration shares my concerns about the civilian casualties
resulting from Saudi Arabia's use of U.S. munitions, and is reviewing
arms sales to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while ending U.S. support
for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. What evidence will the Administration
need to see regarding the improved use of offensive U.S. weapons
systems by those countries before it is comfortable with further sales?
Answer. As President Biden said, the Administration is committed to
reinvigorating diplomatic efforts, alongside the UN and others, to
achieve a ceasefire and end the war in Yemen. The Administration is
recalibrating our relationship with Saudi Arabia to reflect U.S.
values. The President announced the ending of U.S. support for
offensive operations in Yemen, including relevant arms sales, and
appointed Special Envoy Tim Lenderking to spearhead our diplomatic
efforts and support to the UN. The Administration paused two arms sales
with Saudi Arabia, and, if confirmed, I will support efforts to
evaluate other potential sales to help ensure they are consistent with
our values and that Congress will be consulted. The Administration will
work with our partners to help them reduce the risk of civilian harm.
Question. I am under no illusions about the Houthi's malevolent
role in the conflict, but Secretary Blinken's reversal of his
predecessor's poorly thought-out FTO designation of the Houthis has
prevented Yemen's humanitarian crises from exponentially worsening. At
the same time, I am also deeply concerned by the previous
administration's freeze on assistance to Northern Yemen. Will the Biden
Administration lift this freeze? What steps will the Administration
take, alongside the UN and other international donors, to ensure that
the Houthis are not able to divert or place unacceptable conditions on
international assistance?
Answer. USAID was forced to partially suspend some assistance to
NGOs in northern Yemen in March 2020 due to Houthi interference in
partners' operations. This decision is currently under review. As with
all humanitarian programs, the United States aims to ensure our
partners can deliver assistance in a timely manner without undue
interference. Without proper oversight of taxpayer money, we adjust or
terminate funding to specific programs as necessary. Over the last
year, the U.S. has worked closely with our partners, including the UN
and other donors, to advocate with the Houthis to cease interference in
aid operations, and there have been some positive changes. The
Administration continues to press all parties to allow for the
unhindered provision of aid.
Question. I am also concerned by the recent Houthi advance into
Marib province, which threatens to displace hundreds of thousands of
Yemenis, many for the second or third time. How will the Biden
Administration build leverage to push all warring parties to agree to a
nationwide ceasefire in Yemen and begin talks aimed at a sustainable
political solution to the conflict?
Answer. The President committed to ending all support for the
Saudi-led Coalition's offensive operations in Yemen, including relevant
arms sales. There is no military solution to the conflict and the
Department redoubled its diplomatic efforts to find a political end to
the war and address the dire humanitarian crisis. The Secretary named a
U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen in order to redouble U.S. efforts to find
a peaceful resolution as soon as possible. If confirmed, I will support
efforts towards a nationwide ceasefire that quickly moves to
negotiations and increases international pressure against the Houthis
to convince them to halt their assault on Marib.
Question. The Taliban's commitments on counterterrorism are an
indispensable part of the February 29th agreement. Its compliance with
those commitments, or lack thereof, must inform the decisions the U.S.
makes regarding our future in Afghanistan and will certainly be the
basis of future congressional support for assistance to Afghanistan. Do
you commit to make the Taliban's compliance with the February 29th
Agreement, especially with the counterterrorism provisions, the basis
of any decisions the U.S. makes regarding our future in Afghanistan?
Answer. I agree it is important to ensure Afghanistan never again
serves as a safe haven for terrorist groups that threaten the security
of the United States and our Allies. To this end, I support the
Administration's ongoing review of compliance by all parties with their
commitments in the February 29 U.S.-Taliban Agreement and the February
29 U.S.-Afghanistan Joint Declaration. This review includes assessing
whether the Taliban are fulfilling their commitments relating to
counterterrorism, reducing violence, and engaging in meaningful
negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Question. Our relationship with Mexico is one of the most
important in the world. However, I have serious concerns over the
growing challenges to the rule of law in Mexico by armed criminal
organizations-especially when certain groups increasingly appear to be
equipped with military-grade arms and vehicles. While the Mexican
Government rightfully raises concerns about international arms
trafficking from the U.S. to Mexico, that only tells half the story.
The arrest and botched release of former Mexican Defense Minister
Cienfuegos last year, as well as other high profile cases, suggest that
criminal organizations have coopted certain officials and institutions
at various levels of the Mexican Government. And, despite these
challenges, the Lopez Obrador Government has taken steps to complicate
bilateral law enforcement cooperation. What is your assessment of
challenges to the rule of law in Mexico and how will you work with
Mexican authorities on these issues?
Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national
security priority. It is critical that U.S. efforts to dismantle
transnational criminal organizations, reduce impunity and corruption,
and strengthen the rule of law in Mexico receive the full cooperation
of the Mexican Government. If confirmed, I look forward to
comprehensive conversations with the Mexican Government so that this
cooperation deepens and works for the benefit of both nations. In the
context of those conversations, I will not hesitate to raise any issues
with the Mexican Government that I believe to be obstacles to our
bilateral security cooperation.
Question. The U.S. has a long-running strategic interest in the
stability of the East Africa region, given its proximity to the Red
Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Western Indian Ocean. The last
administration never developed a holistic plan to consolidate
democratic gains, prevent democratic backsliding and pursue our
geostrategic interests. I am working on legislation to develop such an
approach, and I hope you will work closely with me on that effort.
Ethiopia is one country that will be impacted by my efforts. The
transition to democracy there is jeopardized by an ongoing conflict in
Tigray, communal violence in other parts of the country and closing
political space. Prominent political opposition figures are in jail,
along with thousands of opposition supporters, journalists, and others.
Under the current circumstances, do you believe Ethiopia can hold
credible elections in June? What action should the USG consider in
addressing the deep humanitarian, political, and security crisis that
is now impacting Ethiopia?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the State
Department develops and implements a comprehensive strategy for the Red
Sea region. One critical element of this is a strategy to address the
ongoing issues in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and the ongoing border
dispute with Sudan. A peaceful, stable, democratic Ethiopia at peace
with its neighbors is essential for the Horn of Africa and the wider
region. The Ethiopian Government has promised national elections in
June. Inclusive dialogue among all political actors is a prerequisite
to identifying and adopting necessary reforms. All detainees need to be
afforded due process. The violence in Tigray must end; humanitarian and
human rights workers must receive unhindered access; and independent
investigations into reported human rights abuses and violations must
proceed.
Question. Sudan, another country along the Red Sea Corridor, is
undergoing a fragile transition as well. What specific steps will you
take to ensure a successful transition?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support Sudan's democratic transition
and Civilian-led Transitional Government, as well as efforts to promote
economic reform and development. Further, if confirmed, I intend to
ensure consistent engagement with Sudan's civilian leaders to encourage
progress in taking the difficult, but necessary, next steps, including
governance and security sector reforms, expanded protection of
civilians in Darfur, resolution of ongoing conflicts, and
accountability for past atrocities.
Question. As I told Undersecretary Hale over a year ago, we are
losing the Sahel. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index found that seven of
the ten countries with the largest increase in terrorism were in sub-
Saharan Africa; Burkina Faso topped the list. But this is not just a
security crisis; we need a comprehensive strategy that addresses
Diplomatic, Development, and Defense issues (3Ds). Will you make the
crisis in the Sahel a top priority for the State Department, and ensure
that the interagency pursues a ``3Ds'' strategy in the region?
Answer. I agree with your concern about rising violent extremism,
governance challenges, and humanitarian concerns in the Sahel. The path
to lasting stability lies in accountable governance, providing services
and economic opportunities, protecting the rule of law, and engaging
communities in decisions. The Biden-Harris Administration has committed
to undertake an interagency review of our diplomatic, security, and
other assistance programs. As part of the review, the Administration
will work to understand threats in the region and evaluate our overall
approach to address the drivers of insecurity. If confirmed, I will
work with the Department of Defense, USAID, and other agencies to
ensure that the U.S. Government has and implements a unified strategy
to support sustained security and stability in the Sahel.
Question. As Deputy Secretary, how will you ensure close
coordination between regional bureaus to develop strategies and
integrated approaches to geographic regions such as the Sahel and the
Red Sea?
Answer. The President's interim national security guidance
underscores that we must be prepared to manage crises and challenges
that do not respect borders. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Department's regional and functional bureaus to make sure they
understand the President and Secretary's policy imperatives in both the
Sahel and the Red Sea region and that they work collaboratively through
working groups, joint briefings, and persistent coordination to develop
strategies around which we can organize our diplomatic engagement and
foreign assistance. If confirmed, I will guide the Department to work
across bureaucratic and geographic seams to address regional challenges
by understanding, engaging, and cooperating with allies and partners;
building strong partnerships; and strengthening long-standing
connections.
Question. Multilateralism has long been a pillar of U.S. foreign
policy, and an avenue for advancing international human rights.
However, over the last four years, the U.S. Government went from being
a strong champion of human rights and of the rights of women, girls and
LGBTQ individuals, to being an obstacle to those goals at the United
Nations and other multilateral forums. It is vital that this
Administration send an early signal that it is fully committed to
reversing that, and to advancing human rights and gender equality
globally. How will you demonstrate, through early action at the State
Department, a renewed U.S. commitment and leadership to promote global
gender equality, women's and girls' rights, and the rights of LGBTQ
persons?
Answer. As President Biden has said, the promotion of democracy and
human rights is central to this Administration's foreign policy and if
confirmed, I will examine all options to address threats to gender
equality and the human rights of women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons. I
fully support the objectives outlined in President Biden's memorandum
on advancing the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the world. The
work to promote gender equality and respect for the human rights of all
women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons is amplified when the United States
works multilaterally and coordinates with international partners. If
confirmed, I will support the Department's efforts to increase U.S.
engagement on these issues bilaterally and across relevant UN fora and
regional organizations, as appropriate.
Question. How will you use your role to immediately halt and
reverse dangerous rollbacks on women's rights and LGBTQ rights in
intergovernmental processes and multilateral forums?
Answer. Advancing the human rights of women, girls, and LGBTQI+
persons is essential to ensure just and equitable societies where all
individuals can fully contribute. If confirmed, I pledge to work
closely with partner nations, civil society, and multilateral
institutions, as appropriate, to advance women's health and human
rights, including women's and girls' sexual and reproductive health and
reproductive rights. I will also fully support the objectives outlined
in President Biden's Presidential Memorandum on Advancing the Human
Rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the world and will work with other
governments and multilateral institutions to ensure that U.S. diplomacy
and foreign assistance promote and protect these rights.
Question. On June 18, 2020, following a year-long investigation by
my staff, I published a comprehensive report on the Global Forced
Migration Crisis, which examined the urgent plight of millions of
people forced to flee their homes due to conflict and persecution. It
provided a blueprint for addressing this growing crisis. What actions
will you take, including with our partners, to address the global
forced migration crisis? How, specifically, will you work to address
the root causes of displacement, such as new and unresolved conflicts,
support populations on the move and those enduring lengthy
displacement, and seek to assist the low-income countries who host the
majority of refugees and displaced people?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure State and USAID are
strengthening protection and durable solutions for the millions of
forcibly displaced people across the globe by pursuing new strategies
for addressing the root causes of migration, including climate change;
rebuilding the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program; enhancing U.S.
engagement in international institutions; and standing up for
democratic values and human rights. The State Department will continue
to work with our partners and the Department of the Treasury to engage
multilateral development banks on support in protracted situations of
displacement. In addition, the Department aims its diplomacy at
continuing to strengthen the global humanitarian architecture,
including through donor engagement, and at promoting respect for
international humanitarian principles.
Question. Principled humanitarian action is under attack around the
world. Violent conflict has reached record highs, and nearly 235
million people worldwide need emergency humanitarian assistance-a 40
percent increase from last year. There has also been a steep escalation
in the deliberate, willful obstruction of humanitarian access to those
in need, the targeting of innocent civilians and humanitarian aid
workers, and an overall noncompliance with international law. What will
you do to minimize the abuse of humanitarian assistance, including the
blocking or diverting of humanitarian aid, and to minimize the
targeting of civilians and humanitarian aid workers?
Answer. I support the United States taking a strong leadership role
in support of principled humanitarian action. If confirmed, I intend to
engage publicly and privately where necessary to promote the protection
of civilians and humanitarian workers, and humanitarian access, working
closely with our global and multilateral partners. Further, I will
support the efforts of the State Department to prevent and immediately
address any diversion or abuse of U.S. humanitarian assistance. The
Administration's commitment to these principles has already been clear
in the Secretary's engagement on the protection of civilians and
unhindered humanitarian access.
Question. How can the United States best hold accountable the
perpetrators of such abuses, and promote accountability and compliance
with the law of armed conflict and human rights law?
Answer. I support using all tools available to promote
accountability for those responsible for targeting civilians, including
humanitarian aid workers, consistent with international law. If
confirmed, I would encourage all parties to armed conflict to comply
with international humanitarian law and ensure the protection of those
providing humanitarian aid. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
the United States supports a variety of tools at our disposal,
including investigations and prosecutions at appropriate international
and national tribunals, targeted sanctions, and other mechanisms, to
promote accountability for those responsible for targeting civilians,
including humanitarian aid providers.
Question. We are in a 15-year democratic recession, and this past
year has been among the worst we've seen for global democracy. For the
first time since 2001, more people live under autocracies than
democracies. The COVID-19 crisis has created new opportunities for
authoritarians and those leaders who strive to consolidate power to
cement their hold on government structures and erode the fundamental
human rights of their countrymen. How will you address democratic
backsliding and emerging global electoral challenges? These include
foreign interference; the manipulation of new media platforms;
advancements in artificial intelligence and sophisticated cyber
threats; and corruption in electoral processes that undermines
governance?
Answer. I share concerns over the need to defend democracy and
counter growing authoritarianism globally, including authoritarian
responses to the global pandemic that suspend or severely curtail
democratic governance, rule of law, and human rights. President Biden
committed to host a global summit to bring together democracies around
a common agenda to defend and strengthen democratic institutions,
including commitments on combating corruption, pushing back on
authoritarianism, and advancing human rights, including online. If
confirmed, I will support the Administration's goals of promoting good
governance at home and abroad with all available diplomatic,
programmatic, and other foreign policy tools to counter democratic
backsliding and strengthen democratic resilience to malign influence.
Question. How will you invest in democracy programs, particularly
in the context of the secondary impacts of COVID-19 on elections and
democracies worldwide?
Answer. The United States has long been a leader in promoting
democracy and human rights, including advancing civil and political
rights abroad. Adhering to democratic principles is essential for an
effective global response to COVID-19, and it is imperative that
countries not use the pandemic as a means to suspend or severely
curtail democratic governance, rule of law, and respect for human
rights. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that democracy programs
support civil society groups and governments in strengthening
protections for human rights by fostering accountable, responsive and
inclusive democratic institutions and processes that directly address
the secondary impacts of COVID-19.
Question. The Department of Defense annually seeks to duplicate
various security assistance authorities heretofore reserved to the
Department of State, to the detriment of the Secretary of States
fundamental mission to oversee and direct U.S. foreign policy. If
confirmed, will you personally and aggressively defend the Department
of State's prerogatives in this area?
Answer. I am aware of the Defense Department efforts in this area
and recall selectively supporting some security assistance authorities
for Defense, where for example they provided clearly for the Secretary
of State to ``concur'' in Defense's use of such authorities; were time-
limited; did not duplicate State's authorities; and provided for joint
formulation. If confirmed, I will certainly study this matter
thoroughly, as I share your concerns. Among my key goals will be
personally to uphold and defend prerogatives of the Secretary and the
Department and to protect the fundamental and primary responsibility of
the Secretary to carry out for the President the fundamental mission of
overseeing and directing US foreign policy.
Question. Will you commit that you and your staff will work closely
with this committee to protect the Secretary of State and the
Department of State's primacy in this regard?
Answer. I look forward to working closely with you and the
committee to protect the primacy of the Secretary of State and the
Department in this regard. I also consider that protecting such primacy
means also protecting and enhancing the tools to engage
internationally, such as reserving to, or enhancing the broadest range
of agile foreign assistance authorities of the Secretary of State. If
confirmed, I also look forward to working with you to ensure that such
authorities are robust and flexible, particularly given the view by
some countries that Defense authorities may be less restrictive than
those of the State Department.
Question. Section 10 U.S.C 127(e) allows the Secretary of Defense
to provide undefined support to any foreign person that is in any
undefined way supporting U.S. Special Forces operations in a country,
so long as the Chief of Mission of such country concurs. There is no
requirement in the law that the Secretary of State, nor the Department
of State, be aware of such activities. Such ``support'' has included,
at least, the provision of lethal defense articles to unknown foreign
persons, who could be involved in criminal or even terrorism-supporting
activities. It is vital that the Secretary of State be aware of this
support. Secretary Blinken, when asked this question, confirmed that he
would look into the current practices and procedures in the Department
with respect to reporting and concurring with such transfers and, if
necessary, make amendments. Will you, if confirmed, ensure that this
issue is put to the Secretary for decision, or if delegated to you,
that you will direct all Chiefs of Mission not to agree to any such
request without first consulting with you or the Secretary of State?
Answer. The Departments of State and Defense are working closely to
address the changing global threat environment. If confirmed, I will
coordinate closely with the Secretary of State and critical Department
stakeholders to review the current Department practices and procedures
related to Section 10 USC 127e. In the event this issue is delegated to
me, I will take appropriate action to communicate Department procedures
to chiefs of mission and will initiate a discussion with Department of
Defense counterparts to clarify reporting and concurrence procedures
and make amendments as necessary.
Question. It is no secret that the Department's morale has sunk to
historic lows over the past several years under President Trump and
Secretary Pompeo. Secretary Blinken has already made great strides in
addressing distrust and improving morale at the Department, but much
work remains to make sure that the Department's workforce is empowered
and trusted to carry out its critical diplomatic work. What steps will
you take to rebuild the morale of the people who serve at the
Department and to ensure the Department has a workforce that is
supported and empowered to carry out their mission to the best of their
ability?
Answer. The people who work for the U.S. Department of State are
committed public servants who uphold U.S. policies to protect Americans
and their interests abroad. The marginalization and loss of career
talent over the last four years coincides with declines in overall
employee job satisfaction in annual workforce. That said, the nearly
77,000 State Department employees worldwide remain resilient. If
confirmed, I am committed to improving and maintaining State Department
to advance our security and prosperity, including by developing a
diplomatic corps that fully represents America in all its talent and
diversity. That means recruiting, retaining, and providing career
development opportunities to officers with the skills to contend with
21st Century challenges and who represent the diversity of the country
we represent. I will spare no effort, if confirmed, to ensure their
safety and well-being and demand accountability for fostering a more
diverse, inclusive and non-partisan workplace.
Question. Last year, I published a report Diplomacy in Crisis,
which laid out the challenges facing the Department workforce. It cited
employee survey data that showed some disturbing trends-for example,
steep increases in the number of staff who said they feared reprisal or
retribution if they were to report a violation of law. Does that
concern you, and how do you plan to reverse that culture?
Answer. I agree that retaliation for participating in the EEO
process or anti-harassment program, for requesting a reasonable
accommodation, or for opposing discriminatory practices is unlawful,
grounds for discipline, and counter to good management; employees do
best when they have the ability to speak up and help us improve. If
confirmed, I plan to amplify the Chief Diversity and Inclusion
Officer's, Bureau of Global Talent Management's, and the Office of
Civil Rights' efforts to promote a culture of speaking up, free from
fear of retaliation.
Question. A recent survey of executive-level staff at the State
Department conducted by Executive Women at State found concerning
trends that inhibit career advancement for women. More than half of the
respondents ranked 15 of the 22 barriers measured in the survey as
having a huge or significant impact on the advancement of women at the
Department; 75 percent of respondents described gender-related bias as
having substantial impact on their career. Do you commit to reviewing
this report and its recommendations, and prioritizing a review of how
the Department can reduce barriers for women to increase retention and
help more women serve in senior roles?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring that women have equal
opportunities for career advancement and professional development.
Throughout my career, I have benefitted from strong mentors and leaders
who have helped me shape my career, and I have worked to mentor others.
If confirmed, I will ask those who report to me to serve as models for
the Department on mentorship and promulgating the tenets of fairness
and transparency in building their teams. I will hold my senior
leadership responsible for creating environments where everyone's
contribution is valued. I will also prioritize reviewing
recommendations on initiatives to help address the gender gap in the
Department from our employee affinity groups and associations.
Question. As you know, Ahlam Tamimi is responsible for
masterminding a terrorist attack that killed 15 people, including two
Americans at a restaurant in Israel in 2001. She has been living in
Jordan since 2011 and the United States has continued to try to bring
her to justice. Do you commit to pursuing justice for Americans
murdered in this brazen attack?
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to bring Ahlam Al-
Tamimi to justice. The Department will continue to ask that the
Government of Jordan extradite Al-Tamimi, and will continue to raise
this issue at the highest levels. The Department will also engage
Jordanian officials at all levels on the extradition treaty, which is
in force.
Question. Will the administration continue to pressure Jordan to
publicly condemn Tamimi and her actions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to bring Ahlam Al-
Tamimi to justice. The Department will continue to ask that the
Government of Jordan extradite Al-Tamimi, and will continue to raise
this issue at the highest levels. The Department will also engage
Jordanian officials at all levels on the extradition treaty, which is
in force.
Question. Will the administration press Jordan to seek
parliamentary ratification of the 1995 extradition treaty?
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to bring Ahlam Al-
Tamimi to justice. The Department will continue to ask that the
Government of Jordan extradite Al-Tamimi, and will continue to raise
this issue at the highest levels. The Department will also engage
Jordanian officials at all levels on the extradition treaty, which is
in force.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In your view, are the Maduro regime's involvement in
transnational organized crime and its poor economic and political
policies in Venezuela to blame for region's most significant security
and humanitarian crisis? Can humanitarian conditions improve on the
regime's watch?
Answer. The illegitimate Maduro regime's corruption and repression
are responsible for the economic collapse and the resulting
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Maduro and his enablers tolerate and
often cooperate and collude with criminal and terrorist networks, non-
state armed groups, and many malign actors that perpetrate human rights
abuses and human trafficking. Instead of applying Venezuela's resources
to respond to its humanitarian crisis, Maduro and those allied with him
pillage state coffers.
I understand the impact the current crisis in Venezuela is having
on the region, and the pain it is inflicting on Venezuelans and their
families. If confirmed, I am committed to addressing the humanitarian
situation affecting millions of Venezuelans both inside the country and
the millions who have fled to neighboring countries, pressing for a
peaceful, stable, democratic outcome in Venezuela through free and fair
elections and helping the Venezuelan people rebuild their lives and
their country.
Question. Please describe your views on what would constitute
adequate conditions under which free and fair presidential,
legislative, and local elections could be conducted in Venezuela.
Answer. There are several conditions that should be met before we
can consider any Venezuelan elections free and fair. The illegitimate
Maduro regime should free all political prisoners, return political
party organizations to their duly chosen leaders, and remove all undue
restrictions on individuals and political parties to allow their free
participation. All candidates, political parties, and the electorate
should have unrestricted access to independent news sources and other
sources of information. An independent National Electoral Council
should be appointed and allowed to organize the elections free from
undue influence. Finally, consistent with the bipartisan Venezuela
Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act (VERDAD) of
2019, elections should be observed and certified as free and fair by an
independent electoral observation mission comprised of domestic and
international experts.
Question. Please describe the conditions under which you would
recommend the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Answer. The United States continues to maintain diplomatic
relations with Cuba, which provides an opportunity to communicate
directly with the Cuban Government regarding matters of human rights.
The Biden-Harris administration's Cuba policy will be governed by two
principles. First, support for democracy and human rights will be at
the core of our efforts through empowering the Cuban people to
determine their own future. Second, Americans--especially Cuban-
Americans--are the best ambassadors for freedom and prosperity in Cuba.
We have serious differences with Cuba on a range of issues, including
Venezuela and human rights, but the administration will engage directly
on those differences and on other issues that are in the interest of
the United States.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to conduct meaningful
consultations with me, my office, and the rest of the committee before
and during any negotiations with Cuba?
Answer. Through three decades of work in foreign policy and
national security, I have learned firsthand the need for close and
constructive coordination with Congress. I recognize there are many
different views in Congress on what our approach to Cuba should be. If
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on a range of
policy topics, including Cuba.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that U.S.
public and private engagement in Cuba does not disproportionately
benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or
personnel at the expense of the Cuban people?
Answer. The administration committed to carefully reviewing U.S.-
Cuba policy, including our posture regarding economic sanctions on
Cuba, to ensure they advance the goals the administration is trying to
achieve in empowering the Cuban people to determine their future. If
confirmed, I will support the Department's review of the policy with an
eye toward assessing its impact on the political and economic well-
being of the Cuban people and look forward to consulting with Congress
on this issue.
Question. In December 2020, Mexico approved reforms to its national
security law, limiting the power of foreign law enforcement agents in
the country and restricting their ability to operate. If confirmed,
what steps will you take to ensure effective law enforcement
cooperation with Mexico?
Answer. It is critical that the United States and Mexico work
together to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and their
operations, reduce impunity and corruption, and strengthen the rule of
law in Mexico. If confirmed, I look forward to comprehensive
conversations with the Mexican Government, and I will not hesitate to
raise any concerns I believe to be obstacles to our bilateral law
enforcement cooperation.
Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the recommendations
of the Bureau of International Organizations as compared to the
regional bureaus?
Answer. I have long appreciated and valued the expertise available
from the Bureau of International Organizations. If confirmed, I will
ensure the bureau's perspective is solicited, whenever appropriate, and
in all circumstances welcome its recommendations. The bureau's voice
and role in U.S. foreign policy is crucial as the administration re-
engages with international organizations, restores its partnerships,
and returns to its traditional alliances.
Question. Will you support the creation of an Office of Integrity
in the United Nations System within the Bureau of International
Organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to
ensure the State Department is organized and resourced effectively to
push back against the rising influence of China and others in the UN
system and other international organizations and to select qualified
and independent candidates to lead and staff these bodies, including
highly specialized agencies.
Question. Nations have increasingly used hostage diplomacy in an
attempt to gain leverage through coercion. Multiple Americans are
victims of this trend, and Americans are currently wrongfully detained
in Russia, China, Iran, and Venezuela, among other countries. What role
do you believe the Deputy Secretary has in returning Americans and
preventing hostage diplomacy?
Answer. Bringing home U.S. hostages and wrongful detainees is a top
priority for the administration and the Department of State. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary and Special
Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs to make every effort to quickly
recover all U.S. nationals held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad.
Additionally, it will be of the utmost importance to closely coordinate
with, and lend support to, family members of hostages and wrongful
detainees.
Question. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, in what
concrete ways will you work to bring home Americans wrongfully detained
abroad and support the work of the Special Presidential Envoy for
Hostage Affairs?
Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens is one of the
highest priorities of the Department of State. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Department continues to use all the diplomatic means at our
disposal to work for the release of those U.S. citizens wrongfully
detained or held hostage and provide support to their families.
Specifically, I will support the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage
Affairs and the interagency in implementing the Robert Levinson Hostage
Recovery and Hostage-taking Accountability Act. The Levinson Act is
critical for harnessing all of the U.S. Government's capabilities to
resolve these cases quickly and provide support to families.
Question. The Iranian regime received billions in sanctions relief
as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The
Obama administration argued that ``our best analysts expect the bulk of
this revenue to go into spending that improves the economy and benefits
the lives of the Iranian people.'' However, a vast body of follow-on
reporting indicates that a majority of sanctions relief was, instead,
funneled to the regime's defense budget and to its proxies in Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.
Do you believe that sanctions relief provided to Iran as a part of
the JCPOA improved the economy and the lives of the Iranian
people?
Answer. While the DIA testified in 2017 that the majority of
sanctions relief was used for domestic purposes, the Biden-Harris
administration is under no illusions about Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region and about its government's willingness to
divert funding that should be used to better the lives of its citizens
to those purposes. It is also clear that the reimposition of sanctions
has not had the effect of drying up Iran's proliferation of missiles,
support for terrorism, and regional activities.
We need to address all of these activities using a variety of
tools--deterrence, sanctions on Iranian entities providing support to
violent groups and militias in the region, and, in the event we rejoin
the JCPOA, in any follow-on talks with Iran--in close consultation and
coordination with our allies and partners. If confirmed, I am committed
to consulting closely with Congress on the path forward.
Question. What tools and safeguards exist that would prevent Iran
from directing future sanctions relief to malign activities?
Answer. The U.S. Government maintains a range of tools to combat
terrorist financing, and we will continue to use these to counter
Iran's destabilizing activities and support for terrorism.
We will continue to maintain and impose sanctions on Iranian
entities and individuals providing support to terrorist groups in the
region. The Biden-Harris administration will take action, in
coordination with our allies and partners, to both deter and counter
Iran's destabilizing activities and to vigorously pursue talks on these
critical issues. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting closely
with Congress on the path forward.
Question. Do you commit not to pursue sanctions relief or
unfreezing of Iranian assets as a precondition for nuclear negotiations
with the Iranian regime?
Answer. We are ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a
mutual return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
as a starting point for follow-on negotiations. Our first order of
business is consulting with Congress and our allies on the path
forward.
Question. You have previously expressed skepticism over the
prospects of U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, indicating that if such a
development were to take place, the United States would need to be
willing to put ``more on the table.'' Please describe in detail the
prospects for U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, to include views of UNSCR
2231-mandated Transition Day in 2023 and Termination Day in 2025.
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to ensuring
that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon and to addressing the many
other issues of concern related to Iran. The administration remains
ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to
compliance with JCPOA commitments as a first step, but the work will
not end there. The administration intends to build on the JCPOA and use
it as a platform to lengthen and strengthen the constraints on Iran's
nuclear program and to address other critical issues.
Question. Exactly what form should ``more on the table'' take in
your view? What do you see as being acceptable to both the United
States and Iran?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration remains ready to engage in
meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with
JCPOA commitments. While it is too early to speculate on the specific
details, if confirmed, I commit to robust consultation with Congress
and our P5+1 partners on the best way forward.
Question. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17)
(``INARA'') requires the President to provide to Congress the text and
related materials of any agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear
program of Iran within five days of reaching the agreement.
Additionally, INARA stipulates that the administration certify that
such an agreement is not ``inimical to or constitute an unreasonable
risk to the common defense and security.''
Would the requirements of INARA cited above apply to any future
nuclear deal with Iran?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under INARA and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA are
satisfied, including its transmission and certification requirements.
Question. Would the requirements of INARA cited above apply to any
process of rejoining or reaffirming U.S. participation in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under INARA. The JCPOA was submitted under INARA in 2015 and
underwent close Congressional and public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am
committed to ensuring that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. Would any agreement between the United States and Iran
regarding how the United States and Iran might return to compliance
with the JCPOA constitute an ``agreement with Iran relating to the
nuclear program of Iran''?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. What are the reporting requirements of INARA that you
believe that the administration is currently subject to?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult within the administration to
identify and confirm those requirements. I am committed to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its reporting
requirements.
Question. In 2014, in your capacity as Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, you hosted a roundtable in which you suggested that
the JCPOA contained ``in one way or another, all the concerns that must
be addressed.'' While the 2015 agreement did secure time-limited curbs
on Tehran's nuclear program, it failed to address Iran's destabilizing
support for proxy militias and its ballistic missile development.
Further, it failed to secure the release of American hostages, like
Washington Post reporter Jason Rezain, who remained illegally detained
by the Iranian regime until January 2016.
Is it still your position that the 2015 nuclear agreement contained
a sufficient basis for the United States to address all of its
most pressing national security concerns?
Answer. The objective of the JCPOA was to ensure that Iran would
never obtain a nuclear weapon, which is just one of the myriad issues
of national security concern the United States and our allies and
partners face regarding Iran. The situation we face in 2021, however,
is different from the situation in 2015. The facts on the ground have
changed, and our path forward must take this into account. The Biden-
Harris administration is committed to addressing not only the concerns
about Iran's nuclear program, but also broader concerns, including
Iran's unjust detentions of U.S. citizens, its ballistic missile
program, and destabilizing regional activities.
Question. Would you recommend the United States pursue re-entry
into the 2015 nuclear agreement absent the release of American
hostages, including Morad Tahbaz, Baquer Namazi, and Siamak Namazi?
Answer. The safety of U.S. citizens overseas is a top priority for
the U.S. Government. The continued unjust detention of U.S. citizens in
Iran is atrocious. I have spoken with family members of U.S. citizens
detained in Evin Prison and their stories are horrific. As President
Biden has said, the administration will aggressively work for the
release and return of all our unjustly detained U.S. citizens.
Question. The Biden administration has indicated that it will
attempt to address Iran's regional terrorism and ballistic missile
activity in follow-on agreements after rejoining the JCPOA. Assuming
the United States grants nuclear-related sanctions relief as a part of
U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, what leverage would the Biden
administration retain to ensure Iran engages in meaningful discussions
on its support of regional terrorism and ballistic missile program?
Please be specific.
Answer. As President Biden has said, we are ready to engage in
meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and then use that as a
platform to lengthen and strengthen the constraints on Iran's nuclear
program and address other issues of concern. The framework of U.S.
sanctions on Iran remains robust, and there are many layers of that
sanctions architecture that would remain in place, even in the event of
a U.S. return to the JCPOA. This certainly includes the primary U.S.
embargo on Iran, and many other U.S. sanctions on Iran. Working with
allies and partners, we also have other avenues to place pressure on
Iran.
Question. The Abraham Accords have the potentially to fundamentally
change the Middle East for the better. The previous administration had
an empowered agent in the White House, Jared Kushner, to pursue
normalization agreements. We understand that the Biden administration
will push this role back down to the State Department--currently at the
Deputy Assistant Secretary level. Given the importance of the Abraham
Accords, how do you plan to expand and strengthen the Accords without a
similar empowered staff?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. If confirmed, we will
also closely monitor the status of the normalization efforts to date,
encouraging the states that have signed such agreements with Israel to
uphold their commitments to establish full diplomatic relations with
Israel.
Question. Will you assign responsibility for additional
normalization agreements to more senior staff?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the normalization
agreements with the relevant subject matter experts and determining the
best way forward, including with respect to staffing responsibilities.
Question. In your hearing testimony, you referenced a number of
meetings that you had with Iranian officials after you had concluded
your service at the Department of State in 2015. What meetings did you
have with any Iranian officials since leaving the State Department in
2015? Were these meetings scheduled ahead of time? If so, by whom?
Answer. To the best of my recollection, I met with Foreign Minister
Zarif twice on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, in 2018
and 2019. I also participated in two bipartisan group meetings in New
York on the margins of UNGA: in 2018 with President Rouhani, and in
2019 with FM Zarif. Those meetings were facilitated by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (2018) and the International Crisis
Group (2019). Finally, in October 2017 I participated in a panel with
Deputy FM Abbas Aragchi at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by
the Center for Energy and Security Studies in Moscow, and we spoke on
the margins.
In every meeting, I urged Iran to stay in full compliance with the
JCPOA, even after U.S. withdrawal, and pressed for Iran to end its
regional violence and to release American prisoners. I consistently
kept Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale apprised
of meetings and offered to convey any useful information back to him.
Question. Who were the participants in those meetings? When and
where did those meetings occur? In what capacity did you engage in
those meetings?
Answer. As noted in the previous answer, the meetings were
principally with Foreign Minister Zarif. At the Munich Security
Conference, I believe he was accompanied by DFM Abbas Araghchi. When I
saw FM Zarif in New York he was also accompanied by the DFM and by
Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations. When I saw DFM Araghchi in
Moscow, he was alone.
Question. Please describe in detail the purpose of the meetings,
the scope of the discussions that occurred in the meetings, the
positions you took in those discussions, and how those discussions
inform your views on Iran policy issues.
Answer. As I stated in my confirmation hearing, I kept Under
Secretary Hale apprised of the meetings and committed to sharing any
useful information with him. I attended meetings to urge Iran to not
escalate the situation, to stay compliant with the JCPOA, to cease its
regional violence, and to release U.S. citizens who had been unjustly
detained. As I noted, families have continued to call me and urge me to
do whatever I can to help gain release of their loved ones. My views on
Iran policy were offered in the confirmation hearing and were not
changed by the meetings.
Question. Did you inform any sitting U.S. official that you had
planned or were likely to have each of these meetings? If so, please
provide details for each meeting.
Answer. As noted, I kept Under Secretary David Hale apprised of the
meetings.
Question. After each of these meetings occurred, did you inform any
sitting U.S. official that the meetings had taken place and/or share
what was discussed? If so, please provide details for each meeting.
Answer. As noted, I offered to apprise Under Secretary Hale of any
useful information and did so as appropriate.
Question. Outside of these meetings, have you had any other
contacts with any Iranian officials since leaving the State Department
in 2015? Please provide details.
Answer. None that I recall.
Question. What are the tools and strategies the Department can best
employ to address cross-regional security, political, and economic
challenges in the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, Sahel, and Maghreb regions
of Africa?
Answer. It is essential that we bring an end to deadly conflicts
and prevent the onset of new ones; help African nations address climate
change; violent extremism; promote development, health security,
environmental sustainability, democratic progress, responsive and
responsible governance, and rule of law; assist countries facing
economic distress, including health and food insecurity; and support
economic and political independence in the face of undue foreign
influence. If confirmed, I will ensure we work across bureaucratic and
geographic seams to address these regional challenges by cooperating
with allies and partners, building strong partnerships, investing in
civil society, and strengthening long-standing political, economic, and
cultural connections.
Question. Do you believe Special Envoys are the most effective tool
in confronting such complex regional issues?
Answer. Special Envoys have been an important tool for responding
to complex security and political challenges, in certain cases where
sustained, high-level diplomatic engagement is needed. When well-
coordinated with regional and functional bureaus and embassies, envoys
can help to integrate and lead cross-regional policy efforts, such as
building international coalitions to counter transnational threats.
Envoys can play an important role in responding to conflicts of a
cross-border and cross-regional nature that require complex, negotiated
solutions with buy-in from multiple states and actors. If confirmed, I
intend to play an active role in the policy discussions surrounding the
potential deployment of future envoys.
Question. What other tools should the United States consider?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration recognizes that many of the
biggest threats we face are transnational in nature and must be
addressed collectively, including through international organizations.
Nowhere is this more true than in Africa--the African Union (AU) and
sub-regional institutions play an important role on governance,
economic, and security issues across the continent. If confirmed, I
will ensure increased U.S. engagement with the AU and other
subregional bodies. Additionally, I will work to pursue
mutually beneficial partnerships across Africa. Coordination and
collaboration are essential, and we must work to align our approaches
to holistically address security and governance challenges.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to building greater
interagency coordination and strategy regarding U.S. security policy
and programs in Africa, namely between the Department of State and the
Department of Defense, and specifically with the United States Africa
Command (AFRICOM)?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department
of Defense and AFRICOM to make sure we are united in our efforts to
implement the President and the Secretary's policy imperatives in sub-
Saharan Africa and that we work collaboratively to develop unified U.S.
Government policies around which we can organize our diplomatic,
security, and development engagement.
Question. The U.S.-Germany relationship has been increasingly
strained in recent years. Among our points of disagreement are the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline, military spending, attitudes towards China, and
questions of the use of nuclear weapons. What steps will you hope to
take to improve the United States' relationship with Germany?
Answer. Reinvigorating and modernizing relations with U.S. Allies,
including Germany, is one of this administration's highest priorities.
The administration has already begun this process by conducting
extensive consultations with the German Government on a range of issues
of mutual concern. The administration also halted the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Germany and lifted the cap on the number of U.S.
troops that can be stationed in Germany. If confirmed, I look forward
to further strengthening the U.S.-German relationship, consulting
closely on our common security priorities, especially at NATO, and
partnering based on our shared values on challenges, including climate
change, recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic, and addressing threats
posed by China, Russia, and Iran. We will not always agree, but we will
look to manage those differences constructively as Allies.
Question. Under German leadership, the European Union just
concluded an investment deal with China. How do you view the German
Government's attitudes towards China, doing business with China, and
their recently published Indo-Pacific Strategy?
Answer. The EU's investment deal with China is a demonstration of
the amount of work we have before us to reinvigorate our Transatlantic
alliance and develop a more unified response to the challenge posed by
China. If confirmed, I will engage actively with the EU, Germany, and
other European partners on shared concerns about China. My engagements
will include discussions on how to advance our shared economic
interests and counter China's aggressive and coercive actions, prevent
goods made with forced labor from entering global markets, create a
level playing field and promote private enterprise, and highlight
China's failure to uphold its international commitments.
The Biden-Harris administration will work jointly with Germany,
NATO, the EU, and other partners to address China's predatory economic
practices, the challenges China poses to our collective security, and
its human rights violations. Ultimately, the onus will be on China to
show that its new pledges on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and
subsidies in its new agreement with the EU are not just cheap talk. The
United States welcomes Germany's support for a rules-based
international order, including in the Indo-Pacific, where Berlin
recently announced it will send a naval vessel to demonstrate Germany's
active engagement in the region.
Question. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder recently wrote
in Handelsblatt that ``a moralizing foreign policy'' towards China,
implying that, when it comes to China, human rights should be placed
after economic interests. Do you agree?
Answer. China has engaged in gross human rights violations that
shock the conscience and must be met with serious consequences. The
President has been clear that the administration will put our
democratic values back at the center of our foreign policy and stand up
for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. The United States will
work with Germany and other allies and partners to condemn human rights
violations by China in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and elsewhere. Promoting
respect for human rights will be a pillar of U.S. engagement with
Germany and other allies with respect to China both in bilateral and
multilateral settings.
Question. How do you and the Biden administration intend to work
with those European voices and actors that fall on either side of the
human rights-economics divide?
Answer. The President has made it clear that revitalizing our ties
with allies and partners, including in Europe, is an administration
priority. The administration is working to demonstrate that democracies
that protect human rights deliver for their people and that human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law are essential to meet the
challenges of our time. Vibrant democracies that protect human rights
are more stable, more open, better partners to us, and more dependable
markets for our goods and services. If confirmed, I will strengthen our
relations with our allies, work with likeminded partners, and pool our
collective strength to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of
law.
Question. Do you believe that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline should be
completed?
Answer. The President has made clear his belief that the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline is a bad deal and that the administration will oppose
it, and I strongly agree with this position. Nord Stream 2 expands
Russian malign influence, threatens Europe's energy security, makes
Allies and partners more vulnerable, and divides Europe. This project
has the potential to destabilize Europe and embolden Russian aggression
toward the West. I understand that the Department and our embassies in
the region are carefully monitoring any activities taken to construct
the pipeline and will respond in accordance with our obligations under
PEESA and CAATSA. The administration continues to engage with Germany
to express the United States' continued opposition to the pipeline and
to highlight our concerns. If confirmed, I will continue to use all
available tools to counter Russian malign influence, to work with
Allies and partners in the region, and to support Transatlantic energy
security goals.
Question. Do you commit to following the law and fully implementing
the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act and the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Clarification Act?
Answer. Yes. The State Department submits a report to Congress
every 90 days on vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying
activities, and various entities providing and supporting those
vessels, for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report
due to Congress in mid-May. I understand the Department submitted the
first report required by PEESA, as amended, in February. If confirmed,
I will continue to use all available tools to counter Russian malign
influence and to work with Allies and partners in the region to support
Transatlantic energy security goals. The administration will continue
to examine entities involved in potentially sanctionable activity and
will designate additional entities as appropriate.
Question. Do you believe the United States should entertain
potential proposals from the German Government that might allow the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline be completed?
Answer. The administration has made clear to Germany and other
European partners that Nord Stream 2 is not just a commercial deal. The
administration views Nord Stream 2 as a geo-political project that is a
threat not only to Europe's energy security, but to strategic stability
on the continent. The United States will continue to work with allies
and partners, including Germany, Denmark, Ukraine, Poland, and the
Baltic states, to ensure Europe has a reliable, diversified energy
supply that enhances, rather than undermines, its collective security.
Question. Do you believe that it would be worthwhile to allow the
completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in hopes of improving the
U.S.-German relationship?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has clearly stated that the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline should not be completed and has consistently
conveyed this to German officials. Germany is an important economic and
security ally and, if confirmed, reinvigorating and modernizing
relations with U.S. allies will be among my highest priorities. Close
friends and allies should be able to talk frankly to one another about
disagreements, as we do with German officials on Nord Stream 2. The
administration remains hopeful that through diplomatic engagement,
bolstered by the tools provided by Congress, Germany will address our
concerns raised by the pipeline related to energy security, Ukraine,
and malign Russian influence.
Question. Are such proposals currently being entertained?
Answer. The administration continues to engage Germany to make
clear our view that Nord Stream 2 is a bad deal and should not be
completed. The administration has not received any formal proposals
from the German Government related to Nord Stream 2.
Question. The Biden administration has stated its intent to achieve
``a carbon pollution-free power sector by 2035'' that puts the United
States ``on an irreversible path to a net-zero economy by 2050.'' To
this end, President Biden has ordered that federal agencies move to a
fully electric vehicle fleet for automotive transportation needs and
begin to use the federal procurement system for smaller equipment to
drive demand for low energy-use appliances. What specific steps will
you take to achieve these goals at the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to
comply with relevant authorities of Energy Policy Act of 2005 (PL 109-
58), in full consideration of the administration's net-zero goal and
Federal Acquisition Regulations.
Question. Will these environmental goals impede other Department
missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Department's operations,
logistics and procurement experts to implement relevant policies,
strategies and plans in a manner consistent with federal laws and
regulations and as outlined in the President's Executive Order on
Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.
Question. Will the Department be expected to offset carbon
emissions from activities such as air travel?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department supports
the administration's goals, which may include future carbon offsets.
Question. Do you agree that extended nuclear deterrence is
foundational to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, and to the strength
of U.S. alliances?
Answer. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in advancing
U.S. national security objectives, including ensuring a free and open
Indo-Pacific. It does so by providing assurance to allies and partners,
which are our greatest strategic asset, and promoting nonproliferation.
If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress, allies, and
partners on this important issue.
Question. Do you believe that adoption of a sole purpose doctrine,
a no first use policy, or a posture that fails to modernize U.S.
nuclear forces would serve U.S. and allied interests in the Indo-
Pacific?
Answer. The United States will ensure our strategic deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence
commitments to our allies remain strong and credible. As directed by
the President, this administration will conduct reviews of various
nuclear policies. In that process, we will consult with our allies and
partners, including those in the Indo-Pacific, as well as with
Congress.
Question. The Trump administration advanced a ``free and open''
Indo-Pacific strategy, which yielded a lot of concrete cooperation,
especially with Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asia. If confirmed,
what are the key principles, initiatives, and other elements of the
previous administration's Indo-Pacific strategy that will you continue?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working
with allies and partners to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific
region. As President Biden has said, working with allies and partners
to secure peace, defend our shared values, and advance our prosperity
across the Indo-Pacific will be among the most consequential efforts we
undertake. If confirmed, I will join the administration's review of our
Indo-Pacific policy, and I commit to working closely with Congress to
make sure we have the right components in place.
Question. What major policy changes would the administration make
in U.S. strategy towards the region?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working
with allies and partners to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific
region. The administration is conducting a review of our
IndoPacific policy and, if confirmed, I commit to working
closely with Congress to make sure we have the right components in
place.
Question. The Obama administration failed to secure congressional
support for the Iran nuclear deal. If confirmed, and if the Biden
administration pursues an agreement with North Korea regarding its
weapons programs, do you commit to regular briefings at both the member
and staff levels in advance of and following negotiations with North
Korea?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with Congress on efforts to
limit the dangers posed by North Korea's weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile programs.
Question. If confirmed, and if the Biden administration pursues an
agreement with North Korea regarding its weapons programs, do you
personally commit to appear before this committee prior to the
completion of any such agreement for public hearings on the matter?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with Congress on
efforts to limit the dangers posed by North Korea's weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile programs.
Question. Do you believe that an agreement with North Korea
regarding its weapons programs should be submitted to the Senate as a
treaty for the Senate's consent to ratification? If no, please explain
in detail.
Answer. Denuclearization of North Korea remains a top national
security priority for the United States. I understand the
administration, in consultation with our allies, will evaluate and
adopt a strategy to keep the American people and our allies safe and
that takes into account pressure options and the potential for future
diplomacy with North Korea. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting
with Congress on efforts to limit the dangers posed by North Korea's
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, including
through any agreements that may be negotiated.
Question. The Indo-Pacific is the most important region for U.S.
security and economic growth. It represents nearly half of the global
population and is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the
world, but is also home to security challenges that threaten to
undermine U.S. national security interests, regional peace, and global
stability. The Trump administration articulated a strategy to advance a
``free and open Indo-Pacific,'' and has expanded partnerships with
regional countries and implemented multiple initiatives in the region
to support this goal. Do you agree with the core tenants of a vision
for the ``free and open Indo-Pacific'' strategy advanced over the last
several years?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what should the State Department's role be in this
strategy? If not, why not?
Answer. While our Indo-Pacific policy is still under review, the
State Department will have a major role in supporting a free and open
Indo-Pacific, including by reinvigorating our alliances and
partnerships, helping the region recover from the global pandemic,
promoting democratic resilience, and confronting climate change. As the
President has said, we will work with partners in the Indo-Pacific and
across the world to protect the free exchange of ideas in open,
democratic societies and to ensure the benefits of growth are shared
broadly and equitably.
Question. Chinese influence in Europe continues to grow. It has
invested billions across Europe and has sought to acquire strategic
infrastructure and companies in Europe. European countries are starting
to take a much more robust approach to China across the board,
including on investment and human rights. What is your assessment of
China's objectives in Europe and with regard to the transatlantic
alliance?
Answer. The objective of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) is
to make Europe more reliant and compliant, by dividing and weakening
alliances forged through the European Union and NATO. They attempt this
through abusive, unfair, and illegal economic and trade practices,
including market-distorting subsidies, intellectual property theft,
forced technology transfers, and predatory investments. With economic
leverage comes political influence, security vulnerabilities, and the
ability to coerce countries. This weakens countries' willingness to
oppose the PRC's efforts to reshape the international order, creating a
threat to the transatlantic alliance itself.
Question. How should the United States respond to growing Chinese
influence in Europe?
Answer. Our engagement with Europe to counter the growing influence
of the People's Republic of China should begin with a common
understanding of the threats facing our mutual prosperity and national
security and must include collaboration with NATO. Working with our
Allies and partners, we will address vulnerabilities to Transatlantic
security, promote technology innovation, information sharing, and
energy security within the Alliance. We will support transparent
economic growth and fair labor practices. We are developing foreign
assistance programs to reach 24 countries that focus on transaction
advisory, cybersecurity, and strategic infrastructure protection.
Question. Last year, I published a report on how the United States
and Europe can cooperate on shared challenges related to China,
including a chapter on contending with China's anti-competitive
economic practices. I argued that the United States and Europe should
revitalize trade negotiations, continue important initiatives at the
World Trade Organizations such U.S.-EU-Japan efforts on subsidies, fix
current sticking points like ongoing disputes between Boeing and
Airbus, coordinate on export controls, and strengthen supply chain
resilience. How would you advance these goals?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to rebuilding
and revitalizing relations with our European allies and working with
them as using the full array of tools to counter China's abusive
economic practices, both in bilateral and multilateral fora, including
the WTO. The administration will work with our allies and partners to
ensure the resilience of the United States, as well as global supply
chains, particularly under the February 24, 2021, Executive Order on
America's Supply Chains. As of March 5, the administration announced a
four-month suspension of tariffs on the UK and EU with the goal of a
permanent settlement, under the Section 301 Boeing-Airbus case. If
confirmed, I will continue these efforts to take on the challenge of
China's abusive and illegal economic practices.
Question. What additional areas would you prioritize?
Answer. In addition to those issues discussed in the previous
question, presenting positive alternatives to China, which showcase the
value of the U.S. model against the techno-authoritarian model
proliferated by Beijing, is critical. If confirmed, I will work with
our European allies and partners on a coordinated approach to China's
abusive economic practices, human rights violations, and other
challenges. The EU has made it clear it is willing to cooperate with
the Biden-Harris administration on China. The administration will work
in bilateral and multilateral fora, including the UN and others, to
ensure U.S. national security is protected with respect to investments
in critical infrastructure and sensitive technologies, and to push back
against PRC attempts to weaken standards, rules, and institutions that
support our economic prosperity.
Question. The incoming administration has stated that global health
cooperation with China will be a major priority. The United States
invested a lot of resources and personnel over many years to pursue
health cooperation with China. That included a close relationship
between the U.S. CDC and China's CDC, including co-location
arrangements where they worked side-by-side for many years. While co-
location arrangements ceased because of concerns about the physical
security of U.S. diplomats, cooperation still continued. However, in
the world's hour of need at the beginning of a serious pandemic
originating in China, the Chinese Government's response proved that
global health cooperation would always take a back seat to the standing
and reputation of the CCP. While some level of cooperation may be
necessary, how can we have confidence in these initiatives without
reciprocal good faith efforts by Chinese Government interlocutors?
Answer. It is important that we get to the bottom of the early days
of the pandemic in China so that we can take steps to prevent future
pandemics. The Biden-Harris administration will rebuild and expand the
systems to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats globally,
including in China. The administration will work to get our experts
back into China so that our scientists have the access and
relationships needed to prepare for and respond to the emergence and
spread of potential future outbreaks around the globe. If confirmed, I
will test whether China is willing to play a constructive role on
certain issues, including on global health, but will be guided by a
clear-eyed assessment of China's intentions.
Question. How will you overcome this fundamental challenge, and why
should the American people trust that use of taxpayer dollars and other
resources will bear fruit?
Answer. China poses the most significant challenge of any nation
state to the United States and our interests. There are competitive,
cooperative, and adversarial aspects to the U.S.-China relationship. We
must advance our economic interests, counter China's aggressive and
coercive actions, sustain our key military advantages, defend
democratic values, and restore our vital security partnerships as we
also conduct results-oriented diplomacy with China on shared challenges
such as global health. The Biden-Harris administration will test
whether China is willing to play a constructive role on certain issues,
including on global health, but will be clear-eyed about China's
intentions.
Question. What areas of health cooperation will the incoming
administration prioritize with China?
Answer. Promoting global health is in China's interests as well as
ours. The Biden-Harris administration is willing to test whether China
is willing to play a constructive role in certain areas where we may
share interests but will be clear-eyed about China's intentions. We
will not trade off our core interests or values in discussions with
China or any other country.
Question. What will be the role of the State Department in this
regard?
Answer. The State Department can play a leading role in elevating
global health diplomacy to identify potential global health risks, to
work with the international community to detect and prevent epidemics
and pandemics before they occur, and to ensure effective international
responses when they do. This includes addressing the root causes of
these events and strengthening the prevention and response capabilities
of local health systems. If confirmed, I will strengthen the Department
of State's diplomatic engagement in support of the COVID-19 health and
humanitarian response, as well as global health security more broadly,
in close alignment with USAID, HHS, CDC, and other agencies involved in
this space.
Question. Would you advise the President to send high-level
visitors to Taiwan, boost defense ties, explore negotiations for a Free
Trade Agreement, strengthen the economic partnership set up by the
Trump administration, and advocate for Taiwan in international
organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I support sending senior-level visitors to
Taiwan to deepen and broaden our relationship. I support boosting
defense ties and strengthening the economic partnership with Taiwan, as
well as advocating for Taiwan's participation in international
organizations. I understand that USTR is the lead agency on trade, and
pending confirmation of the new USTR, I will work with the office of
the USTR on a review of trade policy toward Taiwan.
Question. The previous administration authorized many critical
capabilities via arms sales to Taiwan over the last several years,
including fighters to replace and augment those being worn out from
Chinese Air Force incursions, ground-launched anti-ship missiles,
mobile artillery rocket systems, and surveillance drones. Do you commit
to fulfilling these arms sales with speed and urgency so that the
capabilities get to Taiwan in a timely manner?
Answer. My support for Taiwan is rock solid. Taiwan is a leading
democracy, a major economy, and a critical security partner. I support
a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with the
wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan. If confirmed, I will
continue to support efforts to make available defense articles and
services necessary to enable Taiwan to defend itself, consistent with
the law, U.S. export regulations, and nonproliferation policy.
Taiwan remains a priority for this administration. In my position
at the Department of State, working together with the Department of
Defense, I will implement that priority wherever feasible to assist
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
Question. Do you commit to ensuring that the Department of State
adheres to a regularized process with regard to Taiwan arms sales,
including avoiding the practice of bundling?
Answer. Yes, that would be my intent, if confirmed. Consistent with
the Taiwan Relations Act and our One China Policy, the United States
continues to make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability. This longstanding policy contributes to the maintenance of
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
If confirmed, I will continue to support U.S. policy to assist
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Doing so
increases stability both across the Taiwan Strait and within the
region.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. Throughout my life, my most important contribution has been
to help open doors for women and to advocate for their human rights,
and I have sought to stand for any group of marginalized people in the
United States and around the world. In politics, I ran Barbara
Mikulski's successful campaign for the Senate, helping her to become
the first Democratic woman elected to the Senate in her own right. I
was also Executive Director of EMILY's List, helping Democratic women
get elected to the U.S. House and Senate. As Undersecretary of State,
on virtually every overseas trip, I made it a point to meet with women
leaders, women business owners, and women crafts persons to give women
visibility and press coverage and regularly spoke out about ensuring
that half of the world should be included.
As I traveled as a diplomat, I met with LGBTQI+ youth in Nepal, the
first country to allow citizens to check `other' on their passport, and
I met with LGBTQI+ advocates in other countries as they sought their
rights. I met with the Rohingya in Bangladesh and had a frank
conversation in Burma with Aung San Suu Kyi. I have also worked to help
free those unlawfully detained and imprisoned, particularly in Iran,
and helped achieve some releases over the years.
Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote,
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and
underrepresented groups?
Answer. Studies show how diverse teams outperform other teams based
on their ability to innovate and address new challenges creatively.
Diversity is America's competitive advantage on the global stage.
Addressing today's challenges across the globe will require the
Department to harness the wealth of diversity and experiences in our
workforce to address increasingly complex challenges impacting our
foreign policy as well as the lives of the American people. If
confirmed, I commit to fostering an inclusive workplace throughout the
Department so that every employee's contribution is valued. If
confirmed, I will hold our senior leadership accountable for the
conduct of their teams and for perpetuating an environment where each
individual is heard and seen.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure each of the
supervisors at the Department of State is fostering an environment that
is diverse and inclusive?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that my team upholds the values
of diversity, inclusion, and mutual respect by setting that example
myself and cultivating an environment where every contribution is
valued and considered, regardless of differences in race, gender,
ethnicity, or other attributes. I will ensure my team takes the proper
training to cultivate an office environment that creates opportunity
for dialogue and for innovation across diverse backgrounds. If
confirmed, I will hold my leadership accountable and will work with the
Department's new Chief Diversity and Inclusion officer to ensure our
administrative and foreign policies support the values of diversity and
inclusion.
Question. Do you commit to bring to the committee's attention (and
the State Department Inspector General) any change in policy or U.S.
actions that you suspect may be influenced by any of the President's
business or financial interests, or the business or financial interests
of any senior White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you commit to inform the committee if you have any
reason to suspect that a foreign government, head of state, or foreign-
controlled entity is taking any action in order to benefit any of the
President's business or financial interests, or the interests of senior
White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you or do any members of your immediate family have
any financial interests in any foreign country?
Answer. My spouse's and my investment portfolio includes mutual
funds that may hold interests in companies with an international
presence, but these mutual funds are exempt from conflict of interest
laws. I am committed to following all applicable ethics laws and
regulations and remaining vigilant with regard to my ethics
obligations. I will divest any investments the State Department Ethics
Office deems necessary to avoid a conflict of interest.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Do you agree that Iran is the world's leading exporter
and supporter of terrorism?
Answer. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Its
support for terrorism threatens international security, our forces,
diplomatic personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. The
administration is committed to countering any Iranian threat to our
personnel and our vital interests and will respond to any such threat
using all appropriate means.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should trust the
world's leading exporter of terrorism to honor any international
agreements?
Answer. The administration is ready to engage in meaningful
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA does not rely on trust;
it provides the most intrusive nuclear verification and monitoring
procedures ever negotiated. Diplomacy is a tool; it is not a reward or
concession. It is a means to advance U.S. interests. I remain clear-
eyed about the threat Iran poses to us and our allies.
Question. What policies will you be pressing for to address Iran's
non-nuclear threats?
Answer. The administration is ready to engage in meaningful
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and then use that as a platform to
build a longer and stronger deal and also address other areas of
concern. The administration also intends to pursue full implementation
of relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions involving Iran.
Question. Regarding ``compliance for compliance'' with the
Iranians, can you commit today that you will not be counseling the
administration to take the first step or dilute its existing leverage
vis-a-vis the Iranians amid this process? Could you please explain to
us how you define compliance by the Iranians with the JCPOA?
Answer. The administration is ready to engage in meaningful
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a starting point for follow-on
negotiations. There are many steps in the process to getting there that
we will need to evaluate. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting
with Congress and our allies on the path forward.
Question. Do you believe that for any Iran policy to be
sustainable, it needs to have bipartisan support?
Answer. The administration agrees that a bipartisan approach to
Iran is the strongest way to safeguard U.S. interests for the long
term, and if confirmed I will work to engage with Congress on this and
other issues. As the Biden-Harris administration develops its Iran
policy, it is committed to consulting closely and regularly with
Congress, as well as U.S. allies and regional partners, to listen to
their ideas and concerns.
Question. Do you believe that the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) is a terrorist organization?
Answer. The Iran Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and it is a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. I
believe Iran remains a state sponsor of terrorism and that, as the IRGC
branch focused on extraterritorial activities, the IRGC-Quds Force has
been directly involved in planning, directing, and supporting terrorist
acts outside of Iran. Iran's support for terrorism threatens U.S.
forces, diplomatic personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere.
The administration is committed to countering any Iranian threat to our
forces, personnel, and our vital interests, and will respond to any
such threat using all appropriate means.
Question. Are you committed to strict enforcement of sanctions
against the IRGC and its subsidiaries and affiliates?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to countering
Iran's destabilizing activities, including its ballistic missile
program and support for terrorist groups and violent proxies in the
region. The Biden-Harris administration will continue to maintain and
impose sanctions on Iranian entities and individuals supporting
terrorist activity or responsible for serious human rights abuses, and
will work with our allies promote accountability for those involved.
Question. During your nominations hearing before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on March 3, 2021, you acknowledged that you met
with officials of the Iranian regime--a regime that is a U.S.-
designated State Sponsor of Terrorism--during your time out of
government since 2017. You also stated that you coordinated directly
with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador David Hale
concerning your interactions with Iranian regime officials.
Did you also coordinate directly with any of the following senior
U.S. State Department officials who handled Iran in their
portfolio: Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs David Schenker, Special Representative for Iran Brian
Hook, Special Representative for Iran Elliott Abrams, Deputy
Secretary of State Stephen Biegun, or Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo?
If yes, please identify dates of consultation? If not, why not?
Answer. I did not engage with any of the named individuals beyond
Undersecretary for Political Affairs David Hale.
Question. Besides in-person meetings, have you otherwise been in
contact with any Iranian regime officials, including via e-mail, text
exchange, or secure messaging platforms, between January 20, 2017, and
today? If yes, please identify dates of contact and the text of the
exchanges.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings
discussed, other than to arrange logistical details for those in-person
meetings. I do not have records of those exchanges.
Question. Do you agree that a credible option to use military force
is an important component of U.S. policy to prevent Iran from obtaining
nuclear weapons and to deter Iran's regional ambitions?
Answer. Should Iran threaten U.S. personnel, the United States will
respond in a way that is calculated, on our timetable, consistent with
all applicable domestic and international law, and using a mix of tools
seen and unseen.
Question. Do you believe there were gaps in the JCPOA that must be
addressed to truly stop Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon?
Answer. As a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is obligated not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Under the JCPOA, Iran reaffirmed that under no circumstances would it
ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons and committed to a
series of limits on its nuclear activities that would verifiably block
any path to producing nuclear material for weapons for their duration.
The Biden-Harris administration has made clear it is committed to
ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
Question. You have previously stated that the JCPOA provided the
most comprehensive inspection regime ever negotiated. But in 2018,
Israel revealed Iran's nuclear archive--which was unknown to the IAEA.
Do you agree Iran lied to the IAEA about the possible military
dimension (PMD) of its nuclear program?
Answer. The IAEA has made clear that it takes no information
provided by Iran on its nuclear program at face value. The IAEA has
previously reported that it found evidence of possible military
dimensions of Iran's program to be credible, and that a ``range of
activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device
were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated
effort, and some activities took place after 2003.'' The administration
will not take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear
program, and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its verification
authorities to investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear
material or activities in Iran.
Question. Can you describe your understanding of the regime's
financial system with respect to terrorism finance, money laundering,
corruption, and other illicit activity? Did the JCPOA change this
behavior?
Answer. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Its
support for terrorism threatens our forces and partners in the region.
President Biden is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing
activities, including its ballistic missile program and support for
terrorist groups and violent proxies in the region. The United States
and our partners negotiated a deal that verifiably prevented Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon and subjected it to the most intrusive
inspection regime ever negotiated. It was working. The President has
made clear that the United States will be prepared to resume
participation in the deal if Iran resumes strict compliance, as a
starting point for follow-on negotiations to lengthen and strengthen
these nuclear constraints, and address other issues of concern,
including Iran's ballistic missile program and its destabilizing
regional activity.
Question. Do you agree that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
of 2015 (INARA) is permanent law and is binding on the Biden
administration?
Answer. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) is binding
law. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is committed to
implementing the requirements of INARA.
Question. Do you agree that because INARA requires any agreement
with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran to be submitted to
Congress for review ``regardless of the form it takes'', ``whether a
political commitment or otherwise'', and ``regardless of whether it is
legally binding or not'', that any informal agreement, including even
an unwritten oral understanding, reached about how the United States
and Iran will return to compliance with the JCPOA, or move in the
direction of returning to compliance with the JCPOA, must be submitted
to Congress for review pursuant to INARA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
requirements of INARA are satisfied, including with respect to the
transmission requirement.
Question. Do you agree that prior to and during the period for
transmission of an agreement to Congress for review pursuant to INARA,
and during the period for congressional review provided in INARA, ``the
President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or
otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to
Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such
sanctions pursuant to an agreement'' required to be transmitted to
Congress for review pursuant to INARA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
requirements of INARA are satisfied, including with respect to the
transmission requirement.
Question. Do you agree that the sanctions that may not be waived,
suspended or otherwise obviated under the circumstances described in
the preceding question include sanctions that may have been waived,
suspended or otherwise obviated pursuant to the JCPOA following
congressional review of that agreement pursuant to INARA, but which
were subsequently re-imposed by the United States Government?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). I understand that the Biden-Harris administration
is committed to implementing the requirements of INARA and if
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including with respect to limitations during any
congressional review period.
Question. Are you personally committed to upholding the spirit of
INARA's restrictions on sanctions relief for Iran referred to in the
preceding two questions by not seeking to extend sanctions relief to
Iran in circumvention of those restrictions?
Answer. I am aware that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA) contains certain limitations on sanctions relief during the
congressional review period. I understand that the Biden-Harris
administration is committed to implementing the requirements of INARA.
If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied.
Question. Are you personally committed to ensuring that Congress
will be able to review pursuant to INARA any agreement that is
hereafter reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran,
irrespective of the level of formality or politically or legally
binding nature of such agreement, to include any agreement providing
for return to compliance with the JCPOA, as well as any agreement that
amends, augments, or supersedes the JCPOA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) and to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its
transmission requirement.
Question. Do you agree that INARA requires the President to ``keep
the appropriate congressional committees and leadership fully and
currently informed of any initiative or negotiations with Iran relating
to Iran's nuclear program, including any new or amended agreement''?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under INARA.
Question. Are you personally committed to keeping the appropriate
congressional committees and leadership fully and currently informed of
any initiative or negotiations with Iran relating to Iran's nuclear
program, including any new or amended agreement?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with Congress on
any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called for under
INARA.
Question. Do you agree that INARA requires the President to submit
a report to Congress not less frequently than every 180 calendar days
``on Iran's nuclear program and the compliance of Iran with the [JCPOA]
during the period covered by the report''?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including its reporting requirements.
Question. Do you agree that INARA requires the President to make a
determination and certification to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership not less than every 90 calendar days
regarding Iran's compliance with the JCPOA?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including the requirement to determine whether to make
the certification called for in Section 135(d)(6).
Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, INARA
will require the President to submit a report to Congress not less
frequently than every 180 calendar days ``on Iran's nuclear program and
the compliance of Iran with [each such new agreement] during the period
covered by the report''?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including its semi-annual reporting requirements.
Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, INARA
will require the President to make a determination and certification to
the appropriate congressional committees and leadership not less than
every 90 calendar days regarding Iran's compliance with each such new
agreement?
Answer. I am aware of reporting and certification requirements of
the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am
committed to fully consulting with Congress on any agreement relating
to Iran's nuclear program, as called for under INARA, and to ensuring
the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including the requirement to
determine whether to make the certification called for in Section
135(d)(6).
Question. Do you agree that the Biden administration will be
required under INARA to resume submitting reports and certifications to
Congress that are mandated under INARA should the administration
announce that the United States has returned to the JCPOA, or is
returning to the JCPOA?
Answer. I am aware of the reporting and certification requirements
of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am
committed to fully consulting with Congress on any agreement relating
to Iran's nuclear program, as called for under INARA, and to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its reporting
requirements.
Question. If you agree that the Biden administration will be
required under INARA to resume submitting such reports and
certifications to Congress should it announce that the United States
has returned to the JCPOA, or is returning to the JCPOA, on what date
will the first such report be due, and on what date will the first such
certification be due? If you are not able at this time to specify the
dates on which such reports and certifications will be due, please
specify the method or formula you will use to calculate the respective
due dates.
Answer. I am aware of the reporting and certification requirements
of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The United States has
not announced it has returned to the JCPOA, and I am not able to
specify dates for potential future reporting requirements. If
confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with Congress on any
agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program, as called for under
INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA are satisfied,
including meeting its reporting requirements in a timely manner.
Question. Can you assure the committee that there are no
circumstances under which the Biden administration will not abide by
the understandings about compliance with INARA spelled out in your
responses to the foregoing questions?
Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is
committed to implementing the requirements of the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. Do you agree that U.S. policy in the region is best
advanced when working closely with our ally Israel?
Answer. President Biden has been one of Israel's strongest
supporters over the last fifty years. The U.S.-Israel relationship is
deeply personal to him and he has met and worked closely with every
Israeli Prime Minister since Golda Meir. The President believes the
ties between our two countries, rooted in strategic interests and
shared values, should transcend domestic politics. In this vein, his
administration will not only further strengthen the U.S.-Israel
relationship, but also ensure that it enjoys bipartisan backing. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's goals to work closely
with Israel, to include building on normalization agreements to
strengthen cooperation between Israel and its neighbors.
Question. Do you believe Israel is and should always remain a
Jewish State?
Answer. President Biden supports Israel's future as a Jewish and
democratic state. He continues to believe the two-state solution is the
best way to ensure that Israel remains both Jewish and democratic. If
confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's efforts to
restore credible U.S. engagement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and look for opportunities for the type of diplomatic progress that can
protect Israel's long-term security.
Question. Do you agree with United States policy (and law) that
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel?
Answer. This administration recognizes that Jerusalem is central to
the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians. Jerusalem is
the capital of Israel and its ultimate status is a final status issue,
which will need to be resolved by the parties in the context of direct
negotiations. The administration will handle all issues related to
Jerusalem with the care and sensitivity that they deserve.
Question. Do you agree the United States Embassy in Israel should
remain in Jerusalem?
Answer. The U.S. position is that our embassy will remain in
Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel's capital. The ultimate status
of Jerusalem is a final status issue, which will need to be resolved by
the parties in the context of direct negotiations.
Question. Do you support full funding for United States security
assistance to Israel as laid out in the current 10-year Memorandum of
Understanding?
Answer. President Biden's commitment to Israel's security is
ironclad. As you know, the President played an important role in
helping to negotiate the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on
security assistance, among the largest aid packages in U.S. history. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's pledge to preserve the
terms of the MOU without reservation.
Question. The MOU is a comprehensive agreement that outlined the
terms and conditions of this assistance to Israel. If confirmed, will
you oppose efforts to impose additional conditions or restrictions on
this aid?
Answer. The administration will continue to uphold President
Biden's strong commitment to Israel and its security. If confirmed, I
will advance the administration's position that we oppose efforts to
place additional conditions on U.S. military assistance to Israel.
Question. Do you support the United States' commitment to Israel's
Qualitative Military Edge?
Answer. The United States is required by law to help preserve
Israel's Qualitative Military Edge in the Middle East. If confirmed, I
will champion President Biden's priorities related to Israel's
security, including our commitment to maintain Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge.
Question. If confirmed, will you make ensuring Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge is maintained a priority?
Answer. President Biden's commitment to Israel's security is
inviolable. If confirmed, I will support the administration's objective
to continue U.S. military assistance to Israel and uphold Israel's
Qualitative Military Edge, which is critical to ensuring Israel has the
means to defend itself.
Question. Do you agree that the only way to reach a lasting
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is through direct,
bilateral negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians rather than
one imposed by outside actors?
Answer. The United States is working toward a more peaceful,
secure, and prosperous future for the people of the Middle East. As
part of this, the United States seeks to advance the possibility of
achieving a negotiated two-state solution, in which Israel lives in
peace and security alongside a viable Palestinian state. If confirmed,
I will support direct negotiations between the two parties to advance
this goal. I will also support the administration's goals of working
closely with Israel, engaging the Palestinians, and consulting with
partners in the region who have a common interest in supporting efforts
to advance lasting peace.
Question. Israel constantly faces terrorist attacks and threats--
including rocket attacks by Hamas in Gaza and attacks from Iranian-
backed groups in Lebanon and Syria. Do you fully support Israel's right
to defend itself from terrorist attacks, including taking pre-emptive
action to disrupt weapons shipments from Iran to its terrorist proxies?
Answer. President Biden's commitment to Israel's security is a key
foreign policy tenet. The administration will continue U.S. military
assistance to Israel and uphold Israel's Qualitative Military Edge,
which is critical to ensuring Israel has the means to defend itself.
The administration will take action, in coordination with our allies
and partners, to both deter and counter Iran's destabilizing
activities. There should be no doubt that the President has Israel's
back. If confirmed, I will support the administration's goals regarding
Israel's security.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to counter the
global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) campaign against Israel?
Will you work to expand Israel's inclusion in the international
community and ensure our ally is treated as a normal nation?
Answer. President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and I firmly oppose the
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. This
movement unfairly singles out Israel and too often veers into anti-
Semitism. While the Biden-Harris administration will respect the
American people's First Amendment rights, it will not hesitate to voice
our disapproval of the BDS campaign or to fight efforts to delegitimize
Israel on the world stage. The administration will work tirelessly to
support Israel's further integration into the international community.
Question. The International Criminal Court over the last several
years has taken actions potentially leading to the prosecution of
American and Israeli nationals despite neither country being a member
to the court. If confirmed, will you oppose and work to prevent ICC
prosecutions of Americans or Israelis?
Answer. The United States shares the goals of the ICC in promoting
accountability, respect for human rights, and justice for victims of
atrocities. However, the United States has always objected to any
attempt by the ICC to investigate U.S. personnel, as the United States
is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. If confirmed, I will work to
protect U.S. personnel from legal jeopardy before the ICC. I share the
administration's serious concerns about the ICC's attempts to exercise
jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. Israel is not a State Party, and
Palestine is not a State.
Question. Hezbollah's arsenal, particularly its precision guided
munitions (PGM), represents a clear threat to U.S. and allied forces
across the Middle East. If confirmed, what specific actions will you
recommend the U.S. take to address the PGM threat from Hezbollah?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States uses
all the tools at its disposal to push back on Hezbollah's terrorist and
illicit activities. Hezbollah's actions threaten regional stability, as
well as Lebanon's security, stability, and sovereignty. Hezbollah's
actions demonstrate it is more interested in advancing its own
interests than those of the Lebanese people. If confirmed, I will also
consult closely with Israel on how to address threats to regional
security and stability.
Question. What actions will you take to press all our European
allies and the United Nations to designate Hezbollah in its entirety as
a terrorist entity?
Answer. Hezbollah has been designated by the State Department as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997 and a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist since 2001. The Department remains concerned about
Hezbollah's terrorist and illicit activities around the world and its
destabilizing actions in Lebanon. If confirmed, I will continue to
advance our long-standing diplomatic efforts to press countries and the
European Union to fully designate, ban, or restrict Hezbollah from
operating in their territory. Thirteen governments around the world,
including in Europe, took significant domestic action along these lines
against Hezbollah in recent years. The administration will encourage
others to follow suit.
Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the U.S.
continues support for the Kurds of Syria during the Biden
administration?
Answer. I am committed to supporting our local partners, the Syrian
Democratic Forces. They cannot continue to root out ISIS terrorists or
guard the tens of thousands of ISIS detainees and families who are
still in their custody without U.S. support. If confirmed, I will also
support renewed U.S. efforts to stabilize areas of northeast Syria
liberated from ISIS, to include an ongoing Syrian Intra-Kurdish
Dialogue, which aims to de-escalate tensions with the Syrian opposition
and advance more inclusive governance in northeast Syria.
Question. In a July 2020 piece in Foreign Policy titled ``The Total
Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under Trump'', you criticized the
Trump administration for having ``made no effort to find areas of
cooperation with China, such as climate change.'' Should cooperation or
competition be the dominant U.S. policy approach to Beijing?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, ``our relationship with
China will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can
be, and adversarial when it must be. The common denominator is the need
to engage China from a position of strength.'' China has been growing
more authoritarian at home and more assertive abroad. Beijing is now
challenging our security, prosperity, and values in significant ways
that require a new U.S. approach. If confirmed, I will be committed to
meeting this challenge.
Question. If you seek to cooperate with the PRC, do you believe
that the Chinese Communist Party will cooperate in good-faith?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration approaches China through
the lens of strategic competition and recognizes there are adversarial
and cooperative aspects to the U.S.-China relationship. The
administration is willing to test whether China is willing to play a
constructive role on certain issues but will be clear-eyed about
China's intentions. China's failure to act consistently with its
international obligations and commitments will significantly factor
into how the U.S. approaches China on issues where our interests may
align. If confirmed, I will keep these past shortcomings in mind in
future dealings with Beijing and will consult with Congress on any
potential areas of cooperation.
Question. Can you name bilateral agreements between the United
States and the PRC that Beijing has honored in full and without later
reneging? How do you plan to ensure that Beijing fulfills its part of
any agreement on climate change given its long record of broken
promises?
Answer. China poses the most significant challenge of any nation-
state to the interests of the American people. The Biden-Harris
administration is committed to working closely with our allies and
partners to press China to act more constructively. If confirmed, I
will be unflinching in our diplomacy with China on climate change.
Given Beijing's track record of failing to honor its international
obligations, the United States will keep eyes wide open and not limit
its options in addressing the China challenge just because Beijing
makes offers of cooperation. The administration will judge Beijing by
its actions, not its words.
Question. Does China have more or fewer coal-fired power plants
today than in 2016?
Answer. China has more coal-fired power plants now than it did in
2016. China currently has approximately 1,005 gigawatts (GW) of
installed coal power generation capacity, which is roughly half of the
world's total. According to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean
Air, China also accounts for 41 percent of planned coal-power
construction, approximately 200 GW over the next five to ten years.
Although China has made efforts to decommission old coal plants and
curtail future builds, it has continued to expand its coal-fired power
fleet and added a net 36.8 GW and 29.8 GW of coal-fired generation
capacity in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Media report that, in 2020,
alone China built more than three times the amount built elsewhere
around the world.
Question. If confirmed, how will the State Department, under your
leadership, push for international transparency and accountability to
ensure we learn what caused the COVID-19 pandemic and how to prevent
the next pandemic?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration recognizes COVID-19 is a
global challenge that requires a global response and will engage
globally to respond to and recover from COVID-19, as well as to prepare
for the next threat. The administration will work with allies and
partners to strengthen and reform the WHO, push for a transparent
investigation into the emergence and spread of COVID-19 to better
prepare for future outbreaks, and support multilateral efforts to end
the COVID-19 pandemic. The commitment to combat COVID-19, promote
public health, and advance global health security, as embodied in
National Security Memorandum-1, will save lives, foster economic
recovery, and build better resilience against future biological
threats.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit that the State Department
will follow up on the Department's January 2021 disclosure of new
information on activities at the Wuhan Institute of Virology? Will you
commit to sharing with Congress--and with the public as appropriate--
further details on the disclosures including the names of the Wuhan
Institute of Virology researchers who were sick in the fall of 2019?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has made clear it supports
a robust and transparent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19
pandemic. An impartial public health investigation into the origins and
early spread of any novel outbreak is vital to protecting against
future health security threats. The administration will review all
information available to us about the origins of SARS-COV-2. It is
imperative to have transparency on the early events of the pandemic and
determine how COVID-19 spread, so future emergence events with pandemic
potential can be averted. If confirmed, I commit to follow up--with
Congress and with the public--on disclosures of new information and
relevant diplomatic reporting.
Question. If confirmed, will you support the suspension of U.S.
funding to research institutions in China engaged in virological
studies, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology and all branches of
the PRC Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and discontinue all
joint research projects involving Chinese scientists and U.S.
scientists that receive funding from the U.S. taxpayers so long as none
of this impacts U.S. national security, until PRC authorities allow a
credible and unfettered international investigation into the origin of
SARS-COV-2?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing the current
policy and funding priorities for any programs the Department may have
for joint research projects with China.
Question. On April 3, 2020, you signed a statement entitled
``Saving Lives in America, China, and Around the World,'' which read in
part: ``No effort against the coronavirus--whether to save American
lives at home or combat the disease abroad--will be successful without
some degree of cooperation between the United States and China. China's
factories can make the protective gear and medicines needed to fight
the virus; its medical personnel can share their valuable clinical
experience in treating it; and its scientists can work with ours to
develop the vaccine urgently needed to vanquish it.'' Do you still
believe today that the same regime that infected the world with this
deadly virus, and then lied to cover it up, can really be part of the
solution?
Answer. Promoting global health is in China's interests as well as
ours. It is not a favor to be bargained for, but a challenge best
addressed with China's cooperation. The Biden-Harris administration
will test whether China is willing to play a constructive role on
certain issues where we may share interests, such as global health, but
will be clear-eyed about Chinese intentions. The administration will
not trade off U.S. core interests or values in discussions with China
or any other country.
Question. How would you characterize the nature of the Chinese
Communist Party? Do you believe their worldview and value system are
compatible with our own?
Answer. The Chinese Communist Party is illiberal, authoritarian,
and increasingly aggressive. Under the Biden-Harris administration, the
United States will advance an alternative world view that promotes
democratic governance and transparency.
Question. What are the ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party?
Are they purely domestic in scope? Regional? Global? If global, how do
they challenge U.S. interests?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) seeks to expand its
domestic, regional, and global influence and drive wedges between the
United States and our partners and allies. The PRC's coercive economic
activity and aggressive acquisition of critical technologies through
licit and illicit means--coupled with a corresponding expansion of its
military footprint and collection capabilities--seek to expand Chinese
influence around the globe. These actions pose a threat to U.S.
interests and undermine our own military, diplomatic, and economic
influence. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of Defense,
other national security agencies, and Congress to address this
challenge.
Question. In what areas do you think the United States should try
to frustrate the CCP's ambitions and undermine the party's ability to
achieve their international ambitions?
Answer. The United States is committed to working with our allies
and partners to counter China's malign actions around the world. The
U.S. should engage in international institutions and make the necessary
investments in our military to ensure we can deter any aggression.
Economically, we can and must out-compete China, including by
preventing U.S. intellectual property and technology from being used in
ways that could undermine our competitiveness and security. If
confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and partners to confront
the challenges posed by China from a position of strength.
Question. Do you believe that the Chinese Communist Party's united
front and intelligence activities inside the borders of the United
States, as well as inside the borders of our allies and partners,
challenge the integrity of our policymaking? Why?
Answer. It is important that we bring greater transparency to bear
on malign People's Republic of China influence activities in the United
States. China's use of information operations and other coercive and
corrupting efforts to undermine and interfere in democracies poses a
threat to the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed,
I will push back on Beijing's attempts to write the rules of the
information age by working with allies and likeminded partners to
support an affirmative, democratic vision for the global information
space, while building resilience against these threats and exposing
China's malign activity. Further, if confirmed, I will also work to
educate important U.S. constituencies, including state and local
governments, on these threats.
Question. Do you agree that the goal of the Chinese Communist Party
is not merely to make China stronger and more developed, but rather for
China to ultimately supplant the United States as the world's dominant
economic, political, and military power?
Answer. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intends for the People's
Republic of China, which is growing increasingly illiberal,
authoritarian, and aggressive, to become a dominant world power. Its
values are often at odds with our own. The administration is committed
to working with our partners and allies to address the challenges the
CCP poses to democratic values from a position of strength. The
Department will communicate this clearly and directly in our public
diplomacy efforts. The Department will confront the CCP's growing
authoritarianism and escalating efforts to divide and manipulate others
and write the rules of the information age. It will work with allies
and partners to define an affirmative, democratic vision for the world.
Question. Is Xi Jinping's ``Community of Common Destiny for
Humanity'' compatible with your views of the international order and
the ways in which countries conduct diplomacy? If not, why not?
Answer. China seeks to make America and its allies more dependent
on China and erode the international system that has provided peace and
stability since the end of World War II. Xi's ``Community of Common
Destiny for Humanity'' policy framework is no exception. If confirmed,
I will prioritize renewed engagement with our allies and partners. I
will rally their support to push back against China, including its
attempts to reshape the international order and assert a set of values
inconsistent with our own.
Question. How would you assess the United States' policy of
engagement with Beijing from 1979 to 2017? In retrospect, did that
policy effectively protect and advance of our most vital national
interests? Do you support a return to that policy?
Answer. The strategic environment has changed significantly in
recent years, as has China itself. While there was once a broad
consensus that economic liberalization in China would lead to political
liberalization, that has not happened. China has grown more
authoritarian at home and more assertive abroad. The CCP is illiberal,
authoritarian, and intends for China to become a dominant world power.
Beijing is working across the spectrum to compete with and challenge
the United States. This necessitates a new U.S. approach. If confirmed,
I will commit to addressing China from a position of strength in
coordination with allies and partners.
Question. Please explain how you believe the United States should
act to defend our national interests when challenged by the Chinese
authorities, even if our allies and partners are reluctant to join us.
Answer. The most effective way to defend our national interests
when challenged by Chinese authorities is to build positions of
strength with U.S. allies and partners. On its own, the United States
represents about a quarter of global GDP. When we join with fellow
democracies that share more than doubles. China cannot afford to ignore
more than half the global economy.
When it is in the United States' interest to act on our own, we
will do so. It is essential to confront directly China's economic
abuses, defend our values, and protect the long-term prosperity and
security of the United States.
Question. While multilateral efforts are preferable, do you support
unilateral action to counter China's malign activities if diplomatic
efforts to secure multilateral action should fail?
Answer. The challenges that China poses to our security,
prosperity, and values, and how we conduct this competition in
coordination with our allies and partners, will be crucial for defining
the 21st century. PRC actions hurt American workers, blunt our
technological edge, threaten our alliances, and undermine international
organizations. If confirmed, I will work with partners and allies to
counter Beijing's aggressive and coercive actions, sustain our military
and economic advantages, and defend our democratic values from a
position of strength. However, when it is in the United States'
interest to act on our own, we should do so.
Question. If confirmed, in future dialogue with Beijing, will you
press for meaningful progress as a precondition for further rounds of
dialogue? Do you commit to supporting the administration and Secretary
in raising issues that Beijing deems ``sensitive''--such as human
rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and the Uyghurs--regardless of
whether doing so may affect the CCP's willingness to engage in further
dialogue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will stand up for our values when human
rights are being abused in Xinjiang and Tibet--or elsewhere in China--
or when autonomy is being assaulted in Hong Kong. The administration is
willing to test whether the Chinese Government is willing to play a
constructive role on certain issues but will be clear-eyed about U.S.
interests. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) failure to uphold its
international commitments will significantly factor into how we develop
our approach to the PRC. If confirmed, I will keep these past
shortcomings in mind in future dealings with Beijing. The Biden-Harris
administration will put our democratic values at the center of our
foreign policy and stand up for democracy, human rights, and human
dignity.
Question. Do you support the Trump administration's designation of
the National Association for China's Peaceful Unification as a foreign
mission of the PRC? What steps will you take to ensure other such front
organizations are properly designated, and to inform relevant
stakeholders within the U.S.--including state and local governments,
universities, and business associations--of the nature and mission of
such front organizations?
Answer. China's use of coercive and corrupting tools of influence
to undermine and interfere in democracies is a concern for the United
States and our allies and partners around the world. The Biden-Harris
administration will take action to counter this malign Chinese
influence, including by increasing transparency and accountability. The
administration will work with our allies and likeminded partners to
build resilience against these threats, to expose China's malign
activity and, when appropriate, to impose costs. The administration
will also work with important U.S. constituencies, including state and
local governments and academic institutions, to address these threats.
Question. Do you support the Trump administration's reciprocity
requirements that PRC diplomats report certain categories of meetings
to the U.S. Government, including meetings with educational
institutions and Chinese community groups?
Answer. The United States seeks for our diplomats in China the same
open access PRC officials enjoy in the United States. For years,
Beijing has systematically obstructed access by U.S. officials. The
administration will use all the tools at our disposal to achieve
reciprocal access for our diplomats in China.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that human rights
concerns are integrated in every senior bilateral engagement, and that
specific prisoner cases are raised at the highest levels, both publicly
and privately, with the PRC?
Answer. If confirmed, I will put our democratic values at the
center of our foreign policy and stand up for democracy, human rights,
and human dignity. Effective diplomacy on human rights issues requires
not only general statements but also targeted engagement on specific
cases. If confirmed, I will integrate advocacy on specific cases into
our human rights diplomacy.
Question. Do you see the link between China's pervasive, egregious
human rights abuses and its failure on so many other fronts to be a
responsible global actor?
Answer. The People's Republic of China seeks international
acceptance of its authoritarian alternative to the rules-based
international system that has been the mainstay of global security and
prosperity over the course of decades. At the same time, Beijing denies
or obfuscates that it has an alarming record of violations and abuses
of international human rights. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department to challenge authoritarian governance and stand up for the
human rights of all individuals, including by calling on PRC
authorities to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms consistent
with China's international obligations and commitments.
Question. In December 2018, Chinese authorities detained Pastor
Wang Yi of the Autumn Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu, and one year
later, sentenced him to nine years in prison for refusing to accept the
CCP controls of his congregation described above. If confirmed, will
you agree to raise Pastor Wang's case with leaders in Beijing and
advocate for his immediate and unconditional release until they do so?
Answer. I share your concerns regarding the deterioration of
freedom of religion and belief in the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Religious leaders are at particular risk of PRC repression and are
pressured to join state-run religious organizations, as we have seen in
the cases of Buddhist lamas, Muslim imams, Protestant pastors, and
Catholic bishops and priests. Pastor Wang Yi is no exception and, if
confirmed, I will continue the Department's advocacy for his release.
Effective diplomatic engagement on human rights issues requires not
only general statements but also engagement on specific cases. If
confirmed, I will advocate on specific human rights cases.
Question. Former Secretary of State Pompeo rightly determined that
the People's Republic of China is committing genocide and crimes
against humanity in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and other Muslim
minorities. Secretary Blinken agreed with this determination. Do you
concur with former Secretary Pompeo and Secretary Blinken?
Answer. Yes. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has committed
crimes against humanity and genocide in Xinjiang. Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups have suffered unspeakable oppression at the hands of
China's authoritarian government. The PRC is engaged in atrocities that
shock the conscience and must be met with serious consequences. If
confirmed, I will speak out consistently with allies and partners to
condemn these atrocities, and I will consider all appropriate tools to
promote accountability for those responsible and to deter future
abuses.
Question. If confirmed, will you work toward getting like-minded
countries to join the United States in a genocide determination?
Answer. Secretary Blinken said in his judgment that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) has committed genocide against Uyghurs, and I
agree. The PRC also has committed crimes against humanity in Xinjiang
against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other
ethnic and religious minority groups, including imprisonment, torture,
enforced sterilization, and persecution. The associated abuses in
Xinjiang are particularly devastating to ethnic minority women and
girls. These atrocities shock the conscience and must be met with
serious consequences. If confirmed, I will speak out consistently and
jointly with allies and partners to condemn these atrocities and will
consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those
responsible and deter future abuses.
Question. Will you endorse the Rubio-McGovern Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act to prevent Beijing from profiting from its abuse of
Uyghur and other persecuted groups' labor?
Answer. While I cannot comment on pending legislation, I can
confirm that the Biden-Harris administration stands against forced
labor and abuses targeting Uyghurs and other minority groups carried
out by the People's Republic of China (PRC). If confirmed, I will work
with international partners to promote accountability for the PRC's
atrocities in Xinjiang, press for the immediate and unconditional
release of all those arbitrarily detained, the abolition of the
internment camps and an end to forced labor, as well as the cessation
of all other human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China. In
addition, if confirmed, I will support efforts across the government to
limit the profits China gains from forced labor.
Question. Do you believe that the National Liberation Army (ELN) is
a terrorist organization?
Answer. The National Liberation Army (ELN) is designated as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.
Question. Do you believe that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) is a terrorist organization?
Answer. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is designated as
a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.
Question. Cuba harbors terrorists groups like the ELN. Do you
support keeping Cuba on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has committed to carefully
reviewing decisions made in the prior administration, including the
decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The
administration will also carefully review policy related to Cuba and
will provide further information at the appropriate time. The
administration does not discuss deliberations or potential
deliberations regarding designations.
Question. The Cuban regime denies the Cuban people essential
liberties such as free association, expression, belief, and access to
information. How would you characterize the Cuban regime's human rights
record?
Answer. Cuba has a poor human rights record. The Cuban Government
has increased its practice of arbitrary arrest and harassment of human
rights defenders, journalists, and anyone who criticizes the
Government. If confirmed, I will follow through on the Biden-Harris
administration's promise to ensure that democracy and human rights
remain at the core of our policy efforts toward Cuba. The
administration will engage directly with a large swath of Cuban civil
society, with the goal of empowering the Cuban people to determine
their own future. The administration will also engage directly the
Cuban Government to denounce abuses and push for reform.
Question. The Cuban military plays a large role in controlling the
flow of money in the Cuban economy. They use this control to support
the Cuban Communist Party and ensure regime survival. Do you support
restricting financial transactions with the Cuban military as a way to
promote freedom in Cuba?
Answer. The Cuban people face great hardship as they deal with the
pandemic, economic upheaval caused by the country's recent monetary
measures, and decades of living under an oppressive government that has
failed to responsibly manage Cuba's economy. The administration has
committed to carefully reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, including our
posture regarding economic sanctions on Cuba, to ensure they advance
the administration's goal of empowering the Cuban people to determine
their future. If confirmed, I will support the Department's review of
the policy with an eye toward assessing its impact on the political and
economic well-being of the Cuban people, and I look forward to
consulting with Congress on this issue.
Question. Do you agree that Americans should be compensated for
property that was confiscated by the Castro regime?
Answer. Many Americans waited decades for compensation due to the
Cuban Government's confiscation of their or their family's property.
The Department will explore the best ways to support claimants and
resolve outstanding claims. The administration committed to carefully
reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, including the best way to advance U.S.
nationals' claims against the Cuban Government. The administration
recognizes the varied views in Congress, and if confirmed, I look
forward to consulting with Congress in developing a path forward.
Question. Do you agree with Secretary Pompeo's decision to no
longer exercise the suspension authority in the LIBERTAD Act, which
allows Americans to sue in U.S. courts, companies trafficking in their
stolen properties?
Answer. The administration has committed to carefully reviewing
U.S.-Cuba policy, including U.S. posture regarding the suspension
authority in Title III of the LIBERTAD Act. I understand that the
administration is exploring ways to best support U.S. nationals'
claims. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on
this issue.
Question. Do you agree we should maintain strong sanctions against
Cuba and Venezuela as the Cuban regime provides intelligence and other
vital support to the Maduro regime in Caracas in exchange for
subsidized or free oil?
Answer. The United States should maintain strong sanctions
targeting the illegitimate Maduro regime and its enablers, including
those complicit in human rights abuses and corruptly siphoning wealth
and resources from the Venezuelan people. The administration is also
committed to taking all appropriate steps to prevent our sanctions from
impacting humanitarian access and delivery.
Question. Do you support Interim President Juan Guaido in the
pursuit of the restoration of democracy in Venezuela?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration continues to recognize Juan
Guaido as the interim President of Venezuela. If confirmed, I will
press for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela through holding of
free and fair elections.
Question. Do you support democracy assistance to the Cuban people
to promote democracy, civil society and human rights in Cuba pursuant
to U.S. law?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will follow through on the Biden-
Harris administration's promise to ensure that the advancement of
democracy and human rights remains at the core of our policy efforts
toward Cuba. The Biden-Harris administration will engage directly with
a large swath of Cuban civil society, with the goal of empowering the
Cuban people to determine their own future. The administration will
also engage with the Cuban Government to denounce abuses and push for
reform. I am committed to consulting closely with Congress about Cuba
policy, if confirmed.
Question. The Helms amendment states, ``No foreign assistance funds
may be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of
family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice
abortions.'' If confirmed, can you guarantee there will be a strict
adherence to the Helms amendment in the administration of U.S. foreign
assistance?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take the Helms Amendment and other
legislative restrictions, including other restrictions related to
abortion, very seriously and will work with partners to ensure
compliance.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. March 15 will mark the 10th anniversary of the brutal
crackdown by Syrian president Bashar al-Assad against peaceful
protestors, resulting in a violent and protracted civil war. I am
concerned that U.S. actions in Syria in the last four years have not
reflected a robust decision-making process focused on supporting our
allies and countering malign actors. Having visited our Kurdish
partners in 2018, I have seen first-hand the value of an engaged U.S.
policy on Syria. What actions are available for the United States to
take now to improve the outcome in Syria?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration's policy goals in Syria
include achieving a comprehensive political resolution under the
parameters of UNSCR 2254, ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, and
promoting the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid to Syrians in
need. The administration will use a variety of tools, across a
coordinated whole-of-government approach, to push for a sustainable end
to the Syrian people's suffering. Any political settlement must address
the factors that drive violence and instability in Syria. Additionally,
the humanitarian situation is dire. If confirmed, I will work within
the administration to do more to aid vulnerable Syrians displaced
within Syria, as well as refugees who fled abroad.
Question. How should the U.S. balance Turkey, the Kurds and Russia
in responding to the situation in Northeastern Syria?
Answer. Preventing an ISIS resurgence in Iraq and Syria demands
revitalized U.S. engagement. The administration is committed to
supporting our local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The
United States has shared interests with Turkey in countering terrorism
and ending the conflict in Syria and understands Turkey's concerns
about U.S. cooperation with the People's Protection Units (YPG) as part
of the SDF in the Defeat-ISIS campaign, which we will continue to
address. The administration will continue to consult with Turkey on
Syria as it seeks areas for cooperation. The United States has always
been open to dialogue with Russia on Syria, as long as the dialogue
contributes to protecting civilians and to credibly moving forward on a
political resolution to the conflict.
Question. I was pleased to see the Biden administration
implementing a sanctions regime against those responsible for the
poisoning of Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny and the
continued construction on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. On Nord Stream 2,
what next steps should the administration take to stop the Nord Stream
2 pipeline?
Answer. The administration believes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a
bad deal and a threat to European energy security, including Ukraine
and other vulnerable partners. The administration welcomes Congress's
interest and appreciates Congressional efforts to provide the tools
needed to combat Russian aggressive actions. In a February 19 report to
Congress, the Department identified Russia-based KVT-RUS as an entity
knowingly selling, leasing, or providing the vessel FORTUNA for the
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, as required by
PEESA, as amended. I understand that the Department will continue to
inform companies about the risks of doing business with Nord Stream 2
and use all available tools to examine entities potentially involved in
sanctionable activity, as outlined by CAATSA and PEESA, as amended. It
will also continue its diplomatic engagement with key European partners
and allies to outline our serious concerns regarding the project's
geopolitical implications for Europe's energy security.
Question. How do you view the timeline for the administration to
act to stop the pipeline? Is there a point after which our options to
stop the pipeline are limited?
Answer. The administration's efforts to date aimed at stopping the
pipeline, aided by the authorities granted by Congress, have
significantly slowed the pipeline's pace of construction. It is of the
utmost importance to maintain this high level of engagement and
diplomatic pressure to prevent the pipeline's completion. If confirmed,
I will ensure the Department of State maintains this high level of
engagement and diplomatic pressure.
Question. What should next steps for broad, coherent U.S. policy
response to Russian aggression look like? How are the Navalny sanctions
part of a wider strategy to respond to and deter Russia?
Answer. President Biden has made clear that the United States will
act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to actions
by Russia that harm us or our allies. On March 2, the administration
took action to impose costs on the Russian Federation for the
poisoning, arrest, and imprisonment of Aleksey Navalny. The United
States will continue to take action to counter Russia's malign actions
and will comply with the legal obligations to impose a second round of
sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991. As the administration works to advance U.S.
interests, it will continue to hold Russia accountable for its
destabilizing activity, disregard for international law, including its
repeated use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and human rights violations.
Question. What additional legal tools does the administration need
to stop this pipeline?
Answer. I appreciate Congressional support to stop this pipeline.
The administration has a number of sanctions tools at its disposal to
stop Nord Stream 2, including the Protecting Europe's Energy Security
Act (PEESA), as amended, Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA). As you know, PEESA and CAATSA Section 232 provide more
specific tools targeting Russian energy export pipelines, which can be
supplemented by IEEPA if needed. If confirmed, I will continue to work
with the ample tools Congress has already provided. I will also work to
maintain the high level of engagement with companies and diplomatic
pressure to bring an end to the pipeline's construction.
Question. How can the administration better amplify the concerns of
our central and eastern European allies to persuade Danish and German
authorities to stop the pipeline?
Answer. The administration has made clear to Germany and other
European partners that Nord Stream 2 is not just a commercial deal. It
views this project as a threat not only to Europe's energy security but
also to strategic stability on the continent. The German and Danish
authorities are aware of the U.S. position from frequent and high-level
interaction and statements, and the administration will continue all
such efforts. The United States will also continue to work with our
allies and partners, including Germany, Denmark, Ukraine, Poland, and
the Baltic states, to ensure Europe has a reliable, diversified energy
supply that does not undermine collective security.
Question. From the administration's point of view, what aspects of
the pipeline's construction are the most vulnerable to targeted
sanctions that could stop the project?
Answer. To date, targeted outreach to Western insurers and
certification, engineering, and construction firms, including companies
providing pipe-laying vessels, have significantly affected the rate of
the pipeline's construction with many entities winding down their
operations and untold more refusing to engage with Nord Stream 2 AG
given the risk of sanctions. The administration will continue to be
clear that companies risk sanctions if they involve themselves in Nord
Stream 2 construction and will continue to monitor companies involved
in potentially sanctionable activities.
Question. Georgia has been on a dangerous backslide away from
democracy for several years now. Recent developments, including the
arrest and detention of Russian opposition leader Nika Melia, threats
to further destabilize Georgia and the region. What policy responses
are available to the United States? How should the U.S. work with
European allies to develop an international consensus on Georgia?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Georgian
people's choice to pursue closer ties with the EU and NATO and, as
Congress has done, voice strong U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty
and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized
borders. In its messaging of support for Georgia's future in the
context of recent developments, the Department has emphasized the
importance of Georgian leaders and politicians modeling the values and
norms of the Euro-Atlantic community they aspire to join. If confirmed,
I look forward to working with Congress and European allies to help
identify opportunities to support Georgia's democratic development,
including reforms to foster judicial independence and a level electoral
playing field, as well as anticorruption and pro-business reforms. U.S.
assistance directly supports these goals. I am committed to ensuring
U.S. assistance to Georgia advances U.S. policy objectives.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Rob Portman
Question. Last week I sent a letter cosigned by the other GOP
ranking members of national security committees to provide our vision
for a successful renegotiation with Iran over its nuclear program and
its regional aggression. As you are probably aware, I was a vocal
critic of the previous JCPOA and I believe that the Biden
administration has a rare opportunity to fix the fatal flaws of the
previous agreement.
Specifically, my colleagues and I would like to see that the
nuclear issue and Tehran's regional aggression be addressed together.
Iran remains the number one state sponsor of terror, and it would be a
critical mistake to separate the two issues. Additionally, there should
be no financial relief for Iran to meet their pre-conditions for
diplomatic talks. This is a mistake that is often repeated time and
again, not just in our negotiations with Iran, but with rogue regimes
worldwide.
If confirmed, do you commit to addressing Iran's nuclear program
and regional aggression together in any future diplomatic
negotiations, while opposing any such deal that includes one
without the other? Do you agree to not grant concessions as a
precondition to diplomatic talks?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration agrees that we need to
supplement the JCPOA if we want a deal that is sustainable. There are
several issues the deal did not address, including Iran's ballistic
missile development, proliferation, and destabilizing regional
activities. Iran also remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism,
threatening international security and U.S. forces, diplomatic
personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. The administration
is ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return
to compliance with the JCPOA, and then use it as a platform to
negotiate a longer, stronger nuclear deal, and other critical issues.
Question. Do you agree to not grant concessions as a precondition
to diplomatic talks?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will not make decisions
based on artificial Iranian deadlines. The President made clear he is
committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon, and the
administration believes diplomacy, in coordination with our allies and
regional partners, is the best path to achieve that goal. The
administration is ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a
mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA and then use it as a
platform to negotiate a longer, stronger nuclear deal and other areas
of concern. Iran continues to exceed JCPOA limits on many fronts, so we
are a long way from that point.
Question. Senator Cardin and I worked together to push back against
the politically motivated global boycott, divestment, and sanctions
movement unfairly targeting Israel. These efforts have achieved
widespread bipartisan support in the Senate, and we look forward to
working with your State Department to ensure that Israel is not
unfairly targeted through these efforts.
What is your view on the strategic US/Israel relationship and can
we count on your support to oppose global BDS movements against
Israel?
Answer. President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and I firmly oppose the
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. This
movement unfairly singles out Israel and too often veers into anti-
Semitism. While the Biden-Harris administration will respect the
American people's First Amendment rights, the administration will not
hesitate to voice our disapproval of the BDS campaign or to fight
efforts to delegitimize Israel on the world stage.
Anti-Normalization laws in the Middle East
The Trump administration achieved major breakthroughs in Israel's
relations with the Middle East. Senator Booker and I plan to re-
introduce a bill called ``Strengthening Reporting of Actions Taken
Against the Normalization of Relations with Israel Act'' to capitalize
on this moment. This bill requires the Department of State to report
instances of Arab Government efforts to undermine people-to-people
engagement with Israeli citizens and residents. I believe it is
imperative that the normalization of formal relations between Arab
Governments and Israel is extended down to these countries' citizens.
How crucial is it that instances of anti-normalization laws are
documented publicly, and what further actions can the
administration take to ensure that people are not punished for
engaging with Israeli citizens?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on these efforts to expand the circle
of peace between Israel and its neighbors, urging states and
multilateral organizations with anti-normalization legislation or
decrees to revoke them immediately so that negotiations can commence.
The administration will also closely monitor the status of the existing
agreements to encourage both sides to uphold their commitments to
establish full diplomatic relations.
Question. Here in the Senate we have worked hard to provide the
right framework for Ukrainian Security assistance-I am proud to have
been a principle author of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative,
a program that has provided the Ukrainians billions in military aid and
training. Under the previous administration, we have provided increased
amounts of lethal assistance, and I was glad to see in the NDAA that
$125 million is set aside for lethal assistance-all of this aid is
appropriately tied to continued Ukrainian sector reforms, which I am
glad to see President Zelensky is committed to.
Can I get your commitment to continue the support of robust funding
for USAI while supporting corruption and continued reforms in
Ukraine?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to provide robust
security assistance to Ukraine, including lethal defensive weapons, and
to support continued reforms in Ukraine. The Department will oversee
the execution of $115 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $3
million in International Military Education and Training (IMET), and $6
million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs (NADR) funds that Congress appropriated for Ukraine for FY
2021. Additionally, if confirmed, I will closely coordinate with the
Department of Defense in the execution of $275 million that Congress
appropriated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) in
FY 2021, including the process to certify that the Government of
Ukraine has taken substantial actions to make defense institutional
reforms before the final tranche of $150 million in USAI funding is
released.
Question. For two decades, the Chinese Government has
systematically recruited U.S. researchers and sent Chinese military
researchers to steal U.S. taxpayer-funded research and intellectual
property at U.S. universities and institutes. This has led to the U.S.
taxpayer unwittingly funding the rise of China's military and economy.
This has to stop.
Last Congress, the Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Committee passed Senator Carpers and I's Securing American Innovation
Act. This bipartisan legislation will increase visibility on who is
conducting our federally funded research, their potential conflicts of
interest, and potentially problematic ties with our adversaries. More
importantly, it will provide the State Department the authority to deny
visas to foreign researchers whose problematic affiliations and access
to export-controlled technologies through fundamental research raise
national security concerns. We took a balanced approach with this bill.
We need foreign researchers to work with our researchers here, but we
need to take common-sense steps to prevent bad actors from coming to
the United States.
Do you agree that these new visa authorities are necessary, and how
will they better protect taxpayer-funded research and
intellectual property from foreign adversaries?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department guards against
the transfer of sensitive technology to foreign adversaries. The
Department will implement existing visa ineligibility grounds targeting
this activity. Presidential Proclamation 10043, issued in May 2020,
suspends the entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) nationals to
study or conduct research if the applicant is affiliated with an
identified PRC entity that implements or supports China's military-
civil fusion strategy. The United States continues to welcome
legitimate students and scholars from China and around the world and
promote the United States for international science and technology
talent critical to our research enterprise. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with Congress on reviewing legislation to further
State's work and role in these efforts.
International Criminal Court Mandate
Question. As you are aware, last year the appeals chamber of the
ICC allowed a politically motivated investigation into alleged actions
of US and allied personnel in Afghanistan to move forward. This court
has no jurisdiction over the US as we are not a signatory to the Rome
Statute. I was glad to see that the Trump administration responded with
financial sanctions and the restriction of travel visas for foreign
individuals assisting the ICC in this manner.
However, just last month, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber granted
authorization for an investigation into alleged crimes in the West
Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem to move forward. Like the United States,
Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute. This is not the first
time that the ICC has conducted a politically motivated investigation.
My good friend Senator Cardin and I led a bi-partisan letter on this
issue along with 67 other Senators asking the State Department to push
back on the ICC's decision to prosecute Israel for alleged war crimes
in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza. And this month, we plan to send
to the Biden administration a follow up to that letter asking for a
firmer stance on these politically motivated investigations. Like us,
Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute and in our view this is
harmful to the peace process and again, outside of the ICC's
jurisdiction.
Do you agree that the ICC's expansion of their mandate is
detrimental to prospects of a negotiated settlement between
Israel and the Palestinian authority and what additional
actions can be taken to push back against the expansion of the
ICC's legal mandate?
Answer. I share the administration's serious concerns about the
ICC's attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. Israel
is not a State Party, and Palestine is not a State. A peaceful, secure
and more prosperous future for the people of the Middle East depends on
building bridges and creating new avenues for dialogue and exchange,
not unilateral judicial actions that exacerbate tensions and undercut
efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution.
Question. What steps would you take to protect U.S. service and
allied coalition members from the ICC's jurisdiction?
Answer. I share the concerns and the objection by the United States
to any attempt by the ICC to investigate U.S. personnel, as the United
States is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. If confirmed, I will
work to protect U.S. personnel from legal jeopardy before the ICC. I
also share the administration's serious concerns about the ICC's
attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. We will
continue to uphold our strong commitment to Israel and its security,
including by opposing actions that seek to target Israel unfairly.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. For several months, tens of thousands of farmers have
been camping out on the outskirts of New Delhi, demanding the repeal of
three agricultural laws they say will drive down crop prices and
negatively affect their earnings. Multiple rounds of talks between farm
union leaders and the central government have taken place, but have not
yet resulted in a resolution. As part of its response, Prime Minister
Modi's Government has shut down internet service in several districts,
impeding access to information and compromising protesters' fundamental
right to freedom of expression. It has also arrested activists on
suspicion of sedition for allegedly advocating for support of the
farmer protests. Internet freedom in India continues to decline as the
central government utilizes internet shutdowns to clamp down on
dissent, including for these protests and in the Jammu and Kashmir
region. As Deputy Secretary of State, what steps will you take to
ensure digital access is not obstructed in India?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by the growing use of government-
imposed Internet shutdowns around the world, including in India, which
restrict the rights of individuals online. If confirmed, I will speak
out against this worrying global trend and use bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy, including through U.N. bodies and the Freedom
Online Coalition, to raise our concerns with governments that engage in
this practice, including India. I will emphasize the need to protect
freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive, and
impart information, both online and offline.
Question. Many of those protesting come from the northern Indian
states of Punjab and Haryana, regions with a significant Sikh
population. The Indian Government has labeled some of the farmers and
their supporters as ``anti-national'' and questioned their allegiance
to India. What will you do to encourage the Indian Government to
respect the right to protest for all its citizens?
Answer. The freedoms of expression, association, religion or
belief, and peaceful assembly are universal human rights. If confirmed,
I will use the full array of diplomatic tools to encourage the Indian
Government to respect these human rights.
Question. In 2019, then-Secretary Pompeo announced that the United
States would ``no longer recognize Israeli settlements as per se
inconsistent with international law'' and rescinded a 1978 legal
opinion that then-Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell provided to Congress
reaching a contrary conclusion that said, ``civilian settlements in
those territories is inconsistent with international law.'' This legal
justification was never publicly released or provided to Congress. How
do you view this issue?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration believes that the two-state
solution is the best way to ensure Israel's future as a Jewish and
democratic state and to give the Palestinians the state to which they
are entitled. If confirmed, I will support the administration's focus
on urging both Israel and the Palestinians to avoid unilateral steps,
such as annexation of territory, settlement activity, demolitions,
incitement to violence, and providing compensation for individuals
imprisoned for acts of terrorism, that exacerbate tensions and make it
more difficult to preserve the viability of a two-state solution.
Question. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, would you work to
reverse that decision?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to urge both Israel and the Palestinians to refrain from unilateral
steps that exacerbate tensions and undercut efforts to advance a
negotiated two-state solution, such as annexation of territory,
settlement activity, demolitions, incitement to violence, and providing
compensation for individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism.
Question. If confirmed, would you provide Congress with the Trump
administration's Hansell opinion to include its legal justification for
the decision, and any new decision the Department may reach under
Secretary Blinken?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's focus on
urging both Israel and the Palestinians to avoid unilateral steps that
exacerbate tensions and make it more difficult to preserve the
viability of a two-state solution. This will include engaging Congress
on significant policy matters related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Todd Young
Question. Do you believe the EU's recent commercial agreement with
China is already putting the United States on its back foot when
seeking to bring a unified front?
Answer. It is a demonstration of the amount of work we have before
us to reinvigorate our transatlantic alliance and develop a more
unified response to the challenge posed by China. If confirmed, I will
engage actively with our EU and other European partners on shared
concerns about China. My engagements will include discussions on how to
advance our shared economic interests and counter China's aggressive
and coercive actions, prevent goods made with forced labor from
entering global markets, create a level playing field and promote
private enterprise, and highlight China's failure to uphold its
international commitments.
Ultimately, the onus will be on China to show that its new pledges
on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and subsidies in the new
agreement are not just cheap talk.
Question. Some U.S. partners with whom we will have to cooperate to
best tackle the foreign policy challenges of the coming decades are not
democracies or are illiberal ones. They occupy key positions in the
Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, and we may find ourselves
relying on them more. How do you believe the United States should be
cooperating with the Governments of Vietnam, the Philippines, India, or
our Gulf partners, even as we have concerns about human rights,
democratic values, and good governance?
Answer. As you rightly point out, the United States cannot always
choose the partners it must work with in addressing the most pressing
foreign policy challenges we face. Further, there is not a one-size-
fits-all approach to foreign policy, and no country has a perfect human
rights record. I believe the United States should approach cooperation
on a case-by-case basis, working to advance U.S. interests while also
placing democracy and human rights at the center of U.S. foreign
policy. As President Biden said, ``Diplomacy is back at the center of
our foreign policy.'' The United States must repair our alliances and
engage with the world once again to meet accelerating global
challenges--from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear
proliferation--which will only be solved by nations working together.
We cannot do it alone. If confirmed, I will seek to work in partnership
with countries where we have a national security interest, while at the
same time addressing human rights concerns, promoting good governance,
and upholding our democratic values.
Question. The Biden administration has spoken of the need to work
closely with allies and partners to develop a coordinated response to
the China challenge. What specific differences in approach do you
expect to be most difficult to resolve?
Answer. If confirmed, I will put alliances and partnerships at the
center of U.S. foreign policy to advance shared norms and values that
underpin peace and security and compete with China from a position of
strength. The United States will consult with allies and partners on a
coordinated approach to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) coercive
economic practices, human rights abuses, malign influence operations,
and other key challenges. The administration will work with the EU, our
Indo-Pacific and NATO allies, the Quad, and others to restore our vital
security partnerships, secure the technologies of the future, re-engage
in the U.N. system, and address attempts by the PRC to undermine the
international rules-based system.
Question. The Biden administration has stated that it hopes to
cooperate with China on such pressing global issues as climate change,
proliferation, and global health. How would you respond to concerns
that the administration might downplay areas of friction with China in
order to make progress on these global priorities?
Answer. Combatting climate change; opposing the proliferation of
sensitive goods and technology related to WMD, missile systems, and
advanced conventional weapons; and promoting global health are in
China's interest as well as ours. They are not favors to be bargained
for. If confirmed, I will test whether China is willing to play a
constructive role on certain issues where we may share interests but
will be clear-eyed about Chinese intentions, while advancing the
interests of the American people. Our core interests and values will
not be traded off in discussions with China or any other country.
Further, the Department of State will seek Congressional input on
potential areas of cooperation.
Question. India is making great strides in developing renewable
energy sources, but continues to rely heavily on coal-fired power
generation. Will you seek to work with India on balancing its growing
power consumption with a mutual interest in addressing climate change
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions?
Answer. I fully support the administration's ongoing efforts, led
by Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, to work with
India on more ambitious climate commitments. As Secretary Blinken noted
in his confirmation hearing, the Biden-Harris administration is
committed to ensuring developing countries can meet their energy needs
while also reducing their emissions and building resilience against the
destabilizing impacts of climate change--both of which have clear
benefits not only for the recipient countries, but also for the United
States and the rest of the world. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with Congress to promote affordable energy in the developing
world consistent with our nation's energy and climate goals.
In view of Prime Minister Modi's announced target of installing 450
GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, if confirmed, I would support
the work advancing cost-effective strategies to enhance the flexibility
and robustness of India's electricity grid to encourage India's clean
energy transition over the next decade. If confirmed, I would
prioritize lower-cost alternatives to carbon-intensive energy such as
coal-fired power, including by promoting renewable energy, battery
storage, and load shifting.
Question. How do you intend to engage Pakistan as a player in U.S.
strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region?
Answer. If confirmed, I will push for an open and honest bilateral
relationship with Pakistan that stands on its own merits based on our
mutual interests. Despite a challenging relationship, I believe that
continued cooperation with Pakistan is possible on shared priorities
like securing a responsible end to the conflict in Afghanistan,
advancing regional security and fighting terrorism, expanding bilateral
commerce, and addressing climate change. By fostering productive ties
with all countries in the Indo-Pacific region, we hope to advance our
shared prosperity, security, and values.
Question. Do you view increasing Chinese influence in Pakistan as
an obstacle to U.S. interests?
Answer. I have concerns about many of China's activities globally
and will raise and take action on those concerns whenever appropriate.
While in principle the United States welcomes investments in
infrastructure and economic development that are sustainable and meet
international standards, I am concerned PRC-sponsored projects often
lack transparency and impose unsustainable debts. If confirmed, I will
work to encourage Pakistan to pursue a sustainable development path
involving good governance, long-term capacity building, and market
principles. U.S. diplomacy and cooperation with Pakistan reflects a
vision for a region of independent and prosperous nations at peace with
each other and the rest of the world. If confirmed, I will continue to
support that objective.
Question. To what extent will you prioritize cooperating with
Islamabad in combatting Islamist militancy and stabilizing Afghanistan?
Answer. Cooperation with Islamabad in combatting terrorist groups
in the region is a key part of U.S. efforts to seek a stable, peaceful
Afghanistan through a just and durable political settlement, and
success in this effort would be crucial to improved U.S-Pakistan
bilateral relations. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage the
Pakistani Government to play a constructive role in advancing the
Afghan peace process as a means to achieve a more stable and secure
South Asia. Further, if confirmed, I will continue to work closely with
Afghanistan's neighbors to press for a significant reduction in
violence to facilitate progress in peace negotiations.
Question. Do you support the Abraham Accords and the landmark
normalization agreements that occurred during the Trump administration?
Answer. Yes, I support the Abraham Accords and the Trump
administration's role in negotiating them. The normalization agreements
between Israel and its Arab neighbors are a positive step that reflect
recognition among Israel and the states that have signed the agreements
that they hold many interests in common and can most effectively
address them through cooperation. The agreements are the product of
years of quiet diplomacy between Israel and its neighbors supported by
U.S. administrations from both parties.
Question. Do you intend to help Israel consolidate existing
normalization arrangements and normalize its relations with other Arab
states, and if so, how?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. The administration
will also closely monitor the status of the normalization efforts to
date, encouraging the states that have signed such agreements with
Israel to uphold their commitments to establish full diplomatic
relations with Israel.
Question. How will the administration approach arms sales and
issues such as the Western Sahara impasse with Morocco in light of the
normalization agreements to date?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration welcomes normalization
agreements as an important contribution to regional peace and continues
to review policy in numerous areas, including Western Sahara. The
administration wants to see the appointment of a Personal Envoy of the
U.N. Secretary-General and a renewed U.N.-led political process.
Morocco is a major non-NATO ally, and our military-to-military
partnership is a regional model. The administration looks forward to
continued cooperation, including the upcoming Moroccan-hosted African
Lion exercise, the largest joint military training and interoperability
exercise in Africa. The State Department continues to ensure all arms
sales meet U.S. national security objectives and reflect our values.
Question. Congress has passed two rounds of mandatory sanctions
against Russia's Nord Stream 2 pipeline as part of the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Clarification Act (PEESCA). These laws necessitate the
imposition of sanctions against entities that engage in or support
deep-sea pipe-laying for Nord Stream 2. As required under the laws, on
February 19, 2021, the State Department submitted a report to Congress
only identifying Russia's Fortuna vessel and its owner as engaging in
sanctionable activities. However, media and other forms of public
reporting, including visual data from reputable ship-tracking portals,
indicate that numerous other vessels and companies are supporting the
Fortuna's pipe-laying for Nord Stream 2. As required under PEESA and
PEESCA, the State Department must immediately identify these entities
to Congress and subject them to mandatory U.S. sanctions. When will the
State Department submit an updated report to Congress that formally
identifies these entities?
Answer. The State Department submits a report to Congress every 90
days on the provision of vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying
activities, and various entities providing and supporting those
vessels, for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report
due to Congress in mid-May. If confirmed, I will continue to use all
available tools to counter Russian malign influence and to work with
Allies and partners in the region to support Transatlantic energy
security goals. I understand that the State Department is actively
examining entities involved in potentially sanctionable activity and
will designate additional persons and entities as appropriate.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. U.S. sanctions have taken a heavy toll on civilians in
countries worldwide, particularly amid the COVID-19 pandemic. As a
humanitarian matter and as a matter of global public health, would you
consider strengthening humanitarian exemptions through a worldwide
temporary general license to ensure that sanctioned countries are able
to obtain critical humanitarian resources, including the COVID-19
vaccine?
Answer. Many U.S. sanctions programs include provisions aimed at
facilitating delivery of medical and other humanitarian supplies. If
confirmed, I will continue the State Department's conversations with
our allies and multinational and non-governmental organizations on
these issues. I will also continue State's cooperation with the
Department of the Treasury to use available tools, including issuance
of clarifying guidance and expediting of license requests, to
facilitate global delivery of humanitarian assistance particularly
during the COVID-19 pandemic. I would support initiatives by Treasury
to explore additional options, which could include issuance of
additional licenses to facilitate medical- or vaccine-related
transactions.
Question. What specific recommended additional actions will the
Biden administration pursue to hold Mohammed bin Salman, and senior
Saudi officials, responsible for the murder of Mr. Khasshogi?
Answer. The administration has taken a number of concrete steps to
recalibrate the relationship with Saudi Arabia. It followed the law and
submitted an unclassified report to Congress on the horrific murder of
Jamal Khashoggi. Under the Global Magnitsky Act, it sanctioned a former
senior Saudi official and the group whose members were involved in the
killing. The Department has taken action pursuant to a new visa
restriction policy against 76 Saudi individuals believed to have been
engaged in threatening dissidents overseas, including but not limited
to the Khashoggi killing. The Department will report on any such
extraterritorial activities by any government in the annual Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices.
Question. We will not stop climate catastrophe here at home if we
are supporting industries abroad engaging in ecocide. How will the
Administration prioritize policies that dramatically reduce U.S.
financial and diplomatic exposure in polluting industries abroad?
Answer. Dealing with climate change means investing in resilience
and green energy here at home and leading a global effort to reduce
carbon pollution. In his recent foreign policy speech, Secretary
Blinken described these challenges as being simultaneously domestic and
foreign. The administration is taking a whole-of-government approach to
put climate change at the center of its domestic, national security and
foreign policy, and to working with other nations to advance
conservation promote green recovery; revitalize communities and cities;
and secure environmental justice.
Question. Does U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan
Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, have specific instructions to make
the return of Paul Overby--my constituent who went missing in
Afghanistan/Pakistan in 2014--part of ongoing U.S. peace negotiations
with the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan?
Answer. I have been advised the Secretary specifically directed
Ambassador Khalilzad to continue his efforts to press for the return of
Paul Overby and of Mark Frerichs during engagements with the Taliban
and with key regional partners.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator John Barrasso
Question. On July 7, 2015, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin Dempsey testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee about Iran. He clearly stated, ``Under no circumstances
should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile
capabilities and arms trafficking.''
Only seven days later, you and the Obama-Biden Administration
disregarded the views of the American commanders on the battlefield. As
the lead negotiator of the Iran nuclear deal, you agreed to lift the
arms embargo and restrictions on ballistic missile technologies.
In any future negotiations, would you continue to disregard the
advice our military commanders?
Answer. The President and his national security team will always
take the advice of military commanders seriously. Iran's development
and proliferation of ballistic missiles, as well as its delivery of
weapons to violent proxies across the region, pose a threat to
international security and remain significant challenges. These
challenges existed despite the U.N. Security Council resolutions that
aimed to address them.
The Biden-Harris administration will use a variety of
nonproliferation tools to work to prevent the further advancement of
Iran's missile program and its ability to proliferate technology to
others, and will continue to enforce the U.S. arms embargo on Iran. The
administration will also work with our partners to stop shipments of
equipment and technology, seek to disrupt Iran's delivery of weapons to
violent proxies, and use our engagement in multilateral fora to urge
countries to take steps to address these activities.
Question. On October 18, 2020, the international arms embargo on
Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, was officially
lifted.
Considering the fact that you helped draft the agreement
eliminating it in the first place, what specific steps, if any,
will you take to reinstate the Iran arms embargo?
Answer. The administration will continue to push for full
implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions barring the
unauthorized transfer of weapons to Lebanon and to the Houthis in
Yemen, and also continue to use domestic authorities to dissuade
countries from providing arms to Iran.
Question. What is your strategy to stop the dramatic increase of
weapons flowing to terrorists and proxy groups in the region?
Answer. The administration will continue to use domestic
authorities to dissuade countries from providing arms to Iran and
continue to push for full implementation of U.N. Security Council
resolutions barring the unauthorized transfer of weapons to Lebanon and
to the Houthis in Yemen. The administration will also continue to use
domestic authorities, including sanctions, to counter Iran's support
for terrorism in the Middle East.
Question. The U.S. constitution provides the Senate the power to
approve or reject treaties. Under your leadership, the Obama--Biden
administration refused to submit the Iran nuclear deal to the Senate
for its advice and consent. As one of the lead negotiators of the Iran
nuclear deal, you played a major role in drafting the agreement in a
way to avoid the ratification process.
If confirmed, will you continue to disregard the will of the
American people by negotiating international agreements and
then refusing to submit them to the Senate?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
committee on matters related to treaties and other international
agreements. The Supreme Court has long held that not all international
agreements require approval as treaties pursuant to the procedures set
out in Article II of the Constitution, and the Congress has recognized
this through the enactment of the Case-Zablocki Act, which establishes
procedures regarding legally binding international agreements other
than treaties. Regardless of the form which particular agreements may
take, however, I am committed to engaging with the Senate as a partner
in the State Department's efforts to advance our national interests
through international agreements.
Question. If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is
altered at all to include new provisions, would you advocate for the
administration to submit the accord for congressional review under the
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act or other laws?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) and to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. Authoritarian regimes continue to restrict religious
freedoms and the rights of individuals. The violence, oppression and
attacks on human dignity cannot be tolerated. It is critically
important for the United States to stand up for those who are being
persecuted whether it is Christians in Nigeria or Uyghurs in China.
What additional efforts will you pursue at the State Department to
promote international religious freedom?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to use the full range of diplomatic
tools--both positive and punitive--to encourage governments to live up
to their international obligations and commitments to respect religious
freedom. This includes reforming outdated laws, ending abusive or
discriminatory practices, releasing individuals imprisoned for their
beliefs, and achieving justice for victims and accountability for
perpetrators of religious freedom abuses. The State Department will
also continue to fulfill its statutory requirements to produce its
annual report and annually review and designate countries and entities
for engaging in or tolerating severe or particularly severe religious
freedom violations.
Question. Defending human rights and the dignity of every person is
a fundamental value for Americans. Yet, the United Nations Human Rights
Council has refused to make serious reform to its organization. Efforts
by previous administrations failed to achieve the reforms needed.
Secretary Blinken recently admitted the council ``is flawed and needs
reform.''
What are the flaws of the United Nations Human Rights Council?
Answer. The two principal flaws of the Human Rights Council are its
disproportionate focus on Israel and the continued election of
countries with problematic human rights records. The continued
existence of a separate agenda item on Israel, Agenda Item 7, unduly
focuses attention on Israel to the exclusion of the human rights
records of every other country. The Administration believes that the
Council should treat Israel the same as it does every other U.N. member
state. Similarly, the membership on the Council must reflect high
standards for upholding human rights. Those with the worst human rights
records should not be members of the Council.
Question. What specific reforms does the administration believe
need to be taken at the U.N. Human Rights Council and how do you plan
to get the organization to make those reforms?
Answer. The United States is committed to seeking reforms of the
U.N. Human Rights Council, particularly with respect to the Council's
disproportionate focus on Israel and its problematic membership. The
United States has seen that when we play an active and constructive
role, we can advocate more effectively on Israel's behalf and engage
with our allies and friends to keep some of the countries with the
worst human rights records off the Council and to encourage countries
with better records to run for seats. When we were previously on the
Council, the United States was also able to help reduce the number of
resolutions focused on Israel. If confirmed, I will ensure the United
States prioritizes these specific reforms.
Question. Does the administration plan to demand any commitments
from the United Nations Human Rights Council on making those reforms
prior to rejoining?
Answer. The United States is pursuing reforms while re-engaging and
seeking a seat on the Human Rights Council, as announced by Secretary
Blinken during his speech to the Human Rights Council on February 24,
2021. The United States is most effective at the Human Rights Council
(HRC) and in other U.N. bodies when we are at the table, in the room,
in good financial standing, and use the full weight of our diplomatic
might to lead and to pursue appropriate and needed reforms. If
confirmed, I will ensure the United States prioritizes needed reforms
as part of our re-engagement with the HRC.
Question. For years, the United Nations Human Rights Council has
included human rights abusers and refusing to stand up for human rights
taking place across the world. A recent example is the election of
China and Russia to the United Nations Human Rights Council in October
2020. The Chinese Communist Party engages in torture, detention, and
forced labor of religious and ethnic minorities. Russia tramples on
free speech and the free press every day. Shockingly, Russia was
elected to the council the same week that the EU sanctioned Russian
officials for attempts to assassinate a Russian opposition figure. The
United Nations should be condemning the actions of Russia and China not
electing those responsible to this body.
Would you advise the United States to vote in favor of Russia,
China, or other human rights violators for membership on the
United Nations Human Rights Council?
Answer. The continued election of countries with problematic human
rights records to the Human Rights Council remains one of the principal
flaws of the Council. If confirmed I will advise the United States to
vote for nations with strong human rights records for the Council.
Question. During the Trump Administration, there were several
historic developments between Israel and its regional Arab neighbors.
The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan joined Egypt and
Jordan in establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. These
agreements have created the path to peace through recognition and
engagement rather than isolation and boycotts of Israel.
In January, Secretary Blinken stated, ``We very much support the
Abraham Accords, we think that Israel normalizing relations with its
neighbors and other countries in the region is a very positive
development, and so we applauded them. We hope that there may be an
opportunity to build on them in the coming months and years ahead.''
Do you believe the Abraham Accords are a positive step forward for
the region?
Answer. Yes, I firmly believe the normalization agreements are a
positive step forward for Israel and the region and are in the United
States' best interest.
Question. What specific steps will you take to build upon these
historic successes and create additional peace agreements between
Israel and Arab nations?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. If confirmed, I will
closely monitor the status of the normalization efforts to date,
encouraging the states that have signed such agreements with Israel to
uphold their commitments to establish full diplomatic relations with
Israel.
Question. Congress continues to be deeply concerned with the
Turkish Government's purchase of the S-400 surface to air missile
defense systems from Russia. This decision threatens a range of U.S.
interests, including the strength of the NATO Alliance.
Do you believe a weak U.S. response to Turkey's actions would
embolden other countries to consider buying advanced Russian
military systems?
Answer. President Biden has promised to call out Turkish behavior
that is inconsistent with its commitments as a NATO Ally. A top
priority will be urging Turkey not to retain the S-400 and to refrain
from additional Russian arms purchases. The CAATSA sanctions announced
in December 2020 impose real costs on Turkey for acquiring the S-400
and advance our global efforts to deter and disrupt purchases of
Russian weaponry, which bring Russia revenue, access, and influence.
Turkey's suspension from the F-35 partnership represents an additional
significant cost. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress
to review the impact of the sanctions imposed in response to the S-400
acquisition and to determine whether additional measures are required
or warranted.
Question. Are you committed to fully implementing the Countering
America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) with respect to
Turkey's S-400 acquisition and any related purchases by other foreign
nations?
Answer. Yes. The imposition of CAATSA Section 231 sanctions on
Turkish individuals and entities in December demonstrated the State
Department's continuing commitment to CAATSA. If confirmed, I will not
only continue that commitment as it relates to Turkey's S-400
acquisition but also with respect to any other country that may be
considering similar transactions. I would strongly urge anyone
considering potentially significant transactions with Russia's defense
or intelligence sectors, or persons operating for, or on behalf of
either sector, to avoid such transactions, which may expose them to
CAATSA sanctions.
Question. Are current U.S. and NATO efforts to deter Russian
aggression in Europe adequate?
Answer. NATO has undertaken significant adaptation over the past
decade in response to Russian aggression in the Euro-Atlantic area,
including the illegal invasions of Ukraine and Georgia. The Alliance
relies on both conventional and nuclear capabilities for deterrence and
is also addressing growing gray area challenges. Allies will need to
continue work toward meeting equitable burden sharing to maintain
effective deterrence. Only with greater investment in defense across
the Alliance can we ensure NATO is able to adapt quickly to a changing
security landscape with the necessary capabilities and military
readiness.
Question. What is your position on the administration maintaining
or expanding sanctions intended to get Russia to change its policies
with regard to Ukraine, cyberattacks, and other malign activities?
Answer. President Biden has made clear that the United States will
act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to actions
by Russia that harm us or our allies. On March 2, the administration
took action to impose costs on the Russian Federation for the
poisoning, arrest, and imprisonment of Aleksey Navalny. The United
States will continue to take action to counter Russia's malign actions
and will comply with our legal obligations under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. As the
administration works together with allies to advance our interests, it
will continue to hold Russia accountable, including by sanctions, for
its destabilizing activity, disregard for international law, human
rights violations, interference in our elections, unlawful cyber
activity, and aggression in Ukraine and Georgia.
Question. How will you approach relations with Saudi Arabia?
Answer. President Biden has committed to recalibrating the U.S.-
Saudi relationship to ensure it reflects U.S. interests and values. The
Administration has elevated support for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, which has already led to positive initial results, such as
the conditional release of detained U.S. citizens and activists. Like
Secretary Blinken, if confirmed, I will press Saudi Arabia for the
removal of conditions on their release, including travel restrictions,
and the implementation of reforms to avoid future such cases.
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia remains an important U.S. partner on regional
security and counterterrorism, and the U.S. will continue to support
Saudi Arabian efforts to defend its people and territory, which is home
to thousands of U.S. citizens.
Question. How important of a role does Saudi Arabia play in our
efforts regarding Iran, Yemen, Iraq, and the Israel-Palestinian issues?
Answer. Saudi Arabia is a critical partner for containing Iranian
aggressive actions. The Biden-Harris administration strongly supports
Saudi Arabia's outreach to the Government of Iraq, to include recently
reopening its main border crossing with Iraq for the first time since
1990 and ongoing discussions to provide electricity to Iraq, both of
which will help to reduce Iraq's dependence on Iran. In Yemen, the
Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis has contributed to Yemen's
dire humanitarian crisis; Special Envoy Tim Lenderking is working with
Saudi Arabia, regional partners, and the U.N. to resolve the conflict.
With respect to Israel, Saudi Arabia supports a two-state solution and
has allowed overflights of Israeli-registered aircraft through Saudi
airspace to the UAE and Bahrain.
Question. What role, if any, do you see for Saudi Arabia and other
regional U.S. partners in talks with Iran?
Answer. The administration is committed to consulting closely with
our regional partners regarding U.S. policy on Iran, and in broad
terms, it supports dialogue among the countries in the region on issues
of regional security and stability.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. Section 15(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 states that ``The Department of State shall keep the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives fully and currently
informed with respect to all activities and responsibilities within the
jurisdiction of these committees. Any Federal department, agency, or
independent establishment shall furnish any information requested by
either such committee relating to any such activity or
responsibility.'' Can you commit to complying with this provision of
law by ensuring that information requested by members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee is provided expeditiously and
transparently? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working with Congress and this committee
in accordance with the law to provide all information needed to perform
traditional oversight functions as promptly as possible.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified
information in notifications provided by the State Department to
Congress? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. Last month the State Department transmitted a mandatory
and overdue report to Congress listing entities engaged in sanctionable
activities because of their participation in the construction of the
Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline, pursuant to the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended. PEESA mandates the imposition
of sanctions on entities listed in such reports. The report included
only two entities, the Fortuna and KVT-RUS, both of which the Trump
administration had already sanctioned. It did not include any entities
which are plainly, publicly required to be listed under PEESA.
Reportedly, State Department officials who spoke to Congressional
staffers were unable to provide a justification why several entities -
including the company responsible for the planning, construction, and
operation of NS2 - were left off. This abdication is inexcusable. Can
you commit to immediately ensuring the Biden administration meets its
mandatory obligation to provide an interim report to Congress pursuant
to PEESA and sanction all of the entities that are engaged in pipe-
laying, pipe-laying activities, certification, and insurance
sanctionable under PEESA? If not, why not?
Answer. The State Department submits a report to Congress every 90
days on vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying activities, and
various entities providing and supporting those vessels, for the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report due to Congress
in mid-May. I understand the Department of State submitted its first
report on PEESA, as amended, in February. If confirmed, I will continue
to use all available tools to counter Russian malign influence and to
work with Allies and partners in the region to support Transatlantic
energy security goals. I understand that the Department of State
continues to examine entities involved in potentially sanctionable
activity and will designate additional persons as appropriate, and will
comply with statutory reporting requirements.
Question. One of the most egregious dynamics in the initial
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
involved the way that the Obama administration circumvented
Congressional deliberation and approval by first attempting to lock in
the agreement as international law via United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR 2231). After that resolution was passed - which
occurred just as the Congressional review period mandated by the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) was beginning - officials from the
Government of Iran and the Obama administration suggested that Congress
would be abrogating the U.S.'s formal international obligations by
rejecting the agreement. Can you commit to ensuring that any future
nuclear agreement negotiated between State Department officials and
Iran, which involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional
sanctions, will only be negotiated in full consultation with Congress?
If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with Congress on
any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called for under
INARA.
Question. Can you commit to ensuring that any future nuclear
agreement negotiated between State Department officials and Iran, which
involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional sanctions, will not
be implemented without Congressional approval? If not, why not?
Answer. I am aware that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA) contains certain limitations on sanctions relief during a
congressional review period. I understand that the Biden-Harris
administration is committed to complying with the requirements of
INARA, and if confirmed, I am committed to doing so.
Question. It was recently announced that Iran and South Korea
agreed to allow Tehran to access approximately $1 billion of its assets
that are frozen in South Korean banks due to US sanctions. Reports
indicate that the South Koreans received approval from Biden
administration officials to do so. Please transmit to the committee any
waivers, decision memos, or other documents pertaining to this case,
and confirm doing so.
Answer. I do not have access to Department records nor the
authority on my own to give you Department records. I commit, if
confirmed, to work with the committee to try to accommodate any
official committee request for such Department information.
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5 the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. Officials at the State Department have justified the
delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' designation of
Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large parts of Yemen's
population live under areas controlled by the group. They have not
provided an explanation for the delisting of the three leaders, and in
fact they have publicly, repeatedly, and falsely denied or downplayed
the relief provided to these Iran-backed terrorists. For example, on
February 11 State Department spokesman Ned Price falsely told
journalists ``there is no change'' to the sanctions on these
individuals. He was asked about the issue again the next day, and said
``the Secretary had an intent to remove this broad designation of the
movement.'' The public statement issued by the State Department did not
mention the revocation of the SDGT designation on the Houthi leaders,
but noted that they ``remain sanctioned under E.O. 13611.'' Can you
commit to ensuring that State Department officials stop publicly
misleading journalists and the American public about sanctions relief
provided by the Department and the Biden administration to Iran-backed
terrorists? If not, why not?
Answer. I understand that the three Ansarallah leaders in question
were designated under the U.N. Security Council's Yemen sanctions
regime in 2015 and domestically under E.O. 13611, related to acts that
threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. Therefore, they
remain on the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any
attendant travel restrictions. As a consequence of the revocation of
Ansarallah's Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group
designation under E.O. 13224, there was no longer a basis to retain the
SDGT designations of these individuals as leaders of Ansarallah, which
were derivative of the broader SDGT designation of the group. If
confirmed, I intend to continue our support of U.N.-led efforts,
including a robust implementation of the U.N. and E.O. 13611 sanctions,
to call attention to and condemn Ansarallah's destabilizing activities.
The State Department's emphasis will continue to be on using diplomacy
to build international pressure on Ansarallah to change its behavior
and ultimately end the war.
Question. Please describe why the State Department lifted the SDGT
designations on Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-
Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim.
Answer. I understand that simultaneous with the designation of
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, as a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, these
individuals were designated as SDGTs on the basis that they were
leaders of an SDGT, namely Ansarallah. As a consequence of the
revocation of Ansarallah's SDGT designation, there was no longer a
basis to retain the designations of these individuals as leaders of an
SDGT. However, they remain designated under the U.N. Security Council's
Yemen sanctions regime and domestically under E.O. 13611 related to
acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, and
therefore remain on Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any
attendant travel restrictions.
Question. The Central Bank of Iran (CBI), has been designated as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SGT) pursuant to Executive Order
(EO) 13224 for providing material support to terrorist organizations.
Can you commit to not lift, rescind or significantly modify - or to
agree within the interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly
modify - this terrorism designation of the CBI, in the absence of a
determination that the CBI has ceased providing material support to
terrorist organizations? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to counter Iran's support for terrorism, including through the
appropriate use of sanctions and regular coordination with our partners
and allies. Iran is the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism,
which poses a threat to security and stability in the Middle East, and
we will continue to use all tools available to counter Iran's support
for terrorism. The President has made clear that the United States will
be prepared to resume participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) if Iran restores strict compliance, as a starting point
for follow on negotiations to lengthen and strengthen constraints and
address other issues of concern, including Iran's regional activity.
Question. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is
designated as a terrorist organization both as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization and as an SDGT pursuant to EO 13224. Can you commit to not
lift, rescind or significantly modify - or to agree within the
interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly modify - these
terrorism designations on the IRGC, in the , in the absence of a
determination that the Government of Iran has ceased providing material
support to terrorist organizations.
Answer. Iran's support for terrorism threatens our forces and
partners in the region and elsewhere. If confirmed, I intend to
continue working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's
destabilizing activities in the region, including its support for
terrorist groups and violent militias and its ballistic missile
program, and maintain international, collective pressure on Iran. The
President is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing activities
using the array of tools at our disposal, including sanctions to deal
with Iran's support for terrorism.
Question. You and other officials responsible for the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have repeatedly described it as
the most rigorous inspection regime ever negotiated. Despite this
inspection regime, the IAEA was unable to locate the illicit Nuclear
Archive subsequently seized by Israel, which included designs and
materials relevant to the creation of nuclear weapons. They were also
unable to find locations which, having been revealed by Israeli
officials, subsequently proved to have evidence of nuclear work that
the IAEA says Iran has not accounted for. Please describe what you
perceive to have been the flaws in the JCPOA inspection regime do you
believe were responsible for these failures by the IAEA?
Answer. The IAEA has a decades-long successful track record of
monitoring the non-diversion of declared nuclear material globally.
While the IAEA thoroughly investigates all available information,
including based on its own verification and monitoring activities, it
is not an intelligence organization. It can only act on information
that is either acquired by it in the performance of its verification
mandates or presented to it. President Biden has made clear he is
committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. The
administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any
indications of undeclared or diverted nuclear material that could
contribute to any renewed Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Question. Please describe what new measures would you insist are
included in any future nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure that the
IAEA has the ability to identify such materials and activities?
Answer. The IAEA has said it has the tools it needs to perform its
verification mandates in Iran so long as Iran fully implements its
JCPOA commitments. This includes implementation of the Additional
Protocol to Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement that provides
enhanced information and access regarding Iran's nuclear program,
including with respect to undeclared locations about which the IAEA has
questions. The JCPOA provides the IAEA with the most intrusive
verification procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any
indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The
administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any such
indication.
Question. During your nominations hearing before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on March 4, 2021, you acknowledged that you had met
with officials of the Government of Iran during your time out of
government. You also stated that you coordinated directly with Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador David Hale concerning your
interactions with Iranian regime officials. Please list any additional
senior State Department officials responsible for Iran policy with whom
you consulted or coordinated your engagement with Iranian officials,
such as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David
Schenker, Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook, Special
Representative for Iran Elliott Abrams, Deputy Secretary of State
Stephen Biegun, or Secretary of State Michael Pompeo.
Answer. I coordinated with Undersecretary Hale and did not engage
with others listed in this question.
Question. Please identify the dates on which you coordinated or
consulted with these officials.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, I met with Foreign Minister
Zarif twice on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, in 2018
and 2019. I also participated in two bipartisan group meetings in New
York on the margins of UNGA: in 2018 with President Rouhani, and in
2019 with FM Zarif. Those meetings were facilitated by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (2018) and the International Crisis
Group (2019). Finally, in October 2017 I participated in a panel with
Deputy FM Abbas Aragchi at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by
the Center for Energy and Security Studies in Moscow, and we spoke on
the margins.
In every meeting, I urged Iran to stay in full compliance with the
JCPOA, even after U.S. withdrawal, and pressed for Iran to end its
regional violence and to release American prisoners. I consistently
kept Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale apprised
of meetings and offered to convey any useful information back to him.
Question. Please describe any additional contact you had with
officials from the Government of Iran Besides in-person meetings, have
you otherwise been in contact with any Iranian regime officials,
including via e-mail, text exchange, or secure messaging platforms,
between January 20, 2017, and today? If yes, please identify dates of
contact and the text of the exchanges.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings
referenced in the previous question, other than to arrange logistical
details for those in-person meetings. I do not have records of those
exchanges.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What is the status of the Clean Network Initiative at the
U.S. Department of State? As of November 2020, over 50 countries, 180
telecommunications companies, and dozens of other leading tech
companies had joined the State Department's Clean Networks Initiative
and pledged to advance common principles with regard to securing 5G and
other digital technologies against untrusted foreign vendors and
suppliers. The Biden administration, however, appears to have removed
any references to the Clean Network Initiative from the State
Department's website.
Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration views 5G security as a high
priority and is working with allies and partners to ensure their 5G
networks are free of untrustworthy vendor equipment and to support a
vibrant and diverse supply chain of trustworthy telecommunications
equipment and services. The United States will pursue a comprehensive
strategy that addresses the full range of these issues. As is routine
practice, the Department archives webpages during the transition of
administrations. Webpages from 2017 to 2021 remain available to the
public at https://2017-2021.state.gov/index.html.
Question. What is the status of the Blue Dot Network at the U.S.
Department of State? In November 2019, the United States joined
Australia and Japan in launching the Blue Dot Network concept that
seeks to bring together governments, the private sector, and civil
society under shared standards for international infrastructure
development. If the Blue Dot Network is fully realized to promote
quality infrastructure investment that is open, transparent, and
compliant with international standards--including by eventually
mobilizing the deep capital markets of the United States and other
marked-based democracies--it can help to counter to China's predatory
One Belt One Road (OBOR) infrastructure initiatives.
Answer. I understand that the Blue Dot Network seeks to promote the
development of quality, sustainable infrastructure around the world by
certifying projects that uphold global infrastructure principles. I
understand that the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation continue to work with our Australian
and Japanese partners to develop the technical details of the
initiative, including a methodology and metrics for certifying quality
infrastructure projects in the developing world.
Question. In any negotiations that may occur with the authoritarian
regime in North Korea, do you commit to pursuing an end-state that
achieves complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization? What
do you perceive as the risks of further nuclear proliferation in East
Asia if we fail to achieve that end-state?
Answer. North Korea's proliferation-related activities constitute a
serious threat to international peace and security and undermine global
nonproliferation efforts. If confirmed, I plan to join the Biden-Harris
administration's ongoing policy review, in consultation with our
allies, of the current state of play on North Korea. I support the U.S.
commitment over the long term to the complete denuclearization of North
Korea, while also focusing in the near term on limiting the threat to
the United States and our allies.
Question. Do you concur that any U.S. international agreement to
achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea must
also eliminate the threat of North Korean regime's ballistic missile
program?
Answer. Denuclearization of North Korea remains a top national
security priority for the United States. North Korea's weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile programs constitute a serious threat
to the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I plan
to join the administration in conducting a thorough policy review, in
consultation with our allies, of the current state of play on North
Korea. I support the U.S. commitment over the long term to the complete
denuclearization of North Korea, while also focusing in the near term
on limiting the threat to the United States and our allies.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit that the State Department
will consult closely and proactively with Members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and their personal staff before providing
humanitarian assistance in order to ensure that any such U.S.
assistance benefits directly the suffering North Korean people and is
not vulnerable to diversion by the Kim Jong Un regime?
Answer. As part of its North Korea policy review, the Biden-Harris
administration will carefully consider the country's egregious human
rights record and work closely with partners and allies to promote
respect for human rights in the closed country. The administration
remains deeply concerned by the humanitarian situation in North Korea
and is committed to ensuring any humanitarian assistance benefits the
most vulnerable populations, including pregnant women, children, and
the elderly in detention, in North Korea, and not the Kim Jong Un
regime. The administration will continue to press for monitoring and
access necessary to ensure the assistance reaches its intended
recipients. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on
this crucial issue.
Question. Does the Biden administration intend to appoint a new
Special Representative for North Korea? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to join the administration's ongoing
review, in consultation with our allies, of the current state of play
on North Korea. I am not aware of any new personnel announcements at
this time.
Question. Do you agree that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
of 2015 (INARA) is permanent law and is binding on the Biden
administration?
Answer. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) is binding
law. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is committed to
implementing all of the requirements of INARA.
Question. Do you agree that any agreement-including any annexes or
any informal agreement, even an unwritten oral understanding-involving
the United States and Iran regarding how the two countries will return
to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or
will move in the direction of returning to compliance with the JCPOA
must be submitted to Congress for review pursuant to INARA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
requirements of INARA are satisfied, including with respect to the
transmission requirement.
Question. Are you personally committed to ensuring that Congress
will be able to review, pursuant to INARA, any agreement that is
hereafter reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran-
irrespective of the level of formality or of the politically or legally
binding nature of such agreement-including any agreement providing for
return to compliance with the JCPOA, as well as any agreement that
amends, augments, or supersedes the JCPOA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) and to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its
transmission requirement.
Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, including
a decision to participate again in the JCPOA, INARA will require the
President to submit a report to Congress not less frequently than every
180 calendar days ``on Iran's nuclear program and the compliance of
Iran with [each such new agreement] during the period covered by the
report''?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including its reporting requirements.
Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, including
a decision to participate again in the JCPOA, INARA will require the
President to make a determination and certification to the appropriate
congressional committees and leadership not less than every 90 calendar
days regarding Iran's compliance with each such new agreement?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including the requirement to determine whether to make
the certification called for in Section 135(d)(6).
Question. Can you provide an assurance that there are no
circumstances under which the Biden administration will not abide by
the understandings about compliance with INARA spelled out in your
responses to the foregoing questions?
Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is
committed to implementing all of the requirements of Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. When you were negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) during the Obama administration, were you aware at the
time that the Iranian regime was concealing a nuclear weapons archive?
I request you to begin your answer with a yes or no. The Government of
Israel revealed the existence of this undeclared, covert nuclear
weapons archive in April 2018.
Answer. No. However, the United States and others were well aware
of Iran's long history of concealment regarding elements of its nuclear
program, especially as related to its past military dimensions. That is
why we worked with our allies and partners to ensure that the JCPOA
provides the most intrusive verification procedures ever negotiated,
including to investigate any indications of undeclared nuclear material
or activities in Iran, as well as any information that came to light
after implementation of the JCPOA. President Biden has made clear he is
committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
The IAEA has made clear that it takes no information provided by
Iran on its nuclear program at face value. The IAEA has previously
reported that it found evidence of possible military dimensions of
Iran's program to be credible, and that a ``range of activities
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were
conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and
some activities took place after 2003.'' The administration will not
take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear program,
and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its verification authorities to
investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities
in Iran.
Question. When you were negotiating the JCPOA during the Obama
administration, were you aware that the Iranian regime was storing
undeclared nuclear material at a warehouse reportedly called
Turquzabad? I request you to begin your answer with a yes or no. In May
2020, the State Department noted that in late 2018 ``public allegations
surfaced that Iran had been hiding material and equipment at a site in
Tehran called Turquzabad, only three miles from where the infamous
`nuclear archive' had been stored.''
Answer. No. The Turquzabad site was first publicly disclosed by
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in late 2018. To date, the IAEA has
detected particles of chemically processed uranium at the undeclared
location but has not yet made any conclusion regarding the potential
storage of nuclear material there. The IAEA continues to investigate
the source of the detected particles. The JCPOA provides the most
intrusive verification procedures ever negotiated, including to
investigate any indications of undeclared nuclear materials or
activities in Iran, and the administration has made clear its strong
support for the IAEA's investigation of safeguards-relevant information
that has come to light after implementation of the JCPOA.
Question. When you were negotiating the JCPOA during the Obama
administration, were you aware of any other undeclared sites under the
control or influence of the Iranian regime where nuclear material may
be present?
Answer. Iran has a long history of denial and concealment regarding
its past nuclear weapons program. The JCPOA addressed potential
undeclared locations by providing for the most intrusive verification
procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any indications of
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. President Biden has
made clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a
nuclear weapon.
The IAEA has made clear that it takes no information provided by
Iran on its nuclear program at face value. The IAEA has previously
reported that it found evidence of possible military dimensions of
Iran's program to be credible, and that a ``range of activities
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were
conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and
some activities took place after 2003.'' The administration will not
take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear program,
and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its verification authorities to
investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities
in Iran.
Question. Did your Iranian regime counterparts disclose to you the
existence of its nuclear weapons archive, the Turquzabad site, or any
other undeclared Iranian regime nuclear-related site during the
negotiations for the JCPOA?
Answer. Iran has never acknowledged its past nuclear weapons
program. The JCPOA was concluded to ensure Iran never again pursues
nuclear weapons and provides the most intrusive verification procedures
ever negotiated, including to investigate any indications of undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran. President Biden has made clear
he is committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
Question. President Biden says he will rejoin the JCPOA if the Iran
regime first returns to ``full compliance'' with the JCPOA. Can the
Iranian regime be in full compliance with the JCPOA if it is concealing
undeclared nuclear material, sites, and/or activities?
Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards
agreement to declare to the IAEA nuclear material and nuclear
activities in Iran. Under the JCPOA, Iran committed to strict limits on
its nuclear program as well as enhanced verification and monitoring
measures that go beyond its obligations under its safeguards agreement.
The JCPOA provides the most intrusive verification procedures ever
negotiated, including to investigate any indications of undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran. It is critical that Iran
comply with both its safeguards obligations and its JCPOA commitments.
President Biden has made clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran
never acquires a nuclear weapon.
Question. Is it your view that Iran must fully and verifiably
account for all of its undeclared activities, sites, and materials
before the United States would rejoin the JCPOA and lift any sanctions?
I request you to begin your answer with a yes or no.
Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards
agreement to declare to the IAEA nuclear material and nuclear
activities in Iran. The JCPOA provides the most intrusive verification
procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any indications of
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The Biden-Harris
administration strongly supports the IAEA's ongoing investigation in
Iran into indications of possible undeclared nuclear material and,
along with the rest of the international community, awaits the IAEA's
conclusions in its ongoing safeguards investigations while expecting
full Iranian cooperation with inspectors. President Biden has made
clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear
weapon.
Question. During your nominations hearing before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on March 4, 2021, you acknowledged that you had met
with senior officials of the Iranian regime-a regime that is a U.S.-
designated State Sponsor of Terrorism-during your time out of
government. Besides in-person meetings, have you otherwise been in
contact with any Iranian regime officials, including via phone, e-mail,
text exchange, or secure messaging platforms, between January 20, 2017,
and today? I request that you begin your response with a yes or no. If
yes, please identify dates of contact and the text of the exchanges.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings
discussed, other than to arrange logistical details for those in-person
meetings. I do not have records of those exchanges.
Question. Besides in-person meetings, have you otherwise been in
contact with any Iranian regime officials, including via e-mail, text
exchange, or secure messaging platforms, between January 20, 2017, and
today? If yes, please identify dates of contact and the text of the
exchanges.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings
discussed, other than to arrange logistical details for those in-person
meetings. I do not have records of those exchanges.
Question. In ``The Total Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under
Trump'' (Foreign Policy, July 31, 2020), you wrote: ``As a result of
Trump's failures, the Middle East is further from peace..'' But soon
thereafter, in September 2020, Israel signed the Abraham Accords that
normalized bilateral relations with the United Arab Emirates and
Bahrain, respectively. In December 2020, Morocco signed the Abraham
Accords with Israel. And in January 2021, Sudan also signed the Abraham
Accords with Israel. What is your current assessment about the Trump
administration's efforts to promote peace and normalization agreements
between Israel and Arab nations? And what steps will you support to
further the Abraham Accords peace process in the Middle East?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. If confirmed, the
administration will also closely monitor the status of the
normalization efforts to date, encouraging the states that have signed
such agreements with Israel to uphold their commitments to establish
full diplomatic relations with Israel.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit that if the United
States decides to participate again in the JCPOA, you will seek to
prevent the Iranian regime or any other Iranian entity from being
allowed to export oil to Syria either in defiance of U.S. sanctions
under Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, Executive Order 13894,
Executive 13582, and other relevant authorities, or by receiving a
waiver or license to do so?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is under no illusions about
Iran's destabilizing activities in the region, nor has it forgotten
about the atrocities committed by the Syrian regime. The Biden-Harris
administration is committed to countering the threat posed by Iran,
using the various tools at its disposal, including sanctions, and
working in close coordination with our allies and partners. If
confirmed, I commit that I will seek to enforce fully U.S. sanctions
with respect to Syria.
Question. Will the Biden administration maintain existing sanctions
designations against the Assad regime and continue imposing new
sanctions designations against the Assad regime? The Caesar Syria
Civilian Protection Act has imposed significant economic pressure
against the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad. Before January 2021,
the U.S. Government imposed more than 100 sanctions designations
against the Assad regime and its supporters since June 2020. Under the
Biden administration, the U.S. Government has not yet imposed any new
sanctions designations against the Assad regime and its allies.
Answer. The Caesar Act is an important tool, which seeks to limit
the ability of Assad and others in the Syrian Government to profit from
the ongoing conflict and any post-conflict reconstruction. Sanctions
are also one way to press for accountability from the Assad regime for
its atrocities, some of which amount to war crimes and crimes against
humanity. If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure U.S.
sanctions do not unnecessarily impede humanitarian access in Syria and
that they remain targeted in a way that contributes to progress toward
our political objectives.
Question. Does the Biden administration intend to appoint a new
Special Envoy for Syria? If not, why not? Since closing the U.S.
Embassy in Damascus in February 2012, the U.S. Government has
maintained a Special Envoy for Syria to oversee diplomatic activities
concerning Syria. The Biden administration has not appointed a new
Special Envoy for Syria since the previous envoy left office in January
2021, leaving the position vacant.
Answer. I understand that the State Department does not have any
appointments or nominations to announce at this time, but I am assured
there is a very experienced team in place working on these issues. If
confirmed, I will continue to advance our policy goals in Syria, which
include achieving a comprehensive political resolution that addresses
the factors that drive violence and instability in Syria, under the
parameters of UNSCR 2254 and in close consultation with our allies,
partners, and the UN; ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS; and
promoting the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid to Syrians in
need.
Question. Energy revenues account for approximately 80 percent of
Russia's exports, and the conclusion of the Nord Stream 2 (NS2)
pipeline would provide a financial boon for Russia's Putin regime. At
the same time, Nord Stream 2 pipeline-if finished-would drastically
increase Russia's malign influence and coercive leverage over Europe
especially by exposing Central and Eastern European allies to potential
supply cutoffs and price manipulation by Russia. Does the State
Department continue to publicly maintain that Nord Stream 2 is a
Russian malign influence project? This has been the position of the
U.S. Government, including the Secretary of State and the State
Department, for the last few years.
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has made clear that Nord
Stream 2 is a geo-political project that threatens Europe's energy
security. If confirmed, I support publicly addressing the ongoing
threats to energy, geopolitical security, and European solidarity posed
by Nord Stream2. Nord Stream 2 is a clear example of a tool that Russia
uses for coercive actions in the region and provides the means to use
gas, a critical natural resource, to advance its political goals and
spread its malign influence within Europe.
Question. Why has the State Department not yet imposed sanctions
against NS2 AG itself pursuant to mandatory sanctions against
Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA)? NS2 AG expressly describes
itself on its website as the ``project company established for
planning, construction and subsequent operation of the Nord Stream 2
Pipeline. The company is based in Zug, Switzerland and owned by Public
Joint Stock Company (PJSC) Gazprom.''
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to use all available tools to
counter Russian malign influence, to work with Allies and partners in
the region, and to support Transatlantic energy security goals. I
understand the Department of State is continuing to examine entities
involved in potentially sanctionable activity and will designate
additional persons as appropriate. The administration has made clear to
Germany and other European partners that it does not view Nord Stream 2
as just a commercial deal, but as a threat to Europe's energy security
to strategic stability on the continent.
Question. During the Trump administration, the United States worked
closely with the Government of Japan to facilitate an expedited process
for Foreign Military Sales. Based on that experience, has the State
Department created a best practices template or manual to facilitate
and expedite further Foreign Military Sales to allies and partners?
Please begin your answer with yes or no.
Answer. While the Department has not developed a specific manual or
template for expediting Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to allies and
partners, the State Department adjudicates almost all FMS cases within
48 hours. The Department also continually works with interagency
colleagues and our foreign partners to facilitate and streamline the
FMS process. If confirmed, I will ensure the FMS process works as
smoothly as possible to advance the interests of the United States and
for the benefit of our allies and partners around the world.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. U.S. consulates are a key tool for engaging with local
populations, and I am concerned that the closures of the Vladivostok
and Yekaterinburg consulates will negatively impact our ability to
engage with the Russian people in those areas. What impact will the
closures of those two consulates have on our ability to engage with
Russians in those regions? If confirmed, how will you ensure that the
U.S. continues to engage directly with the Russian people in these
regions?
Answer. At this time, there has been no permanent change to the
consulates' posture. Engaging with Russians, especially those outside
Moscow, is critical to diplomacy. U.S. consulates provide a valuable
platform to convey the deep concerns President Biden has expressed
about the Russian Government's continued efforts to suppress freedom of
expression and peaceful assembly, and to share our values and insights
from the U.S. experience in democracy. During the pandemic, Mission
Russia has adopted a wide range of new virtual tools and hybrid
engagements to maintain a connection with these audiences. If
confirmed, I am committed to continuing, and finding ways to expand,
the Department's virtual engagement.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to advocate for the
release of locally employed consulate staff who remain unjustly
detained in the aftermath of the Turkish coup attempt?
Answer. The Department of State continues to press the Government
of Turkey on behalf of Mission Turkey's three wrongfully accused
locally employed (LE) staff, including by supporting their legal cases
and by calling for their releases and exonerations. Senior Department
and Mission Turkey officials have publicly and privately condemned the
unjust prosecution and conviction of these employees in discussions
with senior Turkish officials, and the Department continues to call for
the swift release of the employee who remains in detention. Department
personnel regularly consult with the LE staff and their families, who
remain appreciative of USG support, and respect their concerns that
public USG statements are more likely to damage than assist their
cases.
Question. More than four years after U.S. personnel overseas began
suffering from a set of mysterious but in many cases debilitating
symptoms, we have more questions than answers about who was behind
these attacks, what the ongoing threat may be to personnel, and, going
forward, what we need to do to protect diplomats and others serving
overseas. Do I have your commitment to engage fully on this issue, to
be transparent with this committee, and to work with relevant
interagency partners to provide Congress all relevant information about
these attacks?
Answer. Yes.
Question. The Department of State faced deep budget cut proposals
every year under the Trump administration. And, as they say, ``if you
show me your budget, I'll tell you your priorities.'' Congress pushed
back repeatedly against these proposed cuts. But they were proposals
that never should have been made to begin with. Do I have your
commitment that you will seek and fight for a full and robustly-funded
Function 150 International Affairs budget?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with you to ensure
a function 150 budget that will allow us to ``make diplomacy the tool
of first resort for U.S. statecraft to achieve the administration's top
foreign policy priorities,'' as the Secretary said on March 3. If
confirmed, I will advocate for the necessary investments in our people
and programs to support and cooperate with our allies and partners
around the world to advance our interests and build back better,
including by furthering the democratic values of prosperity, freedom,
and peace.
Question. The Department of State has remained perilously behind
the curve when it comes to tech innovation and cyber security. The
recent SolarWinds hack is a stark reminder of the high risk of
vulnerabilities in government systems. What do you see as the immediate
priorities for State's cyber infrastructure? What steps will the
Department take in the future to prevent such intrusions and to
mitigate the damage where these intrusions do occur?
Answer. The SolarWinds supply chain compromise is a serious
cybersecurity issue for the federal government and private sector
companies. Cybersecurity remains of paramount importance and if
confirmed I intend to support the Department's efforts to protect and
maintain its cyber infrastructure. These efforts are focused on
dedicated investments in infrastructure, talent, and planning to ensure
the security and resilience of the Department's networks and digital
assets, thereby protecting its global workforce and the citizens we
serve. We must also ensure that the Department's internal governance
structure for cybersecurity is properly aligned to protect the
Department's networks.
Question. How is the Department cooperating and coordinating with
other relevant USG agencies and offices to address the intrusion and to
repair any damage?
Answer. While a full assessment of the incident is ongoing, I will,
if confirmed, support the Department's continued cooperation and
coordination with the joint Cyber Unified Coordination Group in
addressing the SolarWinds vulnerability. It is critical that the
federal government also work with private sector partners to address
the ever-expanding landscape of threats.
Question. In September 2020, State's Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) identified $200 million spent on Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership programs as potentially wasteful spending
due to mismanagement and inadequate oversight from staff in the Africa
Bureau. The OIG found that, among other contributing factors, the
Africa Bureau continuously experiences staffing shortages, and that the
State Department has not appropriately prioritized the Africa Bureau's
needs. As Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, what will you
do to ensure that the Africa Bureau has adequate resources and staff,
including a properly skilled, trained, and incentivized workforce
equipped to meet the bureau's needs and objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of African
Affairs to ensure it has the resources, including personnel, necessary
to meet the bureau's objectives. I recognize that the Bureau of African
Affairs is chronically understaffed both in terms of positions and
vacancies. If confirmed, I will review our staffing levels around the
world to ensure that our embassies and bureaus are adequately staffed
to meet our duties and advance our interests. Staffing must be aligned
with our most pressing interests, including oversight of critical
programs like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. If
confirmed, I will explore enhancing incentives to serve at hardship
posts, including those in Africa, and will look for other ways to
ensure that our vacancies are filled, which would address elements of
the OIG report related to field-based oversight.
Question. I understand that our embassy in Niger lacked both a
political officer and an economic officer for months on end, at a time
when that country was preparing for historic elections, chairing the
Economic Community of West African States regional bloc, and engaging
in counterterrorism operations in the increasingly insecure Sahel.
Similarly, despite an armed uprising and a recent contentious election,
our embassy in the Central African Republic reportedly lacks a
political officer. As Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources,
what will you do to ensure that hard to fill posts, especially in
Africa, are appropriately staffed by qualified Foreign Service
Officers?
Answer. The Department offers a number of incentives for employees
to serve voluntarily in difficult locations. These include hardship
differential payments of 5 percent to 35 percent, and danger pay when
appropriate. Service need differential provides an additional 15
percent of salary for employees who agree to serve an extra year at
posts that are particularly difficult to staff. There are also
procedural incentives, such as the ability to take ``stretch''
assignments into higher-ranking positions that may offer more
challenging work and greater opportunities for promotion. If confirmed,
I will continue to review these incentives and calibrate them to
America's national interests overseas.
Question. There are long-standing concerns among career civil
service employees that the Department is ``designed'' for the career
foreign service, with few career advancement pathways for the career
civil service. The lack of such pathways can mean that the Department
loses talent to outside industries or to another office or bureau with
higher-graded positions available. How will you address these long-
standing concerns among career civil service employees, and create
intentional and transparent pathways to career advancement?
Answer. I am committed to listening to the workforce and ensuring
we retain high performers by investing in their professional
development and strengthening programs that mentor individuals for
success, provide actionable feedback on performance, chart career
progression, provide more interagency and other detail opportunities,
and create viable pathways for those in the Civil Service who aspire to
advance their careers. I support efforts to expand existing career
development and detail opportunities for Civil Service employees.
Question. Some of the most successful businesses in the world have
developed extensive employee training and career-long mentoring
programs. The Department has a renowned facility in the Foreign Service
Institute that plays a critical role in training both foreign and civil
service employees. Unfortunately, there are very few classes focused on
developing the management skills necessary to maximize the morale and
effectiveness of Department employees. Do you believe the Department
should develop a more robust management training initiative to ensure
that sound management skills are viewed as a necessary skill not just
for ``management-coned'' foreign service officers?
Answer. Yes, I believe that management skills should be widely
taught to all of our foreign affairs professionals, and that all
training should reinforce the leadership skills needed to build up
employees' morale and effectiveness. If confirmed, I will continue to
promote FSI's commitment to providing world class training to employees
across the Department. I will work to ensure FSI remains committed to
seeking additional ways to expand its reach in these crucial areas.
Question. Do you commit to reviewing existing management trainings
and reporting back to the committee with recommendations for
improvement?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to a full review of current
management skills training at FSI and will report back to the committee
with recommendations for improvement as necessary.
Question. A recent survey of executive-level staff at the State
Department conducted by Executive Women at State found concerning
trends that inhibit career advancement for women. More than half of the
respondents ranked 15 of the 22 barriers measured in the survey as
having a huge or significant impact on the advancement of women at the
Department; 75 percent of respondents described gender-related bias as
having substantial impact on their careers. Do you commit to reviewing
this report and its recommendations, and prioritizing a review of how
the Department can reduce barriers for women to increase retention and
help more women serve in senior roles?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review this report, and will work to
build upon the Department's ongoing initiatives and framework to
increase flexibilities and support for our workforce. The Department
instituted a number of policy changes designed to advance equal
opportunity for women in the workforce and address barrier concerns
raised by affinity groups and associations. In line with the
recommendation of the January 2020 GAO report, ``Additional Steps Are
Needed to Identify Potential Barriers to Diversity,'' if confirmed, I
commit to the Department's undertaking of further analysis to explore
barriers to equal advancement for women and what remedies can be taken
to mitigate those barriers to support the retention and career
advancement of women at the State Department.
Question. It is no secret that the Department's morale has sunk to
historic lows over the past several years under President Trump and
Secretary Pompeo. Secretary Blinken has already made great strides in
addressing distrust and improving morale at the Department, but much
work remains to make sure that the Department's workforce is empowered
and trusted to carry out its critical diplomatic work. What steps will
you take to rebuild the morale of the people who serve at the
Department and to ensure the Department has a workforce that is
supported and empowered to carry out their mission to the best of their
abilities?
Answer. The people who work for the Department of State are
committed public servants who uphold U.S. policies to protect U.S.
citizens and their interests abroad. The marginalization and loss of
career talent over the last four years has coincided with declines in
overall employee job satisfaction in annual workforce surveys. The
report issued by your committee last July, ``Diplomacy in Crisis,''
also chronicles the decline in morale at the Department, among other
things. That said, the nearly 77,000 State Department employees
worldwide remain resilient. If confirmed, I am committed to improving
the State Department to advance our security and prosperity, including
by investing in a diplomatic corps that fully represents the United
States in all its talent and diversity. That means recruiting,
retaining, and providing career development opportunities to officers
with the skills to contend with 21st century challenges and who
represent the diversity of the country we represent. I will spare no
effort, if confirmed, to ensure their safety and well-being and demand
accountability for fostering a more diverse, inclusive and non-partisan
workplace.
Question. Last year, I published a report, Diplomacy in Crisis,
which laid out the challenges facing the Department's workforce. It
cited employee survey data that showed some disturbing trends-for
example, steep increases in the number of staff who said they feared
reprisal or retribution if they were to report a violation of law. Does
that concern you, and how do you plan to reverse that culture?
Answer. I reviewed the committee's report prior to the confirmation
hearing. These findings do concern me. I agree that retaliation for
participating in the EEO process or anti-harassment program, requesting
a reasonable accommodation, or for opposing discriminatory practices is
unlawful, grounds for discipline, and counter to good management;
employees do best when they have the ability to speak up and help the
Department improve. The release of the forthcoming Diversity and
Inclusion Strategic Plan will help guide a collective action approach
to, among other things, fostering a culture that encourages people to
speak up. If confirmed, as a senior leader in the Department, this work
will be a priority.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator James E. Risch
Question. The COVID-19 pandemic originated and accelerated in
higher-income countries, where USAID does not maintain a regular
presence and where diplomatic engagement proved critical to securing
access for global health experts on the one hand and the evacuation of
American citizens on the other. Who is responsible for the execution of
U.S. foreign policy at overseas posts, including diplomatic engagement
to advance U.S. global health security interests in countries of all
income categories: the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), or the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC)?
Answer. At every overseas mission, the chief of mission is
responsible for the execution of U.S. foreign policy. Multiple agencies
have personnel on the ground under chief of mission authority, and the
State Department works closely with all relevant agencies to deliver on
our robust U.S. Government foreign policy objectives.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to organize and resource
the Department to advance the global health security and diplomacy
objectives of the United States overseas?
Answer. The Department of State is firmly committed to using
diplomacy to advance global health security objectives. The Department
has already begun to mobilize an international response to COVID-19
with an initial $2 billion contribution to Gavi, which will support
COVAX, along with a pledge to provide an additional $2 billion through
2022. The State Department's efforts to address the full range of
global health security threats are facilitated by the close
coordination of bureaus across the Department and the interagency. I
understand the State Department is reviewing options to structure its
response to meet critical policy objectives and, if confirmed I look
forward to being part of these efforts and working with Congress as
planning progresses.
Question. The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator was recently
directed to suspend its Country Operating Plan (COP) process, which had
already reached an advanced stage, in order to alleviate burdens on
implementing partners during the COVID-19 outbreak. While sympathetic
to the needs of implementing partners, the COP process and the data-
driven approach it has institutionalized is vital to the effective
planning and execution of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR) programs. If confirmed, will you ensure that the State
Department-led COP process is restored and that the implementing
agencies--USAID and CDC--adhere to such plans without unwarranted
delays or deviations?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is fully committed to and
supportive of PEPFAR. On March 5, 2021, the Department announced plans
for the COP/ROP 2021 planning process to resume on April 1, 2021, and
conclude no later than May 21, 2021. If confirmed, I will be firmly
committed to ensuring that collaborative, transparent, and data-driven
COP/ROP 2021 plans are completed in every PEPFAR-supported country and
region and that there is no disruption in HIV services at the start of
FY 2022. Following COP/ROP 2021 approvals, I understand that PEPFAR
will move expeditiously through the required processes of Congressional
notifications, approvals, and transfer of funds to implementing
agencies in advance of the beginning of FY 2022.
Question. During his confirmation process, this committee asked
Secretary Blinken: ``Under your leadership as Secretary of State, what
actions will you pursue to ensure that hard-to-fill posts in Sub-
Saharan Africa are sufficiently and consistently staffed?'' On January
19, he replied in writing: ``If confirmed, I will work with the White
House and relevant State Department bureaus and offices to ensure that
all posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently and consistently
staffed with the appropriate personnel.'' Secretary Blinken's response
was insufficient because it merely re-phrased the question into an
answer and was non-specific on any action reflecting a change in
priority from previous administrations. What do you view as the most
pressing management and staffing challenges facing the Department's
Bureau of African Affairs?
Answer. Advancing the State Department's diplomatic agenda and
implementing innovative, effective foreign assistance programs depends
on its personnel. The Bureau of African Affairs has been chronically
understaffed both domestically and overseas, impeding the Department's
ability to achieve the administration's goals, as well as to seize
opportunities when they appear. Staffing must be aligned with our most
pressing interests, including oversight of critical programs like the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. If confirmed I will explore
enhancing incentives to serve at hardship posts, including those in
Africa, and will look for other ways to ensure that our vacancies are
filled.
The Department offers a number of incentives for employees to serve
voluntarily in difficult locations. These include hardship differential
payments of 5 percent to 35 percent, and danger pay when appropriate.
Service need differential provides an additional 15 percent of salary
for employees who agree to serve an extra year at posts that are
particularly difficult to staff. There are also procedural incentives,
such as the ability to take ``stretch'' assignments into higher-ranking
positions that may offer more challenging work and greater
opportunities for promotion. If confirmed, I will continue to review
these incentives and calibrate them to America's national interests
overseas.
Question. What specific actions will you prioritize in your role to
ensure that the Africa Bureau's staffing efforts focus on building
regional expertise, diversity, and preparedness so the Department can
sufficiently and consistently staff hard-to-fill posts in Africa?
Answer. I recognize that the Bureau of African Affairs is
chronically understaffed, both in terms of positions and vacancies. If
confirmed, I will review the State Department's staffing levels around
the world to ensure that staffing is aligned with its most pressing
interests. I will explore enhancing incentives to serve at hardship
posts, including those in Africa, and will look for other ways to
ensure that our vacancies are filled. I am committed to an inclusive
workplace and, if confirmed, will support the Bureau of African
Affairs' efforts as they work to implement management reforms for
recruitment, hiring, and retention.
Question. Recently, legal restrictions--commonly referred to as
``section 889''--have gone into effect that severely limit the types of
telecommunications networks that U.S. Government departments and
agencies can use overseas. These restrictions were an attempt to combat
the Chinese Government's sale and use of Chinese companies'
technological networks and equipment in other countries to engage in
espionage. However, many countries' networks are so saturated by
prohibited telecommunications equipment that complying with section
889, absent a waiver, may limit the ability of our posts to operate
abroad. How do you assess the burden placed on the Department by these
restrictions?
Answer. Compliance with FY 2019 NDAA Section 889 places an extreme
burden on the Department's ability to conduct diplomacy in those
nations where access to trusted networks is limited or non-existent.
The current ODNI national security interest waivers mitigate the impact
of Section 889, enabling the State Department to continue to supply its
posts with critical services. There are parts of the world where it is
unlikely that any trusted vendor will be available. Current ODNI
waivers expire in 2022. Without waiver extensions, changes to the
compliance regimen, or unforeseen technical solutions, the Department
will be severely impacted in its ability to conduct diplomacy overseas.
Question. Do you believe that the Department should be able to
implement these restrictions fully without diminishing its ability to
operate abroad?
Answer. While I strongly support the intent of Section 889 of the
2019 NDAA, I understand that the current global market upon which the
Department relies cannot meet the provision's requirements without
waivers while continuing to accomplish the Department's mission. Absent
a waiver, critical mission area activities will cease or be seriously
hindered.
Question. Are there costs associated with these restrictions?
Answer. As a result of the ODNI approved waivers, I understand that
the initial cost of compliance has been manageable and mainly focused
on administrative workloads. As alternatives and compliant sources are
identified overseas, it is anticipated the cost of compliance will
increase when transitioning overseas acquisitions to compliant
services.
Question. Would the Department be able to operate without the
waivers currently granted by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) to the Department?
Answer. I understand that the Department of State would not be able
to operate without the waivers currently granted by the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI). ODNI granted nine waivers under section
889(d)(2) until September 30, 2022, to allow the Department to continue
contracting activities that would otherwise be prohibited under section
889(a)(l)(B). I understand that these waivers cover not only
contracting for telecommunications services, but also contracting for
security services and equipment and many other programs and services
vital to the Department and potentially impacted by the breadth of
section 889(a)(1)(B).
The Department will make use of these waivers until an offeror
attests itself eligible under section 889(a) or until alternative
sources eligible under section 889 can be identified and contractual
arrangements and necessary transitions implemented.
Question. Do you plan to request an extension of waivers?
Answer. Without change to the current compliance requirements, I
understand that the Department must pursue extensions of all waivers
granted by ODNI. I am committed to protecting U.S. telecommunications
and, if confirmed, will work across government agencies and in the
international community to adopt networks based on trusted supply
chains
Question. Do you commit to work with Congress to find a long-term
solution that ensures secure, reliable communications while encouraging
foreign governments to move away from prohibited technological
networks?
Answer. Yes. I strongly support the intent of the FY 2019 NDAA
Section 889 and concur that steps must be taken to contract with safe,
reliable, and secure services. If confirmed, I will continue to engage
with the Department's interagency partners to develop a unified long-
term solution.
Question. One troubling trend my staff and I have identified during
our travels over the previous Congress is that many of our diplomats
are not getting out from behind embassy walls and meeting with the
local population or even other diplomats. Frequently, we are told that
the security requirements are too great to support regular traverses to
and from embassy compounds. This intolerance of reasonable, voluntary
risk sacrifices advancement of U.S. interests for airtight security and
keeps our diplomats from being able to do their jobs. Does the
inability of State Department diplomats to leave the embassies at which
they are currently stationed put the Department at a strategic
disadvantage?
Answer. Consistent in-person outreach remains essential to
advancing U.S. foreign policy goals. Doing this work requires a
diplomatic presence in some of the most difficult and dangerous
environments in the world. The Department of State continues to
prioritize people-to-people engagement and relationships while taking
into account a wide range of threats, including the unique local
circumstances at each post. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing
the Department's current overseas operating posture and consulting with
Congress and internal Department stakeholders such as the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security to determine if current laws and our policies to
mitigate operational risk should be modified.
Question. Do Chinese, Russian, and Iranian diplomats face similar
restrictions to those placed on U.S. diplomats?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to answer the question of
exactly what restrictions are now being placed on Chinese, Russian, and
Iranian diplomats.
Question. Do you support getting our diplomats back outside posts?
If yes, how so?
Answer. The Department of State strives to provide the most secure
environment possible for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy while
acknowledging that there is never a guarantee of complete safety. The
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) makes every effort to ensure that
the Department's personnel and contractors are aware of potential risks
and trained accordingly. State Department employees understand the
risks but face them every day to advance U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests on behalf of the American people. If
confirmed, I will work with the DS to maximize the ability of our
diplomats to work outside posts whenever possible through effective
risk mitigation and management decisions.
Question. Do you intend to emphasize to the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, regional security officers, and chiefs of mission your desire
to do so? If yes, what specific steps will you take?
Answer. Engaging diplomatically outside posts whenever possible is
paramount to the success of the Department. If confirmed, I intend to
work closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure our
foreign affairs community can effectively achieve U.S. foreign policy
goals with an acceptable level of risk.
Question. Should security concerns always take precedence over the
ability of our diplomats to operate abroad?
Answer. Security conditions faced by our foreign affairs community
overseas evolve, but the need to operate globally and carry out the
State Department's diplomatic mission remains constant. If confirmed, I
commit to ensuring the Department routinely assesses the threat
environment in which its people live and work, mitigating risk with all
the tools at our disposal, and making informed risk management
decisions. My objective will always be to ensure personnel working in
the Department's diplomatic missions overseas are able to carry out
their duties in as safe and secure an environment as possible.
Question. How should diplomatic objectives be weighed in relation
to security concerns, particularly with regard to embassy security?
Answer. I understand that the Department uses a variety of
policies, training, and techniques to weigh diplomatic objectives in
relation to security concerns. The Department sets a high baseline of
security practices for all personnel and diplomatic facilities wherever
they are located. If confirmed, I intend to continuously review and
improve the Department's global security standards without sacrificing
our ability to effectively fulfill our diplomatic mission.
Question. Between late 2016 and May 2018, the State Department
found that certain U.S. Embassy community members suffered a series of
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues. If
confirmed, will you commit to continuing the investigation into the
circumstances surrounding the sonic attacks?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be wholly committed to engaging in the
ongoing investigation into circumstances surrounding the unexplained
health incidents. The Department continues to work on determining what
happened to our staff and their families and to ensure their well-being
and health going forward. There is no higher priority than the safety
and security of our U.S. personnel, their families, and U.S. citizens.
Question. Will you seek to ensure the safety and security of U.S.
diplomatic personnel in Havana and other posts where personnel have
been injured?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure the
safety and security of U.S. personnel and their families under Chief of
Mission security responsibility. The Department is working to determine
what happened to its staff and their families and to ensure the well-
being and health of our officials going forward. That investigation is
ongoing and is a high priority.
Question. Dozens of these cases were reported by personnel
stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba. To date, Cuba has
refused to cooperate with investigations into these reports. Is it in
the national interest of the United States to assign an ambassador to
Cuba before the Cuban Government fully and credibly cooperates with
these investigations and explains the targeted attacks on U.S.
diplomats in Havana?
Answer. The Department of State has no higher priority than the
safety and security of U.S. personnel, their families, and U.S.
citizens. The Department continues to review its staffing posture to
ensure that Embassy Havana can continue its core mission effectively
and safely. The Department continually reminds the Cuban Government of
its obligation under the Vienna Convention to take all appropriate
steps to protect our diplomats.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to support all State
Department employees and their families who were injured by these sonic
attacks, including those employees who have since left the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting all State
Department employees and their families who were injured by these
unexplained health incidents, regardless of employment status. To
ensure that affected personnel receive the appropriate care, the
Department established the Senior Care Coordinator position to serve as
an advocate for the affected personnel and provide administrative
support including assistance in applying for workers' compensation.
This position is an advocate for all affected personnel.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work constructively with
other government agencies to find the cause of the attacks and
determine the best ways to support those U.S. Government employees who
have been injured?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be wholly committed to strengthening
interagency cooperation on this issue. The Department has partnered
with multiple agencies to help identify the source and cause of these
injuries. Recently, the Department designated a senior-level official
as the Senior Advisor to the Health Incidents Response Task Force who
will advise senior Department leadership and coordinate the
Department's response to the health incidents with the interagency.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to regularly share new
information on this issue with Congress, including updates on any live
investigations?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to regularly share new
information on this issue as appropriate.
Question. Do you support Congress passing a State Department
authorization bill?
Answer. As you might imagine, given my years working with the
President, including in his capacity as chairman of this committee, I
have been very involved in and supportive of Congressional efforts to
pass a State Department Authorization Act. If confirmed, I am committed
to working with the committee on our shared interest in strengthening
the capabilities of the Department, including through legislation as
necessary.
Question. Do you believe it is important that the Department be
explicitly authorized outside of the appropriations process?
Answer. I do think it is important. Given my past work on the staff
of the committee, I appreciate the role of the Senate Foreign Relations
committee, in considering and developing authorization legislation
pertaining to Department operations. I recall, too, the challenges
encountered at times in efforts to secure such authorization. If
confirmed, I am committed to working with the committee on legislative
proposals, particularly those providing needed authorizations.
Question. Do you believe that the role the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is important in providing congressional oversight?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you commit to making Department personnel under your
purview available for timely briefings upon request?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department
makes available personnel who are well-positioned to be responsive to
your requests in a timely manner.
Question. In light of the massive cyber hack of the U.S. federal
Government that was reported in December 2020, how important is
cybersecurity to the State Department and U.S. diplomacy?
Answer. Cybersecurity is of paramount importance to the Department
of State. The Department needs to ensure cybersecurity is an integral
part of its efforts, including as it adopts new technologies to meet
new global diplomacy demands. The continually evolving threat to the
cyber landscape requires a dedicated investment in infrastructure,
talent, and planning to ensure the security and resilience of our
networks and digital assets while protecting its global workforce and
the citizens we serve.
Question. What cybersecurity challenges does the Department
currently face?
Answer. As with any global organization, the Department of State is
an attractive target for malicious cyber activity. Therefore, the
Department is always engaged in identifying cybersecurity threats and
taking steps to counter any threats. Cyber threat actors will likely
prioritize exploitation of the Department's maximum telework and global
posture and attempt to target remote access solutions and devices to
collect internal Department information. Threat actors will attempt to
identify and exploit any new vulnerabilities in operations.
Additionally, cyber threat actors may be more likely to target supply
chain operations against the Department's software providers, inspired
by the recent SolarWinds event. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the
Department's cybersecurity efforts are geared toward addressing these
challenges.
Question. How do you intend to improve cybersecurity at the
Department?
Answer. The Department's approach to cybersecurity is rooted in a
deep understanding of the operational nexus between malicious cyber
activity and counterintelligence threats and the need to develop
proactive solutions for managing the Department's global cyber exposure
and ensuring a safe and reliable digital environment for performing the
diplomatic mission. To proactively defend against current, emerging,
and future cybersecurity threats, the Department should continue steps
to consolidate network monitoring and infrastructure IT operations and
maintenance as well as maximize network visibility, auditing, and
configuration management. The Department must ensure rigorous
vulnerability management and swift patch deployment, while leveraging a
matrix of cybersecurity, security technology, and investigative
capabilities to detect, analyze, and defend against all cyber threats.
Question. As with any workforce, high morale among the State
Department's employees is vital to attracting and retaining talent. Is
morale at the Department a problem?
Answer. The people who work for the Department of State are
committed public servants who uphold U.S. policies to protect U.S.
citizens and their interests abroad. The marginalization and loss of
career talent over the last four years has coincided with declines in
overall employee job satisfaction in annual workforce surveys, as well
a reduction in test takers for the Foreign Service exam. That said, the
nearly 77,000 State Department employees worldwide remain resilient and
work every day to advance the interests of the American people.
Question. If yes, how do you intend to improve and maintain morale
at the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to improving and maintaining a
State Department workforce that advances our security and prosperity,
including by developing a diplomatic corps that fully represents the
United States in all its talent and diversity. That means recruiting,
retaining, and providing career development opportunities to personnel
with the skills to contend with 21st century challenges and who reflect
our country's diversity. I will spare no effort, if confirmed, to
ensure their safety and well-being and demand accountability for
fostering a more diverse, inclusive and non-partisan workplace.
Question. Are there specific areas of morale (or bureaus) that you
believe need immediate attention?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to speak to this question,
but if confirmed, one of my first priorities will be to investigate the
areas and bureaus that may need urgent attention. I commit to ensuring
the safety and well-being of the entire workforce and demand
accountability for fostering a more diverse, inclusive, and non-
partisan workplace.
Question. In 2017, Congress passed a lateral entry pilot program
for the Foreign Service which the Department has yet to implement. Do
you commit to begin implementation of the program in 2021 and to design
it as Congress intended?
Answer. I understand the Department developed and planned to roll
out a new Lateral Entry Pilot Program for Foreign Service generalists
in FY 2021. Implementation was delayed for Congressional consultation
and notification requirements in the Department's annual appropriations
act and by the Department's focus on responding to the global COVID-19
pandemic. If confirmed, I commit to resume implementation of the
program when appropriate.
Question. Currently, Foreign Service oral assessments are only held
in Washington, D.C., throughout the year and once a year in San
Francisco, California. On February 24, 2021, Secretary Blinken issued a
press statement saying that, in order to effectively represent the
American people to the world, ``we must recruit and retain a workforce
that truly reflects America.'' Is geographic diversity important is
building a Department that ``truly reflects America''?
Answer. The Department administers the Foreign Service Oral
Assessment outside of Washington, D.C. twice each year, in San
Francisco in February and in Chicago in May. In addition, the
Department maintains a national recruitment platform that includes
geographic diversity in its strategic recruiting objectives. In 2020,
the recruitment team conducted 1,500 events nationwide. Secretary
Blinken is committed to increasing diversity, including geographic
diversity, at all levels through recruitment and retention as a major
priority. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to build a
diverse workforce that is fully representative of our Nation.
Question. Do you think making it easier and more cost effective for
Americans outside of Washington, D.C., and northern California to take
the Foreign Service oral assessments would encourage a more
geographically diverse Foreign Service?
Answer. Secretary Blinken and I are committed to building a diverse
workforce representative of the American people--including
geographically--and the Department will continue to expand the
accessibility of the Foreign Service assessment process. If confirmed,
I will dedicate resources to continue modernizing talent acquisition
and support additional innovations to attract exceptional talent. The
Department typically offers the Foreign Service Oral Assessment outside
of Washington, D.C., twice each year in San Francisco (February) and
Chicago (May). In response to COVID-19 disruptions, the Department
successfully piloted a virtual oral assessment for Specialist
candidates in June 2020. If confirmed, I will direct my team to resume
in-person oral assessments outside Washington, D.C., as soon as
conditions allow.
Question. Do you commit to expanding the number of locations where
the Foreign Service oral assessments can be administered?
Answer. COVID-19 caused disruptions to the assessment process. To
overcome this, in June 2020 the Department successfully piloted a
virtual oral assessment for Foreign Service Specialist candidates.
Although the Generalist Foreign Service Oral Assessment could not be
adapted to a virtual format, the Department's prioritization of public
health measures at the assessment facility will permit in-person oral
assessments to resume in Washington, D.C., in late March. When health
and safety conditions permit, the Department will again offer the
Foreign Service Oral Assessment outside of Washington, D.C., twice each
year, in San Francisco and in Chicago. If confirmed, I will dedicate
resources to continue modernizing talent acquisition and support
additional innovations to attract exceptional talent.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to briefing this committee on
the administration's use of special envoys, including with respect to
the constitutional and legal authority to appoint such officials?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to briefing this committee on the
administration's use of special envoys, including with respect to the
relevant appointment authorities.
Question. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 establishes
an Office of Sanctions Coordination within the Department of State. If
confirmed, do you commit to work with my office and this committee to
ensure that this office succeeds and fulfills its statutory mandate?
Answer. Yes, I am aware that this office has been re-established in
statute, and that the law requires the administration to appoint a head
of such office to have the rank of ambassador and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. I understand that the Department is actively
reviewing these new requirements. If confirmed, I believe there will be
the opportunity for me to engage in this process, as we will want to
ensure that any such official would have the expertise and stature,
including political support, to operate effectively within the U.S.
Government and internationally.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. While a Senate staffer working for then-Senator Biden--
first in his Senate office as a foreign policy legislative assistant,
and later as chief counsel on the staff of the Committee on Foreign
Relations--I developed and executed on legislative and oversight
efforts to protect and enhance the work of U.S. international
broadcasting, which provides objective news and information to
audiences around the world. In particular:
Early in the Clinton administration, Senator Biden blocked an
effort, proposed in the first budget submitted by President
Clinton, to close Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).
Senator Biden believed, as I did, that it was premature to
close the radio services, given that democratic governments and
traditions in Europe and Eurasia after the collapse of the
Soviet bloc were not firmly established. In that period, we
also learned from testimony by leaders such as Poland's Lech
Walesa of the power of these services during the Cold War in
sustaining dissident movements. With the regression of
democracy in the region since then, it is clear that the
decision to preserve RFE/RL was well-founded.
Based on the success of RFE/RL, Senator Biden authored the
legislation that led to the creation of a similar `surrogate'
radio service to broadcast to China and other countries in East
Asia. ``Radio Free Asia (RFA)'' was established by legislation
enacted in 1994 and initiated broadcasts in 1996. Today, the
service has a well-established reputation for its coverage of
news in the countries to which it broadcasts and has earned
numerous journalism awards. For example, in 2019, a journalist
from RFA's Uyghur service received the Magnitsky Human Rights
Award for her reporting on the humanitarian and human rights
situation in China's Xinjiang region.
When legislation was proposed to consolidate U.S. foreign affairs
agencies in the 1990s, Senator Biden insisted that the Broadcasting
Board of Governors (BBG)--then a part of the U.S. Information Agency--
be maintained as an independent agency, and not merged into the
Department of State, based on our concern that doing so would
jeopardize the journalistic integrity of the broadcasting services
supported by the BBG.
As chief counsel to the Committee on Foreign Relations, in
coordination with a human rights organization, I initiated a standard
set of questions for the record that were posed to every ambassadorial
nominee about human rights issues in the country to which they had been
nominated. We also later undertook to request follow-up reports from
the ambassadors after they had been at post for a number of months. I
believe this process helped to sensitize nominees to the importance of
these issues and ensure that they were giving priority attention to
human rights issues as part of their work.
Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote,
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and
underrepresented groups?
Answer. Diversity is the key to unlocking an organization's
potential as diverse teams consistently demonstrate high performance
due to their creativity and innovation. If confirmed, I commit to
upholding and fully implementing the Department's leadership and
management tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to
strengthen teams across the Department. I will hold senior leaders
accountable for promulgating fairness and transparency in their day-to-
day decisions and will seek progress reports, working with the new
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, on their continued commitment to
championing diversity and inclusion.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure each of the
supervisors at the Department of State is fostering an environment that
is diverse and inclusive?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ask those who report to me to provide
updates on their initiatives and contributions to advance diversity and
inclusion at the State Department. I will encourage leaders to
prioritize innovation and creativity across teams, ensuring that all
voices are heard and that their contributions matter. If confirmed, I
will support, empower, and work with the new Chief Diversity and
Inclusion Officer and bureau representatives to implement Department-
wide diversity and inclusion policies, ensure transparency of these
initiatives, and hold senior leadership accountable for progress.
Question. Do you commit to bring to the committee's attention (and
the State Department Inspector General) any change in policy or U.S.
actions that you suspect may be influenced by any of the President's
business or financial interests, or the business or financial interests
of any senior White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules, and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you commit to inform the committee if you have any
reason to suspect that a foreign government, head of state, or foreign-
controlled entity is taking any action in order to benefit any of the
President's business or financial interests, or the interests of senior
White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you or do any members of your immediate family have
any financial interests in any foreign country?
Answer. My spouse does not have any financial interests in a
foreign country. My investment portfolio, as set forth in my SF-278
submitted to the committee, includes mutual funds and exchange traded
funds, including a foreign stock fund, which may hold interests in
companies with an international presence, but these funds are exempt
from the conflict of interest laws. I am committed to following all
applicable ethics laws and regulations and remaining vigilant with
regard to my ethics obligations. I will divest any investments the
State Department Ethics Office deems necessary to avoid a conflict of
interest.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. There is the proliferation of special envoys, who are
often political appointees, and who tend to duplicate work that should
belong to the regional bureaus and other permanent offices of the
Department. This is not to say that special envoys cannot play a role
in certain circumstances, but many career diplomats seem to think there
have been too many in recent years. If confirmed, what will you do to
streamline the Department, reduce wasteful spending, and do away with
redundant positions?
Answer. I understand that the Secretary shares your concern about
the proliferation of redundant positions. I also am aware that some
special envoy positions are required by law. If confirmed, I will work
toward accomplishing the Secretary's goals of efficient and effective
management, including by examining the Department's use of special
envoys.
Question. It is critically important that we have a Foreign Service
that is designed to meet the needs of this century. The talent we have
recruited to the Foreign Service is impressive, but I think there are
ways to further strengthen how we identify new talent and train the
workforce that we have. To meet the challenges of this century, our
Foreign Service must be structured to counter the malign influence of
the Chinese Communist Party. The new regional China officer positions
created during the last administration were a good step in this
direction. If confirmed, what would you do to shift the focus of the
Foreign Service toward developing regional expertise and advanced
language skills, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region? If the
generalist model is to be retained, are you prepared to carve out a
separate track for political and economic officers who specialize in
one region and/or critical language?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to examining the best ways to
develop and advance the skills of Department employees so they are
prepared to meet global challenges, including the challenges posed by
China. In addition to operational and leadership effectiveness,
officers wishing to get into the Senior Foreign Service must
demonstrate language proficiency. The new Professional Development
Program also gives officers the flexibility to focus on and build
expertise in a specific region.
I understand in 2020 the State Department stood up a Mandarin
Language Task Force to answer the continuing critical need for regional
expertise and advanced Chinese language skills. The task force has
already delivered an Advanced Mandarin Training Program, with students
starting in-country, in-depth language training in Summer 2021.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to an evaluation of the
personnel numbers in each region and adjust accordingly?
Answer. People are the most important State Department asset and
properly aligning them to regions and posts is essential to achieving
our mission objectives. If confirmed, I will work to make sure that the
State Department has the appropriate people in the right place at the
right time to achieve its objectives.
Question. Another perennial problem is that too many Foreign
Service officers have traditionally regarded human rights and democracy
promotion as the responsibility of civil servants in the Department of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), or USAID, but not the Foreign
Service. If confirmed, what will you do to raise the importance of
human rights and democracy issues in the Foreign Service?
Answer. The President and Secretary Blinken have made clear that
America's cherished democratic values are at the center of this
administration's foreign policy. If confirmed, I will ensure that this
is reflected in human resources decisions as well as policy actions. I
pledge to encourage Foreign Service Officers, most of whom passionately
and skillfully carry the mantle of human rights and democracy promotion
in the execution of their duties, to serve in DRL and to elevate their
attention to these issues, wherever they serve. If confirmed, I look
forward to working to better enable Foreign Service Officers to build a
career around these important issues and to elevate the roles that
human rights and labor officers play at our embassies.
Question. I hear from married couples in the Foreign Service that
getting assignments in the same country is often difficult. It is
important that we find creative ways to keep married couples together,
both for morale reasons and to make the best use of the talent we have.
If confirmed, what will you do to support Foreign Service families and
tandem couples?
Answer. I strongly support efforts to help tandem couples find
appropriate positions at the same post, while also ensuring that we
meet service need, promote career development, and follow the law such
that no advantage or disadvantage accrues to any employee on marital
status grounds. If confirmed, I will look for ways to expand workplace
flexibilities for tenured employees to increase opportunities for
tandems to serve together, including identifying aligning tours of
duty, expanding positions eligible for domestic employees teleworking
overseas, and identifying more opportunities for in-country language
training.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. Sluggish State Department hiring procedures--including a
pre-pandemic average of six months to complete a security clearance--
contribute to recruitment challenges and poor morale, and create
significant staffing gaps. This is particularly true overseas, where
embassies rely on spouses, known as eligible family members (EFMs), to
fulfill critical professional and support roles. These positions can be
vacant as often as one-third to one-half of the time due to the lengthy
hiring and security process. If confirmed, what will you do to address
sluggish State Department hiring procedures, particularly for eligible
family members?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support ongoing efforts of
the Department's senior leadership to re-engineer the security
clearance process for all employees, including EFMs. The government-
wide Federal Investigative Standards, implemented in 2017, has
increased the work that goes into completing background investigations,
which impacts EFM onboarding. To streamline family member employment to
fill available positions overseas, I am committed to expanding
membership in the Foreign Service Family Reserve Corps (FSFRC), where
eligible EFMs are appointed to a position that allow them to maintain
their current security clearance during gaps in employment at posts.
The FSFRC is a helpful tool in reducing the time needed to hire and
onboard EFMs overseas.
Question. The pandemic has necessitated a swift move to remote
work, highlighting possibilities for expanding the use of telework even
after the current health emergency is under control. Would you support
increasing the number of foreign and civil service domestic positions
approved for telework overseas (i.e. DETO, domestically employed
teleworking overseas) and opening them to EFMs and tandem spouses?
Answer. During the pandemic, Foreign Service personnel and employed
family members teleworked from the United States to provide remote
assistance to our missions around the world. The Department implemented
new workplace flexibilities allowing domestic employees to telework
remotely from other U.S. locations to maintain an agile workforce. In
the past five years, the Department doubled the number of both Foreign
and Civil Service DETOs, which allowed qualifying employees to perform
their domestic work overseas for a defined period of time. Family
members who encumber Civil Service and Foreign Service positions may
enter DETO arrangements to perform work from the location of their
spouse's overseas assignment. If confirmed, I will strongly support the
Department's focus on enhancing employee workplace flexibilities,
including telework and remote work.
Question. Would you instruct offices to re-examine policies that
permit remote telework only after several months of in-office work,
thereby eliminating eligible overseas applicants from applying?
Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support the Department's
focus on enhancing employee workplace flexibilities, including telework
and remote work. The pandemic has reinforced the need for such
flexibilities and demonstrated that virtual work can be successful.
I understand in August 2020, the Department established a remote
work policy, which permits employees in domestic positions to work
full-time from an alternate worksite in the United States with
supervisor and bureau approvals.
Question. Would you support expanding telework to allow for
appropriate overseas positions to be filled by EFMs and tandem spouses
who are stationed in the U.S. or at other posts?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support expanding employment
opportunities overseas for spouses to work in the country to which
their employee spouse is assigned and accredited. While the Department
does not have authority to employ family members domestically using its
overseas hiring authorities, family members with prior U.S. Government
service who are currently residing in the United States may be eligible
to apply non-competitively to Civil Service positions.
Question. Being assigned to the same post is a perpetual struggle
for tandem couples. While the State Department is prohibited from
discriminating based on marital status, 3 FAH-1 H-2425.8-7(A) states
that State ``will make a reasonable effort to assign both members of a
tandem to the same post in positions appropriate to their class levels
and qualifications.'' What actions will you take to ensure that this is
implemented given current challenges that tandems face in being
assigned to the same post?
Answer. I strongly support efforts to help tandem couples find
positions at the same post that are appropriate to their skill codes,
grade levels, and qualifications, while also ensuring that no advantage
or disadvantage accrues to any employee on the grounds of marital
status. I will look for ways to expand existing and new workplace
flexibilities for tenured FS employees to increase opportunities for
tandem spouses to serve together, including identifying aligning tours
of duty, expanding positions eligible for domestic employees
teleworking overseas (DETO), and identifying more opportunities for in-
country language training.
Question. Will you work to align bidding timelines across different
components of the State Department (e.g. Diplomatic Security and
generalist/specialist cycles) and different foreign affairs agencies?
Answer. The Department has worked to bring bidding cycles in line
over the past two years for all employees. The main cycle takes place
in the fall, for positions that will be open the following summer.
There are also bidding cycles for winter vacancies, for ``priority
staffing posts'' in 11 countries, and for chiefs of mission, deputy
chiefs of mission, and principal officers. I will continue to review
the bidding cycles and process to ensure they meet our staffing and
mission requirements. Other foreign affairs agencies manage their own
bidding cycles and process to meet their mission needs.
Question. Will you direct the Entry Level Division of the Career
Development and Assignments Office to make every reasonable effort to
direct assignments for incoming officers and specialists to posts where
their tandem spouse is already serving?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the Career Development and
Assignments Office (CDA) to follow the law when directing assignments
for entry-level employees, so that no advantage or disadvantage accrues
to any employee on the grounds of marital status. Further, if
confirmed, I will direct CDA to make reasonable efforts to assign both
members of a tandem to the same post or region within the bounds of the
law. Entry-level employees have less flexibility due to tenure
requirements and therefore are always the ``lead bidder'' when bidding
with a mid- or senior-level spouse; more flexibilities exist for mid-
and senior-level employees to align tours with an entry-level spouse.
If both tandem spouses are entry-level, CDA will direct the entry-level
employees according to service needs and career development.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Rob Portman
GEC/Global Disinformation
Senator Chris Murphy and I have worked very closely over the last 4
years to strengthen the Global Engagement Center and through our
efforts and have made important strides in countering global
disinformation. I think this is one of the gravest threats we face
internationally. Disinformation operations are cheap, deniable, and
when combined with economic and political subversion can be a
devastating to democracies. Thanks to the work of the GEC we now have
an effective organization that can help our allies fight back.
However, there is more work to be done to ensure that the effort is
sustained and strengthened through the work of the GEC. In particular,
I would like to see:
A sustained funding level of at least $138 million annually. At its
current amount of $60 million, the Center continues to be under
resourced, and is unable to expand into areas such as Africa
where countries desperately need our assistance.
Extension of hiring authority. It is critical that the Center be
able to retain its talent within the Department as well as
recruit outside expertise.
A commitment to continue the work of the GEC. Foreign
disinformation is a threat to our democracy and a tool our
adversaries wield against us. It is critical that we have the
resources, means, and capability to combat this threat, and the
GEC located within the Department of State is the right
organization to do it.
Question. Can I get your commitment to work with Senator Murphy and
me to continue strengthening the capabilities and funding of the GEC so
that we can continue the fight against state sponsored disinformation
campaigns worldwide?
Answer. You have my commitment, if confirmed, to work with you and
your colleagues, as well as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs, to continue strengthening the GEC and our full
range of public diplomacy programs so that we are better able to
counter disinformation campaigns of authoritarian regimes.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. Will you commit that the Department will make a robust
State Department and USAID budget request in Fiscal Year 2022 to
address the global pandemic and its secondary impacts?
Answer. If confirmed, and to the extent that decisions have not yet
been made on the FY 2022 budget request by the time I am appointed, I
am committed to making sure that the Department requests the necessary
resources in FY 2022 to address the global pandemic and secondary
impacts on Department operations and foreign assistance. I know
Congress has already generously provided the Department with funding
and expanded authorities in FY 2020 and 2021, which protected the
health and safety of the American people and others worldwide, allowed
for the timely and efficient repatriation of Americans stationed
overseas in the early stages of the pandemic, supported global health
security and pandemic preparedness, and sustained consular operations
worldwide into FY 2021. I also understand there are significant
resources for international pandemic response efforts in the American
Rescue Plan, which the Congress is currently considering.
Question. Will you commit to the goal of working in cooperation
with our international allies to ensure that every person, regardless
of wealth, will gain access to a life-saving vaccine?
Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support the administration's
commitment to multilateralism to surge broad and equitable global
vaccine distribution. On December 22, 2020, Congress appropriated funds
to contribute to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance to support the procurement
and distribution of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines, including
through the COVAX Advance Market Commitment to facilitate vaccine
distribution in 92 low- and middle-income countries. Last month, the
Administration announced an initial $2 billion contribution to Gavi,
and that the additional $2 billion provided by Congress will be
released as the United States works with other donors to elevate their
pledge commitments. I will encourage countries to consider vulnerable,
marginalized, and at-risk populations in their national vaccination
plans.
Question. What role can ``vaccine diplomacy'' play towards
restoring the U.S. global image?
Answer. Most countries in the world are anxious to procure COVID-19
vaccines. In addition to meeting our primary responsibility and
commitment to ensuring that all U.S. citizens have access to vaccines,
therapeutics, and other resources, the United States will also lead in
ensuring sufficient vaccines are available around the world, with a
focus on protecting communities most at risk. The United States is
supporting COVAX, a multilateral initiative to ensure equitable
distribution of vaccines. The U.S. will work to expand global
vaccination, including through encouraging others to donate to COVAX,
and will work to support efforts to mitigate secondary impacts. If
confirmed, I will work to leverage our technical, financial,
diplomatic, and other assistance to support global vaccination efforts.
Question. What steps will you take to revitalize efforts to ensure
that USG diplomatic and administrative personnel who identify as LGBTQI
are able to receive visas for themselves and their families when
assigned to U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities and bases abroad?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that all of
the Department's employees and their families are treated fairly and
equitably. For employees assigned overseas, that commitment includes
seeking accreditation, with all appropriate privileges and immunities,
for our LGBTI employees and their families. The State Department has
formed a dedicated senior working group to seek ways to gain full
recognition for our LGBTI families in those countries that do not now
extend such recognition.
Question. Will you commit to regular and personal oversight of
these efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be wholly committed to regular and
personal oversight of these efforts.
Question. I was pleased to see the recent Presidential Memorandum
on Advancing the Human Rights of LGTBQI Persons Around the World. The
memorandum outlines a leadership role for the State Department to
ensure the federal government's swift and meaningful response to
incidents which threaten the human rights of LGBTQI persons abroad.
Please articulate how you will mobilize our diplomatic corps to support
LGBTQI equality worldwide.
Answer. In accordance with President Biden's Presidential
Memorandum on Advancing the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the
world, I am committed to working closely with our diplomatic corps in
using the broad range of diplomatic and programmatic tools and
resources to promote and protect the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons.
If confirmed, I pledge to support the Department's efforts to empower
civil society and local LGBTQI+ movements; combat criminalization of
individuals on the basis of LGBTQI+ status or conduct; protect
vulnerable LGBTQI+ refugees and asylum seekers; and allow swift U.S.
responses to human rights violations of LGBTQI+ persons.
Question. How can the Department better use the insights and
talents of its affinity groups to increase outreach to minority
communities with a view to increasing diverse employment and better
connecting U.S. foreign policy programs and goals to the needs of the
American people?
Answer. The State Department encourages all employees to help
recruit diverse talent by using their professional affiliations and
networks to amplify Department career opportunities. The Department's
17 Employee Affinity Groups (EAGs) members can explain to future
colleagues their unique roles and cooperation to create a culture of
inclusion across the Department. The Department's Volunteer Recruiter
Corps, launched in January 2021, will leverage employees' diverse
insights and experiences to recruit for a more inclusive workforce;
half of the 500 participants are EAG members. Outreach from members of
underrepresented groups in the diplomatic workforce will be key to
prioritize diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as a
national security imperative.
Question. Specifically, will you consider encouraging domestic
travel of U.S. diplomats, increasing the number of Pickering and Rangel
Fellows, and increasing the number of Diplomats in Residence at U.S.
colleges and universities in underserved areas?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look forward to carefully reviewing
this proposal. I will also continue the Department's efforts to build a
more diverse workforce. Currently, 16 regional Diplomats in Residence
are based around the country, including seven at Historically Black
Colleges and Universities and Hispanic Serving Institutions. In 2020,
the Department's virtual recruitment and career fairs opened new
channels to reaching candidates. A new ``sourcing unit'' will identify
highly skilled potential candidates from all backgrounds.
The Department increased the Pickering and Rangel Fellowship
Programs by 50 percent in 2020 and will welcome a newly expanded cohort
of 90 fellows in March. Additionally, in 2020, the Department recruited
a record number of fellowship candidates. The Department is considering
new fellowships to meet specialist career track hiring needs and
diversity and inclusion initiatives, as we have done for Information
Specialists with the Foreign Affairs IT Fellowship. If confirmed, I
also look forward to continuing conversations with Congress to explore
an expanded paid internship program.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. Section 15(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 states that ``The Department of State shall keep the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives fully and currently
informed with respect to all activities and responsibilities within the
jurisdiction of these committees. Any Federal department, agency, or
independent establishment shall furnish any information requested by
either such committee relating to any such activity or
responsibility.'' Can you commit to complying with this provision of
law by ensuring that information requested by members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee is provided expeditiously and
transparently? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working with Congress and this committee
in accordance with the law to provide all information needed to perform
traditional oversight functions as promptly as possible.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified
information in notifications provided by the State Department to
Congress? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. Last month the State Department transmitted a mandatory
and overdue report to Congress listing entities engaged in sanctionable
activities because of their participation in the construction of the
Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline, pursuant to the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended. PEESA mandates the imposition
of sanctions on entities listed in such reports. The report included
only two entities, the Fortuna and KVT-RUS, both of which the Trump
administration had already sanctioned. It did not include any entities
which are plainly, publicly required to be listed under PEESA.
Reportedly, State Department officials who spoke to Congressional
staffers were unable to provide a justification why several entities--
including the company responsible for the planning, construction, and
operation of NS2--were left off. This abdication is inexcusable. Can
you commit to immediately ensuring the Biden administration meets its
mandatory obligation to provide an interim report to Congress pursuant
to PEESA and sanction all of the entities that are engaged in pipe-
laying, pipe-laying activities, certification, and insurance
sanctionable under PEESA? If not, why not?
Answer. The State Department submits a report to Congress every 90
days on vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying activities, and
various entities providing and supporting those vessels, for the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report due to Congress
in mid-May. If confirmed, I will use all available tools to counter
Russian malign influence and to work with Allies and partners in the
region to support Transatlantic energy security goals. The Department
of State will continue to examine entities involved in potentially
sanctionable activity and will designate additional persons as
appropriate.
Question. One of the most egregious dynamics in the initial
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
involved the way that the Obama administration circumvented
Congressional deliberation and approval by first attempting to lock in
the agreement as international law via United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR 2231). After that resolution was passed--which
occurred just as the Congressional review period mandated by the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) was beginning--officials from the
Government of Iran and the Obama administration suggested that Congress
would be abrogating the U.S.'s formal international obligations by
rejecting the agreement. Can you commit to ensuring that any future
nuclear agreement negotiated between State Department officials and
Iran, which involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional
sanctions, will only be negotiated in full consultation with Congress?
If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with Congress on
any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called for under
INARA.
Question. Can you commit to ensuring that any future nuclear
agreement negotiated between State Department officials and Iran, which
involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional sanctions, will not
be implemented without Congressional approval? If not, why not?
Answer. I am aware that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA) contains certain limitations on sanctions relief during a
congressional review period. I understand that the Biden administration
is committed to complying with the requirements of INARA, and if
confirmed, I am committed to doing so.
Question. It was recently announced that Iran and South Korea
agreed to allow Tehran to access approximately $1 billion of its assets
that are frozen in South Korean banks due to U.S. sanctions. Reports
indicate that the South Koreans received approval from Biden
administration officials to do so. Please transmit to the committee any
waivers, decision memos, or other documents pertaining to this case,
and confirm doing so.
Answer. I do not have access to Department records nor the
authority on my own to give you Department records. I commit, if
confirmed, to work with the committee to appropriately comply with an
official committee request for such Department information.
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5 the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. Officials at the State Department have justified the
delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' designation of
Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large parts of Yemen's
population live under areas controlled by the group. They have not
provided an explanation for the delisting of the three leaders, and in
fact they have publicly, repeatedly, and falsely denied or downplayed
the relief provided to these Iran-backed terrorists. For example, on
February 11 State Department spokesman Ned Price falsely told
journalists ``there is no change'' to the sanctions on these
individuals. He was asked about the issue again the next day, and said
``the Secretary had an intent to remove this broad designation of the
movement.'' The public statement issued by the State Department did not
mention the revocation of the SDGT designation on the Houthi leaders,
but noted that they ``remain sanctioned under E.O. 13611.'' Can you
commit to ensuring that State Department officials stop publicly
misleading journalists and the American public about sanctions relief
provided by the Department and the Biden administration to Iran-backed
terrorists? If not, why not?
Answer. I understand that the three Ansarallah leaders in question
were designated under the U.N. Security Council's Yemen sanctions
regime in 2015 and domestically under E.O. 13611, related to acts that
threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. Therefore, they
remain on the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any
attendant travel restrictions. As a consequence of the revocation of
Ansarallah's Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group
designation under E.O. 13224, there was no longer a basis to retain the
SDGT designations of these individuals as leaders of Ansarallah, which
were derivative of the broader SDGT designation of the group. If
confirmed, I intend to continue our support of U.N.-led efforts,
including a robust implementation of the U.N. and E.O. 13611 sanctions,
to call attention to and condemn Ansarallah's destabilizing activities.
The State Department's emphasis will continue to be on using diplomacy
to build international pressure on Ansarallah to change its behavior
and ultimately end the war.
Question. Please describe why the State Department lifted the SDGT
designations on Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-
Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim.
Answer. I understand that simultaneous with the designation of
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, as a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, these
individuals were designated as SDGTs on the basis that they were
leaders of an SDGT, namely Ansarallah. As a consequence of the
revocation of Ansarallah's SDGT designation, there was no longer a
basis to retain the designations of these individuals as leaders of an
SDGT. However, they remain designated under the U.N. Security Council's
Yemen sanctions regime and domestically under E.O. 13611 related to
acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen and,
therefore, remain on Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any
attendant travel restrictions.
Question. The Central Bank of Iran (CBI), has been designated as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SGT) pursuant to Executive Order
(EO) 13224 for providing material support to terrorist organizations.
Can you commit to not lift, rescind or significantly modify--or to
agree within the interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly
modify--this terrorism designation of the CBI, in the absence of a
determination that the CBI has ceased providing material support to
terrorist organizations? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to counter Iran's support for terrorism, including through the
appropriate use of sanctions and regular coordination with our partners
and allies. Iran is the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism,
which poses a threat to security and stability in the Middle East, and
the administration will continue to use all tools available to counter
Iran's support for terrorism.
Question. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is
designated as a terrorist organization both as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization and as an SDGT pursuant to EO 13224. Can you commit to not
lift, rescind or significantly modify--or to agree within the
interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly modify--these
terrorism designations on the IRGC, in the absence of a determination
that the Government of Iran has ceased providing material support to
terrorist organizations.
Answer. Iran's support for terrorism threatens our forces and
partners in the region and elsewhere. If confirmed, I intend to
continue working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's
destabilizing activities in the region, including its support for
terrorist groups and violent militias and its ballistic missile
program, and maintain international, collective pressure on Iran. The
administration is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing
activities using the array of tools at our disposal, including
sanctions to deal with Iran's support for terrorism.
Question. You and other officials responsible for the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have repeatedly described it as
the most rigorous inspection regime ever negotiated. Despite this
inspection regime, the IAEA was unable to locate the illicit Nuclear
Archive subsequently seized by Israel, which included designs and
materials relevant to the creation of nuclear weapons. They were also
unable to find locations which, having been revealed by Israeli
officials, subsequently proved to have evidence of nuclear work that
the IAEA says Iran has not accounted for. Please describe what you
perceive to have been the flaws in the JCPOA inspection regime do you
believe were responsible for these failures by the IAEA?
Answer. I did not work on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
while serving in the Obama-Biden administration, but I did support the
policy decision by President Obama to conclude it. The IAEA has a
decades-long successful track record of monitoring the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material globally. While the IAEA thoroughly
investigates all available information, including based on its own
verification and monitoring activities, it is not an intelligence
organization. It can only act on information that is either acquired by
it in the performance of its verification mandates or presented to it.
The administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any
indications of undeclared or diverted nuclear material that could
contribute to any renewed Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Question. Please describe what new measures you would insist are
included in any future nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure that the
IAEA has the ability to identify such materials and activities?
Answer. The IAEA has said it has the tools it needs to perform its
verification mandates in Iran so long as Iran fully implements its
JCPOA commitments. This includes implementation of the Additional
Protocol to Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement that provides
enhanced information and access regarding Iran's nuclear program,
including with respect to undeclared locations about which the IAEA has
questions. The JCPOA provides the IAEA with the most intrusive
verification procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any
indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The
administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any such
indication.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Jeff Merkley
Question. In partnership with the State Department's New Chief
Diversity Officer, what tangible steps will your office take to improve
diversity across the State Department, including at the most senior
levels of the Foreign Service?
Answer. If confirmed, I will partner with the Chief Diversity and
Inclusion Officer to track the progress of the Department on
performance metrics on diversity and inclusion as outlined in the soon-
to-be released Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan. I will hold
officers who report to me accountable to promote a culture of
inclusion--where every individual voice is heard, respected, and
valued. The Department is taking a critical look at the current
selection processes employed by the deputy chief of mission and
principal officer selection panels. If confirmed, I will encourage
hiring managers to identify opportunities that will allow the
Department to reach a wider candidate pool to include more candidates
from underrepresented backgrounds. Additionally, the Department is
finalizing an Enterprise Data Strategy which will include an initial
emphasis on supporting Department diversity and inclusion efforts.
Question. Why have women and minorities historically left the
Foreign Service at significantly higher rates than white males, and
what can you do to address that troubling trend?
Answer. Understanding why women and minorities leave the Department
is a crucial step in increasing retention. If confirmed, I intend to
ask Department experts to examine whether there is a significantly
higher rate of attrition for certain populations. Consistent with the
recommendation of the January 2020 GAO report, ``Additional Steps Are
Needed to Identify Potential Barriers to Diversity,'' I commit to the
Department's undertaking of further analysis, including as part of its
forthcoming Enterprise Data Strategy, to explore what interventions the
Department can introduce to mitigate attrition, including of
underrepresented minorities and women, ensuring the Department remains
an employer of choice. If confirmed, I will focus on bringing
accountability and transparency to this issue.
Question. Significant delays in the hiring process have impacted
the State Department's ability to bring on board talented Foreign and
Civil Service Officers, as well as local staff and family members at
many embassies abroad. Do these delays affect the State Department's
ability to deliver on its goals, and how will you approach implementing
a more efficient hiring process?
Answer. I understand in FY 2020, the Department achieved a 20-
percent reduction in Foreign Service assessment timelines, despite
disruptions caused by COVID-19. A new virtual oral assessment and a
remote-proctored Foreign Service Officer test allowed at-home testing.
The Department's Bureau of Global Talent Management (GTM) created an
entirely virtual Foreign Service onboarding process that met FY 2020-
authorized Foreign Service hiring targets, including 414 Foreign
Service staff hired virtually. The Department exceeded the Foreign
Service Specialists target by 14 percent. The Department has
experienced high Civil Service (CS) vacancy rates due to the extended
hiring freeze; however, I understand the CS hiring backlog has been
significantly reduced. If confirmed, I will dedicate resources to
continue modernizing hiring strategies and support additional
innovations to attract exceptional talent.
Question. With last year's closure of the U.S. Consulate in
Chengdu, the United States appears to be at a disadvantage in our
diplomatic reach and representation in China. How will you approach re-
positioning our diplomatic footprint in China to ensure that we have
the broadest reach, including access to parts of the country in which
we do not currently have representation?
Answer. I understand that the suspensions of operations at U.S.
Consulate General Chengdu and U.S. Consulate General Wuhan
significantly increased the workload for Embassy Beijing without adding
additional staff, and that the Department is currently reviewing
Mission China's request for additional personnel. It is important that
the Department is adequately resourced and positioned to know what is
happening inside China. If confirmed, I will review the Department's
diplomatic presence there, including whether it should resume
operations at U.S. Consulate General Wuhan.
Question. For many years, the State Department has relied on
consular fees to fund most of its basic functions, a model that proved
untenable over this last year. How will you approach working with
Congress to find a more sustainable model for funding the Department?
Answer. The consular funding structure relies on visa fees and the
growth in visa demand to fund the Department's highest priority: the
protection of U.S. citizens and their interests. The Department retains
only 83 percent of all consular fees it collects. Retained fees are
exclusively from passport and visa applications. The Department remits
the remaining consular fees, primarily for overseas citizen services,
to the Treasury. For FY 2021, Congress expanded expenditure authorities
of certain retained fees which otherwise could not be used to support
U.S. citizen services. I understand that the Bureau of Consular Affairs
may continue to need appropriations without further changes to its
fiscal structure. If confirmed, I would work with Congress to find a
solution.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. In your prepared statement, you highlighted the
importance of increasing diversity in the Department of State to ensure
that it is ``fully representative of America.'' If you are confirmed,
what metrics will you develop to measure that all aspects of diversity,
to include race, gender, ideology, regional, and socioeconomic
differences are represented in the Department of State's efforts to
increase diversity?
Answer. Diversity is the key to unlocking an organization's
potential as diverse teams consistently demonstrate high performance
due to their creativity and innovation. If confirmed, I commit to
upholding and fully implementing the Department's leadership and
management tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to
strengthen teams across the Department. I will hold senior leaders
accountable for promulgating fairness and transparency in their day-to-
day decisions and will seek progress reports, working with the new
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, on their continued commitment to
championing diversity and inclusion.
In addition, I will work to ensure that our recruiting efforts
target all regions of the country. The Department is also developing a
program to begin to pay some interns, which will help our recruitment
efforts with those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged.
Question. In the era of global connectivity and greater ease of
movement, what is the purpose of an Embassy in the 21st century?
Answer. Maintaining a U.S. embassy presence allows the Department
to cultivate personal relationships around the world to advance U.S.
foreign policy, economic, and national security interests and to
support U.S. citizens abroad, such as assisting and evacuating more
than 100,000 U.S. citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic. While creative
and effective pivots to virtual traditional and public diplomacy have
allowed the Department's missions to promote U.S. priorities during
COVID-19, consistent in-person outreach remains the most effective way
to achieve an understanding of host countries that strengthen our
ability to assert U.S. influence. If confirmed, I am committed to
working with Congress to ensure Department resources and personnel are
aligned to respond to 21st century challenges.
Question. Do you support reorganizing or abolishing aspects of the
Department of State to prevent redundancy and overlapping areas of
responsibility?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Department's
organization and aligning available resources and staffing with
strategic priorities, as well as ensuring clear lines of accountability
and responsibility. I am committed to ensuring the effective and
efficient use of U.S. taxpayer dollars.
Question. In your view, how can we reform the allocation and
selection of career Ambassadors to ensure American interests are
adequately represented?
Answer. The Department of State endeavors to ensure that U.S.
interests are strongly represented by career ambassadors who embrace
the diversity of the United States. There is a rigorous selection
process in place which focuses on the candidate's suitability, talents,
skills, abilities, and experience, and the candidate is vetted by
senior Department officials before being submitted for consideration by
the White House. These positions are highly competitive, and the
Department thoroughly reviews all qualified candidates. If confirmed, I
will review the Department's ambassadorial selection process to ensure
we are choosing the best candidates for these positions.
Question. In your view, should any Ambassador be seated who has not
met and counseled with the President of the United States?
Answer. The ambassador is the direct representative of the
President of the United States. As such, it is beneficial for the
United States for the ambassador to meet and counsel with the
President. However, that is not always possible, given the number of
ambassadors and the President's schedule. As you know from your
experience as Ambassador to Japan, ambassadors do receive a personal
letter of instruction from the President that provides them guidance
directly from the President in preparation for their assignment.
Question. In order to expand the pool of qualified candidates for
senior positions in Embassy Tokyo, specifically the position of Deputy
Chief of Mission, the Department of State previously removed as a
requirement Japanese language proficiency at the level of 4/4. Is there
a requirement for Japanese language proficiency at the level of 4/4 to
be eligible to apply for the position of Deputy Chief of Mission in
Embassy Tokyo? Please begin your answer with yes or no.
Answer. No. A 4/4 level in Japanese is exceedingly rare and would
exceed the working-level requirement of 3/3 for most language-
designated positions. Although having Japanese language skills is
certainly desirable, there is no specific language requirement for the
selection of the Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo.
__________
Additional Material Submitted
by Senator Cory A. Booker
Report by Amnesty International on the November 19, 2020 Massacre at
Axum (Ethiopia)
Massacre in the Mountains
A CNN Report on the November 2020 Massacre in
the Tigray Region of Ethiopia
[Editor's Note: The CNN report contains video material that
cannot be adapted to the formats used by the Government
Publishing Office to publish committee hearings. The report can
be accessed with the following URL:]
https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/26/africa/ethiopia-tigray-dengelat-
massacre-intl/index.html
----------
NOMINATION
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen,
Risch, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz,
Rounds, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
come to order. Today we are considering the nomination of
Ambassador Samantha Power to be administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, known to all of us
as USAID.
Ambassador Power, congratulations on your nomination. Thank
you for your willingness to return to public service. It is a
pleasure to welcome you back before the committee.
When I chaired your 2013 hearing to be U.N. Ambassador, I
said you were, quote, ``impeccably qualified for the
position.'' Your experience, drive, and dedication to the
advancement of humanitarian principles also, I believe, make
you impeccably qualified to be the next USAID administrator.
Before I go any further, I understand that our
distinguished colleague from Massachusetts, a member of the
committee, wants to introduce you this morning. So we will turn
to him first.
Senator Markey?
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, Ranking
Member Risch. It is my absolute honor and pleasure to introduce
our nominee today, Ambassador Samantha Power, nominated to be
the administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, USAID, and more importantly, a cherished
Massachusetts resident.
I would also like to welcome Ambassador Power's husband,
Cass, and their two young children, Declan and Rian, who are
right behind us here today.
Samantha is a friend, a constituent, and, of course, a
fellow Irishman--Irishwoman in her case. As noted in a New
Yorker profile of her, Ambassador Power's last name, Power,
comes from the Irish ``de paor,'' meaning ``of the poor.''
Fittingly, she has dedicated her entire life in the service of
others, using her razor-sharp intelligence and fierce advocacy
as a journalist, activist, and diplomat to stand with the
world's voiceless masses, all while simultaneously advancing
United States interests by building bonds in every corner of
our world.
Ambassador Power has been known to be ferocious in the
pursuit of justice, human rights, and democracy, always taking
the time to hear other points of view with great humility.
While she disagrees with Henry Kissinger on everything from
politics to the no-brainer debate of Red Sox versus Yankees, he
has said that Samantha, quote, ``has----
The Chairman. Do not ruin the nominee's opportunity here,
Mr. Markey.
[Laughter.]
Senator Markey. Ambassador Henry Kissinger has said that
Samantha ``has an excellent analytical mind, and even on
matters where I might have come to different conclusions, I
respected her analysis,'' perhaps the highest praise ever given
by a Yankees fan to a member of Red Sox Nation.
As an immigrant from Ireland, Ambassador Power's personal
background gives her a unique and deep respect for this country
and all it stands for. Spending time between Pittsburgh,
Atlanta, Dublin, and Boston, she received her bachelor's degree
at Yale University and went on to obtain her law degree at
Harvard University.
She served in several key positions during the Obama
administration, including as the Special Assistant to the
President, the National Security Council, Senior Director for
Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights and, notably, as the
youngest ever United States ambassador to the United Nations.
Prior to entering government service, she began her career
as a war correspondent, reporting from the seas of Sarajevo.
She became a Pulitzer Prize-winning author and served as the
founding executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights
Policy at Harvard University.
As she takes on the important work of the challenges
Ambassador Power will face are daunting: recovering from the
global pandemic, revamping the state of global democracy,
tackling the climate crisis, and extending life-saving
assistance to the nearly 1 billion people around the world who
go to bed hungry every night.
I know of no person more qualified to take on this task.
She embodies that bold red, white, and blue USAID logo which
states ``From the American People.''
In 2015, Ambassador Power invited me to be her guest to
attend His Holiness Pope Francis' address before the United
Nations General Assembly. For two Irish Catholics from
Massachusetts, it was the experience of a lifetime.
On that day, Pope Francis spoke of the need for compassion,
inclusivity, and action in tackling the world's shared
challenges.
Ambassador Power's career personifies each of these
qualities, and I know she will take her compassion, her
inclusivity, and her unwavering desire for action to achieve
great things for the people of the United States and the world
at USAID.
So welcome, Ambassador Power. We are pleased to have you
here. We cannot wait to see you get to work over at USAID and I
thank you for your service to our nation.
It is my privilege, Mr. Chairman, to introduce Ambassador
Power to the committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Markey. We know
that you both sit here and in other committees. So if you have
other work to do, we certainly invite you to join us if you
can. If not, we will see you back a little later.
That was a rousing introduction and with--but with one
flaw. I thought it was extraordinary. So as a Yankee fan, I
just--I just cannot be quiet.
So, anyhow, let me start off. Ambassador, in his inaugural
address, President Biden said that, quote, ``We will lead not
merely by the example of our power, but by the power of our
example.''
The work that dedicated professionals of USAID do
exemplifies that example, supporting people around the world to
advance democratic and citizen-responsive governance, to help
ensure fair treatment and access to opportunity for vulnerable
minorities, and provide life-saving relief on behalf of the
American people.
We know that these core values are the strength of our own
country and that promoting them abroad contributes to more
stability and stability worldwide.
As I emphasized to Secretary Blinken at his nomination
hearing, the U.S. must reassert itself as a global leader
capable of confronting complex challenges.
As we work to address COVID-19 inequality, migration,
climate change at home, if the U.S. is not contributing
leadership and resources to address these issues globally, then
our security at home is tenuous at best.
There are few people as familiar with many of today's
complex long-running conflicts as you are. As you well know, if
confirmed, you will be responsible for responding to new and
renewed conflicts from Venezuela to Ethiopia to Burma, human-
and resource-driven conflicts which have victimized hundreds of
thousands of civilians, forcing millions to flee their homes.
Political crises in Latin America have caused unprecedented
humanitarian disasters. I am encouraged by the Biden
administration's plans to renew our commitment to achieving a
diplomatic solution to the Venezuela crisis where USAID has
provided significant humanitarian and development assistance.
In the Northern Triangle countries, addressing rampant
crime, weak governance, corruption, and displacement must also
be a top U.S. priority, as stability there directly impacts the
security and prosperity of the United States.
Across Africa we have seen democratic backsliding in
various countries, along with persistent terrorist threats and
conflicts that have cost thousands of lives and displaced
hundreds of thousands more.
In particular, the conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray Province
has contributed to destabilizing the whole Horn of Africa while
increased terrorism has thrown the Sahel into chaos.
Meanwhile, climate change is increasing food insecurity and
natural resource scarcity, and threatening the very existence
of many small island nations, while COVID-19 pandemic continues
to ravage the world.
At the same time that you will be confronting these global
challenges, you will also need to rebuild and restore USAID as
an institution. Successful U.S. foreign policy rests on the
appropriate utilization of the three D's: defense, diplomacy,
and development.
Unfortunately, the previous administration had anywhere
from skepticism to disdain for the last of those two. While I
believe Ambassador Green who--for whom I have great respect,
believed and invested in the mission of the agency, the years
after his departure have taken a serious toll on the agency
morale, strained USAID's relationships with its implementing
partners, and weakened trust in America.
The agency needs internal attention, and I recommend that
if confirmed you listen to USAID's civil servants, Foreign
Service officers, and Foreign Service nationals to explain what
USAID needs.
As you may know, USAID underwent a major reorganization
spearheaded by Ambassador Green, and while I believe he
approached this effort with the best of intentions, the
ultimate execution was lacking.
I do believe the agency must be nimble enough to respond to
changing and pressing challenges, and I trust that you will
make the ongoing reorganization work better and consult with
this committee on how that might be achieved.
So, in conclusion, if confirmed, you will have your work
cut out for you. However, I have great confidence in your
experience and abilities, not to mention your passion for
making this world a better place.
But we would expect you to engage with this committee as a
partner and asset in accomplishing USAID's mission. This
committee has a long bipartisan history of support for USAID,
and I expect you to engage in frequent and open dialogue to
help sustain that support.
I look forward to hearing from you today. We welcome your
family, who is always part of the sacrifices that those of us
who are in public service make.
And with that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking
member, Senator Risch.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Menendez. I appreciate
that, and Ambassador Power, thank you for agreeing to take this
on and thank you to your family. As the chairman noted, there
is always sacrifices that are shared, sometimes not equally by
the family.
The role of the USAID administrator is an important one. We
all know that. In order to accomplish the goals of our--as a
nation, we need a development agency that reflects the
challenges of the 21st century and is staffed and resourced to
be strategic, efficient, effective, and accountable.
USAID must be led by someone who understands that aid is
most effective when it is targeted toward clearly-defined U.S.
national interests and those who are committed to advancing
good governance, economic growth, and self-reliance.
The challenges before us are immense. An estimated 80
million people globally have been displaced from their homes,
26 million of whom are now refugees. The conflict in Syria has
entered its tenth year and has left more than 12 million people
food insecure.
Ebola has reemerged in West Africa and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and the COVID-19 pandemic has shuttered
schools, destroyed livelihoods, and pushed millions of people
into poverty around the world.
USAID has a successful record of responding to emergencies,
and we will count on the next administrator to put dollars
provided for humanitarian assistance to good use.
The agency has also done tremendous work in combating food
insecurity, expanding access to water, and empowering women to
participate in their economies.
USAID needs to work on coordination with the CDC. This is
why the largest U.S. global health program, PEPFAR, is
coordinated by the Department of State.
As we continue to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, I look
forward to working with the department, USAID, the CDC, and my
colleagues here in Congress on a more comprehensive approach to
global health, security, and diplomacy.
Senator Menendez and I have been discussing that issue in
particular, and we have talked about a path forward to where we
can get a bipartisan piece of legislation that will be one of
the most important things we do as far as global health is
concerned and as far as the people of the world are concerned.
We must put in the work now so we can get ahead of the next
pandemic and keep Americans safe from infectious disease
threats before they cross our borders again. We should also
maximize the impact of U.S. contributions to COVAX and GAVI,
the Vaccine Alliance, and through the Global Fund's COVID-19
response mechanism.
Beyond pandemics, I am interested to learn more about how
you, if confirmed, will position USAID to counter China's
malign development model. That model is something that many of
us consider to be one of the greatest threats to U.S. national
security.
I would also like to better understand your view on
promoting democracy, good governance, and the rule of law, the
foundations of healthy and stable societies. The United States
cannot, should not, and should not even consider singlehandedly
trying to solve the world's problems. Difficult choices must be
made.
But while the administrator is not empowered to make those
choices independently, USAID does remain under the foreign
policy direction of the Secretary of State.
I am pleased to see that the next administrator will have a
seat at the principal's table on critical matters of
development and humanitarian response.
If confirmed, I am eager to work with you to ensure that
USAID remains strategic focused and accountable.
Thank you, Senator Menendez.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
With that, Madam Ambassador, the floor is yours. Your full
statement will be included in the record. We ask you to
summarize it, and then we will have a conversation with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAMANTHA POWER, OF MASSACHUSETTS, NOMINATED
TO BE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Ambassador Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Risch, members of the committee. It is a tremendous
honor to appear before you today. I am humbled by President
Biden's trust in me and by the opportunity to join such an
indispensable agency at such a critical time.
I would like to begin by thanking my mother, Veera Delaney,
a doctor whom I have watched care for her patients during the
darkest hours of this pandemic, my father, Eddie Bourke, whose
curiosity about the world helped spark my own, my husband and
best friend, Cass Sunstein, an American original, and my 11-
year-old son, Declan, and eight-year-old daughter, Rian, whose
shared love of animals and nature remind me daily of our
responsibility to our planet.
Public service does ask a lot of families and I am
indescribably grateful for the support and generosity of mine.
I would also like to thank the members of this committee.
While bitter political winds blew, continued bipartisan
support for the U.S. Agency for International Development has
saved and improved millions of lives while enhancing U.S.
security and U.S. prosperity.
I was fortunate to work with many of you when I last
served. If confirmed, I will be eager to build on these
relationships and forge new ones.
I first saw USAID's impact in war-torn Bosnia, where I
started my career in 1993 as a reporter. I saw USAID staff and
partners deliver food to the vulnerable while supporting
mothers as they tried to locate their missing sons and
husbands.
Since then, wherever I traveled, whether in East Timor just
after became the world's newest nation, Darfur in the middle of
this century's first genocide, or West Africa at the height of
the Ebola epidemic, USAID was there. America was there,
identifying needs and moving heaven and earth to meet them.
In my work, I have seen how the investments the United
States makes in other countries are investments in our own
security. I have seen the inextricable linkages between
political freedom and broad-based economic growth.
I have seen that the most effective development is driven
by those on the ground with local knowledge and expertise, and
I have seen the overwhelming power of individual dignity as a
driver of world events.
Even as China increasingly uses its financial leverage to
sway other nations, citizens everywhere are insisting that they
be able to exercise agency, provide for themselves, and
exercise their fundamental rights.
If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the institution of
USAID and invest in the capabilities of the agency's dedicated
10,000 Foreign Service officers, civil servants, locally
employed staff, contractors, and other personnel.
This means seeking out and amplifying their insights,
learning about specific local needs, and adapting our programs.
It means addressing the issues related to diversity, equity,
inclusion, and advancement within USAID's workforce, and it
means emphasizing what President Biden himself and both of you,
I think, already have stressed.
Development is critical to America's ability to tackle the
toughest problems of our time, economic, humanitarian, and
geopolitical. In consultation with you and others in Congress,
I will aim to ensure that USAID enhances its long-standing
leadership in food security, education, women's empowerment,
and global health, while also addressing four interconnected
and gargantuan challenges confronting the world at this moment.
First, the COVID pandemic and the development progress that
has been imperiled in everything from food security to gender
equality to access to education to economic growth.
Climate change, and the surge in droughts, storms, food
shortages, and climate-associated humanitarian emergencies.
Third, with more conflicts occurring today than at any
point since the end of the Cold War, conflict and state
collapse.
And fourth, finally, with freedom declining around the
world for the fifteenth straight year in a row, democratic
backsliding.
In tackling these and other challenges, I want to assure
the committee that I will work every day to expand burden
sharing in the international system. At the U.N., working with
my administration colleagues, I was able to help secure major
commitments from other countries to care for refugees, respond
to the Ebola epidemic, strengthen peacekeeping, and adopt the
sustainable development goals.
U.S. investments are catalysts that can be used to mobilize
governments, international organizations, foundations, and
businesses to help countries achieve their own development
goals.
If I am confirmed to lead this great agency, I will work
tirelessly with members on both sides of the aisle to ensure
that taxpayer dollars are well spent. Guided by evidence, I
will work with you to adapt or replace programs that are not
delivering. I will be transparent and accessible as together we
chart a course that meets the needs of the current moment.
In 1979, as Senator Markey alluded to, my mother brought my
younger brother and me to America from Ireland, blessing me
with a life full of opportunity. As one who has been given so
much by the United States, I would take it as an incomparable
privilege to lead the world's premier development agency in
order to expand the opportunities available to others.
I thank you, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Power follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Samantha Power
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
it is a tremendous honor to appear before you today. Thank you, Senator
Markey, for your kind introduction.
I am humbled by President Biden's trust in me, and by the
opportunity to join such an indispensable Agency at this critical time.
I would like to begin by thanking my mother Vera Delaney, a doctor
whom I have watched care for her patients during the darkest hours of
this pandemic; my father Eddie Bourke, whose curiosity about the world
helped spark my own; my husband Cass Sunstein, an American original;
and my 11-year-old son Declan and 8-year-old daughter Rian, whose
shared love of animals and nature remind me daily of our responsibility
to our planet. Public service asks a lot of families, and I'm
indescribably grateful for the support and generosity of mine.
I would also like to thank the members of this committee. While
bitter political winds blew, continued bipartisan support for the U.S.
Agency for International Development has saved and improved millions of
lives while enhancing U.S. security and prosperity. I was fortunate to
work with many of you when I last served. If confirmed, I will be eager
to build on these relationships and forge new ones.
I first saw USAID's impact in war-torn Bosnia, where I started my
career in 1993 as a reporter. I saw USAID staff and partners deliver
food to the vulnerable, while supporting mothers as they tried to
locate their missing sons and husbands. Since then, wherever I
travelled--whether to East Timor just after it became the world's
newest nation; Darfur, in the midst of this century's first genocide;
or west Africa, at the height of the Ebola epidemic--USAID was there--
America was there--identifying needs and moving heaven and earth to
meet them.
In my work--as a writer, professor, human rights advocate, national
security staffer, and diplomat--I've seen how the investments the
United States makes in other countries are investments in our own
security. I've seen the inextricable linkages between political freedom
and broad-based economic growth. I've seen that the most effective
development is driven by those on the ground with local knowledge and
expertise. And I've seen the power of individual dignity as a driver of
world events. Even as China increasingly uses its financial leverage to
sway other nations, citizens everywhere are insisting that they be able
to exercise agency, provide for themselves, and exercise their
fundamental rights.
If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the institution of USAID
and invest in the capabilities of the Agency's dedicated 10,000 foreign
service officers, civil servants, locally-employed staff, contractors,
and other personnel. This means seeking out and amplifying their
insights, learning about specific local needs, and adapting our
programs. It means urgently addressing the issues relating to
diversity, equity, inclusion, and advancement within USAID's workforce.
And it means emphasizing what President Biden himself has stressed:
Development is critical to
America's ability to tackle the toughest problems of our time--
economic, humanitarian and geopolitical.
In consultation with you and others in Congress, I will aim to
ensure that USAID enhances its longstanding leadership in food
security, education, women's empowerment, and global health, while also
addressing four interconnected and gargantuan challenges confronting
the world at this moment:
The COVID-19 pandemic. With decades of development gains shattered
by COVID, imperiling progress on everything from food security
to gender equality and access to education, USAID's support to
partners will be vital for recovery, including by building more
robust and durable health infrastructure for the future.
Climate Change. With the surge in droughts, storms, food shortages,
and climate-associated humanitarian emergencies, USAID can help
countries become more resilient, while supporting their efforts
to reduce carbon emissions.
Conflict and state collapse. With more conflicts occurring today
than at any point since the end of the Cold War, USAID
assistance will continue to mitigate suffering, while working
with U.S. diplomats and our international partners to address
the root causes of such crises.
Democratic backsliding. With freedom declining around the world for
the fifteenth year in a row, USAID's democracy, rights, anti-
corruption, and governance programming must nimbly support
democratic and civil society actors as they push back against
creeping authoritarianism and seek to build lasting democratic
institutions.
In tackling these and other challenges, I want to assure the
committee that I will work every day to expand burden-sharing in the
international system. At the United Nations, working with my
administration colleagues, I was able to help secure major commitments
from other countries to care for refugees, respond to the Ebola
epidemic, strengthen peacekeeping, and adopt the Sustainable
Development Goals. U.S. investments are catalysts that can be used to
mobilize governments, international organizations, foundations, and
businesses to help countries achieve their own development goals.
If I am confirmed to lead this great Agency, I will work tirelessly
with Members on both sides of the aisle to ensure that taxpayer dollars
are well spent. Guided by evidence, I will work with you to adapt or
replace programs that are not delivering. I will be transparent and
accessible--as together we chart a course that meets the needs of the
current moment.
In 1979 my mother brought my younger brother and me to America from
Ireland, blessing me with a life full of opportunity. As one who has
been given so much by the United States, I would take it as an
incomparable privilege to lead the world's premier development Agency
in order to expand the opportunities available to others.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Power.
We will start five-minute rounds of--in order of those who
have appeared either in person or virtually, and I will start
with the chair.
USAID plays a central role in the U.S. government's
humanitarian response to conflict and forced migration. Last
year, I released a comprehensive report on forced displacement,
which found that the vast majority of the 80 million displaced
people worldwide are not displaced for months but for years or
decades at a time.
How will you lead efforts at USAID to ensure coherence
between the U.S. humanitarian and development programs and to
ensure that a maximum impact is achieved in assisting
protracted displacement?
Ambassador Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Well, first, let me say that those displacement numbers, as
you know, are the highest since World War II. Every year, we
see that number go up. When I was U.N. Ambassador, it was the
highest since World War II, and it gets worse and worse.
Climate-related events, of course, are a factor, and I
think you are likely to see a surge and displacement stemming
from the economic fallout from the COVID pandemic.
It is important to look behind the numbers at the causes of
displacement, which vary. I alluded in my testimony to the fact
that more conflicts are occurring now than at any point since
the end of the Cold War. As you noted just now, conflicts are
lasting longer.
So it used to be that one conflict would start but another
might have been brought to an end and that, therefore, again,
those numbers were not just continuing to grow.
But as a new conflict starts, other conflicts are just
lasting longer and longer, and so the protracted refugee
population is higher than it has been since World War II.
The investment that President Biden has committed to making
in diplomacy is a critical part of this. We have seen, for
example, in Libya, diplomacy produce, for the first time in
many years, a U.N.-brokered transition government.
We need diplomacy to pay dividends in Yemen, which is
facing the worst humanitarian crisis of any place on earth. And
when it comes to a place like the Northern Triangle, where you
have been so active, it is critical to look at the different
drivers of migration, which range from physical personal
insecurity and gang violence and corruption to the lack of
economic opportunity.
And USAID, again, I think has a really important role to
play in mitigating humanitarian suffering, but also looking
upstream at why people are leaving their homes in the first
place.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me ask you this. Under the
last restructuring of USAID, the Democracy Rights and
Governance Center was moved under the new development,
Democracy and Innovation Bureau.
My question is, I think this is a very significant part of
the mission of USAID. I noticed you mentioned it among your
four pillars.
How will you elevate and integrate democracy and human
rights in USAID's response both to the COVID pandemic, which
has provided cover for autocrats to attack civil society and
diminish human rights, but even more broadly?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator. Well, there is a
contest in this world occurring now between two models, the
democratic model and an authoritarian model. The trends were
not pretty before COVID struck and, as you note, they are
getting worse in terms of human rights recessions, even in
established democracies around the world.
I think that there would be no question to any of the
wonderful USAID staff as to the level of priority that I give
democracy and human rights. My whole career has been in that
field.
I was moved to go into foreign policy by the massacre in
Tiananmen Square that occurred in June of 1989 when I was still
a college kid.
And so on the specifics of whether the Democracy Rights and
Governance Center and that programming belongs within the DDI
Bureau where it is now, I would love to revert.
But on the substance, I would just like to note that,
again, this is incredibly important programming, partnering
with the Department of State and their Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor Bureau, looking at anti-corruption work specifically,
which is a real Achilles for authoritarian and illiberal
countries, I think one we have not taken full advantage of.
This will be a huge priority for me, Senator.
The Chairman. All right. And finally, you mentioned in your
comments, and I think it is one of the central issues that we
need to face as we deal with the challenges of migration and
the challenges that we have at the border, having AID address
violence, corruption, and other drivers of migration in the
Northern Triangle countries are incredibly important as part
of--Vice President Biden was--when he was vice president he had
a plan then.
Unfortunately, it was not continued. There is another
provision in--that he has put forth. How do you see the key
components of a joint USAID-State Department strategy as part
of that the Northern Triangle effort?
Ambassador Power. Well, just to note that I have been very
heartened in the briefings that I have been able to have from
outside by the reliance on data and evidence in tailoring those
programs.
USAID actually gets data from the International
Organization of Migration and CBP, the Customs Border
Protection, to find out why individuals are leaving their
homes, to dig into the specifics, to dig into the localities
from which they are fleeing.
And USAID--prior to the funding suspension under the Trump
administration, USAID actually has tailored programs around
those places where people are most likely to flee and tailor
programming around, again, the causes of migration.
So I think that is the right approach. It will take us some
time to ramp back up, unfortunately, because some of those
programs were suspended. But the infrastructure is in place and
I look forward to working with you again to dig into specifics.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Ambassador Power, first of all, thank you for taking the
time yesterday and previously for you and I to talk about this
position and your confirmation, and one of the things we talked
about yesterday was National Security Memorandum No. 1 that
President Biden has executed in which the Secretary of State
will lead and, in coordination with the USAID administrator,
the development of the U.S. Government wide plan to combat
COVID-19 pandemic.
Can I get your thoughts on the record for that, please,
briefly?
Ambassador Power. Specifically on COVID-19 or on the
structural----
Senator Risch. Well, generally on the structure and then as
it relates to COVID-19.
Ambassador Power. Yeah. I mean, I think that as actually
COVID-19 illustrates probably better than any contemporary
threat, our fates, and the fates of the American people, are
connected to health infrastructure, economic prosperity, the
curbing of extremism and radicalization internationally.
And so programming that USAID does in that regard, in
cooperation with the State Department and other agencies, is
incredibly important for our security and what President Biden
has done in elevating USAID and giving it a seat on the
National Security Council and in the Principles Committee, I
think, has just effectively enshrined that reality, which is
that our development efforts and our diplomatic efforts have to
be resourced and prioritized alongside, of course, our
essential defense efforts.
So I think that is the logic. You know, from having spoken
with him about this decision, that is the logic of elevating
USAID. The expertise is there, the know-how is there, and I
think what is really important about doing this is it means
that that expertise and know-how will be reflected in the
interagency, not only at high levels but at every level.
Senator Risch. Thank you. Thanks for that answer.
Moving offshore, the memorandum also refers to a diplomatic
outreach plan for enhancing the United States response to the
COVID-19 pandemic by engaging partner nations.
Could you give me your thoughts on that, please?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
When I was U.N. Ambassador, I had the privilege of being
part of President Obama's effort to mobilize a large anti-Ebola
coalition to prevent, in that instance, an epidemic, a horrific
epidemic from becoming a global pandemic of the kind that we
are now living through.
I think the United States is at its most powerful,
effective, and efficient when it leverages the support that it
offers international institutions or the resources that it
dedicates to combating global challenges, when it leverages
that to get others to do more.
And that is what President Biden, I think, has already done
in the context of announcing the $2 billion that you allocated
late last year for GAVI, for the vaccine effort, that that $2
billion is going to be contributed.
But it is also going to be leveraged to get other countries
to do more before the next $2 billion is obligated, and I think
that is just one example. There has not--there has not been, I
should say, optimal coordination, I think, in the international
global vaccine area and that is something that I am very eager
to dig into, if I am confirmed.
Senator Risch. Thank you. I appreciate those thoughts.
The Global Health Diplomacy and Security Act, which I
introduced, creates a coordinator position at the State
Department that is consistent with the type of framework I
believe that President Biden intends in his memorandum.
Are you familiar with that, by any chance, and go ahead.
Your thoughts?
Ambassador Power. The prior version of the bill I was
familiar with. I have not seen--I think the bill that you
either are on the verge of introducing or have just introduced.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that. And as I indicated,
Senator Menendez and I have been talking about the global
health issue and an effort by this committee in that regard,
and I intend to work with Senator Menendez on the creation of
the framework because, obviously, the success is going to
depend on that framework and I hope to engage you and your
agency as we move forward on that.
And with that, my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Cardin, who is with us virtually?
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Ambassador
Power, thank you very much for your willingness to continue to
serve our nation.
I want to follow up on comments that you made earlier this
year, which was something I was pleased to see where you
indicated that anti-corruption would be a centerpiece of
President Biden's foreign policy agenda.
And you have already answered some of that with Senator
Menendez in regards to how you are using the DRG Center. You
specifically mentioned in those comments the use of the tools
that are at your disposal, including Magnitsky sanctions.
Can I take it that you will work with us as we look at
permanently authorizing the Global Magnitsky statute today? It
is by executive order and by statute that expires. We take
pretty much what was in the executive order, Senator Wicker and
I, and codified that as permanent authorization.
Do we have your support on that legislation?
Ambassador Power. Unequivocally, and let me just thank you
for the Magnitsky Act where your leadership was so pivotal. As
you know, it has now been replicated to a large extent in
Europe and in Canada.
I think one of our tasks is to ensure that other countries
adopt similar measures so that we can multilateralize these
corruption and human rights sanctions.
Senator Cardin. And Senator Young and I have introduced
legislation to try to build on it to give capacity for our
missions to evaluate how well the countries in which they
operate are are dealing with corruption.
So it is a way of using a standard similar to what we do in
trafficking in persons to monitor progress made in fighting
corruption. You mentioned in your article anti-bribery statutes
and dealing with those--the laundering, anti-laundering
statutes, et cetera.
Will you work with us as we look to enact this law to give
you additional tools to help fight corruption?
Ambassador Power. Yes, Senator. Always looking for
additional tools. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
So let me talk a little bit about Central America. You
already talked a little bit about that with Senator Menendez,
and I know that President Biden is looking at providing help to
the Central American countries in order to do what is right in
our hemisphere from the humanitarian point of view as well as
the practical aspects of migration.
But there is systemic corruption in these countries that if
we do not deal with it we are going to be giving money that
will not get to its intended purpose.
So how do you intend to make sure that our assistance to
the Central American countries are used for the people to deal
with the problems of Central America and not just fuel
corruption?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
You put your finger on a real inhibitor of progress--above
all progress for the people of that region. Let me say that,
from what I understand of USAID programming up to this point,
there is, of course, a recognition of the barrier that
corruption has constituted to economic progress, to progress in
combating threats to physical security, and thus, much of the
programming is routed, for example, through local officials who
have been identified as reformers or--and/or civil society
partners.
And, indeed, many of those partners, as you know, are doing
work to hold the central authorities accountable for
transgressions and for different forms of corruption.
It has been disappointing to see some of the strides that
were made, for example, in Guatemala and Honduras through CSIG.
CSIG was actually the most popular and I know you were critical
in pushing for its mandates to be renewed successively in
Guatemala. It was the most popular institution in Guatemala
before it was shut down, and so that is disappointing because
it had a really important role to play. Then Vice President
Biden was also critical in ensuring that it was preserved
there.
But I think, thinking through at the central level, how--
what more we can do for civil society actors that are holding
government accountable to try to change the equation so that
those governments that are trending in worrying directions
reverse that tide.
Senator Cardin. I know that we can help you in this regard.
I strongly support our involvement in Central America. But when
we put conditionality on aid, it gives the administration, I
think, the additional strength in dealing with the governments
to indicate there has got to be progress made in dealing with
the governance issues.
So I hope you take that as friendly help when we look at
conditionality to make sure that we do achieve progress in
dealing with systemic problems in these countries.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Portman, who is with us virtually, I understand?
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ambassador Power, and also thank you to your husband, Cass
Sunstein, for his willingness to come back into public service.
We appreciate your willingness to step up again.
I enjoyed our conversation, and let me follow up a little
bit on what Senator Cardin just talked to you about.
As you know, I suppose, we have spent $3.6 billion of
taxpayer money in the Northern Triangle countries--El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatemala--in the past five years. The results are
not impressive, understanding that recently some of the natural
disasters in that area, particularly the hurricanes, added to
this.
But I will tell you, I just got the numbers this morning
from last week. Five hundred and fifty kids per day came into
the United States, mostly from the Northern Triangle countries,
which is five or six times more than in January when there was
less than a hundred.
In terms of families--and by the way, there were 300 in
February so we are going up and up and up--in terms of
families, 1,500 per day last week, as compared to a thousand in
February, on average, less than a hundred in January, again, a
15 times increase.
So the push factors are not being addressed effectively.
People are coming. The pull factors are that the changes were
made in policies to allow people to come and they are
responding and the traffickers are responding.
So I guess what I would ask you is how you would do it
differently. Senator Cardin rightly asked you about corruption,
and I believe insisting on transparency and rule of law and
tying our aid is important.
By the way, of that $3.6 billion, as you know, much was
sent through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC, which
has precisely those criteria and others to ensure the money is
well spent.
But I guess I would ask you also about tying it to
immigration and specifically requiring those countries to work
with us to have people apply for asylum from their country of
origin or if they feel it is unsafe to do it in a safe third
country, which is one of the programs that was discontinued by
the current administration.
In other words, someone could apply in Guatemala for asylum
if they are from Honduras, which would be the first country
that they would come into, a safe third country.
Do you believe that that is an appropriate condition to us
spending what President Biden has now suggested, which is
another $4 billion on top of the $3.6 billion that has been set
in the last five years?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
Well, first, just to embrace the premise of your question
that we have a responsibility to be effective vigilant stewards
of taxpayer resources, this is an immensely challenging set of
problems, and as you called them push factors out of the region
to deal with there are no silver bullets. Needless to say, if
there were someone would have found one along the way.
But I guess I would just offer a few thoughts. I mean,
first of all, there is actually compelling data, and I look
forward to digging into the numbers further if I am--if I am
confirmed, but that shows that, for example, in the districts
where USAID had programming aimed at curbing violence--for
example, in El Salvador between 2015 and 2017, there was a 61
percent drop in homicide rates.
There are comparable numbers in terms of the statistics in
districts that USAID programming was set up in Honduras, with a
slightly smaller drop but, nonetheless, a very substantial drop
in homicide rates.
I think that is encouraging. I think, you know, suspending
the programs, unfortunately, gave us less influence in using
our programming to work with those reformist officials who were
willing, again, to crackdown on violence within their
neighborhoods.
Senator Portman. Ambassador, let me interrupt you just for
a second----
Ambassador Power. Of course.
Senator Portman [continuing]. Because I want to cover
another topic as well. But just on this topic, having just been
at the border the last few days, I did talk to a lot of
unaccompanied kids and also to families and single men coming
over from Central America and, as you know, the constant
refrain is, ``I can make 10 or sometimes 20 times as much in
America. I want to take care of my family.''
So I agree that dealing with the violence is important and
I applaud those changes. And, in fact, not only has violence
been dealt with in those countries so that the numbers are a
little better, generally, but also the economic situation is a
little better, although the hurricanes and the COVID-19 numbers
are probably not going to be as good.
But it is--it is an economic issue, primarily. In other
words, people will still be looking to come to the United
States. And my question to you was, should we condition
billions of dollars in taxpayer money not just on the important
things that Senator Cardin talked about but also on working
with us on this issue of immigration and, specifically, on
asylum claims? Do you agree with that?
Ambassador Power. Well, I think that one of your premises,
if I understood it, of putting individuals in a position where
they could apply for refugee status or asylum in the region
rather than entrusting, for example, their children to
coyotes----
Senator Portman. Right. And taking a dangerous course,
which is----
Ambassador Power. I do not think any parents, you know,
relishes the entrusting of one's child, again, to a smuggler.
So one of the things that we looked at in the Obama
administration, as you know, was setting up these UNHCR offices
in the region. I think that is something that President Biden
is looking at again, and that is very important.
But you put your finger, again, on one of the major causes
of migration, which is the lack of economic opportunity, and
that is something that USAID has a lot of experience investing
in.
You are right, we have not produced the same kinds of
results, as I have pointed to, when it comes to physical
security and crime. But I think, you know, now with tailored
programming, not being everywhere but being specifically in
those communities where we know that there is the highest
concentration of migrants, we can, working with you and being
held accountable, hopefully, begin to make a dent.
Senator Portman. Well, Ambassador, I hope you--I hope you
work with--my time is getting toward the end here. But my
question is specifically dealing with the economy----
The Chairman. The senator's time has past expired so----
Senator Portman [continuing]. And the violence issues, but
also if you could work with us on this issue of immigration and
asylum so people can apply from their home country or a safe
third country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Coons, who just returned from the Tigray region in
Ethiopia on a mission and we appreciate his work, and you are
recognized.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch, and Ambassador Power.
Welcome, and thank you for your willingness to serve our
nation again, and to Cass and to Declan and to Rian, thank you
for supporting your wife and mother in her tremendous service
to our nation.
You are taking on this role, hopefully, once confirmed at a
critically important time. We all saw how, in the last year of
the previous administration, the absence of a Senate-confirmed
administrator.
The absence of clear and forceful leadership led to real
drift and some challenges operationally and organizationally.
There are humanitarian crises all over the world, as many
of us will comment today, from Venezuela to Yemen to Burma to
Ethiopia to many other nations, and clear and capable
leadership at USAID is critical.
I have profound respect and appreciation for the work of
the USAID, the folks who are deployed around the world. I just
had the opportunity to meet with a number of the humanitarian
partners and leaders that USAID is relying on in Ethiopia, as I
have elsewhere.
I also think it is critical we continue to explain to the
average American how the work of USAID overseas helps keep us
safer, healthier, and more prosperous.
And, tragically, COVID-19 is an opportunity for us to
remind folks exactly how vaccinating the rest of the world is
critical to preventing new variants from breaking out and from
harming all of us.
So I look forward to working with you in my role as the
chairman of the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations
Subcommittee and to having a meaningful dialogue.
Let me dive in first, if I could, to what I just saw. If
confirmed, can we count on USAID to work with this committee
and with all of us in Congress to ensure that we are addressing
the humanitarian crisis throughout Ethiopia and, in particular,
in the Tigray region?
Ambassador Power. Absolutely. Thank you for taking the trip
that you took. USAID, as you know, just made an announcement of
an additional $52 million dollars in humanitarian support. I
think that makes the contribution so far $150 million plus
since the crisis began.
But the humanitarian--mitigating the humanitarian
suffering, of course, is not all we need to be doing. We need
to get at the root causes of that suffering and secure access
so that that food can be delivered.
So thank you for what you have done to try to make that
happen.
Senator Coons. And I am optimistic we will make progress
now on humanitarian access.
I also met with the head of the Ethiopian Human Rights
Commission, Daniel Bekele, and discussed with him and with
other international leaders about carrying out a thorough and
independent investigation of human rights abuses.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle
Bachelet, has also talked recently about doing a joint
investigation.
From your career working in human rights issues, what kind
of investigation do you think would be most effective and have
the greatest impact in getting to the root of human rights
violations that have occurred?
Ambassador Power. Well, the biggest challenge,
traditionally, for international human rights investigations,
especially independent ones, is securing access, and so the key
is not only getting the approval from the Center and from the
prime minister for something like that, but making sure that
that agreement trickles down and that there is a willingness on
the part of the authorities who have granted access to ensure
that, you know, the checkpoints do not go up then as soon as
the investigators deploy.
There are many, many countries where atrocity allegations
have occurred, have developed. Unfortunately, creative
traditions of erecting roadblocks, you know, where it matters--
in other words, harassing, intimidating witnesses and so forth,
denying visas to particular communities, blaming so-called
uncontrolled militia, you know, without, at the Center, really
taking steps to make sure that those militia allow
investigators to do their work.
Senator Coons. Well, I look forward to partnering with you
and relying on your advice in exactly how to make sure that
this commitment that has recently been announced by the prime
minister to investigate and this partnership that I think is
quite possible is successful.
And there is a number of things I look forward to working
with you on: the implementation of the Global Fragility Act, a
bill that I helped lead that has been signed into law that is a
new tool to ensure that development and diplomacy take the lead
in support of defense work in securing countries from the Sahel
to the Northern Triangle, the Nita Lowey Middle East
Partnership for Peace Act and ensuring that we are investing in
both people-to-people programs and joint economic ventures to
facilitate the conditions for a possible two-state solution,
and then ways in which we can keep the Development Finance
Corporation a development finance corporation and to best use
the MCC.
My last question will be for you about the critical role
that delivering safe and effective vaccines to the developing
world can play in continuing our role as one of the world's
leading supporters of effective public health programs.
There has been a significant increase in the appropriated
funds available through COVAX. We have rejoined WHO.
What do you think we most need to do to ensure the prompt
and equitable distribution of effective vaccines globally?
Ambassador Power. Well, let me just cite, Senator, the
International Chamber of Commerce report--I think we discussed
it on the phone a month or two ago--but that shows that until
and unless there is economic recovery by virtue of vaccinations
and curbing of the pandemic in the developing world, it is
going to cost the global economy $9 trillion, including
developed countries $4.5 trillion. Between that and the issue
of variants, where as long as the pandemic is raging somewhere
there is a chance of some mutation and variants moving
aggressively, it is so in our interest to make that happen.
COVAX, if fully funded, will vaccinate 20 percent of
people, they hope, by the end of this year--20 percent of the
people in developing countries.
That is not sufficient, and so looking to see how COVAX is
being supplemented by bilateral donations, surplus donations,
and other contributions, I think, is really important.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Paul?
Senator Paul. Good morning. Welcome.
Ambassador Power. Good morning.
Senator Paul. Many on the left are horrified at being
associated with the neocon foreign policy. But it is no small
irony that the end results of responsibility to protect are, in
reality, little different than the interventionist policies of
John Bolton and Bill Kristol.
Like the neocons, the liberal advocates of responsibility
to protect have advocated for military intervention in Libya,
Syria, and Yemen.
Sure, the reasoning might be more humanitarian than
geopolitical, but the advocacy for military intervention ends
up looking pretty much the same.
I remember liking what candidate Obama said about military
intervention, that without congressional approval it was only
justified when there was an imminent threat.
After President Obama began bombing Libya, I asked him at
lunch one day, what about your pledge to ask and seek
congressional permission unless it was an imminent threat.
He responded that there was an imminent threat to Benghazi.
I looked at him incredulously and responded, ``Really? An
imminent threat to a foreign city is your justification for an
unauthorized war?''
The responsibility to protect ideology did not learn much
from the Libyan debacle and immediately pushed the Obama
administration to jump into Syria. Many on the left, like
Secretary Blinken, do not admit that there was too much
intervention. They actually believe in Syria that they failed
because there was too little military intervention.
Several hundred thousand people have died in Syria and more
than a million refugees have been displaced. If you are talking
about humanitarianism, famine, the wars, really, other than
natural causes war is the number-one cause of famine around the
world.
An argument can be made, though, that Assad would probably
massacred far fewer people had the West and the Gulf States
stayed out of the civil war.
Are you willing to admit that the Libyan and Syrian
military interventions that you advocated for were a mistake,
and that going forward, you will be more conscious of the
unintended humanitarian disasters that seem to occur again and
again with our military interventions in Africa and throughout
the Middle East?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
Well, first, if I may, just talk about USAID and its role,
which I think can be very important in Libya today.
I think before you arrived I mentioned that there is--a
power-sharing government has finally been set up in Libya.
USAID right now, because of the security conditions, operates
its programs, largely, from the----
Senator Paul. You would acknowledge Libya is worse now than
it was before we started bombing them?
Ambassador Power [continuing]. I think it is really
important with Libya having the opportunity to have elections
at the end of this year for us to do what we can to support
those elections. I think it is in the face of mass atrocities
there are a whole set of nonmilitary tools that are--I would
hope that you would support deploying.
We had some successes with them, for example, in helping
bring about the South Sudanese Referendum, which was a risk of
grave atrocities occurring back in the first term of the Obama
administration, an attempt to steal an election in Cote
d'Ivoire where diplomatic pressure averted mass atrocities, and
even sending technical advisors, military advisors, to Central
Africa to combat the Lord's Resistance Army, which kidnapped
children and----
Senator Paul. Do you think we were successful in Libya,
that Libya is a better place because of our military
intervention, or Syria?
Ambassador Power. The decision that President Obama made
when confronted with the risk to the people of Benghazi and
other civilian centers was an incredibly difficult one, and
again, in sitting in the Situation Room, I think it is hard now
to remember--you know, with the United Nations, NATO, the Arab
League, this body, the Senate, unanimously calling for a no-fly
zone, President Obama made the judgment that the risks of
allowing Benghazi to fall and the slaughter that would ensue
were not----
Senator Paul [continuing]. I know it is a tough decision,
but in retrospect, was Libya a good idea to militarily
intervene in Libya? A good idea to militarily intervene in
Syria, in retrospect?
Ambassador Power. I think the challenge is that we do not
have the counterfactual and, certainly, the fallout in the--in
the wake of the intervention, the centrifugal forces have been
incredibly difficult to manage and, above all, hard on the
Libyan people.
Senator Paul. But we have to learn lessons sometime. I
mean, we went into Libya. We went into Iraq. We destabilized
Iraq. We are still dealing with that. We went into Libya,
destabilized Libya. We are still dealing with that. Syria, the
same thing, and Yemen as well.
So, I mean, there should be an accumulation of knowledge
and a learning curve here that our interventions make things
worse, not better.
Ambassador Power. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
I, certainly, agree that nonmilitary tools in the toolbox
are--carry with them far fewer risks. I opposed the war in
Iraq. I agree with you on Yemen.
All I am trying to describe is that when these situations
arise, it is a question almost of lesser evils, that the
choices are very challenging.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations,
Ambassador Power, for your nomination.
You have been a human rights activist. You have played a
number of roles with the Obama administration, including U.N.
ambassador, and now you are poised to take the helm of a
critical engine of humanitarian assistance around the globe.
So I am going to ask you questions that kind of combine all
the roles, both about what you might do at USAID but also how
you see some of the challenges that affect the committee.
You began your prepared remarks with four gargantuan
challenges, and one was democracy backsliding, and I want to
talk to you about that. We are seeing it everywhere.
We are seeing it in every continent. We are seeing, as you
indicate, declines in freedom and democracy indices, whether
you are looking at, you know, Freedom House annual reports or
the Economist Democracy Index annual reports.
President Biden has indicated that sometime either later
this year or earlier next year he wants to convene a summit of
democracies, which I think is a great idea.
How would you foresee USAID being part of what the U.S.
might do in convening such a summit? Just share your thoughts
on that.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
If I might, just because the democracy and human rights
numbers are so unfortunate and depressing, just to offer
something on the other side of the ledger.
Prior to the pandemic, there were more political protests
that occurred in more places than at any point in modern
recorded history.
So on the one hand, you have states increasingly repressing
their people and growing more sophisticated in shutting down
the internet and in stifling space for civil society.
On the other hand, many, many people are not getting that
memo and are insisting on taking their protests and their
concerns to the streets and holding governments accountable.
So I think there is a lot to work with out there of
concerns about violations of dignity and rights and a desire
for the United States to play a leadership role in promoting
human rights, of course, with humility.
With regard to the summit, I am not privy to the
deliberations and sort of what the planning and thinking is
either on timing or on the details of substance.
But I think there are a lot of opportunities to collaborate
and for USAID to play an important role, for example, in
combating misinformation and sharing best practices for doing
so in protecting election infrastructure, not only from
misinformation but from hacking and other forms of intrusion,
the anti-corruption programs that have been effective in
holding governments accountable and bringing civil society into
conversations that are too often top down.
I think there are a lot of lessons that can be imparted in
that regard. And often, Senator, I think it is--it is countries
that themselves are at different stages of democratic
progression that have the most valuable lessons to impart to
those countries that are just becoming democratic.
For example, the country of Sudan, which is experiencing a
political transition, is a long way from being a full and--a
full Jeffersonian democracy, that----
Senator Kaine. Sudan is a good example of something. I
agree with you.
You would agree with me that in something like a summit of
democracies it would be very important not to just focus on,
like, a NATO like U.S. and Europe or an OECD, just kind of the
big developed nations, but we should include large and small
democracies, mature and nascent from every continent on the
planet.
I mean, should not that be the goal of such a summit?
Ambassador Power. Again, I do not know how the current
administration is thinking about the summit. I can tell you,
Senator, from having helped design invitation lists as a U.N.
ambassador that questions of who is in and who is out are
actually quite challenging.
Senator Kaine. And but I am not asking about particular
nations. I am just saying it would have less utility if it is
just seen as kind of a U.S. and Europe thing or a big nation
thing, right?
If we are going to have a summit of democracies, there are
democracies on every continent. They are big and small and
nascent and mature. And if we are going to try to uphold the
model and share best practices, we should not have kind of a
U.S. or U.S. and Europe-centric view. We should try to include
democracies from everywhere.
Ambassador Power. I think the more demographically and
culturally and regionally representative we can be in general
in talking about democracy and human rights the better.
The progress I was able to make as U.N. ambassador on LGBTQ
rights would not have happened without the leadership of Latin
American countries, who were at the forefront there.
So I agree with the premise of your question. I am just not
familiar with what the plans are for the summit.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. I do not have any other
questions, Mr. Chair. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young?
Senator Young. Welcome, Ambassador, and congratulations on
your nomination.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
Senator Young. As you know, the People's Republic of China
is using development dollars to advance its foreign policy
goals through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative.
Some have proposed expanding DFC's work to enable it to
more effectively combat China's investments by targeting
middle-income countries or perhaps utilizing DSC to support the
export of U.S.-made emerging technologies.
Whether through USAID or DFC, it is absolutely essential
that our development dollars, I think, be used to advance our
geostrategic priorities.
So, Ambassador, how would you like to see our development
agencies improved so that we are able to more effectively
compete with China?
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
The way in which, and I alluded to this in my opening
statement, but that China is using its economic leverage and
heft not only to, in often a predatory way, but not only to
change governing practices within countries but in my old place
of work the United Nations to actually leverage those financial
commitments to change the rules of the road altogether and to
water down international human rights commitments and so forth,
for fear that those laws and norms will be used against China.
It warrants urgent, immediate, and well-resourced attention.
I think you asked about improvement and I am, again,
incredibly impressed with what USAID staff have done and was
very impressed with the leadership of Mark Green in this area.
I think you and Senator Coons and others have worked on
making the DFC a much more powerful tool in the American
toolbox. I think increasing coordination between the Millennium
Challenge Corporation, the DFC, USAID, and the range of other
development actors is one answer.
I think recognizing our comparative advantages--you know,
we actually believe in local self-reliance. That is what we are
working toward. We want countries not to be dependent on
international assistance.
So the investments we make are in their ability to have
agency and to dictate their own affairs. This is very----
Senator Young. Sure.
Ambassador Power [continuing]. Different, I think, than the
China model. Go ahead, sir.
Senator Young. No. So you mentioned local self-reliance. I
am going to get into that momentarily since you brought that
up.
Might you support expanding DFC's mission to target areas
in the developed world where China is attempting to make
inroads?
Ambassador Power. I would want to look into that and hear
from you and others, just, again, having not worked yet within
the administration or dug into DFC-related questions, if I
could.
But I think, certainly, the question for American foreign
policy, broadly, is not only, you know, how do we deal with
China in sub-Saharan Africa and the inroads they are making
there, but across the developed world as well.
Senator Young. You mentioned self-reliance, that emphasis
on making countries self-reliant, I think, is itself an
advantage, right, because all people--so I think not just most
people but all people want to be more self-reliant, less
reliant upon foreign nations and others. It is sort of wired
into our DNA.
How would you say America's national security interests are
helped by making countries more self-reliant? Is that
consistent with your thinking?
Ambassador Power. Absolutely consistent with my thinking,
and I think you put your finger on it. It is you cannot travel
the world and talk to individuals, whether they are those who
are receiving U.N. food assistance or those receiving technical
assistance in a government ministry, without being struck by
how eager they are to not be dependent on international
assistance, and I think that is something USAID staff have
taken to heart. So----
Senator Young. Is there--is there a way that we might, or
how should we measure self-reliance?
Ambassador Power. Well, I think domestic resource
mobilization is something that USAID has invested a lot in, so
making sure that countries are able to collect their own tax,
infrastructure, strengthening the rule of law, so that there is
an ability, you know, not only for NGOs to hold governmental
actors accountable for potential corruption or malfeasance but
also the courts, and making sure there is an independent
judiciary. So work in those domains, I think, is one----
Senator Young. Then, lastly, in summary fashion, I will
just ask you, how would you use your seat on the Development
Finance Corporation's executive board to ensure that DFC and
USAID's complementary missions are furthering achieving self-
reliance in our targeted countries?
Ambassador Power. I really look forward to that individual
being named, nominated, confirmed, and sitting down with them.
I think a critical answer to your question about China but also
our larger question about just enhancing development for the
sake of U.S. security and prosperity lies in that partnership.
And the resources that DFC bring to bear but also,
specifically, they bring to bear what countries most want,
which is private sector investment and, really, to move away
from assistance to a more equal relationship of that nature.
Senator Young. Thank you, Ambassador. I will be submitting
some questions for the record about Burma.
Ambassador Power. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Young. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I understand that Senator Schatz
is with us virtually.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ambassador, for being willing to serve. Again, thank you to
your family.
USAID is already leading in climate in our foreign
assistance. We see that in the work of the bureaus, the various
offices, and the regional missions.
But I do think there is more that we can do to make sure
that there is leadership at the top to help to steer the
agencies' climate work so there is an advocate for consistent
and reliable funding, and someone to establish a clear set of
priorities for USAID's mission.
Can you talk about where we might make some permanent
structural changes at USAID so that our emphasis on climate is
embedded into our budget, our priorities, and our objectives,
going forward, and so that it does not swing back and forth
depending on who is the president of the United States?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for
your leadership on climate.
I am struck by how much work is already being done, and you
are alluding to this at USAID as it relates to disaster risk
reduction, helping those countries that want to transition to
clean energy or to lower their carbon emissions, above all,
dealing with something that I know you have worked on in the
Pacific Island context, which is mitigation and adaptation
for--especially with Pacific Island countries, those countries
that are only a few feet above sea level and really suffering
devastating effects of climate events and just the rising sea
levels.
But you asked a question more about the sort of
bureaucratic instantiation of these efforts. I think, for
starters, I will want to get smarter at a granular level about
what USAID is already doing and was doing under the prior
administration.
I think, as well, thinking through what it means to
acknowledge that climate touches just about every aspect of
USAID programming, from food security to displacement and
humanitarian emergency to we had an exchange earlier about
conflict and the causes of conflict and how we can address root
causes.
So given that, what is the appropriate bureaucratic sort of
structure for that disaster risk reduction, adaptation,
mitigation, emissions reduction expertise? You know, what is
the best way to channel all the expertise that exists within
the building so that it is reflective of the fact that this
expertise needs to permeate so many domains?
And so I do not have an answer for you today, Senator. If
you have ideas, I would love to hear them. But I think it is
incredibly important to make sure that the structure is fit for
purpose at this moment.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
I want to stay in Oceania and talk a little bit about not
disaster response but disaster preparation. You know, the
United States government is very effective in disaster
response.
I think of the Fukushima Daiichi earthquake and tsunami. I
think of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that impacted coastal
Thailand, among other places, and, of course, we were there for
the rescue.
But for such a small amount of money, we were able to
prevent some of these disasters. Obviously, the natural
disasters are unpreventable, but for the simple price of about
$500,000, we were able to deploy some sea level gauges so that
people would get early warning about tsunamis and save life.
And I just wonder how you are looking at not just disaster
response and mitigation in terms of hard infrastructure, but
especially early warning systems and those relatively easy to
deploy and inexpensive to purchase the kinds of assistance that
really help island nations, and whether USAID would be amenable
to really taking a look throughout Oceania about that.
Ambassador Power. I cannot wait to dig into that set of
questions, if I am confirmed. I do--I did read a little bit
about it, just as I was been preparing these last weeks for
this hearing.
And, as you said, just with such modest financial
investments, I read about these beetles that were working with
NOAA to provide countries that, in low connectivity areas,
allow people to communicate warnings of extreme weather events
to come.
I think that is just a great example of the kinds of uses
of technology, the uses of satellites, the uses of surveillance
that we can bring to bear to mitigate harms.
So eager, all ears, and look forward to hearing more about
what USAID staff, which have been so creative in this domain,
have already done.
Senator Schatz. Sea level gauges, DART buoys, drones for
reconnaissance and disaster response--all of these are really
inexpensive, even in the context of USAID but, certainly, in
the context of our overall foreign aid and defense budget.
So I look forward to working with you on all these things.
Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I understand Senator Hagerty is with us virtually.
Senator Hagerty. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, I would like to commend your two children for
attending today. I know that it takes a lot for a family to be
as supportive as they have been of their parents, and I hope
they obtain a great civics lesson today and I commend them for
joining you and for being so supportive of your service.
To the extent that the United States spends development
funds overseas, I know we all want to make certain that those
funds are spent in a manner that is efficient and as effective
as possible at serving our interest.
So I would like to turn our attention to women's
empowerment. As you know, to the extent that women flourish in
a nation their economies flourish, their democracies flourish,
and we tend to see more stability.
The previous administration put together a tremendous
program, the Women's Global Development and Prosperity
Initiative, and Congress has allocated some $200 million this
fiscal year.
It enjoys great bipartisan support from this committee. And
I think it has tremendous potential.
Ambassador, I would like to ask you, first, if you are
aware of this program, and then further, how would you go about
the implementation and making sure that we see this program
through as it is intended?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator, just to
wholeheartedly agree with your various premises about the link
between women's empowerment and education and increased GDPs.
Peace processes last longer if women are included in at the
table.
As to the program that you are referencing, I have,
certainly, read about it. I would like, if I could, to dig into
it, again, if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, and look
at also how it fits alongside other USAID investments, for
example, in girls' education, in other efforts to catalyze
entrepreneurship for women and girls.
But, again, I share your premises and happy to consult with
you on that, going forward.
Senator Hagerty. Well, I appreciate that, and I would
underscore that this is a terrific program and I think it has
tremendous potential. So I hope that it will take a premier
role as you evaluate what you may do, if confirmed, in the
implementation of programs that will help advance our interest
overseas.
Along those same lines, I would like to shift gears and
talk a bit about nations that are vulnerable to Chinese
influence and, specifically, the implementation of Chinese
technology into their networks and their infrastructure.
Are there things that you might be able to accomplish, that
USAID could accomplish, that would help make these nations less
vulnerable to Chinese penetration, to help them stand up
against the--this sort of incentivization that the Chinese
often will give to get other types of benefits? Can you address
that concern, please?
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
Well, I think some of the answer is diplomatic. You know,
the last administration, I think, exerted a lot of diplomatic
pressure on countries and some of it was proved, I think,
ultimately effective. For example, the United Kingdom reversing
its prior decision on Huawei and 5G.
So I look forward to working with Secretary Blinken in that
regard. But also, I had a couple exchanges earlier, sir, about
the comparative advantages of USAID assistance and U.S.
development assistance, more broadly, and I do think the fact
that we stand for digital and secure--secure and open digital
infrastructure is a comparative advantage.
It is something that aligns with the aspirations of
hundreds of millions of people around the world, and so part of
the investments that USAID makes in civil society and in
nongovernmental actors, part of our work with the DFC, knowing
how much countries value private sector investment from the
United States.
I think linking these conversations and recognizing that
for American companies, for example, the investment climate is
more hospitable in the event of an open and secure digital
infrastructure. I think that can be part of our leverage
alongside questions of how USAID spends--expends its resources.
Senator Hagerty. Well, I appreciate your time and effort
looking at how we might better leverage our position to ensure
that the networks around the globe remain free and clear.
Thank you very much for your time.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I understand Senator Van Hollen is with us virtually.
Senator Van Hollen. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member, for this hearing. And, Madam Ambassador, it is
great to see you. Thank you for your past service to our
country and for your willingness to serve again in this
capacity, if confirmed, and it is great to see your family.
Senator Murphy and I have proposed a new foreign policy
budget to really meet the needs of this century in the year
2021, recognizing that many of the threats that we face are
transnational, global, from climate change to pandemics to
cybersecurity, and we look forward to working with you to
explore that budget.
It includes a significant increase in the budget for AID,
among other things, and part of the idea is also to combat what
Senator Hagerty was just discussing, which is China's very
active and aggressive effort to export its model of
authoritarianism to the developing world through a number of
instruments, including debt trap diplomacy, the Belt and Road
Initiative.
Their focus has been on sort of major infrastructure
projects and, you know, decades ago, AID was also very focused
on building larger infrastructure projects.
If you could just comment on how you see the role of AID in
the developing world in the context of China's ongoing efforts,
but with the toolbox that you have. I mean, should we consider
changing the mix in our toolbox as we go forward and how do you
see that challenge?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
Understandably, this has come up a good bit today, just as
it comes up every day in the world, and I should say thank you
to you and Senator Murphy for looking into this question of how
development diplomacy, our foreign affairs budget, should be
tailored for this moment.
So I look forward to seeing what comes of that exercise. I
have seen the preliminary numbers, but look forward to more.
You know, I think that the phrase I keep coming back to is
comparative advantage, and you alluded to debt trap diplomacy.
I think, you know, on the one hand, this has been a year of
tremendous Chinese expansionism and aggressiveness when it
comes to developing countries and when it comes to its near
abroad as well. We have seen that in Hong Kong. We have seen it
in the South China Sea. We have seen it on the Indian border.
But it has not gone that well for China. Their--you
actually see, you know, very poor polling when it comes to
China's standing in the world. Even with the donations of
protective gear in light of the COVID pandemic, you do not see
increases in soft power.
Quite the contrary, in light of COVID and the status of the
global economy and how much different countries have suffered
from that, and I think it is in part because people recognize
that this coercive and predatory approach, which is so
transactional and, seemingly, not really rooted in encouraging
countries to achieve their own destinies, their own development
objectives.
I think it is not going over that well, and that creates an
opening for the United States. I think our comparative
advantages are our support for accountable governance, which
aligns with what citizens want worldwide, our ability to not
only bring in the DFC but, in parallel, private sector
investments, which countries hunger for, the fact that we are
carrying out programming that is supportive of various
countries' environmental objectives, so many of these countries
cherish the natural resources that they have been given.
And so I think our approach, which is helping them sustain
those resources rather than pillaging them, is something that
also gives us a comparative advantage.
So I can go on and, again, I think it is country specific
in terms of how the programming should be tailored. But,
fundamentally, it is about supporting those countries achieve
their objectives and their goals of becoming self-reliant and
not being dependent on assistance.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. I also want to
follow up briefly on the line of questioning from Senator Coons
regarding our role in working with others in the world to
defeat the coronavirus.
As you indicated, the COVAX facility, we hope, will
vaccinate about 20 percent of the developing world. But it is
in their interest and in our interest, obviously, to stop the
spread of variants as quickly as possible, variants that could,
potentially, you know, become more immune to vaccines. And then
there is the economic fallout, both in those countries and the
global economy.
What do you see as AID's role specifically in trying to
expand the vaccination effort and the use of excess U.S.
vaccine supplies?
Ambassador Power. Well, because it will be some time before
everyone is vaccinated in the world and in the developing
world, it is really important not to lose sight of the
diagnostic and the treatment support that we can offer, the
support as well as we go in rebuilding health infrastructure
that has been completely overwhelmed by the human costs of this
pandemic.
I also think, you know, there is no question that the
humanitarian toll when it comes to severe malnutrition is going
to be substantial, and USAID, of course, brings great assets
when it comes to meeting humanitarian emergencies and
supporting organizations like the World Food Programme and
others in meeting food needs and humanitarian needs.
So I think there is--to look at the pandemic both as the
vaccination challenge, which we have talked about earlier, as a
treatment challenge, but then not to lose sight of the fact
that measles and TB and polio treatments and vaccines, all of
those have lagged behind, and nor to lose sight of the need to
ensure that this is the last pandemic that does this kind of
damage and to be building again in the infrastructure that
these countries need to be able to fend for themselves in the
future.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good to
see you, Ambassador. Thank you for your willingness to serve
again.
Let me just quickly associate myself with a few comments
and lines of questioning from other members on the committee.
First, let me join with Senator Young in recommending that
you play a forceful role at the DFC with respect to increasing
their capability to be able to finance projects abroad. We
have, obviously, targeted DFC's financing towards the
developing world for good reason.
But China plays a different game. We carved out a billion
dollars through legislation written by myself and Senator
Johnson about a year ago to allow for energy projects to be
financed in nondeveloping countries.
I think we are going to have to continue to expand the
aperture when it comes to the type of countries and type of
economies the DFC is able to do business in in order to compete
with China.
Let me just associate myself with Senator van Hollen's
comments. You and I have talked ad nauseam about the need to
dramatically increase our nonmilitary toolkit, and now you will
be in a perfect position to advocate for those resources.
My hope is that the administration, when it submits its
budget, you know, will make a substantial down payment on those
smart power tools. Just no way to compete with China or prevent
the next pandemic or fight climate change if you are still
funding, you know, more employees at military grocery stores
than diplomats representing America abroad.
My lines of questioning are on the ability of USAID to be
able to be nimble enough to meet the changing nature of very
complex challenges.
The first is on the topic of how we get our USAID team
outside the wire. We have significantly downsized--as an
example, we have significantly downsized our embassy in
Baghdad. I think right now we have four USAID officers
overseeing a billion dollars of funding there.
But it is not unfamiliar what is happening there. All over
the world we are having a harder time getting our diplomats and
our economic development officers outside of embassies.
Second, we also have a lack of flexibility in the way that
USAID can deploy funds. Congress tends to compartmentalize and
earmark dollars so that when a challenge pops up it is
difficult for the USAID administrator to put the dollars into
the place that really needs it.
So I wondered if you would talk for a second about the need
to be able to move USAID personnel around to places that need
to see American presence but also the need for Congress to work
with you to try to give some more flexibility to the accounts
that you are going to oversee.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator. Both such important
questions.
So when it comes to the circumstance for USAID personnel
and U.S. diplomatic personnel, as you know, it is very
challenging, with more conflicts happening than any point since
the end of the Cold War.
With extremists, you know, who do harbor depending on,
again, where we are talking about can harbor ill intent towards
U.S. personnel, you know, we need to take security precautions
and keep our personnel safe.
At the same time, you will never meet people more eager to
be out in the communities where the beneficiaries of U.S.
programming are than USAID's personnel. I mean, that is what
drew these extraordinary men and women to this agency in the
first place.
You know, many of them are former Peace Corps volunteers or
people who have taught English when they were, you know,
practically in high school, you know, living in these
communities.
So I think--I look forward to working with Secretary
Blinken and our security professionals to being sure that we
have the balance right there.
And then when it comes to flexibility in deploying funds, I
do think this relates to the conversation that we have been
having about China. You know, we--and actually, the Ranking
Member Risch and I spoke about this a little bit in his office
yesterday--we want our assistance to be fit for purpose.
We want our rules and regulations to be fit for purpose. We
need to be accountable to the American people, given the
generosity and the spirit behind the investments that are being
made through USAID.
I, certainly, if confirmed, want to be responsive to the
objectives that people have up here, and that is why you see a
lot of those earmarks is that people have strong commitments
and want to see particular programming.
And from what I can tell, you know, that is the kind of
programming that I would wish to see as well. But we really do
need to make sure that we are able to move quickly.
I know Administrator Green made some inroads on this issue.
But I do think there is more to be done to make sure that we
are--we are able to be a 21st century agency meeting the
challenges of the moment.
Senator Murphy. Agree. Circumstances change, and these days
they change very quickly, and so I think there is probably a
way for us to maintain accountability for funds, maintain
programmatic earmarking but, perhaps, allow for a little bit
more flexibility with regard to country and geography.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, welcome.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. So, Ambassador, you and I have had a good
working relationship. We had a very good conversation in my
office. We have worked together, in particular, concerning
humanitarian crises and dissidents.
I appreciated your willingness when serving as U.N.
ambassador to speak out for Meriam Ibrahim, who was wrongfully
imprisoned in Sudan and sentenced to torture and death for the
crime of being a Christian, and you showed courage speaking out
for her.
As you know, I was very frustrated President Obama would
not speak out for her, but I was grateful that you did. But I
also had very significant disagreements with you during your
time as U.N. ambassador and nowhere were those disagreements
stronger then concerning Israel and concerning Iran.
Concerning Israel, I think, perhaps, the most shameful
moment of the Obama administration was after the election in
November of 2016 and was the Security Council's passage of
Resolution 2334, which I do not think it is coincidental that
the Security Council passed it after the presidential election
and not before.
And that resolution was passed with, at best, the
acquiescence of the United States and of you as U.N. Ambassador
and, at worst, the active encouragement of the Obama
administration and you, as U.N. Ambassador.
I believe Resolution 2334 is a pile of lies, that it is a
resolution that is motivated by anti-Semitism, by hatred for
Israel. Resolution 2334 declares much of modern-day Israel is
illegitimate and illegally occupied territory.
It declares the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem as illegitimate
and illegally-occupied territory. It declares the Wailing Wall
as illegitimate and illegally-occupied territory.
The much-circulated picture of President Obama in a
yarmulke paying respects at the Wailing Wall, to see the Obama
administration put through a resolution designed to attack
Israel, was quite dismaying.
So I guess my first question is, do you agree with
Resolution 2334?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
I had--there were two sort of guiding principles that I
relied upon as U.N. ambassador as it relates to Israel. The
first was to combat bias and anti-Semitism and the unfair way
that Israel has been treated at the U.N. and is treated at the
U.N., and the second, following President Obama's direction, of
course, was to preserve space for a two-state solution.
I want to make sure I have the chance to just describe a
little bit what I did, and I am disappointed we did not get to
talk about this in your office, what I did in the first
category because I think your question does not reflect the
reality of my four years at U.N.----
Senator Cruz. With respect, Ambassador Power, the time is
limited----
Ambassador Power. Right.
Senator Cruz [continuing]. And so if you could just answer
the question I asked. Do you agree with Resolution 2334?
I recognize you may well have done other things that were
positive concerning Israel. I am focused on this action at the
United Nations.
Ambassador Power. I just would like to get on the record
that under my leadership we secured Yom Kippur as a U.N.
holiday. We convened the first ever General Assembly condemning
anti-Semitism in the same chamber as the Zionism is racism
resolution was passed decades before.
And we integrated Israel in a way that had never been done
before: chairing committees, being able to actually be part of
groups from which they had been traditionally excluded.
I do not think there is a record that looks as substantial
when it comes to integrating Israel.
On the resolution itself, it is a resolution in keeping
with President Obama's desire to encourage the parties to avoid
unilateral steps, including terrorism, incitement to violence,
and the building of settlements.
Those dimensions of the resolution--I think, if you read my
explanation of vote at the time, the problem with the
resolution and the reason President Obama decided to abstain
was, by and large, the venue because the U.N. has been so
biased, because they are 18 General Assembly----
Senator Cruz. So let us get to a little bit more
granularity.
Ambassador Power. Yeah.
Senator Cruz. Do you believe the Jewish Quarter in
Jerusalem is illegitimate and illegally-occupied territory?
Ambassador Power. I do not.
Senator Cruz. So do you disagree with the substance of
Resolution 2334? Because that is what it says?
Ambassador Power. Senator, President Obama's desire was to
encourage the parties to avoid unilateral steps. That is the
essence of that resolution and I think the reason that he made
the judgment to instruct me to abstain.
Senator Cruz. So encouraging the party to--parties to avoid
unilateral steps. Resolution 2334 was a unilateral step. Israel
had no say in it. It was a step taken by the enemies of Israel
to condemn Israel.
Ambassador Power. Again, the desire that animated me in my
time at the U.N. was to fight bias and to preserve space for a
two-state solution.
Senator Cruz. Okay. A final question. Can you please
describe the role played by Iran and by the Houthis, in
particular, in deepening the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and
assess whether the Biden administration's moves to relieve
terrorism sanctions on the Houthis has played a role in that
humanitarian crisis?
Ambassador Power. The Houthis, when I was at the United
Nations, the Houthi overran a sovereign government, used
military force for territorial acquisition, have used food as a
weapon of war.
I mean, again, I am on record condemning Houthi actions and
specifically, again, the use of humanitarian aid. I think the
challenge is the vast majority of Yemenis live under Houthi
control at the moment unless and until there is a political
settlement.
And so it is really important, given that that is the
world's largest humanitarian catastrophe right now, that we
find a way to get food to those vulnerable people.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Cruz. But the Biden administration's lifting the
terrorism sanction----
The Chairman. The senator's time has expired, and----
Senator Cruz. I was just asking her to answer the question.
The Chairman. I know. I have let more time than other
colleagues.
Senator Cruz. Okay. I would still like her to ask the
question.
The Chairman. I am sure you can submit it for the record
and you will get a response.
Senator Cruz. Okay. So you do not----
The Chairman. No, I want to observe the time I have for
everybody else.
Senator Cruz. She could still----
The Chairman. Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. I am really grateful. We are all juggling
hearings today and I appreciate the yielding of my friend from
Texas and the considerations of our chairperson on a tight day.
I am very happy to see Ambassador Power. I have known her
for years. She is a woman of extraordinary integrity,
commitment, and has lived a life of service to our nation on
many fronts that no matter what your political bias is it is
laudatory the kind of dedication she has had to the best
interest of America and issues of human rights and human
decency.
I want to ask Ambassador Power, really quickly, about the--
around the issue of preventing future pandemics. Last week, it
was reported that wildlife farms that were encouraged by the
communist Chinese government to breed exotic animals were most
likely the source of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The senior senator from Texas and I--Senator Cornyn--
introduced a bill called the Preventing Future Pandemics Act,
which authorizes funding to USAID to work on reducing demand
for consumption of wildlife from wildlife markets.
Will you work with us to reduce the global demand for
wildlife that could lead to another zoonotic disease outbreak
and will you work with us to invest in food systems and
alternative sources of food protein to move food-insecure
communities away from the consumption of wildlife?
Ambassador Power. Yes, Senator, and I appreciate the
integrated approach that that you bring to this issue, the idea
that environmental, agricultural, health--that these sectors
can be separated, I think, is--has been proven anachronistic
and, if confirmed, part of my challenge at USAID is to bring
about that integration and make sure that our experts are
working together across what have been silos in the not so
recent past.
Senator Booker. Thank you.
Ambassador, I know, from a friendship with you spanning
from years, that you are--you have an incredible and courageous
empathy for humanitarian crises around this planet and I know
how seriously you take that.
We are in the midst right now in 2021 with a record 235
million people who are in need of humanitarian assistance and
protection. That is an increase of 40 percent since 2020.
I am really honored to be working with Senator Young. He
and I co-chair a task force at CSIS to look at the humanitarian
access, which has been increasingly constrained as violent
conflict has escalated.
The NGO partners we worked with identified both
international--in other words, the willful obstruction by
governments, as we are seeing, frankly, in Ethiopia, and
bureaucratic obstruction of humanitarian access.
And the humanitarian groups really argued to Senator Young
and I that in the complicated environments like Yemen and
Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, northeast Nigeria, and elsewhere,
compliance with some USAID policies related to potential
materiel support to terrorist groups has made it nearly
impossible to operate.
And so in my final question to you and respectful of the
time of other senators, I just want to know, can you outline
the steps that you are going to take to work internally at
USAID and with colleagues at the State Department to try to
streamline and improve the regulatory process itself so that
humanitarian NGOs are really on a sound legal footing when
carrying out humanitarian assistance that is funded by the
United States?
And will you work with us to find ways to ease some of the
regulatory burdens on frontline humanitarian NGOs to make sure
they are on legal--sound legal footing in carrying out
humanitarian assistance funded by the U.S.?
Ambassador Power. Thank you. Thank you so much. My
gratitude to our partners working in those difficult
environments and my gratitude to USAID staff who do the same at
great risk.
I think part of the reason that you are seeing humanitarian
access denied is a sense of impunity on the part of various
actors, and it does create immense challenges for our partners
on the ground.
With regard to vetting and the challenges of complying with
regulations and certification, I think, Senator, that is
something absolutely I would love to sit down with you and talk
through.
I think we have to make sure that our--we are doing
everything in our power to ensure that our assistance reaches
our intended beneficiaries, given the kinds of actors that
inhabit these conflict areas.
At the same time, if there are efficiencies to be achieved,
of course, we would strive to achieve them. So absolutely happy
to sit down with you and talk that through, consistent, again,
with following the law and the requirements that this body has
put forward.
Senator Booker. I look forward to that partnership. I
yield. But I would like to just say I am so grateful to the
state of New Jersey for giving me the privilege of being a
United States senator.
I will count it as one of the great honors of my experience
as a senator to vote for your confirmation on the Senate floor.
You are an extraordinary human being that will do not just
the United States proud but the world proud with what I believe
will be extraordinary efforts to make this planet more just for
humanity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso?
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations. Good to see you. The kids have grown up
since you were last here. Cass is behind you, and as you say,
he is----
Ambassador Power. He has not grown up.
Senator Barrasso. No. No.
[Laughter.]
Senator Barrasso. I would like to--if I could--before I
start on some other questions, just if you could please answer
Senator Cruz's question about if, when the Biden administration
lifted the terrorism sanctions on the Houthis if that made the
humanitarian crisis worse.
Ambassador Power. In lifting the designation--that is an
empirical question. I do not have an answer to the question and
I had not heard the full question before. So I do not know the
answer to that question.
Senator Barrasso. I want to move to energy development in
Africa. You know, worldwide 840 million people are living
without electricity. Five hundred and seventy-three million
live in--of these live in sub-Saharan Africa.
Power Africa was launched to increase the number of people
with access to power. Energy development can lift people out of
poverty, improve their education, health, well-being. On my
multiple trips to Africa, what I see is humanitarian problems
when they do not have electricity, when they do not have power,
whether it is to charge a phone or to deliver a baby and use
the suction apparatus at the time of the birth of the baby
with--it can make the difference between life and death.
So developing countries desperately need access to a steady
supply of affordable reliable electricity to support their
economic growth as well. So, you know, people back home in
Wyoming know firsthand the benefits of developing abundant
energy resources.
The solution to ending energy poverty does not lie in
limiting options but, I believe, using all available options. I
mean, you read about the most threatening environmental hazard
to people it is--it is cook smoke. It is indoor smoke because
they are using dung and wood to cook indoors.
I think we have to be diligent in promoting all-of-the-
above energy strategy that helps alleviate energy poverty.
So will you commit to helping developing countries use all
energy resources, including coal and oil and natural gas, so
they can get electricity?
Ambassador Power. Senator, I know that many of our
partners, you know, are seeking to transition, in part because
of pollution. I think Power Africa, and grateful from afar for
the last four years for your leadership on Power Africa.
I think it has been a tremendous boon to many communities,
both in poverty alleviation and in providing energy.
I gather that more than 18 million new power connections
for homes and businesses have been established through Power
Africa and that means first-time energy access for more than 88
million people in sub-Saharan Africa.
You know, on the specifics of what the energy sources are,
if I could--if I could get back to you I would be grateful.
Again, I know that there has been a shift over time, including
in the last administration, toward renewable sources. But I
also know that the all-of-the-above approach has been one that
has been the standard since the inception.
Senator Barrasso. Well, there have been issues about what
loans would be made to which countries, and China is rushing in
with--if the United States does not want to be active in
providing opportunities for affordable energy, China is happy
to become a partner with many countries that, I think, are ones
that we would rather those be working with us, and sometimes
the purity of the climate alarmists, as I call them, is harmful
to the economic needs and the health needs of people in these
areas, parts of the world.
Moving ahead, due to coronavirus, countries all around the
globe are struggling to support the health and safety of their
citizens. We see that--you have seen it firsthand.
There are limited resources to address incredible and
growing needs that we just heard about from Senator Booker.
Given the increasing needs for humanitarian assistance, global
health, and food insecurity, I am concerned that precious
resources are going to be redirected away from that in terms of
focusing on international climate change. Will climate change
be your top priority as the administrator of USAID?
Ambassador Power. Well, as you know, climate-related events
and the changing climate and the warmer climate is affecting
USAID returns on investments. You know, more droughts have made
an impact on our agricultural and food security programming.
So I think what we would be looking to do is within current
programming, for example, on food security, to think about
climate resilience.
You know, when it comes to humanitarian emergency funding,
you know, since there are more natural disasters happening
statistically, as a general rule, each year, thinking about how
to do disaster risk reduction, so there is less damage.
And so we, thus, you know, need to provide less
humanitarian emergency funding because buildings were built
more securely in the first instance. So I think it is less a
zero sum trade off and more about integration.
Senator Barrasso. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Ambassador, I am going to just draw your
attention to a few things. I am going to submit those questions
for the record. I would like a substantive response to them
instead of going through it here. But I want to draw your
attention to just a couple things.
We have challenges in the hemisphere, like Venezuela and
Colombia, and I would like to hear your assessment on how AID
can provide development assistance to countries like Colombia
that are hosting refugees and doing a good neighbor and a
hemispheric good neighbor.
But I think we need to help countries like that that are in
the midst of doing that.
Second, I would like to draw your attention to the
challenges that the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh
continues to face in the light of last fall's attack by
Azerbaijan.
In the short term, USAID can help address food, water,
health care, and COVID assistance need, particularly for
displaced Armenians. But I am concerned the U.S. has not done
enough to date.
So I would like to look forward to hearing from you on
that. I would like to hear from you how the administration
seeks to address the interconnected security governance and
climate-related crises that are feeding the humanitarian
emergency in the Sahel.
And then lastly, I would like to draw your attention to the
U.S.-India relationship. We introduced the prioritizing clean
energy and climate cooperation with India to boost U.S.-India
cooperation. I would like to hear the role you envision USAID
playing in boosting U.S.-India cooperation on clean energy.
And last, last year's appropriation omnibus authorized the
USAID administrator to establish the United States-India
Gandhi-King Development Foundation, which would attract public
and private capital to fund grants to address development
priorities in India. I would like to hear your views on that
foundation.
So we will submit those for the record. If you give us a
substantive response, I would appreciate it.
I want to salute Declan and Rian, who have done such an
extraordinary job of listening to all these in-depth questions
and had patience through this whole period of time.
As the hearing comes to a close today, I want to thank
Ambassador Power for her time and her thoughtful testimony. It
is my intention, working with the ranking member, to hold the
markup for Ambassador Power as soon as possible after the
recess.
The record will remain open until Thursday, March 25th. I
would urge you to answer any questions that are submitted for
the record so that you can be in a position to be considered at
a business markup.
With thanks to the committee, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Robert Menendez
Refugees from Venezuela
Question. I support a strong U.S. response to the Venezuela
humanitarian crisis given the regional implications, particularly for
neighboring Colombia, which has received the vast majority of
Venezuelan migrants and refugees.
While the State Department leads on the refugee and migrant
response (with the exception of food aid), what is your
assessment of how USAID can provide development assistance in
countries hosting large numbers of refugees?
Answer. Thank you for your support. USAID works closely with the
State Department to coordinate response efforts across Latin America
and the Caribbean, as these countries have received an unprecedented
number of migrants and refugees from Venezuela. Since 2018, USAID has
provided more than $298 million in humanitarian assistance supporting
Venezuelan migrants, refugees, and host communities in Colombia with
food assistance, direct cash assistance, and health support. USAID is
also supporting the long-term development challenges in Colombia
resulting from the Venezuelan migration crisis. In Colombia, I gather
that USAID has dedicated more than $77 million in development funding
to provide long-term assistance for Venezuelan migrant receptor
communities with the aim of expanding health, education, and justice
services. Colombia recently granted ten years of legal status to all
Venezuelan refugees who have fled to the country, making it possible
for Venezuelans to live and work openly. This is an important step for
Colombia to harness the economic potential of the many Venezuelans it
hosts and, if confirmed, I look forward to consulting with you on how
USAID can support this effort.
Central America Regional Security Initiative
Question. The Trump administration sought to include funding for
reintegration services for migrants returning to Central America as
part of all of its programming for the region. As a result, existing
programmatic initiatives such as the Central America Regional Security
Initiative (CARSI) were significantly distorted to address
reintegration initiatives for deportees from the United States-
something never previously conceived to be a part of the CARSI
framework.
As USAID Administrator, will you work to ensure that well-
established initiatives are used for their intended goals, and
that security initiatives such as CARSI are never utilized for
deportee reintegration services?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed as USAID Administrator, I will work to
ensure that well-established initiatives, including CARSI, are used for
their intended goals.
Internal Displacement in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
Question. Humanitarian organizations report that internal
displacement in Latin America and the Caribbean has increased over the
past year as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the region has seen
an uptick in gang and criminal violence, especially in El Salvador and
Honduras. Women, children, and LGBTQI+ individuals are at heightened
risk of violence, intimidation, and forced displacement.
Given recent commitments by governments in the region to address
forced displacement, including the early 2020 passage of an
IDP-focused law in El Salvador, what more can USAID do on the
humanitarian and development fronts to respond to internal
displacement in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?
Answer. I agree this is a crucial issue. With growing needs from
COVID-19, food insecurity, and the continued impact of recent
hurricanes, USAID is looking to further expand humanitarian assistance
in the region, for example increasing support for child protection.
Following the hurricanes, USAID has been instrumental in providing
emergency assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) ensuring
they have safe shelter, food, clean water, health and protection
services, in addition to helping them recover their livelihoods. The
Agency utilizes several sets of data to understand internal
displacement flows and dynamics and inform assistance, such as its
InfoSegura regional project on security information management,
implemented with the United Nations Development Program, and the
International Organization for Migration's displacement and shelter
mapping. This data collection and analysis informs evidence-based
policies on human mobility in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. To
increase protection for IDPs, USAID's Regional Human Rights Project
supports strengthening early warning systems that track IDP dynamics,
preventing and alerting their potential human rights violations,
including referral programs for possible victims. Such efforts with the
Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman, are now being expanded at the
regional level through joint work with the human rights ombudsman from
Honduras and El Salvador. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID
remains focused on internal displacement data to inform programming in
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.
Gender-Based Violence
Question. Will you ensure that USAID targets gender-based violence
(GBV) survivors, women at risk of GBV, and LGBTQI+ individuals for
humanitarian programming in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed as USAID Administrator, I will ensure
that USAID continues to support gender-based violence (GBV) survivors,
women at risk of GBV, and LGBTQI+ individuals for humanitarian
programming in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. I understand that
in the Northern Triangle, USAID supports civil society and independent
watchdog institutions to deter human rights abuses, respond to human
rights violations, and support vulnerable populations. This includes
forcibly displaced persons, women, children, and youth affected by
violence and insecurity, indigenous and Afro-descendent communities,
and LGBTQI+ individuals.
Nagorno-Karabakh
Question. The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to
face serious challenges in light of last fall's attack by Azerbaijan.
In the short term, USAID can help address food, water, healthcare, and
COVID assistance needs, particularly for displaced Armenians.
If confirmed, what will be your plan of action for providing needed
assistance to ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, including
those displaced to Armenia, in both the short and long term?
Answer. This has been a horrific chapter in the lives of the
civilians impacted by the recent conflict. President Biden has made
clear his intention to look at enhancing humanitarian assistance in the
region due to the displacement caused by the conflict. I believe USAID
has an important role to play in supporting peacebuilding and
humanitarian efforts, and supporting citizen-responsive governance and
durable economic growth. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue all
appropriate avenues for helping the people who are suffering in the
aftermath of this war. Since September 2020, USAID has provided more
than $4.5 million in total assistance to effectively respond to the
complex humanitarian crisis resulting from the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict and associated COVID-19 resurgence. USAID provided food,
shelter, emergency health assistance, and social services to
communities displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia.
Question. What do you view as the biggest challenge to providing
assistance at this time, and how will you address that challenge?
Answer. Both the Armenian government and humanitarian actors
estimate that 35,000-45,000 spontaneous arrivals will permanently
remain in Armenia, which is a major challenge moving forward. While the
displacement situation is dynamic and continues to evolve, USAID
continues to work closely with the Department of State to assess urgent
post-conflict humanitarian needs and possible future U.S. Government
engagement on an ongoing basis.
The Sahel
Question. The Sahel region of West Africa is facing a significant
humanitarian crisis due to armed conflict, poor governance, and the
impacts of climate change. Last year, the efforts of U.N. and
humanitarian agencies in the region were severely underfunded.
How will you, if confirmed, plan to address the interconnected
security, governance, and climate-related crises that are
feeding the humanitarian emergency in the Sahel?
Answer. I am concerned about rising violent extremism, growing
humanitarian needs, and increasing governance challenges in the Sahel.
If confirmed, I will ensure USAID continues to align with regional,
national, and local efforts to expand economic growth, improve human
capital, counter violent extremism, strengthen governance.., and build
resilience to climate risks. Gains in these areas will help communities
be less vulnerable to shocks and violent extremism. Complementing these
efforts, USAID carries out and coordinates resilience programs with a
longer term aim to reduce chronic vulnerability that underlie the
crisis and the need for recurrent humanitarian assistance. These
investments aim to lift people out of poverty and improve on successful
interventions to facilitate increased resilience to climate change and
self-reliance in the Sahel. In addition, the administration will take
advantage of the authorities provided in the Global Fragility Act to
move this work forward. If confirmed, I hope to build on USAID programs
already in place to counter violent extremism in the Sahel. I will also
continue to work with my counterparts to find effective programming to
address and combat violent extremism throughout the African continent.
Support for Cuban Civil Society
Question. For more than two decades, USAID has co-led U.S.
government initiatives to promote democracy in civil society, and to
provide support for courageous human rights defenders, as well as civil
society leaders and journalists who work independently of the Cuban
regime.
As USAID Administrator, what steps will you take to continue this
important work and ensure U.S. support for human rights
defenders, independent civil society leaders, and independent
journalists in Cuba?
Answer. Cuba is one of the most repressive countries in the world.
The country is ruled by a dictatorship that flagrantly abuses human
rights, controls information among its populace, inhibits meaningful
civil society activity-including free press-and criminalizes political
dissent. The role of a vibrant civil society continues to be essential
to Cuban democracy. I gather USAID has a portfolio in place to continue
supporting a diverse sector of independent activists in Cuba who will
push for democratic freedoms, including religious freedom. The Agency
will also continue providing basic needs assistance to political
prisoners and persecuted activists. USAID-supported NGOs continue to
defend the human rights of those who are abused and even jailed for
their political beliefs. If confirmed, I will ensure these critical
programs continue. Also, as one of my first acts as U.S. Ambassador to
the UN, I raised the case of Oswaldo Pay directly with the Cuban
Foreign Minister, pressing him to allow an independent investigation of
the circumstances in which Pay had been killed, and I continued to
advocate publicly in support of Pay 's family. During my time at the
UN, I repeatedly called out Cuba for its abhorrent treatment of Cubans
like Jose Daniel Ferrer, Jose Antonio Torres, Julio Ferrer, and Antonio
Rodiles. If confirmed, I will continue to speak out against Cuba's
persecution of its citizens and human rights violations.
Haiti
Question. Haiti's humanitarian situation is rapidly deteriorating,
with the U.N. reporting extremely high levels of food insecurity, a 377
percent increase in gender-based violence over the past year, and lack
of access to education.
What more can USAID do to support protection-related needs, such as
child protection and prevention, and respond to gender-based
violence?
Answer. COVID-19 has had devastating direct and indirect impacts on
women and children in Haiti. Supporting key initiatives that protect
and empower vulnerable people is a priority for USAID. If confirmed, I
will ensure that we continue to build on USAID investments in Haiti
that support protection-related needs. For example, USAID has provided
approximately $2.3 million in fiscal year 2020 funding to the United
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and four non-
governmental organizations to provide protection services such as
psychosocial support to Haitian children, families, and frontline
health care workers affected by COVID-19. In addition to prioritizing
protection activities, USAID also requires partners to adhere to COVID-
specific gender and protection mainstreaming requirements to ensure all
programming is safe and accessible to the most vulnerable. USAID has
also provided $500,000 to support activities in child-friendly spaces
for vulnerable children and adolescents. USAID partners have also
organized awareness campaigns that bring attention to gender-based
violence services; trained journalists on how to ethically report on
gender-based violence; and developed referral networks to connect
survivors to safe spaces, legal aid, and other lifesaving services.
U.S.-India Cooperation
Question. I am a strong supporter of the U.S.-India relationship,
and I was proud to introduce the Prioritizing Clean Energy and Climate
Cooperation with India Act to boost U.S.-India cooperation on clean
energy.
What role do you envision USAID playing in boosting U.S.-India
cooperation on clean energy?
Answer. The U.S.-India development relationship spans more than 70
years. India is a partner in advancing our shared objectives to support
inclusive economic growth, reduced carbon emissions, open and inclusive
digital ecosystems, and the global health security agenda across South
and Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India is a priority country for
our climate diplomacy strategy, both because of its current emissions
trajectory, which is concerning, but also because we see India as an
important partner on future clean energy research, development, and
deployment. If confirmed, I envision that USAID will work with its
clean energy transition as part of our shared objective of meeting the
climate challenge.
U.S-India Cooperation and Congress
Question. How can Congress and USAID work together to strengthen
that cooperation?
Answer. While India is the third largest emitter of greenhouse
gases globally, the Government of India has demonstrated in recent
years a commitment to reducing emissions and combating climate change,
including by setting ambitious targets for power sector-led emissions
reductions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress in
support of India's climate priorities through programs and partnerships
that prioritize climate change mitigation, clean energy development,
sustainable landscapes, and disaster risk reduction.
United States-India Gandhi-King Development Foundation
Question. Last year's appropriations omnibus authorized the USAID
Administrator to establish the United States-India Gandhi-King
Development Foundation, which would attract public and private capital
to fund grants to address development priorities in India. What are
your views on this Foundation? If confirmed, what will be your first
actions regarding the Foundation?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Gandhi-King
Scholarly Exchange Initiative Act, which calls for professional
exchanges and the establishment of the U.S.-India Gandhi-King
Development Foundation in coordination with the Government of India.
The Foundation presents a unique partnership opportunity for the United
States to work with the Government of India in leveraging India's
domestic public and private resources to combat its most pressing
development challenges. I look forward to advancing this partnership
and honoring the legacies of both Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr and
Mahatma Gandhi. If confirmed, I will support the establishment of the
Foundation which will include coordinating with the relevant Government
of India ministries and stakeholders and creating a roadmap for next
steps in establishing the Foundation.
Labor Rights in Bangladesh
Question. In March 2020, I released a SFRC report highlighting the
growing threats to labor rights and trade unions in Bangladesh. The
U.S. must respond to this threat by increasing our support for unions,
not abandoning them. Under the previous Administration, USAID moved
away from using its Bangladesh labor rights appropriation to support
the development of unions, even though unions have been clear that they
want, and can use, such support.
If confirmed, will you commit to directly and robustly supporting
the development of trade unions in Bangladesh, including with
the funding from the annual appropriation for labor rights in
Bangladesh?
Answer. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue.
Labor rights are actively threatened and diminished in Bangladesh, as
was made clear in your 2020 Report commemorating the seventh
anniversary of the Tazreen Fashions and Rana Plaza tragedies. I
understand that USAID has a robust labor program in Bangladesh, and if
confirmed, I commit to continuing this important work. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with you to help ensure the findings of your
report are central not just to USAID's labor programming in Bangladesh,
but also the Agency's entire global labor program.
Tigray
Question. The ongoing conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region has
triggered a large-scale displacement crisis, regional instability, and
a humanitarian emergency with constrained outside access.
Under what conditions should the U.S. restore full foreign
assistance funding to Ethiopia? Should the U.S. increase
assistance for critical development programs that address the
drivers of the conflict and strengthen political reforms?
Answer. The loss of life and mass displacement resulting from the
conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region is profoundly disturbing. The
violence against civilians must end, and unimpeded humanitarian access
to the region must be granted without further delay. Ultimately, what
is required is a constructive political dialogue between the parties
and accountability for the atrocities committed by all sides.
Ethiopia's successful transition to a more democratic, inclusive, and
prosperous society is critical to U.S. interests. I understand that the
Administration is reviewing our diplomatic, security, and other
assistance to the region. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging in
this conversation and commit to keeping you informed.
Question. Do you believe that, under current circumstances,
Ethiopia can hold credible elections in June? What steps will you take,
if confirmed, to address closing political and media space, and
intercommunal violence in Ethiopia?
Answer. For the June elections to constitute a step forward in
Ethiopia's political development, they will need to be seen as credible
by a majority of Ethiopians, result in more inclusive political
representation, and lay the foundation for broader political dialogue
across Ethiopia. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
interagency partners to determine how USAID can best strengthen
democratic processes in Ethiopia, especially at a time of such grave
crisis.
COVID-19
Question. Diseases do not recognize borders, so challenges like the
COVID-19 pandemic necessitate a global response that the U.S. must help
lead.
How will USAID ensure its COVID-19 aid response is conflict
sensitive and takes a peacebuilding and trauma-informed
approach to reduce the risks of further violence and advance
effective recovery?
Answer. Around two-thirds of the countries where USAID works are
beset by or at risk of violent conflict, and COVID-19 is putting
further stress on fragile systems in these nations. Dozens of countries
have curtailed free expression, assembly, and media; more than 70
countries postponed elections; and a number have experienced civil
unrest. Disinformation is rampant. Loss of jobs and lack of adequate
education and basic services create contexts ripe for conflict. I
understand that USAID applies principles of conflict-sensitivity
throughout all programs, including its COVID-19 response. If confirmed,
I will ensure that USAID continues to support conflict-sensitive
approaches across all USAID programming.
Question. What steps will you take to address secondary impacts on
health, education, poverty, and human rights in countries where USAID
has programs and activities?
Answer. No matter where in the world we live, we all share the goal
of ending this terrible pandemic, restoring normalcy in our daily
lives, and beginning to rebuild from the devastation caused by COVID-
19. We will not be safe here at home from COVID-19 and its variants
unless the rest of the world makes significant progress on getting the
pandemic under control. If confirmed, I will prioritize preventing
COVID-19 transmission through public health and vaccine interventions;
alleviating worsening humanitarian crises and food insecurity; and
addressing the long term second order impacts on the global economy,
democracy and human rights, education, and livelihoods. USAID will work
with partner country governments, civil society organizations, and
other partners to address the second order impacts through a conflict-
sensitive, rights-based approach to health, education, poverty
reduction, and governance.
Question. Will you revise the USAID-State COVID-19 strategy to
ensure a peacebuilding and conflict prevention perspective is
integrated?
Answer. As directed by President Biden's first National Security
Memorandum, USAID is working with interagency counterparts to develop a
whole-of-government response plan for combating the global pandemic.
That document will provide a framework for State and USAID's
forthcoming work on COVID-19 and will prioritize addressing second-
order effects of the pandemic. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID's
programs incorporate and address the evolving context of the COVID-19
pandemic, including issues related to peacebuilding and conflict
prevention.
Question. In what ways can USAID respond to governments using
COVID-19 to justify closing civic space, curbing fundamental freedoms,
committing human rights abuses and expanding authoritarianism?
Answer. COVID-19 is not just a public health crisis but also a
crisis for democratic governance, fundamental freedoms, and civic
space. According to Freedom House, the condition of democracy and human
rights worsened in 80 countries during the pandemic, with a range of
countries using the crisis to tighten their grip on power, crackdown on
political targets, and restrict the rights of vulnerable populations.
The Administration will restore democracy and human rights to the
center of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening the protection of human
rights worldwide and re-establishing government-wide attention to
atrocity prevention and the protection of civilians in war. USAID will
ensure that programming to address COVID-19 is implemented in a
conflict-sensitive, rights-based approach. If confirmed, my seat at the
NSC will allow me to ensure that these issues are engaged at the
highest levels of decision-making within the USG.
Environmental and Social Safeguards
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure adequate
environmental and social safeguards are in place for all of USAID's
programming?
How will you support USAID's development of this mechanism to
ensure that it effectively addresses impacts that could
undermine U.S. foreign policy objectives?
Answer. USAID has guiding regulations for examining the
environmental impact of all projects, as well as a commitment to
protect and advance vulnerable populations; to seek to do no harm; and
to promote human rights. I understand USAID is designing an Agency-wide
accountability mechanism that will further enable beneficiaries and the
project affected community to express environmental, social and
economic concerns and grievances. If confirmed, I commit that the
project design and implementation for all USAID programs, projects, and
activities will include strong safeguarding for beneficiaries,
especially the project affected community, including Indignenous
Peoples and vulnerable populations.
USAID Resources
Question. Many USAID officials have argued they need greater
flexibility in managing appropriated funds in order to adjust to
rapidly changing global circumstances and achieve the greatest impact,
while respecting Congressional priorities and maintaining high levels
of accountability.
How would you approach the question of increasing flexibility for
USAID?
Are there resource management tools you need immediately as you
address the challenges presented by the pandemic, and
adjustments needed in the near term as we move to post-Covid-19
requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to discuss
ways to improve USAID's ability to align its resources with its
strategic objectives and priorities, including increasing our ability
to adapt and pivot to emergent needs and opportunities as they arise,
while of course making sure to provide Congress with complete and
useful information on the use of appropriated resources in a timely
manner.
Accountability
Question. Accountability of resources and programs through
transparency, monitoring, evaluation, and learning is an important aid
reform pillar that strengthens the ultimate impact of programs, and
ensures sustainability of investments.
Is it your intention to prioritize accountability across the
agency, especially the role of monitoring, evaluation, and
learning to improve programs and strengthen their impact?
Answer. Yes, it is my intention to prioritize accountability across
the Agency, and especially the role of monitoring, evaluation, and
learning. It is important for USAID to act in the interest of the
American people. Measuring and analyzing results-and learning and
adapting when programs fall short-are essential aspects of day-to-day
management of USAID's operations. USAID is recognized as a leader among
federal agencies in using evidence from monitoring and evaluation for
accountability and for learning. Of course, there is always room for
improvement and innovation. If confirmed, I look forward to pushing
USAID even further on finding innovative ways to quickly gather
information to adapt programs and achieve results.
Question. What is your vision for ensuring important aid
effectiveness tools will receive priority under your leadership?
Answer. The key principles of development cooperation effectiveness
include transparency, accountability, a focus on results, and inclusive
partnerships. If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to ensure
that USAID deepens its commitments to these principles in all aspects
of its programs. I will also ensure that USAID remains a leader in the
international aid community in championing these principles and
promoting learning and exchange among donor and partner countries. For
example, if confirmed, I will ensure that USAID will continue to
support international accountability through USAID's leadership on
remote monitoring and real-time evaluations, among other newer
mechanisms. These innovative approaches have allowed USAID to maintain
oversight of programs following the onset of the pandemic despite
constraints placed on travel.
American Recovery Plan Funding
Question. The American Recovery Plan provides $41 million for
COVID-related operational expenses at USAID; $905 million for global
health response activities; and an estimated $900 million for
international economic stabilization efforts. The United States has
both a national security and economic interest in mitigating the COVID-
19 pandemic's potentially crippling and destabilizing effects on
regional and local foreign economies.
With regards to the economic stabilization allocation: where do you
see the economic risks created by the pandemic as being most
acute?
Answer. The pandemic has had devastating impacts on households in
the U.S. and around the world, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities
and inequalities, especially in humanitarian settings. The
reverberating socioeconomic impacts of this global crisis are, and will
continue to be, widespread-and have already led to major backsliding in
development and governance. If confirmed, I will ensure USAID remains
committed to addressing urgent humanitarian needs, providing immediate
economic relief by forging sustainable pathways out of poverty, and
working with partner-country governments, civil society, and other
actors to stabilize economies.
Question. Will you commit to fulsome engagement with this committee
on the Agency's use of these funds?
Answer. Yes, I commit to fulsome engagement with this committee on
the Agency's use of the American Rescue Plan funds.
Question. The GAO recently published a report finding that the
previous administration gave USAID plenty of marching orders, but
consistently neglected to involve USAID in strategy development and
decision-making around USAID's CARES Act allocation.
Will you commit to asserting USAID's appropriate role in COVID
decision-making processes, and in budgeting the Agency's
American Recovery Plan funds?
Answer. Yes, I commit to asserting USAID's appropriate role in
COVID decision-making processes, and in budgeting the Agency's American
Recovery Plan funds.
USAID Vaccine Allotment
Question. It was widely reported that the previous administration
failed to acquire an allotment of the COVID vaccine for USAID employees
from Health and Human Services.
Will you commit to prioritizing the health and safety of USAID
personnel, and use the Recovery Plan's operational resources to
ensure a healthy and safe work environment at USAID?
Answer. The safety of USAID's workforce is my highest priority. I
commit to prioritizing the health and safety of USAID personnel and to
using the American Rescue Plan's (ARP) operational resources to secure
a healthy and safe work environment at USAID. The Agency has recently
partnered with the Department of State to vaccinate its overseas and
domestic personnel with critical in-person continuity of mission
functions. The Department of State is covering USAID personnel overseas
while, domestically, USAID received a direct vaccine allocation from
HHS. The Agency will continue to make every effort to keep USAID staff
safe in its domestic facilities. The Agency will use ARP funds to
augment its staff to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and to improve
the Agency's operational readiness.
USAID's Global Labor Program
Question. I need your commitment to restore and expand USAID's
Global Labor Program. It is the agency's only multi-country program to
empower marginalized workers to advocate for their rights and
livelihood. Workers around the world are struggling amidst the COVID-19
pandemic, with women workers suffering disproportionately.
Do you believe USAID currently has the staff capacity and expertise
to develop the worker rights programs and approaches that
marginalized workers so desperately need right now?
Answer. Empowering workers is relevant both globally and in the
United States, and I appreciate your longstanding leadership on this
critical issue. Work is central to people's daily lives, and labor
issues and the ways in which workers express their rights affect many
of USAID's development objectives. We already know, for example, that
women are over-represented in a number of the industries (like retail
and hospitality) most impacted by the pandemic around the world.
USAID's Global Labor Program (GLP) was created to increase the capacity
of worker organizations, and I look forward to working with our
partners to ensure our strategy adequately promotes labor rights and
access to justice in a fair and equitable manner. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the high capacity and expertise of USAID staff to address
these issues remains an Agency priority.
Climate
Question. President Biden is hosting a Climate Leaders' Summit on
April 22, 2021. How will USAID participate in this summit? Do you
anticipate building global support and financing for climate adaptation
at the Summit?
Answer. I understand that USAID is actively participating in
preparations for the Summit, and that the Agency welcomes the
opportunity provided by the event to highlight their work with
developing countries on climate change mitigation, adaptation, and
finance. A key theme of the Summit will be mobilizing public and
private sector finance to drive the net-zero transition and to help
vulnerable countries cope with climate impacts. USAID has extensive
experience improving policies, strengthening institutions, and
mobilizing finance for climate adaptation and mitigation that also
advances countries' development priorities. If confirmed, I will
continue to elevate these issues within the interagency and with our
developing country partners, and look forward to engaging in the
Summit.
Question. Climate adaptation is currently vastly underfunded, and
USAID's work in this area needs improvement in terms of execution,
transparency and reporting.
What are your initial ideas for how USAID can improve its support
for the needs of those communities hardest hit by climate
change to adapt in place?
Answer. I agree with your concern that adaptation programs are
vastly underfunded. USAID works with vulnerable countries to implement
their adaptation priorities and is committed to further mainstreaming
climate considerations into its work to intensify efforts to increase
climate security and resilience. USAID helps partners access and use
climate and weather data and tools, and develop strategies to build
resilience to climate risks, whether from sudden events such as floods
and storms or from slower-moving events such as droughts and sea-level
rise. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that our efforts on
climate are informed by on-the-ground knowledge and in consultation
with stakeholders.
Question. Many developing countries have made greenhouse gas
emission reduction commitments to the Paris Agreement that are
contingent upon support and assistance from multilateral finance
institutions and/or bilateral assistance from developing countries.
Is it important for U.S. support and assistance to developing
countries to be consistent with host country climate change
mitigation commitments?
Answer. Yes, and with the U.S. having rejoined the Paris Agreement,
USAID will play an important role in working with developing countries
to set and achieve more ambitious targets under their Nationally
Determined Contributions to the Agreement. Developing countries produce
about two-thirds of annual global greenhouse gas emissions and are
integral partners in limiting climate change. USAID will provide
assistance to partner countries to achieve their climate mitigation
commitments and low-emissions economic development goals through
concrete actions like transitioning to renewable energy and improving
conservation and management of carbon-rich forests and landscapes.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, democratic gains are under
threat as long-serving rulers manipulate constitutional and electoral
processes to remain in power while stifling dissent and limiting
opposition parties and candidates' activities. In 2020 alone, several
African ruling parties and incumbent leaders deployed authoritarian
tactics that manipulated democratic processes and constitutional
frameworks, including in Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Meanwhile, across multiple administrations, including the Obama
administration in which you previously served, U.S. democracy and
governance programs are chronically underfunded and notoriously slow to
respond to emerging opportunities.
If confirmed, how will you prioritize reinforcing democratic
institutions and norms in Africa through USAID programs while
balancing competing priorities in the areas of economic growth,
stabilization, global health, humanitarian assistance, and
human rights?
Answer. In sub-Saharan Africa, Freedom House reports that 21
nations experienced democratic declines and only seven showed positive
trends in 2020--the largest gap in 15 years. If confirmed, I will seek
to increase, in scale and effectiveness, USAID's investments in
democracy and governance throughout the region, including through
support for anti-corruption efforts and justice reforms. In many
backsliding countries, concerns about corruption and accountability are
central to citizens' concerns about government performance. If
confirmed, I will also work to make sure that USAID is doing much more
to integrate efforts to address corruption and improve democratic
accountability into economic growth, stabilization, global health,
humanitarian assistance, and human rights programming. By embedding
strong participation, inclusion, transparency, accountability, and
oversight measures in health, education, and economic programming,
USAID can better safeguard its investments in sustained and resilient
recovery efforts from the pandemic, and lay a foundation for shoring up
democratic institutions in the long term. This is an immensely
challenging area, especially given China's growing support for various
governments' undemocratic tactics and its provision of rights-
infringing technologies in many of these countries. Given the critical
importance of reversing democratic backsliding and supporting
democratic reformers, I look forward to consulting closely on the path
ahead.
Question. In the last two years, Sudan and Ethiopia have embarked
upon unexpected democratic transitions. While the United States was,
and continues to be, eager to support these transitions, rapidly
mobilizing the necessary resources (enabling policies, funding, and
staff) has been a challenge. If confirmed, how would you prepare USAID
to respond to rapid democratic changes and seize unexpected
opportunities?
Answer. USAID's democracy, human rights, and governance efforts are
intended to promote democracy and civil society participation as well
as prevent and respond to closing democratic spaces. These efforts
include both rapid response mechanisms through our Office of Transition
Initiatives programs as well as long-term investments designed to
demonstrate solidarity with pro-democratic forces, protect nascent
advances, and prevent backsliding. USAID can play an important role
during unexpected opportunities by helping civil society adapt to
changing circumstances and providing assistance to strengthen existing
checks and balances. To further support transitions and rapidly
mobilize in the context of unexpected opportunities or crises, USAID
seeks to promote flexibility within activity design, award language,
and implementation. This can ensure that programming, implementers, and
local actors are able to best respond to windows of opportunity and/or
democratic backsliding. As the current crisis in Ethiopia demonstrates,
democratic progress and overall stability are fragile, and if confirmed
I will be focused on ensuring that USAID programming is appropriate
for, and reflective of, actual circumstances on the ground. As a long-
time Sudan watcher, I am grateful to Congress for stepping up in
support of Sudan's nascent democratic transition and eager to assess
current programming and what more might be done to help deepen the
reform process.
Question. There are long-standing concerns about the fungibility of
U.S. foreign assistance for African countries ruled by authoritarian
regimes (e.g., Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, etc.), particularly
for health and food security programs, which account for the
overwhelming majority of U.S. assistance on the continent. While this
aid advances U.S. humanitarian interests, it can also offset essential
budget lines, displace national investment, and enable authoritarian
regimes to prioritize military spending, pilfer state resources, and
support corrupt patronage networks.
Do you think it is time for the United States to undertake a
comprehensive re-evaluation of the policies, forms, and methods
of delivering U.S. foreign assistance in Africa?
Answer. The tendencies that you describe are certainly ones I have
observed in Africa and other regions. USAID works in very complex
environments and I gather that the Agency's investments in Africa,
particularly in health and food security, are structured to be
sensitive to local contexts, in order to save lives and improve
livelihoods for those most in need. When providing assistance in the
region, USAID works with both U.N. organizations and international and
local non-governmental organizations to ensure that support and
services go to those most in need. USAID also utilizes a variety of
tools to monitor the delivery of assistance to ensure compliance with
all applicable laws and regulations. If confirmed, I look forward to
delving into these issues more deeply and consulting with you further
to ensure that USAID's assistance does not inadvertently benefit
authoritarian governments.
Question. How will USAID effectively deliver aid such that it
reaches the intended beneficiaries without enabling the preservation of
repressive regimes?
Answer. This is a very important issue. USAID adheres to strict
guidelines for monitoring assistance provided in restrictive
environments and, depending on the extent of the restrictions, has
developed remote methods for program monitoring, including contracting
with third party monitors who are able to access regions where USAID
staff are not able to travel. One of the cornerstones of U.S. soft
power is our willingness to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance
wherever it is most needed. In response to famine or natural disasters
in authoritarian countries, USAID works with non-governmental partners
to ensure that aid reaches those most in need without providing
material support to unfriendly or authoritarian regimes. When it comes
to longer-term development programs in those countries, USAID works
with civil society and other non-governmental organizations to support
development and democracy and governance programs. If confirmed, I look
forward to consulting with you further to ensure that USAID's
assistance does not enable the preservation of repressive regimes.
Question. Africa is experiencing a massive demographic shift. Over
the next two decades, demographers project that Africa will account for
nearly half of global population growth and, by mid-century, will be
home to a quarter of the world's population. Sixty percent of Africa's
population is currently under 25, with an overall median age of 20, and
expected to continue to get younger. USAID will remain at the forefront
of United States efforts to work with young Africans.
Programs like the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and the
initiative's Mandela Washington Fellowship are important, but
what can USAID do to expand its reach, more effectively engage
Africa's massive youth population, and build long-term
partnerships with the next generation of decision-makers,
business partners, and allies?
Answer. This emphasis on youth is key. Continent-wide initiatives
such as the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), Prosper Africa,
Power Africa, as well as mission-based programs, contribute to USAID's
global reputation as a leader in youth programming. For example,
through YALI, USAID has equipped more than 20,000 young leaders from 49
sub-Saharan African countries with the skills to catalyze economic,
political and social change in their home countries based on American
values of transparency, civic engagement, and accountability. I gather
that USAID missions also integrate youth across all key sectors and
support strategic partnerships with other donors and private sector
partners, a practice I will ensure continues if confirmed. If
confirmed, I look forward to further consultations with you on ways to
expand USAID's engagement with young people on the continent, helping
support the next generation of political leaders, engaged citizens, and
business owners.
Question. Launched by the Trump administration, Prosper Africa is a
U.S. Government initiative supported by 17 agencies and departments,
including USAID, to increase two-way trade and investment between the
United States and Africa. In 2019, Africa accounted for just 1.4
percent of U.S. global trade and received 0.7 percent of U.S. foreign
direct investment. Such shares have declined relative to their
historical highs a decade or so ago. One area of Prosper Africa that
requires greater emphasis, and where USAID can play a critical role, is
in improving the enabling environment for economic growth.
Strengthening the rule of law, combating corruption, and promoting
inclusive economic growth and human rights under a rules-based system
would create better conditions for U.S. investment while also
counterbalancing efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to undermine
free-market competition in African markets to their advantage.
How can the U.S. Government, and USAID in particular, most
effectively incentivize reforms that will improve the enabling
environment for investment and trade in Africa? Does the
existing Prosper Africa provide an effective framework, or does
it need to be modified? If so, how?
Answer. Improving the enabling environment for private sector
investment is essential, and I agree with you that USAID staff and
programs can play an important role in engaging local actors to take
steps to improve the regulatory and investment climate. USAID has
developed innovative new programs in support of Prosper Africa,
including a new continent-wide program to be launched this year to
boost trade, increase investment, and support business-friendly policy
reforms. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other Departments
and Agencies to advance this important goal, including through any
necessary adjustments to Prosper Africa. I will support efforts that
build the capacity of African businesses and catalyze U.S. private
sector investment in Africa's growth, and engaging young entrepreneurs,
especially women, as partners. Programs that strengthen the rule of
law, protect individual rights, and tackle corruption are vital for
creating the conditions for economic growth and for attracting U.S.
investment and trade in Africa.
Question. How should U.S.-African trade and investment initiatives
factor into the U.S. global strategy to counter China, particularly in
Africa?
Answer. Competition with China is one of the defining challenges of
the 21st century for the United States, and engaging with our African
partners to pursue shared strategic interests in advancing security,
protecting global health, fighting climate change, strengthening
democracy, and spurring equitable economic growth must be a cornerstone
of our global strategy to counter China. In this regard, U.S.-African
trade and investment initiatives have a critical role to play in
meeting this challenge head-on. In Africa, the United States is
providing a meaningful alternative to China's state-led approach by
advancing a model of sustainable economic growth based on transparency,
responsible lending practices, strong environmental standards, and
investment in relationships with local communities. Through Prosper
Africa, the United States aims to mobilize billions of dollars of U.S.
private sector capital and to ensure that American companies can
compete on an even playing field by sharing timely information on new
opportunities, providing comprehensive packages of financing and other
assistance, and supporting trade and investment policies that promote
transparency and competition. We must also strengthen American soft
power by effectively communicating this support, engaging with youth,
and promoting entrepreneurship and American business practices. If
confirmed, I look forward to consulting further with you and to working
with other Departments and Agencies as well as the business community
to help ensure that the U.S. is pursuing trade and investment
initiatives strategically and from a position of strength.
Belarus
Question. Since the August 9, 2020, presidential election,
Belarusians have peacefully protested in unprecedented numbers to
contest the official results, which fraudulently awarded Alexander
Lukashenka another term. The Government has responded to these peaceful
protests with violence, initiating a campaign of disappearances,
arrests, torture, and violence against the protestors and journalists.
Since the protests began, the United States, though USAID and the
State Department, has increased its support for civil society
in Belarus. Do you believe that the U.S. response to events in
Belarus has been adequate? What more could, or should, the
United States and its European allies do to assist those
Belarusians working for democracy, free media, and a free
society?
Answer. I have used my platform as a private citizen to be an
outspoken supporter of the courageous Belarusians who have been
peacefully protesting for over seven months. If confirmed, I will build
on the U.S. Government's support for their democratic aspirations.
President Biden strongly condemned the Lukashenka regime for its
violent repression of the protesters and called for a peaceful transfer
of power, the release of all political prisoners, and new elections. As
the administration consults with allies and partners to determine
appropriate next steps to support the Belarusian people and their right
to choose their own leaders via free and fair elections, if confirmed,
I look forward to working with my interagency counterparts--guided by
the Belarus Democracy Act of 2020--in developing a whole of U.S.
Government approach to end this egregious assault on Belarusian
citizens and initiate a constructive dialogue with those calling for
change. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., I made it a priority to call
attention to the work of activists, dissidents, and reformers around
the world, and to mobilize multilateral pressure on their behalf. In
addition to demonstrating solidarity and raising international
awareness, support from government officials can sometimes provide
those on the front-lines in places like Belarus with a greater degree
of protection from potential retribution. As such, if confirmed, I will
continue to find ways to lift up the voices of those Belarusians
working for democracy while encouraging my counterparts around the
world to do the same.
Georgia
Question. Since its independence, Georgia has made generally good
progress in instilling democracy and implementing market-based economic
reforms, and has been a strong U.S. partner with ambitions to join the
EU and NATO. USAID has been a major funder of reform and development
programs in Georgia. However, over the past few years, the country has
suffered democratic backsliding and oligarchic capture of the
judiciary, media, and the ruling political party.
Do you believe that the political and governance situation in
Georgia has reached the point at which we should reevaluate our
relationship with the country, including by conditioning
certain aid to Georgia? What levers can the United States,
through USAID, use to push Georgians, including and especially
the ruling party Georgian Dream, to reform Georgia's judiciary
and complete its electoral reforms?
Answer. I agree that for Georgia to unlock further progress in its
economic and democratic development, the people of Georgia must have
confidence that their elected leaders are committed to a citizen-
centered democracy based on the rule of law. USAID's work with
Georgia's political parties, local nonpartisan monitoring groups, and
the Central Electoral Commission support this goal. USAID's current
programs are also actively working to strengthen Georgia's justice
system and electoral process. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with Congress to assess the shape and scope of these programs in light
of the democratic downturn, so as to ensure that they are targeted
appropriately, considering as well whether resources should be
channeled in different ways.
Ukraine
Question. Ukraine continues to fight two wars: first with the
Kremlin and its various attempts to undermine Ukraine's freedom and
independence; and second with its own demons, particularly the
entrenched corruption that has so often undermined Ukraine's democratic
transition and Euro-Atlantic ambitions.
Should the United States continue to condition certain types of
assistance on continued economic and anti-corruption reforms?
Should existing conditions for aid be expanded? What further
incentives does the United States, along with our European
partners, have to encourage Ukraine to complete its land
reform, decentralization, privatization of State-owned-
enterprises, and creation of an independent and responsive
judiciary?
Answer. When I travelled to Ukraine in 2015 as U.S. Ambassador to
the U.N., I spoke out against the very issue you identify: deep,
systemic corruption that permeated virtually every facet of Ukrainian
life. I continue to share your concerns about the daunting obstacle
that corruption poses for the Ukrainian people. Troubling recent
rulings by Ukraine's own Constitutional Court that weaken important
anti-corruption institutions, such as the National Anti-Corruption
Bureau and the High Anti Corruption Court, demonstrate clearly how much
work remains to be done. At the same time, some inroads have been made.
When the protests against President Yanukovych began in November 2013,
Ukraine ranked 144th out of 175 countries on Transparency
International's corruption index. Today, it ranks 117. While there is
obviously significant additional work yet to be done, these small but
important advances show how critical USAID and USG assistance is to
anti-corruption efforts, from work aimed at strengthening oversight and
accountability mechanisms to partnerships with civil society
organizations. The Biden administration has been clear about its intent
to support Ukraine's self-chosen European path, including by pushing
for more progress on fighting corruption and implementing reforms that
will strengthen Ukraine's institutions. USAID implements numerous anti-
corruption programs in Ukraine that directly address land reform,
judicial reform, decentralization, and privatization. Combating
corruption is a central tenet and cross-cutting pillar of USAID's
development strategy in Ukraine, and if confirmed, I will seek to
ensure that measurable progress continues to be achieved on this
pressing concern.
Central Asia
Question. The five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, or C5, have often
been an afterthought in U.S. foreign policy. However, the region sits
between Russia and China and has often proven eager for U.S.
involvement and activity in those countries. USAID has recently
expanded its presence in the region in response.
Over the past few years, the coordination between the United States
and EU on development programs in Central Asia has markedly
strengthened and both partners have published Central Asia
engagement strategies. Will you commit to continuing to
coordinate USAID's Central Asia engagement with the EU and to
ensuring that Central Asia remains a priority for engagement by
USAID?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that Central Asia remains
a priority for USAID. The Biden administration fully supports the C5+1
initiative and seeks to help this region be more independent and
resilient. We will continue our close coordination with the EU on
development programs. A crucial strategic interest for the United
States is the stability of the region, which borders China, Russia and
Afghanistan and is increasingly marked by conflict and
authoritarianism. USAID has cultivated relationships in Central Asia,
establishing two new Missions in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in June
2020. If confirmed, I will build upon this momentum in collaboration
with Congress and the European Commission's Directorate-General for
International Partnerships, which has established technical expert
working groups focused on coordinating trade, energy, water and
environmental efforts in Central Asia.
Question. The Indo-Pacific is a critical region for U.S. security
and economic growth. It represents nearly half of the global population
and is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the world, but is
also home to security challenges that threaten to undermine U.S.
national security interests, regional peace, and global stability. The
Trump administration articulated a strategy to advance a ``free and
open Indo-Pacific,'' and has expanded partnerships with regional
countries and implemented multiple initiatives in the region to support
this goal. USAID played a significant role in this strategy.
Do you agree with the core tenants of a vision for the ``free and
open Indo-Pacific'' strategy advanced over the last several
years? If so, what should USAID's role be in this strategy? If
not, why not?
Answer. Yes, I agree. The Biden administration has made it clear
that a Free and Open Indo-Pacific will be a foreign policy and national
security priority, consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act
of 2018. If confirmed, I will ensure USAID continues to fulfill its
important role supporting democracy, human rights, inclusive economic
growth, open and inclusive digital ecosystems, and the global health
security agenda in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, I believe that USAID
should continue its vital leadership in efforts to support countries'
COVID-19 responses and their natural resource management.
Question. If confirmed, what are the key principles, initiatives,
and other elements of the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy
do you believe should be retained and continued? How would you build on
these initiatives? What other policies, initiatives, and priorities
would you pursue to advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region?
What specific policy and funding priorities would USAID require to
advance a successful Indo-Pacific strategy?
Answer. The Biden administration will continue to advance the
principles of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will
continue to prioritize strengthening democratic systems, fostering
economic growth, and improving the management of natural resources as
part of USAID's approach to the Indo-Pacific region. I look forward to
building upon USAID's successful investments in democratic governance,
transparency and anti-corruption measures, the digital economy,
infrastructure, and energy across the Indo-Pacific. At the same time,
USAID will need to review and adapt these initiatives to address the
significant impacts of COVID-19 on the region, take advantage of new
opportunities to increase climate security and resilience, and build
upon renewed multilateral partnerships. I appreciate the continued
support and advice of Congress on how to best advance U.S. interests in
the Indo-Pacific region, and if confirmed, I look forward to working
with you to identify policy and funding priorities.
Question. Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands are both
critically important regions to the United States.
If confirmed, what will be your top priorities with respect to
USAID's work in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue deepening USAID's
collaboration with like-minded partners in this critical region. I also
support USAID's increased activities and staff presence in the Pacific
Islands region to support our allies and counter Chinese influence.
We are committed to working with our Pacific Islands partners to
help them address the effects of climate change, which poses an
existential threat, and to mitigate the impacts of frequent natural
disasters.
If confirmed, I am committed to advancing shared objectives toward
strengthening democratic systems, fostering economic growth, and
improving the management of natural resources throughout the region.
Question. In the area of human capital development, the Trump
administration emphasized preserving and expanding assistance programs
that provide concrete technical assistance and capacity-building for
emerging and established leaders in partner governments, the private
sector, and civil society. How would you work to bolster human capital
development programs in the Indo-Pacific through USAID, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support USAID's
investments in technical assistance and capacity-building to bolster
emerging leaders from partner governments, the private sector and civil
society in the Indo-Pacific region. USAID will continue to prioritize
investments to increase workforce participation opportunities (with a
focus on women and girls), develop skills for a digital economy among
youth, and improve education outcomes by modernizing curricula in
partnership with host country governments, educational institutions,
and the private sector. I will also direct USAID to work toward
rebuilding human capacity in critical government institutions and
health systems badly strained by their efforts to combat the COVID-19
pandemic.
China
Question. My view is that China's ``One Belt, One Road'' initiative
(OBOR) is a means by which to increase the economic influence of state-
owned Chinese firms in global markets, engender undue PRC political
leverage with governments around the world, create a China-centric
technology regime, secure dependence on supply chains centered on
Chinese companies, export corrupt business practices, and provide
greater access to strategic nodes for the People's Liberation Army.
Do you agree that these are the goals of OBOR? If confirmed, what
actions would you take and what partnerships would you seek to
execute concrete USAID projects to compete with or reduce the
influence of OBOR?
Answer. China's approach to ``development'' through One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) raises deep concerns for me and many people in USAID's
partner countries. Projects connected to OBOR have come under
significant scrutiny on issues such as corruption; unsustainable debt;
environmental degradation; construction contracts and jobs being
awarded to Chinese firms over local enterprises; lack of transparency
and local consultations; and even worries about the potential erosion
of sovereignty due to the unfavorable terms attached to certain
projects. I share your conviction that USAID needs a far-reaching
strategy that addresses the challenges of OBOR, and I believe that
frustrations around the world with China's development practices
provide an opportunity for the U.S.
The administration's approach is to provide an alternative vision
to Beijing's--a vision that promotes democratic governance,
transparency, and local ownership in our global development work. If
confirmed, I will work aggressively to draw on America's comparative
advantages in distinguishing the U.S. approach from the PRC's, by
engaging directly with our partner countries and ensuring that good
governance, sustainability, and social and economic safeguards are
built into projects we support. USAID can strengthen local capacity to
ensure that development investments are both beneficial and
sustainable. If confirmed, I will work with allies and partners,
including at the DFC and in the private sector, to better leverage our
collective resources and influence, and I will be an advocate for the
highest human rights, governance, environmental, social, and labor
standards in order to promote investments that are sustainable for the
long term.
Question. In a speech you gave on China last year at Harvard, you
highlighted that the Chinese Government and Chinese companies are
supplying other countries with digital technologies, such as facial
recognition and artificial intelligence, and those countries are in
many cases using those technologies for repressive purposes. China is
also supplying next generation telecommunications equipment and other
technologies through its Digital Silk Road.
In your view, what is the role of USAID in helping developing
countries harness emerging technologies to advance economic
prosperity and freedom?
Answer. Emerging technologies can play a significant role in
advancing economic prosperity and freedom, and USAID has an important
role to play in this area. I understand that USAID launched its Digital
Strategy in 2020 to ensure the Agency effectively integrates digital
technologies across all its work and strengthens the openness,
inclusiveness, and security of country-level digital ecosystems in
partner countries. The Agency is supporting the digital security of
civil society and media organizations, including cyber risk assessments
and providing AI tools to track disinformation flows. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with Congress to further strengthen USAID's
work in this area.
Question. What tools does USAID possess in this regard, and how
would you prioritize putting them to good use, if confirmed?
Answer. I understand that the Agency is supporting e-commerce and
the opportunities that digital platforms offer traditional businesses
in developing countries to access new markets and to better integrate
into the global trading system. Additionally, it is working with CBP to
apply emerging technologies such as non-invasive inspection systems to
assure the safety, security and traceability of goods moving across
borders. If confirmed, I will work with the interagency to promote the
adoption of policies and technologies in our partner countries to
advance U.S. national security objectives while creating innovation and
investment opportunities for American businesses.
Question. Last year, I published a report on how the United States
and Europe can cooperate on shared challenges related to China, which
included chapters encouraging U.S.-Europe cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific and Africa.
What areas relevant to USAID's mission are ripe for greater U.S.-
Europe cooperation in these two regions? What are some factors
that could enable such cooperation, and what are the limiting
factors? What is your perspective on the analysis and
recommendations in the report I published?
Answer. I agree that U.S.-EU cooperation is critical to combatting
China's influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa and appreciated your
report's analysis and recommendations to focus on areas such as
democracy promotion, private sector growth, and the environment. USAID
engages frequently with EU officials to seek to align policy and to
increase burden sharing on key issues such as the COVID-19 global
response, democracy and governance, economic growth, energy, food
security and resilience, global health, and humanitarian assistance.
The EU's new seven-year budget articulates commitments to climate
change, human development, gender and digital development. These areas,
along with immediate and second-order impacts of the pandemic, are
opportunities for greater cooperation. In Brussels, Secretary Blinken
and EU leaders recently discussed challenges that China presents to the
rules-based order and agreed to resume U.S.-EU dialogue to coordinate
approaches.
Burma
Question. Please describe your planned approach to USAID engagement
in Burma, in light of the military coup and the Biden administration's
executive order that will retain support for humanitarian assistance
and civil society.
What areas of engagement and assistance will you prioritize, if
confirmed?
Answer. I condemn, in the strongest possible terms, the military
coup in Burma and the junta's violent actions against peaceful
demonstrators. I support USAID's immediate action following the coup to
redirect $42.4 million away from work that would have benefited the
Government of Burma and toward strengthening civil society and other
non-governmental actors.
If confirmed, I will work with the administration and Congress to
continue to put pressure on the military regime, call out human rights
abuses and ensure that USAID programs do not benefit the military
regime and are focused on improving health outcomes and combating
COVID-19, strengthening the ability of civil society to guard
democratic space, fostering food security, supporting independent
media, and promoting peace and reconciliation in Burma's conflict--
affected regions. I would also prioritize continuing to provide
critical humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya and other vulnerable
populations including in Chin, Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan states.
Supporting Middle East and North Africa Policy
Question. When looking broadly across the Middle East and North
Africa, one is struck with the enormity of the humanitarian need.
However, given the relative size of budgets, how do you recommend
the United States best align USAID programs with larger
diplomatic objectives that further U.S. national interests?
Answer. I agree with your assessment regarding the importance of
aligning USAID's humanitarian and development work with diplomatic
objectives, and ensuring that all advance U.S. national interests.
USAID and State align department, regional, and country-specific
strategies and in MENA, in particular, there is close collaboration to
ensure mutually-reinforcing efforts. USAID's primary role in
particularly volatile countries in the region is to meet the basic
needs of suffering populations and support stabilization efforts that
are necessary preconditions for enduring diplomatic solutions. If
confirmed, I commit to working further with the Congress and closely
with Secretary Blinken to ensure that USAID programs are as closely
aligned as possible with our national interests across the region.
Question. Looking across the region, what do you see as the most
significant drivers of instability that run counter to U.S. interests
and are most deserving of USAID's limited resources?
Answer. Destabilizing factors--including Iranian aggression, malign
Russian influence, terrorist networks, and authoritarian resurgence and
repressive governments that don't provide outlets for dissent and
pervasive corruption--run counter to U.S. interests in the region.
Nations in the Middle East and North Africa are also struggling to
address the impacts of the COVID pandemic. Fragile economies, medical
facilities, schools and essential services that were already struggling
to meet the needs of their local populations as well as people
displaced by active conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq, have
been further strained by the pandemic. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure that USAID's resources are addressing life-saving and
stabilization needs and addressing the root causes of conflicts, such
as polarization, state fragility, corruption, social and economic
exclusion, gender inequality, and anemic economic growth.
Iran
Question. In 2008, you advocated for a new Iran policy based on
``broadening cultural contacts with the Iranian people, bypassing the
regime through Voice of America and the Internet.''
What role should USAID play in efforts to foster greater U.S.
engagement with the Iranian people? What form do you envision
this would take?
Answer. The Iranian Government denies Iranians their human rights,
including through severe restrictions on the rights to peaceful
assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or belief, and
freedom of expression. Iranian authorities have responded to a series
of popular and widespread demonstrations with brutal repression, the
arrests of thousands of protesters, and the use of lethal force.
According to Amnesty International, over 300 people were killed during
the most recent spate of major protests in late 2019.
If confirmed, I will work within the administration to draw
attention to the Iranian regime's human rights abuses and express
support for the people of Iran. I look forward to engaging with
Congress to further consider this issue.
Question. Can you commit to limiting any USAID program to Iran to
the development and humanitarian assistance space?
Answer. Yes.
Iraq
Question. In the past, you've suggested the United States should
seek to mitigate, rather than eliminate, Iranian influence in Iraq. In
2008, you wrote ``no aspect of the Iraq quagmire can be resolved
without Iranian involvement.''
Do you still believe this to be the case? If so, how do you plan to
balance concerns about Iranian's malign influence, including
its support for militia groups, with U.S. efforts to support a
stable, sovereign Iraq? What is your vision for the role U.S.
assistance can play in supporting an independent Iraqi
governance model?
Answer. Iran's support for terrorism and human rights abuses
threatens U.S. forces and civilians as well as U.S. partners in Iraq
and the region, and can hinder our ability to implement foreign
assistance progamming. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID's
programs in Iraq further the goal of a stable and sovereign Iraq, while
also considering the safety and security of our staff balanced with
proper oversight of USAID programs. I also will review USAID's approach
to ensure that development and humanitarian assistance needs of all
Iraqis continue to be met in a principled and equitable manner as USAID
continues to support the recovery and rehabilitation needs of victims
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), including Yezidis.
Lebanon
Question. Despite the August 4, 2020, explosions in Beirut and
unrest that followed, Lebanon's political elites have continued to
cling to power. Past policy has been to withhold broader financial
assistance absent reforms targeting corruption and transparency.
How does USAID plan to advance crucial economic reforms in Lebanon,
and what conditions would Lebanon need to meet in order to
qualify for U.S. financial support?
Answer. I share your concerns--the Lebanese people deserve
accountability and a government that prioritizes their safety and
prosperity. However, the crisis in Lebanon goes beyond the explosion at
the port and other immediate concerns like COVID-19. Lebanon's crisis
is the result of decades of bad governance, economic mismanagement, and
corruption. Unfortunately, the Lebanese people have paid the highest
price for their leaders' negligence. USAID's development programs are
intended to provide support directly to the Lebanese people with
essential services and humanitarian assistance and to counter potential
Hezbollah influence in local communities. USAID can support the
Lebanese people through programs that help businesses retain staff and
assets to build a foundation for economic recovery; empower municipal
governments and civil society to deliver vital services; and keep
students in school. These programs lessen the likelihood that Lebanese
citizens will suffer the worst effects of the economic crisis.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and the committee
to ensure USAID's assistance is appropriately targeted to support the
people in Lebanon in the face of these challenges.
Question. Can you commit to working to ensure the $11 billion in
CEDRE, IMF, and World Bank funding earmarked for Lebanon remains
contingent on key reforms, including reforms to the electricity/natural
gas sector, increased transparency, and an audit of the central bank?
Answer. If confirmed, I will expect my team to continue to engage
with the Department of State, the World Bank, other IFIs, and our
allies in support of meaningful economic and political reforms
necessary to halt further deterioration and put the country back on a
path toward prosperity. Lebanon's elected officials must respond to the
demands of their people and move forward on reform.
Yemen
Question. The previous administration suspended U.S. humanitarian
aid to Houthi controlled areas of Yemen in response to restrictions
imposed on the delivery of aid.
What is your position on the suspension? Can you commit to
maintaining broad restrictions on aid flows into Houthi
controlled areas until all 12 conditions are meaningfully and
comprehensively addressed?
Answer. I understand that on March 11, 2021, USAID determined that
international non-governmental organization (INGO) partners could
resume humanitarian operations in northern Yemen, subject to special
award conditions. I further understand that USAID is carefully
monitoring this issue, which includes participation in the Yemen
Technical Monitoring Group (TMG), consisting of USAID, U.N. agencies,
NGOs, and like-minded donors, which meets monthly to review Houthi
progress towards the Benchmarks for Monitoring and Decision-Making on
Donor Criteria/Conditions for Funding. If confirmed, I will support
these efforts and monitor conditions on the ground closely.
Question. How do you plan on working with U.S. funded NGOs to
ensure the appropriate carve-outs are in place to ensure certain, life-
saving operations can continue despite the broader suspension in U.S.
assistance?
Answer. I understand that on March 11, 2021, USAID determined that
international non-governmental organization (INGO) partners could
resume humanitarian operations in northern Yemen, subject to special
award conditions. During the suspension of humanitarian operations,
USAID continued to support NGOs implementing some critical life-saving
assistance, such as treatment for severe malnutrition. USAID partners
remained operational in southern Yemen.
Syria
Question. More than 11 million people are in need of humanitarian
aid in Syria. Traditionally, the U.S. and its partners have relied
heavily on four humanitarian access points along the Syrian border to
transport this life-saving assistance. Of these four cross-border
access points, only the Bab al-Hawa crossing remains open, thanks to
Russian and Chinese vetoes at the U.N. Security Council.
How do you plan on continuing to maintain U.S. aid flows regardless
of any future action taken at the U.N. Security council related
to Bab al-Hawa?
Answer. In 2014, I helped lead the U.N. Security Council in
authorizing the delivery of vital assistance across the four
humanitarian access points that you reference. I share your anger at
Russia and China's vetoes at the U.N. Security Council to reduce the
number of available access points, which even in 2014 were not even
close to sufficient in terms of meeting the actual needs of Syrian
civilians. Overall, since the beginning of the conflict, Russia and
China have together vetoed 16 Security Council resolutions related to
Syria. In the face of these unconscionable decisions, the U.S. must
continue to aid vulnerable Syrians within Syria and across the region.
The United States remains the largest humanitarian donor in Syria,
providing over $12.2 billion in humanitarian assistance since the
conflict began. Despite enormous challenges, humanitarian organizations
are reaching vulnerable Syrians in both government- and opposition-
controlled areas, utilizing both cross-border and cross-line access.
That said, there are no viable alternatives that would yield the same
range and magnitude of capability, or efficiency, as the U.N.'s cross-
border assistance to northern Syria. I understand that the Biden
administration strongly supports renewal of the Bab al-Hawa border
crossing and reinstatement of other crossings into northern Syria in
the U.N. Security Council, and if confirmed, I will work tirelessly in
support of these efforts.
Question. What are your thoughts on cross-border humanitarian
assistance in the absence of a U.N. resolution?
Answer. There is no solution at the scale needed if U.N. cross-
border access is not reauthorized. Humanitarian assistance must be able
to be as flexible as possible, including both cross-line and cross-
border. The humanitarian needs inside Syria will only increase in the
face of closing borders and shrinking operating spaces. As referenced
earlier, I understand that the Biden administration strongly supports
renewal of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing and reinstatement of other
crossings into northern Syria in the U.N. Security Council, and if
confirmed, I commit to tirelessly supporting these efforts. I also
believe that we must partner with a range of countries, NGOs, and
influential figures to raise awareness about the catastrophic impact on
Syrian civilians that will result from losing the final crossing,
highlighting the reputational costs for Russia if it uses its veto to
completely cut off civilians in northern Syria from this life-saving
assistance. Additionally, if confirmed, I will support the Department
of State's efforts to advance a negotiated political settlement so that
Syria can move beyond its continual cycle of violence and suffering
towards reconciliation and rebuilding.
Central America
Question. In September 2019, then-(Acting) Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Michael Kozak described to this
committee how, despite years of programmatic successes, the U.S.-
Central America Strategy had failed to muster the political will
necessary for aid-recipient countries to effectively combat the endemic
corruption, economic protectionism, and rampant criminality that have
generated wave after wave of illegal migration from the region.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to build and maintain
political will among the political leadership in the countries
of Northern Central America to tackle the push factors of
illegal migration?
Answer. The President has articulated a comprehensive $4 billion,
four-year plan that will provide financial and other forms of
assistance and incentives to confront corruption, enhance security, and
foster prosperity across the region. As Vice President, he also exerted
consistent diplomatic pressure in support of anti-corruption efforts in
the region. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on
the most effective ways to implement President Biden's plan, and
increasing the diplomatic pressure on elected officials not doing
enough to confront corruption and lawlessness. I understand that USAID
is working in partnership with other U. S. Government Agencies to
address the root causes of irregular migration from the Northern
Triangle and foster an environment where families can envision their
futures in their home countries and communities. USAID focuses on
combating crime and violence by reaching at-risk youth, addressing
corruption and impunity, disrupting the activities of transnational
criminal organizations, and providing vulnerable citizens with greater
economic opportunity, social services, and protection. With the
appropriate time, sustained commitment, and appropriate partners, I
believe USAID programs can help address the push factors that lead
Central Americans to reluctantly leave their homes. To give just one
example: in neighborhoods where USAID worked in El Salvador to
implement security programs, homicides declined by an average of 45
percent from 2015 to 2017. If we want to duplicate, improve upon, and
eventually scale initiatives of this kind, strengthening our
partnerships with civil society leaders--including advocates for
transparent and accountable government and human rights--will be
important. Similarly, USAID will work with those private sector leaders
committed to transparency and the rule of law.
Question. The 2014 Strategy for Engagement in Central America aimed
to deter illegal migration from the region by promoting economic
prosperity, security, and good governance in recipient countries.
Pursuant to that strategy, Congress has placed multiple conditions on
aid to these countries.
To what extent have legislative conditions contributed to policy
changes in the recipient nations? How do you plan to
incentivize needed reforms if the recipient countries fail to
meet conditions set by Congress, and those failures prompt
restrictions on assistance?
Answer. Congress is a key partner in setting America's foreign
policy agenda and with regard to the implementation of foreign
assistance. I cannot state definitively how the aforementioned
conditions specifically impacted decision-making in recipient
countries, but based on my own experiences as a diplomat, I agree that
it is important that the administration work with Congress to utilize
all available congressional tools with flexibility to implement our
policies and respond to changing contexts.
Question. President Biden has proposed a four-year $4 billion
strategy for Central America.
Can you describe the types of investments and specific reforms you
would seek from individual governments under this strategy to
reduce illegal migration from the region, including the
concrete and verifiable benchmarks by which you will measure
success? How will this strategy help the governments of Central
America become more self-sufficient so that U.S. foreign
assistance is no longer needed to achieve these objectives?
Answer. I believe that the ultimate solution for sustainably
reducing irregular migration from Central America is to work not only
with governments to encourage critical reforms, but also broadly with
civil society, the private sector, and international partners to
catalyze structural changes that address corruption, security, and
prosperity in the region. Creating economic opportunity, rebuilding the
social fabric in communities that have been torn apart by violence,
establishing inclusive, fair, and just rule of law, and ensuring there
is the capacity to deliver citizen-responsive governance and services
will position Central America's Northern Triangle countries to address
the drivers of irregular migration for the long term.
Nicaragua
Question. Nicaragua is scheduled to hold general elections in
November. In October 2020, the Organization of American States adopted
a resolution [AG/RES.2962 (L-O/20)] calling for the restoration of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Nicaragua
through free and fair elections. The Ortega regime responded by
approving three statutes with the apparent aim of quashing dissent in
Nicaragua ahead of the November 2021 elections.
If confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing actions and programs
designed to improve the capacity of the democratic forces in
Nicaragua to be a credible challenge to Ortega ahead of the
November 2021 general elections?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring USAID supports viable,
democratic processes and institutions in Nicaragua. USAID is focused on
the November 2021 national elections in Nicaragua and on restoring
democratic processes and respect for human rights through expanding
opportunities for coalition building and supporting electoral integrity
and an active civil society.
Cuba
Question. According to the State Department, in 2019, the
Government of Cuba maintained an estimated 50,000 medical personnel in
more than 60 countries under conditions that represent forced labor.
The United States, the United Nations, independent media outlets, and
non-governmental organizations have all documented and called out the
Cuban regime's exploitative and coercive practices toward its doctors
participating in its overseas medical programs.
Do you consider the Cuban regime's overseas medical missions to be
exploitative human trafficking efforts? How can USAID Missions
in countries that accept Cuban medical missions help
communicate the realities of the forced labor practices
employed by the Cuban regime?
Answer. Support for democracy and human rights is at the core of
this administration's Cuba policy. We must be vocal in our support for
the journalists, human rights defenders, and democracy activists
seeking to challenge the repressiveness of Cuban authorities, who
maintain an extraordinarily tight grip on all aspects of life on the
island and are ruthless in seeking to stifle dissent. I understand that
USAID has programs in place currently to support the human rights of
Cuban workers, including medical personnel. If confirmed, I will work
with my colleagues at the Department of State to review the Cuban
Government's practices with regard to its overseas medical programs and
look forward to consulting with you on this issue.
Question. The State Department's 2019 Human Rights Report for Cuba
painted a dismal picture of human rights abuses by the Cuban regime, to
include accounts of disappearances; torture and other cruel, inhumane,
or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh prison and detention center
conditions; arbitrary arrests and detentions; denial of fair public
trial; and political prisoners and detainees. The regime also has
cracked down on freedom of expression, limited internet freedom, and
restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.
Will you commit to calling out human rights violations by the Cuban
Government?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that support for human
rights remains at the core of USAID's efforts in Cuba. Cuba is one of
the most repressive countries in the world, and is ruled by a
dictatorship that flagrantly abuses human rights, seeks to prevent its
populace from accessing even basic independent information, inhibits
meaningful civil society activity--including free press--and
criminalizes political dissent. As one of my first acts as U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N., I raised the case of Oswaldo Paya directly with
the Cuban Foreign Minister, pressing him to allow an independent
investigation of the circumstances in which Paya had been killed, and I
continued to advocate publicly in support of Paya's family. During my
time at the U.N., I repeatedly called out Cuba for its abhorrent
treatment of Cubans like Jose Daniel Ferrer, Jose Antonio Torres, Julio
Ferrer, and Antonio Rodiles. If confirmed, I will continue to speak out
against Cuba's persecution of its citizens and human rights violations.
Question. How will you work to support democratic activists and
human rights defenders in Cuba?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue USAID's work to support
democratic activists and human rights defenders in Cuba. The role of a
vibrant civil society continues to be essential to Cuban democracy. I
gather that USAID has a portfolio in place to continue supporting a
diverse sector of independent activists in Cuba who will push for
democratic freedoms, including religious freedom. The Agency will also
continue providing basic needs assistance to political prisoners and
persecuted activists. NGOs are poised to continue defending the human
rights of those who are abused and even jailed for their political
beliefs.
Question. Do you commit to maintain a robust USAID democracy
program focused on advancing respect for basic human rights in Cuba?
Answer. Yes, I am committed to supporting robust USAID democracy
programming in Cuba.
Haiti
Question. Haiti is facing a complex and worsening constitutional
crisis.
What role can USAID play in promoting effective dialogue among the
different political forces? If confirmed, what efforts would
you make to support strengthening Haiti's technical capacity to
hold elections?
Answer. The Haitian people deserve democracy and prosperity. Haiti
has been without a functioning government for too long, and in the
meantime, conditions continue to deteriorate. The political parties
need to come together to end the misery, corruption and insecurity
wreaking havoc for the Haitian people. While Haiti is facing a complex
emergency that USAID assistance alone cannot resolve, USAID does have
an important role to play in helping to promote democracy, human
rights, and governance. With respect to the upcoming legislative
elections, I understand that USAID's current activities aim to promote
credible elections, increase political party competition, and expand
civic participation in electoral processes to help end the ongoing
political crisis of rule by decree. If confirmed, I will advocate for a
strong whole-of-government and multi-donor approach for targeted
democracy, human rights, and governance work to promote democratic
political reform, peace and stability.
South America
Question. Over the last three decades, Colombia has emerged as a
source of economic prosperity and stability in the region and a key
strategic ally and partner of the United States. Yet, policy decisions
made during the negotiations of the 2016 deal with the FARC terrorist
organization created new challenges for Colombia and in our relations.
Coca production in Colombia has steadily increased since 2013, reaching
212,000 hectares in 2019. In March 2020, the United States and Colombia
announced a joint action plan to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine
production by 50 percent by the end of 2023. The plan would make full
use of all available tools, including rural development, interdiction,
as well as manual and aerial eradication.
Would you agree that achieving this goal by 2023 would deliver
significant health and security benefits for Americans here at
home? If confirmed, what tools and policies would you implement
to ensure that our two nations meet this goal?
Answer. I share your concern about the flow of drugs from Latin
America and the Caribbean to the United States. USAID plays an
important role on this issue through its alternative development
programs in Colombia, which are intended to offer licit alternatives--
such as coffee, cacao, dairy, and others--to replace coca production.
Alternative development is a necessary but insufficient tool to
significantly reduce coca cultivation, which also requires robust
involvement by the private sector, civil society, and international
organizations, along with a commitment by Colombian leaders to
equitable economic development in communities that have long been
underserved by government programs. Colombia's historic 2016 peace
accord with the FARC was an important first step in ending one of the
longest-running armed conflicts in the world, which had led to the
deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and displaced millions of
Colombians. Implementing the various components of the accords is a
complex undertaking, and a challenge that continues to this day. I
gather that USAID's assistance focuses squarely on these efforts at
implementation, which must move forward in order to enhance security,
governance and development in former FARC-controlled and ungoverned
territories where some 95 percent of coca is cultivated and cocaine is
produced.
Venezuela
Question. Approximately 7.2 million people will require
humanitarian assistance due to the Venezuela regional crisis in 2021, a
10 percent increase from the year before.
How will you organize the resources of USAID to respond to the
increased need of millions of Venezuelans?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize humanitarian funding for
the Venezuela regional crisis. The situation within Venezuela is grave
and deteriorating: a recent U.N. fact-finding mission has uncovered
``widespread and systematic'' abuses by the Maduro Government against
the Venezuelan people, including extrajudicial executions, enforced
disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture. Concurrently, more
than five million Venezuelans are now refugees, putting immense
pressure on neighboring countries. USAID has provided more than $1
billion in humanitarian assistance since 2017 for Venezuelan migrants
and refugees, and host communities in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru, as well as more than $104 million since 2018 to reach people
inside Venezuela with life-saving humanitarian assistance, making the
U.S. the largest donor to the crisis regionally. USAID also supports
long-term development and integration activities in Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru for Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Still, there is
more that can be done, particularly in terms of stronger coordination
and cooperation with like-minded countries.
If confirmed, I will ensure USAID's critical humanitarian and
development assistance continues. Furthermore, despite the Maduro
regime's efforts to stifle any activities that threaten its hold on
power or accountability for its numerous crimes, if I am confirmed,
USAID will continue to provide support for civil society organizations
and democratically-minded actors working under incredibly dangerous
conditions to bring about a democratic transition.
Self-Reliance
Question. Former USAID Administrator Mark Green spearheaded the
agency's ``Journey to Self-Reliance'' initiative in an effort to
provide strategic focus to U.S. foreign assistance, including by taking
a data-based approach toward building partner country capacity to
achieve and sustain development results. In contrast with China's
development model, which creates dependence, Administrator Green argued
that America should seek to foster self-reliance and responsibility
among its friends.
While distinct from diplomatic and humanitarian assistance, do you
agree that the purpose of development assistance is to end the
need for its existence? If so, how will you ensure that USAID
and the implementing partners it supports effectively work
themselves out of a job?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the principle of self-reliance and that
USAID's programs should encourage self-reliance and sustainability. I
also believe it is what the vast majority of beneficiaries of USAID
programs want most for themselves and their communities. My vision for
USAID's role includes traditional development priorities. It also
applies a broader lens that recognizes U.S. foreign assistance within
core U.S. national security priorities, including advancing democracy,
human rights, increasing climate security and resilience, and global
health in a collaborative manner with civil society partners and
governments. If confirmed, I commit to advancing sound, evidence-based
development and humanitarian programming that continues to improve aid
effectiveness, self-reliance and sustainability.
Question. Do you intend to work with USAID to continue the
``Journey to Self-Reliance'' initiative, whether in name or in spirit?
If not, why not?
Answer. I deeply respect and appreciate former Administrator Mark
Green's leadership on this issue and intend to build on this
initiative. I understand that the Journey to Self-Reliance emphasizes
developing critical local capacities and supporting meaningful country
commitments, fit to the diverse contexts in which USAID works. I agree
the concept is sound and builds on the work of the Agency to support
sustainable development that has spanned multiple administrations.
Global Health Security
Question. The COVID-19 pandemic originated and accelerated in
higher-income countries, where USAID does not maintain a regular
presence and where intense, high-level diplomatic engagement proved
critical to securing global health data, navigating supply chain
disruptions, and facilitating the safe evacuation of American citizens.
Do you agree with the framework outlined by President Biden in NSM-
1, in which the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
USAID Administrator, leads (1) the development of the U.S.
Government-wide plan to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) a
diplomatic outreach plan for enhancing the United States'
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on engaging
partner nations?
Do you agree that this framework outlined by President Biden could
be used in other contexts to support global health efforts of
the U.S. Government, to include efforts to advance the Global
Health Security Agenda and enhance pandemic preparedness and
response overseas?
Answer. Yes, I support the framework outlined by the President in
NSM-1. I gather that there has been effective collaboration in the
interagency on the Global Health Security Agenda and if confirmed, I
look forward to reviewing it further and seeking ways to enhance our
impact.
Question. My bill, the Global Health Diplomacy and Security Act,
creates a coordinator position at the State Department that is
consistent with this type of framework outlined by President Biden. If
confirmed, do you commit to work with me on this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with you and the
committee on all efforts to advance global health security so as to
ensure that, after such devastation, the world is far better prepared
to confront global health threats.
COVID-19
Question. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2),
included $10 billion in international affairs funding for the COVID-19
pandemic response, to include: (1) $3.75 billion to prevent backsliding
in HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis programs, of which $3.5 billion
was directed toward the multilateral Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria's COVID-19 Response Mechanism; and (2) nearly
$5 billion in bilateral funds, of which an unspecified portion would be
directed toward the United Nations and other multilateral entities.
This is on top of the $4 billion that already had been appropriated to
support U.S. contributions to COVAX/Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.
What are the comparative advantages of bilateral funding versus
multilateral funding in the U.S. response to COVID-19 overseas?
Are there benefits to bilateral funding that you, if confirmed,
will advocate for and prioritize?
Answer. I believe that the U.S. Government (USG) is most effective
when both bilateral and multilateral funding is available and flows to
responsible and accountable partners. Multilateral funding allows the
USG to leverage the financial commitments, technical expertise, and
diplomatic engagement of many partners, often achieving economies of
scale and burden-sharing with other donors. Bilateral funding enables
USAID to align that work and those commitments to action on the ground
through the expertise and coordination of USAID field teams and ongoing
local assistance efforts, and address priorities that may not be
effectively or efficiently covered through multilateral channels.
If confirmed, will you continue the policy of providing funding for
multilateral entities, to include COVAX/Gavi and the Global Fund, in
tranches, such that U.S. contributions are made available based upon
need, performance, and other donor support?
I understand that USAID funding to Gavi/COVAX will be provided in
tranches. This will allow USAID to ensure Gavi/COVAX has the funding it
needs to scale global vaccine access, while closely monitoring COVAX's
performance and also incentivizing other donors to provide additional
resources. I understand that to date, USAID has obligated $2 billion
out of a total $4 billion to Gavi/COVAX. If confirmed, I will ensure
that USAID, in consultation with Gavi, is carefully considering the
timing of contributions to ensure COVAX is sufficiently resourced to
meet critical public health needs, given evolving supply dynamics and
resource constraints.
PEPFAR
Question. Lack of strategic direction, embittered competition, and
poor communication between the two principal implementers of U.S.
global health assistance--USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC)--have long plagued U.S. global health programs. This
is why, when authorizing the greatest commitment by any country to
combat a single disease in history, Congress placed the responsibility
for coordinating the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) within the Department of State. The PEPFAR program is now
recognized as the most successful U.S. foreign assistance program since
the Marshall Plan and has saved millions of lives, strengthened health
systems and supply chains, and advanced key U.S. diplomatic, economic,
and security goals.
Recognizing the success of the PEPFAR model--but also understanding
that PEPFAR would eventually need to be transitioned--the Obama
administration in 2009 sought to launch a 6-year, $63 billion Global
Health Initiative (GHI). Managed by the Coordinator of U.S. Government
Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS and Special Representative for Global
Health Diplomacy at the Department of State, the GHI proposed to take
an evidence-based approach toward strengthening health systems and
enhancing global health security. Though the GHI never found its
footing, the compelling need to close gaps in global health security
while also mitigating the need for disease-specific initiatives
justifies taking another look.
Do you agree that the PEPFAR model, to include the coordinating
role played by the Department of State and the implementing
roles played by USAID and CDC, has been successful? As more and
more countries approach epidemic control, do you believe this
model could be adapted to advance broader global health
security and diplomacy objectives, as the Obama administration
envisioned under the GHI?
Answer. I agree that PEPFAR has been enormously successful, and
should be considered one of the most significant and impactful public
health initiatives ever undertaken. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.,
many of my African colleagues spoke to me in strikingly personal terms
about what PEPFAR meant to their countries, offering sincere and
profound thanks to the American people for continuing to support this
initiative. I am also aware that there are other highly successful U.S.
Government public health initiatives, including the President's Malaria
Initiative, the West Africa and Eastern Congo Ebola responses, and
USAID's Neglected Tropical Disease program that should be reviewed for
lessons learned. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the
administration and Congress to review all of these successful programs,
draw lessons learned and determine how to best posture the U.S.
Government and USAID to advance global health security, global health
diplomacy, and pandemic response objectives.
Question. The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator was recently
directed to suspend its Country Operating Plan (COP) process, which had
already reached an advanced stage, in order to alleviate burdens on
implementing partners during the COVID-19 outbreak. While sympathetic
to the needs of implementing partners, the COP process, and the data-
driven approach it has institutionalized, is vital to the effective
planning and execution of PEPFAR programs. If confirmed, will you
ensure USAID fully and faithfully engages in the COP process and
adheres to such plans without unwarranted delays or deviations?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that USAID fully and
faithfully engages in the COP process and adheres to such plans without
unwarranted delays or deviations.
Question. The World Health Organization (WHO): You had a front row
seat to the ineptitude of the WHO during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak
in West Africa. It was so bad, in fact, that you helped lead the effort
on the U.N. Security Council to declare the outbreak ``a threat to
international peace and security'' and to establish the U.N.'s first-
ever ``health-keeping'' mission.
Much like the Ebola outbreak that preceded it, the WHO was either
unwilling or unable to mount an effective emergency response to the
COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China. Not only did it fail to press the
Chinese Government for access and information in the critical first
days of the outbreak, but the WHO provided political cover for China's
reckless response, publicly validated disinformation, and condemned
travel controls designed to mitigate the global spread.
Do you agree that the WHO is badly in need of reform? If so, what
specific reforms are necessary to restore its credibility among
the American people and the world?
Answer. Yes, the WHO needs reform and strengthening. While the WHO
continues to play an important role in the global response to COVID-19,
the pandemic exposed weaknesses in the readiness posture of both the
WHO and member states to respond to a crisis on this scale. President
Biden is firmly committed to reforming and strengthening the WHO, and
some of his first executive actions have focused on strengthening
global preparedness against future pandemic threats. The administration
believes that the best way to do this is by remaining an actively
engaged member of the organization and working with all member states
to support, strengthen, and build accountability at the WHO. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Departments of State and Health
and Human Services to ensure USAID informs and supports efforts that
strengthen the World Health Organization.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that by joining COVAX, the
vaccines pillar of the WHO-supported Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT)
Accelerator, the United States will not subsidize the distribution of
non-transparently developed, reportedly substandard Chinese and Russian
COVID-19 vaccines?
Answer. USAID funding to COVAX will only support procurement and
delivery of vaccines that meet rigorous quality standards, are safe and
efficacious, and have been approved or authorized by a stringent
regulatory authority, such as the U.S. FDA or the World Health
Organization. To date, vaccines developed by China and Russia have not
met these standards.
Food Aid and Food Security
Question. The United States is the single most generous provider of
humanitarian assistance in the world, both financial and in-kind, thus
saving hundreds of millions of lives and promoting the growth of
healthier, more stable societies. Yet today, an estimated 690 million
people are food insecure, of which 270 million are facing starvation.
As needs outpace the ability of donors to respond, it is imperative
that the Department and USAID be enabled to stretch U.S. humanitarian
resources farther, including by modernizing U.S. international food
aid.
Historically, the flagship U.S. food aid program--Food for Peace--
required that 100 percent of the food provided under the Act be
purchased in the United States, of which 50 percent must be shipped on
U.S. flagged vessels. According to the GAO, the shipping requirement,
in particular, has added significant time and cost to emergency food
aid, even while failing to fulfil its statutory purpose. Three
consecutive administrations have thus proposed changes--ranging from
setting aside 20 percent of the budget for local and regional
procurement to eliminating Food for Peace entirely. The Global Food
Security Act (as re-authorized through FY2023) and the 2018 Farm Bill
did include modest reforms, but more needs to be done.
Do you agree that the Department of Defense is capable of managing
its own sealift capacity and that U.S. agricultural cargo
preference requirements have outlived their statutory purpose,
add unnecessary time and expense to life-saving U.S. food aid,
and should no longer be applied to international food aid?
If confirmed, will you carry forward the food aid reform efforts of
your predecessors, including under the Obama administration?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress to
make USAID's programming to combat rising food insecurity and build the
resilience of vulnerable communities as effectively and efficiently as
possible. Each of the food assistance modalities--U.S. in-kind food,
locally and regionally procured food, and cash-based programming--
complements the others in addressing food insecurity efficiently and
effectively. At this time of unprecedented global humanitarian need,
USAID's ability to reach hungry people and improve the efficiency of
our programs is of utmost importance.
Humanitarian Assistance
Question. How will USAID, in coordination with the new Office of
Sanctions Coordination, work with the Treasury Department to ensure our
sanctions programs are designed to shape behavior without exacerbating
humanitarian crises around the world?
Answer. I understand that USAID coordinates regularly with the
interagency to review sanctions programs, including how sanctions are
impacting the COVID-19 response and humanitarian programs. If
confirmed, I will support USAID's work with the Department of Treasury,
the Department of State and the rest of the interagency to develop
effective sanctions regimes with requisite flexibilities to ensure that
life-saving humanitarian assistance can reach those in need.
Question. Should U.S. humanitarian assistance be branded? If not,
why not? If confirmed, will you uphold President Trump's Executive
Order on branding U.S. foreign assistance and the USAID Branding
Modernization Act (P.L. 116-334), including by branding all U.S.
foreign assistance administered by USAID?
Answer. I am committed to branding and agree that branding sends a
strong public diplomacy message, conveying that our assistance is due
to the generosity of the American people. It is also a critical element
of a counter China strategy.
Current branding regulations and policy continue to apply to USAID
awards and partners must continue to follow the branding requirements
outlined in their assistance agreements.
Women, Peace, and Security
Question. Under President Trump's Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
initiative signed into law in 2019, the United States is working to
advance three objectives by 2023, such that: 1) women are more prepared
and increasingly able to participate in efforts that promote stable and
lasting peace; 2) women and girls are safer, better protected, and have
equal access to government and private-assistance programs, including
from the United States, international partners, and host nations; and
3) the United States and partner governments have improved
institutionalization and capacity to ensure WPS efforts are sustainable
and long-lasting.
What actions will you, if confirmed, take to ensure these goals are
met? Will you enhance lines of effort and agency actions?
Answer. I agree that women's meaningful engagement leads to better,
more durable outcomes for peace and security. Studies show that when
women participate in peace processes the resulting agreement is 35
percent more likely to last at least 15 years. More broadly speaking,
one of the best predictors of a state's peacefulness is the way women
are treated within that state. USAID assistance supports the objectives
in the WPS Act to bolster women's ability to participate in peace and
political processes, protect against gender-based violence, and hold
accountable those that commit acts of gender-based violence. USAID's
activities also help break down barriers to women's participation in
conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. If confirmed, I will work with
my colleagues to further implement our commitments under the WPS Act
and ensure that these efforts continue to be a priority for the Agency.
Human Trafficking
Question. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated cases of human
trafficking and online sexual exploitation and abuse worldwide.
What will you prioritize, if confirmed, to counter this growing
problem during COVID-19 and to prevent a resurgence of these
behaviors after the pandemic is over?
Answer. I share your concerns and believe that human trafficking is
a grave human rights abuse. Sadly, the COVID-19 crisis has amplified a
number of factors that increase the risk of human trafficking and
online sexual exploitation and abuse. In particular, as out-of-school
or quarantined children spend more time online, the potential for
online harm of children also increases. If confirmed, I am committed to
USAID's work to counter human trafficking, which includes activities to
raise awareness about the risk of online sexual exploitation and abuse,
and provide children, families, and communities with the knowledge and
tools they need to reduce exposure to harmful online content.
Question. How will you, if confirmed, enhance USAID's role in the
President's Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
(PITF) and the Senior Policy Operating Group to Combat Trafficking in
Persons (SPOG)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will bring USAID's expertise to bear in the
PITF and SPOG, specifically by strengthening the interagency approach
to promote evidence-based prevention practices; identify, protect, and
respond to victims' needs; increase prosecutions and convictions; and
build partnerships, including with the corporate sector. I will
advocate for survivors and those who experienced trauma from human
trafficking. A survivor-centered approach is essential to preserve the
dignity, safety, and well-being of at-risk and vulnerable populations.
I am committed to working within the interagency to increase
collaboration with international organizations, civil society groups,
and the corporate sector.
United Nations Funding
Question. USAID provides significant amounts of funding to the
United Nations system, including through voluntary contributions to the
World Food Program, UNICEF, the U.N. Development Program, and others.
If confirmed, how do you plan to ensure that funding that goes
through the U.N. system has proper oversight and is not lost to
waste, fraud, abuse, or diversion to repressive governments,
armed groups, terrorist organizations, or criminal enterprise?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will continue to hold
United Nations (UN) organizations accountable to their mission and U.N.
member states. This means doing everything possible to ensure that U.N.
organizations are using resources efficiently and effectively--
eliminating waste, demanding zero tolerance for corruption and sexual
exploitation, and strengthening whistleblower protections and
transparency and accountability. Since most USAID funding to U.N.
partners is project-based, the Agency also ensures that USAID's U.N.
partners understand and comply with USAID requirements on monitoring
and reporting. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Department of
State and Mission to the U.N., to continue to advance these priorities.
DDI
Question. With the re-organization of USAID, there is a new Bureau
of Development, Democracy and Innovation.
Can you speak in detail about USAID's democracy promotion efforts?
Answer. China and Russia are using their resources, influence, and
technology to support autocrats and undermine and interfere with
democratic institutions. To meet this moment, the Biden-Harris
administration will restore democracy and human rights to the center of
U.S. foreign policy. USAID will pursue an affirmative strategy that
counters new and emerging threats to democracy and advances human
rights. This has been a top priority of mine throughout my career, and
if confirmed, I will elevate democracy programming and seek to deepen
current investments in anti-corruption programming, democracy, human
rights, and governance, including by supporting civil society and
promoting independent media and protection for journalists.
Question. How do these efforts complement the work being done by
the Department of State's Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau?
Answer. USAID works closely with the Department of State and the
National Endowment for Democracy in democracy promotion efforts. Each
entity has distinct comparative advantages--in the case of USAID, that
includes USAID's ability to leverage relationships and know-how through
its missions to tailor its work to local conditions--which gives the
United States a multi-faceted and more effective approach in
increasingly complex environments. I understand the USAID's Bureau for
Democracy, Development, and Innovation and the State Department's
Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) engage in regular
information-sharing and coordination efforts to avoid duplication and
make the most strategic use of assistance funds. This coordination
takes place both in Washington and at our missions overseas. If
confirmed, I will work closely with my counterparts to ensure that
coordination continues to take place and every effort is made to
maximize the impact of our assistance.
Atrocity Prevention
Question. What role does USAID play in U.S. atrocity prevention
efforts?
Answer. Since the 2011 Presidential Study Directive on Mass
Atrocities, USAID has played a leadership role in helping improve U.S.
Government capabilities related to atrocity prevention. USAID addresses
mass atrocities in four main ways: identifying and communicating risk
factors and warning signs that could lead to mass atrocities;
mitigating risks and bolstering resilience to shocks that could lead to
mass atrocities; responding to escalating atrocity situations with
humanitarian assistance and prevention programs; and supporting
recovery from mass violence and gross violations of human rights
through programs focused on promoting justice and accountability,
rebuilding social cohesion, supporting political transition, and
supporting the protection of human rights.
This work is incredibly important because preventing mass
atrocities is a core national security interest of the United States.
While serving on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to
the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human
Rights, I worked with President Obama to create the aforementioned
Directive and the Atrocities Prevention Board, the first White House-
led structure tasked with reacting to early warnings of atrocities.
Climate
Question. If confirmed, how will you and USAID interact with the
office of Special Presidential Envoy Kerry, including with respect to
implementation of U.S. foreign assistance connected to any climate
arrangements or agreements negotiated by the office of Special
Presidential Envoy Kerry?
Answer. If confirmed, I would commit to working closely with
Special Presidential Climate Envoy Kerry, as USAID plays an essential
role in working with our partner countries to translate bold climate
ambition into action. Indeed, Secretary Kerry and I have a strong
working relationship, forged during my time as U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N. while he was serving as Secretary of State. I understand that the
administration's top priorities are to: immediately raise and implement
partner countries' climate commitments, meet the U.S. climate finance
pledge, accelerate efforts to increase the resilience of climate
vulnerable countries. USAID will work with countries and regions with
globally important forests and carbon-rich landscapes to reduce
deforestation and improve conservation, as unsustainable land use
accounts for one-quarter of global greenhouse emissions, as well as
reduce emissions from land use change in critical tropical ecosystems
that serve as global carbon sinks. USAID will also work with countries
and regions with globally important forests and carbon-rich landscapes
to reduce deforestation and improve conservation.
Infrastructure
Question. USAID plays an important role in the Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network and the Transaction Advisory Fund,
set up under the Trump administration.
Please describe your specific views on these two programs. Will
USAID under the Biden administration retain this initiative?
Answer. China's significant infrastructure investments around the
world are often fiscally unsustainable, include corrupt practices and
processes, do not comply with international environmental and labor
standards, lack public oversight and transparency, and have limited
community involvement. I believe that USAID, through initiatives like
ITAN, should continue advising countries on how to ensure a fair and
level playing field. Once a country commits to undertaking a
competitive procurement process, USAID should continue using mechanisms
such as the Transaction Advisory Fund to advise it on how to ensure
projects are legally, financially, and technically viable and
incorporate appropriate environmental and social safeguards.
Reproductive Health
Question. President Biden has rescinded the Mexico City policy
(which conditioned U.S. assistance to foreign NGOs upon a commitment
that they will not perform or promote abortion with funding from any
source) and has said the United States will rejoin the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), notwithstanding concerns about its support for
China's population control program. Abortion pro-choice advocates are
also seeking to overturn the Helms amendment (prohibiting the use of
U.S. foreign aid for the performance or promotion of abortion as a
method of family planning) and the Siljander amendment (prohibiting use
of U.S. foreign aid to lobby for or against the legalization of
abortion).
In your opinion, does the term ``reproductive health'' include
abortion?
Answer. Abortion is not included in USAID's definition of
reproductive health.
Question. Do you commit to uphold U.S. laws that prohibit funding
for abortion overseas?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to uphold U.S. laws, including
the Helms and Siljander amendments.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Human Rights
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. Promoting human rights and democracy has been central to my
work as a writer, advocate, and diplomat. In 2002, after years of
extensive reporting and research, I published ``A Problem From Hell'':
America and the Age of Genocide, which documented inaction in the face
of genocides over the course of the 20th century. The book was
integrated into high school and university curriculums, and some of its
lessons were embraced by student activists, faith groups, and others
seeking to promote human rights. In addition, many readers have
informed me that the book's central message encouraged them to take
action in the face of genocide in Darfur.
While serving on the National Security Council as Special Assistant
to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human
Rights, I worked with President Obama to develop new processes aimed at
ensuring that atrocity warnings rapidly reached senior policy makers,
and to make creative use of the policy toolbox when signs of potential
atrocities arose--efforts that helped ensure that, in the face of mass
atrocities, the American response did not come down to a choice between
doing nothing or using U.S. military force. This work produced
significant outcomes, such as the highly-effective deployment of U.S.
military advisers to support African Governments combating the Lord's
Resistance Army, proactive peacekeeping in the Ivory Coast to prevent
spiraling mass atrocities following a stolen election, and relentless
high-level diplomacy in support of Sudan's independence referendum,
which paved the way for the birth of an independent South Sudan. Also,
during my time as Senior Director, I worked with my NSC colleague Gayle
Smith to spearhead the creation of the Open Government Partnership
(OGP), a multilateral initiative that secures governmental commitments
to promote transparency, fight corruption, empower citizens, and
strengthen governance. Since its founding in 2011, the OGP has grown to
include 78 country members and a growing number of local members--
representing more than two billion people--that work alongside
thousands of civil society organizations.
As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., my top priorities included working
to prevent and end conflicts, addressing the humanitarian needs of
vulnerable communities, and advancing the human rights and dignity of
all individuals. I spearheaded the effort to convene two successive
summits that mobilized unprecedented commitments to U.N. Peacekeeping
of over 50,000 new troops and police from more than 60 countries. In
response to the global refugee crisis, I led efforts to convene a
summit in which participating nations agreed to increase their total
annual contributions to U.N. appeals and international humanitarian
groups by approximately $4.5 billion and to double the number of formal
refugee resettlement slots made available to the U.N.'s refugee agency,
while a range of private sector companies made $650 million worth of
pledges in support of refugees. Finally, I used intensive public and
private diplomacy to secure the release of political prisoners and
enhance the rights of LGBTQ individuals. Among various efforts to
advocate on behalf of those unjustly imprisoned, in the #FreeThe20
campaign, I publicized the cases of 20 female political prisoners
around the world--16 of whom were ultimately freed. As part of my work
to advance LGBTQ rights, I helped create for the first time a mandate
for an Independent Expert to monitor and report on the violence and
discrimination faced by LGBTQ persons around the world, convened the
first-ever U.N. Security Council meeting on threats to LGBTQ persons ,
and was able to push the Security Council to condemn (for the first
time in its 70-year history) violence against individuals due to their
sexual orientation.
Diversity and Inclusion
Question. In response to a request that I led, GAO reported in June
2020 that USAID still has much work to do in order to create and
sustain a truly diverse workforce. What plans do you have for improving
diversity and inclusion at USAID?
Answer. Diversity, equity, and inclusion must be a guiding
principle--in our people, funding and programs, and policies. If
confirmed, as I noted in my testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, I will make diversity, equity, and inclusion
foundational priorities for both our mission around the world and how
we support our workforce. The report you requested, for example,
presented data demonstrating that ``promotion outcomes at USAID were
generally lower for racial and ethnic minorities than for whites in
early to mid career.'' I will engage the staff to understand the
challenges facing them, solicit advice on how we can create a workforce
that is more diverse and inclusive, and treat these issues with the
urgency they demand. Ensuring that USAID remains the world's leading
development agency requires that diversity, equity, and inclusion be
guiding principles when it comes to our people, our funding and
programs, and our policies.
Question. Do you commit to regularly and transparently monitoring
the Agency's progress towards its diversity goals?
Answer. Yes.
Basic Education
Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that USAID's
efforts to support remote learning and re-enrollment efforts in the
context of COVID-19 will support marginalized learners, including
girls, refugees, and children with disabilities?
Answer. COVID-19 interrupted the education of more than 1.6 billion
learners. The risk of not returning to the classroom is especially high
for those who experience multiple vulnerabilities based on economic
status, gender, disability, refugee and displacement status. Since the
beginning of the pandemic, USAID has adapted its education programming
to respond to the shifting needs of students and educators in more than
50 countries. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID continues to
support partner countries to sustain investments in inclusive distance
learning so that education systems are more resilient and equitable. I
will also ensure that USAID continues to leverage its partnerships and
global leadership to ensure continued learning opportunities,
especially for the most marginalized. I will also ensure that USAID
continues to leverage its partnerships and global leadership with
groups like the Global Partnership for Education, Education Cannot
Wait, the LEGO Foundation, the Inter-agency Network for Education in
Emergencies, the Partnership to End Violence, and UNICEF, among others,
to ensure continued learning opportunities, especially for the most
marginalized, including girls, refugees, and children with
disabilities.
Question. What more can USAID be doing to help build back school
systems around the world so that they are capable of serving all
students, both during and after the pandemic, and are more resilient in
the face of future challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to continue to build
more resilient and equitable education systems and societies,
especially for the most marginalized and those in vulnerable
situations, by building emergency preparedness and response capacity,
institutionalizing remedial and accelerated education, and engaging
youth and higher education institutions as leaders. USAID has
opportunities to leverage its experience and expertise in accessible
and safe distance learning, non-formal and accelerated education,
inclusive education, youth workforce development, and private sector
engagement to scale. Institutionalizing these approaches within
education systems to meet the diverse needs of all children and youth
while also building resilience within education systems will help
minimize disruptions to learning in the event of future emergencies.
Conflicts of Interest
Question. Do you commit to bring to the attention of the committee
(and the USAID Inspector General) any change in policy or U.S. actions
that you suspect may be influenced by any of the President's business
or financial interests, or the business or financial interests of any
senior White House staff?
I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Do you commit to inform the committee if you have any reason to
suspect that a foreign government, head of state, or foreign-
controlled entity is taking any action in order to benefit any
of the President's business or financial interests, or the
interests of senior White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you or do any members of your immediate family have
any financial interests in any foreign country?
Answer. My spouse's and my investment portfolio includes mutual
funds that may hold interests in companies with an international
presence, or directly in U.S. companies that have an international
presence, but none of these holdings represent conflicts of interest
with the position for which I have been nominated. I am committed to
following all applicable ethics laws and regulations and remaining
vigilant with regard to my ethics obligations. I have already committed
to divest investments the USAID Designated Agency Ethics Official
(DAEO) has identified as possible conflicts of interest. Additionally,
the separate U.S. literary agents that represent my spouse and me, have
international offices that negotiate publication or republication of
our writings in various foreign countries. The DAEO has reviewed these
business arrangements and has determined that they do not represent
conflicts of interest, but has advised me that we will need to monitor
and report any overseas re-publications that occur during my tenure in
Government.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting the Interim
President of Venezuela Juan Guiad" and prioritize working with
implementing partners in support of President Guaido's humanitarian
efforts in Venezuela?
Answer. The United States recognizes Juan Guaido as the interim
president and the democratically-elected National Assembly as the only
legitimate democratic institutions in Venezuela. If confirmed, I commit
to working with the interim government and to support the people of
Venezuela.
Question. Will you commit to working with non-governmental
organizations and civil society groups to restore democracy and a
pathway to free, fair, and transparent elections in Venezuela and to
keep my office informed of that progress?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working with non-
governmental organizations and civil society groups to restore
democracy and a pathway to democratic elections in Venezuela. I look
forward to consulting with you about how we might strengthen those
efforts, given the devastating costs of Maduro's repression.
Question. Do you commit to supporting the Interim President of
Venezuela, Juan Guaido, and the National Assembly?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support to support Interim President
Juan Guaido, the democratically elected National Assembly, and the
people of Venezuela to determine their own future through free and fair
elections.
Question. If confirmed, what would your priorities be for Central
America?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities in Central America will include
expeditiously strengthening programs that seek to improve conditions in
the region and tackle the major drivers of migration. While the
specific drivers of irregular migration cannot be generalized across
countries or even communities, they are generally tied to insecurity,
lack of economic opportunity, and the effects of poor governance and
corruption, and I will work with other U.S. Government agencies to
build the political will of partner nations to address these drivers.
COVID-19 has exacerbated these conditions, as have major natural
disasters (including hurricanes) recently hitting the region.
As you know, in recent years, USAID programs have been designed to
combat crime and violence by reaching at-risk youth; addressed
corruption and impunity; disrupted the activities of transnational
criminal organizations; civil society; and provided vulnerable citizens
with greater economic opportunity, social services, and protection. As
USAID restarts and ramps up those programs and as USAID missions in the
region seek new or expanded partnerships, the agency will draw on
evidence of what works in order to help foster an environment where
families can envision their futures in their home countries and
communities. If confirmed, I will continue USAID's current approach of
tailoring and adapting programs to the unique needs of each country and
community. I will also continue the Agency's practice of using
migration data to focus resources geographically in response to
specific, local drivers of migration. USAID will work with a wide range
of stakeholders from civil society and the private sector to increase
the impact of our efforts. And I look forward to further consultations
with Congress on how to further improve the effectiveness of these
programs.
Question. Regional coordination is essential to the effectiveness
of the U.S. Strategy for Central America. Will you commit to working
closely with our partners in this region?
Answer. Yes, I will commit to working closely with our partners in
the region. I understand that USAID works closely with multiple
stakeholders in the region both in the public and private sectors as
well as with civil society organizations and international non-
governmental organizations.
Question. How will USAID, under your leadership, work to address
the drivers of violence, corruption, and migration in the Northern
Triangle?
Answer. The specific drivers of irregular migration cannot be
generalized across communities or even countries. Accordingly, USAID
tailors and adapts programs that address the root causes of irregular
migration to the unique needs of each country and community; the
extensive use of data is critical and is an integral part of these
efforts. By tracking migration trends, the Agency is able to
concentrate resources geographically in response to local drivers of
migration.
I understand that USAID is addressing the security, governance, and
economic drivers of irregular migration to the United States from
Central America in partnership with other U.S. Government agencies,
including the development of a forthcoming strategy on addressing the
root causes of irregular migration as mandated in Executive Order
14010. Critical to the success of our efforts is generating political
will on the part of governments in the region to address the reasons
people choose to migrate. USAID combats crime and violence through its
programming by reaching at-risk youth, addressing corruption and
impunity, disrupting the activities of transnational criminal
organizations, and providing vulnerable citizens with greater economic
opportunity, social services, and protection. Through this work, USAID
seeks to foster an environment where families can envision their
futures in their home countries and communities. If confirmed, I will
work to build and expand on this foundation. I look forward to
deepening consultations with Congress on how to further improve the
effectiveness of these programs.
Question. Last year, in the FY 21 SFOPS conference report, $25
million was allocated for programs in Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador to implement the national sexual gender-based violence (SGBV)
prevention strategies in fiscal year 2021. The bill required, within
120 days, and in consultation with the USAID Administrator, a report on
the implementation of the national SGBV prevention strategies in such
countries. Also included in the FY21 appropriations bill, were
recommendations for the State Department to create programs in the
Northern Triangle for programming and enhancing the capacity of police,
judicial systems, and child protection systems to identify, investigate
and prosecute cases of sexual violence. If confirmed, will you commit
to briefing my staff on how USAID intends to implement this funding?
Answer. I share your desire to prevent sexual and gender-based
violence in Central America, which has some of the highest rates of GBV
in the world. If confirmed, I commit to briefing you on how USAID
intends to implement the funding appropriated in FY 21 and how the
Agency currently works across the region supporting initiatives to
reduce impunity for gender-based violence (GBV) cases. GBV was
prioritized by President Biden in Executive Order 14010 which mandated
a new strategy on the root causes of irregular migration from the
Northern Triangle.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting Cuba
democracy programs as well as civil society and human rights defenders
in Cuba?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, support for human rights will remain at
the core of USAID's efforts in Cuba. Cuba is one of the most repressive
countries in the world, and is ruled by a dictatorship that flagrantly
abuses human rights, seeks to prevent its people from accessing even
basic independent information, inhibits meaningful civil society
activity--including free press--and criminalizes political dissent. As
one of my first acts as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., I raised the case
of Oswaldo Pay directly with the Cuban Foreign Minister pressing him
to allow an independent investigation of the circumstances in which
Paya had been killed, and I continued to advocate publicly in support
of Pay 's family. During my time at the U.N., I repeatedly called out
Cuba for its abhorrent treatment of civil society and human rights
defenders like Jose Daniel Ferrer, Jose Antonio Torres, Julio Ferrer,
and Antonio Rodiles. If confirmed, I will continue to speak out against
Cuba's persecution of its citizens and human rights violations.
The role of a vibrant civil society continues to be essential to
Cuban democracy. I understand USAID has a portfolio in place to
continue supporting a diverse sector of independent activists in Cuba
who will push for democratic freedoms, including religious freedom. The
Agency will also continue providing basic needs assistance to political
prisoners and persecuted activists. NGOs are poised to continue
defending the human rights of those who are abused and even jailed for
their political beliefs.
Question. Colombia has been directly impacted by the man-made
crisis created by Nicol s Maduro and his brutal regime in Venezuela.
Currently, Colombia hosts about 1.7 million Venezuelans, according to
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. How should we support Colombia
in responding to the impacts it faces due to the Venezuelan crisis?
Answer. USAID is addressing immediate humanitarian needs and
supporting the long-term development challenges in Colombia resulting
from the Venezuelan crisis. I understand that the USAID Mission in
Colombia is providing more than $77 million for Venezuelans in health,
education, governance, citizen security, human rights, and economic
integration. Since 2018, USAID has also provided more than $298 million
in humanitarian assistance supporting Venezuelan migrants, refugees,
and host communities with food assistance, direct cash assistance, and
health support. Colombia recently granted ten years of legal status to
all Venezuelan refugees who have fled to the country, making it
possible for Venezuelans to live and work openly. This is an important
step for Colombia to harness the economic potential of the many
Venezuelans it hosts and, if confirmed, I look forward to consulting
with you on how USAID can support this effort.
Question. In 2017, Colombia signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with NATO and became the first NATO partner country in Latin America.
Today, Colombia and the U.S. are a success story that have forged a
bond through shared commitments in support of stability, the defense of
human rights, respect for democracy and the rule of law, and the
protection of citizens' safety and security throughout the Western
Hemisphere. Do you view our partnership with Colombia as one of the
strongest in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. The United States and Colombia enjoy a decades' long
strategic partnership that is among the strongest in the region. If
confirmed, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic
freedoms will be at the center of our relationship with Colombia.
Question. Do you believe that Colombia's shared goals with the
United States should be an example for younger democracies in the
Western Hemisphere? How do we take that model and focus our efforts on
other nations in the region?
Answer. I agree that the U.S.-Colombia partnership has proven
successful, and USAID's work with Colombia over the past decades on
peace and stability has achieved a number of successes. The peace
accords signed with the FARC in 2016 present a tremendous opportunity
for Colombia to end a conflict that had raged for more than 50 years,
and to end a continuous cycle of violence by transforming the long-
neglected parts of the country prioritized in the accords.
If confirmed, I will work with Colombia, and with Congress, to
collectively find ways to make USAID's assistance even more supportive
of Colombia's own efforts toward an enduring and inclusive peace. While
taking into account the context of each country's unique set of
circumstances, I agree that Colombia's advances provide important
lessons that may be applicable elsewhere within the region. At the same
time, as with other countries in the region, I will also speak up in
support of human rights: since 2016, more than 400 Colombian human
rights defenders have been killed, underscoring the importance of
USAID's continued assistance in helping the country achieve the
commitments and overall transformation envisioned by the peace accords.
Question. USAID foreign assistance programs must continue to
strengthen democratic institutions and bolster transparency and
accountability to underpin democratic resilience, but they also need to
provide targeted support to local stakeholders to understand CCP
influence and counter those malign efforts. Such funding should be
integrated into existing democracy programs at the country level, with
support from international actors who understand these issues, to
incorporate them into existing programs at the country level. If
confirmed, how will you ensure USAID supports these efforts?
Answer. U.S. competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC)
is a defining challenge of the 21st century. The administration's
approach is to provide an alternative vision to Beijing's--a vision
that promotes democratic governance, transparency, and local ownership
in our global development work. USAID will draw on America's
comparative advantages in distinguishing the U.S. approach from the
PRC's, by ensuring that good governance, sustainability and social and
economic safeguards are built into projects we support. USAID will
strengthen local capacity to ensure that development investments are
both beneficial and sustainable. If confirmed, I will work with allies
and partners to better leverage our collective resources and influence,
and I will be an advocate for human rights, governance, environmental,
social, and labor standards in order to promote investments that are
sustainable for the long term.
Question. How can USAID support administering some of the
Countering Chinese Influence Fund?
Answer. I would like to thank you and your colleagues for the
Countering Chinese Influence Fund (CCIF) resources that were made
available in the FY21 appropriations act. I understand that USAID is
working with the Department of State on programming these funds, as
well as others, to counter China's foreign policy strategy and
influence in critical countries and regions. The approach is to offer
alternatives to China's predatory development model and instead improve
inclusive, democratic governance; advance rules-based economic
competition and fair trade practices; strengthen our security
partnerships to counter transnational crime and terrorism; combat
digital authoritarianism and malicious cyber activities; and promote
energy security and independence. If confirmed, I look forward to
consulting with you on this and to further assessing how USAID can best
support these efforts.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to pushing for greater
humanitarian assistance and access for the Syrian people, while making
sure that such aid does not fall into the hands of a corrupt and
bloodthirsty Assad regime?
Answer. Yes. USAID remains committed to ensuring that all
assistance reaches those in need and does not benefit the Assad regime.
Across Syria, USAID takes all possible steps to minimize the risk of
diversion, whether to the Assad regime or to terrorist groups, by
working through experienced and trusted U.N. partners, other
international organizations, and non-governmental partners in Syria,
including through the use of third-party monitoring. USAID has zero
tolerance for fraud, waste, or abuse of American taxpayer resources and
requires partners to have robust safeguards and risk mitigation systems
in place to ensure that humanitarian assistance is reaching only those
for whom it is intended.
Question. Do you agree that long-term stabilization in Syria will
not be achieved as long as Bashar al-Assad remains in power?
Answer. Bashar al-Assad has perpetrated the most chilling, barbaric
crimes imaginable against the Syrian people for the past decade.
Despite political isolation, economic pressure, and weak control over
much of Syrian territory, Assad clings to power with no indication that
he is willing to bring an end to the war and the suffering of the
Syrian people, and indeed with Assad's increasingly ruinous economic
mismanagement exacerbating the horrific costs of conflict, repression,
and mass atrocities for the Syrian people. Members of Congress spoke
out clearly on this issue when they voted for the Caesar Civilian
Protection Act in the last Congress imposing military, political, and
accountability benchmarks for the Assad regime before it can receive
sanctions relief. Countless brave Syrians have risked their lives to
preserve evidence of Assad's war crimes, and Assad and his
collaborators must be held accountable for their atrocities.
Question. As an expert on genocide, do you agree that the Chinese
Communist Party is committing genocide and crimes against humanity
against Uyghurs and other its Muslim minorities in Xinjiang?
Answer. Yes. I agree with President Biden and experts who have
studied the facts that China is committing genocide in Xinjiang.
I welcome Congress's bipartisan action on this issue, including the
passage of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act that holds perpetrators
accountable for human rights violations and abuses against Uyghurs and
other minorities in China. If confirmed, I will use my platform to draw
attention to the horrors in Xinjiang and ensure that USAID actively
engages with you, the committee and the interagency to determine any
further steps that can be taken.
Question. You have written extensively about the failure of past
administrations to prevent and respond to genocide. You are now in a
unique position to put your aspirations into action. We have seen what
has happened to Iraq's Yazidi and Christian community at the hands of
ISIS. We know about the atrocities and likely genocide committed
against the Rohingya by Burmese military forces. Now, we are reading
weekly reports about the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang against Uyghurs
and other Muslim minorities by the Chinese Communist Party.
Can you assure this committee that you will not only support, but
also strengthen, USAID's commitment to victims of religious
persecution?
Answer. Yes. As you note, I have a longstanding commitment to human
rights, and a profound awareness of the risks of atrocities, especially
for religious minorities. As Ambassador to the U.N., I used my platform
to elevate the voices of religious minorities. I called for the release
of Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese woman sentenced to death for refusing to
denounce her Christian faith, and for Sudan to repeal the laws that put
her in jail in the first place. I was the first person to bring a young
Yazidi woman named Nadia Murad to the U.N. Security Council, after her
family had been almost completely wiped out by ISIS and she had been
forced into sexual slavery. USAID has a history of helping the world's
most vulnerable people, and it will continue to play a critical role in
supporting communities persecuted or discriminated against because of
their faith. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring with you, the
Agency's regional bureaus and Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood
Partnerships office , and diverse faith communities, to mobilize
resources and, as appropriate, to tailor our programs to support
individuals being subjected to religious persecution.
Question. If so, how do you plan to use your position to do so?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to stand up for victims of
religious persecution, and I will review USAID's approach to ensure
that our programs are most effectively supporting them, making
adjustments as appropriate.
Question. The past several months have been historic for Israel's
relationships with regional Arab neighbors. The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco,
and Sudan joined Egypt and Jordan in establishing diplomatic relations
with Israel--paving the path to peace through recognition and
engagement rather than isolation and boycotts of Israel. What role do
you see for USAID in supporting these new relationships? Do you see
opportunities for increased trilateral cooperation in the region?
Answer. USAID has the opportunity to support these relationships
through identifying opportunities for increased trilateral and
multilateral cooperation, such as by leveraging the inherently
collaborative power of science, technology and innovation in order to
address common challenges. USAID supports cooperation between Israel
and countries in the Middle East region through the Middle East
Regional Cooperation (MERC) program, which has long supported programs
between partners throughout the region. If confirmed, I look forward to
building upon such efforts to further peace and normalization across
the Middle East.
Question. During your tenure as U.N. Ambassador, the United States
abstained at the United Nations Security Council on a one-sided
resolution that sought to impose solutions to final status issues on
the parties. Seventy-nine senators subsequently backed a resolution
objecting to the abstention. In hindsight, do you believe that vote
advanced American interests or moved the peace process forward?
Answer. During my time as Ambassador to the U.N., I worked
tirelessly to combat bias against Israel and end Israel's unfair
isolation at the United Nations. The U.S. Mission to the United Nations
helped secure several notable firsts for Israel under my leadership,
including bringing about recognition of Yom Kippur as a U.N. holiday;
convening an unprecedented session on antisemitism in the U.N. General
Assembly; spearheading Israel's full and equal participation across
numerous U.N. bodies; and lobbying to ensure Israel's historic
selection as chair of a powerful U.N. committee (the Sixth Committee,
the main U.N. forum for addressing questions of international law).
This context is important in addressing the Obama administration's
vote on UNSCR 2334. President Obama instructed me to abstain on UNSCR
2334 in order to try to preserve prospects for a two-state solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He saw the vote as consistent with
bipartisan policy, dating back almost 50 years at the time, of
supporting two states and opposing unilateral measures by either side
that could impede prospects for two states. The resolution included a
condemnation of all acts of violence against civilians, including acts
of terrorism and incitement, and it expressed concern about Israeli
settlement activities, reaffirming the long-standing U.S. position on
settlements.
During my explanation of the U.S. vote, I denounced persistent
anti-Israel bias at the U.N. and described our numerous efforts
(including those mentioned above) ``to fight for Israel's right simply
to be treated just like any other country.'' I also explained President
Obama's posture on the resolution: ``It is because this forum too often
continues to be biased against Israel; because there are important
issues that are not sufficiently addressed in this resolution; and
because the United States does not agree with every word in this text,
that the United States did not vote in favor of the resolution. But it
is because this resolution reflects the facts on the ground--and is
consistent with U.S. policy across Republican and Democratic
administration throughout the history of the State of Israel--that the
United States did not veto it.''
(The full explanation of vote, from December 23, 2016, is available
here: https://web.archive.org/web/20161231232014/https://
usun.state.gov/remarks/7621)
If confirmed, I will work to advance President Biden's strong
support for the U.S.-Israel relationship, as well as to enhance
prospects for two states by working to responsibly restart humanitarian
and development assistance in the West Bank and Gaza in accordance with
all legal requirements, including the Taylor Force Act.
Question. The Helms amendment states, ``No foreign assistance funds
may be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of
family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice
abortions.'' If confirmed, can you guarantee there will be a strict
adherence to the Helms amendment in the administration of U.S. foreign
assistance?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID fully abides by
all U.S. laws, including the Helms Amendment.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. After enduring a decade of conflict, humanitarian needs
in Syria are projected to onlyincrease. President Biden pledged to
recommit the U.S. to lead on humanitarian issues including to pursue
political solutions, protect vulnerable Syrians and facilitate the work
of NGOs.
What specific actions will USAID take under your direction to
reassert U.S. humanitarian leadership and efforts in Syria?
What tools are available to the U.S. to ensure continued
humanitarian access into and within Syria?
Answer. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., I worked tirelessly to hold
the Assad regime and its backers accountable for their war crimes, and
to provide humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people. Among these
efforts, in 2014 I helped lead the U.N. Security Council to authorize
U.N. agencies to deliver relief into Syria without explicit approval
from the Syrian Government, allowing millions of people to receive
assistance that the Assad regime had been blocking. Today, USAID's
humanitarian assistance is reaching an estimated 4.8 million people per
month inside Syria and 1.1 million Syrian refugees in the region. The
United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance inside
Syria and across the region, contributing close to $13 billion since
the start of the conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to be a
forceful advocate for delivering critically-needed humanitarian aid to
the Syrian people, and ensure that the United States continues to play
a leading role in protecting vulnerable civilians by advocating for
unhindered humanitarian access, coordinating with other donors, and
encouraging other donors to increase their support to the response. I
will also work with Secretary of State Blinken and Ambassador Linda
Thomas-Greenfield to ensure that the U.S. Government continues to
advocate in the U.N. Security Council and on the international stage to
improve the lives of the Syrian people, including through the
reauthorization of the aforementioned U.N. cross-border assistance and
to advance a long-overdue negotiated political settlement to end the
Syrian conflict.
Question. How can USAID play a role in bringing about a political
solution in Syria? What tools are available to the U.S. through USAID
to better support our allies in Northeastern Syria?
Answer. While assistance will not solve the conflict in Syria, it
is a vital component of the effort to create conditions for peace by
saving lives, providing some measure of stability to vulnerable
populations, and uniting partners and allies in support of the Syrian
people. If confirmed, in addition to ensuring that as many Syrians as
possible are able to receive critically-needed assistance, I will
support administration-wide efforts to advance a negotiated political
settlement, which is the only way to end this conflict. I will also
explore USAID support for civil society actors who are documenting war
crimes and pursuing accountability, a critical complement to pursuit of
a stable peace. The Biden administration redoubled the U.S. commitment
to our allies in northeast Syria by lifting the previous
administration's freeze on stabilization funds. If confirmed, I will
ensure not only that these critical programs continue, but that they
complement the larger administration-wide efforts to advance a
negotiated political settlement.
Question. It is imperative for U.S. foreign assistance to aim to
break down gender-related barriers to educational attainment in
countries where there is persistent gender disparity. This is
particularly important in secondary school when girls are the most
likely to drop out. In many contexts, poverty and entrenched social and
cultural norms can limit girls' access to quality learning
opportunities.
How can USAID better provide holistic support to ensure adolescents
stay enrolled in and complete secondary school?
Answer. USAID promotes a ``whole-of-girl'' approach, reducing
gender-based violence and increasing the capability of all learners, of
all gender identities, to realize their rights, determine their life
outcomes, and make independent decisions. If confirmed, I commit that
USAID will continue to break down gender-related barriers to education
so that all learners, especially girls and the most marginalized, have
access to safe, quality education from early childhood through
adulthood, especially during adolescence, a crucial time in girls'
lives. Part of this approach is recognizing that menstrual health and
hygiene is an integral part of dignity and empowerment for adolescent
girls, including their ability to attend and stay in school. USAID will
also continue to prioritize the needs of the most marginalized and
those in vulnerable situations, and address inequalities that have been
exacerbated by COVID-19. Ensuring that we continue to make progress in
this area is critically important not just for empowering young women,
but for achieving lasting advances on behalf of society as a whole and
creating conditions for a more equitable response to the fallout from
the pandemic. For example, addressing gender inequality in education
contributes to closing gender gaps in employment and wages, which have
in turn been shown to reduce income inequality and lead to overall
increases in GDP.
Question. USAID's global health programs are critical to providing
sexual and reproductive health care for women and girls. However,
research has shown that a 10 percent decline in the use of
contraceptives--such as due to the COVID-19 pandemic--could result in
more than 48 million women with an unmet need for modern contraception
and more than 15 million additional unintended pregnancies. If
confirmed, I hope you will not only support international family
planning as a priority for USAID, but also the partners on the ground
who implement these programs.
How will you work to expand and improve USAID's family planning and
reproductive health programs?
Answer. I believe that reproductive health care is essential to
women's health and well-being and also positively impacts infant and
child health. Now more than ever, as countries battle COVID-19 and the
secondary effects from the pandemic, we must strengthen our efforts to
reach those most vulnerable, including women who benefit from voluntary
family planning and reproductive health (FP/RH) programs. The
administration is committed to ensuring that foreign assistance
programs prioritize women's health needs globally, including robust
support for voluntary family planning and maternal health programs, and
for preventing gender-based violence.
Question. What needs to be done to increase access to sexual and
reproductive health care amidst the COVID-19 pandemic?
Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic has adversely affected all global
health efforts, including routine vaccination programs for children,
voluntary family planning and reproductive health programs , women and
children's access to basic health care, and the distribution of
treatments to control neglected tropical diseases, as well as
tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. If confirmed, I will work with
USAID global health experts to ensure funding is prioritized to
activities, including voluntary family planning and reproductive health
activities, that will support regaining the progress lost during the
pandemic.
Question. Is there a way for the U.S. to better engage with
partners and allies on the provision of family planning services? What
would that look like?
Answer. USAID is the largest bilateral donor for voluntary family
planning and reproductive health assistance globally. Other donors,
partner governments, and civil society actors have historically looked
to USAID for leadership because of its strong reputation for technical
excellence. The administration is committed to restoring U.S global
health leadership, including as it relates to voluntary family planning
and reproductive health, which will require effective partnerships to
improve coordination and investments and strengthen linkages across
diverse global health programs. If confirmed, I will look for ways that
USAID can advance voluntary family planning and reproductive health
programming with our partners and allies around the globe.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Rob Portman
Extremism and the Global Fragility Act
Question. Despite the best efforts of both parties and their
respective administrations, the threat from Salafi-Jihadi extremism
persists to this day. The Global Fragility Act passed by Congress last
year changed our approach to conflict-prone states that can be vectors
of violent extremism, uncontrolled migration, and extreme poverty by
dedicating $1.5 billion toward this space and establishing a new Bureau
for Development, Democracy and Innovation at USAID.
How will you effectively use this legislation to direct our
approaches toward countering fragile states?
Answer. this is a key priority. We need a comprehensive approach
and more tools to prevent conflict and increase stability. If
confirmed, I will consult with Congress on the implementation of the
U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (the ``GFA
strategy''). It is my understanding that the list of priority countries
is currently being considered by the interagency, with USAID
participation. After country selection, we will need to bring a range
of U.S. policy tools to bear in implementing the GFA strategy and
associated country and regional plans. If confirmed, I commit to
consulting with you and Congress frequently to support the
implementation of the Act with State and DOD.
Latin America
Question. I would like to talk about the importance of Latin
America and the role of the United States in the economic and
democratic development of this region.
Last week I led a bipartisan CODEL to El Paso to see firsthand the
crisis on the border. We are seeing people fleeing extreme poverty from
the Northern Triangle countries-- Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
I am very supportive of building a robust border protection system to
physically protect our border, but I also understand the necessity to
help these fragile countries address the root causes of illegal
immigration such as extreme poverty and breakdown in security.
The latest numbers are deeply concerning. 550 kids per day are
coming into the United States, mostly from the Northern Triangle
countries, which is five or six times more than in January, when there
were less than 100 in terms of families. In terms of families, 1,500
per day last week, as compared to 1,000 in February--on average, less
than 100 in January. This is a 15 times increase when compared to
previous data.
Do you believe that that is an appropriate condition to us spending
what President Biden has now suggested, which is another $4
billion on top of the $3.6 billion that has been sent in the
last five years?
Answer. As you note, President Biden proposed a multi-year, $4
billion comprehensive regional strategy to address the root causes of
irregular migration. I agree that any funding needs to be accountable
and channeled to evidence-based programming. Since the specific drivers
of irregular migration cannot be generalized across communities or even
countries, USAID tailors and adapts programs that address the root
causes of irregular migration to the unique needs of each country and
community; the extensive use of data is critical and is an integral
part of these efforts. By tracking migration trends, the Agency is able
to focus resources geographically in response to local drivers of
migration.
I gather that USAID is addressing the distinct and overlapping
security, governance, and economic drivers of irregular migration to
the United States from Central America in partnership with other U.S.
Government agencies, including, as mandated in Executive Order 14010,
by working with the State Department to develop a forthcoming strategy
on addressing the root causes of irregular migration from the region.
USAID seeks to combat crime and violence by reaching at-risk youth,
addressing corruption and impunity, disrupting the activities of
transnational criminal organizations, and providing vulnerable citizens
with greater economic opportunity, social services, and protection.
Through this work, USAID helps to foster an environment where families
can envision their futures in their home countries and communities. If
confirmed, I will work to build and expand on this foundation and look
forward to consulting with you about how best to ensure these programs
are tailored to optimize results.
Question. Do you commit to work with Congress on asylum seekers to
have them apply from their home country or a safe third country?
Answer. Under President Obama, in my capacity as White House
Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees while serving at the NSC, I saw the
importance of the in-country processing efforts in Iraq that had
initially been established in 2008, and as U.N. Ambassador, I supported
President Obama's establishment of the Central American Minors (CAM)
Refugee program, which President Biden has announced will continue
under his administration. As you know, USAID is not involved in asylum
policy or enforcement of border security, so if confirmed, I would
defer to the Departments of Homeland Security and the State Department.
Question. Do you commit to placing an emphasis on combating
corruption, especially through the Millennium Challenge Corporation
through programming in the northern triangle countries?
Answer. Yes. Corruption can itself be a driver of migration and of
course makes it more difficult to address a wide range of development
challenges--from global health and food security, to economic
development and fair trade, to maintaining strong alliances. If
confirmed, I plan to renew USAID's focus on governance and anti-
corruption programs in the Northern Triangle and, in my role on the
Board of Directors at the MCC, I commit to placing an emphasis on
combating corruption.
Question. Do you commit to emphasizing an adherence to transparency
and rule of law in Latin America and beyond?
Answer. Yes, I commit to the importance of transparency and the
rule of law in Latin America and beyond.
Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA)
Question. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA), which is a
program I created during my time serving in the House, remains a top
priority for me. This is a ``debt-for-nature'' swap program that offers
eligible developing countries options to relieve or restructure
concessional debt owed to the U.S. in exchange for supporting
conservation activities for tropical forests and coral reefs. Through
the TFCA program, approximately $233 million in appropriated funds from
the U.S. Government have generated nearly $340 million through interest
and leveraging from NGOs and private entities.
To date, 20 agreements have been carried out with 14 different
countries to save more than 67 million acres of tropical forest.
Tropical forests are valuable tools for carbon storage. These TFCA
agreements have led to the sequestration of more than 56 million metric
tons of carbon dioxide--that's the equivalent of taking 11.8 million
cars off the road--and without losing a single American job. In fact,
this program has helped developing countries by improving their balance
sheet through debt-for-nature swaps.
TFCA was provided $15 million in appropriations for both fiscal
years 2020 and 2021. USAID, in coordination with the Treasury
Department and the State Department, is one of the key agencies
responsible for carrying out TFCA agreements.
If you are confirmed to be Administrator of USAID, will you commit
to prioritizing additional TFCA deals using the funding that
Congress has provided?
Answer. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue,
which I was grateful to have the chance to discuss with you. I
certainly agree that this is win-win programming. I gather that USAID
works closely with the State Department and Treasury in an effort to
program TFCA agreements, including those addressing coral reef
conservation. I understand that TFCA programs have generated
substantial additional resources through capital gains from fund
investments, cost-sharing by grant recipients, and co-financing with
other donors. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing additional deals
with TFCA funding.
Africa and Great Power Competition
Question. China has focused heavily on Africa as a part of their
Belt and Road Initiative. While China has provided much needed
infrastructure spending and benefits to some countries on the
continent, I am concerned about shifts in Chinese investment away from
development initiatives toward projects that are more aligned with
military purposes. At the same time, many countries have traded
infrastructure and development for natural resource rights and
burdensome debt obligations.
How will you effectively lead USAID to counter China's influence in
Africa? How can we do a better job of highlighting the benefits
of working with America rather than the CCP?
Answer. Competition with China is one of the defining challenges of
the 21st century for the United States, and engaging with our African
partners to pursue shared strategic interests in advancing security,
protecting global health, fighting climate change, strengthening
democracy, and spurring equitable economic growth must be a cornerstone
of our global strategy to counter China. In this regard, U.S.-African
trade and investment initiatives have a critical role to play in
meeting this challenge head-on. In Africa, the United States offers a
meaningful alternative to China's predatory economic approach, and we
must continue to work to ensure that American companies can compete on
an even playing field at the same time we promote local
entrepreneurship and fair practices. Despite the massive amounts of
money that Beijing has invested in Africa, people in many African
nations are voicing growing concerns over China's lack of transparency,
lending practices, poor environmental record, and failure to invest in
relationships with local communities. In these and other areas, the
United States has multiple comparative advantages that we must work
across agencies to demonstrate. If confirmed, I look forward to
consulting further with you and to working with other Departments and
Agencies as well as the business community to help ensure that the U.S.
is pursuing trade and investment initiatives from a position of
strength. I also look forward to digging into the communications
dimension of this challenge, because we need to be strategic about how
we amplify the tenets of the U.S. approach and how we highlight for our
local partners the ways in which U.S. investments are responsive to
local needs and priorities.
Question. China has also exported a number facial recognition and
security software programs for law enforcement, the same systems that
are being used to enable the genocide in Xingjian against the Uyghurs,
to effectively ``coup-proof'' authoritarian regimes on the African
continent.
Do you see this as a threat for democracy promotion in Africa, and
how can we help you to be successful in pushing back against
this threat?
Answer. Yes. China's use of facial recognition and security
software programs for law enforcement are a threat to democracy and
freedom of expression in Africa. Freedom has been declining globally
for 15 consecutive years, and China and Russia are using their
resources, influence, and technology to buttress autocrats and
undermine and interfere with democratic institutions. In Africa, USAID
supports efforts to uphold civil society efforts to advocate for
fundamental rights, such as freedoms of expression, association, and
peaceful assembly, and to hold credible, free, and fair elections. I
appreciate your offer of support. If confirmed, I will continue to
prioritize this critical work and look forward to working with you and
your colleagues to devise new strategies for countering this growing
threat.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Tim Kaine
Virginia Tech Innovation Lab
Question. The Feed the Future Integrated Pest Management Innovation
Lab (IPMIL), funded by USAID and managed by Virginia Tech, has been in
operation since 1993. In that time, the program has generated nearly $2
billion in economic benefits for developing countries, funded 500+
graduate students, and collaborated with more than 100 institutions.
Unfortunately, in a deviation from its historic review process for
innovation labs, USAID has not renewed IPMIL for a full five-year
contract since 2014; rather, it is now operating on its second one-year
no-cost extension that is set to expire in November 2021. USAID's
Bureau for Resilience and Food Security has also established a new
Future Innovation Lab for Current and Emerging Threats to Crops (CETC),
for which the agency is now soliciting proposals.
Given the potential overlap between IPMIL and the CETC, I recently
led a letter with Senate and House colleagues to Acting Administrator
Steele in support of IPMIL, including seeking clarity on the status of
the program at Virginia Tech moving forward. Should you be confirmed, I
look forward to USAID's attention to the matter
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to looking into this matter and
getting back to you.
USAID Collaboration with Research Universities
Question. USAID has a strong tradition of working with universities
to utilize their expertise to help address some of the most challenging
global development challenges. Feed the Future Innovation Labs are one
part of that partnership and are critical in advancing the solutions
needed to help reduce global hunger, poverty, and undernutrition. If
confirmed, are there new programs and collaborations you envision with
strong research universities like those in Virginia? Will you consider
expanding innovation labs to help reach more countries?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would explore opportunities to deepen
USAID's collaboration with research universities. USAID greatly values
its partnership with the U.S. university community and the unparalleled
research capacity that these institutions bring to the U.S.
Government's global hunger and food security initiative, Feed the
Future. The U.S. university-led Feed the Future Innovation Labs are
central to leveraging American science and innovation to solve problems
facing food-insecure regions, and they are doing so in ways that build
local and national capacity in partner countries. I gather that the
cutting-edge portfolio of Innovation Labs evolves as new challenges
emerge and new research pathways open up for making progress in food
security, strengthening climate resilience and accelerating improved
nutrition, and if confirmed, I look forward to engaging in that process
and discussing any new opportunities with you.
New Partnership Initiative (NPI)
Question. The New Partnerships Initiative (NPI) was established to
diversify USAID's partner base by creating avenues for new and
underutilized partners to work with USAID. Through NPI, the Agency
promotes local leadership, seeks bold and innovative approaches to
fostering self-reliance, and identifies new sources of funding to
sustain partnership and scale impact. It is one of the only tools the
agency has to effectively work with new partners.
How will you work to ensure that mechanisms like the New
Partnerships Initiative are maintained as effective tools in
partnering with new, innovative, and locally established
organizations?
Answer. I recognize the longstanding challenge of enlisting new and
non-traditional partners. It is my understanding that approximately 80
percent of USAID funding went to just 75 organizations in 2017, and by
2019 only 69 organizations were receiving the same share. The number of
new partners has declined every year since 2011. Reducing the barriers
to engaging with and accessing resources from USAID is important, and I
strongly believe in diversifying the Agency's partnership base. Doing
so will help to broaden the USAID's perspectives and approaches in
order to address development and humanitarian challenges. If confirmed,
I will ensure that USAID continues to build on and expand efforts to be
more inclusive in partnering with a broader set of organizations to
achieve our objectives, while ensuring that the Agency meets relevant
requirements.
Community Health Workers
Question. Community health workers, the vast majority of whom are
women, have been a critical part of the response to COVID-19 and other
endemic diseases around the world. According to a recent report
commissioned by Malaria No More and the United Nations Foundation,
investments in community-based health programs help prevent 75 million
malaria cases annually, reducing the burden on the health systems of
low-income countries. Unfortunately, in many countries community health
workers are not well supported or compensated.
How can USAID support community health workers so that they have
the resources they need?
Answer. Community health workers (CHWs) have long been central to
responding to basic health needs, confronting global health threats
(including Ebola, Zika, malaria, and now of course COVID-19), and
providing life-saving assistance in humanitarian emergencies. CHWs are
an essential part of the global health workforce and often the only
source of care for their communities. The COVID-19 pandemic has only
exacerbated the need for CHWs, placing additional demands on these
critical frontline workers and requiring communities to redirect
resources to support COVID-19 response, when other health threats
remain. USAID recommends that host country governments include CHWs in
health systems as a professional cadre that are a critical part of a
sustainable health workforce. If confirmed, I commit to continuing to
advance programs that support and equip CHWs with the resources they
need.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator John Barrasso
Question. The coronavirus worsened the existing global food crisis.
An estimated 130 million more people were on the brink of starvation
last year due to factors caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Many of
these individuals are in countries already experiencing instability
from locust infestations, military conflict, and extreme poverty.
In what ways would you alter the previous planning and strategies
for U.S. food security efforts in light of the coronavirus
impacts?
Answer. The pandemic has exacerbated food insecurity and
malnutrition worldwide, with the most vulnerable bearing the brunt of
its impact. The World Bank estimates that in 2020 as many as 124
million people fell into poverty and hunger as a result, and expects
this number to increase significantly this year to as much as 163
million people. The nutrition impacts are equally devastating, putting
millions more children at risk. In the face of COVID-19, the U.S.
Government's Feed the Future initiative to end global hunger, is
adapting its vital programming to mitigate and deal with the impacts on
food systems and nutrition. Specifically, I understand that Feed the
Future is leveraging its existing global portfolio to respond to the
crisis in the following ways: (1) engaging governments on trade and
inclusive economic growth policies; (2) bolstering small and medium
sized enterprises throughout the food system and unlocking private
sector funds to accelerate economic recovery, growth and employment;
(3) transitioning households and communities off of assistance through
economic inclusion models; and (4) supporting governments to create and
strengthen their existing social protection systems, including shock-
responsive safety nets and risk financing. It will be critical to
further leverage Feed the Future as countries rebuild economically in
the long wake of the pandemic, and I understand that USAID is currently
looking at ways to do this.
Question. For more than 50 years, USAID's global health programs
have focused on saving lives and protecting vulnerable populations from
disease. The United States works extensively with countries across the
globe to strengthen public health systems. There are a finite amount of
resources available to address the current global pandemic. Yet, the
needs continue to expand.
What is your strategy to ensure USAID is assisting those countries
most in need due to the coronavirus pandemic?
Question. What indicators or criteria will you rely upon to make
decisions on how to best utilize U.S. resources to combat the
coronavirus?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring that USAID's COVID-19 work is
needs-based and evidence-driven. If confirmed, I will work with the
team at USAID to ensure that we prioritize resources based on rigorous
needs-analysis and clear performance metrics. It is my understanding
that USAID is developing a COVID-19 response plan, in coordination with
interagency partners, to meet critical and immediate health and
humanitarian needs such as vaccine readiness and acute food insecurity,
but also to address the wide range of second-order impacts of the
pandemic. If confirmed, I will support the development of this response
plan and ensure USAID invests new COVID-19 resources in a way that best
responds to the pandemic. I will also work with experts within USAID
and across the inter-agency to apply epidemiologic indicators and other
criteria to guide resource allocations, recognizing the complex and
dynamic nature of the first- and second-order impacts of the pandemic.
And across the board, I will prioritize transparency and accountability
in decision-making, and use data and analysis to guide the use of
funds.
Question. In 1985, USAID created the Famine Early Warning Systems
Network to provide objective, evidence based analysis to plan for and
respond to acute food insecurity.
Is this something that USAID can use as a model to work on an early
warning system for global health pandemics?
Answer. Yes, I believe that the Famine Early Warning Systems
Network is a useful model to inform our efforts to improve early
warning systems for infectious disease epidemics and pandemics, in
terms of establishing a data-driven approach to predict outbreaks. The
challenge will be to establish objective, evidence-based epidemiologic
criteria for tiered risk classification systems, and to link relevant
data to recognize threats early and take actions to prevent new
outbreaks from becoming epidemics or pandemics. If confirmed, I pledge
to work with other U.S. government departments and agencies, and the
international community, to improve early warning systems for
infectious disease epidemics and pandemics.
Question. What role should USAID play in the U.S.'s global health
security strategy to make us better prepared to combat any future
global health pandemic?
Answer. Ensuring global health security for the United States will
require that all countries be capable of preventing, detecting, and
responding effectively to health security risks and public health
emergencies. USAID will work in partnership with other international
organizations and public and private stakeholders to help implement the
U.S.'s global health security strategy. If confirmed, I will ensure
that USAID continues to work in close collaboration with the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of State, and
other interagency partners, to strengthen global health security across
the globe to ensure we are positioned to prevent or respond to future
pandemics.
Question. In July 2019, USAID's Inspector General testified before
Congress on the management challenges impacting USAID. One major
management challenge identified was assessing and responding to the
risk in providing humanitarian and stabilization assistance.
Inspector General Ann Barr's testimony stated, ``Insufficient risk
assessments not only leave USAID programs and services vulnerable to
exploitation, but they also put USAID in the position of attempting to
mitigate threats it does not understand. The adverse effects of poor
planning, monitoring and evaluation were demonstrated in the fraud
schemes that our agents uncovered in Iraq and Syria and across Africa,
some of which involved diversions of USAID-funded commodities to
terrorists.''
How will you address the issues of insufficient risk assessments,
monitoring and evaluations at USAID?
Answer. It is important for USAID to act in the interest of the
American people, and to provide foreign assistance and build
partnerships where there is the greatest need, which is often in
difficult situations. Risks that are inherent to operating in conflict
settings and challenging environments can be mitigated, but never
eliminated. Monitoring risk, and measuring and analyzing results-and
adapting when programs fall short-is part of the day-to-day management
of USAID's operations. Of course, there is always room for improvement
and innovation. If confirmed, I look forward to pushing USAID even
further on finding innovative ways to quickly gather information to
adapt programs and better achieve results, while also ensuring proper
vetting and accountability to U.S. taxpayers.
Question. What steps will you take to strengthen current procedures
aimed at preventing diversions of U.S. taxpayer resources going to
terrorists?
Answer. USAID conducts extensive screening to mitigate risk and
safeguard U.S. foreign assistance from diversion to organizations or
individuals posing a threat to national security. USAID has a robust
system for partner vetting to mitigate the risk of funds supporting
terrorist groups. I understand that since it began tracking these
figures in 2015, USAID estimates that it has prevented more than $800
million from supporting or benefitting people and entities that do not
meet USAID vetting requirements. Further, USAID applicants are required
to sign certifications and assurances stating that they have not
knowingly provided material support or resources to terrorist groups or
individuals/entities affiliated with terrorist groups. This risk
mitigation has allowed USAID to continue to work in the highest-risk
environments, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with the
committee on this important priority.
Question. Will you commit to doing a full audit of USAID funds and
programs to ensure U.S. resources are not going to support terrorist
groups and entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Block
Persons list?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring that USAID funding does not fall
into the wrong hands, whether it be terrorism, fraud, or waste. I
understand that USAID has numerous safeguards, financial accountability
mechanisms and an independent Office of Inspector General, whose work I
am committed to supporting if I am confirmed.
Question. During a Senate investigation into the World Vision's
interactions with the Islamic Relief Agency (ISRA), redacted emails
were uncovered implying that when you were the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations you were involved in efforts to delist the ISRA from the
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list.
Specifically, your office appears to have requested OFAC review the
designation without a formal request from ISRA. The U.S. Treasury
sanctioned ISRA for its support of terrorism including direct financial
support to Usama bin Landen, Al Qaida, the Taliban, and Hamas.
Why were you and your office involved with seeking a review of the
ISRA's placement on the SDN list?
What efforts did you and your office take to discourage the
delisting of ISRA from the SDN list?
Please describe all the efforts you and your office took while
serving as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to advocate
for or provide assistance in the delisting process for entities
on the Specially Designated Nationals and Block Persons list.
As Administrator of USAID, when would you consider it appropriate
to assist entities in requesting a review of their placement on
the SDN list outside the general Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) parameters?
Will you commit to providing this committee and the rest of
Congress timely and substantive responses to oversight
inquiries?
Answer. As U.N. Ambassador, I was not involved in any effort to
delist ISRA; nor did I do anything to ``assist'' this or any other
entity on the SDN list. Indeed, the opposite is true. Under my
leadership, as is documented in public records, the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations (U.S.-U.N.) worked tirelessly to rebut ISRA's false
claims that it had been wrongly designated on the Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons list by the U.S. Government. During my
tenure, U.S.-U.N. repeatedly raised questions about ISRA's status and
funding in order to force the United Nations Committee on Non-
Governmental Organizations to postpone the consideration of ISRA for
accreditation.
In support of these efforts to prevent the accreditation of ISRA by
the United Nations Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, U.S.-
U.N. maintained the standard practice of regularly coordinating with
the U.S. State and Treasury Departments to ensure U.S. diplomats at the
U.N. had the most up-to-date information available.
Please find records of some of U.S.-U.N.'s actions at the January
2014, January 2015, and May 2015 sessions of the United Nations
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ecosoc6593.doc.htm;
https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ecosoc6662.doc.htm;
https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ecosoc6694.doc.htm;
As Ambassador, in addition to repudiating ISRA's efforts to
rehabilitate itself, I often used my platform to draw attention to the
crimes and dangerous activities of organizations on the Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. If confirmed, I can
assure you that I share the goal of ensuring that the U.S. Agency for
International Development takes all appropriate measures to prevent
misuse of its funding-whether for terrorism, corruption, or any other
types of abuse. I further confirm my commitment to cooperate and
provide Congress with timely and substantive responses to inquiries, if
confirmed.
Question. With a national debt over $28 trillion, it is more
important than ever for the government to be good steward of taxpayer
funds. USAID must design and implement programs in the most effective
and efficient manner. Every agency needs to be carefully evaluated and
streamlined to eliminate duplicative and wasteful spending.
What reforms will you take to improve the effectiveness of U.S.
international development assistance?
Answer. I agree with the principle of aid effectiveness and that
USAID's programs should encourage self-reliance and sustainability. My
vision for USAID's role includes traditional development priorities. It
also applies a broader lens that recognizes U.S. foreign assistance
within core U.S. national security priorities, including advancing
democracy and human rights, mitigating the effects of conflict, and
promoting global health in a collaborative manner with civil society
partners and governments. If confirmed, I commit to advancing sound,
evidence-based development and humanitarian programming that continues
to improve aid effectiveness, self-reliance, and sustainability.
Question. What actions will you take, if any, to prevent fraud,
waste and abuse at USAID?
Answer. All USAID employees have a statutory duty and
responsibility to promote accountability in the Agency's programs and
activities. Every USAID employee is responsible for assisting the
Office of Inspector General, by promptly reporting instances of waste,
fraud, or abuse. Furthermore, I understand that USAID has a number of
policies and requirements in place to prevent fraud throughout the
solicitation, award, and management of our grants and contracts. I
understand that when instances of fraud, waste, and abuse do occur, the
Agency considers a variety of award remedies, such as disallowed costs,
special award conditions, and/or award suspension or termination. In
addition, implementing partners and individuals who have committed
fraud, waste, abuse, or other serious misconduct are subject to a
number of accountability actions, including exclusion from receiving
future U.S. Government funds through USAID's suspension and debarment
program.
Question. What opportunities exist for streamlining, efficiencies
and savings at USAID?
Answer. I agree that streamlining, efficiencies, and savings of
taxpayer dollars is a priority. If confirmed, I look forward to looking
for opportunities and continuing this conversation with you.
Question. A January Wall Street Journal article reported that you
requested the ``unmasking'' of nearly 300 people in the last year of
working for the Obama Administration as U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations. When U.S. intelligence agencies intercept the communications
of private U.S. citizens, those individuals are ``masked'' to ensure
their privacy is protected.
How many U.S. citizens did you unmask during the time you worked as
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations?
What criteria did you use in determining whether it was appropriate
to request the unmasking of a U.S. citizen?
Given the large number of reported requests for unmasking made in
your name, do you plan to refine your criteria going forward to
ensure Americans privacy is appropriately protected?
How will you protect the privacy of U.S. citizens as USAID
Administrator?
Answer. Safeguarding classified information and protecting the
privacy of US persons are serious responsibilities for anyone serving
in a national security role within the US government. I have protected
classified information and guarded the privacy of US persons throughout
my career as a public servant, and I will continue to do so if I am
confirmed as USAID Administrator.
While serving as U.N. Ambassador and as a cabinet member advising
the President on the full range of national security threats, I was a
recipient of information prepared by intelligence professionals, which
I used to do my job of protecting and defending the United States and
advancing US national security interests. I did not discuss the
contents of classified material with unauthorized personnel. On
occasion, in order to understand the intelligence briefed to me, I
asked questions about the individuals or entities referenced in
intelligence. Any requests I made for identifying information were made
solely for the purpose of understanding the intelligence in order to do
my job. While I do not recall the specific number of such requests I
made as U.N. Ambassador, the number attributed to me in press reports,
including in the Wall Street Journal Editorial board opinion piece
referenced here, is false. It is my understanding that the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence is responsible for matters
related to how intelligence professionals manage and record matters
related to intelligence.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Powell by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. In the waning days of the Trump administration, USAID
unveiled its 2020 Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy.
Unfortunately, the policy was drafted behind closed doors and erased
key LGTBQI+ rights, and denied comprehensive sexual and reproductive
rights to all people. Will you commit to reviewing the 2020 Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy, and updating it to make sure
it is rights-affirming and inclusive of all marginalized identities,
including LGBTQI+ individuals?
Answer. I understand that a review of the USAID Gender policy
commenced March 2021. If confirmed, I will consult with you and other
Members of the committee on the review. President Biden has been clear
that he supports protections for LGTBQI+ people, as do I. If confirmed,
I will ensure that USAID programs and policies contribute to these
efforts, by advocating for LGTBQI+ rights and programs around the
world.
Question. What is your vision for elevating USAID's leadership
within the executive branch to tackle the existential threat of climate
change?
Answer. If confirmed, I would commit to working closely with
Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and the National
Security Council's climate and energy directorate. The Biden
administration's top priorities are developing an ambitious U.S. target
and working with countries around the world to raise their ambition
alongside the United States. President Biden is inviting leaders from
major economies to a Leaders' Summit on Climate to discuss climate
impacts and-more importantly-what more can be done on a number of
fronts moving forward climate action to keep a 1.5 degree Celsius
warming trajectory in sight. Given that unsustainable land use accounts
for one-quarter of global greenhouse emissions, USAID will work with
countries and regions with globally important forests and carbon-rich
landscapes to reduce deforestation and improve conservation, as well as
reduce emissions from land use change in critical tropical ecosystems
that serve as global carbon sinks.
Question. We must support the developing world in the transition
towards renewable energy, while also better forecasting climate-driven
disasters to minimize human impacts before they occur. Will you commit
to increasing climate change mitigation and adaptation programming as a
part of a proactive and robust USAID climate strategy?
Answer. Yes, I commit to increasing USAID's efforts to support
reduced carbon emissions combating climate change, including climate
change mitigation and adaptation programming. Addressing climate change
will be a top priority for me, as it is for President Biden. If
confirmed, I will expand the scale and urgency of USAID's programming,
building on USAID's strong foundation of local partnerships to address
climate change. I will ensure that USAID continues to be a leader in
supporting countries to reduce carbon emissions and that USAID provides
further support for early warning systems which help communities
prepare for and mitigate the impacts of climatic events.
Question. The coup in Burma has temporarily severed the democratic
hopes for the Burmese people. The situation continues to devolve as the
threat of civil war rises. As USAID Administrator, will you work to
quickly increase and pivot U.S. assistance to strengthen civil society,
protect the fundamental civil and political rights of the Burmese
people, and lead the humanitarian community in contingency planning for
increased humanitarian assistance levels?
Answer. I condemn, in the strongest possible terms, the military
coup in Burma and the junta's ongoing violent crackdown against
peaceful demonstrators. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
and empowering the brave local and civil society actors who are
advocating for civil and political rights under extraordinarily
difficult and dangerous circumstances. I support the action taken by
USAID immediately after the coup to redirect $42.4 million from work
that would have benefitted the Government to civil society and programs
that directly benefit the people of Burma. Those programs focus on a
range of objectives, such as improving health outcomes, strengthening
the ability of civil society to guard democratic space, fostering food
security, supporting independent media, and promoting peace and
reconciliation in Burma's conflict-affected regions. If confirmed,
USAID will also continue to provide critical life-saving humanitarian
assistance to Rohingya and other vulnerable populations including in
Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, and Shan states.
Question. Recent reports and statements from Secretary Blinken
indicate an ethnic cleansing likely occurred in western Tigray.
Humanitarian and media access continues to be constrained in rural
areas. Concerns are mounting regarding the instability in the run up to
the June elections. How will you work with the interagency to increase
access and transparency, pursue accountability for victims, and provide
oversight and capacity building assistance in a surge to promote a free
and fair election?
Answer. The loss of life and mass displacement resulting from the
conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region is profoundly disturbing. The
violence against civilians must end, and unimpeded humanitarian access
to the region must be granted without further delay. Ultimately, what
is required is a constructive political dialogue between the parties
and accountability for the atrocities committed by all sides.
Ethiopia's successful transition to a more democratic, inclusive, and
prosperous society is critical to U.S. interests. The administration,
with support from members of Congress and U.N. representatives, has
undertaken numerous diplomatic efforts to end the violence and provide
humanitarian access. As a result of these efforts, Prime Minister Abiy
recommitted to unhindered humanitarian access to Tigray. I understand
that USAID staff in Addis and in Washington continue to push for real
progress on these important issues. To your question on accountability
for victims, while Prime Minister Abiy has recently acknowledged human
rights abuses and violations and committed to ensuring that those
responsible are held accountable, it will be essential to hold him to
these commitments. If confirmed, I will both ensure that USAID
continues to work with the interagency on these critical issues and
work with the Secretary to ensure we can find a way to provide
humanitarian assistance to the Ethiopian people and support, as
appropriate, the pursuit of accountability.
Question. During the campaign, then-candidate Biden indicated that
his top foreign policy priority would be ``rallying the free world to
push back against rising authoritarianism'' and that ``human rights
will be at the core of U.S. foreign policy.'' Will you commit to re-
vamping the role of human rights programming as a central pillar of
USAID's development mandate?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will seek to deepen Agency investments
in democracy, human rights and governance. With freedom in its
fifteenth straight year of decline, there is more that the United
States and USAID need to do on all fronts to counter authoritarian
trends, support civil society, promote independent media, and protect
human rights defenders.
Question. The U.N. has called gender-based violence (GBV) against
women and girls a ``shadow pandemic'' during the COVID-19 crisis. Will
you commit to utilizing newly appropriated COVID-19 funds in working to
curb GBV and other secondary impacts of the pandemic?
Answer. Yes. Preventing and responding to gender-based violence
(GBV) is a critical component in the global response to COVID-19 and it
is a priority for USAID. If confirmed, I will prioritize USAID's
support for the prevention of and response to GBV that has emerged as a
result of COVID-19. Various types of GBV become particularly pervasive
during emergencies. As such, addressing GBV in emergencies is central
to USAID's efforts, including our COVID-19 response. If confirmed, I
will ensure that USAID programming continues to address GBV and that
our programming prioritizes women and girls' health, psychological
well-being, and safety. I understand that USAID is currently developing
a COVID-19 Response Plan, a strategy that will seek to address second-
order impacts of the pandemic, including increased rates of GBV, and
improve protection and target the needs of the most vulnerable and
marginalized families and individuals.
Question. For the past 15 years USAID has promoted a ``One Health''
approach, bringing togetherdisciplines such as medicine, veterinary
medicine, public health, and ecosystem health to more effectively
address emerging pandemic challenges. Tufts University is leading a new
effort consistent with the ``One Health'' approach to analyze,
communicate, and mitigate risks of zoonotic viral spillover in priority
countries. Will you commit tostrengthening this type of USAID
programming that ensures lasting reduction of the riskof viral zoonotic
spillover and disease so we can avoid repeating the experience of
COVID-19?
Answer. COVID-19 is a grave reminder that biological threats-
whether naturally emerging, accidental, or deliberate-pose a
significant and potentially existential threat to humanity. USAID's
partnership with countries throughout the world makes the Agency well-
placed to prevent avoidable outbreaks, detect threats early, and
respond rapidly when outbreaks occur. Preventing the next pandemic
requires an approach that recognizes that the future well-being of
humans, animals, and the environment are inextricably linked. History
has shown us that we need to significantly increase resources for both
risk reduction and the discovery of unknown viruses. To do this, we
should focus on the discovery of new viruses and address current
zoonotic diseases (e.g., Ebola viruses, coron aviruses) that pose the
greatest risk of spilling from wildlife to humans. If confirmed, I
commit to continuing this critical programming.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Ted Cruz
U.S. Foreign Assistance
Question. On December 10, 2020, President Trump issued Executive
Order (EO) 13964, ``Rebranding United States Foreign Assistance To
Advance American Influence'' which required U.S. Government Departments
and Agencies to use a single logo for all U.S. foreign assistance.
Please assess the degree to which such moves to ensure consistency
and clarity in our aid contribute to the development of
American soft power in general?
Answer. I am committed to branding and believe that branding sends
a strong public diplomacy message, contributing to American soft power
by conveying that our assistance is due to the generosity of the
American people. Branding is also a critical element of a counter China
strategy. Current branding regulations and policy continue to apply to
USAID awards, and partners must continue to follow the branding
requirements outlined in their assistance agreements.
China
Question. Please assess the degree to which such moves to ensure
consistency and clarity in our aid contribute to the development of
American soft power opposite Chinese development efforts?
Answer. China's approach to ``development'' through One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) raises deep concerns for me and many people in USAID's
partner countries. Projects connected to OBOR have come under
significant scrutiny on issues such as corruption; unsustainable debt;
environmental degradation; construction contracts and jobs being
awarded to Chinese firms over local enterprises; lack of transparency
and local consultations; and even worries about the potential erosion
of sovereignty due to the unfavorable terms attached to certain
projects. USAID needs a far-reaching strategy that addresses the
challenges of OBOR, and I believe that frustrations around the world
with China's development practices provide an opportunity for the U.S.
In addition to branding, the U.S. has a range of tools we can bring
to bear including development aid, finance, and our innovative
corporate sector. If confirmed, I will work aggressively to draw on
America's comparative advantages in distinguishing the U.S. approach
from the PRC's, by engaging directly with our partner countries and
ensuring that good governance, sustainability, and social and economic
safeguards are built into projects we support. If confirmed, I will
look forward to working with my colleagues across many agencies to help
ensure the U.S. is responding to Chinese development efforts from a
position of strength.
Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing genocide
against the Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that is ongoing. The Biden administration had
sent differing signals about the degree to which administration
officials assessed that genocide is indeed ongoing, but on March 22,
2021, Secretary Blinken correctly emphasized ``the P.R.C. continues to
commit genocide and crimes against humanity.'' USAID had and has a
significant role to play in countering the CCP's genocide, and the
agency had initiated a number of programs and outreach in that space.
Those programs included efforts to preserve the cultural heritage of
the Uyghurs, which is being directly targeted by the CCP.
Do you agree with the assessment that the Chinese Government is
engaged in a genocide against the Uyghurs and other minorities
in the XUAR that is ongoing?
Answer. Yes. I agree with President Biden and experts who have
studied the evidence that.China is committing genocide in Xinjiang.
Question. What role do you see for USAID in countering that ongoing
genocide, and more broadly the human rights atrocities being committed
by the Chinese Communist Party?
Answer. I welcome Congress's bipartisan action on this issue,
including the passage of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act that holds
perpetrators accountable for human rights violations and abuses against
Uyghurs and other minorities in China. If confirmed, I will use my
platform to draw attention to the horrors in Xinjiang and ensure that
USAID actively engages with you, the committee, and the interagency to
determine any further steps that can be taken.
Question. What is the status of programs aimed at preserving the
cultural heritage of the Uyghurs within USAID?
Answer. I gather that USAID is developing programs to preserve the
cultural heritage and promote the human rights of Uyghurs and other
ethnic and religious minorities in the Asia region. If confirmed, I
will be eager to discuss these programs with you.
International Religious Freedom
Question. The Obama administration repeatedly failed to speak out
on critical issues of religious liberty, including the plight of
imprisoned Christians in Iran, Nigeria, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba,
and Mexico. The result was a vacuum of American leadership. USAID has a
critical role to play in highlighting and countering such persecution,
as well as the plight of dissidents more broadly. Advancing
international religious freedom (IRF) is a major foreign policy
priority of the United States with bipartisan support, and I strongly
believe that the agency must maintain and deepen decisions and
commitments made by the Trump administration in that context.
The Trump administration allocated resources to IRF-related
projects in Iraq, Nigeria, and elsewhere. If confirmed, do you
intend to maintain these projects?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support international religious
freedom programs at USAID. I have a longstanding commitment to human
rights, and a profound awareness of the risks of persecution faced by
religious minorities. While serving at the NSC in the Obama
administration, I advocated on behalf of Coptic Christians in Egypt who
were experiencing violent attacks, and I met with Iraqi Christians
while visiting Iraq to show support for their community. As Ambassador
to the U.N., I used my platform to elevate the voices of religious
minorities. I called for the release of Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese
woman sentenced to death for refusing to denounce her Christian faith,
and called on Sudan to repeal the laws that put her in jail in the
first place. I gave a young Yazidi woman named Nadia Murad her first
major public platform, inviting her to speak before the U.N. Security
Council, after her family had been almost completely wiped out by ISIS
and she had been forced into sexual slavery. In addition, I worked with
the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious
Freedom and others in the administration to seek recognition of ISIS's
violence against the Yazidi people, Iraqi Christians, and Shiite
Muslims as a genocide, which Secretary of State Kerry recognized in
March of 2016. USAID has a history of helping the world's most
vulnerable people, and it will continue to play a critical role in
supporting communities persecuted or discriminated against because of
their faith. If confirmed, I will review USAID's approach to ensure
that our programs are most effectively supporting victims of religious
persecution. Additionally, if confirmed, I look forward to exploring
with you, the Agency's regional bureaus and Center for Faith-Based and
Neighborhood Partnerships office, and diverse faith communities, how to
mobilize resources and, as appropriate, tailor our programs to support
individuals being subjected to religious persecution.
Question. Until recently the agency held monthly sessions for
USAID's cross-Agency Sector Council on Strategic Religious Engagement
and International Religious Freedom. Have such sessions of the
Strategic Religious Engagement and International Religious Freedom been
frozen, and if so why?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to looking into USAID's cross-Agency
Sector Council on Strategic and Religious Engagement and International
Religious Freedom and whether it is still holding sessions. I look
forward to discussing with you.
Question. The Trump administration invested significantly in
programs promoting IRF through USAID's Democracy, Human Rights and
Governance (DRG) Center. What is the status of those programs?
Answer. USAID continues to implement programming, including through
the DRG Center, that supports religious minorities. USAID is deeply
committed to supporting the world's most vulnerable people, including
members of religious minorities. USAID will continue to play a critical
role in supporting communities around the world that are persecuted
and/or discriminated against because of their faith.
Question. The Trump administration was considering support for a
Yezidi Genocide Museum in Kocho. What is the status of that program? If
it has been suspended or canceled, why?
Answer. I am not familiar with these deliberations or this program.
If confirmed, I commit to learning more about it and consulting with
you on this issue.
Question. The persecution of Christians in Nigeria has over the
last decade emerged as a systematic problem that the U.S. and the
global community have struggled to counter. Policy responses have been
broadly inadequate, and have been hampered by disputes over the factors
explaining the violence, including the degree to which the crisis is a
function of farmer-herder clashes or religious extremism. In December
2020, the Department of State designated Nigeria as a country of
particular concern (CPC) in response to pervasive and egregious
violations of religious freedom, and USAID in particular engaged
Nigerian bishops as part of countering the persecution of Christians by
Boko Haram.
What is your assessment of the degree to which the persecution of
Christians in Nigeria is a function of farmer-herder clashes
vs. explanations that the persecution is driven by religious
violence?
Answer. Nigeria's deep structural problems have manifested in
various violent conflicts which have escalated across the country. As I
witnessed in my trip in 2016 to the Boko Haram-affected regions of
Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad, while these conflicts may have been
originally rooted in resource competition, which includes farmer-herder
clashes, they have evolved over time to include targeted attacks based
on religion or ethnic identity. The violence is exacerbated by the
proliferation of illicit weapons and a weak state security
architecture.
Question. Have USAID officials, including and especially those
tasked with advancing IRF, engaged Nigeria's community of bishops since
February 1, 2021?
Answer. I gather that USAID works closely with the State Department
at U.S. Embassy Abuja to advance religious freedom. For example, in
March 2021, USAID supported the U.S. Ambassador's participation in a
major gathering of Nigerian Christian leaders hosted by Cardinal John
Onaiyekan. This meeting followed a July 2020 roundtable hosted by USAID
with senior Christian clerics, including bishops. USAID regularly
engages with religious leaders and faith-based organizations across
multiple sectors of programming to respond to the impacts of Boko Haram
in Northeast Nigeria. In mid-March 2021, USAID met with leaders from
the Christian Association of Nigeria, the Heads of Church
Denominations, and the Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Peace Center.
Question. The Trump administration made a particular point of
engaging churches and other faith organizations globally, and of
increasing the amount of direct aid that is disbursed through local
churches rather than international aid agencies. The move was driven by
several considerations, including concerns about corruption that is
endemic to many such agencies, e.g. on March 19, 2021, the Department
of Justice announced that the International Rescue Committee had agreed
to pay $6.9 million to settle allegations that it performed procurement
fraud by engaging in collusive behavior and misconduct on programs
funded by USAID. Critics of the policy have suggested that it entangles
USAID in faith-based organizations in violation of USAID principles
related to unbiased partnering and humanitarian principles.
If confirmed, will you continue the Trump administration's policy
of increasing the amount of direct aid disbursed through local
churches? If not, why not?
Answer. Faith-based organizations are often the most trusted and
deeply embedded groups in local communities. These organizations often
serve remote, difficult to access communities and provide important
social services, strengthen civic space, and ensure inclusive
development. As I understand it, USAID has a robust history of engaging
faith organizations to advance Agency goals and priorities. The Code of
Federal Regulations (22 CFR 205.1) clarifies that faith organizations
may compete for federal assistance funding on the same basis as other
organizations, and that all funding decisions are made on the basis of
merit, not religious or secular affiliation. If confirmed, I will
support USAID's strong engagement with faith-based organizations,
whenever and wherever appropriate, by ensuring field staff are equipped
with the requisite skills and resources to advance development and
humanitarian assistance goals.
Question. Do you believe that channeling aid through faith based
organizations is in tension with USAID principles related to unbiased
partnering or humanitarian principles? If so, please explain why.
Answer. Faith-based organizations are often the most trusted and
deeply embedded groups in local communities. These organizations often
serve remote, difficult to access communities and provide important
social services, strengthen civic space, and ensure inclusive
development and principled humanitarian assistance.
Question. Do you believe that channeling aid specifically through
Nigerian Christian groups is in tension with USAID principles related
to unbiased partnering and humanitarian principles? If so, please
explain why.
Answer. Faith-based and community organizations are eligible to
participate in USAID programs on the same basis as any other
organization without regard to their religious character or
affiliation. USAID humanitarian assistance is delivered solely on the
basis of need regardless of political, religious, or other affiliation,
in accordance with U.S. law and policy, and does not discriminate
against nor favor one group over another. Delivering humanitarian
assistance to the most vulnerable people, including ethnic and
religious minorities, is central to our work in Nigeria and a core
value of USAID's humanitarian efforts worldwide. USAID takes
significant steps to ensure our assistance reaches those who need it
most and does not jeopardize their safety.
Israel
Question. In recent years Congress has passed a range of
legislation limiting assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and
for activities that benefit the PA, e.g. the Taylor Force Act (TFA)
(Title X of P.L. 115-141), which limits funding for activities that
``directly benefit'' the PA. TFA included certification language
regarding a range of concerns related to PA policies and governance,
including ``payments for acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens and
United States citizens.'' Part of the policy rationale for TFA's
restrictions is that money is fungible: any aid that directly benefits
the PA indirectly supports the PA's payments for acts of terrorism.
Officials in the Biden administration have recently suggested that
regardless of restrictions imposed by Congress the administration
intends to pursue projects and increase assistance that ``benefit[].
ordinary Palestinians,'' implicitly in contrast to programs that would
directly benefit the PA and therefore be noncompliant with TFA. Please
describe your understanding of restrictions imposed by Congress on aid
to the PA, especially your understanding of the distinction between aid
that ``directly benefits'' the PA and other forms of aid.
Can you commit that, if confirmed, you will ensure that USAID will
not engage in projects or provide assistance for projects that
directly benefit the PA?
Can you commit that, if confirmed, you will ensure that USAID will
not engage in projects or provide assistance for projects that
are the same as, materially similar to, or successor projects
to USAID projects and assistance that were suspended pursuant
to TFA?
Answer. President Biden publicly supported passage of the Taylor
Force Act, and he has never hesitated to condemn terrorism or
incitement by Palestinian actors. He has made clear that this will
continue during his administration. I appreciate Congressional concerns
regarding U.S. aid that may benefit the PA and I can assure you that,
if confirmed, USAID will continue to ensure that any provision of aid
strictly adheres to relevant U.S. laws governing the provision of
assistance in the West Bank and Gaza, including the Taylor Force Act.
To comply with various legislative restrictions, including the Prisoner
Payment Restriction (Section 7041(k)(3) of the FY 2020 SFOAA) and
Taylor Force Act ( P.L. 115-141), USAID conducts case specific analysis
to ensure that USAID assistance is neither ``for'' nor ``directly
benefiting'' the PA, consistent with the requirements and exceptions
set forth in relevant statutes.''
Question. The Obama-Biden administration's approach to the Israeli-
Arab conflict was justified on the basis of a theory of regional
relations in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented broader
Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Among other decisions, that administration
implemented discriminatory policies that distinguished between Jewish
communities in places Israel controlled before and after 1967. That
approach culminated in December 2016, when the Obama administration
maneuvered the United Nations Security Council into passing UNSCR 2334,
which among other things denied Israel's sovereignty over the Golan
Heights and part of its capital Jerusalem, including the Jewish
Quarter.
The Trump administration systematically worked to hollow out and
render UNSCR 2334 null and void. They did so, including by recognizing
Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, by recognizing Jerusalem
as Israel's capital, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem, by seeking to
end discriminatory approaches that distinguished legally and for the
purposes of aid and trade between different Israeli communities, and by
taking several other steps.
Can you commit to ensuring that USAID's approach to Israel,
including cooperative projects, will not distinguish or
discriminate between Israeli communities in places Israel
controlled before and after 1967? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to advance the administration's
strong support for the U.S.-Israel relationship, as well as to enhance
prospects for two states by working to responsibly restart humanitarian
and development assistance in the West Bank and Gaza in compliance with
all legal requirements, including the Taylor Force Act.
Question. Do you believe that a) Israel has sovereignty over the
Golan Heights?; b) Israel has sovereignty over Jerusalem, including the
Old City of Jerusalem? c) Israel is in illegal occupation of any part
of Jerusalem?; d) Israel is in illegal occupation of the Old City of
Jerusalem?
Answer. The administration's position is that our embassy will
remain in Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel's capital. The
administration has made clear that the ultimate status of Jerusalem is
a final status issue which will need to be resolved by the parties in
the context of direct negotiations. I agree that the current Syrian
regime and its Iranian allies poses a significant security risk to
Israel and that the Golan Heights is critically important to Israel's
security.
Yemen
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5 the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. The issue of aid was central to the public explanation of
the decision: officials at the State Department have justified the
delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' designation of
Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large parts of Yemen's
population live under areas controlled by the group. Since then the
Houthis have escalated their violence across the region, bombarding
civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen was already one of the worst
humanitarian catastrophes in the world, in large part because the
Houthis and their Iranian backers block aid, steal aid, and attack
civilians.
Please describe the role played by Iran and the Houthis in
deepening the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen.
Answer. Iran's support for the Houthis-and the Houthis use of food
as a weapon of war-during the long-running conflict in Yemen has
contributed to the gravest humanitarian crisis in the world. Moreover,
I agree that Iran's malign influence in the region, including in Yemen,
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, has clear destabilizing effects. Iran's
support for terrorism and human rights abuses threatens U.S. forces and
partners in the region in places like Iraq and Lebanon and hinders our
ability to provide humanitarian assistance in places like Yemen and
Syria. The U.S. Government continues to call on all parties to
implement a comprehensive, nationwide ceasefire in Yemen. The crisis in
Yemen will only be resolved when all parties to the conflict agree to a
durable and peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to deliver aid to
Yemeni civilians in general.
Answer. The Houthis are far from benign actors, and their actions
contribute to prolonging the suffering of the Yemini people. However,
the administration takes seriously the warnings from the U.N. and
international humanitarian organizations that these designations could
lead to a wide-scale famine. At the same time, the administration has
been clear that it will not hesitate to apply pressure to push the
Houthis to curb their abuses against the Yemeni people and to negotiate
an end to the war. With the lifting of the terrorist sanctions, the
U.S. can continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemen, and
critical commercial trade, such as food and fuel, can flow freely.
USAID has announced $336 million in FY 2021 humanitarian funding that
implementing partners can now use to provide lifesaving assistance to
more than 13 million Yemenis. As this assistance moves forward, USAID
will continuously monitor the Houthis' interference and our partners'
access to populations in need to determine if our assistance is able to
reach those for whom it is intended.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to deliver aid to
Yemeni civilians in Marib.
Answer. As referenced in the prior question, Houthi operations in
Yemen exacerbate the already-catastrophic humanitarian situation in
Yemen, and the Houthi leadership should be held accountable for their
actions. However, while seeking to counter Houthi conduct, we must also
consider the highly credible voices urging the United States not to
make the country's humanitarian crisis worse or make it even harder to
end Yemen's civil war. The Biden administration's action has enabled
the U.S. to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemenis,
including to those affected by the recent escalation of conflict in
Marib, and critical commercial trade, such as food and fuel, can
resume.
Classified Information
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in
notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If
not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure that
information provided to Congress by USAID is in a format that
facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying with
Executive Order 13526, USAID's classification guide, and the executive
branch rules on the handling and storage of classified information.
U.S. Foreign Policy
Question. U.S. foreign policy is a responsibility which cannot be
delegated to foreign powers or international institutions. On the
contrary, the weight of U.S. foreign policy comes in three parts from
Congress: treaty ratification or rejection, domestic law that forms the
basis for enforcing foreign policy positions, and the power over the
purse.
Do you agree that U.S. foreign policy is non-delegable to foreign
powers, including international institutions, and that any
enforcement of commitments made by the United States
bilaterally or multilaterally must be authorized by Congress in
the form of treaty ratification or domestic law?
Answer. I agree that the U.S. Government is solely responsible for
conducting foreign policy on behalf of the American people, and that
this responsibility cannot be delegated outside the Government.
Collaboration with other nations and private actors, including using
platforms like international institutions, can be used to effectively
implement U.S. foreign policy.
Question. In a 2003 piece for the New Republic you wrote, ``And the
American approach must cease its reliance on gratuitous unilateralism.
We make rules and create international institutions precisely in order
to bind states when their short-term interests would otherwise lead
them toward defection. The United States is willing to bind itself to
the World Trade Organization, because it knows it benefits more than
any other country from free trade, but not to the ICC, because there is
no good selfish reason to expose American citizens to external
scrutiny. But the truth is that only U.S. resources and leadership can
turn such institutions into forces for the international stability that
is indispensable to U.S. security. Besides, giving up a pinch of
sovereignty will not deprive the United States of the tremendous
military and economic leverage it has at its disposal as a last
resort.''
Is it your view that the United States federal Government, through
the resources of its taxpayers spent at international
institutions, is responsible morally and legally for
``international stability?''
Answer. The United States is not the world's policeman. It is a
critically important global leader and catalyst, and it has often used
its resources and foreign policy tools to promote stability,
development, democracy, and human rights, as well as to alleviate
suffering in humanitarian contexts. As the COVID-19 pandemic
demonstrates, the welfare of Americans is often connected to the fate
of people living elsewhere. As a result, to take but one example,
investments in global health security are investments in the security,
prosperity, and overall well-being of the American people. In addition,
when the United States works with partners and allies and succeeds in
exerting its influence at the United Nations and other global forums,
we can be more effective in countering malign actors such as China,
Russia and Iran-who would like nothing more than to undermine the
democratic values, human rights norms, and rules of the international
system that benefit the American people and contribute to global
stability.
Question. Additionally, is it your view that in joining
multilateral institutions and international agreements outside the
treaty ratification process and changes in domestic law by Congress,
the United States only ``gives up a pinch of sovereignty?'' If yes, do
you believe it is appropriate for the president to unilaterally cede
sovereignty to a foreign power or international governing body?
Answer. The President should always act to advance what is best for
the American people. I believe that foreign policy should be conducted
in accordance with U.S. law. I also believe that Congress has an
important voice and should be consulted in foreign policy deliberations
including with respect to international agreements and engagement with
multilateral institutions.
Question. You note in the same piece that the United States
constitutes,''the very runaway state international law needs to
contain.'' Please elaborate on this view, and please specifically
address how this view reconciles with the oath you will take if
confirmed to'' support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic.''
Answer. This quote from eighteen years ago does not represent my
view of the United States. I should not have used that language,
especially because the article itself is an extended and passionate
call for America's moral leadership in the world.
In 2009, before I became NSC Senior Director for Multilateral
Affairs and Human Rights, I took the oath to ``support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic.'' It was one of the greatest honors of my life. I did so
again in 2013 when I became U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. As a public
servant, I have been a tireless advocate for American values around the
world and a relentless defender of the United States at the U.N. and
elsewhere, standing up to malign actors such as China, Russia,
Venezuela, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and others who seek to undermine
U.S. interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to
determine how to be maximally effective in promoting and protecting the
interests of the American people, drawing on the important tools that
USAID can bring to bear to promote freedom and prosperity.
Question. Religious liberty is a foundational American value
enshrined in our First Amendment. USAID policy should respect and
affirm life and religious liberty at all stages of the program cycle.
This includes adherence to, at minimum, the Silijander and Helms
amendments.
If confirmed, do you commit to following these provisions of law in
crafting and implementing USAID policies, procedures, and
programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will follow the law and ensure compliance
with all applicable laws and regulations, including the Helms and
Siljander amendments.
Food for Peace
Question. Food aid delivered to people in need abroad under the
Food for Peace program currently falls subject to a requirement that 50
percent of the commodities are transported on U.S. built, flagged, and
crewed vessels. Unfortunately, this requirement results in higher
shipping costs, limited availability of vessels or vessels not
appropriately outfitted for carrying food aid, and less food arriving
to people in need due to food spoilage. A 2018 GAO report estimates
that ``for each $40-million increase in shipping costs, food aid
reaches one-million fewer recipients each year.''
Is it your view that cargo preference requirements prevent vital
aid from reaching intended recipients in a timely manner?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress to
make USAID's programming to combat rising food insecurity as effective
and efficient as possible, and to build the resilience of vulnerable
communities. Each of the food assistance modalities-U.S. in-kind food,
locally and regionally procured food, and cash-based programming-
complements the others in addressing food insecurity efficiently and
effectively. At this time of unprecedented global humanitarian need,
USAID's ability to reach hungry people and improve the efficiency of
our programs is of the utmost importance.
Question. Is it your view that USAID should be spending more of
their resources allotted for Food for Peace on the aid products and
commodities as opposed to transportation costs?
Answer. As USAID responds to an increasing number of complex and
protracted humanitarian crises, the costs of providing emergency food
assistance have unfortunately grown to reflect increased security and
logistical needs. In FY 2020, USAID shipped more than 1.4 million
metric tons of U.S.-grown agricultural commodities using Food for Peace
Title II resources. Volatility in shipping costs is just one complex
element USAID faces in the management of the Food for Peace Title II
account as it responds to increasing food insecurity worldwide.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. If you are confirmed, how will USAID contribute to
efforts by the United States and our partner nations to counter the
People's Republic of China's predatory and malign Belt and Road
Initiative, including by bringing together governments, the private
sector, and civil society to promote global infrastructure development.
China's Belt and Road Initiative uses predatory financing, debt-trap
diplomacy, bribery, corruption, and other means to promote
infrastructure projects in developing nations, with the goals of
creating new markets for China's ``national champion'' companies,
capturing the loyalty of foreign government and business elites, and
drawing developing nations-especially those in strategic locations or
with strategically important resources-into Beijing's geopolitical
orbit.
Answer. Competition with China is one of the defining challenges of
the 21st century for the United States. By advancing security,
protecting global health, fighting climate change, strengthening
democracy, and spurring equitable economic growth, USAID can play an
integral role in helping the U.S. meet the challenges you have
identified that are posed by the Belt and Road Initiative. The
administration's approach is to provide an alternative vision to
Beijing's--a vision that promotes democratic governance, transparency,
and local ownership in our global development work. If confirmed, I
will work aggressively to draw on America's comparative advantages in
distinguishing the U.S. approach from the PRC's, by engaging directly
with our partner countries and ensuring that good governance,
sustainability, and social and economic safeguards are built into
projects we support. USAID can strengthen local capacity to ensure that
development investments are both beneficial and sustainable. If
confirmed, I will work with allies and partners, including at the DFC
and in the private sector, to better leverage our collective resources
and influence, and I will be an advocate for the highest human rights,
governance, environmental, social, and labor standards in order to
promote investments that are sustainable for the long term.
Question. If you are confirmed, how will USAID not only promote
effective U.S. development assistance and humanitarian assistance, but
also advance America's long-term competition with the Chinese Communist
Party's broader malign influence and predatory efforts around the
world?
Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) approach to
development through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) raises deep
concerns for me and many of USAID's partners. Projects connected to BRI
have come under significant scrutiny on issues such as corruption;
unsustainable debt; environmental degradation; preferencing of Chinese
firms over local enterprises for construction contracts and jobs; lack
of transparency and local consultations; and even worries about the
potential erosion of sovereignty due to the unfavorable terms attached
to certain projects. I share your conviction that USAID needs a far-
reaching strategy that addresses the challenges posed by the BRI. There
is no question that the frustrations many around the world have voiced
with China's development practices provide an opportunity for the U.S.
U.S. support for transparent, accountable, and inclusive governance
gives us another advantage, especially in communities that have
experienced repression and corruption. If confirmed, I will continue to
promote human rights, democracy and transparency and I will ensure that
USAID works with partners to better leverage our collective resources
and influence for sustainable and beneficial development pursued in a
spirit of cooperation and mutual respect.
Question. If you are confirmed, how will you support and strengthen
USAID's commitment to combat religious persecution, which is all the
more important after the State Department's recent determination of the
Chinse Communist Party's genocide and crimes against humanity with
respect to Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang? You have
written extensively about the failure of past U.S. presidential
administration to prevent and respond to genocide.
Answer. As you note, I have a longstanding commitment to human
rights, and have seen firsthand how religious minorities are at risk of
being targeted with atrocities. I also agree with you, President Biden,
and experts who have studied the facts that China is committing
genocide in Xinjiang.
While serving in the Obama administration, I advocated on behalf of
Coptic Christians in Egypt who were experiencing violent attacks and
met with Iraqi Christians while visiting Iraq to show support for their
community. As Ambassador to the U.N., I used my platform to elevate the
voices of religious minorities, such as by pushing for the release of
Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese woman sentenced to death for refusing to
denounce her Christian faith. I also called for Sudan to repeal the
laws that put her in jail in the first place. In addition, I worked
with the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large for International
Religious Freedom and others in the administration to seek recognition
for ISIS's violence against the Yazidi people, Iraqi Christians, and
Shiite Muslims as a genocide, which Secretary of State Kerry recognized
in March of 2016. I gave a young Yazidi woman named Nadia Murad her
first major public forum, inviting her to speak before the U.N.
Security Council, after her family had been almost completely wiped out
by ISIS and she had been forced into sexual slavery. USAID has a
history of helping the world's most vulnerable people, and, if
confirmed, I will invest in efforts to support communities persecuted
or discriminated against because of their faith, and I will make it a
priority to prevent and address ongoing violence and atrocities
perpetrated against religious and ethnic minorities including Rohingya;
Yezidis and Christians in Iraq, Syria and other parts of the Middle
East; and Tigrayans.
Question. Do you believe that the People's Republic of China should
be classified as a ``developing country'' at the World Trade
Organization? China-as the world's second largest economy-is still
classified as a ``developing country'' at the World Trade Organization.
Answer. No, I do not believe China should be classified as a
``developing country.'' Indeed, by any number of measures, China today
is a global economic powerhouse. China is already the world's largest
trading nation, having surpassed the United States in 2013, and its
investments in research and development are second only to those of the
United States-having increased by more than 15 percent a year on
average over the past two decades. And in 2020, half of the top ten
largest public companies in the world were Chinese companies. If
confirmed, I will work with Congress and the administration to counter
China's tactics whether in global forums or at the country and regional
level, including in Africa, Asia and the Western Hemisphere.
Question. What is your assessment of USAID's ``Clear Choice''
strategy under the last presidential administration? If you are
confirmed, do you commit to continuing and improving USAID's ``Clear
Choice'' strategy? As DevEx-a media platform that tracks the
international development efforts-reported in December 2020, your
predecessor, USAID Administrator Mark Green ``spearheaded a broad
agency strategy called `Clear Choice,' intended to denote that
countries have a `clear choice' between the U.S. and China when they
consider investment partnerships for infrastructure and other
development initiatives.'' The ``Clear Choice'' strategy sought to
better organize USAID's regional and functional efforts on development
and humanitarian assistance while also meeting the China Challenge and
countering China's malign influence, and better informing and
coordinating with interagency partners in the U.S. Government.
Answer. I applaud former Administrator Mark Green's efforts to
proactively counter malign Chinese influence in international
development. If confirmed, I will review and build on these efforts,
and I will work with allies and partners to better leverage our
collective resources and influence.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to modernize the
concept of foreign assistance to include also the development and
adoption of next-generation telecommunications and mobile technology in
partner nations that receive U.S. foreign assistance?
Answer. Digital tools hold immense potential to help people live
freer and more prosperous lives. They also present significant risks to
citizen privacy and data, freedom of the press, and individual
expression. I gather that USAID's work in this area builds upon the
Agency's twenty-five year legacy of bringing internet access points,
strengthening national broadband strategies and universal service
funds, and advancing multi-stakeholder models of internet governance to
USAID partner countries around the world. Today, such efforts are more
important than ever as the foundations of next-generation
telecommunications technologies like 5G are developed and adopted by
our partner countries to enable their citizens to participate in the
digital economy and ultimately become more self-reliant. If confirmed,
I will continue USAID's commitment to open, inclusive, secure and
competitive communications infrastructure and mobile technology, as
outlined in USAID's Digital Strategy.
Question. If you are confirmed, how will USAID use foreign
assistance to help ensure that partner nations-especially those that
receive U.S. foreign assistance-reject or move away from next-
generation telecommunications and mobile technology from Huawei or
other untrusted China-based vendors?
Answer. USAID is already addressing the challenges presented by
untrusted vendors of mobile and next-generation telecommunications
equipment. I understand that USAID provides developing countries with
technical assistance to encourage reforms to related regulations and
policies, including those that support secure networks, vendor
diversity, and cybersecurity best practices. USAID programs also
include work with civil society to bolster messaging for autonomy,
security, and privacy in their telecoms sectors, and with the private
sector to increase investment in and deployment of secure
communications technologies. If confirmed, I will continue this
commitment to next-generation telecommunications and mobile technology
built upon trustworthy vendors.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to supporting the
Abraham Funds or similar development initiatives with other countries
in the Middle East in order to advance U.S. national security
interests, support the Abraham Accords, and promote further peace and
regional economic cooperation between Israel and Arab nations?
Answer. President Biden rightly welcomed the Abraham Accords as an
important contribution to peace in a divided region. If confirmed, I
will join others in the Biden-Harris administration in efforts to build
on these agreements to further strengthen cooperation between Israel
and its neighbors and to encourage other Arab and Muslim countries to
normalize relations with Israel. If confirmed, I will seek to take
steps that advance the cause of peace, as well as Israel's integration
in the region and the world-something that I was able to make great
headway on at the United Nations, securing Israel's integration into
important U.N. bodies from which it had been excluded, recognition of
Yom Kippur as an official U.N. holiday, and the convening of the first-
ever U.N. General Assembly session on antisemitism.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:12 a.m., in
Room SD-106, Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen,
Risch, Johnson, Romney, Paul, Cruz, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Let me turn to--again to the second part of
our business meeting or hearing. Before I do, I want to say
that I understand the administration will be coming up next
week to brief senators on the decision to withdraw from
Afghanistan. This committee will also receive a classified
briefing next Monday.
The administration, in my view, was dealt a terrible hand
by the last administration on Afghanistan, manifested in a
withdrawal agreement, then negotiated away all of our leverage
with the Taliban. President Biden was left only with bad
options. Most Senators would agree that the war in Afghanistan
has gone on too long and that we want to see our troops home.
But as I have said before, how we draw down matters, as does
the political arrangement left in our wake. I have many
questions. How can the U.S. maintain the capability to conduct
counterterrorism operations in the region without a military
presence in Afghanistan? What will this decision portend for
the women of Afghanistan? Without a U.S. military presence, how
long does our intelligence community think the Afghan
Government can survive in the face of punishing Taliban
attacks? So I look forward to these conversations next week.
Let me turn to our------
Senator Risch. May I respond?
The Chairman. Absolutely. The ranking member.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, I concur in the questions that you have. I do not concur
in the initial statement about the prior administration. There
is no good answer to this. There are just questions. I think
that at this point we should look forward rather than
backwards, and I think we should get answers to those questions
and decide what--how we can assist in the path forward because
that is the most important role we will play here. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me turn to our two nominees,
Ambassador Nuland and Ms. Zeya. Congratulations on your
nominations, and our thanks to both of you for your willingness
to return to the State Department and distinguished careers in
the Foreign Service. At this pivotal moment for our foreign
policy for democracy and for the State Department, I am
heartened that President Biden nominated both of you. You are
experienced and accomplished diplomats, and you have both
demonstrated the strength and commitment necessary to defend
our values.
The positions you have been nominated for--Undersecretary
of State for Political Affairs, Undersecretary of State for
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights--are among the
most important in the Department. Ms. Zeya, I understand that
the distinguished Senator from Virginia is going to introduce
you this morning, so I will turn to him at this time. Senator
Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to members of the
committee, it is a real honor for me to introduce a wonderful
public servant, Uzra Zeya, the nominee for the post described
by the chair. Virginia is one of the most connected States in
the country to our military mission, but I am also proud that
it is one of the most connected States to our diplomatic and
development missions, with many diplomats and State Department
staffers calling Virginia home.
Ms. Zeya is a 20-year Virginia resident. She is a
distinguished diplomat and nonprofit leader who has dedicated
virtually her entire adult life to public service, the
advancement of human rights, and U.S. national security. The
duty to serve runs in her family. She is here with her husband,
Tom, a United States Marine. Together, they have more than 60
years of public service to the American public, which is just
wonderful, and I love that we have got a diplomat and a
military union in the household. That is a wonderful balance.
Ms. Zeya served five presidents, three Republicans and two
Democrats, with distinction for 28 years as a Foreign Service
officer on four continents. She is fluent in Arabic, French,
and Spanish. She was Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor. In that post, she led U.S.
human rights dialogue with China, Egypt, and Bahrain, among
others. She vigorously defended religious freedom around the
globe and expanded public/private partnerships to advance LGBT
equality and counter gender-based violence.
She was charge d'affaires in Paris, and she led the U.S.
response to, sadly, three major terror attacks in that city,
took U.S.-French cooperation on counterterrorism and Russia to
unprecedented levels, and elevated U.S. engagement against
antisemitism and online hate. In India, she crafted a strategic
partnership framework over a decade ago that still enjoys broad
bipartisan support and today serves as the cornerstone of the
U.S. Indo-Pacific engagement. She helped overcome India's
longstanding aversion to external democracy promotion, and
launched new bilateral initiatives to support gender equality
in Afghanistan, and to support free and fair elections abroad.
As a young human rights officer in Syria, she documented the
brutality of the Assad regime and led U.S. outreach to Syria's
minority, religious, and ethnic communities under siege. Since
leaving the State Department, Ms. Zeya served for 2 years as
CEO and president of the leading nonpartisan Peacebuilders
Network where she worked to strengthen the evidence base for
successful political transitions and support greater
accountability for taxpayer-funded foreign assistance. She also
drafted the Council on Foreign Relations report on revitalizing
the State Department.
Ms. Zeya is a trailblazer. She is the proud daughter of
Indian-American immigrants. She would be the first Asian-
American woman to serve as an undersecretary of state, and I
believe she is very, very well prepared to take on this post,
and we are proud to support this exemplary Virginian. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine, for the robust
endorsement of Ms. Zeya. Let me conclude. The State Department
faces unprecedented challenges from restoring America's place
in the world to managing the health and economic crisis created
by COVID-19, and China and Russia is at the top of the list of
foreign policy crises confronting America today. As you know
well, Ambassador Nuland, the United States needs to act now to
stop a resurgent Russia with Putin once again threatening
Ukraine, continuing his attacks on our democracy, and
threatening his grip on the Russian people and those who dare
to oppose him. I want to applaud the administration for the
actions that were announced today. They are robust. It is a
type of action I would have wanted to see, and I look forward
to their continuing engagement.
On China, we must both confront Chinese attempts to
undermine democracy and human rights and compete with them
economically. That is why I am pleased that Senator Risch and I
have authored a bipartisan bill which will make the United
States competitive with China, and provide us with a clear and
coherent national security strategy on China. And while I look
forward to a more in-depth discussion on Russia and China
during our time for questions, I want to quickly highlight
three additional policy areas: Iran, Turkey, and the Western
Hemisphere.
Although I did not support the JCPOA, I felt strongly that
the Trump administration's decision to withdraw without a
coordinated diplomatic strategy would embolden Iran and leave
us less safe, and Iran's behaviors only validated my
predictions. I recently led a bipartisan letter supporting a
diplomatic path forward, but let me be clear. That path must go
beyond the scope of the JCPOA. I expect that this
administration will pursue what the President and Secretary
themselves have endorsed, a stronger and longer agreement, and
I will expect you to provide the committee with details of any
agreement and on exactly what ``longer and stronger'' means.
Iran, not surprisingly, is seeking to control the timetable for
these discussions by taking provocative actions against vessels
in the Arabian Gulf and U.S. military facilities in Iraq.
In Turkey, President Erdogan got a free pass from the
previous administration, and we are seeing the effects: the
purchase of a Russian missile, systematic military aggression
in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria, bellicose actions against Greece
and Cyprus. Long considered a NATO ally, Turkey seems to want
to break with us instead of being our partner now. Now, I do
not agree with Erdogan's choice, but we have to begin to
reorient ourselves in the Eastern Mediterranean towards
democracies that share our values and our security interests.
The administration has an important opportunity here, and I
hope they seize it.
Finally, in our own hemisphere, we must strengthen our
alliances and address forced migration. I am particularly
concerned about the challenges Columbia, our top strategic
partner in Latin America, currently faces, including the
monumental task of implementing the 2016 Peace Accord, the
violence related to drug trafficking, and the destabilizing
influence of the Madura regime's crimes against humanity in
Venezuela.
And, Ms. Zeya, I cannot close the day without raising a
crisis that goes to the core of American values and American
leadership: the state of democracy around the world. We are in
the midst of a 15-year democratic recession. From Nicaragua to
Hungary, democracy is marching backwards. Even worse,
authoritarians are using the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to
steamroll free and fair elections, independent media, and other
hallmarks of democracy, and they have assumed that their
violations will be met with little resistance. It is time for
the United States to step up and speak out on democracy, and I
expect that both of you will help lead the charge to restore
democracy throughout the world.
At a time of unprecedented challenges around the world,
America needs outstanding leadership at the State Department. I
have no doubt that you are both up to that task, but I expect
to hear from both of you today about how you plan to restore
America's place in the world, repair democracy, and confront
the immense challenges facing us.
With that, I turn to the ranking member for his opening
comments.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. We all
know that undersecretaries of state serve an important role at
the Department. They are responsible for day-to-day management
of and policy coordination for their respective bureaus, and we
want to thank both of you for your willingness to serve in
those capacities.
In the case of Ambassador Nuland's nomination to be
undersecretary for political affairs, this role oversees all
regional, bilateral, and multilateral policy issues for the
Department. This is no small task obviously. While this
position has a broad scope, there are a few specific areas of
concern I would like to address today, the first of which, of
course, is China. Next week, this committee will mark up the
Strategic Competition Act. This legislation, introduced by
Senator Menendez and myself, counters the Chinese Communist
Party's malign influence globally, including by expanding the
scope of the Committee on Foreign Investment and the United
States' review of foreign money flowing into U.S. higher
education institutions; advances concrete cooperation with
allies and partners in technology, infrastructure, development,
and defense; shines a light on China's predatory economic
practices; pushes back on the Chinese Communist Party's
influence at the U.N.; highlights China's growing nuclear
missile capacities; and calls on President Biden to assure our
extended deterrence to allies and engage China in arms control
talks.
These are just a few of the issues we face when it comes to
strategic competition with China. The Biden administration's
highest priority and ours here in Congress must be to
prioritize resources and respond to the challenges posed by the
Chinese Communist Party, as well as opportunities presented by
expanded and concrete cooperation with allies and partners,
especially in the Indo-Pacific region and in Europe.
I want to take this opportunity once again to thank the
chairman and the majority party for the negotiations we have
had on the China bill. I think this has been a very positive
step forward, and it is certainly bipartisan. And obviously, as
with all these kinds of things, there are parts of it that I am
not in love with, but, on the other hand, it is always a give
and take proposition to get where we want to go. I specifically
want to thank the staffs of both of the majority and the
minority for the give and take that they have entered into and
the many hours they have spent negotiating the details of the
many pages. I hope we can move this forward. I am a little bit
concerned about the overall idea of taking this and wrapping it
with six other committees who have ideas along this line. I
think these are always difficult enough, but the more of those
you wrap together, the more difficult it will be. So whatever
happens, I hope we are able to move this bill forward in a
bipartisan fashion.
Next, I would like to address the administration's ongoing
desire to re-enter the failed JCPOA. Many of us on both sides
in the Senate are closely following negotiations with the P5+1
in Vienna. I concur with the chairman that this is difficult.
This is not an easy proposition. And at the outset, many of us
are deeply concerned with the administration's promises to
lengthen and strengthen. Unfortunately, it sounds like a bumper
sticker, and, like the chairman, I am interested in hearing
what the details are. Unfortunately, to me, it is starting to
look a lot more like a straight re-entry into the 2015 deal,
which is not acceptable to me and I think not acceptable to
most members of this committee on both sides of the aisle.
Discussions with the parties have led me to conclude that, and
I hope I am wrong on this.
Negotiators have established working groups to address
nuclear compliance and sanctions relief, but they have not
established a working group on Iran's regional terrorism,
something that a lot of us have repeatedly said must be
addressed in any deal with Iran. Our national security
interests on Iran must last longer than a single
administration. If the administration chooses to continue on a
path of straight re-entry into the nuclear deal, it will be
short-lived. Either the next Republican administration will
tear down the deal, or the nation most directly affected, who
is remarkably always excluded from the deal, will take
unilateral action, which will not end well. To avoid this
outcome, the administration must seek bipartisan congressional
support for any agreement with Iran. I am feeling that the
administration is walking down a well-worn, partisan path that
will repeat the mistakes of the original administration that
entered into the deal. I hope I am wrong on all of this and all
of us here who have a lot of experience in this will be
listened to as we move forward.
In Europe, Russia remains a pressing concern. Although
Russia is amassing tens of thousands of troops on Ukraine's
border as we speak, they have still been allowed to continue
construction of the malign Nord Stream 2 pipeline. And,
Ambassador Nuland, I appreciate your candid discussion with me
in that regard. Actually, in front of this committee, Secretary
Blinken testified that he sees the pipeline as a bad deal and
has told us that he would like to see it stopped. Yet despite
having the power to stop it, we have not seen real action, and
I am very disappointed in this. He was personally handed, by
myself and other members of this committee, a vetted list of
people who need to be sanctioned.
I am not happy with what has happened. They keep telling us
that, well, they need to vet this and prepare a case so that
when they put the sanctions on, they can be prepared to do it
at Court. I have told them, no, you do not. You have probable
cause on every one of those people that we have put in front of
you, and you need to sanction them. Now, when you go to Court,
you need lawyers that have a case well prepared, but there is
probable cause on every one of these to be sanctioned that will
shut down the pipeline.
The committee drafted and pushed through legislation on a
bipartisan basis to prevent the completion. We continue to be
concerned by the administration's refusal to fully implement
the law and sanction all parties--all parties--involved in the
construction of the pipeline. It is past time that the
administration take meaningful action on this issue.
I would remind everyone, on day one of this administration,
they stopped the XL pipeline, on day one. They have in hand
direction from this Congress on a bipartisan basis to do the
same thing on a Russian pipeline. If we are going to put
American workers out of work, we ought to put the Russian
workers out of work on the Nord Stream pipeline. Many on this
committee bemoan the previous administration's posture on
Russia. What is clear is that the Trump administration was
tougher on them than the present Biden administration has been
so far.
Next, we have Ms. Zeya's nomination to be undersecretary of
state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights. This
position is tasked with a broad functional portfolio, which
encompasses human rights, counterterrorism, refugees,
migration, and trafficking in persons. We must continue to lead
on the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for
human rights around the world, not just because those
democratic values form the core of our values as a Nation, but
also because they lead to stronger partnerships with other
nations. I know virtually every member of this committee agrees
with me on that proposition.
With regard to the rule of law, I share the
administration's concern about the International Criminal
Court's decision to investigate U.S. personnel in Afghanistan
and Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories. It is
completely unacceptable that the ICC has decided to pursue
cases clearly outside of their jurisdiction. The Department
must continue its efforts to protect our personnel from these
politically-motivated efforts.
Again, I thank you both for being here today and your
willingness to serve, and your family's willingness to
undertake the sacrifices necessary to do so. With that, thank
you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. We will now turn to
our two nominees. We ask you to summarize your statements in
about 5 minutes or so, so we can have a conversation with you.
Your full statements will be included in the record. We welcome
your family members who may be with you either virtually or
presently. We understand that it is a family affair. There are
sacrifices that are made by all in this process, and we
appreciate the willingness of your family members as well as
yourselves to make the sacrifice. With that, let me turn to
Ambassador Nuland.
STATEMENT OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE
AN UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (POLITICAL AFFAIRS)
Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking
Member Risch, and the members of this committee for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I also want to thank my
husband, Bob Kagan, and my kids, Lanie and David, for their
love and their wise counsel. Bob and David are with me today.
Lanie is studying for her law exams.
It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden and
Secretary Blinken to serve as undersecretary of state for
political affairs. If confirmed, I will rejoin the profession
and the Department that I love, determined every day to
strengthen America's capacity to protect our freedom, our
security, and our prosperity. And I will support Secretary
Blinken in his vision to re-energize American diplomacy, to
strengthen our alliances and partnerships, and to build the
closest possible collaboration with this committee and with
both houses of Congress.
Over 32 years in the Foreign Service, I have served five
presidents and nine secretaries of state from both Republican
and Democratic administrations. That experience taught me that
America is at its strongest when our foreign policy enjoys
broad bipartisan support both in Washington and at kitchen
tables across America, and the move that you have made together
on a bipartisan China bill is really important in that regard.
The Chairman. Could I just ask you to turn--move your
microphone closer to you? It is a little difficult.
Ambassador Nuland. Is that better?
The Chairman. Yes, thank you.
Ambassador Nuland. Okay. My foreign service career was full
of adventures, and challenges, and historic moments, from my
first tour in Guangzhou, China in 1985, to watching the Soviet
flag come down and the Russian flag go up over Red Square in
1991, to being at NATO when it invoked Article 5, an attack on
one is an attack on all, 20 years ago in solidarity after the
Twin Towers fell. And, of course, I had the opportunity to work
closely with many of you in this room, both when I was
ambassadored in NATO in the Bush administration, and as
assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs in the
Obama administration. I take pride that, together, we built
strong bipartisan approaches to policy, and many members of
this committee and the Senate contributed with their own travel
and diplomacy.
Today, our Nation faces a confluence of challenges as
daunting as at any time in my professional life. China, under
Xi Jinping, does not simply want to compete with us, it wants
to dominate the international system and change its rules to
benefit autocrats and undercut freedom around the world.
Putin's Russia has deployed its fighters and weapons on almost
every continent and accelerated its disinformation, election
interference, and snuff campaigns against its opponents. Iran
is again enriching uranium at 20 percent, while continuing to
destabilize its neighborhood from Syria, to Yemen, to Lebanon,
to Iraq. ISIS and Al-Qaeda are weakened, but they are not
defeated, and too many of the world's citizens are suffering
under corrupt and/or illegitimate leaders with blood on their
hands. Add to this the urgent global challenges we share:
restoring global health and security, tackling climate change,
and building our democracies and economies back better with
more equity and more justice.
If confirmed as undersecretary of state for political
affairs, my job will be threefold; first, to take on any
negotiations or diplomatic assignments and management issues
that the Secretary deems necessary; second, to oversee the work
of the regional bureaus and the Bureau of International
Organizations, ensuring that this orchestra of talent plays in
harmony; and third, to maintain the closest coordination with
fellow political directors around the world, especially in
allied and partner capitals, to build communities of common
action.
If confirmed, I will also be the senior lifer in the State
Department. The President and Secretary Blinken have pledged to
respect and empower our great workforce and to have their
backs. That was also a powerful motivator for me to return to
service to help revitalize and modernize American diplomacy. We
must give our foreign, and civil service, and local employees
more professional opportunities, support, training, career
flexibility, and better technology, while strengthening
diversity at all levels of the Department.
I am also animated every day by a firm belief that America
is safer and stronger when we lead. As Secretary Blinken has
said, the alternatives are far worse, a chaotic vacuum or a
global takeover by the enemies of freedom. I also share
President Biden's conviction that we are at a global inflection
point. Democracy will and must prevail, but democracy does not
happen by accident. We have to defend it, we have to fight for
it, strengthen it, and renew it. If confirmed, it will be the
honor of a lifetime to play my part in that effort.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Nuland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Victoria Nuland
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and members of
this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I also want to thank my husband, Bob Kagan and my kids, Leni and
David, for their love, their wise counsel and the sacrifices they made
as a foreign service family.
It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden and Secretary
Blinken to serve as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. If
confirmed, I will rejoin the profession and the Department that I love,
determined every day to strengthen America's capacity to protect our
freedom, our security and our prosperity. And I will support Secretary
Blinken in his vision to reenergize American diplomacy; strengthen our
alliances and partnerships; and build the closest possible
collaboration with this committee and both houses of Congress.
Over thirty-two years in the Foreign Service, I served five
Presidents and nine Secretaries of State from both Republican and
Democratic administrations. That experience taught me that America is
at its strongest when our foreign policy enjoys broad bipartisan
support both in Washington and at kitchen tables across America.
President Biden and his team have pledged to lead a foreign policy that
represents and benefits the American people. This will require more
listening, more consultation with each of you, and with American
business, workers, and committed citizens across our country. If
confirmed, I look forward to doing as much hard work at home as abroad.
My foreign service career was full of adventures, challenges and
historic moments:
From my first tour in Guangzhou, China in 1985 when our
relationship seemed to have so much promise;
To watching the Soviet flag come down and the Russian flag go up
over Red Square in 1991;
To working on tough arms control problems and conflicts from Rwanda
to Haiti to Bosnia and Kosovo;
Too serving as Deputy Chief of Mission at NATO when our great
Alliance invoked Article 5--an attack on one is an attack on
all--in solidarity with the United States the day after the
twin towers fell.
And, of course, I had the opportunity to work closely with many of
you when I was Ambassador to NATO in the Bush administration and
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs in the Obama
administration. Together, we built strong bipartisan approaches to
policy, and many members of the Senate contributed with their own
travel and diplomacy.
Today, our nation faces a confluence of challenges as daunting as
at any time in my professional life. China, under Xi Jinping, does not
simply want to compete with us; it wants to dominate the international
system and change its rules to benefit autocrats and undercut democracy
and freedom around the world. Putin's Russia has deployed its fighters
and weapons on almost every continent and accelerated its
disinformation, election interference, and snuff campaigns against
opponents. Iran is enriching uranium at 20 percent again, while
continuing to destabilize its neighborhood from Syria to Yemen to
Lebanon and Iraq. ISIS and AQ are weakened but not defeated. And too
many of the world's citizens are suffering under corrupt and/or
illegitimate leaders with blood on their hands. Add to this the urgent
global challenges we share: restoring global health security, tackling
climate change, and building our democracies and economies back better,
with more equity and justice.
If confirmed as Under Secretary of State, my job will be three-
fold:
First, to take on any negotiations, diplomatic assignments or
management issues that the Secretary deems necessary;
Second, to oversee the work of the regional bureaus and Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, ensuring this orchestra of
talent plays in harmony, not at cross purposes;
And third, to maintain close coordination with fellow Political
Directors around the world, especially in allied and partner
capitals, to build communities of common action to meet today's
challenges.
If confirmed, I will also be the senior ``lifer'' in the State
Department. The President and Secretary Blinken have pledged to respect
and empower our great workforce, and to have their backs. That is a
powerful motivator for me to return to service--to help revitalize and
modernize American diplomacy. We must give our Foreign and Civil
Service personnel and local employees more professional opportunities,
support, training, career flexibility, and better technology while
strengthening diversity at all levels of the Department. For years, the
State Department scored the highest among government agencies for
workforce satisfaction. I believe it can and will again.
I am also animated every day by a firm belief that America is safer
and stronger when we lead. As Secretary Blinken has said, the
alternatives are far worse: a chaotic vacuum or a global take-over by
the enemies of freedom. I share President Biden's conviction that we
are at a global ``inflection point''--``democracy will and must prevail
. but democracy doesn't happen by accident. We have to defend it, fight
for it, strengthen it, renew it.''
If confirmed, it will be the honor of a lifetime to play my part in
that effort. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Zeya?
STATEMENT OF UZRA ZEYA, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE AN UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE (CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS)
Ms. Zeya. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking
Member Risch, Senator Kaine for your kind words, and
distinguished committee members. It is also the honor of my
lifetime to be President Biden's nominee as undersecretary of
state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights. I am
deeply grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken for the
confidence they have placed in me.
I also want to thank those who made my journey here
possible: my husband, Tom, for always having my back and his
decades of service to our Nation as a U.S. Marine and civilian.
I also want to thank our two children, Kiera and Lexi, who
could not be here today, but whose idealism never ceases to
inspire me. Ours is a family rooted in public service and the
advancement of freedom. For my father-in-law, a World War II
veteran who fought tyranny on the shores of Okinawa; to my
grandfather, a freedom fighter in India's quest for
independence; to my mother, whose own education was cut short
by marriage at the age of 16, and invested all her brilliance
in raising four independent-minded, opinionated daughters to
seize opportunities never afforded to her. I thank my parents,
brother, and sisters for their solidarity in joining virtually
today.
In today's disrupted world, the work of the State
Department's ``J'' family of bureaus and offices has never been
more important. Authoritarianism, violent antisemitism,
islamophobia, and xenophobia are on the rise as the world
enters the 15th year of a democratic recession. The Chinese
Government is perpetrating genocide and crimes against humanity
in Xinjiang, strangling autonomy in Hong Kong, and repressing
Tibetans, Christians, and other religious and ethnic
minorities. Global human displacement is at record levels while
the scourge of human trafficking is ever present and while
terrorists expand their lethal reach from Africa to South Asia.
Recognizing the enormity and complexity of the task ahead,
I would like to emphasize three core areas where, if confirmed,
I would gladly partner with all of you to address. First, the
United States needs to take on the China challenge from a
position of strength, rooted in human rights and our democratic
values. Having led U.S.-China human rights dialogues, I know
the severe repression that has only grown more acute under the
CCP. I have met with courageous Chinese human rights activists
and their families, gave voice to their concerns at the United
Nations, and demanded the release of Chinese prisoners of
conscience who put their quest for liberty above their personal
welfare. I am proud to have been banned on Weibo for denouncing
systematic Chinese human rights abuses in Beijing in 2013. We
also must continue to press China on synthetic opioids, which
have killed far too many Americans.
Second, we must defend and renew democracy at home in
tandem with allies and partners. We are stronger when we work
together to address not only China's human rights abuses and
Russia's efforts to undermine Western democracies, but also
rising corruption, disinformation, hate crimes, cyberthreats,
and violent extremist movements. If confirmed, I will leverage
decades of experience from Europe to South Asia, shoring up
alliances in service of shared democratic values, and champion
administration initiatives, such as the Quad Summit and the
planned Democracy Summit. I am strongly committed to using
tools developed by Congress, such as the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy
Act to target human rights violators, human traffickers, and
kleptocrats, and to encourage parallel action by allies and
partners.
Third, we need more integrated, inclusive, and effective
foreign policies and programs that deliver for the American
people. If confirmed, I would build on my experiences inside
and outside government to ensure that our assistance and
policies have measurable impact and help support reliable
rights respecting burden-sharing partners for the United
States. To this end, I will support meaningful implementation
of key bipartisan legislation, such as the Global Fragility
Act, the Child Soldiers Protection Act, and the Women, Peace,
and Security Act. And with the devastating impact of COVID-19,
we need to ensure that humanitarian assistance and diplomacy
work in tandem towards promoting prevention, self-reliance, and
durable solutions.
And finally, with research showing that diverse
organizations produce greater impact and innovation, I will
gladly champion Secretary Blinken's effort to build a more
diverse and inclusive State Department, especially with respect
to the ``J'' family workforce.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here and potentially
return to public service. If confirmed, I will work intensively
with all of the members of this committee on policies that seek
to deliver greater peace, security, and prosperity for the
American people. I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Zeya follows:]
Prepared Statement of Uzra Zeya
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished Committee Members. It is the honor of my lifetime to be
President Biden's nominee for Under Secretary of State for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. I am deeply grateful to the
President and Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in
me.
I also want to thank those who made my journey here possible: my
husband, Tom, for being here today and his decades of service to our
Nation as a U.S. Marine and civilian. I also want to thank our two
children, Kira and Lexi, who could not be here today but whose idealism
never ceases to inspire me.
Ours is a family rooted in public service and the advancement of
freedom--from my father-in-law, a World War II veteran who battled
tyranny at Okinawa; to my grandfather, a freedom fighter in India's
quest for independence; to my mother, whose education was cut short by
marriage at the age of 16, so she invested her brilliance in raising
four independent-minded and opinionated daughters to seize
opportunities never afforded her. I thank my parents, brother, and
sisters for their solidarity in joining virtually today.
In today's disrupted world, the work of the State Department's ``J
family'' of bureaus and offices to advance civilian security,
democracy, and human rights has never been more important.
Authoritarianism, violent anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia
are on the rise worldwide, with a global democratic recession entering
its fifteenth year. The Chinese Government is perpetrating genocide and
crimes against humanity in Xinjiang while strangling autonomy in Hong
Kong and continuing to suppress Tibetans, Christians, and other
religious and ethnic minorities. Global human displacement is at the
highest levels ever recorded and the scourge of human slavery is ever
present, while terrorists expand their lethal reach from Africa to
South Asia.
Recognizing the enormity and complexity of the task ahead, I'd like
to emphasize three core areas where--if confirmed--I would partner with
members of this committee to address:
First, the United States needs to take on the China challenge--what
Secretary Blinken has called our greatest geostrategic test--from a
position of strength, anchored in America's support for human rights
and democratic values. Having led U.S.-China human rights dialogues, I
know the severe repression of human rights in China that has grown even
more acute. I met with courageous Chinese human rights activists and
their family members, gave voice to their concerns at the United
Nations, and demanded the release of Chinese prisoners of conscience
who put their quest for liberty above their personal welfare. I am
proud to have been banned on Weibo--a state-controlled social media
platform--for denouncing systematic Chinese human rights abuses in
2013. We also must continue to press China on synthetic opioids, which
have killed too many Americans.
Second, we must defend and renew democracy at home and abroad, in
tandem with allies, the ``force multipliers'' for our national
security. We are stronger when we work together with democratic allies
and partners to address not only China's human rights abuses and
Russia's malign efforts to undermine Western democracies, but also
rising corruption, disinformation, hate crimes, cyber threats, and
violent extremist movements. If confirmed, I will leverage decades of
experience, from Europe to South Asia, shoring up alliances and
partnerships in service of shared, democratic values, and champion
Biden-Harris administration efforts to empower democratic partnerships,
such as the Quad Summit and the planned Democracy Summit. I am strongly
committed to using tools developed by Congress, such as the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and the Uyghur Human Rights
Policy Act, to target human rights violators, human traffickers, and
kleptocrats--and to encourage parallel actions by allies and partners.
Third, we need more integrated, inclusive, and effective foreign
policies and programs that deliver for the American people. If
confirmed, I would build upon my experiences inside and outside
government, most recently as CEO of a non- partisan global
peacebuilders' network. We must be careful stewards of taxpayer dollars
while ensuring our policies and assistance have a measurable impact and
help support reliable, rights-respecting, burden-sharing partners for
the United States. In consultation with Congress, we must also exercise
greater leadership to implement bipartisan legislation such as the
Global Fragility Act, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, and the Women,
Peace, and Security Act. And with the impact of COVID-19, we need to
ensure that humanitarian assistance and diplomacy work in tandem
towards promoting prevention, self-reliance, and durable solutions.
Finally, research shows diverse organizations produce more
impactful and innovative results. If confirmed, I will champion a more
diverse and inclusive State Department, especially with respect to the
talented, 1,000-plus J family workforce.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. If confirmed, I
will work with members of this committee on policies that seek to
deliver greater peace, security, and prosperity for the American
people. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much to both of you, and we
will start a round of 5 minutes questioning.
Ambassador Nuland, I appreciate your leadership over the
years in countering Kremlin malign influence. I do not think
they were very happy to hear of your nomination, which is a
good thing, but a lot has changed since you were in government.
Thanks to Congress, we have the CAATSA law, which forced the
last administration to take some sanctions measures. However,
the last administration also ignored key mandatory provisions
in CAATSA and did little to galvanize our friends in Europe to
counter Russian aggression in all of its forms. So what
specific new measures would you recommend the Biden
administration take to build cohesion among our European allies
to show a united front against Kremlin aggression?
Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for
your leadership on this issue. I am going to guess you are
right about Kremlin's attitude to today's proceedings. I think
we made a very important step today with the strong package of
sanctions and measures that the President announced, including,
very importantly, constraining Russia's access to our financial
markets, to hold them to account for the SolarWinds attack, and
other things. I think you have also seen that the
administration has already been working hard to align with
allies and partners when it moves on Russia. For example, the
sanctions that were imposed after Navalny's arrest in February
were matched in Europe and in other parts of the world.
I agree with you completely that the U.S. can confront
Russia alone, but that is not the smart policy, and we are far
stronger when we do it together. I was very pleased to see
Chancellor Merkel, for example, issue a parallel, very strong
warning to President Putin with regard to his aggression in and
around Ukraine and the buildup of forces. That is the kind of
thing we need to do, and we need to continue to build sanctions
packages together so that the costs are borne born equally, and
we highlight what Russia is doing collectively.
The Chairman. Can we count on you to robustly implement the
CAATSA law?
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely, as well as Global Magnitsky,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me turn to China, which we
collectively agree is probably biggest strategic challenge
whether it is the broader Indo-Pacific region, getting that
right, which I think is the way in which we ultimately face the
China challenge correctly, or the previous administration,
which I welcomed the Trump administration's clarification of
our legal position on China's unlawful claims in the South
China Sea. How do you intend to be part of implementing a new
approach that we know that such claims are not self-enforcing?
It is critical that we make a legal position of reality, not
just rhetoric in the South China Sea, among other things. How
do you see your role in that regard?
Ambassador Nuland. Well, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you,
and, as I said in the opening, China is not just competing with
us. It wants to change the rules of the global system. This is
the challenge of our time, and having strong bipartisan
consensus, not just in this committee, but across the Congress
and across the country, makes us stronger. So does investing in
our strength at home. But as you have said, and as we talked
about with regard to Russia, doing this in tandem and
addressing all of China's issues in tandem with our allies and
partners is absolutely essential.
So we have to build a coalition of allies and partners to
combat unfair trade practices, to the aggressive security
policies of China in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan
Straits, the cybersecurity, disinformation, all of these
things, and protect against a PRC takeover of international
organizations. I am particularly gratified to see more
countries joining us, as you said, in the South China Sea with
freedom of navigation patrols, et cetera, and we need to take
this new quad and build on it, and get Europe and other parts
of the world more involved.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Nuland. If confirmed, obviously every bureau
that I will oversee will have to play a very strong role in our
China policy, and I would be responsible for weaving that into
everything that we do.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ms. Zeya, let me ask you
one last question. The previous administration, in my view,
deprioritized human rights and weakened U.S. credibility on
this important value. From abdicating our role in the Human
Rights Council to failing to call out dictators' human rights
abuses, the previous administration disregarded one of the most
critical pillars, I view, of U.S. foreign policy. Can you speak
to the importance of U.S. leadership on human rights in terms
of our values and interests, and will you make it a priority to
ensure that we are working to hold both our allies and our
adversaries to the same standards on human rights?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for your leadership on
bipartisan human rights issues as seen in the Strategic
Competition Act, and I think it is a very pertinent question. I
would commend the administration's approach to reasserting U.S.
leadership on human rights by reclaiming an American seat at
the table. I think the U.S. decision to rejoin the recent Human
Rights Council session and to seek reelection to the Human
Rights Council reflects its commitment to make the aspiration
of centering human rights and democratic values in our foreign
policy a reality.
I would say that they are doing this eyes wide open,
recognizing many of the endemic flaws within the Human Rights
Council itself, starting with the fact that you have almost a
who is who of the world's worst human rights violators as
members of that grouping. But I think even within the session
that just took place where the U.S. was an observer, we are
seeing the positive impact of American engagement and
leadership.
And, you know, one of the very important issues that I
would continue to focus on is working to eliminate pervasive
anti-Israel bias in the U.N. At the just concluded Human Rights
Council session, they were able to reduce the number of agenda
items for Article 7. You know, the only country in the world is
Israel in having a specific agenda inclusion in that fashion.
And also work with like-minded partners on issues like Sri
Lanka, Belarus, Iran, on so many of the core concerns of this
committee, and I would work to expand and sustain that
leadership.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, Ms. Nuland, I want to talk about the JCPOA for a moment.
Look, all of us have been through this exasperating exercise
now for many, many, many years. Can you give me your thoughts
on how we can get together on this, the administration and
Congress? I mean, words alone cannot explain to you how
frustrated we were in dealing with the negotiators the last
time as they dealt with Iran. Totally ignored everything we
asked them to do, and then came back and wanted us to agree to
what they had agreed to. How are we going to work through this?
Help me out here.
Ambassador Nuland. Senator Risch, I agree with you 100
percent that whatever agreements we reach with Iran need to be
supported in a bipartisan fashion, not only on this committee,
but across the Congress and across America, and, you know, that
will ensure that they are binding across administrations and
for the long term. So we have to do our job and consult at
every phase, and hear your ideas and incorporate them, and use
your expertise and the expertise that we have on this committee
and throughout the Congress.
We also have to get on with the job because as we sit here,
Iran is now enriching again at 20 percent. It is deploying IR2
centrifuges again. Its breakout time has shortened. So, you
know, first job, get them back in the box, and then together
define what ``longer and stronger'' means, and work together as
we go through these negotiations.
You know, I think you know from our time together working
on Ukraine, we built that policy together, and it was enduring
because of that. And if confirmed, I would pledge to be here as
often as we need to be to ensure that we all support what is
going--what is happening.
Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. One of the things
that strikes me, and I have just become so disgusted with this
over the years. I have listened very carefully to the nation
that is most directly affected by what happens with Iran's
nuclear ambitions, and they are very clear that it does not
matter what kind of an agreement you make, they are going to
take care of themselves. And so, look, however we go forward in
this, they have got to be brought into the fold here to come
along because they do not believe they are bound by this. They
believe that their existence depends on Iran not having a
nuclear weapon, and they are going to see that they do not,
regardless of what the agreement says. So this is an issue that
really has to be addressed.
And the question I keep asking the administration is, what
happens when you get the call, because that is going to be the
question. What do we do when we get the call? And so I think
that is something that is obviously appropriate for a closed
session, but somebody has got to answer that question.
In any event, let's talk for just a minute. Well, my time
is running out. Let me, again, express my frustration on the
U.N. Human Rights Council. I understand all the criticism that
was given to the last administration for getting up and walking
out of the Council. Frankly, I was not as shocked as a lot of
people were. I do not know how you sit at a table with--Ms.
Zeya, as you indicated, you are sitting around a table with the
who is who of human rights violators on the planet, and how do
you talk to these people? How do you say to them, you guys got
to behave yourself even a little bit more, and they are telling
us mind your own business, you know, we will handle our things
internally. How do you handle that?
Ms. Zeya. Senator, I share your concern and even
frustration over that issue, but I think it is a question of
tactics where U.S. disengagement from the multilateral system
leaves a vacuum that others are very gladly there to fill,
starting with China, but also Russia and other countries allied
to basically entirely distort the framework of universal human
rights, arguments of sovereignty, to reject any notion of
international scrutiny or accountability for human rights
violations.
So I think the United States needs to be there, but I think
the critical element as well, as I cited, is really leveraging
our alliances and partnerships, something that China and Russia
do not have and does not compare, as a force multiplier to
basically integrate universal human rights and our democratic
values to make bodies like the Human Rights Council much more
effective, and upholding the mission that they were set out to
pursue.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you. That is really good
description of what they do and their malign activities, but I
think the general statement that we want to make things better,
as you talked about it, getting them to move forward on this, I
wish you well. I really, really do. But, boy, I will tell you,
watching what they have done and how they defend it, I am sure
not optimistic in that regard. But I wish you well, and we will
support you every way we can. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me
thank both Ambassador Nuland and Ms. Zeya for your public
service, your incredible record to our country, and your
willingness to continue. And I also want to express my thanks
to your family for putting up with public service. It is not
always easy, so thank you both.
You both have mentioned that our foreign policy mission
must be defined by our values, and I agree completely with
that. I have listened to President Biden express that on
several occasions as well as Secretary of State Blinken. Both
of you mentioned Global Magnitsky, and I am pleased that you
underscored the importance of that particular statute that was
passed by Congress and incorporated in an executive order by
the President. You might be aware that there is a limitation on
that, a sunset clause, and there is legislation to remove that
sunset clause. And I take it we will have your support for
making clear that that statute needs to be made permanent by
Congress.
Ms. Zeya. Yes, Senator. Absolutely.
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I got both of your answers.
Thanks. Appreciate that. And, Ambassador Nuland, I want to just
underscore your point about President Biden's action taken
against Russia. It was not only a decisive action, as it was.
It was very clear on its findings, which was refreshing to see
the President of United States be very clear about Russia's
accountability under Mr. Putin in regards to incursions on
borders of other countries, in regards to the treatment of Mr.
Navalny, in regards to interference in our cybersecurity, all
those. It was a very clear finding, so that was refreshing to
see. So knowing your record, it looks like the President is
following in your footsteps about being very direct about
issues, and we appreciate that very much.
I also want to underscore the point that both of you made,
that we have to engage our allies. If we are going to be
effective in our foreign policy objectives, it is not only
having bipartisan support here in Congress. It is having the
support of like-minded countries, and that requires effort, and
we have done that in regards to the sanctions under Global
Magnitsky. We have gotten more and more countries to go along
with us, but I think we need to do more of those, that type of
outreach.
Ms. Zeya, I want to just mention one area that is under
your portfolio, and that is trafficking in persons. We have a
pretty clear statute on trafficking in persons. It is pretty
objective findings as to what tier a country would find itself.
But we have had problems under previous administrations where
political considerations interfered with the objective findings
of countries because of other bilateral considerations. Do we
have your commitment that you will maintain the integrity of
the TIP reports so that it is based solely on the facts and not
interfered with by other politics?
Ms. Zeya. Yes, Senator. Absolutely.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. And I use that as an example
because there is legislation that I hope will move in this
Congress that will use that model for dealing with anti-
corruption activities in countries. All countries have problems
with trafficking. All countries have problems with corruption.
Many of the issues that you have talked to, the root problem is
corruption. Mr. Putin does what he does because he gets a lot
of money. Oligarchs support his operations, his corruption, and
we need to increase the capacity in our country missions to
evaluate the corruption situations as we did with trafficking,
and then evaluate and use that for foreign policy
considerations, and that legislation does exactly that. So can
I have both of your commitments to work with us on passing
legislation that would use the trafficking model to deal with
corruption so that we have capacity in each of our mission
countries to deal with corruption in those countries?
Ms. Zeya. Yes, Senator. I confirm to consult with you and
would certainly support the elevation of U.S. anti-corruption
efforts, and view corruption as both a violation of human
rights, a means to sustain autocracy, as well as an inherent
danger to democracies.
Ambassador Nuland. Senator, same from me. Corruption is a
country killer. It is also a tool of malign outside actors. I
think we have got to do a better job of pulling together the
tools of government to help countries attack corruption, so
combining the efforts of the State Department, intelligence
services, Treasury, Justice into a fusion, and we can do that
off the embassy platforms, but we also have to train and
educate and support our officers out in the field better. And
if confirmed, I look forward to working with you on these
issues.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. My last point--it is not a
question--is that, dealing with diversity in the State
Department is a very high priority, and I know both of you have
mentioned that. Recognize that you have support in the Senate
to advance diversity within the Department of State. We have--
it is a challenge because we are looking for senior positions
as well as entry positions, and I hope that you will work with
us on a strategy as to how we can improve the record of
diversity within the State Department.
Ms. Zeya. Yes, I will.
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin, and I think you
have spoken to the ranking member as well. We look forward in
the near future to have your legislation on corruption, which I
understand is bipartisan, for a markup soon.
I am going to see if we have some of our colleagues
virtually. Senator Paul?
[No response.]
The Chairman. All right. Senator Cruz?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Senator Hagerty?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Okay. Then as we wait for them to get
connected, let me turn to Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations to both of you on your nominations. And thank
you both for your willingness to come back into the State
Department and continue your public service, which has been
admirable on both counts.
Ambassador Nuland, I have expressed disappointment in the
President's decision to set the September deadline in
Afghanistan to remove all of our troops. Given that we have a
very limited time there, is there anything that we should be
looking for in terms of benchmarks that we should try and reach
before that September deadline?
Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for
your long commitment to Afghanistan, and particularly to the
women of Afghanistan. As you mentioned, when we prepare for the
U.S. redeployment of forces, that puts an emphasis even more
strongly on the diplomatic aspects of our work and on the
embassy as the platform for that. So we have really got to bear
down on this peace process and on bolstering civilian, and
economic, and humanitarian assistance programs, and
particularly those that protect the gains that have been made,
and the gains of women and human rights, Afghan people. We have
got to, as the President has pledged to do, expand and expedite
special immigrant visas for those Afghans who helped us. We
have got to ensure that, as we find a new place to stage our
counterterrorism efforts, that we are successful in the
diplomacy to establish that, but also in their ability to
deploy as needed. I think we also have to look at our embassy
platform, particularly when we do not have military security
around it.
So I would expect we are going to be coming back to this
committee and to the Congress as a whole for more support, and
particularly also to get you involved in the diplomacy. I know
that has been something you have been willing to do in the
past, so watch this space. Thanks.
Senator Shaheen. And can you expand a little bit on post-
withdrawal strategy with respect to how we can continue to
support the gains that women and girls have made in
Afghanistan?
Ambassador Nuland. Well, Senator, I want to be careful here
because I obviously------
Senator Shaheen. Assuming you have been confirmed.
Ambassador Nuland. Yes. Yeah. I was not part of the
deliberations, but, as you know, we have very robust support
programs, assistance programs, and civilian training programs
for women and girls both in Afghanistan and outside. I think we
need to ensure that our allies and partners are also
contributing to that effort. And we have to hold the Afghan
Government and the Taliban to account for their commitments in
this regard, and it needs to be a fundamental measure of
whether Afghanistan is making progress or retaining the gains
or sliding backwards.
Senator Shaheen. Ms. Zeya, I appreciate your mentioning the
Women Peace and Security Act in your opening remarks. I think
it is a very important tool that we have, and I was
disappointed that it was not used by the previous
administration in Afghanistan as they were negotiating with the
Taliban. But can you talk about how you will work with the
Office of Global Women's Issues, if you are confirmed, to
ensure that the ``J'' family is aligned with the gender
concerns of GWI and the GPC?
Ms. Zeya. Absolutely, Senator, and I want to thank you for
your leadership on building bipartisan consensus for, you know,
greater women's empowerment and ultimately achieving women,
peace, and security goals. And I think the Afghanistan example
is critical, as you discussed with Ambassador Nuland. I would
say, from my own perspective, I think it is very important with
this decision for the U.S. to continue to strongly support
increased women's participation in the peace process. As you
are well aware, women's participation in peace processes, most
of which fail, you know, by record of history, makes them 35
percent more likely to last 15 years or more. This is critical,
I think, at the inflection point we find ourselves.
It is also critical to take an integrated approach in the
State Department. I think since the GWI Office was created,
and, you know, it has been a bipartisan effort with important
progress made, it is really critical to recognize this is not
the work of one office. So if confirmed, I would certainly seek
to further integrate gender equality across the full spectrum
of ``J'' family activity, obviously on democracy and human
rights, but also on issues like counterterrorism, counter-
narcotics, and, quite obviously, trafficking in persons. So
this work is too important, it is too enormous for anyone
office to accomplish alone, and I certainly would seek to
leverage the talent and expertise in the ``J'' family to make
WPS goals a reality. And I think we have a critical task ahead
of us in Afghanistan to make that possible.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you both very much. If you are
confirmed, and I assume you will be, I look forward to working
with you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Thank you for
your leadership on global women's issues. With that, I
understand now that Senator Hagerty is with us virtually?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Senator Hagerty?
Senator Hagerty. Thank you very much. I have a question for
Ms. Zeya, please. Ms. Zeya, this is a matter of deep concern to
me. It is a serious problem in my home State of Tennessee.
December 1st, 2018, President Xi promised then-President Trump
to halt the export of fentanyl and all of the ingredients used
to make fentanyl. Since that promise was made, we have had over
100,000 American lives lost to synthetic opioids, directly
traceable to CCP-produced fentanyl. If I think about it,
America has done a great job, in the current administration and
the administration that preceded it, in dealing with the COVID-
19 situation, but there is no vaccine for the addiction to
fentanyl that we are experiencing at the hands of communist
China. Can you tell me what your plan is to address this and to
hold President Xi to his promise made in December of 2018?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising a critically-
important issue, and I just want to express my own concern for
the welfare of your constituents, and this was one of the
reasons I raised this point in my opening remarks. And as you
recounted, I think there was progress made under the previous
administration where China agreed to implement controls and
schedule fentanyl analogs, but sadly, what happened is we saw
transnational criminal organizations adapt and basically shift
to using precursor chemicals from China, negating the gains
from the previous effort, which was the result of considerable
U.S. diplomacy and negotiation. So I absolutely believe that
the Chinese Government can and must do more to hold its
citizens and companies accountable that are supplying these
precursors to transnational criminal organizations in Mexico
and elsewhere.
I think the United States needs to take a whole-of-
government approach where the State Department, our embassy in
Beijing, plays a very important role, but we also need to work
with the Department of Homeland Security, DEA, and DOJ, to take
on the Chinese Government's willful ignorance on this issue and
to really prioritize saving the lives. As you mentioned, the
record numbers of American losses due to opioid-related
overdoses is unacceptable, and this is something I would intend
to prioritize if confirmed.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate your prioritization of that,
and I would also underscore the fact that our border has become
far more porous at Mexico, and that is where this fentanyl is
coming in and being produced in mass quantities. I was just
back in my home State of Tennessee talking with sheriffs, with
mayors, and what they have told me is something I think is
probably being experienced across America. There has been a
huge uptick in the number of overdoses since the borders
collapsed after the 20th of January. So this situation has
become even more critical at this point, and very much
appreciate your attention to it.
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for sharing that information,
and I will certainly work to prioritize that in the work of the
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, and I know
this remains a significant priority in terms of our counter-
narcotics engagement with Mexico.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Next is Senator Kaine, and there
is a vote that is ongoing. It is the intention of the chair to
work through the vote, so I would urge members to possibly vote
and return. The order I have in order of appearance is--and,
course, we will flip back and forth to the extent that there
are members on the other side who are available. It is Senator
Kaine, Senator Merkley. I do not know if they will be here, but
Senator Schatz, Senator Van Hollen, Senator Coons, Senator
Booker, and Senator Murphy. That is the order I have. With
that, Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Great to see both of you, and
congratulations on your nominations. Ambassador Nuland,
briefly, I am about to reintroduce a bill that this committee
acted on last year but that never saw action on the floor that
would clarify that no President can withdraw unilaterally from
NATO without congressional action. NATO is a Senate-affirmed
treaty. I view this as a statement of congressional
prerogative, but also just simply an effort to demonstrate to
our NATO allies that congressional support for the alliance's
near 75 years is still very, very strong. You have a lot of
experience with our NATO allies. Would they see that statement
of strong intent from Congress in a positive light?
Ambassador Nuland. Thanks, Senator Kaine. When you
introduced it last year, you could hear the huzzahs on the
other side of the Atlantic. I think there was quite a lot of
concern. And, you know, I also think that it is really
interesting that over the last 3 years, public opinion polling
on the United States with regard to NATO has gone up to record
levels over the last 20 years. You know, Americans want to work
with allies and partners, so I think you are reflecting the
bipartisan commitment to our great alliance as well across the
country. So I commend you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. And when that bill was acted on
by the committee last year, just to specify, it was a very
bipartisan vote. It was bipartisan in introduction. The version
that we will introduce, again, is very bipartisan. Ms. Zeya,
thank you for the conversation that we had the other day. One
of the issues I would like to ask you about is the issue of the
refugee cap. The past administration dramatically scaled back
U.S. acceptance of refugees, and the Biden administration sort
of in its campaign and earlier today said we wanted to kind of
return more to the norm where the U.S. was accepting refugees
who go through a careful vetting process because our Nation has
been such a haven for those seeking refuge from circumstances
that are just nearly unspeakable. Tell me, is it your
understanding that it is still the administration's intent to
revert back to a norm on refugee admission? Some of us are a
little bit discouraged at the timing and pacing of that, but
please let us know what the administration's plans are, to your
knowledge.
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator. I can assure you that I
strongly support President Biden's public commitment to raise
the ceiling for refugee admissions to 125,000 for fiscal year
2022. Now, as a nominee I am not privy to policy discussions
that are under way, but I know that the President is committed
to regrowing this program and doing it in the most effective,
orderly, and humane way possible. So if confirmed, I will do
everything in my power to make this a reality.
Senator Kaine. My surmise is that when the past
administration cut the program down so dramatically in terms of
the admissions, they may have also reassigned staff who were
working on vetting and other issues. And so I do not think we
want to just go back to the number without having the staff to
make sure the program is run well, so I think we would all
understand if it takes a while to get back to the norm. But
should you be confirmed, we would really love your reporting to
us about the progress toward that, recognizing it is not just a
State Department issue, but multiple agencies work on this, and
we would love to be in dialogue with you about that going
forward.
Human rights questions, I cannot think of anybody whose
background is better suited than yours to dealing with these
tough human rights issues. And one of the things that, you
know, I have often found on this committee in dealing with
human rights issues is, it is one thing to raise them against
adversaries, you know, what is happening with the Uyghurs in
China, what is happening with Hong Kong pro-democracy
activists, and we need to be muscular in raising this with
adversaries, but it is one of the most difficult sets of human
rights issues when you are dealing with allies. And, you know,
whether it is a--we have had an alliance with Saudi Arabia, we
have an alliance with Egypt, but we run into significant human
rights challenges with them.
And when you raise human rights issues with an ally, one of
the stock responses we used to hear from the past
administration, but not just them, from others, is, well, if
you push us too hard on human rights, of course, we will just
buy our arms or do our, you know, diplomatic activities with
Russia or others. Just talk about how we balance aggressive
promotion of our human rights values with this sort of oft-
repeated threat that, well, if you push us, we will deal with
countries that are not interested in human rights.
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising, you know, what
is a challenging and a critically-important issue, this issue
of consistency with respect to centering human rights and
democratic values in our foreign policy. And in this case, the
way I see it, the administration is absolutely committed to
democratic renewal at home and abroad. And what this means is
it is important, as we seek to shore up our alliances and
partnerships, for us to hold one another accountable. And
ultimately, I think we have seen how a selective U.S. approach
to human rights, one that only targets U.S. competitors or
adversaries, ultimately undermines U.S. credibility and
leadership. So I can pledge to you, if confirmed, I would work
very closely with Ambassador Nuland, with counterparts in
regional bureaus, our 270 missions in the field, to strike the
right balance and to make sure that we are truly centering
human rights and democratic values in our foreign policy.
I think that the initiative of the Democracy Summit, which
the President is committed to, is a very important one where we
can help carry a concrete agenda forward on issues like
corruption, countering rising authoritarianism, and really
defending human rights at home and abroad.
Senator Kaine. Thank you much. I am over my time. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you. I just want to echo Senator
Kaine's concern about the presidential declaration on refugees.
There is a difference between refugee resettlement and the
question of those who seek asylum at our border. They are
fundamentally different, and they should not be conflated, and
I do hope and I believe the President is committed to that, but
the sooner he signs the declaration, the greater the
crystallization of that commitment will be realized. So thank
you.
I am not sure if there are any members presently waiting
virtually. If you are, please speak up at this time.
[No response.]
The Chairman. I am not hearing any. I do understand that
Senator Coons is coming back and there is another member on his
way. So let me take advantage of the time to ask one or two
questions that I had intended to wait to the end.
Ambassador, Azerbaijan's attack on the Armenian people last
fall with Turkey's full support was, in my view, an unspeakable
tragedy. The absence of top-level United States diplomacy
throughout the war was inexcusable, and we have to prevent it
from repeating in the future. I also believe the U.S. must
press Azerbaijan to release the prisoner of war numbers that it
has, which it is refusing to release them, in violation of
international law, and to ensure that the Armenians displaced
from their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh get the assistance they
need. So if you are confirmed, will you commit to advocating
for robust humanitarian assistance, including de-mining funds,
to help the Armenians in the South Caucasus who have been
displaced from their homes or otherwise affected by
Azerbaijan's attack? And secondly, what can we do to revitalize
the OSCE Minsk Group and create a more sustainable peace
process?
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, I think you
know that I have worked on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-
Karabakh issues for some 25 years, and the way things went down
last year was absolutely tragic for so many in the region. So
as you say, we have to get prisoners released. We have to get
humanitarian support back in. We have to ensure the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Armenia and that it can make its
own decisions, and we have to talk to our ally, Turkey.
You know, the Secretary has spoken about needing to be
clear eyed regarding trends in Turkey. I think we have got a
lot of work to do there in our bilateral relationship to make
clear our concerns about not only what Turkey is doing outside
its country, but also what it is doing inside its country. So I
think we have got to get back into the business of strong
support for the Caucasus countries, being active
diplomatically, getting high-level leadership there, showing
support, et cetera, and using all of our economic and
humanitarian tools.
The Chairman. And I hope we will be a strong advocate for
getting POWs back. I mean, it is just in violation of
international law.
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely.
The Chairman. With that, let me turn to Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to both the
nominees. Congratulations on your nominations. I have enjoyed
conversations with both of you in my office.
Ms. Nuland, I want to turn to a topic that is not going to
surprise you, and it is a topic we have discussed at great
length, and that is Putin's Nord Stream 2 pipeline. I have deep
concerns that the Biden administration is on the verge of
squandering what was an enormous bipartisan victory won by this
committee, by Congress, and the previous administration last
year. Nord Stream 2 was 90 percent complete when Congress
passed bipartisan sanctions that I authored, along with Senator
Shaheen, that stopped the pipeline in its tracks, immediately
stopped the pipeline for a year.
Russia has begun again building the pipeline. It did so in
the weeks following Joe Biden's election, and it did so because
Russia believes the Biden administration is not going to follow
the law, that they are not going to enforce the bipartisan
sanctions that have passed now both houses of Congress with the
chairman's support, with the support of virtually every member
of this committee, passed twice now, sanctions targeting Nord
Stream 2. And yet there are voices within the Biden
administration that I think are arguing not to enforce the law
and enforce the sanctions.
Ms. Nuland, in your judgment, can you assess the damage to
American national security and to the energy security of our
European allies if the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is completed?
Ambassador Nuland. Senator Cruz, thank you for your
leadership on this issue. We did have a robust conversation
about this, and we also worked on the energy security together
when I was in the European assistant secretary job. Look, this
is not just a bad deal for Germany and Europe. It violates
their own climate policy, their energy policy to go greener. It
deepens their dependence on Russia just at a time when Moscow
is rearming around and inside Ukraine and when they are letting
Navalny wither in prison. So I want to thank you for the tools
you, and this committee, and this Congress have given us. I
think we need to use all the tools at our disposal to stop this
pipeline before it is finished. We need to press the German
Government to do the same.
As I said earlier, I was very pleased to see a strong
statement from Chancellor Merkel warning President Putin about
his arming in Ukraine. Nothing would send a stronger signal to
him than the cancellation of this pipeline, and I think we have
got to make that point. And if confirmed, it will be a top
early priority of mine.
Senator Cruz. So if you are confirmed, what steps would you
anticipate taking to stop the completion of Nord Stream 2?
Ambassador Nuland. I understand there are sanctions
packages in development, some of them based on information that
has been provided and circulated from the Congress. I think we
have to accelerate the sanctions packages. I also think we have
to be much clearer and stronger with our German allies that
this is a matter of bipartisan concern across the United
States, and it is taking Germany in the wrong direction in
terms of its relationship with Russia. And all of us together
now need to stand up to an increasingly aggressive Putin. So
lots to do.
Senator Cruz. So I very much agree with you. I also think
time is of the essence. The Russians are trying to jam through
and finish this pipeline before the administration takes
action. As you know, I have tried to work with the
administration, using both carrot and stick, to prompt the
administration to comply with the law and use the tools that
are available. I appreciated Secretary of State Blinken putting
out a strong statement on Nord Stream 2. And, as you know,
because you were in the room when we negotiated that agreement
in my office, that in exchange for that statement, I lifted two
holds that I had placed on nominees from this administration. I
very much hope to lift other holds as well, but the agreement
that we worked out was designed to be incremental and staged,
and in order for the next set of holds to be lifted, we need to
see sanctions on the entities responsible for Nord Stream 2.
And the Biden State Department has indicated that those
would be forthcoming, but they have not been, and I will say
there are reports of ongoing resistance within the
administration to doing so. If that resistance manifests in
delays that will turn into an unequivocal win for Putin, a loss
for Europe, and a loss for America. And so let me urge the
administration to honor the commitments that it has made,
follow the law, and issue the sanctions that are mandatory
under law. We can stop this pipeline. We have stopped this
pipeline, and it is only the signals of weakness and a
willingness to disregard the law that have enticed Russia into
returning once again to building the pipeline. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Van Hollen is
online with us virtually.
Senator Van Hollen. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and let
me thank both of our witnesses here today. Ambassador Nuland,
let me start with you. I was pleased to see President Biden
impose sanctions yesterday and today on Russia given Putin's
continuing aggression, given their cyberattacks on the United
States, including on our democracy and in working to interfere
in our elections. And, of course, we see increased aggressive
activity in eastern Ukraine from Putin.
Meanwhile, the chairman mentioned in his opening statement
a number of actions being taken by one of our allies, Turkey.
Under President Erdogan, Turkey has purchased the advanced air
defense system, the S400, from Russia. Turkey has violated the
airspace of another NATO ally, Greece, and invaded the
territorial waters of Cyprus. Under Erdogan, they have attacked
our Syrian Kurdish allies who were critical to our fight
against ISIS, additional measures taken in Armenia, so this
does not sound like a faithful NATO ally to me. Can you talk
about how you and the administration propose to deal with the
challenges we are facing now under President Erdogan's Turkey?
Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen. I agree
with you that this is a very challenging allied relationship
that is going to require a whole lot more work. As I said to
the chairman, I agree with the Secretary. We have got to be
clear eyed and firm about it. It makes zero sense to me that a
NATO ally is buying new Russian weapons systems. It is also a
matter of bipartisan concern across the United States. We need
to continue to press Turkey on this issue, as well as all of
the other issues that we have together, and we have got to--you
know, including democracy and human rights inside the country,
freedom of the press. We have got to get on the same page
together with regard to Syria and Libya, and, as we talked
about earlier, Nagorno-Karabakh.
And, more broadly, I think we have got to start a
conversation in NATO about backsliding on our values among
allies. The United State is far from perfect itself as we all
know, but it is very important that we all recommit at that
table to the things that make us strongest, and, particularly,
in the context of a rise of autocracy and illiberalism across
the world. NATO allies have to stand for freedom, democracy,
and governments that serve their people. So if confirmed, I
look forward to rolling up sleeves, getting back to Ankara, and
having these conversations.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you. I was also pleased to
see the Biden administration, first of all, reaffirm our
ironclad commitment to the security of Israel and, you know,
deepen those ties even further. And also I was pleased to see
them reaffirm what had been longtime bipartisan support for a
two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. There
are a lot of people who think it is too late for a two-state
solution given the changes on the ground in the territories and
other factors. Do you believe it is too late, and, if not, what
needs to be done to ensure that we preserve the option of a
viable two-state solution?
Ambassador Nuland. Thanks, Senator. It remains profoundly
in U.S. national interests to support a two-state solution. As
you know, Senator, it is going to require willing and ready
partners on both sides in the Israeli context where, again, in
a government formation period in the Palestinian Authority,
there needs to be will as well. And in the meantime, we need to
ensure that both Israel and the PA refrain from any unilateral
steps that could exacerbate tensions and make it harder to get
to a two-state solution.
I think the United States has got to remain a steady
partner and continue to say to both Israel and the Palestinian
Authority that this is the best path for peace, so. I think
that is where we have got to go. And I think it is important
that the National Security Council is running almost weekly
sessions with Israeli counterparts, particularly in this period
of transition in Israel, to keep us connected not only on these
issues, but on Iran and other vital issues in the region.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I know
I have run out of time. I will submit my questions for our
other witness, and congratulations to both of you on your
nominations.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen. Chairman
Menendez has gone to the floor to vote. As you both, as
seasoned public servants, know, the schedule of the Senate is
not entirely predictable, so for those watching and may be
surprised that I just popped in--Senator Coons--I am sitting in
for a few moments for the chairman as he goes to vote.
Thank you so much, Ambassador Nuland, Ms. Zeya, for your
willingness to serve our Nation again and for the support and
love that your family and your circle of supporters have
offered throughout your decades of service. I look forward to
working with both of you to address the many foreign policy
challenges facing our country, how to build a bipartisan China
strategy, something I am really encouraged about progress being
made here by Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Risch and
their staff. There is bipartisan legislation being introduced
that will be marked up next week. I am very excited about that
and look forward to joining as a sponsor and supporting their
work on that; the work to address Iran's nuclear program and
other threats regionally from the Islamic Republic, efforts to
support stability in the Middle East while avoiding additional
long-term entanglements, efforts to push back on and contain
the malign influence of the Russian Government. There are so
many challenges, I could take all of 5 minutes in summarizing
them, and I hope we will get to work closely together on
prioritizing human rights, defending democracy, revitalizing
the State Department, confronting shortcomings in workforce
diversity, and others.
Let me just ask both of you, if I could, about the Global
Fragility Act. Ms. Zeya you were kind enough to reference it in
your opening remarks. This is a tool provided by Congress on a
bipartisan basis, I helped co-author, to address the root
causes of extremism and violence in fragile countries. Will you
commit to reviewing it, and to promptly selecting the priority
countries for the Global Fragility Act, and submitting a
revised strategy that takes into account the post-COVID
context?
Ms. Zeya. Yes, absolutely, Senator.
Ambassador Nuland. I think one of the fun things here, if
we are both confirmed, is that we would work on these issues
together because it will obviously cross the remits of both of
our jobs, so looking forward to it.
Senator Coons. It is my hope and expectation we will use
this tool to balance assistance around security, democracy,
human rights, and to make sure that between diplomacy
development and defense, we have got the order right.
The Moscow Bureau of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is
under intense pressure, really under siege by the Kremlin, just
one of many recent examples of an authoritarian crackdown on
press freedoms around the world. How would you support, if
confirmed our RFE/RL's efforts to ensure that Russian citizens
have access to unbiased news about their own country, and what
actions would you take to support free press around the world?
If I might, Ms. Zeya.
Ms. Zeya. Senator, I think it is critical for, you know,
for the United States to take a whole-of-government approach on
these issues. So certainly, if confirmed, I would work closely
with the undersecretary for public diplomacy as well as USAGM
on this critical closing space for civil society and free
expression in Russia that is critical to holding the Putin
Government accountable for their widespread violations of human
rights. So I would look to work with partners in government as
well as the mission in the field to elevate this issue and act
accordingly.
Senator Coons. Thank you. Ambassador Nuland on press
freedom broadly?
Ambassador Nuland. Yeah, just to pile on, Senator, and
thank you for raising RFE/RL. I agree with you that they are at
a critical moment here. Really interestingly, I think one of
the reasons the Kremlin is cracking down is because
listenership and viewership at RFE/RL has gone up exponentially
over the last recent years, and not just in Russia, but also in
Belarus and other parts of the world where press is
constrained. So one of the things that Moscow understands is
reciprocity. If confirmed, I would be interested in looking at
whether we are being reciprocally constraining with regard to
RT Sputnik and other Russian Government organs. Press freedom
is an absolutely essential human right and part of good
governance around the world.
I would just lay down a marker here that I am also
concerned about press freedom in the NATO space. We have a
number of allies backsliding here, and it is very important
that we keep that front of agenda. And we also have a number of
American companies that, you know, broadcast freely in these
countries, and their ability to do that is being constrained by
government. So a lot of work to do.
Senator Coons. I introduced a bipartisan Libya
Stabilization Act in the last Congress and recently
reintroduced it. This would support a diplomatic resolution to
the ongoing grinding conflict in Libya, a country where there
are 280,000 IDPs and 570,000 refugees. What additional action
should we be taking to ensure that elections actually take
place in December of this year and to enable the Government to
be successful, and would movement by this committee on a bill
like the Libya Stabilization Act be constructive? Ambassador
Nuland, if you might.
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely. We have a sliver of light
now in Libya with these elections, agreed, and we have got to
ensure that they are free, fair, that they are internationally
observed. This is a place where, again, working with allies and
partners, Europeans obviously, but countries in the--in the
region to support Libya as it goes forward with all of this, we
may need more resources to do that. I, you know, if confirmed,
look forward to opening up the hood and seeing what we are
already doing and working with allies and partners to ensure
that the Libyan people feel that support and get this chance
that they have suffered so much for.
Senator Coons. Any additional comments before I turn to my
colleague, Senator Murphy?
Ms. Zeya. Senator, I would just add on Libya, endorsing
Ambassador Nuland's comments, I think we should also leverage
all tools available, including U.N. and U.S. Government
sanctions, to bring an end to foreign military intervention,
hold violators of human rights accountable, and ultimately
support the goal of a sovereign, stable unified Libya.
Senator Coons. Wonderful. Thank you both. Let me now turn
to my colleague, Senator Murphy of Connecticut.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Senator Coons. Welcome
to you both. Thank you for your willingness to serve once
again. Ms. Zeya, I look forward to building a working
relationship with you. To Ambassador Nuland, I am glad to have
you back as a partner. I will tell you, your candor and your
reputation for candor, we appreciate it here on the Foreign
Relations Committee. We often get a lot of spin from
administration officials on both sides of the aisle, but I
think you are well respected here on both sides of the aisle
because of your ability and willingness to talk to us about
facts on the ground as they are, not as we wish. So great to
see you again.
Speaking of facts on the ground, I wanted to bring us back
to the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, and just note
a statement from the Saudi foreign ministry dated yesterday or
today in which an official there said we can begin with a
nuclear deal and move on to another format that we will discuss
all these other issues in a positive manner. Some folks took
note of that statement, but it, frankly, likely acknowledges
two realities: one, that our partners in the Gulf would like to
be at the table when we discuss broader regional security
concerns, in particular, Iran's support for terrorist
organizations or their ballistic missile program, but also,
that it is much more likely to have that conversation
constructively if we get back into the JCPOA and get back on
the same page with the P5+1.
And so I wanted to ask you whether you think that the
likelihood of getting a comprehensive agreement, where we
litigate all of our disputes with Iran, is more likely today
than it was in 2013, 2014, and 2015, when we were negotiating
the JCPOA.
Ambassador Nuland. Senator Murphy, it is great to see you.
Although I am a citizen in Senator Kaine's region at the
moment, I grew up in Connecticut, so Connecticut strong. Look,
on Iran, I think we have got to pursue all of these problems in
tandem. Whether that is a question of a comprehensive
agreement, I think there are many players in many different
pieces of this. What is most urgent today is that Iran is
breaking out again of its nuclear box. It is enriching at 20
percent. It is using these advanced centrifuges. We have got to
get them back in the box on the nuclear front. But at the same
time, we can and should be countering their malign regional
influence by being stronger diplomatically in Syria.
I have concerns that the diplomatic table, the future of
Syria's political structure, et cetera, is being run by Russia
and Iran, and the United States needs to be more active there.
We need to support Lebanon more strongly against malign Iranian
influence, and I was glad to see the undersecretary for
political affairs, David Hale, smake a trip to Lebanon. You
have worked a lot on the Yemen issue.
So I believe we can be working on Iran's malign influence
at the same time that we are having these conversations about
the nuclear problem, and, frankly, the players are different in
some of those things. And we have also got a build the basis
for people to understand better than they do now what Iran is
doing on the missile front. So walk and chew gum would be my
answer to your question.
Senator Murphy. Yeah, so I agree that our goal should be to
walk and chew gum at the same time. Do you think we have to be
driven by realities on the ground? And I, for instance, do not
believe that we are going to be able to make progress in Yemen
while we are still outside of the JCPOA. I think while we are
still engaged in maximum pressure, the Iranians are likely to
use every opportunity they can find to provoke. And so I do
think that there is some argument to sequence here, and I will
continue to make that argument on this committee.
In the remaining time I have left, I just wanted to turn to
the subject that you and I have spent a lot of time working on
together, and that is Ukraine. Obviously, you know, we have
taken strong steps today to send a strong message to the
Russians about the message we need to send regarding the array
of Russian forces on the border. But it has always been, I
think, our belief that while Russia wants to use that front in
order to put pressure on the Ukrainian Government, their
longer-term plan is not likely a full military takeover of
Ukraine, but to try to politically and economically weaken that
country to the point where they ultimately just make the
decision to install pro-Russian or a Russia-friendly government
again.
And so I would just ask this question. It is still
incredibly important for us to view this as a multi-systemic
effort that, while we have to have a military answer and
support Ukraine in a military way, we also have to be equally
focused on supporting their economy, supporting their political
reform agenda, because that is maybe the most likely mechanism
for Russia to eventually get a state of affairs that aligns
with their interests.
Ambassador Nuland. I absolutely agree completely, and, you
know, your leadership on Ukraine was essential the last time I
was in government, and the fact that you continue to support
Ukraine is important. The number one thing Ukraine needs to be
a strong, stable, sovereign state is to tackle endemic
corruption. The United States has put a huge amount of effort
into that, but corruption is also a tool that the Kremlin uses
to corrode Ukraine from the inside and by governments, et
cetera. So it is in all of our interests to continue to work on
those issues.
And the Zelensky Government has taken some important steps
in recent weeks, but there is a lot more to be done. And we
also need to get--support them and getting back into alignment
with the IMF and all of those things that you have worked on.
And the strong support from the Congress for Ukraine has been
important, but they need to take the steps to walk the walk.
Senator Murphy. Thank you. Thank you to you both. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. My understanding is there are no
members seeking recognition on either side of the aisle, and
with that, thanks to both nominees for their time today.
The record will remain open until the close of business on
Friday, April the 16th. I would urge the nominees to answer
questions expeditiously in order for their nominations to be
able to move forward to a business meeting.
The Chairman. And with that, the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Too often, regional bureaus have sidelined DRL and other
essential functional bureaus. If confirmed, how will you ensure better
consultation and coordination between DRL, other functional bureaus,
and the regional bureaus you will lead as P?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize to the regional bureaus
under my supervision, as well as to the functional bureaus, that the
President's vision of placing human rights and democracy at the heart
of the foreign policy of the United States necessitates full inclusion
of DRL in the Department's policy-making processes. I intend, if
confirmed, to work with the Under Secretary for Civilian Security and
Human Rights, and with DRL's leadership, to ensure full policy
coordination among regional bureaus and across the Department.
Question. What actions will you take, including with our partners,
to address the global forced migration crisis? How specifically will
you work to address the root causes of displacement such as new and
unresolved conflicts; support populations on the move and those
enduring lengthy displacement; and seek innovative solutions to assist
low-income countries who host the majority of refugees and displaced
people around the world?
Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue comprehensive strategies for
addressing the root causes of migration, including climate change, help
rebuild the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, and stand up for
democratic values and human rights. I will also encourage stronger
partnerships between humanitarian and development actors, including
multilateral development banks, in situations of protracted
displacement and fragility, conflict, and violence.
Question. Do you think we are doing enough to counter threats to
democracy right now? What more should the United States be doing, and
how will you elevate the importance of democracy promotion efforts and
a democracy-centered foreign policy within the State Department and
abroad given the President and Secretary of State's public commitment
to these goals?
Answer. As President Biden said, ``The United States will stand up
for democracy wherever it is under attack.'' We know well from our own
experience that sustaining democracy requires hard work, careful
stewardship, and constant vigilance. If confirmed, I intend to support
the Biden Harris administration's commitment to putting the promotion
and protection of democracy at the center of U.S. foreign policy. This
means working to bolster to democratic resilience at home and abroad,
and holding ourselves, our allies, and our partners accountable to
promote, respect, and defend human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Question. What shifts must be made in our foreign policy to ensure
we are working to hold our allies and adversaries to the same standard
on human rights? How will you prioritize this parity in expectations on
upholding human rights?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the tradition of seeking to
report the facts on human rights fully and objectively on every country
in the Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, using
the standards found in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. I
also intend to raise human rights issues with allies and adversaries
alike, regardless of the other interests we may have in our
relationships with other countries.
Question. How will you engage with international counterparts to
pursue effective accountability measures to address violations and
abuses of human rights around the world? What role do you believe
multilateral bodies like the United Nations have in this endeavor?
Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring that the United
Nations promotes respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and
holds those countries with the worst human rights records to account.
The United States supports U.N. investigatory mechanisms designed to
enhance accountability for human rights violations and to end impunity.
If confirmed, I will consider all possible tools and actions to promote
accountability for those responsible for human rights violations and
abuses.
Question. We must be clear-eyed about the nature of President
Erdogan's Turkey. Turkey is among the top jailers of journalists and
lawyers in the world, which is unbelievable for a member of an alliance
founded on democratic values. In addition to its many domestic abuses,
Turkey's aggression throughout the region and its refusal to give up
the S-400 underscore the fact that Turkey is not a reliable NATO ally.
How the U.S. decides to define its relationship with Turkey is
critically important to security in the region and our ability to
support democratic values abroad. Is there any circumstance under which
the U.S. should reconstitute the F35 program with Turkey if it does not
get rid of its S-400 system?
Answer. President Biden has promised to call out Turkish behavior
that is inconsistent with its commitments as a NATO Ally. Turkey's
acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 was incompatible with NATO
principles, Turkey's commitments to NATO, and its participation in the
F-35 program, and thus resulted in Turkey's suspension and pending
removal from the global F-35 Joint Strike Fighter partnership. If
confirmed, I will continue to press Turkey to abandon the S-400 system,
and I would not support reconstitution of the F-35 program so long as
Turkey retains the Russian system.
Question. What is your position on the Cyprus question, in advance
of 5+1 talks next month?
Answer. I continue to support a Cypriot-led comprehensive
settlement to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation,
something which would benefit all Cypriots as well as the wider region.
The United States has welcomed and should stand ready to assist the
U.N. Secretary-General's initiative to convene an informal 5+UN meeting
in Geneva. Consistent with the October 2020 U.N. Security Council
Presidential Statement, I am deeply concerned by the Turkish Cypriots'
unilateral decision, with the support of Turkey, to reopen Varosha. If
confirmed, I will urge a reversal of this decision.
Question. Do you commit to the full implementation the Eastern
Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and
colleagues in the interagency to support robust ties between the United
States and Greece, Israel, and Cyprus, as envisioned in the
legislation. The U.S.-Greece security relationship remains vital to our
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and has grown significantly as
bilateral ties have improved, beginning in the Obama-Biden
administration. If confirmed, I will work to continue to deepen ties
between the United States and Greece and the United States and Cyprus.
Question. Do you commit to consult with, not simply notify, this
committee as it relates to U.S. policy on Turkey?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing close
consultations with the Senate Foreign Relations committee regarding
U.S. policy toward Turkey.
Question. Last year's NDAA included provisions which would require
the Department to be more forthcoming with Congress on the peace
process. The Department was required to provide a certification in
January to confirm that the Senate has been provided with all relevant
documents associated with the February 29th agreement. We have yet to
receive this certification. Will you commit to providing this
information to Congress upon your confirmation?
Answer. Yes, I understand that the Department is preparing to
provide a response regarding section 1217(b) of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
(P.L. 116-283) to Congress. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
that the Department provides this response and other required
notifications, reports, and certifications promptly.
Question. The law also requires regular consultation with Congress
on the peace process. Do you commit to consult with, not simply notify,
this committee as it relates to U.S. policy on Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to consult fully with theon
U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.
Question. The continued spread of COVID-19 in Latin America and the
Caribbean is deeply concerning. Despite initial vaccination campaigns
in the region, cases are on the rise and many health systems are
overwhelmed. The current situation in Brazil is alarming and
unrestrained spread only raises risks for new variants. What steps will
you take to ensure vaccine access for nations in the Western
Hemisphere, as well as other developing nations? What other vaccine-
related initiatives will you prioritize?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the U.S. commitment to leading
the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including through
supporting global vaccine distribution via COVAX. Latin America and the
Caribbean are suffering a disproportionate share of global COVID-19
cases and deaths, posing a threat to the United States given our strong
economic ties. However, the President's first priority must be to take
care of the American people, and given the unpredictability of this
virus, we must be prepared for a variety of scenarios. As the United
States moves toward having enough vaccine here at home, I will support
efforts to pursue options for sharing doses abroad, if confirmed. I
will also support efforts to work with partners to expand the global
manufacturing of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines, and their needed
supplies, to increase worldwide capacity and availability.
Question. As Colombia works to implement its 2016 peace accord, it
is facing an uptick in violence against civil society leaders by
irregular armed actors and drug traffickers, including criminal groups
that receive safe haven inside Venezuela. Additionally, there are
concerns about the role of Russia in the region, including its presence
in Venezuela and its disinformation efforts targeting Colombia. What
steps will you take to strengthen U.S.-Colombia relations and ensure
that the United States helps our Colombian partners consolidate the
gains of peace?
Answer. Colombia is a vital strategic partner that shares our
democratic values. If confirmed, I will support the efforts the
Colombian Government and people as they continue to work towards a just
and lasting peace and a prosperous future. Through diplomatic
engagement and foreign assistance, the United States must work with
Colombia to promote sustainable peace and reconciliation by expanding
security, state presence, access to justice, and licit economic
opportunities throughout the country. If confirmed, I will support
efforts to work together with the Colombia Government to combat
narcotics trafficking and transnational crime, coordinate a regional
response to the political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, and
promote and protect human rights.
Question. President Biden has outlined his strategy for a COVID-19
response, and has committed to making vaccines more widely available
here in the United States. Part of what we need to do to safeguard
American lives is ensure that other countries-especially poor
countries-can do the same. As I've said before, COVID-19 didn't start
here, but it came here. Americans are not safe until the world is safe.
What do you see as the most important actions the United States can
take to lead international efforts to end the COVID-19 pandemic for
once and for all?
Answer. To keep U.S. citizens safe, build back the economy, and
curb the emergence of variants, the United States is committed to
leading the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and strengthening
global health security and pandemic preparedness to prevent future
biological threats. I will support those efforts if confirmed. Under
President Biden's direction, the United State has already taken
significant steps, including: re-engaging with the WHO; committing to
provide the most funding--$4 billion to COVAX--of any country to
accelerate the pace and ambition of global vaccination efforts; and
collaborating with our Quad partners (Japan, India, and Australia) to
expand the manufacture and supply of safe and effective COVID-19
vaccines.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your role in achieving that
goal?
Answer. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have committed to a
whole-of-government response to COVID-19 and building longer term
global health security. If confirmed, I will work with all the regional
bureaus under my supervision, our functional bureaus, the U.S.
interagency and the international community--including the private
sector, civil society, and other partners--to help bring the COVID 19
pandemic to an end and build back better preparedness to prevent,
detect, and respond to public health threats both at home and abroad,
including through initiatives such as the Global Health Security Agenda
(GHSA).
Question. The situation in Ethiopia is alarming. Not only is there
conflict in Tigray, ongoing tensions in other parts of the country have
the potential to cause sustained violent conflict and political space
continues to close. The administration has taken a robust multilateral
approach to resolving the Tigray crisis, working through the U.N. and
with our African partners to achieve results, which I applaud. It also
sent a strong, positive signal of its engagement by dispatching Senator
Chris Coons to Addis Ababa. However there is much more to be done to
put Ethiopia's democratic transition back on track. 3. Can Ethiopia
hold credible elections in June under the current circumstances?
Answer. I share Secretary Blinken's concern that a number of
factors could undermine inclusive, free, fair, and credible national
and regional elections, including: continued violence, harassment and
detention of opposition figures, human rights abuses and violations,
growing insecurity, more than 2 million internally displaced,
interference with media freedom, and regional and local government
interference in political processes. If confirmed, I will pursue
sustained engagement to press the Government of Ethiopia to move
towards inclusive political dialogue, to ensure a free political
environment, and to address ongoing inter-ethnic tensions across the
country to help mitigate these risks.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to encourage the Abiy
administration to take meaningful action to open political space, and
engage with all political stakeholders?
Answer. The United States strongly supports democratization in
Ethiopia. Political space for all Ethiopians is critical for advancing
this process and building strong, inclusive institutions. If confirmed,
I will work with the newly appointed Special Envoy for the Horn of
Africa and the Bureau of African Affairs to press the Ethiopian
Government to ensure freedoms of assembly and expression, political
participation, access to information, including through the internet,
and political resolution of inter-ethnic conflict across the country.
If confirmed, I will continue to underscore to the Government of
Ethiopia the need for broad and inclusive dialogue and for opposition
parties and civil society to be able to participate freely in the
political process and organize and work without the fear of harassment
or intimidation.
Question. What will you do to help resolve the Tigray crisis should
Russia and China continue to block U.N. Security Council efforts to
address this urgent matter, or the African Union fail to take a more
prominent leadership role?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N. Linda Thomas Greenfield and the newly appointed Special
Envoy for the Horn of Africa to use every opportunity to address the
crisis across U.N. agencies. The U.N. plays a vital role in delivering
humanitarian assistance and in protecting refugees in Ethiopia. As
conflict in Ethiopia poses a threat to the broader region, if
confirmed, I will work with the African members of the Security Council
in New York and the African Union to push for an end to fighting and
press for a political settlement, protection of civilians, withdrawal
of Eritrean forces, immediate unhindered humanitarian access,
restoration of all communications to the region, independent
investigations into reported human rights violations, abuses, and
atrocities, and accountability for those responsible. I will also work
closely with the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa to build a broad
coalition of likeminded countries willing to work together to achieve
these objectives and to take the necessary steps to hold all parties
accountable to their commitments and their international obligations.
Question. The administration's recent suspension of drone strikes
outside select war zones has significant implications for the situation
in Somalia, where AMISOM and Somali operations against Al Shabaab have
long depended on the support of US drones. The current election crisis
in the country, which has been made significantly worse by parliament's
ill-conceived attempt to extend the term of President Farmajo, and an
earlier withdrawal of US troops under the Trump administration, are
additional complicating factors. What is your view on how best to
achieve a breakthrough both in the struggle against Al Shabaab, and on
the broader democratization and stabilization of Somalia?
Answer. A holistic approach is needed to ensure sustainable gains
in countering terrorist violence, achieving stability, and building
adequate governance. Such an approach will require not only continued
international support to counter al-Shabaab but also robust support to
build the capacity of Somali security institutions, promote sustainable
development, and improve governance. Engagement with all Somali
stakeholders and international partners, including the U.N. and AU, on
a pathway forward for Somalia is required. With respect to the current
political crisis, it is vital for the peace, stability, prosperity, and
governance of Somalia that the Federal Government and Federal Member
States reach a consensus on a way forward for the electoral process
without delay.
Question. Recent flawed elections in Uganda require a robust USG
response that advances of democracy, governance, and human rights in
this important African country. I was pleased to see the
administration's recent announcement of visa restrictions on Ugandan
persons engaged in undermining democracy. But Uganda's status as a
security partner in East Africa has complicated the willingness of past
administration's to apply meaningful pressure on Kampala for its
shortcomings in this area. How can the USG better prioritize democracy
and governance in its relationship with Uganda, and ensure that our
regional security interests do not crowd out or trump these essential
priorities?
Answer. Uganda's positive contributions to regional stability,
particularly as the largest troop contributing country to AMISOM and as
Africa's largest host of refugees do not give the Government of Uganda
a free pass regarding the importance of respecting human rights,
democracy, and good governance. If confirmed, I intend to support the
Department's efforts to ensure that U.S. policy appropriately reflects
the centrality of strong democratic institutions and respect for human
rights in our partnership with Uganda.
Question. The Central African Republic (CAR) faces ongoing violence
and a humanitarian crisis in the wake of elections that suffered from
low participation, and were fraught with irregularities. The U.S.
supported an increase to the United Nations peacekeeping force but
stability remains elusive, complicated by CAR government-aligned
Russian and Rwandan military involvement and an anti-government
coalition of militia groups representing roughly two-thirds of the
country that are committed to the overthrow of President Touadera. What
steps should the U.S. take to reduce tensions, encourage inclusive
political dialogue, build a participatory democracy, and help put the
country on a path toward sustainable peace?
Answer. The United States has been a steadfast supporter of the
democratic will of all Central Africans and their efforts to build
resilient, responsive, and representative democracy. This is the best
way to move the country towards peace and away from its repeated
crises. If confirmed, I will support efforts to continue working with
our partners to encourage an inclusive dialogue between all legitimate
actors in the country with the support of neighbors, regional
organizations, and the United Nations. If confirmed, I will work with
partners and allies to ensure countries providing assistance, military
or otherwise, do so in a transparent and coordinated way, and
consistent with the U.N. arms embargo.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator James E. Risch
Question. There are several vacant ambassadorial posts in Sub-
Saharan Africa without a named nominee to be considered by the Foreign
Relations Committee, including such high-priority posts as Sudan,
Kenya, and South Africa. Many other posts will become vacant in the
coming year with little evidence that candidates are in the pipeline
for consideration. As Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
if confirmed, are you committed to working with the White House to
ensure that Ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are filled by
qualified, experienced nominees in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the White
House to ensure that ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are
filled by qualified, experienced nominees in a timely manner.
Question. Under your leadership as Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, if confirmed, what actions will you pursue to ensure
that hard to fill posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently and
consistently staffed?
Answer. I recognize that State's Bureau of African Affairs (AF) is
chronically understaffed, both in terms of positions and vacancies. If
confirmed, I will review our staffing levels around the world to ensure
that staffing is aligned with our most pressing interests. I will
explore enhancing incentives to serve at hardship posts, including
those in Africa, and will look for other ways to ensure that our
vacancies are filled. I am committed to an inclusive workplace and will
support AF's efforts as they work to implement management reforms for
recruitment, hiring, and retention.
Question. With 49 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are myriad
opportunities and challenges to the security, economic, health and
humanitarian interests of the United States. The U.S. Government is
presently engaged on a variety of fronts. The White House and Secretary
Blinken have repeatedly stated that ``Africa is a priority for the
Biden administration''. In the early days of your tenure as Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, if confirmed, how will you
make clear inside the Department, across the administration and
externally, that Africa is a priority for the Biden administration?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to support the Secretary's efforts
to engage African countries early and often as partners in pursuing our
shared interests and values--from security, global health, climate
change, freedom and democracy, and mutual prosperity. If confirmed, I
intend to participate in the interagency policy process as the Biden-
Harris administration develops a whole-of-government Africa strategy
and consider additional banner initiatives to signal the critical
importance of this region. I believe active, consistent engagement of
senior officials in Africa will be critical to advance U.S. interests
on the continent and a signal of our commitment.
Question. How will you ensure the United States respects and values
our African partners, while also representing our values and interests,
particularly as it relates to respect for the rule of law, protecting
human rights, and advancing democracy?
Answer. I believe we must continue to build partnerships in Africa,
investing in civil society and strengthening democratic institutions.
If confirmed, I look forward to implementing the Secretary's plan to
engage African countries early and often as partners in pursuing our
shared interests and values--from security, global health, climate
change, freedom and democracy, and mutual prosperity. Senior-level
engagement on a consistent basis will be a signal of our commitment.
Question. Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing a massive ``youth
bulge.'' While programs like the Young African Leaders Initiative and
its Mandela Washington Fellowship are vital, what can the United States
do to expand its reach and effectively engage with Africa's enormous
youth population?
Answer. Empowering youth is at the heart of the longstanding U.S.-
Africa partnership. If confirmed, I will direct Department of State
resources to expand youth engagement initiatives. In addition to the
Mandela Washington Fellowship, I intend to leverage YALI's USAID-run
Regional Leadership Centers, the online YALI Network, and other public
diplomacy and Department programs, including U.S. youth exchange
programs like the Pan-Africa Youth Leadership Program, to help identify
and dedicate resources for youth and alumni engagement to empower youth
leaders in their communities, particularly around issues of
entrepreneurship, civic engagement, democracy, governance, and respect
for human rights.
Question. What are your views on the role trade and investment
could and should play in building stronger ties between the United
States and the African continent? How should U.S.-African trade and
investment initiatives factor into the U.S. global strategy to counter
China, particularly in Africa?
Answer. Strengthening and expanding U.S.-Africa trade and
investment is critical to our primary objective of building stronger
ties between the United States and the African continent. Stronger
trade and investment ties with the United States also offers Africa an
alternative to the PRC. If confirmed, I will engage in our commercial
and economic diplomacy and use the tools of the DFC, USAID, MCC and
Treasury. I will also work with the U.S. private sector, African
governments, and international financial institutions to increase trade
and investment in Africa and promote U.S. business.
Question. One vital area of Prosper Africa that requires greater
emphasis is improving the enabling environment within African partner
countries to better attract U.S. business investment. Improvements in
anti-corruption initiatives, human rights, the rule of law, and overall
good governance would create better conditions for U.S. investment
conditions. Such enhancements would also counterbalance efforts by
Chinese firms and the Chinese Communist Party to undermine free-market
competition in African markets to their advantage. How can the U.S.
Government most effectively support efforts to improve the enabling
environment for competitive foreign investment by U.S. firms in Africa?
What types of partnerships work best, and how can the United States
best incentivize reforms and other actions necessary to foster economic
opportunity and expand two-way trade and investment with the African
continent?
Answer. A conducive business climate is essential to building
sustainable economies. If confirmed, I will deploy the full set of
diplomatic and development tools to promote enabling environments in
our African partners that foster robust economic growth and respect for
human rights and democracy. For example, the Prosper Africa Initiative
will help clear impediments to economic growth in Africa, create new
export and investment opportunities for U.S. companies, and increase
prosperity at home. If confirmed, I will work to provide a meaningful
alternative to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) economic
approach, and I will help build countries' resilience in order to
respond to PRC economic coercion.
Question. What should be guiding principles for increasing two-way
trade and investment between the United States and Africa in light of
the presence of China, Russia and other malign actors that often
operate within several of these countries by their own rules?
Answer. The President is particularly focused on rebuilding the
middle class at home by creating new and better jobs, raising wages,
and strengthening communities. Increasing two-way trade and investment
is critical to building stronger ties between the United States and
Africa, and it will benefit the American middle class. The competition
with China, Russia, and other malign actors is one of the central
challenges that will define the 21st century. If confirmed, I will
advance the Department's efforts to ensure that American companies can
compete on an even playing field in Africa, which will allow them to
provide an attractive alternative based on entrepreneurship and free-
market principles, and which will be of benefit to African economies.
Question. How can the Department better leverage the Bureau of
African Affairs and encourage better coordination with the Bureau of
Near East Affairs on Red Sea Corridor issues?
Answer. A comprehensive and coordinated interagency approach to the
Greater Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor better serves U.S.
national security interests. To this end, Secretary Blinken has
appointed a special envoy for the Horn of Africa. If confirmed, I will
ensure close coordination between the Bureau of African Affairs and the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the new special envoy for the Horn of
Africa, and the special envoy for South Sudan and Sudan on Red Sea
Corridor issues, and ask senior leadership to identify and implement
mechanisms for further coordination.
Question. President Biden has proposed a $4 billion plan for
Central America. Please describe specifically how this plan will build
off of the successes and failures of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement
for Central America, and the importance of garnering sustained
political will from the individual governments.
Answer. As I understand it, the Root Causes Strategy seeks to build
on the lessons learned from the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
Americas. Place-based strategies, including targeted security and
economic programs, helped Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador reduce
violence and increase job growth prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
Root Causes Strategy seeks to use similar tools and reforms to increase
transparency, combat corruption, and create conditions conducive to
economic growth a top priority, and to use data to support decisions
and technology to increase efficacy. If confirmed, I would work to
support a strategy to engage the governments, civil society, and
private sectors of countries throughout the region as partners in this
endeavor to address the factors that cause people to leave their homes.
If confirmed, I will work with these countries, including by bolstering
civil society, to build the necessary political will to undertake tough
reforms. I am under no illusions that will be easy. It will require a
consistent, committed effort from the United States and our partners.
Question. There have been more than a dozen failed attempts at
negotiating with Maduro in Venezuela. They have occurred in an
environment of engagement favored by the Obama administration, and
under the pressure of punitive measures implemented by the Trump
administration. Describe the conditions that would need to be met for
the administration to engage in negotiations with the Maduro regime in
Venezuela.
Answer. Only good faith negotiations among Venezuelans can
establish the conditions required for free and fair elections. That is
the best framework for a political resolution to the political,
economic, migratory, and health crises afflicting Venezuela. This was
the clearly stated sense of Congress when it passed the bipartisan
VERDAD Act in 2019, co-sponsored by nearly twenty Democrats and
Republicans, and it remains true today. As the Act states, ``direct,
credible negotiations led by the Interim President of Venezuela and
members of Venezuela's democratically elected National
Assembly.represent the best opportunity to reach a solution to the
Venezuelan crisis.'' The Venezuelan democratic opposition to Nicol s
Maduro has assembled a broad alliance for free and fair elections and
has made clear its willingness to establish the conditions for such
elections through negotiations, while also relying on coordinated
domestic and international pressure to bring Maduro to the negotiating
table. If confirmed, I will work with Venezuelan and international
partners to press Maduro to commit to participate in credible
negotiations with the Venezuelan opposition. If confirmed, I will also
work with international partners to press for respect for human rights,
restoration of democratic norms, and the delivery of humanitarian
assistance in Venezuela.
Question. What is your assessment of what it would take to achieve
those conditions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support diplomatic engagement in
order to advance a negotiated, peaceful solution to Venezuela's
political, economic, and humanitarian crises, an approach consistent
with the VERDAD Act of 2019. Venezuelans themselves must meet this
challenge. Past negotiations have fallen short because Nicol s Maduro
and his supporter used negotiations as a tactic to distract the
international community and to centralize power. Negotiations can
promote a peaceful transition toward free and fair elections if the
international community is united in pressuring Maduro to engage in
good faith and Venezuela's democratic forces remain united. Credible
negotiations must incorporate the views and reflect the interests of
Venezuelan civil society. They need to produce elections that comply
with international standards of freedom, fairness, and transparency and
allow Venezuelans to restore their democracy and the rule of law. To
create the conditions for such a process, Maduro must free political
prisoners and allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid. At the same
time, the President has made clear that the United States will continue
to pursue regime supporters involved in criminal activity and
violations of human rights.
If confirmed, I would work with partners inside Venezuela and
internationally to pressure Maduro and those who support him to commit
to a serious process.
Question. Nicaragua is scheduled to hold general elections in
November. In October 2020, the Organization of American States adopted
a resolution [AG/RES.2962 (L-O/20)] calling for the restoration of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Nicaragua
through free and fair elections. The Ortega regime responded by
approving three statutes with the apparent aim of quashing dissent in
Nicaragua ahead of the November 2021 elections. If confirmed, do you
commit to prioritizing and maintaining policies and programs to create
acceptable conditions for free and fair elections in Nicaragua?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing and maintaining
policies and programs to create acceptable conditions for free and fair
elections in Nicaragua. I will support the continued use of the
economic and diplomatic tools at our disposal, including targeted
sanctions, bilateral and multilateral engagement, and support for
democratic processes, to advance free and fair elections. It is not too
late for the Ortega regime to make the meaningful reforms by the May
OAS deadline, and the United States continues to urge them to do so.
Question. Please describe the long-term implications for Nicaragua
and the region if Ortega fraudulently extends his time in office.
Answer. If confirmed, I will press for meaningful electoral reforms
by the May OAS deadline toward free and fair elections in November. I
understand that the Department is working multilaterally, in
coordination with the European Union, Canada, and the UK, as well as
our partners in the OAS, to use the tools at our disposal to create the
conditions for free and fair elections in November. If Ortega chooses a
non-democratic path, and if confirmed, I will join the Department's
efforts to work with those partners to hold accountable those
responsible and encourage a return to democracy.
Question. Despite reassurances from Secretary Blinken acknowledging
the importance of the Abraham Accords, there are concerns that
encouraging additional normalization agreements between Muslim majority
countries and Israel isn't a priority for the Biden administration.
Specifically, Senator Risch is concerned with the staffing, resourcing,
and messaging the Biden administration has dedicated to this issue thus
far. On the staffing front, the previous administration had an
empowered agent in the White House to pursue normalization agreements.
This has been pushed back down to the State Department, where it
currently falls under the purview of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
(DAS) for Israel Palestinian Affairs (IPA). On messaging, we've seen
more out of the Department on restarting assistance to the Palestinians
than on additional normalization agreements. The Biden admin's interim
strategic guidance makes no mention of normalization in its section on
the Middle East. Can you share your thoughts on the Abraham Accords and
where it, as well as other prospective normalization agreements, rank
among your policy priorities?
Answer. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have welcomed the
recent normalization agreements between Israel and countries in the
Arab and Muslim world. The Department is leading the U.S. Government's
efforts, working with the National Security Council and the U.S.
Government interagency to deepen existing agreements and urge other
countries to normalize relations with Israel. If confirmed, fostering
peace in the Middle East will remain a top priority and I will look for
opportunities to build on the Abraham Accords and expand cooperation
among countries in the region.
Question. Apart from the Abraham Accords, Senator Risch's top
priority in the Middle East is Iran policy. He led a letter to
President Biden, along with other national security Ranking Members
that outlined his position. We've engaged in extensive Iran discussions
with Sec Blinken, Wendy Sherman, and have just started consultations
with Rob Malley. How would you define this administration's strategic
aims with Iran? Where does regional activity fall in our strategic
aims? How does engagement with allies and partners fit in to this wider
strategy with respect to Iran?
Answer. The President is committed to ensuring Iran never acquires
a nuclear weapon and believes diplomacy, in coordination with our
allies and regional partners, is the best path to achieve that goal.
The administration has fundamental problems with Iran's actions across
a series of issues, including its support for terrorism, its ballistic
missile program, its destabilizing actions throughout the region, and
its abhorrent practice of using wrongfully detained U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals as political tools. If confirmed, I will support the
Biden-Harris administration's continuing commitment to addressing these
challenges using the various tools at its disposal, including
sanctions, and working in close coordination with our allies and
partners.
Question. The administration has said that regional terrorism and
ballistic missiles will be addressed in follow-on agreements. Do you
think this is possible? Assuming we grant financial relief as a part of
a nuclear negotiation, what leverage would the US have in terms of
securing follow-on agreements?
Answer. President Biden has committed to try to achieve a mutual
return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), and then use that as a platform to lengthen and strengthen the
constraints on Iran's nuclear program, regional support for terrorism,
and other issues of concern. If confirmed, I will work to achieve this
vision. If confirmed, I would ensure the framework of U.S. sanctions on
Iran remains robust. Many layers of that sanctions architecture would
remain in place, even in the event of a U.S. return to the JCPOA. This
includes the primary U.S. embargo on Iran and many other U.S. sanctions
on Iran. If confirmed, I would work with allies and partners, and use
other avenues to place pressure on Iran to address these critical
issues.
Question. President Obama argued in favor of granting sanctions
relief, stressing ``.our best analysts expect the bulk of this revenue
to go into spending that improves the economy and benefits the lives of
the Iranian people'' and that ``Even a repressive regime like Iran's
cannot completely ignore those expectations.'' Yet, we now know that a
majority of the sanctions relief went to Iran's defense industry and
proxies. We actually saw an increase in Iran's malign regional
activities since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was
signed in 2015. Do you still believe Iran prioritized the needs of its
people over its defense industry and proxies?
Answer. I do not believe that Iran has prioritized the needs of its
people, as evidenced by its abysmal human rights record. The U.S.
Government maintains a range of tools to counter Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region and support for proxy organizations. If
confirmed, I will support continuing U.S. efforts to maintain and,
where available, impose sanctions on Iranian entities and individuals
providing support to designated terrorist groups in the region. I will
also support action by the Biden-Harris administration, in coordination
with our allies and partners, to both deter and counter Iran's
destabilizing activities and to vigorously pursue talks on these
critical issues. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting closely
with Congress on the path forward.
Question. Russia and China are increasingly encroaching in the
Middle East in ways that are contrary to US interests--we see joint
R&D, basing, and a growing cooperation with US partners and allies in
the region. Russia's continues to use its support for Bashar al Assad
in Syria as a platform to further its influence in the region, while
China is trying to make deeper inroads into the Gulf and Israel and
thereby advance its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Biden
administration has advertised its commitment to de-prioritizing the
Middle East North Africa region, in favor of a greater presence in the
Indo-Pacific and Europe. Yet Great power competition has historically
taken place outside the Indo-Pacific and Europe regions, favoring
combat in weak and failed states. The moves made by the Biden
administration is occurring against backdrop of recalibrating
relationship with Saudi Arabia, de-emphasis on Abraham Accords, and
renewed focus on Palestinian issues. How do we compete with Russia and
China in the Middle East? How do we remain the partner of choice and
strike right balance between human rights and the national interest?
Answer. There is no question that the People's Republic of China's
(PRC) and Russia's coercive behavior threatens our collective security,
and that these countries are actively working to undercut the rules of
the international system and the values we and our allies share. If
confirmed, I will press our Middle East partners to be clear-eyed about
the risk of doing business with Russia and the PRC, highlighting that
partnerships with the United States bring tangible benefits to the
people of the region, while protecting human rights. The U,S. also
should support investment and economic growth in the region in a
transparent manner that respects workers, strengthens labor rights, and
serves as a counter to authoritarian business models.
Question. Lebanon is moving quickly towards financial collapse.
Despite the August 4 port explosion, political elites lack the will to
execute necessary reforms and unlock IMF, World Bank funds that will
save the country from collapse. According to many, Lebanese political
players are interpreting US outreach to Iran as a precursor to
sanctions relief and an excuse not to implement reforms. Can you
outline your thoughts on appropriate Lebanon policy? What role do
sanctions play in that policy?
Answer. Lebanon needs to execute significant reforms in cooperation
with the IMF to address its economic challenges. Lebanon can never be
truly stable and will never prosper if corruption remains rampant, and
Hezbollah continues to operate with impunity. If confirmed, I would
seek to use all available tools to push Lebanese officials to implement
the reforms necessary to root out corruption and terrorism and unlock
critical support from international financial institutions.
Question. Secretary Blinken has been vocal on the importance of
renewing and maintains cross-border humanitarian assistance, which we
agree with, but when discussing Syria policy or strategy, we return to
the same mantra of UNSCR 2254, progress on which remains stalled. What
changes would you propose for Syria policy? How can the administration
accelerate progress under UNSCR 2254?
Answer. If confirmed, I will join the Biden-Harris administration
in continuing to engage diplomatically to press for an end to the
Syrian people's suffering and to encourage all possible efforts to
advance the legitimate political track in keeping with UNSCR 2254, and
will advocate for accountability for the most serious crimes committed
against the Syrian people, including war crimes and crimes against
humanity. The United States seeks a nationwide ceasefire, unhindered
aid access through all possible routes, the release of those
arbitrarily detained, and free and fair elections under U.N. auspices.
If confirmed, I will support the use of a variety of tools to ensure
the Assad regime and its supporters do not profit from the conflict or
any post-conflict reconstruction, and will consult closely with our
partners and allies on the best way forward in Syria.
Question. What role does the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act
play in US policy? Do you feel it can be used as an effective tool to
containing Russian influence in Syria, and preventing US partners and
allies from normalizing relations with Bashar al Assad?
Answer. The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act is an important
tool to limit the ability of Assad and his enablers to profit from the
ongoing conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. If confirmed, I will
use it and all available tools to stop those responsible for grave
human rights abuses against the Syrian people, and will coordinate with
our allies and partners on policies toward Syria, including in
preventing normalizing relations with Assad, in order to push for
meaningful progress on our shared political objectives.
Question. In light of the rocket attack on Erbil by an Iranian
proxy group in February, and the continuing presence of ISIS forces in
remote areas of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, what steps is the Biden
administration prepared to take to reaffirm America's commitment to the
territorial integrity and safety of the Kurdistan Regional Government?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the United States' top
priorities of ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and increasing the
capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including Peshmerga
forces. I understand that the administration is in constant contact
with Kurdistan Regional Government leaders to address security
concerns, and the United States provides assistance to support the
continued development and professionalization of the ISF, increasing
their ability to respond to threats and conduct counter-terrorism
operations, as well as defend Iraq--its people and borders--while
upholding the rule of law. If confirmed, I will support U.S. continued
efforts with Iraq on our shared vision of a secure, stable, democratic,
and prosperous Iraq that can stand on its own and defend its autonomy
against malign regional influence.
Question. In light of the threats posed to the Kurdish people of
Syria by ISIS, the Assad Government, Assad's backers in Moscow and
Tehran, and the Government of Turkey, what are the Biden
administration's policies on the U.S.-Syrian Kurd security and
diplomatic relationship, and the appropriate Kurdish role in Syria's
political roadmap under UNSCR 2254?
Answer. Stability in Syria and the greater region can only be
achieved through a political process that represents the will of all
Syrians. The Syrian Democratic Forces remain a capable and committed
military partner in the fight against ISIS. The United States also
supports the ongoing Intra Kurdish Dialogue and looks forward to its
continued progress. The dialogue complements renewed U.S. efforts to
stabilize areas of northeast Syria liberated from ISIS and to promote
greater transparency and inclusivity in local governance, and if
confirmed I will work to support it.
Question. In your opinion, does the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons threaten the integrity of U.S. alliances, especially
regarding extended deterrence commitments?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration does not believe that
progress toward nuclear disarmament can be decoupled from the
prevailing security threats in today's world. If confirmed, I will
support the administration's view that the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is incompatible with U.S. extended deterrence
relationships that are still necessary for international peace and
security, and may reinforce divisions that hinder the international
community's ability to work together to address pressing proliferation
and security challenges. U.S. allies covered by extended nuclear
deterrence--which includes all NATO Allies, plus Australia, Japan, and
the Republic of Korea--share the administration's view that the TPNW is
incompatible with our extended nuclear deterrence arrangements.
Question. In December 2020, NATO re-affirmed the Allie's
longstanding position that, ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO
will remain a nuclear alliance.'' In your view, do you believe that
this principle requires the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in
NATO countries?
Answer. The United States is fully committed to its Article 5
obligations. If confirmed, I will strongly support U.S. continued
coordination with Allies in support of NATO's deterrence and defense
posture, including U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe.
Question. How can we get NATO allies to invest more in their own
defense?
Answer. This is an issue I have spared no effort on since my days
as NATO Ambassador, and if confirmed, one I will continue to pursue
vigorously. At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies agreed to increase their
defense spending for the mutual benefit of the Alliance. If confirmed,
I will work to ensure Allies continue to share the responsibility of
our collective security against new and existing threats and appeal to
them to do more. If confirmed, I will also ensure that the burden-
sharing conversation at NATO also focuses on capabilities, readiness,
and force generation. I look forward to consulting with NATO Allies, as
well as with Congress, on the best strategy to ensure NATO has the
capabilities, readiness, and forces it requires to maintain a credible
defense and deterrence posture, as well as fulfill NATO missions and
operations.
Question. Why does Japan spend only about 1 percent of its GDP on
defense? Given increasing threats from China, is this acceptable and
sustainable? If confirmed, how would you approach discussions regarding
defense spending with the Japanese Government?
Answer. Japan has become one of our strongest allies in maintaining
peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. The
Government of Japan has increased its defense budget every year since
2012. The U.S. Japan Alliance advances our shared vision for a free and
open Indo-Pacific and beyond. If confirmed, I will work with Japan to
bolster its national defense capabilities to further strengthen the
alliance and regional security.
Question. Taiwan is set to increase its defense spending to about
2.4 percent of GDP for this year. However, some senior U.S. defense
officials have indicated that is still an insufficient amount for
Taiwan to be able to ensure resilient defense in the face of an
increasing Chinese threat. Do you agree with those concerns? If
confirmed, how would you approach discussions regarding defense
spending with the Taiwanese Government?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining the U.S. rock-solid
commitment to Taiwan. The United States will continue to make available
to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the
Taiwan Relations Act and our ``one China'' policy. At the same time,
Taiwan needs to maintain robust defense budgets. The United States sold
nearly $30 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales
alone cannot ensure Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Our expanding
security cooperation seeks to encourage Taiwan to prioritize cost-
effective, mobile, resilient, and asymmetric capabilities, including an
effective civil defense force for defense in depth.
Question. How can we resolve the current impasse with Turkey over
the S-400?
Answer. One of President Biden's top priorities with respect to
Turkey is urging it not to retain the S-400 and to refrain from
additional Russian arms purchases. If confirmed, I will support efforts
to persuade Turkey to forego the S-400. The CAATSA sanctions announced
in December 2020 impose real costs on Turkey for acquiring the S-400
and advance our global efforts to deter and disrupt purchases of
Russian weaponry, which bring Russia revenue, access, and influence.
Turkey's suspension and pending removal from the F-35 partnership
represents an additional significant cost. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with Congress to review the impact of the sanctions imposed
in response to the S-400 acquisition and to determine whether
additional measures are required or warranted.
Question. What is your understanding of how China has expanded and
modernized its nuclear forces?
Answer. I understand that during this decade, the People's Republic
of China (PRC) is likely to more than double the size of its nuclear
stockpile. This rapid expansion includes new delivery systems as
Beijing works to establish a nuclear triad, which will include a long-
range stealth bomber, new road-mobile ICBMs, multiple-warhead silo-
based ICBMs, and a growing fleet of ballistic missile submarines. The
PRC also appears to be working on hypersonic-glide vehicles, air-
launched ballistic missiles, and low-yield nuclear weapons that will
fit into this nuclear triad. The PRC is also making additional advances
towards developing a launch-on-warning posture.
Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its allies?
Answer. Yes. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) ongoing rapid
expansion of its nuclear arsenal presages a more dangerous future, with
a considerably larger number of sophisticated nuclear delivery systems
able to reach the United States and our allies and partners than in the
past. This larger nuclear arsenal will buttress a broader PRC military
build-up and its increasingly assertive and threatening behavior to
U.S. allies and partners.
Question. How can we bring China to the negotiating table for arms
control?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support U.S. efforts to pursue arms
control to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
(PRC) growing nuclear arsenal. To date, the PRC has failed to
meaningfully engage on these issues. If confirmed, I will support
efforts to work with U.S. allies and partners to press Beijing to
engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control to reduce
global nuclear risks.
Question. Do you believe that China's professed no first use policy
is credible?
Answer. There is ambiguity over the conditions under which Beijing
would act outside of its professed no first use policy. Some People's
Liberation Army (PLA) officers have written publicly of the need to
spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear
weapons first. There has been no indication that national leaders are
willing to attach such nuances and caveats publicly. However, ongoing
PRC advances in their nuclear arsenal, from an exploration of low-yield
warheads to the development of a launch on warning posture, raise
questions regarding PRC intent and undermine their claims to seek a
minimum nuclear deterrent backed by a no-first use policy.
Question. Until now, analysts have estimated that the growth of the
Chinese arsenal would be constrained by the lack of fissile material.
However, recent reports indicate that Chinese plans to reprocess
plutonium will greatly increase its stocks of weapons-grade material.
Do you see this as threatening to the U.S. and its allies? Why do you
believe China is pursuing these activities?
Answer. Yes, this would be threatening to the United States and its
allies. China's ongoing rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal presages
a more dangerous future, with a considerably larger number of
sophisticated nuclear delivery systems able to reach the United States
and our allies and partners than in the past. Precisely because Beijing
is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear weapon states,
accurate assessments of its nuclear trajectory and intentions are
difficult. I would defer to the intelligence community for specific
assessments. In general, the United States has a longstanding position
that seeks to limit the further development of sensitive fuel cycle
technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing, beyond those
facilities already in existence.
Question. What is your understanding of how Russia has expanded and
modernized its nuclear forces?
Answer. Russia's strategic forces are undergoing a comprehensive
modernization in their force structure, operations, and planning. If
confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's intention
to engage Russia in comprehensive negotiations that address the full
range of systems that threaten international security, including
Russian novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its allies?
Answer. The United States monitors Russian nuclear policy,
strategy, doctrine, and current and projected nuclear forces. If
confirmed, I would work to sustain a safe, secure, and effective
strategic deterrent and ensure that our extended deterrence commitment
to our allies remains strong and credible. If confirmed I would also
support efforts to use the time provided by the five-year extension of
the New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with
Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control measures that
address all Russian nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems
and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Question. After the United State ratified the New START Treaty,
Russia refused to engage in follow-on negotiations regarding its non-
strategic nuclear weapons, and other arms control issues. The United
States recently agreed to a five-year extension to the New START
Treaty. Given Russia's refusal to negotiate in the latter years of the
Obama administration, do you expect Russia to behave differently this
time, and to be willing to engage in arms control negotiations in the
next few years? Why or why not?
Answer. President Biden and President Putin have agreed to explore
strategic stability discussions on a range of arms control and emerging
security issues. The administration is in the process of establishing
the terms of these discussions and, if confirmed, I commit to
consulting with Congress and allies on the path forward. While Russian
intentions regarding possible negotiations remain unclear, the United
States must enter any talks on future arms control from a position of
strength.
Question. How should we account for Russian non-strategic nuclear
weapons and exotic delivery systems in future arms control agreements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support an approach in which the
United States uses the time provided by a five-year extension of the
New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress
and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian
nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems and nonstrategic
nuclear weapons.
Question. Would Russia view a U.S. no first use or sole purpose
policy as credible? Would such a policy affect the confidence of U.S.
allies in extended deterrence?
Answer. President Biden is committed to maintaining a strong,
credible deterrent to defend the United States and our allies, while
also taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. The Biden-
Harris administration is undertaking a review of nuclear policy that
will certainly include declaratory policy and, if confirmed, I will
ensure we consult with Congress and our allies on any policies or
actions in this area.
Question. The Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions
Act (CAATSA) and other U.S. legislation and policy tools have failed to
deter Russia from attacking our democratic systems, especially through
means of cyberattacks. How can we deter Russia from conducting
cyberattacks?
Answer. Russia is a full-scope cyber actor that will remain a major
threat to U.S. Government, military, diplomatic, commercial, and
critical infrastructure networks. If confirmed, I will support efforts
to combat Russian cyber threats through a whole-of-government approach
that leverages the full range of U.S. Government capabilities--
diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, intelligence, and military. If
confirmed, I will work with the Department to communicate to the
Russian Government when its behavior is unacceptable, coordinate with
interagency partners to impose costs in response to destabilizing
activity, and build international coalitions to actively deter malign
Russian activities--including those carried out through cyberspace.
Question. If confirmed, how will you balance the International
Organizations bureau within the Political Affairs family regarding
decision-making?
Answer. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) is
the State Department's gateway to advancing U.S. foreign policy
priorities across the multilateral system. The IO Bureau was an
invaluable partner when I served as Assistant Secretary for European
and Eurasian Affairs, and if confirmed, I will rely heavily on the IO
Bureau's U.N. system and international organizations expertise to
advance U.S. interests and address global challenges. IO is also
central to our efforts to protect international organizations from
Chinese domination and efforts to flood the staff with their nationals.
Question. There is growing concern about the aggressive efforts of
the Chinese Communist Party to stack U.N. agencies with Chinese
nationals and secure leadership positions in order to exert undue
influence in International Organizations. Do you share this concern?
Answer. I do. The PRC engages in conduct to reshape the
international system to accommodate and more closely align with its
ideology. Its actions undermine the foundations of the international
system that has provided peace and stability since the end of World War
II. At the U.N., the PRC drives an authoritarian agenda that stands in
opposition to the values of the United States and the U.N. itself,
including on human rights, labor rights, transparency, and poor
economic practices. If confirmed, I will work to stop the PRC's efforts
to harm international organizations and their transparency, efficiency,
and influence.
Question. Do you believe the United States should craft a
comprehensive strategy to ensure the open and transparent processes for
the selection and promotion of Directors, Secretary Generals, and
Director Generals of all international organizations, including the
U.N. and its specialized bodies?
Answer. I believe in the independence and integrity of the U.N. and
other international organizations, including specialized agencies, and
agree with the importance of having qualified, independent candidates
in key positions. If confirmed, I will prioritize robust strategies
that include working with our allies and partners to select or elect
qualified, independent candidates that support democratic values
through a transparent and fair process.
Question. What do you believe is the most appropriate level of
funding to the United Nations? Should the U.S. leverage our
contributions to promote necessary reform within U.N. specialized
bodies and committees?
Answer. The most appropriate funding level for the U.N. is the one
that enables the U.N. to fulfill its mission effectively and
efficiently, as determined by the U.N. General Assembly in accordance
with its established procedures. If confirmed, I will work with the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations and the other IO missions to U.N.
organizations to promote reforms that ensure that the U.N. and U.N.
specialized agencies are transparent, accountable, and well-managed.
Question. The United States has accrued peacekeeping arrears due to
incongruence between U.S. law and U.N. assessment levels. How will you
advocate for the lowering of U.S. peacekeeping assessments to 25
percent during the scales of assessment negotiations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs on
a strategy to advance U.S. interests in reaching agreement in the U.N.
General Assembly to lower the U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate,
thereby reducing or eliminating future peacekeeping arrears.
Question. Do you support paying the backlog of U.S. arrears,
including the pre-Helms-Biden agreement arrears, or will you honor the
bipartisan agreement negotiated in the current President's name?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult closely with Congress on the
issue of whether to pay the ``contested'' arrears that are subject to
the Helms-Biden agreement. As indicated in the President's FY 2022
budget request, the Department is seeking funds and authority from
Congress to enable payment of peacekeeping arrears that accrued over
the past four years. These arrears are not subject to the Helms-Biden
agreement.
Question. Given the potential conflict with U.S. policy that U.N.
membership would cause, what actions would the Biden administration
take if the Palestinian Authority submitted a new application for
membership to the U.N. or attempt to accede to any new U.N. body?
Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join
international entities are premature and counterproductive. There are
no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct negotiations
between the parties, a process I would support, if confirmed.
Question. Do you support establishing an office of U.N. Integrity
within the Political Affairs family to counter malign influence within
the U.N. system and to promote free and fair elections within the U.N.
system?
Answer. The IO bureau has taken steps in recent years to strengthen
its capacities to counter malign influence and I would support building
on those efforts, if confirmed. I look forward to working with Congress
to ensure the State Department is organized and resourced effectively
to strengthen the U.N. system and ensure the transparency,
effectiveness, and integrity of multilateral institutions. If
confirmed, I will work with partners and allies to elect qualified and
independent candidates to lead the U.N. and other international
organizations bodies, including highly specialized agencies.
Question. In 2014, your phone call with then-Ambassador to Ukraine
Geoff Pyatt was leaked, and, among other things, it revealed less than
flattering opinions about the European Union. At the time, how did you
address this comment with your European Union colleagues?
Answer. I made immediate contact with senior partners in the EU and
key Allied capitals to make clear that this phone call was leaked by
the Russians to try to drive wedges between us, and that my comments in
no way reflected my larger view of the EU, but reflected only a short
term, tactical frustration that the EU had chosen not to send an envoy
to help negotiate a transitional Ukrainian Government. In fact, I was
seeking more EU collaboration on Ukraine. I also apologized for the
crude language I used. I went on from that incident to have very
productive and collaborative relations with EU diplomats and Allied
partners for the next three years on Ukraine, energy security, Russia
relations, the Balkans, Cyprus settlement talks and a host of other
issues.
Question. Do you believe this statement will present issues in your
job as Under Secretary and impede your ability to work well with the
political directors of European Foreign Ministries? How will you
fulfill President Biden's intent to strengthen our relationship with
our allies, including the European Union as a bloc?
Answer. As noted, I went on from that incident to have very
productive and collaborative relations with the EU and Allied partners
on a wide variety of issues. If confirmed, I look forward to building
on that experience to support the President and Secretary's efforts to
repair, revitalize, and raise the level of ambition in the U.S.
relationship with the European Union. U.S.-EU cooperation will be
critical to our ability to control the pandemic, fight climate change,
address the challenge posed by China, secure a digital future that
favors free societies, and manage other global issues. If confirmed, I
will work closely with my EU and other European counterparts to deepen
cooperation on these issues on the basis of our shared values.
Question. Which nations do you believe the U.S. should work most
closely with to counter China's growing malign influence and actions
around the world? Which countries do you see as most aligned with U.S.
goals and values vis-a-vis China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will put alliances and partnerships at the
center of our foreign policy to advance shared norms and values that
underpin peace and security and compete with the People's Republic of
China (PRC) from a position of strength. This includes working closely
with our Indo-Pacific and NATO and EU Allies, within groupings like the
Quad and the G7, and with other likeminded partners to preserve our
democracies, protect the integrity of the U.N. system, strengthen our
vital security partnerships, and secure the technologies of the future.
Question. What are your views on the recently agreed EU-China
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment? Should the U.S. be engaging with
the European Parliament to stop its ratification?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to early consultations with
our EU and European partners on shared concerns about China, including
those related to trade and investment. Ultimately, the onus will be on
China to show that its pledges on forced labor, state-owned
enterprises, and subsidies in its new agreement with the EU are not
just cheap talk, and the Chinese Government will need to follow
through. If confirmed, I will seek to engage with European
counterparts, including members of the European Parliament, on how to
advance our shared economic interests and counter China's aggressive
and coercive actions, as well as on China's failures to uphold its past
international commitments.
Question. Many European countries have pledged to keep unsafe
telecoms companies out of their networks. What do you view as the next
priority areas for cooperation between the U.S. and EU?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support continued collaboration with
European Allies and partners to build a vibrant and diverse supply
chain of trustworthy telecommunications equipment and services. This
includes support for open, interoperable approaches like Open RAN
(radio access network) technologies that promise to increase vendor
diversity and market competition and have the potential to lower costs
and improve security. The United States encourages others to join us in
our support of trustworthy vendor diversity, open networks, and
transparent standards. National measures must be crafted to fully
exclude untrustworthy and high-risk suppliers, regardless of national
origin, from providing equipment and software in 5G networks.
Question. To what extent do you believe that there is an emerging
Russia-China axis? Some suggest that the U.S. should try to drive
wedges between the two nations to destroy any emerging axis. Do you
agree with that analysis?
Answer. I believe the alignment between Russia and China on many
issues amplifies the challenges that both countries pose to the United
States. China and Russia cooperate in certain areas, touting their
relationship as a ``comprehensive strategic partnership,'' but remain
competitors in others. Beijing and Moscow share the same goal of
undermining U.S. leadership and reshaping the international rules-based
order, particularly in the defense, democracy, and human rights realms.
They complement these efforts with their military capabilities,
technological innovation, and disinformation campaigns. If confirmed, I
will ensure the United States is vigilant in imposing costs on coercive
and reckless behavior that undermines the rules-based order.
Question. In an article last year in Foreign Affairs, you said the
U.S. should ``resist Putin's attempts to cut off his population from
the outside world and speak directly to the Russian people.'' As
Putin's tightens the screws on his people, not least through the
``foreign agents'' law, independent media is being suppressed, and RFE/
RL is on the brink of withdrawing from the country altogether. How do
you propose we resist Putin's attempts to cut off his population from
the outside world? What actions do you believe the U.S. should take?
Answer. The United States is committed to maintaining ties with the
Russian people despite the Russian Government's efforts to increase
government control over its population using new and existing
legislation and regulations adopted under the guise of regulating
``foreign influence.'' If confirmed, I will ensure the United States
continues to promote the courageous work of Russia's independent media,
civil society organizations, and democratic elements of the society and
call out the Russian Government for abusing the fundamental freedoms of
the Russian people and will join with partners and allies to amplify
that message. If confirmed, I will work to enhance people-to-people
ties, seek ways to ensure continued communication with the Russian
people, and draw attention to Russia's increasing repression.
Question. In the same article, you wrote ``U.S. and allied
sanctions, although initially painful, have grown leaky or impotent
with overuse and no longer impress the Kremlin'' and the ``U.S. and
European leaders should be clearer about their conditions for rolling
back or removing sanctions.'' What do you believe the role of sanctions
should be in the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy?
Answer. Sanctions remain an important tool in our broader arsenal
of instruments for countering Russian malign behavior and signaling to
Russian leaders that their actions will have costs, as most recently
demonstrated by the President's April 15 executive order. If confirmed,
I will work with allies and partners to enhance coordination and
amplify the effect of U.S. sanctions actions, as well as the imposition
of new sanctions if warranted.
Question. With respect to Russia, how do you believe the sanctions
imposed on that country since 2014 have affected the Russia's economy
and foreign policy decision making?
Answer. U.S. and allied sanctions impose costs on Russia for its
destabilizing activities. Russia might well have sought to take even
more territory in Ukraine and elsewhere had tough sectoral sanctions
not been imposed. Economically, sanctions have sharply curtailed new
foreign investment in Russia. Moscow now has few opportunities to
achieve sustained growth absent significant structural reforms to
improve competitiveness and the business environment, which the Kremlin
shows little willingness to undertake. The economic role of the state
has steadily expanded, growing from roughly 35 percent of GDP in 2000
to 60-70 percent today. This is detrimental to Russia's long-term
interests and growth.
Question. Given the wide range of Russian malign behavior, how can
the U.S. (including Congress) and Europe do a better job of being
clearer about the policy aims of sanctions and any conditions needed
for rolling back or removing sanctions with respect to Russia?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with Allies and
Partners, as well as with Congress, to examine all options for how to
calibrate sanctions actions to best meet U.S. and allied policy aims.
Question. Do you believe that the imposition of more sanctions on
Russia would accomplish U.S. policy goals? What are other measures
besides economic sanctions that could be effective tools with respect
to U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia?
Answer. I do, if they are properly targeted and maintained. I see
value to using other tools as well including multilateral visa bans and
international pressure campaigns. If confirmed, I will support the
Biden-Harris administration's commitment to using all available tools,
including but not limited to sanctions, to stop Russian malign
influence, and will also continue to seek ways to engage the Russian
people.
Question. What outreach to every day Russians do you intend to do
as Under Secretary for Political Affairs?
Answer. As the Russian Government increases its suppression of
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly in Russia, it is even more
critical for us to engage with everyday Russians through public
statements, broadcast and digital media, and the remaining educational
and people-to-people programs that the Kremlin still allows. And even
as we focus on responding to the Russian Government's aggression, as
the President has stated, ``the Russian people, like the American
people, are invested in a peaceful and secure future for our world.''
We need to nurture these inclinations, and Mission Russia has been able
to adopt a wide range of new virtual tools and hybrid engagements for
this purpose. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing and finding
new ways to expand our outreach to the Russian people.
Question. As Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian
Affairs between 2013 and 2017, you were responsible for U.S. policy on
Turkey during the 2016 coup attempt and as Turkey descended into the
authoritarianism under President Erdogan we see today. What did you and
the State Department do in those years to try to prevent Turkey from
purchasing the S-400 missile defense system from Russia?
Answer. As Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, I oversaw the successful effort in coordination with our NATO
Allies to convince the Government of Turkey to overturn its 2013
decision to move forward with a Chinese air defense system. I
consistently and repeatedly pushed for Turkey to choose a NATO-
interoperable air defense system, emphasizing that PATRIOT would be the
best choice for Turkey. I also worked within the U.S. interagency to
address Turkey's concerns about the PATRIOT. More broadly, I
successfully pushed other NATO Allies to reduce their dependence on
legacy Russian military equipment and procure NATO interoperable
military equipment.
Question. Is there anything you think the U.S. should have done
differently in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt?
Answer. Following the devastating July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey
in which more than 250 people lost their lives, the United States
promptly condemned the coup and extended its heartfelt sympathy to the
Turkish people. Since then, we have supported Turkey's efforts to bring
perpetrators of the attempted coup to justice in evidence-based
prosecutions. However, I am concerned by the significant expansion of
scope of the prosecution for attempted coup-related activities to
include opposition politicians, the media, and others whose views
differ from the Government's.
Question. How should the U.S., the European Union, and NATO deal
with an increasingly authoritarian Turkey whose decisions are
problematic for its people, its allies, and its larger neighborhood?
Answer. I share the concerns about the Turkish Government's curbs
on freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly that erode
the foundations of a democratic society. It is in our shared interest
to keep Turkey anchored to the Transatlantic community. If confirmed, I
commit to press Turkey to do more to bolster the rule of law, protect
human rights, support fundamental freedoms, uphold the rules-based
international order, and stand united with the Transatlantic community
in addressing global challenges from Iran, Russia, and China.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. should try to drive a wedge
between Russia and Turkey?
Answer. Russia attempts to interfere in domestic processes and
drive wedges between the United States and its Allies, including
Turkey, using manipulative energy tactics, weapons sales, corrupt
business deals, and disinformation. Turkish-Russian relations are
transactional and frequently divided by strategic rivalries. For
example, Russia and Turkey are often on the opposite side of regional
conflicts (e.g., Syria and Libya). At the same time, Turkey is heavily
dependent upon Russian energy supplies and Russian tourists,
construction sector projects, and Russian agricultural purchases are
important for the Turkish economy. If confirmed, I will work to prevent
Russian influence from weakening a key NATO Ally.
Question. Recently, Senator Menendez and I re-introduced the
Ukraine Security Partnership Act, which aims to support Ukraine in its
fight against Russian-backed separatists in the east and push the
country to continue necessary reforms of its military and defense
sectors. In the bill, we propose placing of conditions on Foreign
Military Financing and International Military Education and Training
(IMET). With your experience working on Ukraine policy, what is your
view on Ukraine's historical response to conditionality? Do you believe
that increasing conditionality on a portion of military support for the
country would provide incentive for further reforms?
Answer. Reform conditionality on security assistance to Ukraine has
been an important driver of positive change in the armed forces,
including in ensuring U.S. support is properly used. If confirmed, I
will work with Congress to provide robust security assistance to
Ukraine, including lethal defensive weapons, and to support continued
reforms in Ukraine. The Department will oversee the execution of $115
million in FMF, $3 million in IMET, and $6 million in Nonproliferation,
Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funds that
Congress appropriated for FY 2021. If confirmed, I will also coordinate
with the Department of Defense in the execution of $275 million that
Congress appropriated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
(USAI) in FY 2021, including certifying that Ukraine has taken
substantial actions to make defense reforms before the final tranche of
$150 million in USAI funding is released. I will continue to urge the
implementation of defense reforms, for which Ukraine has made moderate
strides. If confirmed, I also look forward to consulting with Congress
as we engage the Ukrainian Government on these issues to ensure we have
the right mix of incentives for Ukraine to continue its reforms.
Question. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was
overwhelmingly elected in 2019 on an anti-corruption platform. After a
few promising reforms, Zelenskyy and his government have stalled and
even backslidden on democratic and market-based economic reforms. The
U.S. gives a huge amount of money to support Ukraine's transition, yet
much of the country remains under the influence of oligarchs. What do
you see as the current priorities for reform in Ukraine, and what
pressure or leverage can the U.S. use to ensure Ukraine continues down
its previously positive path?
Answer. Ukraine needs to make more progress in combatting
corruption, institutionalizing rule of law, deepening economic reforms,
and strengthening democratic institutions. If confirmed, I will work
with Ukraine to hold accountable corrupt actors who stand in the way of
reforms or try to undermine the country's sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
Question. As Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, you had responsibility for Europe during years of upheaval in
the region: the 2014 Ukraine Revolution of Dignity, the 2014 the 2015
European migration crisis, the Russian meddling in the 2016
presidential election, and the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, to name a
few. Looking back from today, what would you do differently? What
should the U.S. have done differently?
Answer. I am proud that the U.S. provided crucial political,
economic, and security support to Ukraine during my tenure as Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, in close
collaboration with the EU, NATO, and our democratic allies around the
world. I regret that the U.S. was not a direct participant in the
Normandy negotiations to implement the Minsk agreements because we
might have been able to push the process faster and more effectively.
As I testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in
2017 and 2018, I also believe we should have done more in 2016 to
expose and deter Russian election interference in the U.S.
Question. What do you believe you and the U.S. got it right?
Answer. The U.S. provided crucial political, security, and economic
support to Ukraine, coordinated closely with Allies and conditioned our
assistance on meaningful reform. We assembled a global coalition to
censure and sanction Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. We also
strengthened deterrence along NATO's Eastern border with Russia,
reversed the flow of gas in Europe to help Ukraine when Russia tried to
cut it off, collaborated with the EU to bring new non-Russian energy
sources to Europe, and provided intensive support to the U.N.-
facilitated Cyprus peace talks. We also worked intensively in the
Balkans to support good governance and reform, and called out those
NATO Allies that were backsliding on their democratic commitments.
Question. There were reports that you supported arming Ukraine with
lethal weaponry during your time as Assistant Secretary, a position at
odds with key officials in the Obama administration. Do you remain
willing to disagree, when appropriate, with the administration to
ensure the best policies are put into place?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed, as I always have
been, to providing my best counsel in the formulation of administration
policy, even if that input is at odds with others. Once the President
and Secretary have decided on a policy, I will faithfully implement it
to the best of my ability. If confirmed, I would look forward to
working with Congress to continue providing the assistance that Ukraine
requires to defend itself against Russia's aggression, including lethal
weapons, based on a U.S. and Ukrainian assessment of Ukraine's defense
requirements. This includes the provision of defensive lethal
assistance that has already expanded beyond Javelin missiles, such as
armed Mark VI patrol boats this year, for instance.
Question. In the number three spot in the State Department, how do
you propose the U.S. reinvigorates the Minsk process and the Normandy
Format to pressure Putin to withdraw from Eastern Ukraine? Though not a
member of the Normandy Format, what can the U.S. do to support Ukraine
and end the war that is in its 7th year?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously oppose Russia's
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic
efforts to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia
will remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and
aggression in eastern Ukraine. I will continue to support the Minsk
agreements as the framework for a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-
instigated conflict in eastern Ukraine and, in coordination with our
allies and partners, will seek opportunities to leverage U.S.
engagement on Ukraine-Russia conflict diplomacy.
Question. Do you view the sanctions in the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, as a mandatory or
discretionary authority?
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
PEESA, as amended, is an important tool to stop the Nord Stream 2
pipeline and ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy
supply that enhances rather than undermines its collective security. I
understand that the Department continues to assess all potential
targets involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, to identify
persons that engaged in conduct that meets the specific terms of the
statute and is considering designations.
Question. Do you believe that it is possible to prevent the
completion of Nord Stream 2, or is it inevitable?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with allies and
partners to prevent the completion of the pipeline and to ensure that
Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply that enhances, rather
than undermines, its collective security. The administration has made
clear that Nord Stream 2 is a geopolitical, Russian malign influence
project that is a threat to Europe's energy security. If confirmed, I
will ensure the Department continues work to bring an end to the
project.
Question. Do you believe it would be appropriate for the
administration to negotiate a deal with Germany (or any foreign power)
involving the waiving of mandatory sanctions absent prior consultations
with Congress?
Answer. In the spirit of our Transatlantic partnership, the
administration is prepared to listen to the concerns of our Allies.
That said, to the best of my knowledge, there is no such deal. If
confirmed, I will consult early and often with Congress on all
sanctions matters. The Department looks forward to continuing to
consult with Congress on this matter and others, and if confirmed I
would look forward to doing the same.
Question. Do you believe that the State Department should implement
the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended,
consistent with congressional intent to stop the completion of the
pipeline? Do you commit to ensuring that the State Department adopts an
interpretation of PEESA, as amended, consistent with Congress' intent
that the sanctions target a broad range of pipe-laying activities,
support services, insurance and certification activities, and other
conduct that supports or facilitates the construction of the pipeline?
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
The administration is thankful for the tools that Congress has provided
to ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply that
enhances rather than undermines its collective security. Furthermore,
the Department continues to work to bring an end to the pipeline, which
it views as a threat to European energy security and as a tool of
Russian coercion. If confirmed, I will work with the Department to
continue to assess and evaluate evidence available to determine the
applicability of PEESA, as amended.
Question. The five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, or C5, have been
an afterthought in much of U.S. foreign policy. However, the region
sits between Russia and China and has often proven eager for U.S.
involvement and investment. Former Secretary Pompeo visited Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan in 2020, and USAID has recently expanded its presence in
the region. Over the past few years, the coordination between the
United States and EU on development programs in Central Asia has
markedly strengthened and both partners have published Central Asia
engagement strategies. Will you commit to ensuring that Central Asia is
a priority region for engagement by the State Department and to
continuing to coordinate the U.S.'s Central Asia engagement with the
EU?
Answer. Changes in Central Asia in the last several years have
created both new opportunities and new challenges. If confirmed, I will
work with the SCA bureau to continue to advance the U.S. Central Asia
Strategy by providing strong support for the independence and
territorial integrity of the Central Asia countries, encouraging
regional cooperation and connectivity, working to reduce terrorist
threats, and promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights. If
confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress to sustain
U.S. diplomatic support and engagement in the region, including the
continued routine contact between EU and U.S. officials overseeing
engagement with Central Asia.
Question. In your opinion, what are the immediate priority areas in
which the U.S. should engage these nations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the U.S. Central Asia
Strategy, which lays out six priority policy objectives, including
support for the independence and territorial integrity of the Central
Asia countries, reduction of terrorism, support for stability in
Afghanistan, encouraging regional cooperation and connectivity,
promoting rule of law reform and respect for human rights, and
furthering regional development. If confirmed, I would look forward to
working with Congress to sustain U.S. diplomatic support for these
priorities and engagement in the region
Question. 1Do you believe that the U.S. should continue to look at
the Central Asian nations through an Afghanistan-centric, ``War on
Terror'' lens?
Answer. While promoting regional security will remain critical, the
U.S. Central Asia Strategy lays out several priorities beyond
preventing terrorism. If confirmed, I will support these priorities,
including support for the independence and territorial integrity of the
Central Asia countries, regional cooperation and connectivity,
promoting rule of law reform and respect for human rights, and
fostering economic opportunities for U.S. businesses in the region. If
confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress to sustain
U.S. diplomatic support for these priorities and engagement in the
region.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. The Saudi regime's human rights abuses are well-
documented, and while Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman has tried to
present himself as a ``modernizer,'' his social reforms have been
accompanied by vast crackdowns on independent voices. He has imprisoned
women's rights activists, journalists, and academics, and of course
most infamously, our own intelligence services have assessed him to be
behind the brutal murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi
in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The administration is to be
applauded for taking the important steps of releasing the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) report confirming MBS's
complicity in the Khashoggi murder, adopting the ``Khashoggi Ban,'' and
applying sanctions to 76 Saudis behind Khashoggi's murder. But MBS was
not among those, and continues to face no direct consequences for his
role. If confirmed, what steps would you take to hold Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman accountable?
Answer. I agree that the Saudi Government must be held accountable
for the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and I support the steps the
Biden-Harris administration has taken to elevate the role of human
rights within the relationship, address past behavior, and deter future
abuses. As you note, the administration followed the law and submitted
an unclassified report to Congress on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi;
imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on a former senior Saudi official
and the group whose members were involved in the killing, which
includes members of the Presidential Guard close to the Crown Prince;
and took action pursuant to a new visa restriction policy against 76
Saudi individuals believed to have been engaged in threatening
dissidents overseas, including but not limited to the Khashoggi
killing. The Department has committed to report on any such
extraterritorial activities by any government in its annual Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices. If confirmed, I will push to ensure
that human rights concerns remain a central element of our bilateral
conversations, and that we obey all aspects of U.S. law in this regard.
Question. Since the fraudulent election last August, freedom of
expression has been under attack in Belarus. The U.S. has sanctioned
some entities and individuals over their roles in the election and the
subsequent crackdowns on protesters; yet, the question remains what
more the U.S. Government should do to signal its support for the
Belarusian people. If confirmed, what measures would you support to
hold the Lukashenko regime accountable and support the people of
Belarus in their fight for a democratic future?
Answer. I condemn the Lukashenko regime for its violent and
repressive tactics against the Belarusian people peacefully protesting
for the right to choose their own leaders. If confirmed, I will call
for the release of all political prisoners, new elections, and a
national dialogue inclusive of the opposition and civil society. I will
support coordinated actions with our allies on sanctions and visa bans
against individuals and entities involved in human rights abuses and
other efforts to undermine democracy. I am committed to finding ways to
bolster assistance to support brave Belarusians advocating for
democratic change and standing up for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
Question. I applaud the Biden administration's new sanctions
designations against the Russian Federation for its malign activities
on American soil that undermine U.S. national security. I urge the
administration to now follow through with congressionally mandated
sanctions against Putin's Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This pipeline, if
completed, would further undermine U.S. national security by increasing
the Kremlin's influence in Europe, exacerbating divisions within
Europe, and stripping Ukraine of its only source of leverage over
greater Russian military activity at a time when Putin is substantially
increasing his military capabilities along Ukraine's Eastern border.
The Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA) impose mandatory
sanctions on all entities involved in pipe-laying activities for Nord
Stream 2. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring the imposition of
sanctions as required under PEESA and PEESCA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate using to all available tools
to stop the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. I understand that
the Department is actively examining entities involved in potentially
sanctionable activity and will designate additional persons as
appropriate. If confirmed, I will use all tools, to include these
authorities as appropriate, to counter Russian malign influence and to
work with allies and partners to support Transatlantic energy security
goals.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. How would you characterize the nature of the Chinese
Communist Party? Do you believe their worldview and value system are
compatible with our own?
Answer. The Chinese Communist Party is illiberal, authoritarian,
and increasingly aggressive. I believe the Chinese leadership seeks not
just to compete with the U.S. but to change the global rules of road to
favor autocracy. As such, we are in a fundamental struggle with China,
and it will be the challenge of our generation to defend and advance
democracy, liberalism, universal human rights, and freedom in the face
of Chinese ambitions.
Question. Is there any doubt in your mind that the goal of the
Chinese Communist Party is to become the world's predominant political,
military, and economic power, and for the United States to decline in
relation to it?
Answer. I have no doubt that is China and the CCP's goal.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government's past approach
towards the PRC was effective at meeting this challenge?
Answer. The strategic environment has changed significantly in
recent years, as has China itself. While there was once a broad
consensus that economic liberalization in China would lead to political
liberalization, the opposite has happened. China has grown more
authoritarian at home and more aggressive abroad. The Chinese Communist
Party is illiberal, authoritarian, and intends for China to become a
dominant world power. Beijing is working across the spectrum to compete
with and challenge the United States. This necessitates a new, tougher
U.S. approach, working with allies and partners.
Question. Do you believe that the CCP can be trusted to uphold its
commitments? How do you think the United States' approach to diplomacy
with China should change because of its long record of broken promises
to the international community?
Answer. Beijing has a long track record of failing to honor its
international obligations, including in Hong Kong and around the world.
As such, the United States must judge Beijing by its actions, not its
words, and work with allies and partners to impose costs on China when
it violates international norms and agreements.
Question. In 2018, during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing,
you said that Beijing is adapting and improving on Russia's methodology
and is now running disinformation campaigns and influence operations in
Taiwan, Australia and other neighboring countries. Do you believe China
is doing the same in the U.S.?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Given this broad consensus around Confucius Institutes
and their role in supporting CCP propaganda, how do you believe the
United States should counter Chinese influence operations through
programs such as their Confucius Institutes?
Answer. A clear understanding of the organizations and entities
that China uses to attempt to influence U.S. policy is important. If
confirmed, I commit to review these policies to ensure organizations
are properly designated and inform relevant stakeholders within the
United States, including state and local governments, universities, and
business associations, as appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, how will the State Department under your
leadership push for transparency and accountability to ensure we learn
what caused the COVID-19 pandemic and how to prevent the next pandemic?
Do you commit to follow up on the Department's January 2021 disclosure
of new information on activities at the Wuhan Institute of Virology,
and share with Congress-and with the public as appropriate-further
details on those disclosures, including the names of the researchers
who fell sick in the fall of 2019 and the nature of the research they
were conducting at the time?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to pursuing transparency and
accountability as we seek to determine the origins of the COVID-19
pandemic, assess the shortcomings of the global response, and support
necessary reforms to prevent future pandemics. I will continue to urge
the WHO to ensure the second phase of the study in China is timely,
transparent, expert-led, and free from interference. We do not know and
cannot know the full origins of the virus and its spread until we have
full transparency from the PRC.
Question. Do you concur with Secretary Pompeo's and Secretary
Blinken's determination that genocide and crimes against humanity are
currently being committed by the CCP against Uyghurs and other Turkic
and Muslim communities in Xinjiang? If so, what are the appropriate
tools for holding the CCP and its officials accountable for its
atrocities?
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang. These atrocities shock the conscience and
must be met with serious consequences. If confirmed, I will support
using all appropriate tools, including those provided for in the Uyghur
Human Rights Policy Act, to pressure the PRC to end these atrocities
and to promote justice and accountability for the victims.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that human rights
concerns are integrated into every senior bilateral engagement with the
PRC, and that specific prisoner cases are raised at the highest levels,
both publicly and privately?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that human rights concerns are
at the forefront of our China policy, and I will commit to integrate
our human rights concerns into senior bilateral engagements with PRC
counterparts. I recognize that advocacy on behalf of individuals who
have been abused by PRC authorities should be a critical component of
the U.S. Government's approach, and I will engage both publicly and
privately to urge the PRC authorities to release unjustly detained
individuals unconditionally, consistent with their international human
rights commitments.
Question. Do you see the link between China's pervasive, egregious
human rights abuses and its failure on so many other fronts to be a
responsible global actor?
Answer. Yes. I am clear-eyed about China's failure to uphold key
past commitments, including on human rights, and ongoing abuses. I will
keep these failures in mind as I deal with my PRC counterparts. If
confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and partners to address
these challenges from a position of strength, re-engage in
international institutions, and push back against attempts to rewrite
the rules and procedures of the international system.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the State Department
maintains a high degree of pressure on Beijing for its violations of
Hong Kong's long-cherished autonomy, and prioritizes this key issue
above all other competing interests in Hong Kong?
Answer. Yes. The United States must clearly address Beijing's
assault on freedom, democracy, and autonomy in Hong Kong, in violation
of its international obligations and commitments. If confirmed, I will
work with partners and allies to strengthen a coordinated approach to
the crackdown.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to strengthening the U.S.-
Taiwan relationship, including support for the Taiwan Travel Act and
supporting and encouraging senior U.S officials to travel to Taiwan,
and senior Taiwanese officials to travel to D.C. to meet their
respective counterparts?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining and strengthening our
rock-solid commitment to Taiwan. We must deepen our ties with Taiwan--a
leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner, as
guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and
the Six Assurances provided to Taipei. Consistent with the ``one
China'' policy, I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is
looking for opportunities for visits between Washington and Taipei that
advance our unofficial relationship and enable substantive exchanges on
issues of mutual concern.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to a regular and robust
arms sales process with Taiwan that does not fluctuate in accordance
with U.S.-China relations?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that the United States
continues to maintain its commitment under the 1979 Taiwan Relations
Act to maintain Taiwan's defensive capabilities.
Question. Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister recently called Taiwan
the ``red line'' of the Indo-Pacific region and expressed Japan's hope
that President Biden would come to Taiwan's defense if the PRC attacks
it. How would you work together with your counterpart in Tokyo to
enhance Taiwan's defense and prevent PRC aggression against it?
Answer. The United States and Japan share concerns over Chinese
activities that are inconsistent with the international rules-based
order, including the use of economic and other forms of coercion, and
we oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East
China Sea. Given Taiwan's strategic location in the East China Sea, its
security is closely linked to Japan's. If confirmed, I will work with
Japan to promote peace and stability in the region, including in the
Taiwan Strait, and help create an environment in which Taiwan and the
PRC can reach a peaceful resolution of their differences, consistent
with the wishes of the people of Taiwan.
Question. Do you believe we should have a bilateral Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with Taiwan? If confirmed, will you work with Secretary
Blinken to urge USTR to prioritize the launch of trade talks with
Taiwan?
Answer. I support strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan economic and trade
relationship as part of a broader effort to strengthen the U.S.
geostrategic position, diversify global supply chains, and benefit U.S.
industry.
Question. Mongolia sits between two authoritarian states, the PRC
and Russia, both of which have taken aggressive action against
neighboring countries. Mongolia also plays an important role in Tibetan
Buddhism. If confirmed, will you commit to strengthen U.S. relations
with Mongolia and shore up its sovereignty if it comes under pressure
from its revisionist neighbors? If President Biden follows through with
his campaign promise to assembly a summit of democracies, will you
ensure that Mongolia is invited to participate?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with my counterparts in
Ulaanbaatar and will also push back against the attacks of the Chinese
Government on Mongolian language and culture, as well as Tibetan
Buddhism. I understand planning for the Summit for Democracy remains in
the early stages, and the invitation list is yet to be determined. I
understand participating countries will be expected to deliver on both
domestic and international commitments that advance democracy, fight
corruption, and protect human rights.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure the
U.S. promotes free speech in Russia, including by protecting the
remaining outlets that count as free and independent press in Russia?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by Russia's intensifying crackdown on
freedom of expression, including for members of the media. A prime
example of the Russian Government's campaign against independent media
is the use of its ``foreign agent'' law to harass and inhibit the work
of USAGM-funded entities in Russia. Another example is the Russian
Government's targeting for repression of those who are seeking
transparency and accountability from their government. Russia's recent
legislative changes further restrict the freedom of expression for
members of the media, the political opposition, and civil society. If
confirmed, I will press the Russian Government to end its repression of
independent media, raise the plight of embattled journalists and
outlets in multilateral fora, call out the climate of impunity for
violent attacks against journalists, and defend freedom of expression
in Russia.
Question. The Biden administration's new Russia sanctions,
announced on April 15, did not include any sanctions against the
Kremlin's most malign geopolitical project, Nord Stream 2. These
sanctions are statutorily required under the Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Act (PEESA) and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security
Clarification Act (PEESCA). Will you commit, if confirmed, to using
your position to ensure full implementation of the law including
sanctions to prevent the completion of Nord Stream 2? Do you believe
this is in the interest of the security of the United States and our
allies and partners?
Answer. If confirmed, I will use all available tools to stop the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline from being completed. I understand that the
Department continues to examine entities involved in potentially
sanctionable activity, is considering designations, and has made it
clear that companies risk sanctions if they are involved in the
project.
Question. Do you agree that Iran is the world's leading exporter
and supporter of terrorism?
Answer. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Its
support for terrorism threatens international security, our forces,
diplomatic personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. If
confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's continuing
commitment to counter any Iranian threat to U.S. personnel and
interests, and will respond to any such threat using all appropriate
means.
Question. The Biden administration is making clear its intention to
return to the fundamentally flawed JCPOA. Do you support the lifting of
sanctions, including terrorism-related sanctions, against Iran in an
effort to return to the JCPOA?
Answer. The framework of U.S. sanctions remains robust, and there
are many aspects of our sanctions architecture that would remain in
place even in the event of a U.S. return to the JCPOA. I understand
that the Biden-Harris administration intends to continue to use its
considerable leverage--including sanctions that would remain in place,
the threat of sanctions re-imposition, and other joint action with our
allies and partners--to protect U.S. interests. In the meantime, I
understand the administration's intention is to maintain and
potentially impose new sanctions on Iranian entities providing
financial and material support to designated terrorist groups in the
region. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting closely with
Congress on the path forward.
Question. Secretary Blinken in his confirmation hearing was asked
if it was in America's national security interests to lift terrorism
sanctions against Iran, including sanctions on the IRGC, Central Bank
of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company. He answered that it was
not in America's interest to lift these sanctions and that he backed
``the toughest possible sanctions to deal with Iranian support for
terrorism.'' Do you agree with Secretary Blinken?
Answer. Yes, I agree with Secretary Blinken. The U.S. Government
maintains a range of tools to combat Iran's support for terrorism, and
if confirmed, I support continuing to use these tools to counter Iran's
destabilizing activities.
Question. Do you acknowledge that there are gaps in the JCPOA that
must be addressed to truly stop Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear
weapon?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris
administration's unshakable commitment to preventing Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. The administration's intention is to build
on the JCPOA with respect to its constraints on and transparency into
Iran's nuclear program and to address other issues of concern.
Question. Do you believe that for any Iran policy to be
sustainable, it needs to have bipartisan support?
Answer. Yes. A bipartisan approach to Iran is the strongest way to
safeguard U.S. interests for the long term.
Question. Do you believe that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) is a terrorist organization?
Answer. Yes. Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and
facilitates a wide range of terrorist activity. Iran's support for
terrorism threatens U.S. forces, diplomatic personnel, and our partners
in the region and elsewhere. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance
with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.
Question. Do you believe that a credible option to use military
force is an important component of U.S. policy to prevent Iran from
obtaining nuclear weapons and to deter Iran's regional ambitions?
Answer. Yes.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Rob Portman
Question. As you know, I am the Co-Chair of the Ukraine Caucus
along with Senator Dick Durbin. I am very concerned with the recent
buildup of Russian forces on the eastern border of Ukraine and on the
Crimean Peninsula as well as the recent rise in attacks on the Line of
Contact that has resulted in the death of over 20 brave Ukrainian
soldiers. Russia's diplomatic, information, military, and economic
aggression throughout Eastern Europe is a stark reminder of the danger
revisionist powers pose to the free world. Recent escalations and
displays of military strength in the Arctic, the basing of Russian
troops in Belarus, and the constant drumbeat of misinformation threaten
America's national security. Russia's actions constitute a very
different vision, where international relations are singularly focused
on Russian interests, where its neighbors play a subservient role to
Putin's wishes and desires. These actions by Russia are regressive and
incompatible with the aspirations of freedom loving people everywhere.
Senator Durbin and I recently led a letter with our fellow members of
the Caucus to President Biden expressing our appreciation for his
support to Ukraine and encouraging him to provide critical material
support in the near and long term to help Ukraine protect from this
unwarranted, unprovoked aggression. Over the past 7 years, we have made
great strides in our support of Ukraine. I personally feel this is
important because not only does this serve as a direct check against
the Russians, but also sends a strong signal to our European allies
that we will stand and support those nations that seek freedom and
democracy. We have done a great deal in Congress, to include:
Over $1.6 billion in military aid through the Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative Fund and over $3 billion in aid overall.
Provided Island Class patrol boats and anti-ship missiles to defend
their coast
Lethal and non-lethal assistance to include medical support for
wounded Ukrainian soldiers.
In this recent NDAA, one of my initiatives was included to have a
Department of State and Defense report to identify capability
gaps in the Ukrainian military and develop a strategy to
address the shortfalls.
Can I get your commitment to work with me and my Senate Colleagues
to find ways to continue our support for Ukraine and other eastern
European countries as they work to become democratic countries aligned
with our Western ideals?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support Ukraine's chosen Euro-
Atlantic path, including by pushing for progress on rule of law and
economic reforms that strengthen Ukraine's democratic institutions and
lead to a brighter future for all Ukrainians. I will bring the same
commitment to reform to relations with other eastern European
countries, such as Moldova.
Question. Last year, Ukraine received Enhanced Opportunity Partner
status from NATO. Ukraine has also been working hard to make much
needed military organization and security sector reforms to meet NATO
standards. From your perspective, do you see pathway to NATO membership
for Ukraine, and how would that impact the security environment in
Eastern Europe?
Answer. NATO's Open Door Policy has long served to promote
democratic values and common security across Europe, and that door
should remain open to Ukraine. In the 2008 Bucharest Summit
Declaration, Allies agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would become NATO
members, and in 2019 Ukraine was granted Enhanced Opportunities Partner
status. Ukraine is now working to implement its Annual National Program
(ANP), which is NATO's primary tool for guiding aspirants' reforms
towards Euro-Atlantic standards. If confirmed, I will support Ukraine's
chosen Euro-Atlantic path, including by pushing for progress on rule of
law, economic, and security sector reforms.
Question. Since 2014 Congress has made very strong statements in
regards to sanctioning Russia for their invasion of Crimea and backing
separatists in the Donbas. While I am supportive of diplomatic efforts
to solve the Donbas issue through the Minsk Process, I do not want to
do so at the cost of Ukrainian sovereignty or acknowledging the Russian
annexation of Crimea as legitimate-which of course, it is not. What are
your thoughts on how to best support the peace process and what do you
see as a viable way ahead to solve this very complex issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously oppose Russia's
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic
efforts to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia
should remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and
aggression in eastern Ukraine. I will continue to support the Minsk
agreements as the framework for a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-
instigated conflict in eastern Ukraine and, in coordination with our
Allies and partners, seek opportunities to use U.S. leverage to see
Minsk implemented.
Question. Regarding Crimea, do you share my views on the
illegitimacy of the Russian claims on what is Ukrainian land? Do you
anticipate keeping the sanctions in place?
Answer. Let me be perfectly clear: Crimea is Ukraine. If confirmed,
I will continue to oppose vigorously Russia's occupation and attempted
annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic efforts to end the conflict
in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia must remain in place until
Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine.
Successive administrations have been clear that the United States will
never recognize Russia's attempted annexation. Russia must end its
occupation of Crimea and return the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine.
Question. Combatting corruption has been a central tenant of the
Ukrainian Government after the Revolution of Dignity. In opinion polls
of the Ukrainian public, respondents consistently rank corruption as
top concern along with Russia. However, after the March 2020 government
reshuffling, the future of anti-corruption measures have been
uncertain. How can the United States utilize the tools of the State
Department and interagency to assist Ukraine in tackling corruption?
Answer. I am committed to strengthening our bilateral relationship
with Ukraine. If confirmed, I will pursue tight interagency
coordination to support Ukraine's chosen Euro-Atlantic path, including
by pushing for progress on rule of law, corruption and economic reforms
that strengthen Ukraine's institutions and lead to a brighter future
for all Ukrainians. If confirmed, I will continue working with Ukraine
to hold accountable those who stand in the way of reforms or try to
undermine the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Advancing reforms, particularly anticorruption efforts, is just as
important for Ukraine's future as opposing Russia's aggression.
Question. Senator Chris Murphy and I have worked very closely over
the last 4 years to strengthen the Global Engagement Center and through
our efforts have gotten increased funding and personnel for the Center.
Senator Murphy and I recently sent a letter to Secretary Blinken asking
that he increase the funding for the GEC to at least $138 million. The
GEC budget was flatlined last year at $60 million and I am concerned
that the Department will not request robust funding this year. I hope
that when you are confirmed you will see the value of the GEC and fund
it properly to accomplish its critical mission of pushing back against
Russian and Chinese disinformation. We have done too much work on a
bipartisan basis to allow the GEC to not reach its full potential.
Secretary Blinken kept the former director Lea Gabrielle on for a
month, and I really appreciated that. Now there has been a gap in
leadership at the GEC and I hope that when confirmed you will work the
Secretary to bring on a new director quickly. I feel that the
disinformation efforts led by China, Russia, and Iran are a very
dangerous threat to the freedom and democracy of our allies and we
should do all we can to support and help them.
Can I get your commitment to work with Senator Murphy and me to
continue strengthening the capabilities of the GEC as well as
increased funding?
Answer. Yes, you have my commitment, if confirmed, to work with you
and your colleagues, as well as the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, to continue strengthening the Global
Engagement Center (GEC) and our full range of public diplomacy
programs. The GEC's efforts are an important part of the work we must
undertake with allies and partners to counter disinformation, define an
affirmative and democratic global information space, and ultimately
sustain an information environment in which audiences around the world
can freely access, contribute to, make informed judgments about, and
trust transparent and truthful communication.
Question. Recently, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that the
Office of the Prosecutor could proceed with an illegitimate
investigation into alleged crimes occurring in the West Bank, Gaza, and
East Jerusalem. As you are aware, both the United States nor Israel are
signatories to the Rome Statute, and the ICC is ignoring its mandate
that stipulates it only initiate a case where there is the absence of a
robust legal and justice system. Neither the United States nor Israel
fit this criteria, yet the ICC has decided to proceed with this
politically motivated investigation anyway. Senator Cardin and I wrote
a letter to Secretary Blinken signed by over 30 Senators commending him
on coming out against this statement by the ICC and encouraging him to
do everything he can to push back against this effort. We have also
authored language together that was included in the Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA) law of 2015, which leverages ongoing trade negotiations
to discourage prospective U.S. trade partners from engaging in economic
discrimination against Israel. Governments that call upon their own
companies to participate in a political boycott of Israel run afoul of
clear guidelines in the law.
On the ICC issue and BDS in general--will you work with me and
Congress to push back against efforts to marginalize and
discriminate against Israel?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to push back
against efforts to marginalize and discriminate against Israel,
including the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) campaign, which
unfairly singles out Israel. While the Biden-Harris administration will
respect First Amendment rights, I understand that it will not hesitate
to voice disapproval of the BDS campaign or to fight efforts to
delegitimize Israel on the world stage. If confirmed, I will also
support the administration's continued objection to the International
Criminal Court's efforts to assert jurisdiction over Israeli personnel.
Question. For the last six years, I was the Chairman of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. During that time, I worked in
a bipartisan way to uncover the ways China exerts its influence here in
the United States. We held several hearings issued bipartisan reports
that documented how China stifles speech and academic freedom on
college campus through its Confucius Institutes, and how it uses talent
recruitment programs (like the Thousand Talents Plan) to steal our
taxpayer funded research and Intellectual Property. Based on those
findings, we proposed legislative fixes to these issues and I look
forward to working with you on them. Last Congress, I introduced the
Safeguarding American Innovation Act alongside Senator Carper and group
of 19 bipartisan senators (including Chairman Risch) to combat the
theft of American taxpayer funded research and intellectual property.
Recently, both FBI Director Wray and Attorney General Barr have spoken
about this threat, with the FBI opening a new China-related
investigation every 10 hours with around 2,500 open counterintelligence
investigations across the country. This legislation is designed to get
the federal government's house in order to respond to the threat of
China's talent recruitment programs. It also ensures that individuals
are held accountable for failing to disclose their foreign ties on
federal grant applications. Reforms the State Department's vetting
process for issuing visas to foreign researchers, and requires more
safeguards on sensitive research from our research institutions. One
particular section of the legislation would grant the State Department
a new authority to deny visas to individuals we know are coming to the
United States to steal our research and IP through loopholes in our
export control laws. This an authority that career attorneys at the
Department have requested across multiple administrations. And we
worked closely with those same career attorneys at the State Department
to craft the language in our legislation, including with safeguards to
ensure that the new authority is not abused.
Do you agree that government sponsored theft of US intellectual
property and technology by the CCP is a serious problem that
needs to be addressed?
Answer. Yes. Theft of U.S. intellectual property (IP) from sources
within China, including state sponsored entities, spans the entire
spectrum of IP, and costs U.S. companies hundreds of millions of
dollars a year. If confirmed, I will work with our interagency partners
and allies to ensure we are taking the most effective steps to combat
all forms of IP theft from the PRC.
Question. I understand that as of last week the administration has
entered indirect negotiations with Iran to discuss a return to the 2015
JCPOA. Last month I signed a letter with the other GOP ranking members
of national security committees outlining our shared vision for a
return to new negotiations. While I understand the need to prioritize
the nuclear aspect of the Iranian threat to the region, Iran's support
for terror proxies must be addressed in these negotiations. Their
support for Hezbollah, Shia-backed militias in Iraq, and the Houthi
rebels in Yemen are destabilizing the region with innocent civilians
paying the highest price. As we witnessed with the previous JCPOA, the
money earned through sanctions relief went not to the Iranian people
but directly to support terrorism beyond Iran's borders.
What is your assessment of the threat posed by Iranian backed proxy
networks, and how will you balance that assessment with the
need to contain Iran's nuclear program and their conventional
ballistic missile program?
Answer. Iran's development and proliferation of ballistic missiles,
as well as its support for violent proxies and groups across the
region, pose a threat to international security, and remain significant
challenges. If confirmed, I commit to work on all aspects of the Iran
threat, including its nuclear program, its missile program, and its
support for extremist groups across the region.
Question. The Abraham Accords were an historic achievement that
will lead to a new era of peace and prosperity between Israel and its
neighbors. Last month, I introduced legislation with Senator's Booker,
Cardin, Young, Risch, and Kaine that would strengthen and expand these
normalization agreements. This legislation requires the Department of
State to develop a comprehensive strategy to expand these agreements,
as well as require the State to report on Arab countries anti-
normalization laws which punish community and people to people
engagement with Israelis
Do I have your commitment to expand and strengthen the Abraham
Accords while using all tools at your disposal to push back on
the barriers that still prevent the normalization of Israel in
the region?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to urge other countries to
normalize relations with Israel and support other opportunities to
expand cooperation among countries in the region.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Todd Young
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take or oversee to
enhance the level of our diplomacy in Afghanistan and to help ensure
that basic human rights--such as the ability of girls to go to school--
are preserved?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the U.S. stays actively
engaged in supporting the peace process, economic development, and
promoting human rights, women's rights, and girls' education in
Afghanistan, consistent with U.S. policy and values. The results of
U.S. investment in the social and economic development of Afghanistan
over the past 20 years have been significant, particularly with regards
to access to education. In 2001, fewer than 900,000 children--almost
all boys--were in school. Today, more than 9.2 million children--40
percent of them girls--are in school. Through robust diplomacy and
coordinated assistance, I will work to see these gains further advanced
and strengthened.
Question. Pakistan, India, and Iran have different views on what
the future of Afghanistan should look like. How should the U.S. engage
with those in the region on the path forward for Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to put the full weight of our
government behind diplomatic efforts to reach a peace agreement between
the Afghan Government and the Taliban. All of Afghanistan's neighbors
share an interest in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan that can serve
as an effective partner in combating terrorism, criminal networks, and
narcotics trafficking. I would welcome diplomatic efforts by all
countries to encourage the negotiating parties to accelerate the peace
process though meaningful negotiations. I would also welcome the U.N.
playing a constructive role as a convener and facilitator of
discussions. Additionally, I recognize that peace, regional
connectivity, and economic growth and development are mutually
supportive and indispensable to each other. If confirmed, I will
encourage regional and international partners to commit to greater
cooperation with Afghanistan in support of regional security and
economic growth.
Question. India has moved closer to the United States and the Quad
in recent years and away from their traditional ``non-alignment
posture.'' They have adopted something they've termed ``strategic
autonomy.'' This is clearly a nuanced shift but a shift nonetheless. As
the only Quad member that shares a land border with China, and as a
place where fighting between China and India has occurred, they are
undoubtedly an important partner. How will you help the U.S. to pursue
closer relations with India?
Answer. The United States and India share a comprehensive global
strategic partnership. The recent Quad leaders' summit marked a new
milestone for our collaboration to address a range of security,
economic and governance challenges across the Indo-Pacific. Our two
nations also enjoy a robust defense and security partnership as
evidenced by Defense Secretary Austin's recent visit. If confirmed, I
will strive to work with my Indian counterparts to further strengthen
our partnership, including our defense and economic cooperation, COVID-
19 response, and climate change.
Question. On February 11th Secretary Blinken revoked the Foreign
Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist
designations of the Houthis, while retaining the designations of five
Houthi individuals as Specially Designated Nationals. I supported this
call because of what that designation would have meant for the
humanitarian situation on the ground as it would have likely led to a
famine and further devastated those on the ground. However, despite
these steps, fighting in Yemen has intensified, and Houthi forces have
been emboldened and have advanced on the city of Marib, the last
northern city controlled by the internationally-recognized Republic of
Yemen Government. I am glad to have a trusted hand with Tim Lenderking
serving as Special Envoy but the situation seems increasingly grim.
Should the United States do more to counter Iranian weapons smuggling
to the Houthis and protect Saudi territory from Houthi missile strikes?
If so, how?
Answer. I understand that the Department has been working closely
with interagency partners to disrupt the Iranian threat network and the
smuggling that occurs over land and via sea routes. It is also
essential that the U.S. continues to support the Republic of Yemen
Government (ROYG) Coast Guard and Border Guard with non-lethal training
so they can police their own borders. The Export Control and Related
Border Security program builds the capacity of the ROYG to interdict
the illicit transfers of arms and mitigate Iran's malign influence. If
confirmed, I would support continued work with Saudi Arabia to bolster
its defenses against various Houthi capabilities. These efforts will
prevent the Houthis from gaining access to further advanced
capabilities, and also encourage all parties to reach a ceasefire
agreement and subsequently end the war.
Question. What potential incentives can the international community
provide the warring parties to reach an immediate cease-fire?
Answer. A ceasefire is just one step in an overall peace process.
For a ceasefire to be durable, the warring parties must believe it is
in their interest. Toward that end, internationally facilitated
incentives should include: a roadmap to an inclusive resolution of the
conflict that addresses political grievances, accountability for human
rights violations, future reconstruction assistance, and the removal of
economic restrictions in support of engagement in negotiations. I
understand that Special Envoy Lenderking continues to work in support
of U.N. Special Envoy Griffiths' efforts and with the Republic of Yemen
Government and Saudi Arabia, with the support of the Sultanate of Oman,
and with our European partners, to align these incentives and bring
about an end to the conflict. However, I also understand that the
Houthis appear intent on continuing their offensive on the city Marib
and have been resistant to negotiating the terms of a durable
ceasefire. We need more pressure from the international community, to
include the U.N., our European partners, and Oman, to encourage the
Houthis to engage constructively with the U.N. and other parties if we
hope to end the conflict. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting
those efforts.
Question. How can the United States influence local actors to
create an agreed-upon political framework that maintains national unity
while addressing regional concerns?
Answer. The United States must remain committed to a unified,
stable Yemen that contributes to wider regional security and economic
cooperation. As the conflict continues, the country becomes
increasingly fragmented, and local stakeholders will expect to maintain
their new-found autonomy in a post-conflict setting. The buy-in of
these local stakeholders will be critical for any future political
settlement, and ultimately the long-term stability of Yemen. The future
of the Yemeni state is for Yemenis to determine. I understand that
Special Envoy Lenderking is working in lockstep with U.N. Special Envoy
Griffiths to achieve a ceasefire so we can transition to an intra-
Yemeni political process that is representative and can be sustained
over the long-term.
Question. There have been reports regarding the appointment of a
special envoy for Nord Stream 2. Presumably, such a position would
coordinate with U.S. partners and allies the imposition of additional,
mandatory sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as required under
the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA). It would not be,
in my view, to negotiate a deal that allows the Russian pipeline to be
completed. If confirmed, would you support the appointment of a special
envoy to ensure full implementation of U.S. sanctions laws and make
sure Nord Stream 2 is never finished?
Answer. Should the U.S. decide to appoint a Special Envoy for Nord
Stream 2, I believe that person's task should be to coordinate and
advance increased U.S. pressure consistent with U.S. law to stop the
pipeline before it is finished, and to work with European allies toward
the same goal.
Question. The Biden administration's new Russia sanctions,
announced on April 15, did not include any sanctions against the
Kremlin's malign geopolitical project, Nord Stream 2. These sanctions
are statutorily required under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security
Act (PEESA) and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Clarification
Act (PEESCA). In your view, why did the Biden administration fail to
sanction Nord Stream 2?
Answer. Without being inside the Biden-Harris administration, I
can't speak to why certain decisions were or were not made. I
understand that the Department continues to actively examine entities
involved in potentially sanctionable activity and will designate
additional persons as appropriate. If confirmed, I commit to use all
available tools to try to stop the pipeline before it is completed.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the administration
to implement U.S. sanctions laws on the Kremlin's Nord Stream 2
pipeline?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to use all available tools,
including bipartisan legislation passed in the NDAA, to try to stop the
pipeline before it is completed, and to engage with key European
partners and allies to seek their support in that goal.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing a
genocide against the Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that is ongoing. The Biden administration had
sent differing signals about the degree to which administration
officials assessed that genocide is indeed ongoing, but on March 22,
Secretary Blinken correctly emphasized ``the P.R.C. continues to commit
genocide and crimes against humanity.'' Do you agree with the
assessment that the Chinese Government is engaged in a genocide against
the Uyghurs and other minorities in the XUAR that is ongoing?
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes include imprisonment,
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including through
forced labor and draconian restrictions on the freedoms of religion or
belief, expression, and movement. These atrocities shock the conscience
and must be met with serious consequences.
Question. What role do you see for the State Department in
countering that ongoing genocide, and more broadly the human rights
atrocities being committed by the Chinese Communist Party?
Answer. I share your deep concern about the ongoing genocide and
crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim,
and members of other ethnic and religious groups in Xinjiang. I
understand the Department has reinvigorated cooperation with partners
and allies and has imposed a number of measures to address these
atrocities. If confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts to broaden
this international coalition and call for an independent and unhindered
investigation. I also will support using all appropriate tools,
including those provided for in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, to
pressure the PRC to end these atrocities and to promote accountability
for those responsible and justice for victims.
Question. The Obama-Biden administration's approach to the Israeli-
Arab conflict was justified on the basis of a theory of regional
relations in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented broader
Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Among other decisions, that administration
implemented discriminatory policies that distinguished between Jewish
communities in places Israel controlled before and after 1967. That
approach culminated in December 2016, when the Obama administration
maneuvered the United Nations Security Council into passing UNSCR 2334,
which among other things denied Israel's sovereignty over the Golan
Heights and part of its capital Jerusalem, including the Jewish
Quarter. The Trump administration systematically worked to hollow out
and render UNSCR 2334 null and void. They did so, including by
recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, by recognizing
Jerusalem as Israel's capital, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem, by
seeking to end discriminatory approaches that distinguished legally and
for the purposes of aid and trade between different Israeli
communities, and by taking several other steps. Do you believe that
Israel has sovereignty over the Golan Heights?
Answer. In considering the U.S. position on the Golan Heights,
Israel's security must remain paramount. As long as Bashar al-Assad is
in control of Syria, it would be irresponsible to urge Israel to part
with the Golan Heights. Control of the strategic Golan Heights provides
Israel an added measure of security from the turmoil next door.
Question. Do you believe that Israel has sovereignty over
Jerusalem, including the Old City of Jerusalem?
Answer. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and at the same time,
it is central to the national visions of both Israelis and
Palestinians. I support the USG's longstanding position that Jerusalem
is a final status issue to be resolved through direct negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians. As such, all issues related to
Jerusalem must be handled with care and sensitivity.
Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of
any part of Jerusalem?
Answer. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and at the same time,
it is central to the national visions of both Israelis and
Palestinians. I support the USG's longstanding position that Jerusalem
is a final status issue to be resolved through direct negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians. As such, all issues related to
Jerusalem must be handled with care and sensitivity.
Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of
the Old City of Jerusalem?
Answer. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and at the same time,
it is central to the national visions of both Israelis and
Palestinians. I support the USG's longstanding position that Jerusalem
is a final status issue to be resolved through direct negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians. As such, all issues related to
Jerusalem must be handled with care and sensitivity.
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5, the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. The issue of humanitarianism was central to the public
explanation of the decision: officials at the State Department have
justified the delisting of what they described as the ``broad''
designation of Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large
parts of Yemen's population live under areas controlled by the group.
Since then, the Houthis have escalated their violence across the
region, bombarding civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen was
already one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world, in
large part because the Houthis and their Iranian backers block aid,
steal aid, and attack civilians. Please describe the role played by
Iran and the Houthis in deepening the humanitarian catastrophe in
Yemen.
Answer. Iran continues to provide the Houthis with training,
equipment, and monetary support, which assists them in promoting
regional instability; threatening our partners, especially Saudi
Arabia; and disrupting international shipping through the Bab Al
Mandeb. Further, the Houthis use this support to threaten Yemeni
civilians, especially at this time in the city of Marib. The Houthis
also impede humanitarian access in the areas they control. If
confirmed, I am committed to working with our interagency partners to
counter Iran's destabilizing activities, and with our partners on the
ground to improve humanitarian access and facilitate the provision of
critical commodities and humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in general.
Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
The Biden-Harris administration heeded concerns from the United
Nations, humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among
others, that the designations could have had a devastating impact on
Yemenis' access to basic commodities like food and fuel, which could
increase the risk of famine. The short time that passed between the
designations and the revocations limited the impact the designations
could have had on humanitarian assistance and commercial imports,
including food and other essential supplies.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in Marib.
Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
This has been especially critical in Marib, where the escalation of
hostilities has caused additional needs and secondary displacement. The
lifting of sanctions has allowed for the delivery of life-saving food,
emergency shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, and essential non
food items, such as blankets and water containers.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified
information in notifications provided by the State Department to
Congress? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized for
inaction in response to Iranian human rights atrocities, and critics
have suggested that those issues were subsumed beneath the
administration's commitment to securing a nuclear deal. The Biden
administration, which is rushing to secure another nuclear deal with
Iran, has already come under similar criticism. Please describe your
assessment of the scope and nature of Iran's human rights record.
Answer. The Iranian Government severely restricts the rights to
peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or
belief, and freedom of expression. If confirmed, I will be vocal about
Iran's human rights violations and abuses, which include arbitrary or
unlawful detention of numerous individuals, some of whom have faced
torture and/or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
and execution after unfair trials. If confirmed, I intend to work with
my colleagues to consider all appropriate tools to promote
accountability for those responsible for human rights violations and
abuses.
Question. Please describe the degree to which you believe that
Iranian human rights concerns should be highlighted vs. considerations
related to nuclear negotiations or securing nuclear-related
concessions.
Answer. I believe we can and must work to ensure Iran never obtains
a nuclear weapon, at the same time we continue to pressure Iran
regarding its gross human rights violations and abuses, and use all
tools at our disposal to promote accountability for those responsible.
Question. Do you believe that imposing new human rights sanctions
against Iran, or enforcing existing ones, would violate the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or a successor agreement?
Answer. The Iranian Government denies Iranians their human rights,
including through severe restrictions on the rights to peaceful
assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or belief, and
freedom of expression. I support continuing to maintain and impose
sanctions on Iranian entities perpetrating human rights violations and
abuse.
Question. Russia and Germany appear to have assessed that the Biden
administration will not respond forcefully to their effort to complete
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Can you please describe your assessment of
the damage to American national security and to the energy security of
our European allies, if Nord Stream 2 was completed?
Answer. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline deepens Europe's energy
dependence on Russia, threatening European energy security and the
security of Ukraine and Central and Eastern European NATO and EU
countries, while dividing the continent. It enriches the Kremlin and
President Putin's allies at a time when Russia is amassing forces in
and around Ukraine and continuing its cyber and disinformation
campaigns in the U.S. and globally, among other malign activities.
Question. Could you please describe what steps you would take, if
you're confirmed, to ensure that Nord Stream 2 is stopped?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly with allies and
partners, using all the tools at our disposal, including legislation
you have authored, to prevent the completion of the pipeline and to
ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply that
enhances rather than undermines its collective security.
Question. There have been public reports that the State Department
is considering the appointment of an envoy to specifically oversee the
State Department's efforts around Nord Stream 2. Additional reports
suggest that foreign diplomats have expressed hope that the envoy will
work for a deal with the Russians or Germans to allow the pipeline to
be completed, or at least serve as a short-term substitute for
sanctions. The State Department should absolutely spare no effort or
resource in blocking Nord Stream 2, and an envoy position would help
mobilize action in that regard--but the envoy must be someone who
ensures and oversees the immediate application of congressionally
mandated sanctions and makes sure Nord Stream 2 is never completed.
Appointing an envoy who negotiated terms for completing Nord Stream 2
would be an absolutely unacceptable outcome. This envoy must not be a
substitute for sanctions: it must be someone who immediately delivers
them. Do you intend to seek the appointment of an envoy who would work
on Nord Stream 2 specifically?
Answer. I understand the Biden-Harris administration is considering
appointing an envoy to work on Nord Stream 2 and other issues.
Particularly until a new Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs is confirmed, I believe an envoy could help give focus
and energy to the interagency effort to stop the pipeline, and to
diplomacy with key countries.
Question. What responsibilities would such an envoy have?
Answer. I have not been privy to any formal position description if
it exists. If named, the envoy, I presume, would work inside the U.S.
Government to accelerate and sharpen policy and sanctions options and
diplomatically to stop the pipeline, using all available tools,
including the legislation you authored.
Question. What role do you envision such an envoy playing?
Answer. Particularly until a new Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs is confirmed, I believe an envoy could
help give focus and energy to the interagency effort to stop the
pipeline, and to diplomacy with key countries.
Question. The administration regards rejoining the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or signing a successor agreement a
top priority. The JCPOA was classified by the Obama administration as
merely ``political commitments'' rather than an executive agreement or
a treaty. In your hearing you noted the importance of securing
``bipartisan support [for rejoining the JCPOA or singing a successor
agreement] so an agreement is binding.'' Is it your understanding that
any form of international agreement between the United States and
foreign nations does not hold any legally binding commitment unless
Congress ratifies the agreement as a treaty and passes legislation
implementing those commitments?
Answer. I share President Biden's conviction that a bipartisan
approach to Iran is the strongest way to safeguard U.S. interests for
the long term. The JCPOA was negotiated as a non-binding arrangement in
2015. Numerous other important international arrangements have been
done in this way. With respect to international agreements, the Supreme
Court has long held that not all such agreements require approval as
treaties pursuant to the procedures set out in Article II of the
Constitution, and the Congress has recognized this through the
enactment of the Case-Zablocki Act, which establishes procedures
regarding oversight of legally binding international agreements other
than treaties.
Question. Can you commit that, if the administration plans to
rejoin the JCPOA or signs any successor agreement, such agreement will
be submitted by the administration to Congress for ratification as a
treaty?
Answer. I understand that President Biden has pledged to work
closely with Congress, and this includes briefing on any plans
regarding his administration's future course of action on Iran. The
JCPOA was negotiated as a non-binding arrangement in 2015. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Department carefully considers the facts
and circumstances of any U.S. return to the JCPOA to determine the
implications under INARA and would also assess the appropriate form of
any future agreement. The Biden-Harris administration has committed to
ensuring that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. The administration continues to emphasize working and
coordinating with ``allies and partners,'' especially in the context of
multilateral forums and in addressing major security challenges of our
time such as the rise of authoritarian China and the threat of a
nuclear Iran. In your view, do the alliances and partnerships of the
United States with other nations always produce a net-positive benefit
to U.S. foreign policy and homeland defense priorities?
Answer. I believe that alliances and partnerships serve as a force-
multiplier for the United States in advancing its foreign policy and
homeland defense priorities. While we must always maintain our
prerogative to operate unilaterally if it is in our national interest,
working with allies and partners to address shared challenges often
achieves the best outcomes for the United States. Some of the most
significant threats we face today--from the COVID-19 pandemic to
climate change--cannot be solved by one country alone. Our ability to
shape the behaviors of China, Iran, or others with whom we have serious
concerns will only be strengthened with likeminded partners by our
side.
Question. In situations where our allies and partners take a
differing or less stringent approach to a major foreign policy or
homeland defense priority, in your view is it appropriate for the
United States to exercise unilateral leadership? In your response,
please address the example of differing postures toward China between
the United States and the European Union.
Answer. The United States should work with its Allies and partners
whenever it can but should always reserve the right to act unilaterally
if and when necessary. While European views on China have evolved, the
U.S. remains more cautious about the challenges and threats China poses
to our security, economic interests and global norms and standards. If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to discuss China with Europeans
both at NATO and in the U.S.-EU China Dialogue to align positions more
closely.
Question. Do you believe burden sharing in both monetary costs and
international commitments between the U.S. and our allies and partners
must be addressed before re-engaging or forming new multilateral
treaties or forums?
Answer. I believe in appropriate burden-sharing with allies and
partners in all shared endeavors and international commitments. The
U.S. should have full knowledge of the monetary and other consequences
before entering into any international commitments, whether through a
treaty or other means. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to
ensure that the implications of any such commitments are well
understood by both branches of the Government.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. Do you agree with the State Department's determination
that CCP-controlled China is committing genocide and crimes against
humanity with respect to Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang? Secretary of State
Antony Blinken has sustained former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's
determination that CCP-controlled China is engaging in genocide and
crimes against humanity with respect to Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. The
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have stated the
evidence--including from satellite imagery, and eyewitness testimony,
as well as the Chinese Government's own documents--is overwhelming.
China's extensive program of repression includes severe restrictions on
religious freedoms, the used of forced labor, mass detention in
internment camps, forced sterilization, and the destruction of Uyghur
heritage.
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes include imprisonment,
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including through
forced labor and draconian restrictions on the freedoms of religion or
belief, expression, and movement. These atrocities shock the conscience
and must be met with serious consequences.
Question. In your view, should U.S.-based corporations remain
silent on the issue of genocide and crimes against humanity in CCP-
controlled China?
Answer. No. Uyghurs have suffered unspeakable oppression at the
hands of China's authoritarian government. The People's Republic of
China is engaged in gross human rights violations that shock the
conscience and must be met with serious consequences. The United States
must speak out consistently and jointly with allies and partners,
impose costs and sanctions on those responsible, and help those
persecuted find safe haven in the United States and other countries. I
have been heartened by bipartisan Congressional action on Xinjiang and,
if confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on this crucial
issue.
Question. If you are confirmed, how will you support the State
Department's efforts to compel U.S.-based corporations that conduct
substantial business in China to pitch in to immediately stop genocide
and crimes against humanity in CCP-controlled China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts by the U.S.
Department of State, along with the U.S. Department of the Treasury,
the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security to caution businesses about the risks of supply chain links to
entities that engage in human rights abuses, including forced labor, in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) and elsewhere in
China. I will also support sanctions imposed on people and
organizations complicit in genocide and crimes against humanity against
Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, in Xinjiang. I am heartened by
bipartisan Congressional action on Xinjiang and, if confirmed, I look
forward to working with Congress on this crucial issue.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. How will the State Department invest more resources into
protecting fundamental human rights? How will the State Department help
protect civic space around the world to ensure local human rights
activists, peacebuilders, and humanitarians, particularly women and
youth, have the space and resources to prevent violence and promote
sustainable peace?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to consult closely with Department,
interagency, and Congressional colleagues to ensure we have systems in
place that provide flexibility to reallocate resources as needed. I
will also work with bureaus and offices that administer democracy
programs to capitalize on emerging opportunities, including by pivoting
quickly to support programs tailored for these situations. In all
cases, I will work to ensure U.S. efforts empower democratic reformers
and activists on the ground. In addition, I intend to work bilaterally
and multilaterally with U.S. allies and partners to increase mutually
reinforcing efforts and burden-sharing in these areas.
Question. How will you increase support for members of civil
society that champion the full inclusion of disabled persons and
expansion of disability rights?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support timely appointment of a Senior
Advisor or Special Envoy for International Disability Rights and
prioritize disability-inclusive programming that recognizes persons
with disabilities among the beneficiaries, supports projects to address
gaps in their inclusion, and bolsters the work done by civil society to
advance the rights of disabled persons. I also will support the full
inclusion of persons with disabilities through Department of State
training, data collection, programming, and communication about
disability rights. An empowered and knowledgeable workforce can best
support members of civil society championing the full inclusion of
disabled persons and expansion of disability rights.
Question. How will the Biden administration right-size and
rebalance what many experts believe are over-militarized interventions
to address violent extremism? What steps can you take in this role to
restore a more balanced approach to prevention and countering violent
extremism?
Answer. Military forces and kinetic tools have played an important
role in U.S. and international counterterrorism efforts, but it is
clear that balanced, sustainable, whole-of-government and whole-of-
society approaches are needed to sustainably defeat terrorism and
prevent terrorist radicalization and recruitment. If confirmed, I will
promote civilian-led counterterrorism approaches that address
underlying grievances that fuel violent extremism and reduce the need
for military interventions. I will also work to ensure that U.S.
countering violent extremism (CVE) programs--especially prevention
work--are prioritized and adequately resourced, and that all U.S.
counterterrorism efforts advance the rule of law and respect for human
rights.
Question. The J Under Secretary and the bureaus he or she oversees
can find themselves disadvantaged when working with the regional
bureaus during the policy-making process. Do you agree that this is a
challenge and, if so, how would you empower the bureaus under you?
Answer. I agree that siloing between regional and functional
bureaus is a long-standing challenge for State Department policymaking.
If confirmed, I would leverage my 27-plus years of service in four
regional and three functional bureaus to elevate and achieve better
integration of J family issues in the full spectrum of U.S.
policymaking, including through improved coordination within the State
Department, the interagency, and with the 270-plus U.S. diplomatic
missions worldwide. I would elevate the voice and expertise of J family
bureaus and office by taking a burden-sharing approach with regional
and other functional bureaus on addressing challenges that know no
borders--from corruption and narcotics to rising autocracy and
extremism worldwide.
Question. What steps would you take to attract more individuals -
particularly from the Foreign Service - to work in the J family
bureaus?
Answer. If confirmed, I will create an inclusive environment that
is welcoming to all employees--both foreign and civil service--and of
all races, ethnicities, and backgrounds, because diverse teams make
strong teams. I will work collaboratively with the new Chief Diversity
and Inclusion Officer and the Bureau of Global Talent Management to
ensure that J family bureaus and offices are appropriately staffed and
attractive to all applicants. I also will focus on retention and
advancing a more meaningful professional development and advancement
path for all J family team members. This includes increasing training
opportunities for all and advocacy for J family Foreign Service
Officers in the DCM and Chief of Mission selection processes.
Question. Given President Biden and Secretary Blinken's strong
emphasis on re-centering human rights and democracy in U.S. foreign
policy, do you believe any changes should be made to the Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor bureau to ensure that it can effectively play a
much larger role in U.S. foreign policy than it has in the past?
Answer. Democracy and human rights are under increasing threat
globally from democratic backsliding and growing authoritarianism.
Responding effectively to these challenges requires more than any one
bureau or agency acting alone; it requires a whole-of-government
approach. If confirmed, I intend to empower the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor while also working with partners across the
Department, other U.S. agencies, and Congress to bolster democratic
resilience and promote, protect, and defend human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
Question. How do you think the U.S. arms transfer process should
change to better incorporate human rights and civilian harm concerns,
and what changes would you advocate for as Under Secretary?
Answer. The President and Secretary Blinken have said human rights
must be at the center of our foreign policy, including arms transfers
and other security assistance. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
human rights remains key to reviews of potential Foreign Military Sales
and State Department-licensed Direct Commercial Sales. If confirmed, I
will encourage the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's
continued participation in arms transfer deliberations. I understand
the administration has been clear that the United States will insist on
adherence to agreements on the use of U.S.-origin defense equipment,
compliance with international law, including the law of armed conflict,
and respect for human rights, and it will consider appropriate
consequences when violations occur.
Question. Do you agree that the U.S. Government should refrain from
exporting arms to fragile states or countries at risk of atrocities?
Answer. I understand that, consistent with the Conventional Arms
Transfer (CAT) Policy, all arms transfers are subject to comprehensive
case-by-case considerations of U.S. interests - including any risk the
transfer may contribute to human rights abuses, including acts of
gender-based violence, violence against children, violations of
international law, including the law of armed conflict, terrorism, mass
atrocities, or transnational organized crime. If confirmed, I will work
to ensure human rights remains a key focus of CAT policy documents and
discussions, and I will promote measures for the mitigation of harm to
civilians.
Question. What specific actions will the State Department take
under your direction to reassert U.S. peacebuilding and humanitarian
leadership and intervention in Syria?
Answer. I fully expect the United States will continue to be a
leader in the Syria humanitarian response. On March 29, Secretary
Blinken called on the UN Security Council to reauthorize all three
international border crossings for humanitarian assistance. If
confirmed, I will support efforts to increase multilateral diplomatic
engagement at the Security Council and will be in close consultations
with our allies, in addition to Russia and China, at the UN to find a
formula that keeps humanitarian aid flowing. I understand the
administration supports the UN-facilitated, Syrian-led process laid out
within the parameters of UNSCR 2254. If confirmed, I will use a variety
of tools to push for a sustainable end to the conflict to end the
Syrian people's suffering and to bring stability, accountability, and
security to the Syrian people.
Question. How specifically will the United States ensure continued
principled humanitarian access into and within Syria?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with partners across the U.S.
Government to use a range of tools, including diplomacy, advocacy,
multilateral and bilateral engagement with other donors, information-
sharing, and financial support, to promote the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to those most in need across Syria, whether in areas
controlled by the Syrian Government or elsewhere. If confirmed, I
intend to do everything I can to realize Secretary Blinken's call to
the UN Security Council on March 29 to reauthorize all three border
crossings for humanitarian assistance and to urge the international
community to allow humanitarian agencies to use the safest, quickest
pathway to reach civilians in need.
Question. Since the passage of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, all
but one of the special coordinators for Tibetan issues have been an
individual who served as Undersecretary for Civilian Security,
Democracy and Human Rights. If you are designated as the US Special
Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, will you commit to promoting
substantive dialogue without pre-conditions between the Dalai Lama and
the Chinese Government that leads to a negotiated agreement on Tibet,
as mandated by the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed and designated as Special Coordinator for
Tibetan Issues, I will work intensively with U.S. allies and partners
to press Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or
his representatives, without preconditions, to achieve meaningful
autonomy for Tibetans.
Question. The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to
face significant challenges following last fall's attack by Azerbaijan.
The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has provided
some funding to address this humanitarian situation, but I believe a
lot more needs to be done. If confirmed, what will be your plan of
action for providing needed assistance to Armenians from Nagorno-
Karabakh, including those displaced to Armenia, in both the short and
long term?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure continued support to address
the humanitarian situation of persons displaced by the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. I understand the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration closely monitors and assesses the situation on the ground
with the support of relevant embassies and humanitarian organizations.
I understand the administration is deeply committed to working on
lasting solutions for all those displaced by the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, including persons now in Armenia. If confirmed, I will
support the administration's efforts to seek short-term and long-term
solutions to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.
Question. What do you view as PRM's role in responding to the
situation versus the role of other U.S. Government agencies and
offices, such as USAID?
Answer. Pursuant to the legislative authorities of each, I
understand the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has
lead responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance, protection,
and solutions for refugees, asylum seekers, migrants in situations of
vulnerability, and stateless persons, while USAID's Bureau of
Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) leads in response to natural and man-made
disasters, for internally displaced persons, and providing emergency
food assistance to refugees. If confirmed, I intend to ensure
complementary efforts that utilize the strengths of the humanitarian
expertise of both PRM at State and USAID/BHA.
Question. The United States continues to suffer the devastating
impact of our nation's opioid epidemic, with over 90,000 deaths in
2020, a large portion of which are caused by fentanyl overdoses. China
continues to be the largest source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl
precursors. How will you prioritize combatting the illicit fentanyl
trade and what diplomatic tools will you use to ensure that countries
around the world, including China, take steps to place greater controls
on fentanyl and fentanyl precursors?
Answer. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) manufacture the
vast majority of the illicit fentanyl driving the opioid crisis using
People's Republic of China (PRC)-sourced chemicals, and traffic the
fentanyl into the United States via the southwest border. If confirmed,
I intend to continue and strengthen the Department's diplomatic efforts
to press the PRC to better regulate its chemical industry to prevent
chemical diversion, including through targeted engagement on this issue
in the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. I also intend to continue
efforts to work with Mexico to bring justice to TCOs that contribute to
the deaths of thousands of Americans Mexicans each year.
Question. Last year, a United Nations fact-finding mission cited
evidence of a systematic campaign of extrajudicial killings, forced
disappearances, and torture in Venezuela since 2014. According to the
report, the Maduro regime's human rights abuses and torture constitute
crimes against humanity. How will you use the tools available to you,
including oversight for the various bureaus that have equities in this
issue, to ensure accountability for and prevent further crimes against
humanity in Venezuela?
Answer. Human rights conditions in Venezuela are horrendous. I
understand the United States is committed to supporting justice and
accountability measures and programs with our allies and partners that
strengthen democratic institutions, transparency, rule of law,
inclusion, economic empowerment, and access to information. The United
States has employed sanctions and imposed visa restrictions on
Venezuelan officials and their family members believed to be
responsible for undermining democratic governance, perpetrating human
rights abuses, or engaging in corrupt practices. If confirmed, I will
continue to support efforts to hold the Maduro regime accountable.
Question. How will you support efforts to mobilize international
attention to this issue?
Answer. The Department should continue to regularly engage the
international community to raise awareness of human rights violations
and abuses in Venezuela and to urge allies and partners to condemn the
Maduro regime's human rights record, hold human rights abusers
accountable, and call for the peaceful return to democracy and the rule
of law. The Department should continue to encourage international
bodies, in accordance with their respective mandates, to investigate
crimes committed by the regime and its enablers. If confirmed, I will
promote increased efforts to mobilize the international community to
hold the Maduro regime accountable.
Question. The European movement to ban ritual slaughter by
mandating stunning prior to slaughter threatens the existence of
religiously observant national Jewish and Muslim communities in Europe.
Bans such as those passed in Belgium in 2018 and 2019 make no exception
for religious purposes. Most recently, in December 2020, the European
Court of Justice dismissed appeals by Jewish and Muslim groups, setting
a precedent that may open the door to more such laws. This ruling and
the laws it upholds are an infringement on religious freedom and
endanger communities sustained by adherence to halal and kosher legal
traditions. How will you work to encourage individual European
countries to refrain from such legislation and support religious
pluralism in Europe?
Answer. Religious freedom extends to the observance and practice of
religion or beliefs, including dietary regulations. Slaughter in
accordance with religious beliefs is a fundamental practice for members
of certain religious groups, including Jews and Muslims. If confirmed,
I intend to work with the Governments of Belgium, other European
countries, and elsewhere, as well as Jewish, Muslim, and other groups,
to ensure laws, such as those intended to protect animal welfare, do
not have an undue negative impact on religious freedom.
Question. Atrocities are being perpetrated by armed actors
throughout Ethiopia's Tigray region, including extra-judicial
executions, sexual violence, forced displacement, and starvation
crimes. Other Ethiopian communities outside of Tigray have also been
the target of serious human rights abuses in recent months and years.
The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights are set to begin a joint investigation;
however it is unclear what level of access and cooperation the
organizations will be given to conduct their inquiry. How can the U.S.
best ensure that there is accountability for atrocities and other grave
human rights abuses across Ethiopia?
Answer. I understand the United States will support the work of a
joint investigation mechanism by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as a first
step in the accountability process. I understand the Special Envoy for
the Horn of Africa will monitor this process closely and work with
international partners to press to ensure that the Ethiopian Government
provides the promised access necessary for these investigations to
proceed and respects their independence. If confirmed, I will work with
international partners and organizations, including the UN and AU, to
press for credible, independent, and transparent investigations into
human rights violations and abuses. These investigations are critical
for long-term transitional justice efforts, including criminal
accountability, which are also necessary for reconciliation.
Question. Samia Suluhu Hassan has recently assumed the Tanzanian
presidency and there is considerable hope she will turn the page on the
repressive policies of her predecessor, John Magufuli. However, it
remains to be seen whether the new President will pursue a concrete
package of much needed political reforms. How can the U.S. best
encourage the new administration to urgently improve Tanzania's
political climate?
Answer. Although I am encouraged by President Hassan's first steps,
including reinstating licenses for previously suspended media outlets,
the new Tanzanian leadership is still in its early days and much
remains to be seen. I understand the U.S. ambassador to Tanzania has
already met with representatives of the new administration and has
raised ongoing U.S. human rights concerns. If confirmed, I will support
further engagement with the new Tanzanian Government at the highest
levels, to both communicate our expectation of improvement on democracy
and human rights markers and to explore how the United States can best
support strengthening democratic institutions and preventing further
democratic backsliding.
Question. Sudan has made significant progress over the last year in
moving its political transition forward. Yet deep challenges remain,
including persistent violence in Darfur and the still shaky political
arrangements between the civilian and military components of the
transitional government. What action should the U.S. take to better
support a civilian-led, democratic transition in Sudan?
Answer. Sudan's civilian-led transitional government has made
important progress in implementing economic and political reforms,
improving human rights protections, and creating a pathway for ending
conflict in Darfur and other areas in Sudan. However, more needs to be
done to facilitate a transition to democracy as established under
Sudan's Constitutional Declaration, to implement the Juba Peace
Agreement, to establish peace accords with other armed groups, and to
address the root causes of conflict. If confirmed, I will work with the
Africa bureau, the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and J
family bureaus and offices to develop comprehensive strategies to
address these issues and support a peaceful democratic transition.
Question. The United States has recently taken actions to address
the insurgency in northern Mozambique including terrorist designations
of ISIS-Mozambique and its leader, the deployment of a Special Forces
training mission, and publicly-acknowledged consideration of an
antiterrorism assistance program for the Mozambican police. These
actions seem to suggest a security-focused approach to
counterterrorism, but I believe that a successful counterterrorism
strategy must appropriately balance diplomacy, development, and
defense. If confirmed, will you pursue a ``3 D's'' approach to
counterterrorism in Mozambique?
Answer. Yes. A successful response to the threat from ISIS-
Mozambique must include more than a focus on security. If confirmed, I
will support a strategy that focuses equally on development, diplomacy,
and security, along with strategic communications, in coordination with
regional partners and D-ISIS coalition members.
Question. The interim government in Mali has announced that a
referendum on a new constitution will take place on October 31 of this
year, followed by general elections in February of 2022. What role
should the U.S. play in helping ensure a restoration of democracy in
Mali?
Answer. I believe the United States should continue its support for
regional efforts, including those by the Economic Community for West
African States (ECOWAS), to broker a restoration of democracy in Mali.
The ECOWAS-led effort to push for a civilian-led transition led to the
establishment of a transitional government, the recent announcement of
the constitutional referendum, and the scheduled series of elections.
If confirmed, I will continue the United States' role of coordinating
assistance and support with our African and other international
partners to continue these positive developments.
Question. What actions will you take if confirmed to support a
civilian-led transition in Mali?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the ECOWAS-brokered transition
effort, including by encouraging the transitional government to
maintain its course toward a return to constitutional rule. I
understand that due to the manner in which the security services
overthrew the last democratically elected government, the United States
restricts most bilateral assistance that benefits the Government of
Mali except for certain specified categories including humanitarian
needs and election support. I understand assistance can resume only
once a democratically elected government is in place and, if confirmed,
I will coordinate actions by other donor and partner states in support
of timely democratic elections.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator James E. Risch
Question. How will you work to ensure efficient communication and
facilitation among bureaus within the J family, the department, and in
the interagency?
Answer. Today's challenges are too complex for any one agency,
bureau, or individual to undertake alone. Similar to the U.S.
Government's efforts on the global stage, the Department's efforts are
strengthened when done in partnership with others. If confirmed, I will
work tirelessly to facilitate cooperation and ensure efficient
communication, not only among the J family of bureaus and offices but
across the Department, the interagency, and our branches of government.
These efforts will build on my 27-plus years of public service and
longstanding efforts to strengthen the Department by empowering staff,
incentivizing innovation, and promoting a workforce that is diverse in
both its personnel and perspectives.
Question. If confirmed, you will be in a position historically
dual-hatted as the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. How will you
engage with the Tibetan community? Will you commit to hosting the
Tibetan administration representative at the State Department?
Answer. If confirmed and designated as the Special Coordinator for
Tibetan Issues, and consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, I
will maintain close contact with Tibetan religious, cultural, and
political leaders, including by seeking to travel regularly to Tibetan
areas of the People's Republic of China and to Tibetan refugee
settlements in India and Nepal. This engagement will include hosting
the Representative to North America of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and
the Central Tibetan Administration at the Department of State.
Question. The Atrocity Prevention Task Force is a key tool to
understanding and targeting crises around the globe before they become
atrocities. This task force lacks structure and a clear mandate. How
will you bolster the efforts already in place to ensure this task force
can fully mobilize?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support a whole-of-government approach
to prevent, mitigate, and respond to atrocities in line with the Elie
Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018. I understand
there is collaboration across the J family and interagency to support a
White House review of the structure, process, and interagency
coordination of the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force. I understand
that effort includes examining how best to integrate atrocity
prevention across related administration priorities, including the
Global Fragility Act and the Women, Peace, and Security Act. If
confirmed, I will support these efforts and work closely with
interagency partners, Congress, and civil society to improve U.S.
atrocity prevention.
Question. The administration has announced a resumption of funding
to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA) without securing any reforms. What reforms will
you seek to ensure that UNRWA's textbooks and materials will not be
anti-Semitic? How many UNRWA beneficiaries have citizenship in another
country where they reside?
Answer. I understand the Department has urged reforms in UNRWA and
received commitments from the Agency prior to announcing the funding
resumption. U.S. resumption of aid allows the Department to ensure
UNRWA upholds the highest level of neutrality and a commitment to
tolerance in educational materials; if confirmed, I will prioritize
further progress in this area.
A significant majority of the 2.2 million registered Palestinian
refugees in Jordan hold citizenship. Not all Palestinian refugees seek
access to UNRWA services.
Question. How will you ensure there is not overlap between the work
of the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
and USAID's Bureau of Democracy, Development and Innovations?
Answer. President Biden has made clear in his Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance that revitalizing democracy is a priority
for U.S. foreign policy. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and USAID's Bureau of
Democracy, Development and Innovations (DDI) to ensure their close
coordination continues in support of this objective. The bureaus have
complementary approaches to strengthen democratic institutions,
including empowering and protecting local voices and strengthening
government bodies. Using a complementary, holistic framework consistent
with best practices reinforces prospects for success.
Question. Over the last 15 years, we have seen democratic
backsliding around the world from countries in every hemisphere. Where
is the democracy promotion tool-kit failing? How can we improve our
democracy promotion efforts?
Answer. I share your concerns about the 15-year global trend of
democratic backsliding. The United States must continue to respond and
adapt to growing authoritarianism and new challenges such as the rise
of surveillance tools and the use of COVID by some governments to
justify repression. If confirmed, I will utilize all of the diplomatic
and programmatic tools available to address these trends, in close
partnership with other U.S. agencies, Congress, and like-minded
international partners. If confirmed, I also intend to ensure that U.S.
efforts to promote democracy are driven by data to improve
effectiveness, measurability and impact.
Question. Secretary Blinken has announced that the U.S. will be
seeking a seat at the U.N. Human Rights Council for next year without
securing reforms to the deeply flawed body. He has also indicated that
the reforms the U.S. would seek are the same as the previous
administration 1) Agenda Item 7 (Israel Bias) and 2) membership reform.
What steps will you take to ensure that true reform is achieved? And if
true reform is not achieved, what will the United States do?
Answer. I am committed to seeking reforms of the Human Rights
Council, particularly with respect to the Council's disproportionate
focus on Israel and to its membership. When the United States plays an
active and constructive role on the Council, it can better advocate to
protect Israel from unfair bias on the Council. This year, there has
been a reduction in the number of resolutions targeting Israel under
Agenda Item 7. I believe the United States can also better engage, in
consultation with its partners, to keep some of the countries with the
worst human rights records off the Council and encourage countries with
better records to run for seats. If confirmed, I will ensure the United
States continues to prioritize needed reforms as part of our re-
engagement with the Council.
Question. Earlier this month, the State Department released its
annual Human Rights Report, press reporting indicates that the
Department decided to delete paragraphs which listed out abuses,
including murder of Iranian citizens. If confirmed, would you work to
ensure that instances like this do not occur in the Human Rights
report? Do you believe this occurred because of administration's plan
to re-open negotiations with Iran?
Answer. The most recent State Department Country Report on Human
Rights Practices for Iran lays out in detail-based on credible sources-
Iran's abysmal human rights record. It includes numerous reports of
unlawful or arbitrary killings; forced disappearance and torture by
government agents; life-threatening prison conditions; hundreds of
political prisoners and detainees; serious problems with independence
of the judiciary, particularly the revolutionary courts; and severe
restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet. If
confirmed, I will not pull any punches in calling out Iran's human
rights violations and abuses and will consider all appropriate tools to
promote accountability for those responsible for these actions.
Question. The administration has announced that it will host a
Summit of Democracies. Can you please provide more details on this
proposed summit? What will be the definition of democracy will be used?
Answer. I understand the administration is currently formulating
its vision for the Summit of Democracy, which is intended to advance
concrete commitments on pressing challenges to established and emerging
democracies, including corruption, rising autocracy, and defending
human rights at home and abroad. If confirmed, I promise to consult
with the committee as details become available, including on
definitional issues. I also commit to work with the committee to make
the Summit as results-oriented as possible.
Question. We have multiple allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific
region with poor human rights records, but who we also cooperate with
on economic and security issues that are important to the United
States. Some of the allies, like the Philippines, are crucial to
overarching U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. In your view, what are
the most effective ways to address human rights issues with countries
that fall into this category?
Answer. I understand the United States promotes a free, open, and
rules-based Indo-Pacific region. Upholding U.S. values, including
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a
key pillar of U.S. foreign policy and an enormous contributor to
security, prosperity, and stability as well as U.S. influence across
the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will utilize the full range of
diplomatic tools to strengthen bilateral and multilateral
relationships, to promote our values, to candidly address human
security challenges with allies and partners, to support accountable
government institutions, to strengthen local civil society capacity to
hold their governments accountable, and to counter malign authoritarian
influence.
Question. Nicaragua is scheduled to hold general elections in
November. In October 2020, the Organization of American States adopted
a resolution [AG/RES.2962 (L-O-20)] calling for the restoration of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Nicaragua
through free and fair elections. The Ortega regime responded by
approving three statutes with the apparent aim of quashing dissent in
Nicaragua ahead of the November 2021 elections. If confirmed, do you
commit to prioritizing programs and policies that support the efforts
of democratic actors in Nicaragua to be a credible challenger to Ortega
ahead of the November 2021 elections.
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing and maintaining U.S.
efforts to create conditions for free and fair elections in Nicaragua.
The United States should continue to use the economic and diplomatic
tools at its disposal, including targeted sanctions and bilateral and
multilateral engagement, to support the democratic opposition and
advance free and fair elections. It is not too late for the Ortega
regime to make the meaningful reforms required before the May
Organization of American States deadline.
Question. How can the United States best reconcile its defense
commitments to allies and partners, including through arms sales, with
its need to adhere to U.S. values?
Answer. As President Biden has said, America's values--defending
freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights,
respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity--are
the grounding wire of our foreign policy and our abiding advantage
globally. U.S. diplomacy must be rooted in those values, and our
defense commitments, including arms sales, are no exception. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure we are mindful of both our values and
our interests as we engage allies and partners, and that our partners
respect their commitments to the United States in turn.
Question. The Trump administration began initiatives to mitigate
civilian casualties caused by the actions of U.S.-supported partner
forces. How can we best build off of these efforts?
Answer. Human rights and civilian harm concerns should continue to
be a critical consideration for every U.S. arms transfer review. The
President and Secretary Blinken have said that human rights must be at
the center of our foreign policy, and that includes policy regarding
arms transfers and other security assistance.
If confirmed, I will build upon U.S. efforts to assist partners to
mitigate risks of civilian casualties and ensure our partner forces are
taking steps to comply with international law, including the law of
armed conflict, and protect human rights. If confirmed, as programs are
re-examined, I intend to make sure they promote these policies with our
security partners.
Question. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, democratic gains are under
threat as long-serving rulers manipulate constitutional and electoral
processes to remain in power while stifling dissent and limiting
opposition parties and candidates' activities. In 2020 alone, several
African ruling parties and incumbent leaders applied authoritarian
tactics that manipulated democratic processes and frameworks, including
in Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. If confirmed as Under
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights,
will reinforcing democratic institutions and norms in Africa be a
priority? What is your perspective on balancing competing U.S.
priorities in the areas of security, democracy, and human rights in
Sub-Saharan Africa, especially when some of our top security partners--
including Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Mali--periodically or
consistently engage in undemocratic practices? In your view, which
should take priority in Africa?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize encouraging governments
across Africa to support democratic processes, strengthen democratic
institutions, and respect the rights to freedom of expression,
association, and peaceful assembly. I will also work to ensure that
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is a pillar of U.S.
foreign policy and that the United States takes a holistic approach to
security challenges, ensuring that U.S. security and governance
approaches are mutually reinforcing.
Question. In the last two years, Sudan and Ethiopia have embarked
upon unexpected democratic transitions. While the United States was,
and continues to be, eager to support these transitions, rapidly
mobilizing adequate resources has been a challenge in both cases. If
confirmed, how would you support the Department to respond to rapid
democratic transitions and opportunities that emerge unexpected?
Answer. Democratic breakthroughs present an excellent opportunity
for the U.S. Government to help consolidate democratic progress. Doing
so often requires marshaling resources quickly to put in place
effective programming. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with
Department and USAID counterparts to ensure we have systems in place
that provide flexibility to reallocate resources as needed. I will also
work with embassies in the field and bureaus and offices that
administer democracy programs to capitalize on these opportunities,
including by pivoting quickly to support programs tailored for these
situations. In all cases, I will work to ensure U.S. efforts empower
democratic reformers and activists on the ground.
Question. In Africa, USAID maintains a large democracy and
governance portfolio. In recent years, it has been the policy of the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) to limit programming
to countries in Africa without an active USAID presence. Do you agree
with this approach? What benefits could be seen from complimentary
efforts by USAID, DRL and other State Department bureaus?
Answer. I understand the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor (DRL) is currently active in over 90 countries in the world,
including many where there is a USAID presence. I believe that DRL's
focus on empowering local activists and grassroots organizations to
hold their government accountable complements USAID's work to build
more effective government institutions. If confirmed, I will support
DRL's efforts to coordinate closely with U.S. embassies, USAID, and
other programming entities to maximize their collective impact.
Question. Since Georgian Dream's 2012 electoral win, democracy and
governance in the Caucasian country has steadily declined. The
political situation came to a head after the October 2020 parliamentary
election culminated in an opposition boycott of parliament and a
breakdown of negotiations between the major parties. What more can be
done to steer Georgians of all political parties back on a democratic
trajectory? Does U.S. assistance to Georgia need to be conditioned on
political progress? What would incentivize the major political parties
to come to the negotiating table and compromise? Do you believe the
U.S. should consider targeted sanctions on individuals or entities that
are exacerbating or prolonging the crisis?
Answer. If confirmed, I will call on both sides to deescalate the
situation, engage in constructive dialogue, and make compromises to
allow Georgia to move forward. I believe U.S. assistance is integral to
advancing democratic reforms, boosting economic growth, and helping
Georgia resist Russian aggression. I understand the United States also
assists Georgian civil society and independent media to raise public
awareness and advocate for positive change. Any proposed conditionality
should be approached with this in mind. I believe it is important that
Georgia continues to make progress on institutionalizing democratic
values. If progress continues to wane in these areas, and if confirmed,
I would consider the deployment of additional tools to address these
issues and would seek consultation with Congress.
Question. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was
overwhelmingly elected in 2019 on an anti-corruption platform. After a
few promising reforms, Zelenskyy and his government have stalled and
even backslidden on democratic and market-based economic reforms. What
do you see as the current priorities for reform in Ukraine, and what
pressure or leverage can the U.S. use to ensure Ukraine continues down
its previously positive path? While Ukraine's democracy and electoral
process is fairly robust and free, the country continues to struggle
with entrenched corruption. What further steps can the U.S. take,
either through its aid programs or political influence, to help propel
forward Ukraine's fight against corruption in all areas of its society?
How can we work better with European nations and the EU to leverage our
collective support for Ukraine into real reforms? How well do you
believe State and USAID coordinate their activities in Ukraine? What
would you change to better utilize scarce resources in such a needy
country?
Answer. I am committed to revitalizing our bilateral relationship
with Ukraine. If confirmed, I will support Ukraine's chosen Euro-
Atlantic path, including by pushing for progress on rule of law, anti-
corruption, and economic reforms that strengthen Ukraine's institutions
and lead to a brighter future for all Ukrainians, in coordination with
Allies and partners, including the EU. State and USAID are very well
coordinated in Ukraine thanks to Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and
Central Asia (AEECA) appropriations and the role of the Coordinator of
U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. If confirmed, I will promote
accountability for those who try to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial and institutional integrity. I believe advancing reforms is
just as important for Ukraine's future as opposing Russia's aggression.
Question. Several high-profile scandals have exposed the Western
financial system's difficulty in preventing corruption. In the FY21
NDAA, the U.S. Congress updated its anti-money laundering laws to shift
the burden of disclosure from the banks to the corporations and
beneficial owners. And the EU has been working on a rule-of-law
mechanism to link EU funds to good governance, as well as cracking down
on ``golden visas.'' This corruption hurts both the citizens of the
countries where the money was stolen and where it is stored. European
countries have found themselves at both ends of this corruption cycle.
How will the Biden administration collaborate with our democratic
allies to tackle corruption in our interconnected financial systems,
and what concrete actions will you take? How will State collaborate
with the interagency on this goal? With the Treasury Department? How
important is it that the United States and its European allies take
steps to make our own systems less friendly to kleptocracy and less
penetrable by dirty money?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support enhanced coordination with our
partners to apply diplomatic pressure, bilaterally and through key
multi-stakeholder fora, to prevent and combat corruption, building upon
recent Congressional legislation. I will prioritize foreign assistance
to strengthen governments' and civil society's capacity to do so as
well. If confirmed, I intend to work with the Department of the
Treasury and our other partners to utilize tools, such as the Global
Magnitsky sanctions program and visa restrictions, to protect our
financial systems and prevent kleptocrats from using their ill-gotten
gains in the United States. It is critical that the United States and
European allies work in tandem to curb corruption's destabilizing
impact.
Question. Several members of the EU's eastern bloc have experienced
a rise in corruption, a decline in rule of law, and a strain on
democratic institutions. Free and independent media in Poland, Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria, to name a few, has been reduced and persecuted.
Ruling parties have consolidated power in important industries and in
the government. The EU has begun the process of implementing rule-of-
law conditionality to the disbursement of EU funding as a means to
combat this trend. Does the United States have a role to play in EU and
EU member states' anti-corruption efforts? If yes, what is that role?
Answer. I am concerned about the rise of corruption and attacks on
the rule of law, media, and democratic institutions in a number of
European states. I firmly support democratic values, including the rule
of law and media freedom, and, if confirmed, will work to advance these
values in multilateral fora to include the U.N. Convention against
Corruption's Conference of States Parties and the G20 Anticorruption
Group. These shared values underpin the United States' relationship
with the EU and, I understand, are a topic of frank discussions with
member state governments. If confirmed, I intend to use all tools at
our disposal to address corruption within Eastern Europe and will
encourage our EU partners to establish similar tools.
Question. The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
(J/TIP) authors one of the most important diplomatic tools we have each
year, the Trafficking in Persons Report, which countless bodies rely on
for crucial information, including Congress. Yet, this report is
criticized for undue influence from regional bureaus or other parts of
the department. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the information and tier rankings in the TIP report accurately reflect
anti-trafficking efforts and the real situations on the ground in-
country?
Answer. The United States has always been a global leader in the
fight against human trafficking. The Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
report is one of the most important diplomatic tools and information
sources on this issue. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure the TIP
Report is as objective and accurate as possible, and that tier rankings
are based solely on each country's efforts to combat trafficking, as
required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
Question. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
(TVPRA) mandates that foreign assistance restrictions placed on
countries receiving a ``Tier 3'' ranking can be waived. The previous
administration used this tool, but the rollout was messy due to lack of
guidance on what exactly non-trade, non-humanitarian assistance was.
Will you continue to recommend to the Secretary that these Tier 3
restrictions be used for appropriate countries? Will you commit to
working with Congress on clarifying the scope of non-trade, non-
humanitarian assistance?
Answer. I understand the Department considers Tier 3 restrictions
and waivers carefully every year. This review informs the Secretary's
recommendations to the President, whom the TVPA requires to impose or
waive restrictions. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the State
Department's recommendations to the President on restrictions and
waivers are grounded by the facts on the ground in each country and an
assessment of what would most effectively lead to improvements in those
countries. I will welcome consultation with Congress on how to apply
the trade-related exception.
Question. The International Criminal Court has open investigations
in Afghanistan and the West Bank and Gaza. How will GCJ plan to engage
with this court on these two cases? Do you agree that both cases are
squarely outside of the court's jurisdiction?
Answer. I strongly agree with the administration's objection to
attempts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to assert
jurisdiction over U.S. and Israeli personnel. The United States and
Israel are not States Parties, and the Palestinians do not qualify as a
sovereign State. If confirmed, I will work to address U.S. concerns
about these cases through engagement with all stakeholders in the ICC
process. The Office of Global Criminal Justice provides critical
subject-matter expertise, advising the Secretary and other senior
leaders formulating U.S. policy on accountability for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. If confirmed, I intend to ensure
engagement with the Court on these cases is part of an administration-
wide strategy.
Question. Secretary Blinken has agreed to examine a genocide
determination for the Rohingya. Do you agree with this examination and
how would you execute it?
Answer. I am appalled by the Burmese military's reign of terror
against Rohingya and members of other ethnic and religious minority
groups, as well as those related to the devastating military coup. If
confirmed, I will support the Secretary in any review process, and
ensure the Department remains focused on promoting accountability for
those responsible for abuses, seeking justice for victims, advocating
for unhindered humanitarian access, supporting the return to Burma's
democratic transition, and promoting reforms that will help prevent the
recurrence of atrocities and other human rights violations and abuses
across Burma.
Question. How will this administration engage with the office of
Global Criminal Justice? Given crises like the Rohingya and Syria,
engagement from you, if confirmed, alongside GCJ is important to
curbing the atrocities being committed against some of the most
vulnerable populations.
Answer. The Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ) provides policy
advice and technical expertise to the Secretary of State and the Under
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights on
preventing, mitigating, and responding to atrocities, including war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The office also plays a
central role in coordinating U.S. policy to promote transitional
justice and accountability, which is vital to atrocity prevention and
prospects for lasting peace and stability. If confirmed, I will ensure
GCJ's expertise is incorporated into U.S. policy formulation on these
issues as part of the administration's efforts to promote respect for
human rights and the rule of law.
Question. The CCP is actively committing genocide against the
Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslims in Xinjiang. However, the IOC has
given it the prestige of holding the Winter 2022 Olympics and
Paralympics. Do you support China hosting the Winter Games in 2022?
What other alternatives would you propose?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support extensive U.S. engagement and
coordination with allies and partners to deny the CCP the ability to
use the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to obscure China's abysmal human
rights record. This would include outreach to the U.S. Olympic and
Paralympic Committee, Olympics sponsors, and equipment and apparel
suppliers to raise awareness of and promote accountability for the PRC
Government's atrocities and human rights abuses, including genocide and
crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, as well as forced labor. I will
also consult closely with allies and partners to define our common
concerns and establish a shared approach to the PRC in advance of and
during the 2022 Winter Olympics.
Question. Can you please explain the mandate and operations of the
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations? How does it add value
to the work of the Department? How does CSO's work differ from or
overlap with USAID's Office of Transitions Initiative?
Answer. I understand the mission of the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations (CSO) is to anticipate, prevent, and respond
to conflicts that undermine U.S. national interests. CSO's work differs
from USAID/OTI in that, as part of the State Department, CSO plays a
vital role in enhancing the Department's strategies, policies, and
programs on conflict prevention and stabilization. Top CSO priorities
include implementation of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities
Prevention Act of 2018 and the Global Fragility Act of 2019, which
builds upon the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review and the Women,
Peace, and Security agenda. If confirmed, I welcome Congressional
consultation on CSO's mandate and operations.
Question. The Global Fragility Act (GFA) required the formulation
of a whole-of-government strategy to identify and address the drivers
of violence and conflict in fragile states and regions. Under the
previous administration, a broadly accepted strategy was released.
Unfortunately, the process for selecting the target countries and
regions in which the strategy would be tested was fraught with
challenges. Moreover, pilot initiatives brought to light how competing
interests--namely between the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations and U.S. Embassies and USAID Missions--and a lack of
appropriate consultation with the field could undermine the future
success of GFA initiatives. The Biden administration will now be
charged with relaunching the GFA country and region selection process
and implementation plans in a manner that reflects these critical
lessons learned. If confirmed, how will you approach the GFA selection
process for target countries and regions? What, if anything, within the
country/region diagnostic and selection process needs to be changed?
Should the Sahel and the Northern Triangle automatically be included as
priority regions given the national security interests at stake, or
would you recommend reserving judgement and allowing selection to be
strictly guided by the data?
Answer. It is my understanding that the White House is leading a
renewal of the GFA country and region selection process to evaluate
previous recommendations and consider others, followed by Congressional
consultation and final approval by the President. I understand the
review takes into account the impact on fragility of COVID-19, the
global economic crisis, gender inequality, and climate change. I also
understand the selection process is based on objective criteria
outlined in the GFA, including assessed levels and risks of fragility,
violent conflict, atrocities, gender inequality, and resilience;
political will and capacity; opportunity for impact; as well as U.S.
national security and economic interests. If confirmed, I will support
these efforts.
Question. There are also concerns about an apparent lack of senior-
level buy-in from the Department of Defense, poor coordination between
the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and other key
functional bureaus within the Department of State (such as
Counterterrorism and Political Military Affairs), and poor
communication with U.S. Embassies and Missions in the field. If
confirmed, how would you work across departments and agencies to
implement the GFA? How will Embassy and Mission priorities be reflected
in selection and implementation plans? Should GFA implementation
continue to be run out of CSO, or should leadership be elevated to a
higher level, as Congress intended?
Answer. Successful GFA implementation will require fundamental
changes in the way the U.S. Government works on issues of fragility and
conflict, integrating more closely the work among functional and
regional bureaus, different agencies, the field, and Washington. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary for Political
Affairs to ensure strong partnerships with embassies and missions. I
believe elevated senior staff buy-in and CSO's expertise and
coordination role are critical to effective implementation of the GFA,
which will require ongoing learning, monitoring, and adaptive
management to inform policy and programming decisions.
Question. A criticism of the previous administration was its focus
on international religious freedom issues. How will you, if confirmed,
ensure this administration does not overcorrect on IRF issues and
therefore ignore the serious concerns of religious freedom issues
globally?
Answer. I am committed to promoting and defending religious
freedom, which has long been a key U.S. foreign policy objective I was
proud to advance in my prior role as Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. If confirmed, I will look
to leverage the tools of U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance to
advance this universal right, ensuring that efforts to promote respect
for religious freedom are fully integrated into broader policies that
promote freedom and dignity for all people.
Question. How will you work to empower the office of the Special
Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism?
Answer. I am deeply committed to combatting anti-Semitism at home
and abroad and share the concerns of Congress about rising anti-
Semitism around the world. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Special Envoy to reinforce her or his efforts, elevate the fight
against global anti-Semitism in our engagements with foreign
interlocutors, and ensure the office of the Special Envoy has the staff
and resources it needs to execute its mission effectively.
Question. The Office of Global Women's Issues continue to be a
separate office within the S bureau. Under the last administration,
there was an effort to align this office within the J family. Will this
continue to be an S office, or do you, if confirmed, plan to continue
re-alignment of S/GWI under the J family? What steps will you take to
integrate global women issue initiatives throughout the J family and
the interagency, especially on projects like Women, Peace, and
Security, and Women's Global Development and Prosperity Fund (WGDP)?
Answer. I am committed to supporting President Biden's goal of
advancing gender equality and the full empowerment of women and girls
around the world. The Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues (S/
GWI) plays a pivotal coordination role in ensuring the Department is
bringing the full diplomatic toolbox to bear in support of gender
equality goals, including through robust collaboration with J family
bureaus and offices. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring how the
J family can enhance coordination with S/GWI and mobilize its unique
resources to support women and girls as part of a comprehensive U.S.
Government gender equality strategy.
Question. The 2020 DEA report on fentanyl flows to the United
States identifies the People's Republic of China as the primary source
of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances trafficked to the United
States, increasingly through Mexico. Mexican transnational criminal
organizations are producing increased quantities of fentanyl and
cartels, such as the Sinaloa and the New Generation Jalisco Cartel, are
the primary trafficking groups responsible for smuggling fentanyl into
the United States from Mexico. If confirmed, what specific actions
would you take to ensure the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs programs are focusing on meaningfully reducing the
flow of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids to the United States?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to stop fentanyl trafficking by:
reducing diversion and illicit production of synthetic drugs;
strengthening the capacity of our partners to detect, interdict, and
share information on synthetic drug threats; building capacity to
target illicit online sales; shrinking the drug market by reducing
global drug demand; and enhancing partnerships with governments,
industry, and international organizations. If confirmed, I will work
with partners such as Mexico to reduce production and improve
interdiction, and I will continue U.S. efforts to press the People's
Republic of China to better regulate its chemical industry and
synthetic opioid precursors.
Question. On March 1st, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report with specific recommendations for the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to strengthen
risk management for programs under the Merida Initiative (GAO-21-335).
If confirmed, do you commit to ensure INL takes swift action to
implement the recommendations in this report?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) swiftly implements
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations to strengthen
risk management for programs under the Merida Initiative. I understand
the Department concurred with GAO's important recommendations, and, for
programs under the Merida Initiative, INL is in the process of
completing an anti-fraud risk assessment; developing and implementing
an anti-fraud strategy; developing and implementing a mandatory fraud
awareness training program for staff; and re-evaluating practices for
local vetting of non-security personnel.
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the Government of Cuba, the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and the Maduro
regime in Venezuela.
Answer. I am deeply concerned by the actions of the Government of
Cuba, from its treatment of its own people, to its connection to and
substantial support for the brutal Maduro regime. I understand members
of the Colombian-origin National Liberation Army (ELN), including
senior leadership, traveled to Cuba in 2018 for now-defunct peace
negotiations with the Government of Colombia. When negotiations failed,
Cuba continued to provide safe haven to ELN leadership. In January
2019, ELN claimed responsibility for a deadly bombing in Colombia.
Citing peace protocols signed before the ELN negotiators traveled to
Cuba, Cuba has refused to extradite ELN leaders to Colombia. With
respect to Venezuela, Maduro and his associates use criminal activities
to help maintain their hold on power, fostering a permissive
environment for known terrorist groups, including the ELN and its
sympathizers.
If confirmed, I will commit to closely reviewing the status of ELN
leadership in Cuba and consulting with Congress as the Biden-Harris
administration reviews U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Question. There are around 10,000 ISIS fighters at various
detention facilities, including 2,000 foreign fighters (FTF) that U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) characterizes as ``hardcore foreign terrorist
fighters.'' Internally Displace Camps (IDP) in Syria, like al Hol, have
become areas of systemic ISIS indoctrination of IDPs and refugees. The
process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of
former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to
peace. Yet, countries around the world with foreign terrorist fighters
have failed to make any progress to date. How does the Biden
administration plan to address this problem?
Answer. I understand the Department urges countries of origin to
repatriate their foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and associated
family members from detention facilities and camps in northeast Syria,
and to rehabilitate, reintegrate and prosecute those individuals as
appropriate. I understand the Department does this through intensive
diplomatic engagement, including through the Global Coalition to defeat
ISIS, by helping to repatriate individuals whose countries of origin
are willing to accept them, and helping develop rehabilitation and
reintegration protocols and programs. If confirmed, I will urge FTF
repatriation and leverage multilateral platforms in those efforts to
prevent ISIS from reconstituting capability in Syria and Iraq.
Question. 10 USC 127e authority allows the Secretary of Defense,
with the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission, to expend up to
$100 million each year to support foreign forces, irregular forces,
groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating authorized
ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces
to combat terrorism. Despite the important counterterrorism (CT)
collaboration between Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee (HFAC) lack visibility into this space.
Traditionally, SFRC and HFAC have not been afforded any insight into
127e programs and what our Chiefs of Mission are concurring with. Do we
have your commitment to return to this committee and brief on areas of
DoD and State CT cooperation, particularly the integration between 10
USC 127e and Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programs?
Answer. I understand the Department of State works closely with the
Department of Defense on a broad range of counterterrorism issues,
including in the Department of Defense's activities under its Title 10,
Section 127e authorities. I recognize that Congress has an important
oversight role to play in the U.S. Government's counterterrorism
efforts, and if confirmed, I will be committed to engaging with
Congress to discuss these and other counterterrorism lines of effort.
Question. The previous administration disbanded the Defense
Department's Defeat- ISIS Task Force, leading its then director
Christopher Maier to resign in November 2020. Former President Trump
similarly moved State Department's Special Envoy to the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS under the Bureau of Counterterrorism, with
Acting John Godfrey serving as that special envoy. Is this the right
staffing and organizational structure to prevent an ISIS resurgence?
Answer. I understand that achieving the enduring defeat of ISIS
remains a central priority of the administration. I do not believe the
dual-hatting of the CT Coordinator and Special Envoy reflects a
diminution of the position of the Special Envoy for the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS. It instead reflects the evolving nature of
the ISIS threat to encompass areas outside Iraq and Syria, and a desire
to situate the enduring D-ISIS mission within the established CT Bureau
architecture. Doing so enables effective leverage of CT Bureau's
civilian counterterrorism capacity-building assets and closer
coordinate with other bureaus. If confirmed, I will ensure that both
roles are prioritized and sustainably resourced.
Question. The Biden administration has launched a review of the
February 29 agreement with the Taliban, including the CT assurances and
posture issues associated with it. This is an issue with obvious and
important CT ramifications given the origins of this war and the
terrorist threats that endure. What role do you anticipate your bureau
playing in this review? How do you plan on ensuring U.S. CT interests
in Afghanistan are addressed?
Answer. I understand the Department of State, including the Bureau
of Counterterrorism, is a part of the interagency effort to monitor and
disrupt significant terrorist threats not only in Afghanistan but
anywhere else they might arise. If confirmed, my focus will be to
ensure our counterterrorism efforts maintain consistent pressure on
terrorist groups to deny them the time, space, and resources they need
to conduct complex, international attacks, including against the U.S.
homeland.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. My most meaningful achievements in promoting human rights
and democracy involve expanding coalitions to advance universal human
rights, countering malign influence, and elevating protection for human
rights defenders worldwide. In prior State Department leadership roles,
I expanded the first public-private partnership (PPP) for LGBT equality
to include private sector stakeholders, launched the first global PPP
against gender-based violence, and created new regional platforms to
protect journalists under siege. I helped persuade France to cancel a
multi-billion dollar defense sale to Russia in the wake of the Crimea
invasion, and successfully countered Russian disinformation efforts to
interfere with France's 2017 election. I persuaded India to launch its
first-ever third-country democracy promotion efforts with the United
States, including programs to generate self-employment opportunities
for Afghan women and build other nations' capacity to conduct free and
fair elections.
Question. The Hong Kong National Security Law, which mainland
Chinese authorities have imposed on Hong Kong, has already begun to
fundamentally transform the space for democracy and human rights in the
city. In your view, what steps should the U.S. Government take to help
defend the space for press freedom, free expression, and democracy in
Hong Kong?
Answer. If confirmed, I will stand united with our allies and
partners against the PRC's assault on Hong Kong's freedoms and its
blatant disregard for its international obligations and commitments. I
will use all available diplomatic tools at the U.S. Government's
disposal, including sanctions, visa restrictions, and other measures,
to promote accountability for the egregious actions of authorities in
Hong Kong and Beijing, and I will urge our allies and partners to do
the same. If confirmed, I will also help those who have been persecuted
by the Hong Kong and Beijing authorities find safe haven in the United
States and other countries.
Question. Since the February 1 coup by the Burmese military, the
space for free expression and association has dramatically constricted
as the junta attempts to suppress a sustained and countrywide civil
disobedience movement against its rule. More than 700 civilians have
been killed, and several thousand are currently detained. The
solidarity already shown by the U.S. Government to the protestors is
encouraging, but what further specific steps do you envision that this
administration can take to ensure maximum support for human rights
activists, journalists, and prominent voices of conscience at risk, and
to urge the military to peacefully return power to the duly-elected
government as soon as possible?
Answer. The United States, under the Biden-Harris administration,
has condemned in the strongest possible terms and taken actions against
those responsible for the military coup in Burma, the horrific violence
against protesters, and the ongoing, unjust detentions of State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other
democratically-elected leaders as well as more than 3,000 civil society
actors from across ethnic and religious groups. If confirmed, I will
use all available U.S. diplomatic tools, including sanctions, visa
restrictions, and other measures, to promote accountability and build
global coalitions to support the Burmese people's efforts to
reestablish and safeguard their path to democracy.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. You were listed in the acknowledgements section of a 1990
book titled ``Stealth PACs: How Israel's American Lobby Took control of
U.S. Middle East Policy,'' published by your employer at the time, the
American Educational Trust. Can you confirm today that you do not share
the anti-Israel claims in this book or of the American Educational
Trust? Do you believe pro-Israel Americans, and pro-Israel members of
Congress, have dual loyalties?
Answer. I categorically reject the anti-Israel claims in this book
and espoused by the American Educational Trust. Further, I had nothing
to do with the content of the book. My entry-level employment at the
American Educational Trust ended some 31 years ago, I have had no
contact with the organization since then, and I reject the
organization's positions with respect to Israel. I deplore any
suggestion that American Jews or members of Congress who advocate for a
strong U.S.-Israel relationship have dual loyalties or are disloyal to
the United States.
Question. The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs routinely
publishes a list of members of Congress who receive donations from pro-
Israel Americans. Do you believe there is something untoward about pro-
Israel Americans engaging in the political process?
Answer. I strongly support the right of every American, including
those who strongly support the U.S.-Israel alliance, to engage in the
U.S. political process, and see nothing untoward in this activity. As I
noted, my entry-level employment at the American Educational Trust
ended some 31 years ago, I have had no contact with the organization
since then, and I categorically reject the organization's positions
with respect to Israel. I strongly support the Biden administration's
commitment to renewing democracy abroad and at home, and believe the
latter is underpinned by the rights of every American to fully exercise
their constitutional rights, including freedom of expression, freedom
of association, freedom of religion, freedom to petition one's
government, and equal protection under the law.
Question. What is your view of the U.S.-Israel relationship?
Answer. I support the United States' unwavering and ironclad
commitment to Israel's security. If confirmed, I will support the
administration in working to further strengthen all aspects of the
U.S.-Israel alliance, including with respect to countering Iranian
state-sponsored terrorism, increasing international solidarity against
Hezbollah and other Iran-supported foreign terrorist organizations,
expanding global coalitions against anti-Semitism, building upon
Israel's normalization agreements with key Arab Governments, and
eliminating anti-Israel bias in the U.N. system, including the U.N.
Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court.
Question. Do you agree that U.S. policy in the region is best
advanced when working closely with our ally Israel?
Answer. Yes. President Biden has been one of Israel's strongest
supporters over the last fifty years. I understand the U.S.-Israel
alliance is deeply personal to him and, indeed, he's met and worked
closely with every Israeli Prime Minister since Golda Meir. I
understand the President believes the ties between our two countries,
rooted in strategic interests and shared values, should transcend
domestic politics. In this vein, I understand the administration will
not only further strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance, but also ensure
that it enjoys bipartisan backing. If confirmed, I will support the
administration's goals to work closely with Israel, to include building
on normalization agreements to strengthen cooperation between Israel
and its neighbors.
Question. Do you fully support Israel's right to defend itself from
terrorist attacks, including taking pre-emptive action to disrupt
weapons shipments from Iran to its terrorist proxies?
Answer. Israel has the right to defend itself from terrorist
attacks, and I understand the Biden-Harris administration's commitment
to Israel's security to be a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. I
support the administration's policy to continue U.S. security
assistance to Israel and uphold Israel's Qualitative Military Edge,
which is critical to ensuring Israel has the means to defend itself. If
confirmed, I will support action, in coordination with our allies and
partners, to deter and counter Iran's destabilizing activities. If
confirmed, I will strongly support the administration's goals regarding
Israel's security.
Question. Do you support full funding for United States security
assistance to Israel as laid out in the current 10-year MOU? Do you
support the position of President Biden that conditioning aid to Israel
is wrong?
Answer. I understand President Biden's commitment to Israel's
security is ironclad. The President played an important role in helping
to negotiate the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security
assistance, among the largest aid packages in U.S. history. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's pledge to preserve the
terms of the MOU without reservation.
Question. What is your view of the Iranian regime and the country's
human rights record?
Answer. The Iranian Government has the dubious distinction of being
the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, a destabilizing force
in the region, and a longtime and systematic human rights violator.
Iran severely restricts the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of
association, freedom of religion or belief, and freedom of expression.
If confirmed, I will call out Iran's human rights violations and
abuses, which include arbitrary or unlawful detention of numerous
individuals, some of whom have faced torture and/or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, and execution after unfair trials. I
also will work with my colleagues to consider all appropriate tools to
promote accountability for human rights violators.
Question. Are you committed to robust human rights programming in
Iran, regardless of how such programming may impact nuclear
negotiations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support robust human rights programs
in Iran. The Iranian Government denies Iranians the ability to exercise
their human rights, including through severe restrictions on the rights
to peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or
belief, and freedom of expression. If confirmed, I will support all
appropriate diplomatic tools to support the Iranian people so their
voices are heard and they can hold their government accountable for its
actions.
Question. Since the passage of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, all
but one of the U.S. Special Coordinators for Tibetan Issues have
concurrently held your position. If you are designated the Special
Coordinator, will you commit to promoting substantive dialogue without
pre-conditions between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government that
leads to a negotiated agreement on Tibet, as mandated by the Tibetan
Policy and Support Act of 2020?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed and designated as Special Coordinator for
Tibetan Issues, I will work with our allies and partners to press
Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives, without preconditions, to achieve meaningful autonomy
for Tibetans.
Question. If Beijing continues to refuse to engage in dialogue, as
it has done since 2010, will you insist that our dialogue with Beijing
on some issues of importance to them be linked to their resumption of
dialogue with the Tibetans?
Answer. If confirmed and designated as the Special Coordinator for
Tibetan Issues, I will work with our allies and partners to press
Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives to achieve meaningful autonomy. I will also call upon
Beijing to respect the human rights of Tibetans and to preserve Tibet's
environment as well as to respect its distinct cultural, linguistic,
and religious traditions.
Question. If confirmed, will you stand firm in communicating to
Beijing the United States position that we will not under any
circumstances accept a Chinese-controlled process to select the Dalai
Lama's successor? If the Chinese authorities attempt to force a
politically chosen successor on the Tibetan people, will you commit to
imposing serious sanctions in response?
Answer. The PRC Government must have no role in the succession
process of the Dalai Lama. PRC authorities' interference in the
succession of the Panchen Lama 26 years ago, including disappearing the
Panchen Lama as a child and attempting to replace him with a PRC
Government-chosen successor, remains an outrageous abuse of religious
freedom that I denounced as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. If confirmed, I am committed to
promoting respect for Tibetans' religious freedom and to taking all
appropriate measures to promote accountability for PRC Government
officials who attempt to interfere in the Dalai Lama's succession,
consistent with the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020.
Question. Do you believe that the CCP is committing cultural
genocide, also known as cultural erasure, against the Tibetans, whose
civilization is distinct from that of China and boasts its own rich
language, literature, religious tradition, and culture? Will you commit
to undertaking programmatic and policy initiatives that will protect
Tibetan culture and language in Tibet and in exile?
Answer. The Chinese Government has been relentless in seeking to
suppress the distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious traditions of
Tibetans. If confirmed, I will call on Beijing to end these policies
and will explore every opportunity, including through policy and
program initiatives, to help Tibetans preserve their traditions. This
will include working with allies and partners to press Beijing to
return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives,
without preconditions, to achieve meaningful autonomy for Tibetans.
Question. Will you commit to regularly raise the case of the
Panchen Lama and press for his release? Will you ensure that no U.S.
official meets with, or provides a public platform, for the individual
that Beijing appointed in his place?
Answer. Yes. I am saddened that Gedhun Choekyi Nyima--the Panchen
Lama--remains disappeared since his 1995 forced disappearance by PRC
authorities, separated from his community and denied his rightful place
as a prominent Tibetan Buddhist leader. If confirmed, I am committed to
supporting Tibetans' religious freedom, including their ability to
select, educate, and venerate their religious leaders, like the Dalai
Lama and the Panchen Lama, according to their own beliefs and without
government interference. I will also call on the PRC Government to
publicize verifiable proof of the Tibetan-selected Panchen Lama's
whereabouts and wellbeing and allow him to speak for himself.
Question. If confirmed, can you commit that the Biden
administration will not provide aid to the PA if Palestinian officials
have not ceased payments to those convicted of terrorist acts according
to U.S. law?
Answer. I understand that the administration has been clear that
all U.S. assistance for the Palestinians, including the recently
announced assistance, will be provided consistent with U.S. law.
Question. UNRWA currently only discloses contracts over $100,000 in
its quarterly filings. However, the Annual Statistical Report on U.N.
Procurement states that U.N. agencies must disclose all contracts over
$30,000. Will you hold UNRWA accountable for disclosing all contracts
over $30,000?
Answer. I understand UNRWA discloses all of its awards, including
those above the $30,000 threshold, to the United Nations Office for
Procurement Services which then reports them together with all other
U.N. agencies in the Annual Statistical Report on U.N. Procurement,
published on the U.N. Global Market website (UNGM.org). If confirmed, I
will seek to ensure UNRWA continues to abide by all relevant U.N.
policies and regulations.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting Cuba
democracy programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that support for
democracy and human rights is at the core of our efforts to empower the
Cuban people to determine their own future. The recently released 2020
Human Rights Report notes the significant human rights abuses
perpetrated by Cuban Government officials. If confirmed, I will ensure
the U.S. Government continues its steadfast support for and engagement
with Cuban human rights defenders, activists, and civil society members
to bolster their important work. I also will promote human rights,
fundamental freedoms, and democracy, and will facilitate the free flow
of information to the Cuban people.
Question. If confirmed, how will you support Cuba's democracy,
civil society and human rights defenders in Cuba?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the U.S. Government continues
its steadfast support for and engagement with Cuban human rights
defenders, activists, and civil society members to bolster their
important work. I also will promote human rights, fundamental freedoms,
and democracy, and will facilitate the free flow of information to the
Cuban people. I will also denounce the Cuban Government's abuses and
push for democratic reform. If confirmed, I will consult with Congress
about Cuba policy.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Rob Portman
Question. North Korea is a topic of personal significance to me.
Last year I gave a speech on the Senate floor to honor Otto Warmbier on
the third anniversary of his passing, and I remain in contact with Fred
and Cindy--Otto's parents who are constituents. How will this
administration approach the challenge of North Korea from a national
security and human rights perspective?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to placing human rights at the
center of our foreign policy, including with North Korea, and working
with like-minded partners to call out human rights abuses. I am deeply
concerned by North Korea's deplorable human rights abuses, including
its network of political prison and labor camps, use of forced labor,
and severe restrictions of religious freedom, and horrific treatment of
unjustly detained Americans like Mr. Warmbier. If confirmed, I will
prioritize addressing North Korea's egregious human rights record and
promoting respect for human rights in the closed country. I will also
prioritize increased coordination with our allies and partners and will
use all diplomatic tools at the U.S. Government's disposal to promote
accountability for those responsible for the unspeakable abuses that
occur in the country.
Question. I am deeply concerned regarding the ongoing reports of
atrocities and human rights abuses occurring in the ongoing civil war
in Ethiopia. As you are aware, civil wars are a unique threat, as this
type of conflict often destabilizes neighboring states, attracts
foreign fighters as well as third party proxy support for sides in the
conflict. How can we ensure that Ethiopia's fragile transition toward
democracy can continue given the current circumstances, and how can the
United States ensure accountability for crimes occurring not just in
the Tigray region, but all of Ethiopia?
Answer. The President and the Secretary of State have made clear
that securing a ceasefire and supporting a political dialogue to defuse
the political crisis in Ethiopia, including in Tigray, is an urgent
priority, and I understand they plan to appoint a special envoy to lead
a robust diplomatic effort to advance these goals. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the special envoy in this regard. In addition, I will
support the work of a joint investigation mechanism by the Ethiopian
Human Rights Commission and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights as a first step in the accountability process.
Credible, independent, and transparent investigations into human rights
violations and abuses are critical for long-term justice,
accountability, and reconciliation.
Question. Yesterday, President Biden announced his intention to
withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by the 20th anniversary of the
September 11th attacks. While the American people are understandably
weary after two decades of war, any move to draw down our military
presence in Afghanistan should be based on conditions on the ground,
not in accordance with an arbitrary date. The Taliban have not upheld
their commitments during the peace negotiations process. Before any
withdrawal, we must ensure that the Taliban respects the legitimate
governing authority of Afghanistan and see a de-association from
extremist groups such as Al 'Qaeda and ISIS. We cannot repeat the
mistakes of the past, such as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq
in 2011. That decision lead to more military intervention from the
United States, not less, while giving rise to new extremist groups that
filled the vacuum of instability. Do you share in my concern that a
complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces in September without any sign
that the Taliban is prepared to become a responsible partner in
governing? What are the chances that Afghanistan becomes a failed state
and a haven for terrorists who could once again strike the United
States Homeland?
Answer. I support the administration's decision to complete a full
military withdrawal by September 11, and to focus on diplomatic efforts
to facilitate a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the
Afghan Government. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we remain
vigilant to the terrorist threat and that U.S. humanitarian assistance
preserves gains for Afghan women and civil society and mitigates
prospects for state failure. I understand the administration will work
with Afghan partners and Allies to counter any reemergence of a
terrorist threat and to hold the Taliban to its commitment to ensure al
Qaeda does not threaten the United States, our interests, or our
allies.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing a
genocide against the Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that is ongoing. The Biden administration had
sent differing signals about the degree to which administration
officials assessed that genocide is indeed ongoing, but on March 22,
Secretary Blinken correctly emphasized ``the P.R.C. continues to commit
genocide and crimes against humanity.'' Do you agree with the
assessment that the Chinese Government is engaged in a genocide against
the Uyghurs and other minorities in the XUAR that is ongoing?
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes include imprisonment,
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including through
forced labor and draconian restrictions on the freedoms of religion or
belief, expression, and movement. These atrocities shock the conscience
and must be met with serious consequences.
Question. What role do you see for the State Department in
countering that ongoing genocide, and more broadly the human rights
atrocities being committed by the Chinese Communist Party?
Answer. I share your deep concern about the ongoing genocide and
crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim,
and members of other ethnic and religious groups in Xinjiang. I
understand the Department has reinvigorated cooperation with partners
and allies and has imposed a number of measures to address these
atrocities. If confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts to broaden
this international coalition and call for an independent and unhindered
investigation. I also will support using all appropriate tools,
including those provided for in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, to
pressure the PRC to end these atrocities and to promote accountability
for those responsible and justice for victims.
Question. The Obama-Biden administration's approach to the Israeli-
Arab conflict was justified on the basis of a theory of regional
relations in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented broader
Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Among other decisions, that administration
implemented discriminatory policies that distinguished between Jewish
communities in places Israel controlled before and after 1967. That
approach culminated in December 2016, when the Obama administration
maneuvered the United Nations Security Council into passing UNSCR 2334,
which among other things denied Israel's sovereignty over the Golan
Heights and part of its capital Jerusalem, including the Jewish
Quarter. The Trump administration systematically worked to hollow out
and render UNSCR 2334 null and void. They did so, including by
recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, by recognizing
Jerusalem as Israel's capital, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem, by
seeking to end discriminatory approaches that distinguished legally and
for the purposes of aid and trade between different Israeli
communities, and by taking several other steps. Do you believe that
Israel has sovereignty over the Golan Heights?
Answer. In considering the U.S. position on the Golan Heights, I
understand the administration gives great weight to Israel's security.
The current Syrian regime and its Iranian allies pose a significant
risk to Israel. It is apparent that the Golan Heights is critically
important to Israel's security. As long as Bashar al-Assad is in
control of Syria, it would be irresponsible to urge Israel to part with
the Golan Heights. Control of the strategic Golan Heights provides
Israel an added measure of security from the turmoil next door.
Question. Do you believe that Israel has sovereignty over
Jerusalem, including the Old City of Jerusalem?
Answer. I understand the administration recognizes that Jerusalem
is central to the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Jerusalem itself is a final status
issue to be resolved through direct negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to handle all issues related to Jerusalem with the care and sensitivity
that they deserve.
Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of
any part of Jerusalem?
Answer. I understand the administration recognizes that Jerusalem
is central to the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Jerusalem itself is a final status
issue to be resolved through direct negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to handle all issues related to Jerusalem with the care and sensitivity
that they deserve.
Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of
the Old City of Jerusalem?
Answer. I understand the administration recognizes that Jerusalem
is central to the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and its ultimate status is a final
status issue which will need to be resolved by the parties in the
context of direct negotiations. If confirmed, I will support the
administration's efforts to handle all issues related to Jerusalem with
the care and sensitivity that they deserve.
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5, the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. The issue of humanitarianism was central to the public
explanation of the decision: officials at the State Department have
justified the delisting of what they described as the ``broad''
designation of Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large
parts of Yemen's population live under areas controlled by the group.
Since then, the Houthis have escalated their violence across the
region, bombarding civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen was
already one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world, in
large part because the Houthis and their Iranian backers block aid,
steal aid, and attack civilians. Please describe the role played by
Iran and the Houthis in deepening the humanitarian catastrophe in
Yemen.
Answer. Iran continues to provide the Houthis with training,
equipment, and monetary support, which assists them in promoting
regional instability; threatening our partners, especially Saudi
Arabia; and disrupting international shipping. Further, the Houthis use
this support to threaten Yemeni civilians, especially at this time in
the city of Marib. If confirmed, I am committed to working with our
interagency partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities.
The Houthis impede humanitarian access in the areas they control.
If confirmed, I will support U.S. efforts to work with our partners on
the ground to improve humanitarian access and facilitate the provision
of critical commodities and humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in general.
Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis. I
understand the administration heeded concerns from the United Nations,
humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among others,
that the designations could have had a devastating impact on Yemenis'
access to basic commodities like food and fuel, which could increase
the risk of famine. The short time that passed between the designations
and the revocations limited the impact the designations could have had
on humanitarian assistance and commercial imports, including food and
other essential supplies.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in Marib.
Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
This has been especially critical in Marib, where the escalation of
hostilities has caused additional needs and secondary displacement. The
lifting of sanctions has allowed for the delivery of life-saving food,
emergency shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, and essential non-
food items, such as blankets and water containers.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in
notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If
not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized for
inaction in response to Iranian human rights atrocities, and critics
have suggested that those issues were subsumed beneath the
administration's commitment to securing a nuclear deal. The Biden
administration, which is rushing to secure another nuclear deal with
Iran, has already come under similar criticism. Please describe your
assessment of the scope and nature of Iran's human rights record.
Answer. The Iranian Government severely restricts the rights to
peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or
belief, and freedom of expression. If confirmed, I will call out Iran's
systematic human rights violations and abuses, which include arbitrary
or unlawful detention of numerous individuals, including American
citizens. I will work with my colleagues and U.S. allies and partners
to consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for regime
officials responsible for human rights violations and abuses, including
torture, executions, persecution of religious minorities, and digital
repression.
Question. Please describe the degree to which you believe that
Iranian human rights concerns should be highlighted vs. considerations
related to nuclear negotiations or securing nuclear-related
concessions.
Answer. President Biden has been clear that Iran must never obtain
a nuclear weapon. Iran's development and proliferation of ballistic
missiles pose a threat to international security and remain a
significant nonproliferation challenge. The President has also
emphasized that human rights must be at the center of our foreign
policy. If confirmed, I will call out Iran's human rights violations
and abuses, which I did forcefully in my prior role as Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. If
confirmed, I intend to work with colleagues and U.S. allies and
partners to consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability
for Iranian regime officials responsible for pervasive human rights
violations and abuses.
Question. Do you believe that imposing new human rights sanctions
against Iran, or enforcing existing ones, would violate the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or a successor agreement?
Answer. The Iranian Government denies Iranians the ability to
exercise their human rights, including through severe restrictions on
the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of
religion or belief, and freedom of expression.
I support continuing to maintain and impose sanctions on Iranian
individuals and entities perpetrating human rights violations and
abuses. Human rights sanctions are independent of JCPOA provisions and
remain an invaluable, bipartisan tool to achieve the Biden-Harris
administration's commitment to center human rights and democratic
values in U.S. foreign policy.
Question. In July 1989, you were hired as director of the American
Educational Trust's speakers' bureau, according to the Washington
Report on Middle East Affairs, which is published by the organization.
The organization and outlet routinely suggest that American Jews who
advocate for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship invite hostility and
even violence because of their advocacy, that political expenditures
and activities by Americans and especially American Jews are unseemly,
and that such activities raise questions about their loyalty to the
United States. The Washington Report has also lists of members of
Congress who receive donations from Americans who politically advocate
for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship.
Do you agree that these sorts of rhetoric and tropes, including
accusations that American Jews who advocate for a strong U.S.-
Israel relationship are disloyal to the United States, are
inappropriate?
Answer. Yes. I deplore any suggestion that American Jews who
advocate for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship are disloyal to the
United States. My entry-level employment at the American Educational
Trust ended some 31 years ago, I have had no contact with the
organization since then, and I categorically reject the organization's
positions with respect to Israel.
Question. Do you agree that these sorts of rhetoric and tropes,
including accusations that American Jews who advocate for a strong
U.S.-Israel relationship are disloyal to the United States, are anti-
Semitic?
Answer. Yes, I agree that accusations of dual loyalty against
American Jews supportive of the U.S.-Israel alliance constitute anti-
Semitic speech. I fully endorse the International Holocaust Remembrance
Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of anti-Semitism, under which
certain criticisms leveled against Israel, or Jewish persons as a
collective, can be considered anti-Semitic. I strongly support the
Biden administration's embrace of the IHRA working definition of anti-
Semitism and join the Biden administration in categorically condemning
all forms of anti-Semitism. If confirmed, I intend to combat anti-
Semitism and intolerance in all forms and will work to expand
international coalitions towards this objective.
Question. Do you agree that it is inappropriate to suggest that
Americans who believe in a strong U.S.-Israel relationship should be
excluded from engaging in political activities, including donating to
members of Congress?
Answer. Yes. I categorically reject any suggestions that Americans
who believe in a strong U.S.-Israel relationship should be excluded
from engaging in political activities, including donating to members of
Congress. I strongly support the Biden administration's commitment to
renewing democracy abroad and at home, and believe the latter is
underpinned by the rights of every American to fully exercise their
Constitutional rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of
association, freedom of religion, freedom to petition one's government,
and equal protection under the law.
Question. Do you believe that a strong U.S.-Israel relationship
boosts American national security?
Answer. Yes. I strongly support the Biden-Harris administration's
unwavering and ironclad commitment to Israel's security and, if
confirmed, will work to further strengthen all aspects of U.S.-Israel
partnership. The ties between the United States and Israel are rooted
in strategic interests and shared democratic values, and in this vein,
I understand the Biden-Harris administration will seek to further
strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance. If confirmed, I will support the
administration's goals to work closely with Israel, to include
countering anti-Israel bias in the U.N. system, strengthening
international coalitions against anti-Semitism, and building on
normalization agreements to strengthen cooperation between Israel and
its neighbors.
Question. The term ``universal human right'' is frequently used
throughout the international community, and it was a reference you made
consistently throughout the hearing. Please provide in your own words a
definition of universal human right.
Answer. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) represents
a common understanding, which I share, of universal human rights and
freedoms around the globe. The UDHR begins by stating that all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. It sets out, for
the first time at the international level, rights and freedoms to be
universally protected. To me, many of these rights are inspired by
those enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and hold U.N. member states to
a common standard. The universality of human rights articulated in the
UDHR also counters false arguments put forth by China, Russia, and
other autocracies of a U.S. or Western agenda being imposed on the rest
of the world.
Question. In your view, is the concept of a ``human right'' fluid
or relative?
Answer. As human rights are universal, they are neither fluid nor
relative. As an example, the right to freedom of expression has not
changed since it was articulated even though our understanding of the
application of the right has been challenged as we adapt to new methods
of communication. From time to time, our understanding of rights may
expand; for example, where once societies held other human beings in
bondage, it is now universally recognized that slavery is a violation
of one's human rights. This does not make human rights fluid or
relative, but reflects the reality that the understanding and
application of human rights standards can evolve in a positive
direction alongside societal progress.
Question. Do you believe that certain rights are unalienable?
Answer. In its preamble, the Declaration of Independence states,
``We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.'' I believe that these unalienable rights and those
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution apply to all Americans, cannot be
denied by government, and that there is no hierarchy of rights.
Similarly, in the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
I understand and support the concept of ``inalienable'' rights that
cannot be denied or taken away from people, and which governments have
a duty to protect and to refrain from violating.
Question. The Biden administration rejoined the United States to
the United Nations Human Rights Council, a body that features some of
the worst human rights violators in the world including China, Cuba,
Somalia, and Venezuela. In your hearing you argued a lack of U.S.
presence at the Council would create a ``vacuum'' for bad actors to
direct policy initiatives. What substantive policy areas does the U.N.
Human Rights Council hold jurisdiction over or govern?
Answer. The U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC), while not without
flaws, provides a venue to raise human rights violations from around
the world. It can play an important role in shining a spotlight on the
world's worst human rights violators. For example, the HRC is one of
the few places in the U.N. where China has been called out for its
abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. HRC engagement allows the United
States to keep countries with the worst human rights records off the
Council and encourage more rights-respecting nations to run for seats.
U.S. engagement decreased unfair HRC bias against Israel.
Question. If we accept the ``vacuum argument,'' is it your view
that United States participation in the U.N. Human Rights Council
should include the following (please explain your response for each):
Advocate for the removal of well-known human rights violators from the
Council; Withhold funding for certain activities or initiatives as a
tool to produce changes in behavior from malign actors; Use the voice
and vote of the United States at the Council to highlight human rights
atrocities, including violations of protecting the right to life, by
other nations, including nations who sit on the Council.
Answer. I understand the administration is committed to working
with partners to ensure the Human Rights Council shines a spotlight on
countries with the worst human rights records and serves as a forum for
those fighting injustice and tyranny. U.S. re-engagement should
advocate to keep some of the countries with the worst human rights
records off the Council and encourage more rights-respecting nations to
run for seats. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States
continues to seek Council reforms, including elimination of anti-Israel
Article Agenda Item 7, and promote all appropriate, available, and
effective accountability mechanisms for those who commit atrocities, to
include forced abortions and sterilization, rape, torture, and mass
killings.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What is your understanding of U.S. law with respect to
engagement with Hamas? News media reports indicate the Biden
administration has committed to ``resetting the U.S. relationship with
the Palestinian people and leadership,'' including robust engagement
and provision of aid. On April 7, the State Department announced its
intent to ``restart U.S. economic, development, humanitarian assistance
for the Palestinian people'' by providing $75 million in aid to the
West Bank and Gaza.
Answer. Hamas is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under
Executive Order 13224. I strongly support the Biden-Harris
administration commitment to disrupt and deter terrorist organizations
worldwide, including Hamas. I understand U.S. engagement in the West
Bank and Gaza and with the Palestinians is consistent with U.S. law and
involves no engagement with Hamas, a designated FTO.
Question. What are the implications for U.S. engagement and
provision of aid if the Palestinian Legislative Council includes, or is
led by, members of Hamas? Under the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of
2006, the United States is prohibited from providing assistance to a
Palestinian Authority effectively controlled by Hamas.
Answer. I understand U.S. assistance for the Palestinians is
provided consistent with U.S. law. I also understand the Department
routinely assesses its foreign assistance programming, and would do so
following Palestinian elections or any other significant change related
to the Palestinian Authority.
Question. If confirmed, can you commit that the Biden
administration will not engage with Hamas officials and will not seek
to find technical loopholes to engaging with Hamas officials such as
considering them as members of the PLO, which they are not?
Answer. Hamas is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive
Order 13224. I understand U.S. engagement in the West Bank and Gaza and
with the Palestinians is consistent with U.S. law and involves no
engagement with Hamas, a designated FTO. If confirmed, I will comply
with U.S. law and seek to ensure that ``J family'' bureaus and offices
do the same.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Markey,
Schatz, Van Hollen, Risch, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Ambassador Jenkins, former Secretary Fernandez,
congratulations on your nominations and my thanks for your
willingness to return to the State Department with your
demonstrated experience, strength, and commitment to advancing
our national interests.
I have spoken often of the pivotal foreign policy
challenges facing our country and the State Department, and
this hearing will be no different. If confirmed, both of you
will confront serious issues and challenges and a department in
need of repair and rebuilding.
I am heartened by the Biden administration's emphasis on
nominating knowledgeable and seasoned leaders with rich foreign
policy experience.
Ambassador Jenkins, the Under Secretary for Arms Control
and International Security is one of the most vital senior
positions in the Department of State. Its portfolio ranges from
nuclear weapons to terrorism and from nonproliferation to
landmines. It requires orchestrating global cooperation with
both allies and adversaries on critical issues.
As you and I have discussed, I have long been concerned
over the way that the Department of Defense has assumed the
security assistance mission that should be the exclusive
purview of the State Department and the Secretary of State.
I greatly respect the service of the men and women in our
armed forces and particularly your own 20 years of naval
service. But the person delivering assistance to officials of a
foreign government should not be wearing a uniform. They
should, instead, have the authority to advance and promote a
comprehensive foreign policy vision consistent with our core
values.
We also discussed the need for the State Department to
respect this committee's crucial statutory oversight role over
the arms sales process, including when the laws and regulations
governing those sales may have been violated.
This relationship was poisoned by the last administration.
Thus far, the relationship has been much improved, but more
work is necessary to create an effective partnership.
Make no mistake. One way or another, this committee will
conduct effective oversight, and I hope and expect that we can
depend on your cooperation.
Finally, we stand at a crossroads in our nuclear
relationship with Russia and China. We have extended the New
START Treaty with Russia for five years. The question is now
where do we go from here.
Do we seek deeper reductions in Russian strategic forces?
Should we focus on shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons
not covered by New START?
Should we focus on engaging China which, although its force
structure remains smaller than the United States or Russia, is
rapidly modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces?
So I look forward to hearing your thoughts on those matters
today.
Mr. Fernandez, if confirmed, I expect that your previous
experience as Assistant Secretary for Economics, Energy, and
Business Growth will serve you well. This is vitally important
because the last four years have been especially difficult for
the bureaus that you have been nominated to lead.
They suffered from neglect, a loss of an institutional
experience, and an undervaluing of diplomacy at the highest
levels. The former administration never even bothered to
nominate an Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.
Given the sad state of affairs, your first priority, I
believe, has to be rebuild the E Bureaus, restore morale, and
provide clear leadership. This is especially important because
President Biden has elevated the mission of the E Bureau by
prioritizing climate change as a foreign policy imperative.
Energy, the environment, economic growth, leadership in all
of these arenas is necessary to restore U.S. leadership and
successfully combat the climate crisis.
If confirmed, you will also head the economic diplomacy
wing at the State Department. I am interested in hearing about
your views on building back better America's economic
statecraft toolkit.
Economic diplomacy is an absolutely critical domain for
competition in the 21st century, and there are many questions
to be answered about a strategy for the post-COVID
reconstruction of the global economy, as well as how to help
poor countries administer vaccines and build resilience to the
economic strains brought by the pandemic.
I am particularly interested in your views on Secretary
Yellen's proposed $650 billion in special drawing rights and
how it promotes global economic stability and growth, and I
would like to understand how you plan to engage on economic
sanctions both within the department and in the interagency
process.
So, Ambassador Jenkins and Mr. Fernandez, both of you face
steep challenges ahead, but I have no doubt that you are up to
the task.
And with that, we look forward to your testimony and turn
to the distinguished ranking member for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The two nominations before us today are important and,
indeed, really critical to our nation's foreign policy. I would
first like to start with the nomination to be Under Secretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security.
For the past few decades, the global threat landscape has
been going through a paradigm shift. Unfortunately, many in the
West have clung to the notion that we can simply rely on the
policies of the past to keep us secure today.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In just the last
10 years since the New START Treaty was ratified, the threats
facing the United States, its allies, and our collective
security have only grown.
Russia has completely modernized its nuclear forces and has
done so outside existing treaty limits. It is growing its
nuclear stockpile and is developing new so-called exotic
missile delivery systems.
In addition, State Department compliance reports have laid
out a consistent pattern of Russian noncompliance, also known
as cheating, with a majority of the international arms control
obligations it has signed.
Meanwhile, China is on pace to at least double its nuclear
stockpile over the next decade. It has tested more ballistic
missiles in 2018 and '19 than the rest of the world combined,
and is likely engaged in nuclear testing activities.
Currently, China is modernizing every element of its
nuclear triad, including larger land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles, new ballistic missile submarines, and long-
range stealth bombers, and the Department of Defense assesses
that China is raising the alert level of much of its nuclear
force indefinitely.
Combined with lack of transparency, these actions
contribute to potential miscommunication or inadvertent
escalation in a conflict and each of these threats demands
immediate attention.
Beyond Russia and China, we continue to face mounting
threats from other malign actors like Iran and North Korea, who
continue to vie for a place on the world stage by advancing
their nuclear and missile programs and engaging in proxy and
cyber warfare.
This arms race encourages other nations to question whether
they too need to develop nuclear weapons--certainly, not a
pretty picture--and in the process, it undermines--all of this
undermines Cold War--the Cold War architecture.
The role of the Under Secretary for Arms Control is our
lead negotiator and accountability monitor to keep other
countries honest on these issues. This person must not only
have a deep level of technical knowledge but also the skills
and wherewithal to sit across the table from leaders of these
nations and push back against empty offers and veiled threats.
It is also critical that this administration recognize the
interdependence between arms control and nuclear modernization,
as explicitly as explicitly codified in the ratification of the
New START Treaty.
The Obama administration committed to nuclear modernization
in order to win ratification of the New START Treaty but
promptly scrapped those promises and abandoned those
commitments just a year later.
Trust must be rebuilt between Congress and the executive.
To rebuild this trust, the Biden administration must commit to
a full modernization of the nuclear triad and nuclear weapons
complex.
This is vital to reassure our allies who have forgone
developing nuclear weapons and instead rely on our nuclear
umbrella that we provide for them. Dismantling our capabilities
while our adversaries build their stockpiles, is inherently
destabilizing and undermines international security.
Which brings me to the last but, certainly, one of the most
important topics for this nominee, the Senate's role in
approving arms control agreements and treaties. The
Constitution plainly lays out the Senate's role in approving
these types of international agreements.
I cannot stress enough that any international agreement in
the arms control space, including reentry into a previous
agreement, must be put to the Senate for its advice and
consent, as demanded by the Founding Fathers and our
Constitution.
And to win consent, the administration should take concrete
steps to rebuild the trust previous congresses have placed in
the executive branch.
Next, we have the nomination of the Honorable Jose
Fernandez to be Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth,
Energy and Environment. Our economy is one of our greatest
assets and we all know economic policy is a crucial part of
foreign policy.
The United States represents about 4.5 percent of the
world's population, but we account for 22 percent of the
world's economic activity. American creativity, innovation, and
determination are hallmarks of the U.S. economic model and it
is not surprising that countries around the world long to
duplicate our success.
More government spending of borrowed money or of
government-appropriated private capital is simply not the
answer to our problems or those of other countries. Spending
enormous sums at home and abroad in the hope that it will
create a better world is not sustainable.
Instead, we must carefully define our objectives. Whether
it is economic energy or environmental policy, we must be
advocates of a free market system that resists the temptation
to impose a one-size-fits-all solution to these incredibly
diverse and difficult issues.
Further, how we steward our economy and help other
countries develop is important to expanding the rule of law,
encouraging compliance to international norms, and pushing back
on corruption.
We must continue to promote the private sector-driven
market-based economy that has led to the United States and its
allies achieving a level of prosperity for our citizens never
before seen in history.
It is only through promoting this system that the West will
truly be able to offer the world a better alternative to the
socialists and parasitic Chinese economic policies and to
reinforce the system of fair play rules we, along with other
free and democratic countries, have constructed.
This is the economic landscape that lies ahead of us. With
our allies, we must rise to this challenge. I look forward to
hearing from both the witnesses on how they plan to address
these very important issues.
Thank you, Senator Menendez.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
So we will turn to our two nominees. Your full statements
will be included in the record. We ask you to summarize them in
about five minutes or so we can have a conversation.
And we will start off with Ambassador Jenkins.
STATEMENT OF HON. BONNIE D. JENKINS OF NEW YORK, NOMINATED TO
BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
Ms. Jenkins. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I am grateful to President Biden, Vice President Harris,
and Secretary Blinken for their trust and faith in nominating
me to be Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security.
It is a great honor for me to come before this committee.
If confirmed, I pledge to work tirelessly for the American
people and in close coordination with members of Congress and
this committee to advance our shared ideals for this great
nation.
I would like to thank my mother, Dorothy Jenkins, my
family, and my friends and colleagues who have inspired and
supported me for so many years. I have been honored to serve
the U.S. Government as both a civilian and in uniform from
working on arms control treaties as a lawyer with the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1990s to over 20 years in
the U.S. Air Force and Navy Reserves.
Most recently, I had the honor of being confirmed to serve
as ambassador for the State Department Threat Reduction
Programs from 2009 to 2017, working to bring the issues of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security front
and center.
My commitment to public service has always included
advancing opportunities for all Americans. In 2017, I founded
the nonprofit Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and
Conflict Transformation in an effort to make sure that our
nation's policymakers are engaging in and constitute all of our
experts, regardless of race, gender, or background.
I am also a professor at Georgetown and George Washington
Universities teaching our future generation of policymakers. If
confirmed, I will bring this breadth of experience to bear on
the challenges that our country is facing today.
An increasingly authoritarian People's Republic of China is
pursuing a destabilizing military modernization project and
rapid nuclear buildup, endangering the international rules-
based order and inflaming regional and global tensions.
Iran has continued to expand and accelerate its nuclear
program and ballistic missile development, in addition to its
ongoing support for terrorist groups and violent armed
militias.
Russia continues to violate arms control agreements and
commitments, and we face new cybersecurity and emerging
technology threats from our adversaries. Reducing the risk of
war through effective arms control, limiting Russian and
Chinese nuclear expansion, strengthening our efforts in
biosecurity, pursuing accountability for the use of chemical
weapons, and promoting a diverse workforce will be among my top
priorities, if confirmed.
We must strengthen deterrence alliance in the Euro Atlantic
and Indo-Pacific to better deter and defend against growing
threats. We must develop and implement norms of responsible
behavior in outer space.
We must grapple with advancements and emerging technologies
that can threaten strategic stability. If confirmed, I will
strive to ensure that arms transfers and security assistance
are focused on building value-based security partnerships.
I will carefully assess all critical factors, including
nonproliferation, arms control, and human rights, and will
ensure other key commitments, such as maintaining Israel's
qualitative military edge, are upheld.
I look forward to working with this committee, if
confirmed, to look strategically at how our security assistance
authorities are structured and how they are balanced and
resourced across the Departments of State and Defense to ensure
that our tools, including our security cooperation agreements,
are the most efficient for the U.S. taxpayer and the most
effective for U.S. national security.
Renewed American leadership, as set out in the
administration's interim national security strategic guidance,
will be essential to reducing the dangers from chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their
delivery systems.
Further, working with allies and partners the United States
must continue to stand up for an open, interoperable, reliable,
and secure internet and stable cyberspace where international
law and voluntary nonbinding norms apply to state behavior.
You have my commitment that if I am confirmed I will work
in close coordination with you in our efforts to restore
Congress' role in formulating foreign policy and to ensure the
policies we enact are in the greatest interest of our national
security of the American people.
The interests we face are numerous, but our commitment to
our allies and to our American people is rock solid. We have
much work to do and I am ready to get started.
With that, I welcome your questions and I look forward to
our discussion today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I am grateful to President Biden, Vice President Harris, and
Secretary Blinken for their trust and faith in nominating me to be the
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. If confirmed,
I pledge to work tirelessly for the American people and in close
coordination with Members of Congress and this committee to advance our
shared ideals for this great nation.
I would like to thank my mother, Dorothy Jenkins, my family, and my
friends and colleagues who have inspired and supported me for so many
years.
I have been honored to serve the U.S. Government as both a civilian
and in uniform, from working on arms control treaties as a lawyer with
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1990s, to over 20
years in the Air Force and U.S. Navy Reserves. Most recently, I had the
honor of being confirmed to serve as Ambassador for the State
Department's threat reduction programs from 2009 to 2017, working to
bring the issues of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
security front and center.
My commitment to public service has always included advancing
opportunities for all Americans. In 2017, I founded the non-profit
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation in
an effort to make sure that our nation's policy makers are engaging in
and constitute all of our experts, regardless of their race, gender, or
background. I am also a professor at Georgetown and George Washington
Universities, teaching our future generation of policy makers.
If confirmed, I will bring this breadth of experience to bear on
the challenges that our country is facing today. An increasingly
authoritarian People's Republic of China is pursuing a destabilizing
military modernization project and rapid nuclear buildup, endangering
the international rules-based order and inflaming regional and global
tensions. Iran has continued to expand and accelerate its nuclear
program and ballistic missile development, in addition to its ongoing
support for terrorist groups and violent armed militias. Russia
continues to violate arms control agreements and commitments. And we
face new cybersecurity and emerging technology threats from our
adversaries.
Reducing the risk of nuclear war through effective arms control,
limiting Russian and Chinese nuclear expansion, strengthening our
efforts in biosecurity, pursuing accountability for the use of chemical
weapons, and promoting a diverse workforce will be among my top
priorities, if confirmed. We must strengthen deterrence alliances in
the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific to better deter and defend against
growing threats. We must develop and implement norms of responsible
behavior in outer space. And we must grapple with advancements in
emerging technologies that can threaten strategic stability.
If confirmed, I will strive to ensure that arms transfers and
security assistance are focused on building values-based security
partnerships. I will carefully assess all critical factors, including
nonproliferation, arms control, and human rights, and will ensure other
key commitments, such as maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military
Edge, are upheld.
I look forward to working with this committee, if confirmed, to
look strategically at how our security assistance authorities are
structured, and how they are balanced and resourced across the
Departments of State and Defense, to ensure that our tools, including
our security cooperation agreements, are the most efficient for the
U.S. taxpayer, and the most effective for U.S. national security.
Renewed American leadership--As set out in the administration's
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance--will be essential to
reducing the dangers from chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems. Further, working with
allies and partners, the United States must continue to stand up for an
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet and a stable
cyberspace, where international law and voluntary, non-binding norms
apply to state behavior.
You have my commitment that if confirmed I will work in close
coordination with you in our efforts to restore Congress' role in
formulating foreign policy, and to ensure the policies we enact are in
the greatest interest of our national security and of the American
people. The threats we face are numerous, but our commitment to our
allies, and to the American people, is rock solid. We have much work to
do, and I am ready to get started. With that, I welcome your questions
and look forward to our discussion today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Fernandez?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSE W. FERNANDEZ OF NEW YORK, NOMINATED TO
BE AN UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENERGY, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT); UNITED STATES ALTERNATE GOVERNOR OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT; UNITED
STATES ALTERNATE GOVERNOR OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK; AND UNITED STATES ALTERNATE GOVERNOR OF THE EUROPEAN BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Fernandez. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Menendez.
Thank you, Ranking Member Risch, and other members of this
committee for the opportunity that you have given me before--to
appear before you today.
I would like to take a couple of seconds to introduce my
family. I am blessed to have a supportive and loving family
made up of three remarkable women. All three of them walk the
talk of public service and I am very proud of them.
My wife, Andrea Gabor, is a professor at Baruch College in
New York and the author of four books, in addition to being the
mother of Sarah and Annie. Sarah, who is also here, spent a big
chunk of her law school years volunteering at a death penalty
clinic and is on her way to a graduate degree in psychology.
And not with us but very much in our thoughts is our second
daughter, Annie, who is pursuing a joint public health and
medical degree in California. I could not be here without them.
So thank you for giving me the opportunity to introduce them.
I am honored to come before you as President Biden's
nominee for Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth,
Energy, and the Environment. I am grateful for the confidence
shown in me by the president and by Secretary Blinken.
If confirmed, I will consult frequently with this committee
as we work to serve the interests of the American people.
Nearly a dozen years ago, in the midst of the Great
Recession, I appeared before this committee as the nominee for
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Business
Affairs.
I come to you today under circumstances that are different
from those that we faced in 2009. But the reasons that brought
me here have not changed.
My family and I left Cuba as refugees in 1967. We were fed
in food kitchens by charities and we lost the lease in our
first home. But when we settled in New Jersey in the town next
to Union City in Hudson County, we began to rebuild lives that
had been upended by revolution, fear, and deprivation.
A decade later, a country that owed us nothing had given me
scholarships at Dartmouth College and Columbia Law School where
I was challenged and nurtured by educators I will never be able
to repay.
In short, I have lived the promise of America. I know that
trading essential liberties for economic security is a false
bargain, and I believe to my core that a humble but confident
nation that celebrates its diversity while striving to reach a
more perfect union can inspire others to tackle the existential
challenges of our time.
With the exception of my four years here as Assistant
Secretary, I practiced commercial law in New York since 1980. I
have represented U.S. investors doing business abroad and
foreign investors operating in the United States.
I have advised governments in Africa, Latin America, and
elsewhere on pro-growth policies, and, unfortunately, over the
last year I have also witnessed how workers and businesses
everywhere have suffered in economies ravaged by COVID-19.
If confirmed, I will advance--seek to advance foreign
policy initiatives that will benefit the American people and,
particularly, our middle class, and I will focus on five
priorities.
My first will be to support the State Department's critical
role in stopping COVID-19. As Undersecretary, I would work to
advance global vaccination, secure critical supply chains,
promote economic recovery, and promote effective global
systems.
My second priority will be to work on environmental and
energy policies to accelerate economic growth. President
Biden's executive order on tackling the climate crisis has
established this goal as a national priority.
There is no greater challenge than climate change and we
must work to include all countries in the effort while ensuring
that our workers will share in the benefits of the new economy.
My third priority will be to ensure that our country will
benefit from free, fair, and reciprocal trade. We need to focus
on common goals with our trade partners while working to remove
trade irritants.
We also need to support American innovation by protecting
intellectual property rights overseas and preventing strategic
competitors from gaming the system.
A fourth priority of mine will be to help maintain American
leadership in the digital economy and emerging technologies.
U.S. technology companies face increasing challenges in
maintaining U.S. preeminence in cutting-edge science and
technology, and we need to engage diplomatically and with
industry stakeholders so that international norms and standards
are fair and transparent.
Finally, my last task will be to do what I have been doing
now for almost 40 years and that is to facilitate new market
opportunities for U.S. firms. Competing in the international
arena is a strategic imperative for the United States and an
opportunity for our companies and our workers.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fernandez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jose W. Fernandez
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and members of
this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I am honored to come before you as President Biden's nominee for
Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment. I am grateful for the confidence shown in me by the
President and Secretary Blinken. If confirmed I will consult frequently
with this Committee as we work to serve the interests of the American
people.
Nearly a dozen years ago, in the midst of the Great Recession, I
appeared before this committee as the nominee for Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs. I now come to you
at a moment that is no less dire. A pandemic has robbed the lives of
more than 570,000 Americans and millions more around the world.
Generations wonder whether we can avert a climate cataclysm. Emboldened
rivals seek to expand their influence at America's expense. And
traditional allies question whether the United States will remain at
their side.
I come to you today under circumstances different from those we
faced in 2009, but the reasons that brought me here have not changed.
My family and I left Cuba as refugees in 1967. We were fed in food
kitchens run by charities and lost the lease in our first home, but
when we settled in New Jersey and my mother took a job as a seamstress
in a local factory and my father became a bank clerk, we began to
rebuild lives upended by revolution, fear and deprivation. A decade
later, in a country that owed us nothing, I had received scholarships
to Dartmouth College and Columbia Law School, where I was challenged
and nurtured by educators I will never be able to repay.
In short, I have lived the promise of America. I know that trading
essential liberties for economic security is a false bargain. And I
believe to my core that a humble but confident nation that celebrates
its diversity while striving to reach a more perfect union can inspire
others to tackle the existential challenges of our time.
With the exception of my four years in Washington as Assistant
Secretary, I have practiced commercial law in New York since 1980. I
have represented U.S. investors operating in troubled countries, and
foreign investors seeking to raise funds in our capital markets or
navigate the U.S. foreign investment system. I have advised governments
in Africa and Latin America on pro-growth policies. Unfortunately, over
the last year I have also witnessed how workers and businesses
everywhere have foundered in economies ravaged by COVID-19.
If confirmed I will seek to advance foreign policy initiatives that
will benefit the American people, and particularly our middle class,
focusing on five priorities:
1. The State Department's critical role in stopping COVID-19: As
Secretary Blinken has said ``This pandemic won't end at home
until it ends worldwide.'' As Under Secretary I would work to
advance global vaccination, secure critical supply chains,
support safe international transportation systems, and--more
broadly-- promote inclusive economic recovery and effective
global health systems.
2. Environmental and energy policies to accelerate economic growth:
President Biden's Executive Order on tackling the climate
crisis established as a national priority raising global
climate ambition and integrating climate considerations across
a wide range of international fora. There is no challenge
greater than climate change, and we must work to enlist all
countries. We also need to ensure that our workers will share
in the benefits of the new economy.
3. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade: The United States needs to focus
on common goals with our trade partners while working to remove
trade irritants. We also need to support American innovation by
enlisting partners to protect intellectual property rights
overseas and prevent strategic competitors from circumventing
the rules.
4. Leadership in the digital economy and emerging technologies: U.S.
technology companies face increasing challenges in maintaining
U.S. preeminence in cutting-edge science and technology. We
need to engage diplomatically and with industry stakeholders to
maintain U.S. competitiveness and ensure that international
norms and standards are fair and transparent.
5. Facilitating new market opportunities for U.S. firms: As the
Department's senior economic official, I would direct our
network of economic officers in embassies around the world to
help U.S. firms expand overseas, creating jobs in the United
States and contributing to our economic growth. Competing in
the international arena is a strategic imperative for the
United States and an opportunity for our companies and workers.
Let me conclude by stressing that, if confirmed, I would be honored
to serve with Secretary Blinken and my counterparts throughout the U.S.
Government in support of the President's economic policy agenda. I will
also seek your counsel throughout my tenure.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your testimony. We
will begin a series of five-minute rounds for members, and I
will at the beginning say I have to go to introduce two judges
to the Judiciary Committee. So I will----
Senator Risch. I will take over.
The Chairman. Yeah, absolutely. I know you would be happy
to.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I have no doubt about that. So I will start
off with my questions. Then I will turn to Senator Risch. I
should be back by then. But if not, Senator Risch, if you would
acknowledge according to the list that we have here.
Let me start off with you, Ambassador. I am glad I heard in
your statement about your commitment to work with the
committee. The leadership of State in the last administration
had a very contentious relationship with this committee on arms
sales matters, and it was clear that our legitimate statutory
oversight role was neither recognized nor respected.
So far, Secretary Blinken has fostered a very different
relationship that is professional, respectful, and
consultative. Will you continue and broaden this relationship
on arms sales oversight and will you commit to consult with us
regarding policy changes and initiatives and not merely inform
us of your decisions?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for your questions, Senator.
Yes, I can confirm that I am more than happy to consult
with you.
The Chairman. All right.
Now, I have been concerned for some time that a Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor Bureau does not have appropriate
influence on the arms sales process. The Biden administration
seems better disposed to consider the human rights components
of the arms sales process.
I plan to reintroduce my Safeguarding Human Rights in Arms
Sales Act, which seeks to reemphasize and enhance DRL's role. I
have no ideological prohibition to having U.S. arms be sold
abroad. I have no problem with that.
I do have a problem when we sell it to countries that
violate human rights or act outside of the international norm
and the use of those weapons.
So, if confirmed, will you enhance DRL's role in the arms
sales process?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, Senator. What I can certainly say is, as
I said in my statement, I view human rights as forefront and
fundamental to arms sales and arms transfers. So I will,
certainly, do what I can, if I am confirmed, at State to
include all issues and individuals in terms of promoting human
rights.
The Chairman. Now, I want to turn to the question that I
raised earlier, and I think you and I had an opportunity to
discuss this. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, DOD has
reproduced more and more of State's security assistance
authority.
It has recently attempted to reproduce State's
international military education and training program with a
focus on its own priorities as it has done with other
duplicated programs. It, essentially, runs its own foreign
military financing grant program, which is considered far more
flexible than State's.
If confirmed, will you give equal focus to all the issues
in all of the bureaus and offices under your supervision and
actively defend State's equities and authorities in this
regard?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, I am very concerned and would, certainly, be working
with all the authorities and the offices within State and the
interagency to strengthen the role of the State Department in
this issue.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Fernandez, it is good to see your family here,
incredibly gifted family, I must say. You have got all the
bases covered. You can get educated, your health care is going
to be taken care of, and that is a pretty good deal.
So I want to know--I hope you have had an opportunity maybe
to see what this committee did last week, in a 21 to 1 vote,
passed out the Strategic Competition Act, which is something
that Senator Risch and I authored, along with many members of
this committee, intended to restore our global economic
leadership, including passages calling on the president to work
with our G-7 allies in matters relevant to economic and
democratic freedoms.
We see in this committee on a bipartisan basis as China
being our most strategic competitor, a nation that we must
confront when they violate international norms but we must also
compete with.
If confirmed, what will be your goals when it comes to the
global economy and in its post-COVID recovery, particularly as
it relates to competing with China?
Mr. Fernandez. Thank you for your question, Senator, and I
commend you and the committee for the work that you did last
week on the China bill. It is an issue that I think will be an
important part of my role at the State Department.
The fact of the matter is that, as you know, China is no
longer biding its time. It is challenging us in the economic
sphere every chance that it gets and it is doing so through
practices that are inimical to many of the rules that it had to
follow in order to get to where it is. The Chinese are now
trying to challenge those rules.
We have pushed back but I think we must do more, and I
think the bill that you worked on last week will be--will give
us an additional tool to do that.
One of the areas on which I think I would like to
concentrate my efforts will be to work with our allies more, to
work with our private sector more, and to provide alternatives
to other countries doing business with China.
Oftentimes, they may not have other choices, and I think
part of what we need to do is to work with our allies and to
work with our companies to talk to them about the opportunities
abroad and to get them much more involved in international
business.
The Chairman. Thank you. I am going to turn to Senator
Risch. I am going to let Senator Risch preside in this period
of time. After Senator Risch, Senator Cardin is next and then
Senator Hagerty after that. But I should be back by that time.
Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Risch [presiding]. I appreciate that. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
I am going to ask a few questions here and then we will
turn to Senator Cardin.
Ambassador Jenkins, as you know, the United States withdrew
from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, commonly known as
the INF Treaty. We believed it was the right thing to do--that
is, the United States did--and so did NATO. NATO found that the
U.S. was justified in withdrawing from INF. I am told you do
not particularly agree with that decision. Is that correct?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir.
At the time the decision was made, my concern was whether,
in fact, in my view, we had a significant strategy as a next
step after that. So that was my concern at the time.
Senator Risch. Do you still--are you still in the same spot
you were?
Ms. Jenkins. I think that after I had time to see this, I
am still concerned about the strategy, going forward. But I,
certainly, understand why the U.S. withdrew. Senator Risch: All
right. And, of course, that was the result of the fact that the
treaty was a one-way street. That is, we were complying but the
Russians were not. Fair statement?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Yes, a fair statement.
Senator Risch. Do you have any plans of turning that
around?
Ms. Jenkins. The statement or----
Senator Risch. No.
[Laughter.]
Senator Risch. The statement is the statement. I am talking
about the--about the facts, about trying to get them back in
the lane they are supposed to be in.
Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think what we--what the administration
does have planned for the future, and if I am confirmed I would
be, hopefully, involved in these kind of discussions, is a way
forward to work with Russia, and the idea would be to have what
they are calling strategic stability talks, in which time it
would be an opportunity to really look at all the different
issues with Russia. But also we want to continue to engage our
allies on issues in--regarding Europe and NATO.
So I think that the idea now is to have some of these
discussions with our allies and, of course, we will have our
discussions with Russia, and then we will see where we are
after we have had a chance to start these dialogues.
Senator Risch. How about the Chemical Weapons Convention
and Russia's compliance or, rather, noncompliance? Do you have
thoughts on that?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, the use of chemical weapons is
reprehensible and I--you know, I know the U.S. has instituted
sanctions against Russia as a result of the use of nuclear--
chemical weapons against their own citizens.
The U.S. continues to make the point at the OPCW in The
Hague and also to raise the point with our allies as well. So
my view is that that use of chemical weapons is, as I said,
reprehensible.
Senator Risch. I think we all agree with that. But the
question is, how do you get them--how do you bring them to heel
to comply with the convention that they have subscribed to?
Ms. Jenkins. Sir, you continue to use sanctions. You
continue to work with our allies to put pressure on them. You
continue to work with multilateral organizations like the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
You work through the U.N. You use all the tools that you
have--in my view, use all the tools that you have at your
disposal, whether they are diplomatic or others, to actually
try to get the Russians to actually abide by what they are
supposed to be doing.
Senator Risch. How about the Biological Weapons Convention?
Ms. Jenkins. The Biological Weapons Convention is a
convention that is significant and we need to continue to put
more emphasis on the Biological Weapons Convention, to
reinvigorate it.
It is another opportunity and another way that we can
encourage Russia to abide by things that we think they should
be abiding by.
Senator Risch. And what about nuclear testing with Russia?
Ms. Jenkins. The concern there is, as you probably know,
all of the P-5 countries, all the nuclear weapons countries,
currently have a moratorium on nuclear testing. The concern
there is if countries start to test again it can open a box to
nuclear testing.
We have had a moratorium for a number of years so we want
to try to prevent a situation where countries feel that that is
something that they could be doing again.
Senator Risch. I am assuming you are familiar with the 2020
State Department compliance report that Russia is, in fact,
violating each one of these agreements. Are you familiar with
that from the agency that you are about to join, that report?
Ms. Jenkins. I am aware of the compliance report.
Obviously, I did not have any input on that.
Senator Risch. Of course.
Ms. Jenkins. And I will have much more time to examine it
after--of course, after--if I am confirmed, but after today.
Senator Risch. Are you in disagreement with their
conclusions that Russia is in noncompliance and violating all
of these conventions and treaties that we have just talked
about?
Ms. Jenkins. No, I am not in--I would not be in
disagreement with that, sir.
Senator Risch. Well, I think that underlies the heavy lift
that you have ahead of you. You have talked to me generally
about that. Can you give me any more specifics on your--on how
you intend to go down that road?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, sir, I mean, I think that what we need
to do is as the Government is planning--and I am not there so I
cannot really attest to all of the discussions that are
actually taking place in their interagency.
But as I said, what I am aware of are the next steps in
terms of engaging on issues of nuclear weapons, the use of
sanctions against Russia that have just been done. We can
continue to do sanctions, continue to put pressure on them in
other ways using the whole-of-government and all of the
different tools that we have, using diplomacy, which is--which
we have different avenues for that both bilaterally,
multilaterally, through our multilateral organizations.
You know, we think--I think we just have to use all the
tools that we have at our disposal to try to convince and to
push Russia to comply with treaties.
Senator Risch. In looking over some of the things that you
have written, I was a little perplexed. On April 21st, 2019,
you wrote, and I quote here, ``Men make nuclear weapons more
dangerous,'' end quote.
I am a little perplexed by that. How do I make nuclear
weapons more dangerous? What--could you drill down on that a
little bit for me?
Ms. Jenkins. Yeah. I do not quite recall that statement. I
am not saying I did not make it, but out of context I do not
recall. If it is--I would have to know which article that was.
But I know that I have written about the importance of
having diverse perspectives in terms of national security and
foreign policy, in terms of having different viewpoints, in
terms of having more women at the table. I assume that that is
the context that you are--you are pulling that from.
Senator Risch. Well, the--I am looking at it here and the
exact quote is, ``Men make nuclear weapons more dangerous,'' a
completed sentence. And I guess I am just perplexed as to how
men make nuclear weapons more dangerous.
Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think what--if I can recall what you
are pulling it from, essentially, what I am saying there is
that we have a situation now where we have to reassess where we
are in terms of where we have been.
We need to look at bringing more different diverse people
to the table. To date, we have not had enough significant
diversity, and it has been a situation where it has been,
essentially, men at the table.
So it is more of an issue of we need to include more people
and more diverse people because we only know what we have right
now, and we do not have that.
Senator Risch. I do not think anyone is in disagreement
that diversity is appropriate. But I just do not understand how
men make nuclear weapons more dangerous. That is very
perplexing.
Ms. Jenkins. I think--yeah, what you are pushing at is that
the context that men--without having to make any certain
statements here, that the belief that women in conflict
situations, and there has been study on this, that when women
at the table that there is more peace and peace tends to last
longer.
Senator Risch. Senator Cardin, you are up.
[No response.]
Senator Risch. Okay. We will go down in the list of people
who signed up. Senator Van Hollen, are you with us by WebEx?
[No response.]
Senator Risch. How about----
Senator Cardin. No, I am sorry. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Risch. Senator Cardin, it sounds like you, but I do
not see you.
Senator Cardin. I think I am now with you. Thank you very
much, and let me thank both of our nominees for their
willingness to serve in these two very important roles.
In both of your testimonies, you have indicated the
importance of American values in our policies. Ambassador
Jenkins, you specifically said that we need a value-based
policy as it relates to our arms issues.
And certainly, Mr. Fernandez, your family experience points
out the importance of value-based policies. So I want to ask
both of you a question but, first, let me start with Ambassador
Jenkins. And that is, our arms policy needs to be based upon
our values and our values are respect for human rights.
So when we get involved in arms sales with countries that
allow these arms to be used inappropriately against their own
people, or to deny human rights to others, we should not permit
that to happen. We need to filter our considerations of arms
sales through our human rights concerns.
What commitments can we have from you that, as you are at
the table as these types of decisions are being made that,
indeed, we will promote our values, our human rights, even
though at times it might run some challenges in our bilateral
relations with other countries?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for the question, Senator.
Yes, as I said, that we need to look at our values but also
we need to highlight the importance of human rights. In that, I
can--what I am aware of is that there is now a review ongoing
on our conventional arms transfer policy which will inform
decisions on transfers, and that I can certainly say, if I am
confirmed, that things will change. It will not be business as
usual.
So we need to continue to look at these on a case by case
basis. We need to look at our national security concerns. We
need to look at our strategic concerns that we have in the
region, region stability, and we also need to continue to
reassess anything that we decide to transfer to another
country.
But, ultimately, we have to consider human rights in these
issues, and if I am confirmed, I will be looking at the revised
CAT policies that are being discussed right now.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. I will be working with you on those areas.
I have introduced some legislation in this regard, and I am
glad to see it is not business as usual. It is absolutely
essential that, as we talk about arms sales that human rights
be a component of those discussions.
Mr. Fernandez, I want to raise a subject I have raised
consistently with nominees that have come before our committee,
and that is the importance to standing up against corruption.
We have several tools that are available that are in your
toolkit, including the use of the Global Magnitsky statute.
There are pieces of legislation pending before this committee
that I have authored on a bipartisan basis with other members
of our committee that would set up a requirement that our
missions evaluate every country's commitment to anti-corruption
and evaluate how well they are doing, as well as making funds
available to fight corruption.
Can I get your commitment--I have gotten this from so many
of the members of the Biden administration--that you will be
focused in your work on an anti-corruption agenda, recognizing
that corruption many times is the fuel for anti-democratic
regimes being able to stay in power and abuse power?
Mr. Fernandez. Senator, thank you for your question.
Absolutely. You have my commitment. In fact, I will tell you
that I am a firm believer from my time in the private sector
that we are never going to out compete other countries through
low environmental standards, intellectual property theft,
corruption, or lack of respect for human rights.
Transparency is part of our DNA. It is part of what we are
about as a country and it is also--I have seen it. I have seen
it be a competitive advantage.
I have seen countries say, we are going to use an American
company to build this road because we know that that contract
was not obtained through illicit means. So you have my
commitment and, in fact, I would love to work with you some
more on these issues. It is something that is in my DNA as
well, and I very much would welcome the opportunity to discuss
it further with you.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, and again, I want to thank
both of our nominees and their families. This is a tough time
to serve in government.
Both of your roles that you have been nominated for are
critically important to our national security and have
challenges, and thank you for stepping forward and I look
forward to working with both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cardin. I
understand Senator Hagerty is with us virtually.
Senator Hagerty. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You are recognized, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch. I appreciate your holding this meeting.
My first question is for Ambassador Jenkins. Thank you for
being here today, Ambassador.
We are in a period right now where China is ramping up its
nuclear weapons capability. At the same time, Russia is
articulating a strategy of ``escalate to de-escalate''. They
are developing weapons like the Poseidon that has the
capability of destroying cities.
So at this time, I want to get your perspective on which
way the Biden administration is going to go, and if I could, I
would like to read a couple of quotes and then get your
thoughts on what direction we are going.
During her nomination hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Kath Hicks said that ``The Triad has been the bedrock of our
nuclear deterrent and I think it must be modernized in order to
be safe, secure, and credible.''
Yet, on April 10th, 2021, two Biden administration
officials gave an interview in Japan with the Asahi Shimbun
with a fundamentally different message about U.S. nuclear
policy.
During that interview, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
Alexandra Bell and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear Missile Defense Policy Leonor Tomero said that, quote,
``There is no doubt that President Biden's goal is to reduce
the role of nuclear weapons.''
So, Ambassador Jenkins, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to supporting the modernization of nuclear weapons?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir. I think I, like President
Biden, really support a safe, secure, and strong nuclear
arsenal for as long as we do have our nuclear arsenal, and I
know that this is a--this has been something that has had
bipartisan support.
I know that right now this is being led--issues of
modernization are led by our Department of Defense, our Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Department of Energy. So what I can say is
that, obviously, I am not in the Government right now to know
what is being discussed.
But I can, certainly, say that if I am confirmed I look
forward to engaging with military components as well as
Department of Energy in the modernization and process.
And, you know, I think we can agree--as I said, it is
bipartisan--that we do need a safe, secure, and effective
arsenal.
Senator Hagerty. Well, help me rectify this, because we are
at a time right now when China and Russia are both stepping up
their nuclear programs and you have got people in the
department that, if you are confirmed, the department that you
will run, who are saying that they feel that President Biden
wants to see us reduce our nuclear capability.
How do you square that?
Ms. Jenkins. I think the way to square it is it is going to
be a whole-of-government approach in terms of how we--how we
approach these issues. I think having a strong nuclear arsenal
is not necessarily a contradiction in terms of looking at how
we can also find a way in which we can safely and adequately
reduce our arsenal.
I think a lot will depend on what is decided in terms of
how we work with countries like Russia. It will determine, I
assume, on ongoing discussions with China. So I cannot say
because I am not in the Government.
But I think that we should be able to square this by having
a whole-of-government approach in how we look at all of these
issues of the nuclear Triad, the Nuclear Posture Review, and
also the way in which we will approach countries on arms
control and disarmament.
Senator Hagerty. Ambassador, thank you. I will just say
this. We live in a competitive world. We need to take account
of what China is doing, what Russia is doing. We need not be
naive in our process.
So I hope you will take a very careful look at what your
staff, if you are to be confirmed, are saying and make certain
that we have a consistent policy and that we are not
articulating a confusing position to our own nation and to our
adversaries.
Can I turn now to a discussion that I have been looking
forward to having with Mr. Fernandez?
Mr. Fernandez, I would like to talk with you about the
Clean Network initiative that you and I have discussed. It has
been an undisputed success with some 60 countries that have
already signed up. Two hundred companies have been involved in
the Clean Network initiative, again, an initiative that enables
us to keep untrusted vendors out of our infrastructure.
We have talked about this in the past. It has built
tremendous brand equity, and given your background in mergers
and acquisitions, I am certain you realize that that type of
momentum has a great deal of value, something that we would
certainly like to see captured and the momentum continue.
If you are confirmed, would you commit to working with
Congress to secure the resources and any new authorities that
you may need to continue to move this program forward?
Mr. Fernandez. Senator, thank you for your question, and we
had a conversation yesterday about this and let me repeat what
I said then, which is I very much agree that the stakes could
not be higher, that we need to trust that--and our allies need
to trust that the 5G equipment that they purchase will not
threaten national security, privacy, or basic infrastructure,
and the Biden administration has reaffirmed the importance of a
5G strategy.
The Clean Network Initiative is currently under review. We
share the goal. There has been lots of progress, and it is my
intent to try and further those goals.
In a new administration, there may be some tweaks. But you
have my commitment and you have my word that we will pursue the
same goals because they involve national security at its core,
not just for the United States but for the entire world.
And so I look forward to working with you on that and I
would be delighted to spend some time working on furthering
that objective.
Senator Hagerty. Excellent, Mr. Fernandez, and I look
forward to working with you, actually taking this approach
across other sectors--technology sectors, energy sectors--as we
think about, you know, the new infrastructure of the future,
autonomous vehicles, et cetera. I think there is a lot of
opportunity there.
One follow-up question. The State Department compiled a
list of 1,100 companies that are involved in financing the PRC
military. That list is very helpful to investment advisors as
they think about and advise their clients on which companies to
divest.
When will the State Department update that list of 1,100
companies?
Mr. Fernandez. Senator, thank you for the question. I am
not familiar with those plans. I would be happy to get back to
you on that. But I am not familiar with the--with that list of
the names that are there or the plants that the State
Department has to update them. I will certainly get back to you
on that.
Senator Hagerty. Great. It is very useful tool, and I
appreciate the update schedule when you can get it. Thank you
so much.
Mr. Fernandez. Of course.
Mr. Fernandez's Response to Senator Hagerty's Question
Mr. Fernandez. I understand that the State Department, in
consultation with the Treasury Department, is currently evaluating
entities based on required criteria under Executive Order 13959, as
amended, and relevant published Frequently Asked Questions.
The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Van Hollen is
with us virtually.
Senator Van Hollen. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member, and congratulations to both witnesses on their
nominations. Thank you for your willingness to serve.
Madam Ambassador, I want to follow up a little bit on some
of the questions that Senator Hagerty raised, at least that
line of questioning. I think we have long agreed on a
bipartisan basis that our sort of strategic defense depends on
a reliable and effective nuclear deterrent.
But we have also recognized that we can make ourselves
safer through smart arms control agreements with previously the
former Soviet Union and now with Russia and others, and I was
pleased to see that President Biden chose to extend the New
START agreement by five years.
That had some bipartisan support here. I had introduced a
resolution with Senator Young to encourage that and I am glad
that the administration moved forward, and that has the
support, as you know, of our military leadership as well, who
recognizes--who recognized that that is an important part of
our stability, predictability, and verification regime.
But this five years will now give us an opportunity to look
at follow-on negotiations, strategic nuclear negotiations, or
other nuclear weapons negotiations with Russia.
How do you anticipate moving forward on that? Do you agree
that we should be looking for deeper cuts in strategic nuclear
weapons and looking at some of the Russian capabilities and
bringing them within the fold of the next arms control
agreement?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir. And I think, looking forward,
and as I said, this is something also being looked at by the
administration and they are also in the process of planning the
next steps for engagement with Russia on these issues,
certainly, I think the idea would be deeper cuts.
But I think a lot of that depends. A lot of that depends on
what happens with the strategic stability talks that are being
planned.
We, certainly, want to include discussions on some of the
novel weapons that Russia have. We, certainly, want to look at
their nonstrategic nuclear weapons that they have, which they
have a lot more and are planning to build more of these type of
weapons.
So we, certainly, want to have a discussion in which we
will bring in all of these weapons systems, as I said earlier,
so we can--we can determine exactly where we need to have a
conversation on deeper cuts.
And as you--and as you have acknowledged, this will be a
decision by the administration looking at all the different
relevant factors, including having a strong nuclear arsenal.
Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you.
Let me turn quickly to China. While China is working to
develop and modernize its nuclear forces, there remain big, you
know, differentials between both the size and the quantitative
edge with respect to our nuclear arsenal.
That does not mean, however, that there is not room for
some negotiations with China to avoid miscalculations. Could
you talk a little bit about your vision of how we engage with
China when it comes to nuclear arms control?
Ms. Jenkins. China is an important country in terms of
nuclear arms issues. They are a significant threat to us, as we
have noted earlier. As noted, they are trying to increase their
nuclear arsenal two times by the end of the year. They are
strengthening their nuclear Triad. They are looking at trying
some novel systems.
So, certainly, we have to find a way to have a--to get them
at the table. As you know, it has been a challenge to do that.
There have been attempts to try to make that happen.
But I think we have to focus on results more than form. We
do think and I think the administration thinks that a bilateral
effort is the way to go and because there are certain security
issues that I think that we want to look at specifically with
China.
So we want to engage them and I believe the administration
is discussing next steps for to engage--to engage China
bilaterally to try to start the discussion so we can prevent
miscalculation, we can have more transparency, and get a much
better understanding of what is happening for everybody's
security.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you.
And, Mr. Fernandez, just briefly, I want to mention Power
Africa and whether you would agree that that has been a very
useful tool in terms of engaging with Africa and trying to
accomplish some of our objectives there and whether it makes
sense to expand the use of Power Africa.
Mr. Fernandez. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for your
question, and I am very familiar with your interest and
commitment to working in Africa.
I think Power Africa has been a success. It has been a
success on the renewables front. It has been a success on
regulatory reform in Africa. I think we need to expand it. I
think, as I said in my opening statement, one of the benefits,
one of the competitive advantages that we have over countries
such as China is a private sector, and we need to get our
private sector involved in infrastructure in Africa.
That may be a tall order. But I think programs such as
Power Africa are programs that we ought to deepen, and you have
my commitment to work with this committee to do that, going
forward.
I have spent a fair amount of time in Africa. I used to
commute to Ghana for about two years, privatizing its phone
company. It is a country that has great potential and it also
presents an opportunity for U.S. business and U.S. workers.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Markey, I understand, is with us virtually.
Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Thank you. You are recognized.
Senator Markey. Mr. Chairman, can you hear me?
The Chairman. I can, and you are recognized.
Senator Markey. Beautiful. Thank you.
Ambassador Jenkins, President Trump systematically
dismantled the arms control architecture that you will oversee
as undersecretary. He was egged on--President Trump--by John
Bolton.
But, ultimately, President Trump tossed aside the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Arms Trade Treaty, the
Iran nuclear deal, the treaty on open skies, and he flirted
with taking a wrecking ball to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty by signaling an interest in conducting a, quote,
``demonstration'' nuclear test just last year.
And at home, President Trump broke with his predecessors by
increasing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in military
strategy by deploying a low-yield warhead on our strategic
ballistic submarines and developing a new nuclear sea launch
cruise missile after President George Herbert Walker Bush
retired them three decades again.
So it is clear we need to build back a better nuclear
posture, and so my question to you is are--is the Biden
administration going to carry out a review of its nuclear
policy and do you agree that every effort should be made to
follow the tradition of presidents on a bipartisan basis, going
back to George Herbert Walker Bush but exempting Donald Trump?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir. It is my understanding that
there is review taking place on the Nuclear Posture Review.
There are reviews and interagency discussions, to my
understanding, on a number of issues relating to arms control,
relating to nonproliferation issues, and all the other--many of
the other issues that we are discussing today.
So there is a review of that and I, certainly, look forward
to and hope, if I am confirmed, that we can have a bipartisan
process for going forward on all these issues that are within
the T Bureau, particularly the ones we are talking today about
arms control and nonproliferation, and finding ways that we can
reassert the U.S. leadership role in arms control and
nonproliferation.
Thank you.
Senator Markey. Yeah, thank you.
Well, in 2013, President Obama's nuclear employment
guidance concluded that we could reduce our deployed stockpile
by up to one-third and still meet our deterrence and
reassurance commitments, and I hope that is the position that
the Biden administration is once again going to reaffirm.
The Trump administration reportedly flirted with conducting
the first U.S. nuclear test in over a generation in a clumsy
attempt to bring Russia and China to the negotiating table. My
PLANET Act last year helped to deny funds to make good on those
Dr. Strangelove visions.
In your view, if we were to carry out such a test, what
would the consequences be to the nuclear nonproliferation
regime?
Ms. Jenkins. Sir, for the U.S.--if the U.S. did a test that
would certainly--we, certainly, would not be considered leaders
in the nonproliferation area. We have--we would go against our
moratorium that we have on nuclear testing.
There would be lots of questions about why we are testing,
what that mean in the future. So that would create a lot of
confusion in the international community. It would create a lot
of confusion by countries in terms of our overall role and
obligations in arms control and it, certainly, would not bode
well, in my opinion, in terms of our role and our position on
nuclear testing.
Senator Markey. Good, thank you. And one final question. If
confirmed, will you advocate for the president to recommit to
the Arms Trade Treaty and work with members of this committee
to build support for future senate advice and consent on that
treaty?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for the question. If I am confirmed,
I would, certainly, be interested in conversations and in the
interagency on next steps or next possible steps for the U.S.
in the Arms Trade Treaty.
Senator Markey. Okay. Beautiful. Thank you, and thank you
for your service to our country.
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Schatz?
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both
of you for being willing to serve.
Ambassador Jenkins, there was a recent DOD report in which
they essentially conceded an inability to track--to do end-use
monitoring of arms in conflict areas like Ukraine and
Afghanistan. We have seen American-made so-called nonlethal
weapons used in Egypt and in Hong Kong.
I have a couple of questions about how we do end-use
monitoring. I know there is a good partnership at the--at the
State Department with the Department of Defense to track the
weapons that we sell or provide to our foreign partners.
My understanding is that the Security Cooperation Office at
our embassies is responsible for conducting these end-use
checks. But often the people in these offices are stretched
thin, and I am wondering if this is an area where a few more
people or some new use of technology could strengthen our
oversight in terms of weapons exports.
Can you comment on this and talk about what opportunities
you see to improve the resources we dedicate to end-use
monitoring checks?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you. Thank you, sir, for that
question.
Yes, end-use monitoring is very important in terms of
ensuring that the arms transfers actually end up where they are
supposed to be.
So we, certainly, want to do everything we can to
strengthen and make sure that end-use monitoring is happening.
I am aware that there are cases, and I cannot recall which--in
which case at the moment, but I know that it has been more
successful I know in some cases where countries have actually
gone out and done--have done more in terms of end-use
monitoring and have more agreements.
I think one thing that we need to do, as you said, I think
we should always look at more options if there is technology
that can help. I think that, you know, if I were confirm happy
to look at different options that can help us. Strengthening--
if there is a need for more people to help out with that, I
think that is great.
But I think, as I was saying earlier, as we have much more
emphasis in the future on human rights, as we more have a much
stronger emphasis on these issues in general in terms of where
these--where these arms end up, I am, certainly, open to more
discussion on what we can do to make it better, in particular,
in light of the fact that we are relooking at our CAT policy
and everything else.
Senator Schatz. So I think there are a couple areas for
improvement.
First of all, technology. Second of all, just flat out
resources. You need more human beings to do this work. And then
third, sort of undergirding that, you do not want to just lay
down a layer of technology on an old system under old
assumptions.
And so I do think we need to do a comprehensive look and
just concede it is not working right now. It may be working to
greater and lesser degrees in certain countries, but where it
needs to work it is not working.
Now, there is another question that I think is essential to
this, which is that it is not just the geographic location of
whatever arms have been transferred. It is how they are used,
right, and that is a policy question.
I am wondering if we can work together on that, because it
may be that it is in the possession of those--of that country
that we transferred it to but used for something that is
antithetical to our values.
And I think that is a more ticklish kind of difficult
policy question to get to because it is after the fact. But I
still think that is our basic obligation when we think about
and use monitoring. I wonder if you can comment on that.
Ms. Jenkins. No, I think--I think you are right. I think--I
think, I mean, obviously, as you said, one question is where do
the arms land and the other one is how are they used, you know,
and giving them to a country for one purpose and they are being
used for something else.
You know, it is a challenge. You know, it is a challenge to
always--to know exactly how it is going to be used. But I think
that we, certainly, want to strengthen whatever we have now to
make sure that we can do that.
If I am confirmed I am, certainly, happy and ready to work
with you on that.
Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
Mr. Fernandez, just a final question. Our science bureaus
play an important role in terms of our relationships with
countries in Oceania. Their work is key to protecting marine
resources and combating IUU fishing and tackling the climate
crisis.
But I worry that these issues get a little bit isolated,
stovepiped, from the day-to-day diplomacy run out of the East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau.
Can you talk about how we can make sure that oceans and
climate are elevated in our approach to Oceania so that it is
not that we are separating science and conservation questions
from the sort of big boy and big girl conversation around
geopolitics, but that those are one and the same, especially in
those areas where when you are dealing with heads of state
where climate is their main issue, right?
When you have an inundated runway or you have an inability
to farm or fish, climate is not some secondary optional
conservation question. It is an existential question.
But I think that our bureaucratic systems have to reflect
that prioritization, particularly in Oceania but also
elsewhere.
Mr. Fernandez. Thank you for your question, Senator, and I
could not agree with you more that this is an existential
question for the countries in Oceania. They are--they are
facing, in some cases, extinction because of climate change. So
I share very much your concern.
I also think that many of them--it also cuts across a
number of other areas. They also are targets of Chinese
influence, and so that is another national security challenge.
On the pollution front on the ocean, illegal fishing and
those kinds of crimes, we have offices that are all over that
and I have spoken to a number of them already, and I think
there is more we could do, going forward.
So I would very much welcome, if confirmed, the opportunity
to talk to you about that and you have my commitment that we
will certainly look at those again, because I do agree with
you. Sometimes these issues do get overlooked.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Now, I understand there are no
other colleagues seeking recognition, virtually or otherwise.
So I have one final question.
Mr. Fernandez, during my time in this committee, I focused
on reinvigorating the tools and instruments of our economic
statecraft so that the Department of State, Treasury, Commerce,
U.S. Trade Representative, and other elements of the U.S.
Government are working in tandem to promote international
development, U.S. business opportunities, and U.S. best
practices for corporate social responsibility.
I am amazed--you know, we have the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, which we should. It does not allow U.S.
businesses to suborn some entity or official abroad. Other
countries do not have that. This has been one of Senator
Cardin's passions on the question of corruption.
I go abroad and I see the chancellor of Germany with a
trade mission directly engaged in trying to promote her
country's services and products. Until recently, the Brazilians
had a very powerful economic tool in their centralized effort.
So my question is what tools do we have, in your opinion,
that are currently working? What tools are not working as
effectively?
What additional authorities might you believe you might be
needing and how do we bring a whole-of-government approach to
an economic statecraft that creates greater opportunities for
U.S. companies in selling their products and services abroad,
opening up more markets, also instilling the business practices
that are better than many others in the world so it has an
economic benefit here at home?
We sell products abroad, our services abroad. We create
jobs here at home. When we instill the right business
practices, we improve governance in those countries.
Can you give me some insights as to how you are thinking
about this?
Mr. Fernandez. Sure. Thank you for the question. That is a
big question and I am glad that you asked.
The Chairman. That is why you are going to get paid the big
bucks if you get confirmed.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Fernandez. I am very glad that you brought it up. You
know, when I was here in--between 2009 and 2013, I was amazed
by the fact that I would go to countries in the Middle East
and, you know, I would go on my regular commercial flight and
next to me would be the president of another country, and that
president would come down the aisle and right behind them were
a number of companies, were a number of business people.
It was not so much of a presidential visit as much as a
Chamber of Commerce visit. We do not have that kind of ethos
yet at the State Department. We are working on it and you have
given us a number of tools.
I think what was done with the DFC is something that that
ups the ante on where we can compete with the Chinese and with
others.
We need to--and I intend to do this, if confirmed, at the
State Department--we need to do more on the training front. Our
State Department employees have to have economic statecraft at
the forefront of their tasks. It has got to be part of what
they get graded on.
And I think I would like to focus more on the training
side. I think getting more whole-of-government cooperation, for
example, on deal teams that where we embed economic officers in
some of the embassies to support American business.
We need to do more of that because at the end of the day,
becoming involved in international opportunities are not just a
strategic imperative for the United States but also business
opportunities for companies and an opportunity to create better
jobs in the United States.
And so, if confirmed, I will continue my push to try and
get economics at the forefront of what the State Department
does.
The Chairman. Well, I am thrilled to hear you say that. I
think that one of our challenges is trying to permeate
throughout the State Department and its offices, particularly
our embassies abroad, the concept that economic statecraft is
one of the core missions that are critical for an ambassador
and their staff to promote.
When I go abroad and visit our embassies--and they do
incredible work and our people are just fantastic individuals--
but I do not get the--I hear about the political component of
what is happening in the country or our bilateral relations in
dimensions that are everything but economic, in most cases.
And having that permeate to the thought that, in fact, what
we are doing to promote U.S. economic interests, which I would
argue also are about good governance issues as well within the
country and better products and services for the nations
receiving it, is, I think, an incredibly important element.
So we look forward upon your confirmation and working with
you on this because I think this is a critical issue and it
creates a real connection to Americans to understand if my
business or the company I work for gets to sell X product
abroad, my job here is not only more secure but maybe more
prosperous. And so that is something we need to do a better job
of.
Let me thank--oh, I am sorry.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Okay. So we look forward to working with you
on that. I am going to say we have a colleague who is
supposedly on his way here and in deference to him I will wait.
But I will say that when he finishes his line of
questioning, the record will remain open until the close of
business Friday, April 30th. I would urge both of you there
will be questions for the record. I would urge both of you to
respond to them fully and expeditiously as possible so that--
excuse me, so that your nominations can be considered at a
business meeting of the committee and move the process forward.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Excuse me for one moment.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. All right. I am not quite sure when our
colleague would be here, and in deference to the rest of the
committee, I am sure he will be able to pursue his questions
for the record. He may call you as well.
I do not know if Senator Kaine has had an opportunity to
engage with both of you. But if he has then I would urge you to
do so.
And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Robert Menendez
Arms Control with China
Question. The recently passed ``Strategic Competition Act''
provides a blueprint for using all of the United States' strategic,
economic, and diplomatic tools to effectively compete with China. One
section of this bipartisan bill lays out the need for effective arms
control in the face of China's military modernization and expansion.
The previous administration made a clumsy attempt to engage China in
arms control, which the PRC firmly rejected.
What approach should the United States use to begin strategic
stability talks or arms control with China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. If confirmed, I commit to
consulting with Congress regarding the arms control approach the
administration foresees pursuing with China.
Question. What issues do you believe the United States should focus
on? Risk Reductions? Arms limitations?
Answer. The United States should pursue arms control, in the form
of both numerical limitations and broader risk reduction measures, that
advances the security of the United States, U.S. allies, and partners.
Question. What role should U.S. Indo-Pacific allies play in our
arms control dialogue with China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. If confirmed, I will work
with U.S. allies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, to regularly urge
Beijing to engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control,
as doing so is essential to reducing global nuclear risks.
Question. Should the United States seek trilateral arms control
talks involving both Russia and China?
Answer. The United States should pursue arms control measures with
Russia and China that advance the security of the United States, U.S.
allies, and partners. While there may be opportunities for trilateral
initiatives that meet this criterion, I believe the United States
should engage each country on a bilateral basis as well.
Open Skies
Question. In November of last year, the Trump administration made
the reckless decision to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, leaving
the United States and our allies less secure against Russia. The
administration's decision to abandon the Treaty fits into a broader
pattern of discarding arms control and non-proliferation agreements,
which has raised deep concerns among our allies about our commitment to
their security. I have urged the Biden administration to rejoin the
Treaty in a manner consistent with our constitutional structure, but
recognize that it will not be easy, and that the Open Skies treaty,
while valuable, does not address many of the current security
challenges we face from Russia.
Do you believe the United States should seek to rejoin the Open
Skies Treaty?
Answer. I share President Biden's view that it was a mistake to
withdraw from the Treaty, notwithstanding Russian compliance issues.
Many of our Allies pointed out that none of these compliance concerns
impacted the overall operation of the Treaty. That said, leaving a
treaty, and rejoining a treaty while Russia continues to violate it are
two different things. I understand an interagency review of Open Skies
is underway. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the
internal discussions on the matter.
Question. The State Department and Congress have consistently
expressed concerns about Russia's violation of some its treaty
obligations; for example, limiting the length of flights over
Kaliningrad and restricting flights near Russia's border with Georgia.
If the United States decided to rejoin the treaty would the United
States insist on resolving these compliance issues?
Answer. The United States has made it quite clear that Russia must
return to compliance and that Russia's violations are an important
consideration in our review of U.S. policy on the Treaty. I know the
administration is committed to effective arms control that advances
U.S., Allied, and partner security and will only join agreements that
are deemed to be in our security interests. Compliance is an essential
consideration in that regard.
Question. If the Biden administration decides not to rejoin the
treaty, what steps should we take to reassure our allies that we still
seek a European security system based upon transparency and
cooperation?
Answer. I know the United States is committed to effective arms
control, transparency and confidence building measures that advance
U.S., Allied, and partner security. If confirmed, I would continue the
ongoing U.S. effort to work closely with our allies in this regard and
on a host of broader security issues at NATO and OSCE. These include
ongoing efforts to modernize the Vienna Document to strengthen
transparency on military activities and increase stability in Europe.
Firearms Export Control
Question. As a candidate, President Biden pledged to return the
export control jurisdiction of semiautomatic weapons from the
Department of Commerce to the Department of State. As part of ``THE
BIDEN PLAN TO END OUR GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC'', the following commitment
was made:
Additionally, Biden will ensure that the authority for
firearms exports stays with the State Department, and if
needed, reverse a proposed rule by President Trump. This will
ensure that the State Department continues to block the code
use to 3D print firearms from being made available on the
Internet.
Just this week, the appeals court for the Ninth Circuit lifted an
injunction that prevented the transfer of 3D Printed firearm technical
information from also being transferred to the Department of Commerce,
whose regulations and ability to control the publication of such
information is significantly more limited than that of the State
Department's International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) regulations. This is
a loosening of controls on these very dangerous ``ghost guns''.
I am concerned that the Department of State is not doing all it can
to fulfill the President's promise to the American People. State has
not yet even answered a letter I sent to Secretary Blinken on February
1 on this issue.
If confirmed, what will you do, specifically, to fulfill the
President's campaign promise?
Answer. I share the concerns expressed regarding the unregulated
proliferation of ``ghost guns.'' If confirmed, I commit to working,
together with my interagency colleagues, to ensure that there are
effective controls over the export of information necessary for the
manufacture of firearms, or any defense articles, no matter how those
items are manufactured.
Question. What options exist in the ITAR or other State authorities
to maintain controls on 3D Gun Printing information?
Answer. The Arms Export Control Act provides the President with the
authority to designate those items which shall be considered defense
articles and defense services and to promulgate regulations for the
import and export of such articles and services. That authority has
been delegated to the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Executive Order 13637. It is
my understanding that the Department conducts regular reviews of the
United States Munitions List, in consultation with the Department of
Defense and other relevant U.S. Government agencies, to ensure that any
defense article or defense service designated on the USML provides a
critical military or intelligence advantage such that it warrants
control under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Question. ITAR Sec. 126.2, ``Temporary suspension or modification
of this subchapter,'' states that ``[T]he Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Defense Trade Controls may order the temporary suspension or
modification [emphasis added] of any or all of the regulations of this
subchapter in the interest of the security and foreign policy of the
United States.''
Do you construe that passage to mean that you, if confirmed, could
direct this Deputy Assistant Secretary to, on a temporary
basis, alter the provisions of Category 1 of the ITAR to retain
the technical information that enables the 3D Printing of
firearms and components?
Answer. Under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act and
Executive Order 13637, the authority to designate defense articles and
defense services on the United States Munitions List for the purpose of
export and temporary import is delegated to the Secretary of State. If
confirmed, I commit to working, together with my interagency
colleagues, to control those defense articles and defense services that
provide the United States with a critical military or intelligence
advantage. In so doing, I will ensure that the United States Munitions
List is appropriately revised and updated using the regulatory
mechanisms that best clarify the controls and offer the greatest
transparency and opportunity for public comment and agency
consideration.
Question. Will you do so, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the United States
Munitions List is appropriately revised and updated using the
regulatory mechanisms that best clarify applicable controls and offer
the greatest transparency and opportunity for public comment and agency
consideration.
Compliance with Committee Oversight
Question. The Political-Military Affairs Bureau has refused to
provide answers to my questions or those from my staff about their
investigative and compliance activities. They have claimed that ``it
was not the policy or practice'' to answer such questions, even to
questions concerning whether certain activities are considered
``defense services'' and subject to licensing. In response, I have
initiated a GAO investigation.
If confirmed, will you continue this policy of blocking the
legitimate oversight of this committee, or will you change this
``policy and practice''?
Answer. I appreciate the critical role that Congress plays in
providing oversight. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure
that it is able to effectively perform its oversight activities. In
addition, if confirmed, I will seek to maintain the integrity of the
Department's investigations into potential export control violations,
which includes pursuing investigations of potential export control
violations in a vigorous and timely manner.
CAATSA 231
Question. CAATSA section 231 imposes secondary sanctions on
entities that conduct significant transactions with the Russian defense
and intelligence sectors. The law has been instrumental in denying
billions of dollars to the Russian defense sector, but there was no
senior level leadership under the last administration in pushing for
full implementation. I expect that to change and that the State
Department will renew its diplomatic efforts at every post to ensure
that every effort is being made to deter these transactions from taking
place.
Do I have your commitment to reinvigorate the department's efforts
to ensure robust implementation of this law? Do you commit to
report back to me on the specific actions taken by the
department on CAATSA 231 implementation?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to full implementation of CAATSA 231
and to ensuring that the Department keeps you and other appropriate
Congressional Members fully apprised of our implementation efforts.
Nagorno-Karabakh
Question. Azerbaijan's use of cluster munitions, rockets, and other
such weapons during its attack on Nagorno-Karabakh last fall has
increased the need for demining funding there, which the previous
administration cut off. In his QFR responses, Secretary Blinken said
that he ``strongly support[s]'' U.S. funding for demining efforts in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
If confirmed, will you support the resumption of U.S. funding for
humanitarian demining in Nagorno-Karabakh?
Answer. The administration is deeply concerned by the renewed
hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the ongoing humanitarian
needs in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. Secretary Blinken has signaled
strong support for funding demining efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh, as
well as his intent to work with Congress, international organizations
such as the U.N., and our allies and partners to meet humanitarian
needs in the region. I understand that the Department is evaluating the
needs of affected populations and clarifying practical questions
related to the United States' ability to commit funding and implement
programs effectively.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Do you believe there is a symbiotic connection between
nuclear deterrence and arms control?
Answer. Yes, a credible, modern deterrent and arms control should
work together to address nuclear threats and increase our security.
Question. Is it your understanding that that the New START Treaty
was ratified only after the Obama administration agreed to modernize
the nuclear triad and nuclear weapons complex, and that any unilateral
reduction of these programs would make the Senate far less likely to
ratify future arms control treaties?
Answer. I understand that the Obama administration pursued a
combination of diplomacy, arms control, and nuclear deterrence to
reduce nuclear dangers. If confirmed, I will provide analysis and
advice to the Secretary of State on measures for reducing nuclear
dangers, and I will be prepared to consult with members of Congress.
Question. Do you believe that unilateral U.S. reductions in the
nuclear triad and the nuclear weapons complex would enable the United
States to negotiate with Russia and China from a position of strength?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring the United States maintains an
effective, credible and modern deterrent, while simultaneously using
arms control to address nuclear threats and increase our security.
Question. Do you believe the President can rejoin the Open Skies
Treaty without it being submitted to the Senate for advice and consent
per the Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Answer. I believe that Congressional authorization would be
required for the United States to rejoin the Treaty on Open Skies.
Question. How should Russia's long-standing and ongoing violation
of the Biological Weapons Convention and China's disinformation
surrounding COVID-19 affect our efforts to strengthen U.S. biosecurity
initiatives?
Answer. Russia's Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) violation and
the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate the need to address the full range of
biological threats--whether deliberate, accidental, or natural in
origin. We must counter known BW programs and, increasingly, organized
disinformation efforts. If confirmed, I will work with allies and
partners to strengthen the BWC's ability to manage the risks of dual-
use research and advanced biotechnologies and to improve global
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, as well as international
preparedness. I will take a clear-eyed approach, recognizing that not
all countries will share our goals, and I will work with Global
Engagement Center colleagues to counter COVID-19 related and other
disinformation campaigns.
Question. How can we best ensure accountability for Russia and
Syria's use of chemical weapons?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to work with allies and partners,
including through the U.N. and the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to hold Russia and Syria to account for their
repeated violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). At the
OPCW, the United States supported actions to add two Novichok families
to the CWC Annex on Chemicals and to suspend Syria's rights and
privileges under the CWC. The United States has also used other
measures, including sanctions authorities against Russia and Syria. If
confirmed, I will explore further measures to address any violation of
the CWC.
Question. Which emerging technologies most threaten strategic
stability, and why? How can we best address these technologies?
Answer. I would be most concerned about any technology that
undermines the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces, especially the
credibility of our second-strike capability. The best way to address
potential threats is by taking steps to ensure our strategic deterrent
remains effective and credible and pursuing arms control that enhances
U.S., allied, and partner security.
Question. In your testimony, you reference building ``values-based
security partnerships.'' How do you define a values-based security
partnership? Do you believe that the U.S. should only pursue security
partnerships with liberal democracies?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, the administration's foreign
policy will reflect our values and human rights will be at the center.
We will stand firm behind our commitments to human rights, democracy,
and the rule of law, and our security partnerships are no exception.
While the United States will necessarily have security relationships
with countries that are not liberal democracies, if confirmed, I will
champion values like accountability, transparency, professionalism, and
respect for human rights as we engage our security partners and help
build their capacity to address shared challenges.
Question. Should the United States re-sign and then ratify the Arms
Trade Treaty? Why or why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I support reviewing the implications of
decisions taken to date on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), both in the
United States and in the ATT Conferences of States Parties, to
determine the proper relationship of the United States to the Treaty. I
believe this review should be situated within a larger evaluation of
U.S. policy on conventional arms transfers. The United States is the
largest arms exporter in the world, and it is imperative that U.S.
transfers of conventional arms are consistent with our laws, values,
and interests.
Question. The Obama administration repeatedly declassified the
topline number of the total U.S. nuclear stockpile. Russia and China
never reciprocated. Would you support declassifying our nuclear
stockpile number without any reciprocity by Russia or China today?
Answer. I believe that declassifying topline U.S. nuclear stockpile
numbers demonstrates the United States' serious commitment to
transparency and confidence building measures that can enable further
progress on reducing nuclear risks. If confirmed, I will work to
encourage Russia and China to be more transparent. The declassification
of U.S. stockpile numbers has not harmed U.S. national security and has
shown U.S. leadership in nuclear fora. Others have welcomed our
transparency and joined us in calling on Russia or China to do the
same.
Question. In your opinion, why does Russia maintain a nuclear-
capable missile defense system consisting of 68 nuclear-armed
interceptors?
Answer. Despite Moscow's complaints regarding U.S. ballistic
missile defense programs and capabilities, it is clear that the Russian
Federation also believes in the importance of developing, deploying,
maintaining, and modernizing its ballistic missile defense
capabilities.
Question. It was a significant concern of the Senate during the
ratification of the New START treaty that it not constrain U.S. missile
defense. Do you agree it is imperative that the U.S. not commit to arms
control agreements that would limit U.S. missile defenses?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. support for effective
missile defense programs and will only pursue agreements that enhance
U.S., allied, and partner security.
Question. The administration has made clear its intent to negotiate
another United States-Russia arms control treaty. At the same time,
U.S. intelligence leaders have found that Russia now ``possesses up to
2,000 such non-strategic nuclear warheads not covered by the New Start
Treaty'' and now has ``dozens of these [nonstrategic delivery] systems
already deployed or in development''. Indeed, 10 years after New START
was ratified, Russia's advantage under the treaty is now so profound
that, according to Secretary of State Pompeo ``[o]nly 45 percent of
Russia's nuclear arsenal is subject to numerical limits.[m]eanwhile,
that agreement restricts 92 percent of America's arsenal.'' Do you
agree, as expressed in its Resolution of Ratification for New START,
that the next arms control treaty between the United States and Russia
must include these unconstrained nuclear weapons, and not just so-
called strategic nuclear weapons?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we use the time
provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons,
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.
Question. Russian President Vladimir Putin has proffered a
``deployment freeze'' on intermediate range missiles in Europe. What is
your view on this plan? In your opinion, what are President Putin's
motivations for making this proposal?
Answer. While the United States plans to pursue arms control that
addresses all Russian nuclear weapons and engage Russia in strategic
stability discussions, we must be clear that Russia's proposed
deployment moratorium proposal, which the administration opposes, would
not actually prevent a Russian build-up of ground-launched
intermediate-range missiles because Russia has already produced and
deployed multiple battalions of the 9M729, including in Western Russia.
Question. Stakeholders are generally disappointed by the results of
U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Treaties, despite the best
efforts of both nations. In your opinion, why have the treaties not
fulfilled their promise? What can the State Department or the
interagency do to make them more useful?
Answer. I understand that, initially, companies did not take
advantage of the U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation
Treaties (DTCTs), as they found the requirements for using them to be
overly burdensome and costly. Subsequently, many of the benefits
envisioned under the DTCTs were superseded by the success of Export
Control Reform, which moved many less sensitive items to the more
flexible jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce. The Department
continues to work closely with U.S. interagency colleagues and our UK
and Australian counterparts to pursue novel solutions to defense trade
issues.
Question. In your opinion, why did China stop reporting to the IAEA
on its plutonium activities and holdings after 2017? What are the
potential implications for U.S. security as a result of China's
decision to stop reporting.
Answer. While I cannot speculate on why China stopped reporting, if
confirmed, I will call on China to submit its declaration report to the
IAEA per Information Circular INFCIRC/549 concerning ``Guidelines for
the Management of Plutonium.'' China's lack of transparency on nuclear
issues is very troubling, and if confirmed I will pursue measures with
the PRC that preserve our national security interests.
Question. Given China's rapidly growing nuclear and conventional
military capabilities and pattern of aggression against many of its
neighbors, do you believe that China has become over-confident in its
ability to control escalation in a conflict? If so, how do you propose
the United States deal with that reality.
Answer. I agree that China has increased its aggressive behavior in
many spheres, but defer to the Intelligence Community for a specific
assessment regarding China's confidence to control escalation in a
conflict.
Question. You have previously advocated for the United States to
adopt a No First Use (NFU) policy for nuclear weapons. Do you still
hold that view today?
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to
the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find
the best ways to do this.
Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles
Richard, recently commented that the exceptions in China's No First Use
policy are ``large enough to drive a truck through''. What are your
thoughts on the efficacy of China's No First Use policy? Why would one
support a NFU policy for the United States when China's NFU policy is
so ambiguous?
Answer. There is ambiguity over the conditions under which Beijing
would act outside of its professed no first-use policy. China's ongoing
advances to its nuclear arsenal, from an exploration of low-yield
warheads to the development of a launch on warning posture, raise
questions regarding China's intent and undermine its claims to seek a
minimum nuclear deterrent backed by a no first-use policy. I understand
that the administration is undertaking a review of nuclear policy that
will include declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will participate in
that process and will consult with Congress and our allies on any
policies or actions in this area.
Question. Do you believe the United States should adopt a No First
Use policy without the same concessions and policy reciprocity from
Russia and China?
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will include declaratory policy. I have
thought, as many do, that the United States might consider changes to
U.S. declaratory policy that could increase stability. I understand
that there are varying perspectives on the issue, but I believe most
agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to the United States and our
allies. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the interagency
and allies and Congress to find the best ways to do this.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should adopt a Sole
Purpose doctrine? How would adopting such a doctrine impact our
deterrence options?
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to
the United States and our allies. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find the best
ways to do this, while ensuring that the United States maintains a
credible strategic deterrent.
Question. Our extended deterrence commitments to allies in the
Indo-Pacific are foundational to U.S. strategy in the region. That has
been the case for seven decades. Do you agree that extended deterrence
is key to regional stability in the Indo-Pacific, and that the United
States must continue to honor, uphold, and strengthen these
commitments?
Answer. Yes. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in
advancing U.S. national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific, and
our strategic deterrent, including U.S. nuclear forces, underpins
extended deterrence. It does so by providing assurance to allies and
partners, which are our greatest strategic asset. If confirmed, I would
work to ensure, in coordination with the rest of the Biden-Harris
administration, that U.S. extended deterrence commitments to U.S.
allies remain strong and credible.
Question. How would the adoption of a No First Use policy or a Sole
Purpose doctrine impact our extended deterrence commitments? If we
weaken or dilute our extended deterrence commitments in the Indo-
Pacific, what do you assess would be the impact on the security
environment in the region, given the threats from China and North
Korea?
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will include declaratory policy. If
confirmed, I will participate in that process and will consult with
Congress and our allies on any policies or actions in this area. This
administration is committed to reinvigorating and modernizing alliances
and partnerships around the world; this includes ensuring U.S. extended
deterrence commitments to U.S. allies remain strong and credible.
Question. The PRC currently has thousands of missiles pointed at
Taiwan, and Admiral Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,
has noted that ``Taiwan is clearly one of [the PRC's] ambitions. during
this decade.'' How can the United States best support Taiwan's defense
against this threat?
Answer. The United States has long maintained our abiding interest
in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. If confirmed, I commit to
maintaining America's rock-solid commitment to Taiwan. The United
States will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles
and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our
``one China'' policy. The United States sold nearly $30 billion worth
of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales alone cannot ensure
Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Our expanding security cooperation
seeks to encourage Taiwan to prioritize asymmetric capabilities
including reserve force reform.
Question. Please describe your views on U.S. export control
policies as they relate to China. What types of technologies should we
seek to limit or cut off from nefarious end users in China?
Answer. Export controls are a critical tool to counter Chinese
President Xi Jinping's strategy to bolster the PRC's military and
security services and to challenge U.S. and allied technological
leadership. It is imperative that U.S. arms embargo on China remains in
place. If confirmed, I will work with the Commerce Department and other
Departments, as appropriate, to keep dual-use controls as tight as
possible for products and end-users that pose national security
concerns, as called for by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.
Question. Do you believe Huawei and its affiliates should remain on
the Entity List? Are there any circumstances under which you would
consider recommending the removal Huawei or any of its affiliates from
the list?
Answer. I have no reason to believe that Huawei should be removed
from the Entity List. Parties are placed on the Entity List for several
reasons, including posing a threat to U.S. national security and
foreign policy, and the threat that Huawei poses will remain a key
factor moving forward. If confirmed, I will work closely with
colleagues at the Department of Commerce to prevent U.S.-origin
technology from being used in ways that threaten U.S. interests.
Question. Do you agree that it is in our national interest to
strengthen our security cooperation with Vietnam, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand? If so, please elaborate. If
confirmed, what specific steps will you take to advance security
partnerships with these nations, including your views on continuing
arms sales, engaging in capacity-building, and cooperating on advanced
technology with South and Southeast Asian partner countries facing
China's coercion and growing military power?
Answer. It is absolutely in the national interest of the United
States to strengthen security cooperation with Vietnam, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. Security cooperation with these
allies and partners is essential to ensuring a free and open Indo-
Pacific region, building interoperability and bolstering U.S. force
projection, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, upholding
rule of law, countering transnational crime and terror organizations,
responding to natural and humanitarian crisis, and reassuring our
allies and partners of U.S. commitment to the region, empowering them
to stand up to coercion and malign influence. It also provides
opportunities to reinforce our allies' and partners' commitment to the
rules-based international order.
If confirmed, I will work to expand engagement with these nations
at all levels, including by promoting the United States as the region's
security partner of choice and ensuring they have the arms and training
capabilities they need to protect and advance our shared interests in
the region. I will also seek to deepen and expand our overall defense
cooperation with these nations by advancing key foundational defense
agreements, which will help enable the transfer of defense articles and
establish mechanisms that allow for greater overall defense
cooperation.
Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Philippine
relationship and its importance to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific
region more broadly? Do you support continuing a robust security
partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including through
appropriate arms transfers consistent with existing U.S. law?
Answer. The alliance with the Philippines is foundational to the
U.S. role in the Indo-Pacific, and the relationship is based on shared
strategic interests, shared history, culture, and strong connections
between our nations. If confirmed, I support continuing our robust
security partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. I would
ensure that all arms transfers are appropriate and consistent with
existing U.S. laws, including the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,
Arms Export Control Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. In this
regard, I would continue the current global policy of reviewing
proposed arms sales according to a number of factors, which include:
the degree to which the transfer contributes to ally and partner
burden-sharing and interoperability in support of strategic, foreign
policy, and defense interests of the United States; the recipient's
ability to field, support, and employ the requested system effectively
and appropriately in accordance with its intended end use; and the risk
the transfer may be used to undermine international peace and security
or contribute to abuses of human rights. When appropriate, that review
includes consultations with Congress and input from DoD and other
interagency partners.
Question. In your view, can U.S. security partnerships be a force
for good in improving human rights conditions in a particular country?
Answer. The President and Secretary Blinken have stated that human
rights must be at the center of our foreign policy. Strong U.S.
security partnerships around the world come with a multitude of
benefits, including the opportunity to positively influence a country's
human rights practices. These relationships allow us to work closely
with partners, set an example for human rights standards, and provide
training, when appropriate.
If confirmed, I will support assistance to help ensure our partner
forces are taking steps to comply with international law and protect
human rights. Additionally, I will work to ensure human rights concerns
are given full weight in arms transfer decisions, and I will support
the Leahy laws, which prohibit assistance to foreign security forces
units that are credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights.
Question. Will you ensure that the U.S. Department of State
consults with Congress before taking action on issues that could
jeopardize U.S. access to or create significant tensions in our
relationships with key defense partners in the Indo-Pacific, especially
those in Southeast Asia?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that the Department
engages with Congress, as appropriate, on actions affecting our
security partnerships.
Question. What is your understanding of the Russian Federation's
nuclear doctrine and how it may be enacted in practice? Which aspect of
Russia's nuclear doctrine do you find potentially most problematic for
U.S. defense and strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. intelligence
community on Russian nuclear policy, strategy, doctrine, and forces. It
is clear that Russia has a large arsenal of up to 2,000 non-strategic
nuclear weapons that is projected to grow. It has developed a wide
range of new dual-capable ground-, sea-, and air-based short- and
intermediate-range missile systems. Such weapons can range U.S. allies
and partners in Europe and East Asia--as well as U.S. forces stationed
there--and both our deterrence strategy and our approach to arms
control must address these threats.
Question. Which of the Russian Federation's new, so-called
``exotic'' weapons systems do you find the most geostrategically
concerning? Please enumerate your specific concerns and explain why
this system worries you more than the others.
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. intelligence
community on Russia's ``exotic'' weapon systems and I will engage with
the Department of Defense on the military implications of these
systems. Based on the unclassified information that is available, the
nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile appears to be volatile,
unreliable, and dangerous, posing a threat to the entire world,
including Russia.
Question. It is likely that Russia has placed nuclear weapons in
Kaliningrad, and there is great concern that they may do the same in
occupied Crimea. How should the U.S. respond, if at all, should Russia
place nuclear weapons in Crimea? Would that action, in your view,
dramatically change the way that the U.S. looks at Black Sea security?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. intelligence
community on the location of Russian theater-range nuclear weapons and
I will engage with the Department of Defense on the military
implications of Russia's nuclear posture.
Question. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was founded
in 2005. Over the last 15 fiscal years, GPOI has received almost $1.3
billion in funding. This funding has accomplished several objectives,
including building self-sufficient peace operations training,
supporting partner country development, enhancing partner country
operational readiness, and expanded the participation, integration, and
leadership women in peace operations, to name a few.
GPOI has improved the capacity and operations of U.N. peacekeeping
forces in Africa and globally. Please describe the efforts you
will take to continue to integrate women into GPOI's work in
both peacekeeping troops and in leadership positions in
peacekeeping missions.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support GPOI's continued work to
increase the meaningful participation of women in peace operations by
promoting efforts to: encourage partners to increase recruitment,
training, and deployment of women in all levels and aspects of peace
operations--including in leadership and decision-making positions;
train women peacekeepers; incorporate women, peace, and security (WPS)
topics into peacekeeping training for all peacekeepers; invest in
gender-responsive upgrades at partner countries' training centers,
including female barracks and latrines; and support the U.N.'s
development of WPS training materials.
Question. GPOI provides critical training to partner countries
looking to deploy peacekeepers, which includes topics like preventing
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), violence against women, as well as
technical training. Given the high number of instances of SEA committed
by peacekeeping troops globally, how would you direct GPOI to enhance
trainings to counter these occurrences?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct GPOI to pursue activities that
enhance existing SEA prevention and accountability training
incorporated into pre-deployment training assistance. I will also
support GPOI's joint efforts with the U.N. to launch a training-of-
trainers course for National Investigation Officers who investigate
allegations of SEA against military peacekeepers, as well as to fund a
U.N. pilot course to train engagement platoons, at least half of which
are women, to interact with the local population, identify vulnerable
areas and at-risk populations, and conduct gender-responsive
assessments to improve situational awareness.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. My entire professional life has been dedicated to public
service, often in direct promotion of human rights and democracy. For
example, while at the Ford Foundation, I oversaw the funding of
activities, programs and research on issues of human rights and
democracy in my role as Program Officer of U.S. Foreign and Security
Policy, and approved joint funding with the Human Rights officer. In
addition, I also had a pool of funds for organizations doing work in
the area of ``conflicts,'' where the funds went to the issues of child
soldiers, women in peacekeeping, and the problem of illicit trafficking
of diamonds and its negative effects. At Women of Color Advancing
Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation, of which I am now the
Executive Director, I have started a working group on Human Rights to
host events and activities on issues of human rights. I am also engaged
in several activities at the U.S. Institute of Peace, including serving
on the Women Building Peace Council. Finally, my 22 years in the Air
Force and Naval Reserves have been dedicated to promoting democracy
both in the U.S. and internationally.
Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote,
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and
underrepresented groups?
Answer. My commitment to public service has always included
advancing opportunities for all Americans. Fostering diversity and
inclusion in the national security workforce is incredibly important to
me personally, and I strongly support President Biden's policy of
prioritizing diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as a
national security imperative to ensure critical perspectives and
talents are represented in the national security workforce. If
confirmed, I commit to working with the new Chief Diversity and
Inclusion Officer, the Bureau of Global Talent Management, the
Secretary's Office of Civil Rights, and other Department leadership to
foster an inclusive workplace in the T family so that every employee's
contribution is valued. If confirmed, I will hold T family senior
leadership accountable for the conduct of their teams and for
promulgating an environment where each individual is heard and seen.
Question. Fighting corruption is one of the most important ways
that we can promote democracy and human rights worldwide. What steps
would you take to address global corruption within the role for which
you are nominated?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with experts across the
Department and interagency to promote and defend democracy. Through the
targeted deployment of accountability tools, foreign assistance, and
diplomatic engagement, we can address endemic corruption and human
rights abuses. I will also prioritize working with allies, seeking
opportunities to promote our shared ideals together.
Question. Do you commit to work with Congress to strengthen U.S.
policies to combat global corruption?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will commit to working with Congress
to strengthen U.S. policies, to the extent that my portfolio allows, to
combat global corruption, including efforts to improve global standards
of transparency, accountability, and good governance.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Marco Rubio
China
Question. Do you agree that Chinese state-directed Huawei is a
threat to U.S. and global security?
Answer. Yes. Telecommunications equipment made by untrusted
vendors, including Huawei, is a threat to U.S. and global security.
Allowing untrusted telecommunications suppliers to participate in or
control any part of a 5G network creates unacceptable risks to critical
infrastructure, privacy, and human rights. In addition, the Chinese
Government provides significant support to Huawei, including through
subsidies and coercive tactics against host governments, that unfairly
disadvantages market-based rivals. Huawei's history of unethical and
unlawful behavior, including intellectual property theft, compounds the
national security risks that it poses.
Question. Do you commit to use your position to oppose any measure
to remove Huawei from the Commerce Department Entity List, including
any measure to water down or provide licenses under that listing or the
Foreign Direct Product Rule?
Answer. I have no reason to believe that Huawei should be removed
from the Entity List. If confirmed, I will work closely with colleagues
at the Department of Commerce to prevent U.S.-origin technology from
being used in ways that threaten U.S. interests.
Question. On January 15, 2021, the State Department issued a fact
sheet on activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which raised the
possibility that the COVID-19 epidemic could have emerged from a
laboratory accident. Do you agree that this is possible?
Answer. Yes, my understanding is that a range of possibilities
exist, including the possibility of a laboratory accident. I believe
that the full range of these possibilities should be considered. I
understand that the Biden-Harris administration supports a robust and
transparent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. An
impartial public health investigation, based on science, is vital to
protecting against future health security threats.
Question. If confirmed, can you commit that the administration will
take steps to investigate the origins of COVID-19, including pressing
for a full forensic investigation of the labs in question?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has been clear about its
concerns with the PRC's lack of transparency regarding the pandemic,
including Beijing's refusal to provide the international health
community timely and full access to data, scientists, records, and
samples. This information is essential to our full understanding of the
origins of the virus and how it spread. If confirmed, I am committed to
providing the appropriate diplomatic and technical support to any
relevant efforts as they relate to my portfolio.
Question. Are you concerned about China's development of biological
and chemical weapons? If confirmed, how do you plan to address these
issues?
Answer. In 2021, the State Department's Compliance Report found
that the PRC engaged in biological activities with dual-use
applications, which raises concerns regarding its compliance with
Article I of the BWC. The report also noted uncertainty regarding the
status of China's assessed historical biological warfare program. This
year's Condition 10(c) report raised similar concerns related to
chemical activities that prevented the U.S. from certifying the PRC's
compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I understand that the U.S. was unable to engage with the PRC on these
issues in 2020 due to COVID-19 travel restrictions and the PRC's
unwillingness to meet virtually. If confirmed, I will continue efforts
to address these concerns, including in bilateral meetings.
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
Question. If confirmed, would you advise the Biden administration
in the next nuclear posture review to return to language closer to the
2010 NPR?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a review of
nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory policy. If
confirmed, I will participate in that process and will consult with
Congress and our allies on any policies or actions in this area.
Question. Do you believe that the United States nuclear posture is
also critical for our allies and partners?
Answer. Yes. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in
advancing U.S. national security objectives, and our strategic
deterrent, including U.S. nuclear forces, underpins extended
deterrence. It provides assurance to allies and partners, which are our
greatest strategic asset. The Biden-Harris administration is committed
to reinvigorating and modernizing our alliances and partnerships around
the world; this includes ensuring our extended deterrence commitments
to our allies remain strong and credible.
Question. Do you believe that the United States nuclear arsenal is
an effective deterrent against the use of these non-nuclear weapons
against our allies?
Answer. All U.S. military capabilities contribute to extended
deterrence commitments to U.S. allies. The Biden-Harris administration
is undertaking a review of nuclear policy that will certainly include
declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will participate in that process
and will consult with Congress and our allies on any policies or
actions in this area.
Question. The Obama administration declassified the topline number
of the total U.S. nuclear stockpile. However, Russia and China never
reciprocated. Would you support declassifying our nuclear stockpile
number without any reciprocity by Russia or China?
Answer. I believe that declassifying topline U.S. nuclear stockpile
numbers demonstrates the United States' serious commitment to
transparency and confidence building measures that can enable further
progress on reducing nuclear risks. If confirmed, I will work to
encourage Russia and China to be more transparent. The declassification
of U.S. stockpile numbers has not harmed U.S. national security and has
shown U.S. leadership in nuclear fora. Others have welcomed our
transparency and joined us in calling on Russia or China to do the
same.
North Korea
Question. Do you agree that the only path forward for North Korea
that the U.S. could accept is the complete, irreversible, verifiable,
denuclearization of North Korea?
Answer. North Korea's unlawful weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile programs constitute serious threats to international
peace and security and the global nonproliferation regime. The Biden-
Harris administration recently completed a comprehensive review of U.S.
policy towards North Korea that reiterates the goal of complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, I look forward
to supporting the administration's efforts to pursue calibrated and
practical diplomacy with North Korea, in close consultation with our
allies and partners, in order to increase the security of the United
States, our allies, and our deployed forces.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
the voices of North Korean defectors are included in negotiations of
any agreement with North Korea?
Answer. I am deeply concerned about North Korea's egregious human
rights record and how to promote respect for human rights in the closed
country. If confirmed, I will be committed to placing human rights at
the center of our foreign policy with North Korea and to integrating
the voices of the North Korean defector community into our approach,
including by meeting with North Korean escapees to hear their thoughts
and recommendations.
Russia
Question. Do you agree that Russia was in violation the Treaty on
Open Skies?
Answer. Yes, Russia has violated, and continues to violate, the
Treaty on Open Skies. I am not aware that Russia has taken any action
to return to compliance. As stated in the most recent compliance
report, Russia has not rescinded its illegal 500-kilometer sublimit
over Kaliningrad. Russia also remains in violation for refusing to
allow observation flights to approach within 10 kilometers of its
border with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While
not a violation, Russia has also declared an airfield in Crimea as a
Russian Open Skies refueling airfield, in an attempt to politicize the
treaty.
Question. Do you agree that Russia's abuses the Open Skies Treaty
and its actions posed an unacceptable risk to our national security?
Answer. In my view, while concerning, Russia's violations of the
Treaty on Open Skies by themselves do not pose a direct and immediate
threat to our national security. Russia's use of the treaty to collect
information on military and civilian infrastructure, while not
prohibited by the treaty, could pose a risk, although I understand
there are measures in place to mitigate that risk.
Question. Russia has been implicated in the use of chemical weapons
on several different occasions in the last several years, including
assassination attempts. What should be done to counter Russia's use of
chemical weapons and its violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC)?
Answer. Russia's use of chemical weapons in assassination attempts
against not only Sergei Skripal and his daughter, but also Aleksey
Navalny, is reprehensible. In response to these attacks, the United
States exercised its sanctions authorities and imposed other measures
to send a clear signal that Russia's use of chemical weapons and abuse
of human rights have severe consequences.
At the OPCW, the United States has worked with allies and partners
to address Russia's violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
including submitting a technical change proposal to add two families of
Novichoks to the CWC Annex on Chemicals, which the OPCW Conference of
the States Parties adopted in 2019.
If confirmed I will work within the administration to take steps to
deter Russia's use of chemical weapons, including engaging Russia
bilaterally and multilaterally as well working with allies and partners
at the OPCW Executive Council and Conference of the States Parties, and
in U.N. fora, including the Security Council. If confirmed, I will
explore further measures to address Russian non-compliance with the
CWC. There can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. For all of the missteps in converting the Singapore
Summit Communique that President Trump agreed to with Chairman Kim Jong
Un in 2018 into meaningful action, it did lay out a useful framework
that committed the two countries to work towards better relations,
cooperate on the return of Prisoner of War remains, and work towards
peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Given the reality
that any full denuclearization agreement is a long term endeavor, will
you support efforts that make progress on the other elements agreed to
in Singapore, provided such actions are in concert with U.S. allies and
partners, and achieve the objective of lessening the nuclear weapons
threat from North Korea as well as the threat of war?
Answer. North Korea's unlawful weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile programs constitute serious threats to international
peace and security and the global nonproliferation regime. I understand
that the administration recently completed a comprehensive review of
U.S. policy towards North Korea that both reiterates the goal of
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and seeks to build on
the Singapore Summit commitments. If confirmed, I look forward to
supporting the administration's efforts to pursue calibrated and
practical diplomacy with North Korea, in close consultation with our
allies and partners, in order to increase the security of the United
States, our allies, and our deployed forces.
Question. I understand the total number of Washington DC-based
full-time equivalents in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and
Compliance as of January 2017 was 113. The number of Washington DC-
based FTEs as of late 2019 in the AVC Bureau was 94. In 2014, the
Office of Inspector General reported 48 percent of the AVC workforce
would be eligible to retire by 2019. If confirmed, what actions will
you take to address the large number of FTEs eligible to retire, how
can the ``T cone'' prioritize recruitment and hiring of diverse
candidates, and what additional flexible hiring authorities--if any--
does the Department need to fill this gap?
Answer. Rebuilding the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and
Compliance is one of my top priorities. If confirmed, I will exercise
the Excepted Service Appointment Authority to bring in a diverse cadre
of arms control experts. Diversity is the key to unlocking an
organization's potential because diverse teams consistently demonstrate
high performance due to their creativity and innovation. The Department
must rebuild the AVC workforce and ensure it is well-equipped to
address the dangers posed by chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems. If confirmed, I commit to
uphold and fully implement the Department's leadership and management
tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to strengthen
teams across the T family of bureaus.
Question. Has the President provided any guidance to the
Departments of State, Defense, and any other agencies, detailing his
instructions for a review of U.S. nuclear policy and posture? If so,
approximately when will that review be completed?
Answer. I understand that the President has directed his
administration to conduct reviews of various nuclear policies. In
accordance with the Biden administration's Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance, the administration will take steps to reduce the
role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy, while
ensuring the U.S. strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and
effective and that U.S. extended deterrence commitments to U.S. allies
remain strong and credible. In that process, the administration will
consult with U.S. allies and partners, including those in the Indo-
Pacific, as well as with Congress.
Question. The United States is not one of the 164 States Parties to
the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Ottawa Convention, which bans
the production and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines. President
Trump opened up the geographies where the United States can use
landmines provided they have a self-destruct mechanism, which
superseded an Obama administration policy which narrowed persistent
landmine use to the Korean Peninsula. The Biden administration has yet
to rescind the permissive Trump administration-era policy. When
confirmed, can you commit to advocate as the head of the ``T cone'' for
President Biden to adopt a U.S. policy that brings us closer in line
with the obligations under the Ottawa Convention? Additionally, will
you support a robust budget request for de-mining activities in
conflict zones?
Answer. As Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield noted last month,
``President Biden believes we need to curtail the use of landmines.
[L]et me speak plainly: President Biden has been clear that he intends
to roll back [the Trump administration] policy, and our administration
has begun a policy review to do just that.'' If confirmed, I will
commit to supporting the administration's landmine policy review and
will advocate for a clear and explicit role for the State Department in
any future policy on landmines. I also will commit to consult with
experts inside and outside of the Department, and with you in Congress,
on the question of whether and how the United States should bring its
policies closer in line with the provisions of the Ottawa Convention.
Thanks to bipartisan Congressional support, the United States has
been the world's leader in fighting proliferation by safely destroying
at-risk conventional weapons and saving lives by clearing of landmines
and other explosive hazards for more than 25 years.
Question. The Biden administration is currently undertaking a
global sanctions review to ensure that U.S. and multilateral sanctions
do not inadvertently prevent humanitarian aid from getting to those in
need. While food and medicine is exempt under U.S. and U.N. sanctions,
aid workers are often forced to navigate massive red tape just to bring
laptops to North Korea, which are considered ``luxury goods,'' or even
treatments for drug resistant tuberculosis. If confirmed, can you
commit to work with interested Members to make practical changes to the
implementation of existing exemptions to U.S. sanctions and seek
additional exemptions in the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee
of items related to providing life-saving assistance to North Koreans?
Answer. Sanctions are in place to address the threat posed by North
Korea, including its ability to continue developing its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs. The U.S. Government maintains a number of
sanctions exemptions and authorizations related to humanitarian aid,
and has also led efforts to streamline the process for humanitarian
exemptions in the U.N. sanctions committee. North Korea itself has
created the most significant barriers to the delivery of aid by closing
its borders and limiting access for the personnel responsible for
implementing such projects. If confirmed, I will work to support
efforts aimed at helping humanitarian aid reach the people of North
Korea.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Rob Portman
Question. The position of arms control and international security
is one of paramount importance to our nation's defense. Both Russia and
China have made strides in their own force modernization and we must
take steps to ensure that our adversaries are in compliance with
existing arms control agreements while we look to new initiatives as
well.
New START and U.S. Nuclear Force Modernization: In January 2021,
the Biden administration agreed to an extension of the NEW Start treaty
for a period of five years, while committing to pursue new arms control
agreements with both Russia and China. As you are aware, New START does
not limit non-strategic nuclear warheads which are a growing concern as
Russia outnumbers the United States 10-1 in this category. China is on
pace to more than triple its nuclear force in the coming decade.
Cleary, more work is needed to ensure that our adversaries do not
outpace U.S. capabilities in this space.
The Obama administration in 2010 committed to Congress that it
would address the disparity between the United States and
Russia regarding non-strategic nuclear warheads, however
several administrations have failed to make progress. What
actions will you take, if confirmed, that will address this
disparity?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that we use the time
provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons,
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.
Question. Both Russia and China are in the process of expanding,
diversifying, and modernizing its nuclear arsenals. The United States
is just beginning this effort. Do you believe that a modernization of
the U.S. Triad is necessary to negotiate from a position of strength?
Answer. A credible, modern deterrent and arms control should work
together to address nuclear threats and increase our security.
Question. Do you believe that a unilateral reduction of our nuclear
forces endangers U.S. national security?
Answer. I would never support any reductions in nuclear forces that
endanger U.S. national security, but I do not believe that any type of
reduction would automatically undermine U.S. and allied security.
Question. Iran's Ballistic Missile Program and the Abraham Accords:
Iran's ballistic missile program and armed drones, including
proliferation of these technologies to terrorist organizations, are
increasingly becoming a regional threat in the Middle East. The
continued threat from Iran is just one of the many reasons why many
neighbors of Israel decided to sign normalization agreements such as
the Abraham Accords last year.
Last month, I introduced a bill called the Israel Relations
Normalization Act with Senator's Booker, Cardin, Risch, and Young, to
require the Department of State to expand and strengthen these
normalization agreements.
Do you support these normalization agreements as a means to
strengthen security in the region and pledge, if confirmed, to
pursue additional normalization agreements?
Answer. As President Biden and Secretary Blinken have said, this
administration welcomes and strongly supports the recent normalization
agreements between Israel and countries in the Arab and Muslim world. I
understand that the Department is leading the U.S. Government's
efforts, working with the National Security Council and U.S. Government
interagency, to deepen existing agreements and urge other countries to
normalize relations with Israel. If confirmed, I will look for other
opportunities to expand cooperation among countries in the region,
which is critical to strengthening regional security.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator John Barrasso
Question. In April 2019, President Trump notified the Senate that
he had decided to withdraw the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty from
the Senate and requested the Senate return the treaty to the President.
The United States notified the United Nations Secretary General that
the ``United States does not intend to become a party'' to the United
Nations Arms Trade Treaty despite its signature, adding that the United
States ``has no legal obligations arising'' from its treaty signature.
What is the current status of the United States with regards to the
United Nations Arms Trade Treaty?
Answer. On December 9, 2016, the Department transmitted the Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT) to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification. On July 18, 2019, the Trump administration informed the
Treaty Depositary that the United States did not intend to become a
State Party to the Treaty and that the United States had no legal
obligations arising from its signature. The United States is
participating in ATT meetings as an observer to protect U.S. national
security interests, economic interests, and industry equities.
Question. Based on your knowledge and experience in this field,
what position have you formulated on whether the United States should
ratify the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty?
Answer. If confirmed, I support reviewing the implications of
decisions taken to date on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), both in the
United States and in the ATT Conferences of States Parties, to
determine the proper relationship of the United States to the Treaty. I
believe this review should be situated within a larger evaluation of
U.S. policy on conventional arms transfers. The United States is the
largest arms exporter in the world, and it is imperative that U.S.
transfers of conventional arms are consistent with our laws, values,
and interests.
Question. Have you ever supported, implicitly or explicitly in
writing or in speech, the United States joining the United Nations Arms
Trade Treaty? Please provide details.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, I have not made any
statement on the issue of the United States joining the U.N. Arms Trade
Treaty.
Question. What changes to our nation's policies, regulations, or
laws would be needed to comply with the United Nations Arms Trade
Treaty?
Answer. It is my understanding that the United States would not
need to change any policies, regulations, or laws to comply with the
Arms Trade Treaty. U.S. national control systems and practices to
regulate the international transfer of conventional arms already meet
or exceed the requirements of the Treaty.
Question. The United States Constitution protects the rights of
Americans to keep and bear arms. The Arms Trade Treaty would infringe
on the second amendment. Article 12 of the Arms Trade Treaty encourages
countries to maintain records on the importation of conventional arms
including small arms. It specifically requests that states maintain
records on the quantity, value, model/type and end user. These records
must be maintained for a minimum of ten years. Article 13 requires
signatory states to issue annual reports to the United Nations on all
imports and exports.
Do you support the United Nations establishing and maintaining a
gun registry on law abiding U.S. gun owners?
Answer. No. If confirmed, I will not support the United Nations
establishing and maintaining a gun registry on law-abiding U.S. gun
owners. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) establishes standards for
regulating only the international trade in conventional arms, not
domestic trade or possession. The ATT does not touch on purely domestic
arms transfers or private ownership, which are matters of national
sovereignty.
Question. China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces.
U.S. intelligence analysts estimate that China could double its nuclear
warheads in the next decade.
How is China modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal?
Answer. During this decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
likely to more than double the size of its nuclear stockpile. According
to open-source reporting I have read, this rapid expansion includes new
delivery systems as Beijing works to establish a nuclear triad, which
will include a long-range stealth bomber, new road-mobile ICBMs,
multiple-warhead silo-based ICBMs, and a growing fleet of ballistic
missile submarines. The PRC also appears to be working on hypersonic-
glide vehicles, air-launched ballistic missiles, and low-yield nuclear
weapons that will fit into this nuclear triad. The PRC is also making
additional advances toward developing a launch-on-warning posture.
Question. What is the projected size and composition of China's
strategic nuclear forces by 2026 when the New START would expire?
Answer. During this decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
likely to more than double the size of its nuclear stockpile. Precisely
because Beijing is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear
weapon states, accurate assessments of its nuclear trajectory and
intentions are difficult. I defer to the intelligence community for a
specific assessment on the projected size and composition of China's
nuclear forces in 2026.
Question. Secretary of State Blinken noted his intent to ``pursue
arms control to reduce the dangers from China's modern and growing
nuclear arsenal.'' China has so far refused U.S. efforts to engage in
arms control negotiations.
What specific steps would you take to reduce the dangers posed by
China's modern and growing nuclear arsenal?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. If confirmed, I commit to
consulting with Congress regarding the arms control approach the
administration foresees pursuing with China.
Question. What specific leverage does the United States have to
force China to participate in future arms control negotiations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races, which is in the interest of
both our countries. If confirmed, I will seek to work with U.S. allies
and partners to urge Beijing to engage meaningfully with the United
States on arms control, as doing so is essential to reducing global
nuclear risks.
Question. Has the United States ever effectively used the leverage
you mentioned in question 8? Please provide details.
Answer. As I understand, the People's Republic of China has thus
far resisted engaging with the United States in any meaningful nuclear
arms control discussions. If confirmed, I will work with the
administration, along with U.S. allies and partners to regularly urge
Beijing to engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control.
Doing so is essential to reducing global nuclear risks.
Question. There is a very large disparity regarding non-strategic
nuclear weapons, also known as tactical nuclear weapons. During the New
START debate, there were a number of Senators including myself who were
extremely concerned that the treaty did not include tactical nuclear
weapons. The New START Resolution of Ratification specifically provided
the President was to address the massive disparity in the tactical
stockpiles prior to contemplating further reductions in the strategic
arsenal.
Can you assure the United States Senate that the next arms control
agreement with Russia will focus on the massive numerical
advantage Russia has over us and our allies in tactical nuclear
weapons rather further reductions in the strategic arsenal?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we use the time
provided by the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons,
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.
Question. For more than six decades, the United States has employed
an effective and credible nuclear deterrent. The U.S. nuclear triad is
made up of the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear-capable heavy bomber
aircraft. All three legs of the triad work hand-in-hand to deter our
adversaries and reassure our allies and partners. It provides weapon
systems that are survivable, stabilizing and flexible.
Please describe how each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad contributes
to the effective and credible nuclear deterrent?
Answer. SSBNs are the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad.
Nuclear-capable bombers are the most flexible. ICBMs are the most
responsive and contribute to deterrence by requiring an adversary to
exhaust a large number of warheads to destroy a smaller portion of the
U.S. deterrent.
Question. Based on your expertise, are ICBMs on ``hair trigger''
alert or are they safe and secure?
Answer. In overall terms, U.S. ICBMs are not on ``hair trigger''
alert. U.S. nuclear forces are safe and secure as the United States
maintains multiple redundant technical and procedural measures in place
to prevent the unauthorized or accidental launch of U.S. missiles. I
defer to the Department of Defense to discuss the specifics.
Question. Do you believe the ground based strategic deterrent will
start an arms race with Russia and China?
Answer. No, replacing elements of the U.S. nuclear triad will not
cause an arms race. If confirmed, I will work with the administration
to head off costly arms races and re-establish U.S. credibility as a
leader in arms control. I will also work to pursue new arms control
agreements and arrangements by engaging in meaningful dialogues with
Russia and China on a range of emerging military technological
developments that implicate strategic stability.
Question. All three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are required to
maintain a reliable, credible and effective deterrent. This is
especially true as Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces and
China is increasing its nuclear forces in an attempt at nuclear parity.
Have you ever expressed, implicitly or explicitly in writing or in
speech, support for eliminating any leg of the nuclear triad?
Please provide details.
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I have not made any statement
saying that any leg of the nuclear triad should be eliminated.
Question. Based on your knowledge and background, what is your
position on the United States modernizing our ICBMs with the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrent, our submarines with the Columbia class, and
our bombers with the B-21 Raider?
Answer. A credible, modern deterrent and arms control should work
together to address nuclear threats and increase our security. If
confirmed, I will review each element of the current modernization
program during the course of the Nuclear Posture Review, and I will
advise that the United States undertake the modernization necessary to
sustain a credible strategic deterrent.
Question. Have you ever supported, implicitly or explicitly in
writing or in speech, any delay or budget cuts related to or the
elimination of any of the U.S. nuclear modernization programs? Please
provide details.
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I have not explicitly
supported any delay or budget cuts to, or elimination of, the
modernization program. I have asked questions about the total amount of
funding that will be spent on the modernization program.
Question. What specific steps will you take to advocate for
modernization of the U.S. nuclear program?
Answer. The United States will ensure its strategic deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective. If confirmed, I will advise that
the United States undertake the modernization necessary to sustain a
credible strategic deterrent.
Question. On December 4, 2019, you retweeted a post from PSR
Nuclear Weapons Abolition supporting the United States adopting a no
first use of nuclear weapons policy.
Please explain why you support the United States adopting a ``no-
first use'' policy.
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to
the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find
the best ways to do this.
Question. As our country continues to face threats from around the
world, we should not take any action that will hinder our missile
defense options. The United States must always remain in charge of our
missile defense, not Russia or any other country. I have concerns about
the efforts of Russia to limit our missile defense and actions the
Obama administration took on this issue.
Can you commit to me that, in any arms control discussions with
Russia for which you are responsible, the United States will
never agree to any limitation on our missile defense programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. support for effective
missile defense programs and will only pursue arms control agreements
that enhance U.S., allied, and partner security.
Question. President Putin announced Russia's development of new
strategic nuclear weapons. The weapons include a nuclear powered cruise
missile, a nuclear powered underwater drone that could be armed with a
nuclear warhead, and a hypersonic missile. President Putin declared
that these new additions to Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would
render U.S. missile defense ``useless.''
How would you ensure the new weapons are covered under Russia's
treaty and arms control obligations?
Answer. The New START Treaty limits Russia's Avangard hypersonic
glide vehicle and will limit the Sarmat heavy ICBM at the appropriate
point in its development cycle. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
that we use the time provided by the five-year extension of the New
START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress and
U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian
nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems and non-strategic
nuclear weapons.
Question. Does the United States have a current or prospective
missile defense system to intercept these weapons? If not, what
specific actions would you recommend the U.S. Government take to
respond to and counter these new strategic nuclear weapons?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department
of Defense to better understand their capabilities to deter, and if
deterrence fails, defend against, attack from the novel strategic
systems being developed by the Russian Federation. If confirmed, I
anticipate working closely with the Department of Defense to review
U.S. capabilities to ensure the United States has robust capabilities
to deter, and if deterrence fails, defend against, attacks on the U.S.
Homeland and to examine ways that our allies can contribute to
enhancing U.S. national security.
Question. During your testimony, you discussed pursuing deeper cuts
to our nuclear weapons systems.
At a time when Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear
weapons, would you advocate for the United States to make
unilaterally cuts to our nuclear deterrent?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review all relevant information on
specific programs during the course of the Nuclear Posture Review and
report my conclusions back to the committee. Prior to the review, it
would be premature to speak to the sizing, including possible
reductions, of U.S. forces.
Question. The U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Force Treaty (INF), the Open Skies Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action. You opposed the United States withdrawing from each of
these international agreements.
Given your tweet confirming your statement that U.S. actions to
withdraw from the INF treaty undermines global security, what
is your view on whether the United States should rejoin the INF
treaty?
Answer. As the INF Treaty terminated upon the U.S. withdrawal, it
is not possible to re-enter it. I agree with NATO's August 2, 2019,
statement that ``Russia bears sole responsibility for the demise of the
Treaty.'' Russia's material breach of the INF Treaty and refusal to
return to compliance led to the U.S. withdrawal and thus to the
Treaty's termination. The United States should work with its allies and
partners to ensure Russia gains no advantage by possessing this class
of missile.
Question. Based on your detailed knowledge on this treaty and
strong statements opposing the United States leaving the treaty, do you
believe the United States should rejoin the Open Skies Treaty?
Answer. I share President Biden's view that it was a mistake to
withdraw from the treaty, notwithstanding Russian compliance issues.
Many of our Allies pointed out that none of these compliance concerns
impacted the overall operation of the treaty. That said, leaving a
treaty, and rejoining a treaty while Russia continues to violate it are
two different things. I understand an interagency review of Open Skies
is underway. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about
internal discussions on the matter.
Question. Why do you support the United States rejoining the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that Iran
does not obtain a nuclear weapon and to addressing the many other
issues of concern related to Iran. The JCPOA was concluded to ensure
Iran never acquires nuclear weapons, and it provides the most intrusive
verification and monitoring procedures ever negotiated. I understand
that the Biden-Harris administration is engaging in meaningful
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with JCPOA
commitments as a first step, but the work will not end there. The
administration intends to build on the JCPOA and use it as a platform
to lengthen and strengthen the constraints on Iran's nuclear program
and to address other critical issues.
Question. The United States has not ratified the 1996 Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Do you support the United States ratifying the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty? If so, why?
Answer. Yes. The United States maintains the safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal without having to conduct nuclear
explosive tests. It is in our national security interest to prevent a
world in which states are completely unconstrained from conducting such
tests. An in-force CTBT would aid in that effort.
Question. The United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons entered into force in January 2021. It is the first
multilateral legal document to outlaw nuclear weapons.
Based on your experience and background in arms control, what is
your view of the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons?
Answer. While I understand and share the desire to make progress
toward a world without nuclear weapons, the TPNW is not the right way
to achieve that goal. The TPNW risks undermining U.S. deterrence
relationships that are still necessary for international peace and
security and may reinforce divisions that hinder our ability to work
together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges. All
NATO Allies remain opposed to the TPNW, as repeatedly stated by the
North Atlantic Council, most recently in December of 2020. The best way
to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a process that
takes into account the international security environment and seeks
effective, verifiable arms control and disarmament measures.
Question. On January 3, 2020, you tweeted, ``What is the U.S. logic
to the strike on Qasem Soleimani?''
The United States took decisive action on January 3, 2020, to
prevent an imminent attack by a ruthless terrorist on Americans
and our allies in the region. As the head of the Quds Force,
General Soleimani created, supported, and directed a network of
terrorist organizations that launched attacks across the
region. As a war criminal, Soleimani was responsible for
wounding and killing hundreds of Americans and he would have
killed many more if given the chance.
Based on your tweet, why did you disagree with the top U.S.
commander in the region that the Soleimani strike re-
established a deterrent in the region?
Answer. The tweet you referenced above was a retweet, without
commentary, of a CNN article titled, ``What is the U.S. logic to the
strike on Iran's Qasem Soleimani?'' The article was an analysis of the
likely factors that went into the previous administration's decision to
strike Soleimani. I have not expressed disagreement on this issue with
the ``top U.S. commander in the region.''
Question. Why do you believe America is not safer today because
Qasem Soleimani is gone?
Answer. Qasem Soleimani was a key architect of much of Iran's
malign behavior. He had blood on his hands, including American blood,
and I do not regret the killing of such an enemy of the United States.
The question is not whether Soleimani was good or bad; the question is
whether this action made the American people safer, based on the
likelihood of Iranian retaliation and the broader strategic context in
which the strike took place. I did not comment that America is not
safer today because Qasem Soleimani is gone, nor do I have access to
strategic assessments that would enable that conclusion, but it is a
question that I and others have raised.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. The Trump administration made great progress unwinding
the United States from outdated Cold War-style arms control agreements
with Russia. Many of those treaties--and the approach behind them--
eroded American national security by constraining us, permitting
Russian noncompliance, and of course not constraining the Chinese at
all.
One significant step was to end U.S. participation in the Open
Skies Treaty (OST). The Russians had been in chronic
noncompliance for a decade, and were declared noncompliant in
2017: certain overflights of the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad,
flights in the vicinity of the enclaves that they essentially
invaded and carved off of the country of Georgia, not allowing
some overflights of Russian military exercises, etc. It was
long past time to withdraw.
You've publicly indicated that the U.S. withdrawing from the OST
was a mistake.
Do you believe the U.S. should reenter OST or a similar agreement?
Answer. I share President Biden's view that it was a mistake to
withdraw from the treaty, notwithstanding Russian compliance issues.
That said, leaving a treaty, and rejoining a treaty while Russia
continues to violate it are two different things. I believe we should
carefully consider the costs and benefits of rejoining before making
any decision. As part of this analysis, we should consult with Allies
and partners who are States Parties to the treaty, including on any
future steps.
Question. Do you believe that if the U.S. did reenter OST or a
similar agreement, such a step would require the advice and consent of
the Senate?
Answer. I believe that Congressional authorization would be
required for the United States to rejoin the Treaty on Open Skies.
Question. If you believe that the U.S. should reenter OST or a
similar agreement, please describe your strategy for ending chronic
Russian noncompliance.
Answer. If the administration were to decide to take steps to
rejoin OST, I would recommend working with the interagency on ways to
expand and enhance our work on compliance as it relates to the
agreement.
Treaties/INF
Question. Another Cold War-style treaty from which the Trump
administration withdrew was the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty. China had arguably been the biggest beneficiary of the
INF Treaty. According to then-Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command
Harry Harris (now U.S. ambassador to South Korea), roughly 95 percent
of China's missile forces would fall within INF Treaty parameters. The
Treaty held us back from developing the technologies we needed to
counter the Chinese.
Do you believe it was a mistake to exit the INF?
Answer. I agree with NATO's August 2, 2019, statement that ``Russia
bears sole responsibility for the demise of the Treaty.'' Russia's
material breach of the INF Treaty and refusal to return to compliance
led to the U.S. withdrawal and thus to the treaty's termination. The
United States should work with its allies and partners to ensure Russia
gains no advantage by possessing this class of missile.
Question. Do you believe the U.S. should reenter the INF or a
similar agreement?
Answer. As the INF Treaty terminated upon the United States'
withdrawal, it is not possible to re-enter it. I look forward to
working with Congress and relevant agencies and departments on ways to
create new arms control agreements that serve U.S. interests.
Question. How do you believe that the missile asymmetry created by
INF compliance in the Pacific affects America's efforts to operate
within the first and second island chains in a conflict over Taiwan or
the South China Sea?
Answer. China's expansion of its nuclear and missile arsenal
presages a more dangerous future, with a larger number of sophisticated
intermediate-range delivery systems able to target U.S., allied, and
partner forces in the Indo-Pacific. I defer to the Department of
Defense for a direct assessment of their effects on regional U.S.
military operations and posture.
Question. How should the U.S. craft an arms control framework that
secures its ability to operate within contested zones in the Indo-
Pacific?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's pursuit
of arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the People's
Republic of China's growing nuclear arsenal, coupled with efforts
designed to bolster deterrence in the region. It is critical that the
United States consult closely with Indo-Pacific allies and partners to
ensure arms control efforts both reduce the role of nuclear weapons in
U.S. security strategy and ensure U.S. extended deterrence commitments
remain strong and credible.
Treaties/CEF
Question. The 1996 Flank Agreement to the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is one of the canonical examples where the
United States negotiated arms control restrictions that the Russians
serially violated, but nevertheless it took years for the U.S. or its
allies to formally unwind from the Treaty. Under most interpretations,
Russia was never in compliance with the 1996 limits, though it arguably
complied with parts of the Adapted treaty. You participated in
negotiations regarding the Flank agreement. Please describe--
Your assessment about whether the Russians ever came into
compliance with the Flank parameters.
Your assessment of whether the Flank Agreement enhanced U.S.
national security.
Your role in formulating, reviewing, and approving the Flank
Agreement, including--
Your overall role in formulating, reviewing, and
approving the Agreement.
Your role in the delegation, including who you
reported to.
Answer. My understanding is that Russia has not been in compliance
with the May 1996 flank limits, but is within the overall treaty
limits. If Russia remains within the overall conventional treaty
limits, I believe such limits continue to promote both U.S. and U.S.
allied national security interests as envisioned when the treaty was
negotiated.
As noted, the flank limits text was negotiated in 1996, at a time
when I had already transitioned to working on the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and was working on CTBT
backstopping in Washington, DC. I was therefore not involved in
the drafting of the final text of the agreement. I refer you to
the Department as to its staffing of this issue at that time.
Question. Any role you had in reviewing the final text of the
Agreement. If you did not have a role in reviewing the agreement, why
not and who provided legal advice for reviewing?
Answer. I was not involved in the drafting of the final text of the
agreement because I had moved on to working on the CTBT. I refer you to
the Department as to its staffing of this issue at that time.
Question. Any role you had in approving the final text of the
Agreement. If you did not have a role in approving the agreement, why
not and who provided legal advice for approving?
Answer. I was not involved in the drafting of the final text of the
agreement because I had moved on to working on the CTBT. I refer you to
the Department as to its staffing of this issue at that time.
China/NPT
Question. The Chinese plan to triple their nuclear arsenal in the
coming years.
What leverage does the U.S. have to get China to the negotiating
table?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. U.S. allies and partners will
be key to success, and if confirmed I will seek to work with them to
regularly urge the PRC to engage meaningfully with the United States on
arms control.
Question. What is your plan to realistically get China to the
negotiating table for a credible arms control agreement?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's pursuit
of arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the People's
Republic of China's growing nuclear arsenal. U.S. allies and partners
will be key to success, and if confirmed I will seek to work with them
to regularly urge the PRC to engage meaningfully with the United States
on arms control. I understand that the administration is in the process
of crafting specific proposals, and, if confirmed, I commit to
consulting with Congress regarding the arms control approach the
administration foresees pursuing with China.
Question. I introduced a bill last session that would impose
sanctions on parts of the Chinese military sector unless they come into
compliance with their already-existing NPT Article VI obligations for
`good faith' negotiations.
Do you believe China is meeting its NPT Article VI obligations?
Answer. China's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades
of international progress toward nuclear disarmament. If confirmed, I
will consult with legal and policy experts at the Department of State
on a variety of matters related to China's behavior in the nuclear
weapon arena, including its compliance with Article VI.
Iran/NPT
Question. As traditionally understood, Article IV of the NPT
entitles member states to the benefits of peaceful civil-nuclear
technology to the extent that they are members in good standing with
the NPT. In the last administration, Special Representative of the
President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Jeffrey L. Eberhardt confirmed
to the SFRC in writing that ``Iran's standing as a non-nuclear-weapon
State Party to the NPT cannot be described as `good.'''
Do you consider Iran's past possession of the Nuclear Archive
seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive
relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute
non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). If yes, please
explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and if confirmed, I will work
with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT
compliance. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA to address the
serious, outstanding issues related to potential undeclared nuclear
material in Iran. As a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, Iran
is obligated not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.
Under the JCPOA, Iran reaffirmed this commitment, and if confirmed, I
will work to ensure that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.
Question. All three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are required to
maintain a reliable, credible and effective deterrent. This is
especially true as Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces and
China is increasing its nuclear forces in an attempt at nuclear parity.
Do you consider Iran's past concealment of the Nuclear Archive
seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive
relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute
non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the NPT. If
yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. Iran's long history of denial and concealment regarding its
past nuclear weapons program is of serious concern. The Biden-Harris
administration has stated that it will not take Iran at its word
regarding assertions about its nuclear program, and fully supports the
IAEA as it uses its safeguards authorities to investigate any
indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Iran. If
confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure that Iran never acquires
a nuclear weapon.
Question. Do you consider Iran a member in good standing of the
NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and if confirmed, I will work
with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT
compliance. Given Iran's past noncompliance with both its safeguards
agreement and its NPT obligations, its failure to fully and
substantially address IAEA questions related to past activities
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, its
retention and concealment of documents, equipment, and personnel
related to its past nuclear weapons program, and its failure to fully
address current IAEA questions related to potential undeclared nuclear
materials and activities in Iran, Iran's nuclear activities are cause
for serious concern.
Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from
nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT? If yes, please
explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the
Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination
and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must,
however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking
nuclear activities, including its obligations under Article II of the
NPT and its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from
nuclear technology for any reason? If yes, please explain why. If no,
please explain why.
Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the
Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination
and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must,
however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking
nuclear activities, including its obligation under Article II of the
NPT not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.
Iran/UNSCR 2231 Snapback
Question. UNSCR 2231 ended a long-standing international arms
embargo against Iran, described across the previous six resolutions
terminated by paragraph 7(a) of the resolution. After an effort to
extend that embargo, the Trump administration took two measures. First,
it invoked the ``snapback mechanism'' described in paragraphs 10-15 of
UNSCR 2231, reversing the termination of those resolutions. You and
others have publicly suggested that the U.S. was not entitled to invoke
that mechanism. Second, the Trump administration implemented EO 13949,
``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional
Arms Activities of Iran,'' which authorizes sanctions for transfers to
and from Iran of arms or related material or military equipment. As a
result, the U.S. established a baseline deterrent against major arms
sales to Iran. Multi-billion dollar arms agreements publicly described
and anticipated by Russia, China, and Iran did not occur.
However, in February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded that
decision.
Do you agree with the decision to rescind invoking the snapback
mechanism?
Answer. The snapback mechanism was designed to provide leverage to
help ensure Iran performed its commitments under the JCPOA. The
previous administration invoked snapback in a way that was never
contemplated by the deal, namely after unilaterally exiting it.
Virtually none of our allies or partners recognized this invocation of
snapback. The Biden-Harris administration believes that the United
States will be in a stronger position to counter the full range of
threats posed by Iran, including its nuclear program, by working in
close concert with our allies.
Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Russia sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?
Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply,
or transfer to Iran of items on the U.N. Register of conventional arms
expired in October 2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed
to working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region, including its acquisition of advanced weapons
from Russia. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners on
the Security Council to dissuade countries from providing advanced
weapons to Iran and fueling Iran's efforts to undermine the stability
of its neighbors in the region. The United States retains numerous
unilateral authorities, including E.O. 13949 (``Blocking Property of
Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'')
to deter and sanction transfers to and from Iran of advanced weapons.
Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Russia purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which
ones?
Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply,
or transfer from Iran of arms and related materiel expired in October
2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working with our
allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the
region, including its sales of weapons and arms. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with our partners on the Security Council to dissuade
countries from purchasing such equipment from Iran and fueling Iran's
efforts to undermine the stability of its neighbors in the region. The
United States retains numerous unilateral authorities, including E.O.
13949 (``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to
Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'') to deter and sanction transfers
to and from Iran of advanced weapons.
Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any
UNSCR if China sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?
Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply,
or transfer to Iran of items on the U.N. Register of conventional arms
expired in October 2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed
to working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region, including its acquisition of advanced weapons
from China. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners on
the Security Council to dissuade countries from providing advanced
weapons to Iran and fueling Iran's efforts to undermine the stability
of its neighbors in the region. The United States retains numerous
unilateral authorities, including E.O. 13949 (``Blocking Property of
Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'')
to deter and sanction transfers to and from Iran of advanced weapons.
Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any
UNSCR if China purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which ones?
Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply,
or transfer from Iran of arms and related materiel expired in October
2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working with our
allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the
region, including its sales of weapons and arms. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with our partners on the Security Council to dissuade
countries from purchasing such equipment from Iran and fueling Iran's
efforts to undermine the stability of its neighbors in the region. The
United States retains numerous unilateral authorities, including E.O.
13949 (``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to
Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'') to deter and sanction transfers
to and from Iran of advanced weapons.
Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches using such ballistic missile technology?
Answer. United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2231
calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,
including launches using such ballistic missile technology. The United
States uses a number of tools to prevent transfers of equipment and
technology to Iran's missile programs and call attention to Iran's
missile development efforts. This includes reporting to the Security
Council launches by Iran that use technologies related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and
urging the Council to address such activities.
Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such
ballistic missile technology?
Answer. United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2231
calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,
including launches using such ballistic missile technology. The United
States uses a number of tools to prevent transfers of equipment and
technology to Iran's missile programs and call attention to Iran's
missile development efforts. This includes reporting to the Security
Council launches by Iran that use technologies related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and
urging the Council to address such activities.
JCPOA/Treaty
Question. I believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) and any similar arms control agreement with Iran should be
brought to the U.S. Senate as a treaty for the Senate's advice and
consent. Officials from the Biden administration have indicated in
public and private they disagree with that stance, because it is
important in the context of such agreements to allow the U.S. to act
``without the constraints of international treaty law.'' I disagree
with that analysis, which fails to account for the Senate's
prerogatives in general, and in the context of the JCPOA cannot be
reconciled with the Obama-Biden administration's move to lock in the
JCPOA at through United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 2231,
which sought to constrain U.S. behavior at the level of international
law.
Do you believe that the JCPOA or a successor agreement should be
brought to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent? If not, why
not?
Answer. Secretary Blinken has committed to consulting fully with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program, as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
negotiated as a non-legally binding arrangement and transmitted to
Congress under INARA in 2015, and it underwent close congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the
Secretary, Special Envoy Malley, and other members of the
administration in consultations on any agreement relating to Iran's
nuclear program, and to complying with the provisions of INARA.
Question. Do you believe that the JCPOA or a successor agreement
should not be brought to the Senate for advice and consent specifically
because it would constrain U.S. options? If so, please describe those
constraints.
Answer. Secretary Blinken has committed to consulting fully with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
negotiated as a non-legally binding arrangement and transmitted to
Congress under INARA in 2015, and it underwent close congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the
Secretary, Special Envoy Malley, and other members of the
administration in consultations on any agreement relating to Iran's
nuclear program, and to complying with the provisions of INARA.
Question. If a future agreement with Iran is not submitted to the
U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, do you believe that a future
administration would be within its legal prerogatives to dismantle it?
Answer. Secretary Blinken has committed to consulting fully with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
negotiated as a non-legally binding arrangement and transmitted to
Congress under INARA in 2015, and it underwent close congressional and
public scrutiny. If there were to be a U.S. return to the JCPOA, the
arrangement would impose no legal constraints on the United States'
ability to protect its interests, including, for example, by ceasing
participation in the deal if Iran were to fail to adhere to its JCPOA
commitments.
State Department
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in
notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If
not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. What are your goals for your bureau, if confirmed?
Answer. I have several priorities I would like to engage on if
confirmed, the broadest and most important of which is to play a role
in reducing the risk of nuclear war through effective arms control. I
believe it is also critical that we make progress on limiting Russian
and Chinese nuclear expansion, strengthening our efforts in
biosecurity, pursuing accountability for the use of chemical weapons,
and promoting a diverse workforce. If confirmed I hope to work to
strengthen deterrence alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific
to better deter and defend against growing threats, and to help
position the U.S. Government and State Department to grapple with
advancements in emerging technologies that can threaten strategic
stability. Finally, I intend if confirmed to strive to ensure that arms
transfers and security assistance are focused on building values-based
security partnerships.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. China voluntarily agreed, in 1997, to report its annual
civil plutonium production figures and related activities to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along with the U.S., UK,
France, Russia, Japan, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany. The last
Chinese report, which covered 2016, was submitted in 2017.
There is no public record of the U.S. taking them to task for no
longer reporting this information, which is troubling due to their
development of a fast-breeder reactor program.
Furthermore, the Commander of USSTRATCOM indicated, at an open
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 14 April 2021, that ``this
will change the upper bounds of what China could choose to do, if they
wanted to, in terms of further expansion of their nuclear
capabilities.''
Do you know if this has been discussed, with the Chinese, in
diplomatic circles? Will you commit to meeting with me, if
confirmed, to discuss this issue further?
Answer. I have not been privy to such conversations. However, if
confirmed, I will call on China to submit its declaration report to the
IAEA per Information Circular (INFCIRC)/549 concerning ``Guidelines for
the Management of Plutonium.'' If confirmed, I would be happy to meet
with you to discuss this issue further.
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Bill Hagerty
Nuclear Modernization
Question. If you are confirmed, will you commit supporting the
modernization of U.S. nuclear forces? Please begin your answer with yes
or no.
Answer. Yes, the United States should have a modern, credible, and
effective deterrent.
Question. In your view, why is the modernization of U.S. nuclear
forces critical to protecting the security of the United States?
Answer. The United States must maintain a credible nuclear
deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. Nuclear weapons will
continue to exist beyond the planned service lives of existing U.S.
nuclear forces and modernization is necessary to sustain a credible
deterrent.
Question. In your view, do you agree that the role of nuclear
weapons should be reduced in U.S. foreign policy, as stated by two
Biden administration officials in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun?
Please begin your answer with yes or no. In an interview with Asahi
Shimbun, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms
Control, Verification, and Compliance Alexandra Bell and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Missile Defense Policy
Leonor Tomero publicly stated that ``there is no doubt that President
Biden's goal is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.''
Answer. Yes, as the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
states, ``We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in
our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence
commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.''
No First Use Policy
Question. If you are confirmed, will you commit to upholding the
longstanding U.S. policy of not adopting a ``no first use'' policy?
Please begin your answer with yes or no. Admiral Charles Richards, who
heads the U.S. Strategic Command, said that his ``best military advice
would be not adopt a no-first-use policy.'' During her nomination
hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kath Hicks said that a ``no first
use'' policy is not in the interest of the United States.
Answer. The President of the United States determines U.S.
declaratory policy. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. If confirmed, I will participate in that process and will
consult with Congress and our allies on any policies or actions in this
area.
Question. In your view, what are the conditions in which the United
States can actually use a nuclear weapon? On January 2021, you argued
for declaring a ``no first use'' policy, stating that ``the United
States needs to define the conditions where we can actually use a
nuclear weapon.''
Answer. The President of the United States determines the
conditions under which the United States would consider the use of
nuclear weapons. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to
the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find
the best ways to do this.
Question. What risks might U.S. allies face if the United States
were to adopt a ``no first use'' policy?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a review of
nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory policy. If
confirmed, I will participate in that process and will consult with
Congress and U.S. allies on any policies or actions in this area. It
would be premature to speculate about risks prior to the completion of
this review.
China & Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons
Question. In your view, if a country with nuclear weapons, which is
a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
deliberately and repeatedly refuses to engage in good faith
negotiations on the issue of arms control, would you agree that country
is in violation of Article VI of the NPT? Please begin your answer with
yes or no. Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons clearly stipulates that countries with nuclear weapons should
``pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race.'' In recent years, the United
States repeatedly attempted to engage China on the issue of arms
control, but Beijing refused, asserting that ``the time is not yet
ripe'' for such discussions.
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with legal and policy experts
at the Department of State on a variety of matters related to China's
behavior in the nuclear weapon arena, including its compliance with
Article VI of the NPT. It is urgent for China to take on greater
responsibility, transparency, and restraint with respect to its nuclear
weapons arsenal.
Security Assistance
Question. If you are confirmed, what metrics would you rely upon to
determine whether China is violating VI of the NTP Treaty?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with legal and policy experts
at the Department of State on a variety of matters related to China's
behavior in the nuclear weapons arena, including considerations
relevant to assessing compliance with Article VI of the NPT.
On the Next Arms Control Treaty
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit that the next arms
control treaty should include China? Please begin your answer with yes
or no.
Answer. No. While the United States will pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal, arms control agreements and arrangements must
be tailored to the security challenges they are intended to address.?
Although there may be opportunities for the United States and Russia to
engage the PRC in a trilateral forum, I do not believe that all future
arms control endeavors with Russia must include the PRC.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit that the next arms
control treaty with Russia must address all nuclear warheads, to
include Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons? Please begin your
answer with yes or no.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we use the time
provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons,
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to regularly briefing
Congress on the status of diplomatic engagements with China on the
issue of arms control?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed I commit to regularly consulting Congress
on the status of the Biden-Harris administration's approach to China
and arms control.
Iran and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Question. In your view, is Iran in compliance with the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? Please begin your answer with
yes or no.
Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the
NPT, and if confirmed, I will work with legal and policy experts to
monitor and assess Iran's NPT compliance. President Biden has made
clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear
weapon, and I share that commitment.
Question. If yes, how is Iran in compliance when it has not
answered the IAEA's questions on undeclared nuclear material and
activities?
Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in light of the IAEA's ongoing
safeguards investigations and Iran's failure to provide the IAEA with
the cooperation necessary to resolve them. If confirmed, I will work
with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT
compliance. Iran must engage and cooperate fully with the IAEA in a way
that leads to credible, concrete progress and toward resolution of
these issues. Like President Biden, I have full confidence in the IAEA
to pursue any indications of undeclared or diverted nuclear material
that could contribute to any renewed Iranian pursuit of a nuclear
weapon.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to providing no
sanctions relief to Iran until they comply with the IAEA's requests to
resolve the outstanding issues on undeclared nuclear materials and
activities? The 2021 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments noted that
during the 2020 reporting period, the IAEA Director General (DG) issued
several reports on Iran that make clear that serious, outstanding
concerns remain regarding possible undeclared nuclear material and
activities in Iran today.
Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards
agreement to declare to the IAEA nuclear material and nuclear
activities in Iran. Iran's failure to provide substantive or
technically credible responses to the IAEA's questions related to
possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran is cause
for serious concern. If confirmed, I will strongly support the IAEA's
ongoing investigation in Iran into indications of possible undeclared
nuclear material and, along with the rest of the international
community, expect full Iranian cooperation with inspectors--without
delay--as the IAEA works toward conclusions. President Biden has made
clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear
weapon.
Open Skies Treaties
Question. In your view, do you agree that Russia has violated, and
continues to violate, the Treaty on Open Skies? Please begin your
answer with yes or no. The 2021 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments
noted that in ``2020, the United States continued to assess that Russia
was in violation of the Treaty on Open Skies (OST).'' In May 2020, the
Director of the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center
said: ``For years, Russia has used the Open Skies Treaty to collect
intelligence on civilian infrastructure and other sensitive sites in
America, posing an unacceptable risk to our national security.''
Answer. Yes, Russia has violated, and continues to violate, the
Treaty on Open Skies. I am not aware that Russia has taken any action
to return to compliance. As stated in this year's compliance report,
Russia has not rescinded its illegal 500-kilometer sublimit over
Kaliningrad. Russia also remains in violation for refusing to allow
observation flights to approach within 10 kilometers of its border with
the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While not a
violation of the treaty, Russia has also declared an airfield in Crimea
as a Russian Open Skies refueling airfield, in an attempt to politicize
the treaty.
Question. In your view, do you agree that Russia abuses the Treaty
on Open Skies and its actions posed an unacceptable risk the security
of the United States and our allies?
Answer. My view is that Russia's violations of the Treaty on Open
Skies, while concerning, by themselves do not pose a direct and
immediate threat to U.S. national security. Russia's use of the treaty
to collect imagery of military and civilian infrastructure, while not
prohibited by the treaty, could pose a risk, although I understand
there are measures in place to mitigate that risk.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Robert Menendez
Rebuilding the Bureaus
Question. Neglect of the Economic Growth, Environment, and Energy
Bureaus has resulted in a serious brain drain from the bureaus and hurt
morale among the dedicated workforce of these Bureaus. The previous
administration's skepticism and outright hostility towards
environmental stewardship, climate change, clean energy diplomacy and
economic cooperation were not only tone deaf and out of touch with the
interests of the rest of the world, but were demoralizing to the very
thoughtful and engaged personnel within these bureaus.
How will you restore morale among personnel, build back the ranks
of the ``E'' bureaus and offices, and demonstrate leadership
and interest in the E Bureaus' priorities?
Answer. Rebuilding the ``E'' family will require commitment and
dedication, not only in recruiting but in training and retention
efforts. We will also need to pay special attention to groups whose
lack of representation at the State Department predates the previous
administration. If confirmed, with your support and the help of my
colleagues at State, I intend to pay special attention to this effort.
Question. How will you continue and build on this tradition of
leadership to advance the values of transparency and accountability
that the U.S. Government has championed across MDBs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will champion the values of transparency
and accountability across all U.S. engagements with the multilateral
development banks. In large part due to our significant shareholding
size, the United States is in a position to continue to work with
fellow shareholders to ensure the MDBs promote transparency and
accountability in order to build more support among all stakeholders
for the very important work they do to address systemic barriers to
economic development.
Question. The U.S. National Contact Point (NCP) to the OECD is one
of the only avenues for justice for harm caused by companies; however,
reports have documented meaningful shortcomings in the NCP's ability
for facilitating accountability and remedy. How will you ensure that
the U.S. NCP is strong and effective to address business and human
rights grievances?
Answer. The U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) serves an important role in
promoting and implementing the Guidelines, and in facilitating the
resolution of allegations brought against a company. The Guidelines
provide important recommendations by governments to companies on
responsible business practices, including with respect to human rights.
If confirmed, I will review the current work of the U.S. NCP, consider
feedback from concerned stakeholders, and take appropriate steps to
ensure that the mechanism we have in place to address grievances is a
meaningful one.
Question. What is your assessment of the push for an Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) capital increase?
Answer. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is a vital source
of development finance for Latin America and the Caribbean and provides
a high-quality alternative to unsustainable borrowing from China or
other creditors. IDB lending and policy advice will be important for
supporting the region in emerging from the multiple crises it faces. If
confirmed, I intend look closely at the IDB's plans and current
financing needs in collaboration with Treasury and other agencies.
Question. How can Congress best work with the administration to
advance this goal (of an IDB capital increase)?
Answer. Discussions on the Inter-American Development Bank's (IDB)
resources should occur from the bottom up, considering the views of all
shareholders, including Congress and IDB management. Such discussions
should include fulsome analyses of financial conditions, how its use of
resources addresses the region's challenges, and the IDB's role within
the larger financing and policy landscape for the region. If confirmed,
I would look closely at the IDB's plans and current financing needs in
collaboration with Congress, Treasury, and other agencies.
Question. How do you see the Under Secretary facilitating climate
into the operations of State Department bureaus where the concept of
``Climate Diplomacy'' may still be new?
Answer. Among the many pressing international priorities on
President Biden's agenda, reasserting American leadership in combating
the global climate crisis is among the most critical--having been
identified by the President as one of the four ``historic'' crises
confronting the United States. If confirmed, I plan to work closely
with Secretary Kerry and his team to advance our climate diplomacy
work. I understand that Secretary Kerry's climate diplomacy work is
closely coordinated with the Department's. If confirmed, I am also
committed to further integrating the climate agenda in the ``E'' family
of bureaus and offices, and supporting the Biden-Harris
administration's broader diplomatic engagement.
Question. Can you describe how you see yourself, if confirmed,
working in cooperation with the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate
in realizing the full-scale integration and consideration of climate
into our foreign policy apparatus?
Answer. If I am confirmed, while I will report to Secretary
Blinken, I plan to work closely with Special Presidential Envoy Kerry
and his team to advance our climate work. Addressing the climate crisis
is going to take a whole-of-government and whole-of-Department of State
approach. If confirmed, I will have the privilege of overseeing two of
the bureaus most actively engaged in climate change diplomacy: the
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, and the Bureau of Energy Resources. I anticipate a close
working relationship with SPEC to ensure we are working together to
advance this policy priority.
Question. Is it in the U.S. interest, or a sound reflection of U.S.
values, to respond to BRI investments in fossil fuels by offering
financing for comparable fossil fuel energy projects that have
significant environmental impacts?
Answer. It is in the U.S. interest to work with countries to
understand the full economic and environmental impact of energy
investments and the availability of cost-effective, clean, and low-
carbon alternatives to fossil fuels. This includes, but is not limited
to, countries where the PRC is investing through its One Belt, One Road
(OBOR) initiative. If confirmed, I commit to coordinating across U.S.
Government agencies to work with international partners and expand
competitive financing options for cost-effective, low carbon
alternatives to PRC-backed, heavy-emitting infrastructure projects.
Question. Should the U.S. compete by providing better clean energy
alternatives that provide wide ranging health, economic growth and
social benefits to BRI energy projects that exacerbate the climate
crisis and harm local health and the environment?
Answer. It is critical that countries' energy needs be met in a
safe, and fiscally and environmentally sustainable, manner. If
confirmed, I commit to working with institutions like DFC and EXIM to
advance U.S. clean energy financing options, with a focus on building
partners' capacities to assess and mitigate financial and environmental
risks in the energy sector. I also commit to supporting international
initiatives, such as the Blue Dot Network, to certify quality
infrastructure projects that uphold global standards and are vital to
strengthening shared climate, social, and environmental standards.
Question. Do you believe it is in the U.S. economic interest, and
sound environmental policy, for the U.S. to pay foreign entities to
take our plastic waste to create energy?
Answer. It is in the economic and environmental interest of the
United States to support environmentally sound management of plastic
waste and scrap. If confirmed, I will work with international partners
to better understand international trade flows of plastic waste and
scrap as the State Department and other Departments and agencies
consider these important policy questions.
Question. Would you support a prohibition on export of U.S. plastic
waste for foreign energy production?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support upholding and implementing
U.S. export laws for waste and scrap, and supporting U.S. industry in
understanding the policies of other countries related to trade in
plastic waste and scrap. I understand that the Biden-Harris
administration is still reviewing its position on international waste
and scrap issues, and if confirmed I look forward to participating in
that review.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to
increase U.S.-India cooperation on clean energy and address climate
change?
Answer. I understand that U.S.-India cooperation on climate and
clean energy is a core element of the bilateral relationship. President
Biden and Prime Minister Modi launched the U.S.-India Climate and Clean
Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership at the Leaders Summit on Climate on
April 22, 2021. Advancing India's ambitious 2030 climate and clean
energy targets, such as reaching 450 GW of renewable energy, will be
critical to confronting the climate crisis. If confirmed, I intend to
ensure that the State Department plays a leading role in advancing
U.S.-India collaboration, including by building on existing initiatives
through the Bureau of Energy Resources to mobilize clean energy finance
and integrate renewable energy into a flexible power system.
Question. What role would you anticipate having in the
implementation of the U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030
Partnership?
Answer. President Biden and Prime Minister Modi launched the U.S.-
India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership at the Leaders
Summit on Climate on April 22, 2021, elevating climate and clean energy
collaboration to the core of the bilateral relationship. The
Partnership goals are to support India's deployment of 450 GW of
renewable energy by 2030, scale up innovative technologies, and build
capacity for climate adaptation. If confirmed, I intend to ensure the
State Department plays a leading role in this Partnership--through
promoting clean energy finance, technical assistance on regulatory
reform, and support for innovation and technology scale-up--and
provides the resourcing to achieve the ambitious 2030 agenda.
Question. If confirmed, will you support the establishment of a
U.S.-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center?
Answer. I am familiar with the goals of the Eastern Mediterranean
Security and Energy Partnership Act and, if confirmed, I will work with
Congress and the Department of Energy to support the U.S.- Eastern
Mediterranean Energy Center. I understand that the Department of Energy
is working with counterparts from Israel, Greece, and the Republic of
Cyprus, along with the State Department's Bureau of Energy Resources,
to determine the Center's scope of activities, and expects to have a
framework for establishment of the Center in the coming weeks.
Question. Will you commit to prioritizing labor rights and support
for labor unions in relations with Bangladesh, if confirmed?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to prioritizing labor rights
and support for labor unions in relations with Bangladesh. In 2013,
President Obama suspended Bangladesh's trade benefits under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) because the Government of
Bangladesh had made insufficient progress in affording Bangladeshi
workers internationally recognized worker rights. Since then,
Bangladesh has made a few amendments to its labor law, but workers
continue to face dismissals, blacklisting, and violence for attempting
to join or form unions or demonstrate for their due wages and benefits.
In response, the Department of State, USAID, and Department of Labor
fund programs to improve workers' rights and safety in the garment,
shrimp, and domestic work sectors, as well as for migrant workers. I
understand that the State Department also coordinates with USAID, the
International Labor Organization, and other partners to encourage
Bangladesh to enact reforms to bring its labor legislation in line with
international standards. If confirmed, I will ensure my team amplifies
this work, and raises concerns about labor rights at the highest levels
of the Government of Bangladesh.
Question. How specifically will you ensure that labor rights and
labor unions are prioritized in initiatives such as High-Level
Consultations on Economic Partnership with Bangladesh?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with leadership in the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of Labor, and U.S.
Trade Representative to ensure labor rights and labor unions are
prioritized in initiatives with Bangladesh, including the High-Level
Consultation on Economic Partnership. President Biden made clear in his
address to a joint session of Congress on April 28: middle class
workers grow the economy and unions build the middle class. Likewise,
economic partnerships are only possible because of workers, so labor
rights must be viewed as a priority across topics and sectors, rather
than a standalone issue.
Question. Will you commit to working with international partners to
combat plastic pollution and marine debris in the oceans?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working with international
partners to combat plastic pollution and marine debris in the ocean. I
plan to work with colleagues at the Department and across the
interagency, along with stakeholders, as the United States prepares for
negotiations under the fifth United Nation Environment Assembly
meeting, which is expected to deliberate on options for global action
to address ocean plastic pollution in February 2022. If confirmed, I
will also work with staff to implement the Department's activities
under Save Our Seas 2.0, including building international partnerships
to build capacity to address marine debris.
Question. Will you help guide the State Department, working with
other relevant federal agencies and multilateral institutions, to
examine the environmental risks and social impact of foreign plastic
waste processors that claim to recycle plastic waste?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will help guide the Department,
including collaborating interagency partners and relevant multilateral
institutions, to better understand the environmental and social impacts
of foreign plastic waste processors that claim to recycle plastic
waste.
Question. Will you make exploring the potential for new
international agreements on land-based sources of marine debris and
derelict fishing gear a priority for the Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs Bureau?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to addressing ocean plastic
pollution and working with countries and stakeholders to find
innovative solutions to address land-based sources of marine debris as
well as derelict fishing gear. The Biden-Harris administration has not
taken a position on launching a new global instrument and is still
developing its perspective on the best approaches to addressing marine
litter and plastic pollution. If confirmed, I will work with
interagency, stakeholders and international partners as we consider
different approaches, including new global instruments.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Who is responsible for coordinating and effectively
executing U.S. foreign policy, to include diplomatic engagement to
advance U.S. global health security interests overseas--the Department
of State, USAID, or CDC?
Answer. I understand that the United States takes a whole-of-
government approach, under the President's leadership, and in
coordination with the National Security Council, to advance U.S.
foreign policy, including advancing U.S. global health security
interests overseas. The President appointed a Coordinator for the
Global COVID-19 Response and Health Security at the Department of
State. This role leads diplomatic engagement on behalf of the U.S.
Government on health security matters, coordinating closely with
relevant departments and agencies. I understand that the Chief of
Mission ultimately has authority and responsibility for U.S. activities
in a respective country and is responsible for coordinating and
effectively executing U.S. foreign policy. Staff across the U.S.
interagency, including from the Department of State, USAID, and CDC,
have critical roles to contribute to this effort.
Question. Who is responsible for coordinating and effectively
executing U.S. foreign assistance overseas, to include diplomatic
engagement to advance U.S. global health security interests in
countries of all income categories--the Ambassador (Department of
State), the Mission Director (USAID), or CDC country representatives?
Answer. I understand that under the direction of the President, the
Secretary of State is responsible for the supervision and general
direction of U.S. foreign assistance. I understand that the U.S.
Ambassador, with Chief of Mission authority and responsibility for U.S.
activities in a country, is responsible for ensuring adequate
coordination among U.S. departments and agencies in country, as to best
utilize the expertise of technical agencies such as USAID and CDC and
ensure coordination across equities. The implementation of specific
programs falls under USAID Mission Directors and CDC country
representatives, who have important roles in directing country teams in
the responsible and effective use of U.S. foreign assistance overseas.
Question. Who is best placed to coordinate the execution of a
comprehensive U.S. global health security strategy overseas, including
by resolving conflicts between implementing agencies and
organizations--the Department of State, USAID, or CDC?
Answer. I understand that the Chief of Mission in a given country
has ultimate responsibility for U.S. activities in the country, and the
National Security Council coordinates implementation of U.S. foreign
policy across agencies. I understand that the Department of State,
USAID, CDC, DOD, and other agencies collaborate closely to coordinate
and resolve conflicts in the execution of U.S. global health security
strategy overseas.
Question. Given the leading role assigned to the Department of
State by National Security Memorandum-1 (21 January 2021) and Executive
Order 13747 (4 November 2016) in advancing U.S. global health security
and diplomacy, the enormity of U.S. foreign assistance dedicated to
advancing global health priorities overseas, and the fact that the
major implementer of U.S. global health assistance overseas--USAID--
falls under the foreign policy guidance of the Department of State, do
you believe the Office of International Health and Biodefense, as
currently structured, is fit for purpose?
Answer. The current pandemic highlights the importance of global
health security. The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs' Office of International Health and Biodefense
(OES/IHB) advances these interests through diplomacy and foreign policy
implementation bilaterally and multilaterally, in close coordination
with the interagency. I understand that OES leadership will continue
coordinating with relevant Department of State bureaus and offices and
interagency partners to review global health security needs and assess
the need for any additional resources, working with Congress.
Question. Do you agree that the PEPFAR model, to include the
coordinating role played by the Department of State and the
implementing roles played by USAID and the CDC, has been successful?
Answer. Yes. PEPFAR uses a whole-of-government model to harness the
comparative advantages of seven U.S. Government implementing agencies,
including USAID and CDC, with leadership and coordination through the
U.S. Department of State, including at the country level through U.S.
Chiefs of Mission worldwide. It may be the most rigorous global health
program in terms of data collection. PEPFAR's interagency program
implementation has been critical to PEPFAR's success in controlling the
HIV/AIDS pandemic. As PEPFAR's work continues, it is seen as a model in
global health, even in the context of COVID-19.
Question. As more and more countries approach epidemic control, do
you believe this (PEPFAR) model could be adapted to advance broader
global health security and diplomacy objectives, as the Obama
administration envisioned under the GHI?
Answer. The current pandemic highlights the importance of
strengthening global health security capacity and health systems.
Various models for U.S. foreign assistance programs, including PEPFAR,
have successfully bolstered health outcomes globally. Bureaus and
offices at the Department of State--including the Office of the U.S.
Global AIDS Coordinator, Office of International Health and Biodefense,
and Office of Foreign Assistance--continue efforts to leverage the
successes of various aid models to effectively strengthen global health
security capacity, and I will look forward to reviewing those efforts
and models if confirmed.
Question. As the Department and U.S. interagency work to help
developing nations build their infrastructure and provide their energy
needs, will you commit to considering all energy sources and fuels
types that make the most sense for each project, particularly with
respect to the needs of developing countries? Will you commit not to
make general prohibitions on coal, oil, or natural gas projects?
Answer. I am committed, if confirmed, to help developing countries
address their energy needs and support the Biden-Harris
administration's whole-of-government approach to ensure that climate
considerations are fully integrated into our energy-related
engagements. This includes supporting developing countries as they plan
for a low-emissions future that decarbonizes key sectors, increases
competitive energy and infrastructure development, and increases energy
access to sustainably meet growing demand. If confirmed, I will work
within the Department and interagency to coordinate support to
countries to meet their climate, energy access, and energy security
needs in ways that further our climate and energy goals.
Question. If a capital increase is authorized for the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) this Congress, if confirmed, will you
commit to working to establishing appropriate safeguards, transparency
and conditionality measures to protect debt-vulnerable IADB member
countries of that borrow from the IADB to restructure Chinese bilateral
debt held by such countries? Do you also commit to establishing
measures to protect such countries from incurring subsequent Chinese
bilateral debt?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and
partners to distinguish our approach to development from China's by
ensuring that economic viability and transparency are built into the
projects we support at the Inter-American Development Bank. I will also
work to confront China's economic abuses and advocate for the highest
transparency and accountability standards to promote development
investments that are both beneficial and sustainable over the long
term.
Question. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative, is financing
and constructing infrastructure projects around the globe. These
projects build relationships that will last years if not decades
between China and other countries. Depending on the terms of the
financing and the quality of the construction, China may secure an
unfair advantage in the relationship to the detriment of the interests
of the host country as well as the United States. How do you propose
the United States counter these practices and strengthen relationships
with countries in need of infrastructure development?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States
distinguishes itself from Beijing's state-led approach to development,
including the ``One Belt, One Road'' initiative, by promoting private-
sector driven alternatives. The United States' approach focuses on
partnerships that strengthen local capacity and promote
entrepreneurship, transparency, good governance, fair practices, and
internationally recognized environmental, social, and labor standards.
If confirmed, I will work with partners and allies, and through
existing U.S. Government agencies such as the Development Finance
Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, and others, to promote and support
infrastructure investments with high standards that ensure such
projects are beneficial and sustainable over the long term.
Question. People's Republic of China (PRC) companies are making
significant headway an important but often overlooked technology area:
undersea cables. The prior administration focused on this issue through
its Clean Cable initiative, and by providing financing for specific
cable projects in the Indo-Pacific. Please describe your understanding
of PRC activities in the undersea cable market and the implications for
United States interests. Do you commit to prioritizing this area of
technology if you are confirmed?
Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration views
undersea cables as critical to America's national security and economic
prosperity. If confirmed, I will fully support Department efforts that
prioritize protecting this critical infrastructure and work with allies
and partners to prevent untrusted, high-risk, and unproven vendors,
like those with ties to the PRC, from increasing their market share
through unfair practices.
Question. After years of negotiations, on December 30th, 2020-
nearly the final day of the German Council presidency--the European
Union (EU) announced it had reached an agreement with China on an
investment deal. What is your view of the EU's decision to conclude
this agreement at this moment?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to early consultations with
our EU and European partners on shared concerns about China, including
through the recently relaunched U.S.-EU dialogue on China and on issues
related to trade and investment. Ultimately, the onus will be on China
to show that any new pledges in the Comprehensive Agreement on
Investment (CAI) on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and
subsidies are not just cheap talk, and the EU will need to hold the
Chinese Government accountable. If confirmed, I will seek to engage
with European counterparts on how to advance our shared economic
interests and counter China's aggressive and coercive actions, as well
as on China's failures to uphold its past international commitments.
Question. What are the economic and geopolitical implications of
this agreement? Please be specific. Will it affect the EU's willingness
to push back on China for its malign behavior, such as using the EU's
new human rights sanctions regime? Do you believe that this agreement
with affect, negatively or positively, U.S. attempts to hold China
accountable for its malign trade and investment practices?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the administration's active
engagement with EU and European counterparts on how to advance our
shared economic interests and counter China's aggressive and coercive
actions, including trade and investment practices. The economic and
geopolitical implications of the deal will depend on whether it is
ratified and, if so, whether the Chinese Government follows through on
its commitments. The United States applauded the EU's imposition of
sanctions in March under its global human rights sanctions regime
against PRC individuals in connection with serious human rights abuses
in Xinjiang, an action taken in unity with the United States, Canada,
and the United Kingdom.
Question. The prior administration stood up an initiative called
the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, designed to
advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality
infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region by strengthening capacity-
building programs; providing transaction advisory services and project
preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and
coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the
development of infrastructure. If confirmed, do you commit to
supporting and continuing this program?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to continuing the Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN). Public financing alone
cannot fulfill the $15 trillion global infrastructure gap over the next
twenty years--we must mobilize private financing of quality
infrastructure, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Participants in ITAN
representing 14 U.S. agencies have collaborated to identify and provide
support for dozens of projects with a market value of $190 billion. I
will work to continue helping foreign partners build better enabling
environments to mobilize greater private sector financing in quality
infrastructure investment through ITAN.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing advocacy,
assistance, and other necessary initiatives to encourage, promote, and
support greater investment in and economic and commercial engagement
with Southeast Asia?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to supporting increased
investment, economic, and commercial engagement in Southeast Asia.
Transparent, inclusive, and resilient economic growth is key to
ensuring that Southeast Asia remains free and open. Through our Indo-
Pacific programs, if confirmed, I will work with U.S. Government
economic agencies to help countries in the region attract quality
investments, increase transparency, secure project financing for key
transactions, and advocate for U.S. firms. I will also seek to work
through multilateral organizations, such as APEC and ASEAN, to improve
regional business environments, reduce trade barriers, and increase
commercial ties between U.S. businesses and the region.
Question. How can the United States build more reliable trade and
investment partnerships with African countries, particularly when the
region faces severe economic impacts from the coronavirus pandemic,
external debt, and inflationary pressures? What will it take to
overcome these myriad challenges, and how do you believe the United
States can assist?
Answer. I believe that fostering debt transparency is a key
requirement for building back better in Africa. I understand that the
United States supports the Paris Club-G20 Debt Service Suspension
Initiative and the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, both of which
include debt transparency requirements. If confirmed, I will advance
U.S. engagement in the multilateral debt initiatives, as well as
ongoing World Bank and IMF support for economic recovery in Africa. The
World Bank has provided $50 billion for African countries, while a
significant portion of the IMF's $110 billion in COVID-related rapid
financing has gone to Africa. If confirmed, I will also support
development of a plan for a $650 billion IMF special drawing rights
allocation.
Question. Our strategy to counter malign foreign actors like the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in African countries cannot be limited
to still-nascent programs like Prosper Africa and aged initiatives like
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The United States' plan
will also require strategic, targeted, and well-resourced ``whole-of-
country'' initiatives that address not only the economic side of the
issue, but the governance, cultural, and diplomatic sides as well. How
can the United States better develop country- or city-level strategies
(for Africa's ever-growing mega-cities) to properly incentivize U.S.
private sector engagement in critical sectors to ensure they are well-
positioned to compete?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that U.S. companies can
compete on an even, transparent playing field. I will enhance our work
to improve the investment climates on a country-by-country basis and
inform U.S. firms of Africa's opportunities. U.S. businesses provide
world-class products and services that Africans seek to grow their
economies. If confirmed, I will examine how we can better coordinate
our financing support across U.S. agencies. The Prosper Africa
initiative has been working to coordinate many of these efforts, but we
can do more. If confirmed, I will also support our soft power efforts,
including engaging with youth and diaspora, and encouraging educational
opportunities.
Question. Should the United States prioritize support of Africa's
efforts to realize implementation of the African Continental Free Trade
Area (AfCFTA) or carve out strategic Free Trade Agreements with
countries like Kenya? For regional economic blocs like the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)?
Answer. I understand that the United States, while not a party to
the AfCFTA, supports its goals of improved harmonization and
coordination of trade in Africa. The agreement has the potential to
foster a better business climate that would increase opportunities for
U.S. businesses. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting USTR on any
trade matters and strengthening alliances with our key partners, like
Kenya and the Regional Economic Communities across Africa. With respect
to Kenya, I understand USTR is closely reviewing the negotiations that
have taken place to date.
Question. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 establishes
an Office of Sanctions Coordination within the Department of State. If
confirmed, do you commit to work with my office and this committee to
ensure that this office succeeds and fulfills its statutory mandate?
Answer. Yes. I share the Department's appreciation for Congress's
deep and continued involvement in sanctions issues. If confirmed, I
will work to leverage available expertise and resources throughout the
Government on sanctions issues, including as the Department works to
stand up the Office of Sanctions Coordination established in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, and will work with your office and the
committee.
Question. Do you anticipate that the Office of the Special Envoy
for Climate will coordinate with the E bureau? If so, how? Do you have
an understanding of what the reporting structure would look like? In
the event of a disagreement between your office and the Special Envoy's
office, to whom would the matter be elevated?
Answer. While the Under Secretary position I have been nominated to
reports to Secretary Blinken, if confirmed, I plan to work closely with
Special Envoy for Climate (SPEC) Kerry and his team to advance our
climate work. I understand Special Envoy Kerry's climate diplomacy work
is closely coordinated with the Department's. If confirmed, I am
committed to further integrating the climate agenda in the ``E''
(Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment) family. If confirmed, I
will have the privilege of overseeing the two bureaus most engaged in
climate diplomacy: the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs and the Bureau of Energy Resources. I anticipate
a positive working relationship with SPEC.
Question. One of the irritants in the United States' relationship
with our closest allies is the question of taxation of digital
companies. Understandingly, European countries would like to tax
companies operating in their territories, but this would have a direct
and targeted harm on U.S. companies, since the U.S. is home to most of
the largest tech companies. Resolving this issue is of primary
important both for our relationship with Europe, for pushing back on
the influence of Chinese tech companies, and for the health of the U.S.
tech companies. In this role, you would have a large part to play in
the negotiations to resolve this issue. How do you view the issue? What
do you believe is the right compromise? What are the consequences for
not resolving it?
Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is
committed to finding a multilateral solution to the current set of
international tax issues?that require collective action.??If confirmed,
I would seek to work within my role to pursue a strong international
minimum tax?to?end?the race to the bottom in corporate taxation,
ensuring multinational enterprises pay their fair share. This should
also include?an equitable way to address the allocation of profits
generated through the deployment of intangible property, including to
resolve the issues that have been used to justify?Digital Services
Taxes. If confirmed, I look forward to working alongside colleagues
throughout the U.S. Government to advance these efforts.
Question. Do you commit to continuing the previous administration's
support for the Three Seas Initiative as a way to assist the
infrastructure development of Eastern Europe in a sustainable way and
to counter China's Belt and Road and 17 + 1 Initiative?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to continuing strong U.S.
Government support for the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), a commitment
already voiced by Secretary Blinken on several occasions. 3SI meets
multiple strategic objectives of the Biden-Harris administration,
including promoting the economic development and critical
infrastructure resilience of some close U.S. Allies. 3SI contributes to
closing development deficits left by communism; fostering the overall
integration of Europe; strengthening Central and Eastern European
resilience against, and Western alternatives to, Russian malign
influence and the PRC's Belt and Road and 17+1 initiatives; and
advancing multilateral partnership and transatlantic ties.
Question. What do you view as the DFC's role in this (3 Seas)
Initiative? What additional steps can, and should, the U.S. Government
take to incentivize the private sector to take the risks necessary to
invest in the region?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
Development Finance Corporation to maximize U.S. investment in Three
Seas Initiative (3SI) projects and in finding other ways, in
coordination with members, international financial institutions, and
private capital markets to support 3SI goals in the energy, digital,
and transport sectors. The needs in the 3SI region cannot be addressed
solely by the public sector; the United States must incentivize private
capital and U.S. business to invest in this stable region whose
economic indicators have long been strong and positive. The U.S.
Government should also promote U.S. business investment in 3SI
projects.
Question. Do you view the sanctions in the Protecting European
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, as a statutory requirement or
an optional authority??
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
PEESA, as amended, is an important tool to stop the Nord Stream 2
pipeline and ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy
supply that enhances rather than undermines its collective security. I
understand that the Department continues to assess all potential
targets involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, to identify
persons that engaged in conduct that meets the specific terms of the
statute.
Question. Do you believe that it is possible to prevent the
completion of NordStream 2, or is it inevitable?
Answer. Nord Stream 2 is a threat not only to Europe's energy
security, but also to strategic stability on the continent. The
administration will continue to work with allies and partners, using
the tools at its disposal, to prevent the completion of the pipeline
and to ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply
that enhances, rather than undermines, its collective security. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to work to bring an
end to the project.
Question. Are U.S. sanctions on entities involved in NordStream 2
extraterritorial, as some have claimed?
Answer. The administration has made clear that any entity involved
in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline risks U.S. sanctions and should
immediately abandon work on the pipeline. I understand the
administration continues to engage European allies and partners to make
our opposition to the pipeline and the potential sanctions risk clear
and will continue to underscore strong, bipartisan U.S. opposition to
this Russian malign influence project.
Question. Do you believe it would be appropriate for the
administration to negotiate a deal with Germany (or any foreign power)
involving the waiving of mandatory sanctions absent prior consultations
with Congress?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, there is no such deal. If
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on this matter
and others.
Question. Do you commit to upholding U.S. law and sanctioning
entities that are building or supporting the building of the NordStream
2 pipeline?
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
I understand the Department continues to work to bring an end to the
pipeline, which it views as a threat to European energy security and as
a tool of Russian coercion. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department to continue to assess and evaluate evidence available to
determine the applicability of PEESA, as amended.
Question. How will you use your position as Under Secretary of
Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment to use U.S. economic power to
partner with, rather than coerce, European allies and partners to
strengthen their mechanisms to push back on China, including
strengthening and diversifying their economies, incentivizing western
investment into eastern and southern Europe, building strong export
control regimes, and reinforcing their investment screening mechanisms?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken said, the People's Republic of China
is the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military, and
technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open
international system. To address this challenge, the United States must
engage from a position of strength, which requires working with allies
and partners since this combined weight is much harder for Beijing to
ignore. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with European
partners who share our concerns to build resilience and reduce reliance
on the PRC, and look forward to making progress on the issues you raise
in upcoming G7 meetings, the U.S.-EU Summit and U.S.-EU China Dialogue,
and in other venues.
Question. What are the most immediate and critical areas for State
to prioritize in this effort? Will you have the capacity to prioritize
both the removal of irritants in our relationship AND work to weaken
China's economic power over Europe?
Answer. Our European partners share many of our concerns regarding
the PRC's efforts to challenge the current economic order, but we will
not always see eye to eye, even with our closest allies. We must work
together to build resilience by both protecting and promoting our
technological advantages. We must work together to ensure global norms
and standards reflect our values. We must work together to secure our
global supply chains and promote fair trade. Managing our differences
is essential to achieving our shared objectives and, if confirmed, I
will ensure we find the common ground that will allow us to do so.
Question. The EU struck an investment deal with China last
December, and yet, the U.S.-EU talks on trade and investment, through
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiations,
have crumbled. While the U.S. Trade Representative has primacy over
trade talks, in this role, how will you push for enhanced trade and
investment between the United States and the EU? What do you see as
areas ripe for immediate cooperation in trade and investment? Do you
believe there is room, despite protectionist instincts on both sides of
the Atlantic, to complete any trade and investment agreements during
the Biden administration? Will you push both sides to compromise for
the sake of economic growth and unity against malign economic actors?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the administration's active
engagement with EU and European counterparts on how to advance our
shared economic interests. Failed FTA negotiations and tariff wars have
badly damaged the U.S.-EU trade relationship over the past seven years.
Resolving the trade disputes including Airbus-Boeing, Section 232 steel
and aluminium, and Section 301 determinations in response to digital
services taxes, in a manner that supports domestic jobs and growth in
the United States, would remove key irritants in the relationship and
allow us to focus on future challenges.
Question. Will you support a trade agreement between the United
States and the United Kingdom? Do you believe that a US-UK free trade
agreement would be a benefit to the United States as well as the UK?
How will you work with the UK and EU to ensure that both sides of the
Brexit deal uphold their commitments, which is to the benefit of the
U.S., EU, and UK?
Answer. President Biden has been clear that he will make
significant new investments in the United States for American workers
before he signs any new trade deals. Now that a U.S. Trade
Representative has been confirmed, I understand that the administration
is reviewing the status of the negotiations and the text of the U.S.-UK
FTA to determine the best way forward. If confirmed, I look forward to
working closely with Department colleagues and USTR to engage with the
UK Government on strengthening our ties across a wide range of economic
issues. Further, President Biden has warned that any trade deal is
contingent upon respect for the Good Friday Agreement.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. While chairing the American Bar Association's Interamerican
Law Committee at the height of the internal wars in Central America, I
organized a network of lawyers from the hemisphere who sought to
promote human rights and help mediate labor law conflicts in the
region. Together with bar associations from Central America, from 1986
to 1989 we organized conferences in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala
and Costa Rica that focused on the use of arbitration. The conferences
received much attention in these jurisdictions, and at least in one
country resulted in draft labor law legislation that incorporated
arbitration procedures. While the results were modest and violence
against labor unionists continues to this day, our efforts served to
highlight alternative dispute resolution methods to adjudicate often-
bloody conflicts.
In 1999 journalist Horacio Verbitsky filed a complaint with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against the Republic of
Argentina over his conviction for publishing criticisms of Argentine
Government officials, including then-President Menem. At the request of
a Columbia Law School professor, my team and I researched the
applicable law and prepared a first draft of Mr. Verbitsky's legal
brief. The case was ultimately decided in favor of Mr. Verbitsky.
In 2013, the Rana Plaza building in Dhaka, Bangladesh collapsed,
killing more than 1,100 garment workers and injuring an additional
2,500-plus. The disaster followed several accidents in garment
factories in the country. Shortly afterwards, as Assistant Secretary of
State for Economics, Energy and Business, I led a U.S. Government visit
to Bangladesh, where we informed Bangladeshi officials that the United
States would revoke GSP privileges over worker conditions. I followed
up with several meetings in Washington DC with two industry groups that
had been created by European and U.S. clothing retailers to improve
worker conditions in Bangladesh. My main concern was that, although
both groups had similar objectives, they were often in competition and
were dissipating efforts that could not be wasted. Our meetings led the
groups to agree on common standards and greater coordination. I
understand that, largely through the efforts of both industry groups,
safety has improved at the larger factories in Bangladesh, although
more work remains to be done in smaller enterprises.
Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote,
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and
underrepresented groups?
Answer. Successful international economic policy is predicated on
having a diverse and representative staff. President Biden has made
diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility a national security
imperative. Secretary Blinken has committed to recruit and retain a
workforce that truly reflects the American people. Diversity and
inclusion make our diplomatic team stronger, smarter, more creative,
and more innovative. If confirmed, I commit to working with the new
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, the Bureau of Global Talent
Management, the Secretary's Office of Civil Rights, and other
Department leadership to foster an inclusive workplace in the E
``family,'' promoting, mentoring, and supporting the advancement of
diverse staff.
Question. Fighting corruption is one of the most important ways
that we can promote democracy and human rights worldwide. What steps
would you take to address global corruption within the role for which
you are nominated?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to work with experts across the
Department and interagency to promote and defend democracy. Through the
targeted deployment of accountability tools, foreign assistance, and
diplomatic engagement, we can address endemic corruption and human
rights abuse. I will prioritize working with allies, seeking
opportunities to promote our shared ideals together. I will work to
expand opportunities for U.S. companies to compete for and win business
globally by advancing the fight against foreign bribery and corruption,
strengthening transparency and good governance, and promoting
responsible business conduct.
Question. Do you commit to work with Congress to strengthen U.S.
policies to combat global corruption?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress to
strengthen U.S. policies to combat global corruption, including efforts
to bolster enforcement of foreign bribery laws and improve global
standards of transparency, accountability, and good governance. These
efforts directly support the American middle class through job creation
by helping to level the playing field for U.S. business.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In 2015, you wrote an article stating that the loosening
of restrictions on telecommunications investments in Cuba ``had the
greatest potential to accelerate the growth of civil society in Cuba.''
Although I believe that increasing connectivity and allowing the free
flow of information to the Cuban people will help increase the
communication among the Cuban people, ETECSA, Cuba's only
telecommunication company sets high prices, and shuts down the access
to those who voice opposition against the regime. Just recently the
regime shut down internet access in response to the San Isidro
protests. Can you describe your views towards Cuba today?
Answer. As a refugee from Castro's Cuba, I have no illusions about
the Cuban Government. Many human rights activists from across the
island rely on expanded internet access to communicate with each other
and strengthen networks with other groups in Cuba and abroad, but the
Cuban Government has restricted the country's internet access to keep
independent media and journalists from reporting on government
repression. If confirmed, I will seek to engage directly with Cuban
civil society, and will work to design policies to empower Cuban civil
society and recognize their leadership on these issues. Further, I will
directly engage the Cuban Government on human rights issues, including
freedom of expression.
Question. As you know, the Cuban military plays a large role in
controlling the flow of money in the Cuban economy. They use this
control to support the Cuban regime. Do you support restricting
financial transactions with the Cuban military as a way to promote
freedom in Cuba?
Answer. The Cuban people face great hardship as they deal with the
pandemic and decades of an oppressive government's economic
mismanagement. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration has
committed to reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, including the U.S. posture
regarding economic sanctions, to ensure they help empower the Cuban
people to determine their future. If confirmed, I will support the
Department's review, and I look forward to consulting with Congress on
this issue.
Question. As you know, Taiwan has long pursued a bilateral trade
agreement with the United States. Late last year, the Taiwanese
Government expended tremendous political capital to lift a ban on the
import of American pork, which was the last major stumbling block to an
agreement with Washington. If confirmed, will you urge the U.S. trade
Representative to prioritize free trade agreement negotiations with
Taiwan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to deepening trade, investment,
and other economic ties with Taiwan, which is a critical economic
partner. Trade with Taiwan advances U.S. interests and helps create
economic opportunity and prosperity in the United States. If confirmed,
I will work with the U.S. Trade Representative to strengthen U.S.
economic ties with Taiwan as an important priority.
Question. China engages in economic predatory behavior through
initiatives like Belt and Road, conducts malign influence operations
around the world, steals IP, and is working to reshape the
international rules-based system to its benefit. If confirmed, how will
you use your role to counter China's malign activities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to work with partners and allies
to promote democratic governance and transparency. In contrast to the
PRC's approach to development, I will work to ensure that we continue
to focus on strong fiscal, social, and environmental safeguards in the
projects we support. This includes building partnerships and local
capacity, and promoting U.S. leadership in science, technology, and
innovation. Further, if confirmed, I will work to promote the highest
standards in development investments that are both beneficial and
sustainable over the long term, and advocate for these standards in
international standard-setting bodies. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with Congress on this issue.
Question. Do you think that the Belt and Road Initiative challenges
U.S. strategic and economic interests? If so, could you expand on that?
Answer. The PRC's opaque and unilateral approach to its overseas
lending and investments creates unknown financial risks and undermines
the efforts of the international community to advance development in a
transparent, accountable, and sustainable manner that includes
appropriate social and environmental safeguards. If confirmed, I will
actively contribute to the Biden-Harris administration's efforts to
counter this malign PRC influence, including by working with partners
and allies to offer sustainable, market-based alternatives and help
countries increase transparency and accountability of existing PRC
lending.
Question. How do you think the U.S. should work with our allies to
make them aware of the repercussions of tightening economic engagement
with China?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken said, the PRC is the only country with
the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to
seriously challenge the stable and open international system. The
United States must address this challenge from a position of strength,
which requires working with allies and partners. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure our partners and allies are aware of the risks posed by
Beijing's economic statecraft. These risks include vulnerability to
predatory and unsustainable lending, malign investment, economic
coercion, ICT networks with equipment that can be manipulated or
controlled by the PRC, pressure to prioritize the PRC's interests in
international organizations, and unfair competition from the PRC's
state-owned enterprises.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. If confirmed, you will serve as the Alternate Governor at
the World Bank, the EBRD and the IDB. All three of these banks are
involved and have influence in countries where sexual minorities are
discriminated against and where there is violence and persecution based
on sexual identity and gender preference. Will you commit for the
United States to use its vote and voice to improve the situation in
these countries and ensure that all citizens can benefit from
development programs supported by these multilateral banks?
Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring that programs
financed by the multilateral development banks are inclusive and reach
the most vulnerable and marginalized groups in society, including those
who may be victims of persecution based on their sexual orientation,
gender identity, or sex characteristics. If confirmed as Alternate
Governor, I will work with the U.S. Governor to promote inclusivity in
the development programs we support.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Rob Portman
Question. As the senior economic officer of the State Department,
your responsibilities often overlap with those of the Department of
Commerce, the Treasury Department, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), among other agencies. I am interested in hearing
what you see as your role in this effort and how you will work with
other agencies to advance our goals?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the U.S. Trade
Representative, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the
Treasury, and others in the administration to ensure that all U.S.
trading partners live up to their commitments in trade agreements, and
I will encourage a whole-of-government approach to addressing these
challenges. If confirmed as the State Department's senior economic
officer, I will work to ensure the interagency considers the foreign
policy implications of all decisions while taking into account the
economic impacts on U.S. businesses, as well as those of our allies and
partners.
Question. You have spoken in the past about how our trading
partners must live up to their commitments, especially as it pertains
to workers' rights. Currently, in the Xinjiang region of China, Uyghurs
are currently being forced to produce products in atrocious conditions.
How do you recommend we deal with this situation and how should we hold
China accountable?
Answer. The PRC is engaged in human rights violations and abuses in
Xinjiang, including forced labor, that shock the conscience and must be
met with serious consequences. The United States has used several tools
to confront the PRC's use of forced labor, including sanctions and
Withhold Release Orders to prevent products made with forced labor from
entering the United States. If confirmed, I will work with our
interagency partners to use all appropriate levers available to us as
we seek to eliminate all forms of human trafficking. In addition, I
will work with allies and partners to promote accountability and call
on Beijing to respect the human rights of Uyghurs and all other
religious and ethnic minorities across China.
Question. The State Department, in concert with the Treasury
Department and USAID, works to negotiate and executive conservation
agreements under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) program.
If you are confirmed to be Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy,
and the Environment, will you commit to prioritizing additional TFCA
deals using the funding that Congress has provided?
Answer. If confirmed I would welcome new TFCA deals and would
actively seek such, including for coral reefs.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator John Barrasso
Question. If confirmed, what role would you have in formulating
U.S. policy at the multilateral development banks?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead three bureaus at the Department
of State that play an important role in formulating the agency's views
on projects and policies at the multilateral development banks,
including the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, which
coordinates that process. In support of the Department of Treasury's
role as the U.S. Government lead on multilateral development banks
issues, the Department of State provides advice, expertise, insights,
and recommendations that contribute to our Government's oversight of
those institutions.
Question. How are the authorities divided up between the State
Department and the U.S. Department of Treasury when it comes to
international financial institutions?
Answer. The Department of the Treasury is the lead agency for U.S.
engagement with the international financial institutions. The
Department of State provides advice, expertise, insights, and
recommendations in support of the Department of the Treasury's role.
Question. How does ending financing of fossil fuel projects at
multilateral development banks help alleviate poverty and promote
development?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support multilateral development
banks' (MDBs) continued focus on energy policies that increase energy
access, accelerate development, and reduce poverty. I will encourage
MDBs to recognize and address the linkages between climate change and
poverty, food insecurity and migration. The lack of recurring fuel
costs for many clean energy systems allows countries to spend funds on
development priorities rather than on the unpredictable costs of fuel.
Question. What role will you play in the administration's U.S.
international climate finance plan?
Answer. The U.S. International Climate Finance Plan (``Plan'')
outlines how U.S. agencies will work with each other, the private
sector, and other partners to most strategically mobilize investment
for energy transformation and climate adaptation. The Plan recognizes
the importance of suitable investment climates, leveraging private
capital, and positioning the United States to seize the economic
opportunity of a low-emissions future by promoting U.S. exports and
private investment into low-carbon and climate-resilient technologies
and services, which can be a catalyst for job growth here at home. If
confirmed, I would leverage the resources of the Department to advance
these objectives.
Question. What specific steps will you take to help U.S. businesses
increase exports of American energy resources, including coal, oil, and
natural gas?
Answer. America's energy resource abundance and exports have helped
stabilize global markets, increased energy access and, in some cases,
reduced energy costs, spurring economic growth and prosperity. If
confirmed, I will work within my role at the State Department to help
ensure that U.S. energy exporters are treated fairly in foreign
markets. I also look forward, if confirmed, to further expanding the
scope of U.S. solutions and U.S. businesses that can be supported
through our diplomatic efforts as we embrace a diverse array of energy
technologies, such as carbon capture, that can assist countries with
their decarbonization goals, energy security, and development
priorities.
Question. How will you ensure the State Department is helping
developing countries with all types of energy projects, including oil,
gas, and coal?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with developing countries to
optimize technologies according to nationally integrated resource
plans, which will cost-effectively meet clean energy deployment and
energy access goals, while also driving economic growth. As developing
countries navigate the transition to a clean energy economy and build a
climate-resilient future, finance will play a crucial role. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's climate finance plan to
promote the flow of capital toward climate-aligned investments and to
assist developing countries' implementation of emissions reduction
measures.
Question. With billions of people without power, do you believe the
United States should be promoting fossil fuels that are affordable and
reliable, such as coal and natural gas, while supporting new
technologies that reduce their carbon output?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support a foreign energy policy that
advances energy access and energy security alongside decarbonization
goals. While renewable energy and energy storage are increasingly the
cheapest, most effective way of promoting energy access, carbon capture
and storage technologies, if commercialized, could abate or decarbonize
power generated by existing fossil-fuel infrastructure. If confirmed, I
will work within the Department and with other agencies to coordinate
efforts to support countries to meet their climate, energy access, and
energy security needs in ways that further our climate and energy
goals.
Question. Instead of regulating and placing impossible restrictions
on the undeveloped energy sectors of the developing nations, we should
be encouraging growth so that these countries can compete in the
international marketplace, create jobs, and alleviate poverty. Do you
agree?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to encouraging growth in
developing nations and creating jobs and alleviating poverty. I
understand that the Biden-Harris administration seeks to support
developing nations' energy sectors to achieve this goal, while also
comprehensively addressing multiple diplomatic goals, including climate
change. Often, energy resources with the lowest costs--which can also
offer health and environmental benefits--cannot compete due to barriers
in existing regulatory and market structures, as well as country risk
factors. If confirmed, I hope we can work together to ensure
multilateral development banks support investments to increase access
to affordable and reliable energy for development and support cleaner
energy to support our climate change efforts.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Ted Cruz
State Department
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in notifications
provided by the State Department to Congress? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. What are your goals for your bureau, if confirmed?
Answer. During my confirmation hearings I listed five priorities
for the ``E'' family, which I would like to summarize here:
Support the administration's efforts to end COVID-19 globally, in a
manner that reinforces America's global leadership, strengthens
our alliances, and counteracts Russian and Chinese ``vaccine
diplomacy.''
Promote environmental and energy policies that tackle climate
change, and ensure that our companies and workers lead the
world in the clean energy revolution.
Insist on free, fair and reciprocal trade rules that our trade
partners--both allies and adversaries--must adhere to, and that
enable U.S. companies and workers to compete on a level playing
field. Based on my experiences in the private sector, I am
convinced that U.S. businesses and workers can thrive in the
global marketplace if given fair shot.
Help create alliances to maintain U.S. leadership in the
technologies of the future. This includes confronting efforts
to undermine American innovation, impose biased norms and
standards and appropriate our intellectual property.
Expand the international footprint of our workers and companies by
providing information about opportunities abroad and
facilitating U.S. participation in international projects. In
particular, meeting the developing world's infrastructure needs
should be a strategic imperative for the United States and a
business opportunity for our companies.
Question. Please assess the degree to which China uses child labor
for producing critical minerals, and manufacturing products that
include critical minerals.
Answer. I understand that the U. S. Government is conducting a
review of the critical minerals supply chain in accordance with
Executive Order 14017 (America's Supply Chains). I understand that the
State Department has found that PRC authorities are increasingly
placing the young children of interned Muslims in Xinjiang in state-run
boarding schools, orphanages, and ``child welfare guidance centers.''
Reportedly, older children among these groups are placed in vocational
schools, where some may be victims of forced labor. If confirmed, I am
committed to helping end the forced labor of children in all sectors,
including those involving critical minerals.
Question. Please assess the degree to which China uses slave labor
for producing critical minerals, and manufacturing products that
include critical minerals.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to do everything in my authority to
help end State-sponsored forced labor, which is increasingly prevalent
in China. In 2013, the National People's Congress ratified a decision
to abolish ``re-education through labor'' (RTL), a punitive system that
subjected individuals to extra-judicial detention involving forced
labor, from which the Government reportedly profited. I understand that
the Government closed most RTL facilities by October 2015; however, the
Government reportedly converted some RTL facilities into state-
sponsored drug rehabilitation facilities or administrative detention
centers where, according to civil society and media reports, forced
labor continues.
Question. Please assess the degree to which supply chains for
critical minerals, and products made with critical minerals, run
through the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
Answer. State-sponsored forced labor is intensifying under the PRC
Government's mass detention and political indoctrination campaign
against predominantly Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (Xinjiang). Authorities have detained more than one
million members of ethnic and religious minority groups, including
Uyghurs, Hui, ethnic Kazakhs, and ethnic Kyrgyz, in as many as 1,200
``vocational training centers.'' If confirmed, I am committed to
eliminating forced labor from critical mineral supply chains, including
any that run through Xinjiang.
Question. Over the last several years, the United States has taken
a bipartisan, bicameral, whole-of-government approach to stopping the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Production halted for a year after President
Trump signed into law the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act
(PEESA) and remained halted until after now-President Biden was
elected. According to public reports, the Germans and Russians believe
that the Biden administration will not impose crippling sanctions
mandated by PEESA, as amended--and unfortunately, thus far, they have
proven correct. Can you commit to using your role, if confirmed, to
ensure the imposition of sanctions pursuant to PEESA, as mandated by
Congress?
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
Congress has provided tools that ensure that Europe has a reliable,
diversified energy supply that enhances rather than undermines its
collective security. The Department of State continues to work to bring
an end to the pipeline, which is a threat to European energy security
and a tool of Russian coercion. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department to continue to assess and evaluate evidence available to
determine the applicability of PEESA, as amended.
Question. Please assess the effect that allowing Nord Stream 2 to
come online would have on American national security and European
energy security.
Answer. The administration has made clear its belief that Nord
Stream 2 is a geopolitical, Kremlin malign influence project that
threatens European energy security, including that of Ukraine and
eastern flank NATO Allies and partners, while dividing the continent.
The administration will continue to work with allies and partners,
using the tools at its disposal, to ensure that Europe has a reliable,
diversified energy supply that enhances, rather than undermines, its
collective security.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the
Blue Dot Network under the Biden administration's State Department?
Answer. The Blue Dot Network seeks to promote the development of
quality, sustainable infrastructure around the world by certifying
projects that uphold global infrastructure principles. I understand the
State Department and the interagency continue to work with our
Australian and Japanese partners to develop the technical details of
the initiative, including a methodology and metrics for certifying
quality infrastructure projects in the developing world.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to advancing and fully
implementing the Blue Dot Network?
Answer. If confirmed, I fully intend to advance and implement the
Blue Dot Network initiative to certify quality infrastructure projects
in the developing world. As the global economy recovers from the
pandemic, infrastructure financing will play a central role in creating
an economic recovery that is sustainable and long-lasting. Rigorous
standards will ensure that infrastructure investment in developing
countries serves the best interests of their citizens and are
consistent with their economic, climate, environmental, and social
goals.
Question. Do you plan to replicate the model created by the Clean
Network Initiative across other tech sectors, infrastructure, and
energy?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration views emerging
technologies, infrastructure, and energy as critical to America's
future national security and economic prosperity. If confirmed, I will
support Department efforts to work with allies and partners to create
an international environment that is competitive and open to innovation
by American technology, infrastructure, and energy providers.
Question. What is your understanding of the Indo-Pacific Business
Forum and what it accomplished when it was held in November 2019?
Answer. The 2019 Indo-Pacific Business Forum (IPBF) underscored the
U.S. commitment to broad-based economic and commercial engagement in
the Indo-Pacific. The IPBF is the premier conference where business
leaders and government policy makers meet to discuss economic issues in
the Indo-Pacific region. At the 2019 Forum, over 1,000 U.S. and Indo-
Pacific business and government leaders discussed investment
opportunities and new policy initiatives in infrastructure, energy,
digital, and healthcare. Building on this success, in 2020 the United
States organized an IPBF which attracted record attendance with 2,900
participants--including three U.S. cabinet secretaries--and over $10
billion in deal signings and announcements.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you plan to continue and improve
the Indo-Pacific Business Forum that the Biden administration
inherited?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work with U.S. Government
economic agencies to continue and improve upon the Indo-Pacific
Business Forum (IPBF). The event draws together business leaders,
policymakers, and media from across the Indo-Pacific and serves as a
venue to highlight U.S. economic policy developments, sign commitments
for new investments, and build relationships between the private sector
and governments. As with the 2020 forum, I understand that the 2021
forum will likely be a hybrid in-person and online event for maximum
flexibility and engagement, and to help American businesses bring key
commercial transactions to closure.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to consulting with
Congress on ways to make progress in the Indo-Pacific with respect to
sectors such as energy, tech, and infrastructure?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to open and robust
communication with Congress, including through consultations on energy,
technology, and infrastructure issues in the Indo-Pacific. Central to
our efforts, the United States will promote private-sector alternatives
in these areas. I intend to focus on partnerships that strengthen local
capacity and promote entrepreneurship, transparency, good governance,
fair practices, and internationally recognized environmental, social,
and labor standards.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Young, Cruz,
Rounds, and Hagerty.
Also present: Senator Whitehouse
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Ambassador Nichols, Ambassador Sison, congratulations on
your nominations, and thank you for your willingness to
continue serving our country, as well as your families.
We understand that that is a sacrifice of all of those who
are part of the family and in terms of this continuing service,
so we appreciate that as well.
At this pivotal moment for our foreign policy in the State
Department, I am heartened that President Biden has nominated
individuals to two critical positions.
I believe that your experience and commitment will be
assets to the department and critical to the defense of our
interests and values.
I understand that the Senator from Rhode Island will be
introducing Ambassador Nichols this morning, and that the
Senator from Maryland, a member of this committee, will be
introducing Ambassador Sison.
I do not see Ambassador Whitehouse yet. I know he is very
busy in Judiciary affairs. So he is probably is on his way
here.
So let us recognize the Senator Van Hollen first for an
introduction.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations to both the nominees.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, colleagues, thank you
for the opportunity to introduce to you the president's nominee
to serve as our next Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, Ambassador Michele Sison.
And in this nomination, President Biden has not only
selected a nominee with impeccable credentials, unimpeachable
character, and a deep knowledge of foreign policy, he has also
wisely selected a longtime Marylander.
I had met Ambassador Sison before, but my conversation with
her yesterday makes me even more confident that she has the
knowledge and experience we need at this critical moment in our
history.
President Biden is determined to renew American engagement
around the world and leadership in international organizations
and, if confirmed, I am confident Ambassador Sison will
faithfully help achieve this goal.
Ambassador Sison has had a distinguished career at the
highest levels of the United States Foreign Service. Her
experience spans nearly four decades and six presidents.
She has served as our ambassador four times to different
places: first, to the UAE, then to Lebanon, then to Sri Lanka
and the Maldives, and most recently, to Haiti, a post she was
appointed to in 2018 and a post which brought her full circle
from her first diplomatic position as the human rights officer
at Embassy Port-au-Prince in 1982.
Throughout her 39 years at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy,
she has served in a variety of roles that have taken her across
the world, representing our nation's interests in West Africa,
South Asia, and elsewhere.
She also spent four years as the United States deputy
representative to the United Nations from 2014 to 2018, a
position that makes her ideally prepared for this new post.
She also has a long track record of collaborating with U.N.
peacekeepers and has gained a firsthand knowledge of the U.N.
entities responsible for development, humanitarian relief, and
human rights in the field.
Her superb talents have been recognized by our country many
times. She is decorated with numerous awards for her service,
including Superior Honor awards, the ambassadorial level awards
for her contributions to counter proliferation and combating
trafficking in persons, and she has received both a
Distinguished Service Award and the Presidential Rank Award of
meritorious service.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I could go on, but
it would consume the entire hearing. So let me end with this. I
grew up in a Foreign Service family and lived in some of the
countries where Ambassador Sison has served.
I know a good diplomat when I see one, and Ambassador Sison
fits the bill. She exemplifies the very best of what it means
to serve our country as a career Foreign Service officer.
I urge the committee to support her nomination.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
And after that sterling recommendation, Ambassador, maybe
you should just rest your case. But we are not going to let you
off that easy.
In any event, thank you, Senator Van Hollen. I understand
that Senator Whitehouse is with us virtually.
Senator Whitehouse. I am, Chairman.
The Chairman. Please proceed. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, and thank
you, Ranking Member Risch, for welcoming me to your committee
today.
Like Senator Van Hollen, I come from a Foreign Service
family. I am the black sheep in a family of--my grandfather,
father, uncle, and cousin who were all Foreign Service
officers.
So it gives me particular pleasure to be here to recommend
a career Foreign Service officer and a native Rhode Islander,
Brian Nichols, as the nominee for Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs.
My father served for decades, not exactly on the champagne
circuit but in countries embroiled in conflict and upheaval,
where the comforts and security of America often felt very far
away. But he always felt he was doing rewarding and deeply
important work.
Brian Nichols has had a similar career serving in
challenging State Department roles in South and Central
America, Southeast Asia, and Africa.
He has won department honors for his contributions to
State's trade development mission and helped lead the
department's international narcotics and law enforcement work.
He has been our United States ambassador to both Peru and
Zimbabwe, a country emerging from decades of dictatorial rule
and dire economic hardship. So he knows the ropes and he has
skills developed in our small, tight knit, and diverse state.
Rhode Islanders have, I think, an unusual ability to reach
beyond seeming difference and even simmering enmity to find
shared values and common humanity, and Ambassador Nichols is a
shining example of that skill.
Building consensus is as simple, he says, as understanding
people, a very Rhode Island quality, a very diplomatic quality,
and one which Ambassador Nichols has demonstrated throughout
his distinguished career.
I am confident that if we confirm his nomination, he will
serve all Americans well and make us proud.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse, for your
introduction of Ambassador Nichols.
Ambassador Nichols, your nomination comes at a time when
the Western Hemisphere is reeling under a cascade of
challenges: the devastation wrought by COVID-19, the fraying of
democratic consensus, major migration crises, and a void a four
years of American absence that China is seeking to fill. The
task at hand is immense.
With death rates among the highest in the world, COVID-19
is inflicting a terrible toll on the hemisphere, and the United
States has to step up. As we accumulate surplus vaccines, we
must prioritize vaccine access for countries in the hemisphere
as part of our global efforts to ensure that the most
vulnerable are vaccinated.
And as the region's economic health has a direct impact on
the United States, we have to take bold steps to facilitate its
recovery. That is why this committee voted to authorize a
capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank last
month.
Additionally, Latin America is facing the recurrence of
flawed elections, deterioration of the separation of powers,
attacks on journalists and freedom of the press, and entrenched
autocrats in Havana, Caracas, and Managua.
Indeed, we know where democratic decay can lead. After two
decades, Venezuela is now a land of unbridled criminality and
kleptocracy, where a humanitarian crisis has forced more than 5
million people to flee their homeland.
While the scale is distinct, we also know that irregular
migration from Central America is rooted in decades of low
levels of democratic governance.
Deficit, or I should say, deficient institutions are unable
to meet the needs of the people and too many leaders have
exploited weak rule of law to place their personal interests
over those of their citizens.
Given the scale of the challenge, I am pleased to see that
Vice President Harris is heading the administration's
diplomatic efforts in Central America.
Under her leadership, we are already seeing an increased
humanitarian response and a strong reaction to leaders that
seek to undermine democracy.
So, Ambassador Nichols, I look forward to discussing with
you. I appreciate our visit yesterday. We had a whole tour de
force of the Western Hemisphere, and we look forward to
discussing with you how we will address some of these
challenges and best to collaborate to ensure your success.
Ambassador Sison--I am sorry, Sison. I do not know why I
am--it is in my mind. But, Ambassador Sison, I apologize.
Welcome to your sixth Senate confirmation hearing. It is
deeply reassuring that President Biden nominated you, a
diplomat with extensive experience, immense skill, and a
demonstrated management record to be the next Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
Over the course of the Trump administration, we witnessed a
dramatic and troubling erosion of U.S. government leadership at
the U.N. We tried to pull out of the World Health Organization
in the middle of a pandemic.
We undermined international protections for women, girls,
and LGBTI individuals, and we defunded or reduced funding to
key agencies. We refused to pay our dues in full to U.N.
peacekeeping operations and, as a result, the United States has
accrued $1.1 billion in arrears.
When we shun our responsibilities and fail to lead, other
countries take note and seek to take advantage, to the
detriment of our interests and security.
China and Russia have sought to fill the vacuum left by our
absence. It is time for renewal and engagement with the United
Nations and its agencies, like the World Food Programme and
UNFPA.
In the wake of the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, we must
redouble the Biden administration's effort at restoring U.S.
leadership at the WHO and other international health and
humanitarian organizations.
The world will be closely watching how we more effectively
engage within and work to strengthen international
organizations.
So I look forward to hearing your views and working with
you to ensure we restore our critical leadership role.
In closing, at a time of unprecedented challenges around
the world, America needs outstanding leadership at the State
Department. We look forward to your testimony.
And now I am going to return to the distinguished ranking
member for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both
of you for your willingness to serve. Certainly, outstanding
credentials. It is not often we see a panel like this with the
depth of experience that the two of you have.
I want to start at where the chairman started and that is
on the issues in the Western Hemisphere. I am increasingly
concerned that while a majority of nations in our hemisphere
are considered democracies, authoritarian regimes in Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and Cuba have systematically dismantled democratic
institutions and have committed some of the world's worst human
rights abuses.
These bad actors undermine their own countries, but they
also undermine their neighbors. Transnational criminal
organizations and malign state actors benefit from and
contribute to these authoritarian regimes and pose a
significant threat to the peace and stability of our
hemisphere.
More broadly, I remain exceedingly concerned about the
malign influence of China and Russia throughout our hemisphere
and the apparent increase of that.
China's predatory lending practices and spread of
corruption threaten the sovereignty and the privacy of our
southern neighbors.
At the same time, Russia has exported repressive tactics to
allow authoritarian regimes to maintain control and crackdown
on dissent.
Beyond external malign influence, poor governance,
violence, and lack of economic opportunity in countries like El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have prompted waves of
illegal migrants to show up at our southern door.
The previous administration negotiated a number of
agreements with these countries, and the current
administration's failure to capitalize on those agreements has
only fueled a surge of migrants over the past few months, along
with other precipitating factors, and demonstrates a
significant challenge to our government's ability to protect
our homeland.
Lastly, as you know, Ambassador Nichols, the Columbia River
Treaty between the United States and Canada is a great example
of two nations managing a shared resource. I want to impress
upon you the importance of a successful and timely conclusion
to these negotiations for the entire North West congressional
delegation.
As you know, a number of us on a bipartisan basis have been
working diligently with the department to move the negotiations
forward. We stand ready to continue to assist the
administration however we can in this effort.
I look forward to hearing your thoughts on all of these
important matters. Next, we have the nomination for Secretary
of State for International Organization Affairs. This position
oversees a wide range of multilateral organizations, the
largest being the United Nations. The United States remains the
biggest donor to the U.N. in both assessed and voluntary funds.
While the Chinese Communist Party has increased its
assessed dues, it is still severely lags behind the United
States and our allies in voluntary contributions.
The Chinese Communist Party uses its minimal donations to
leverage a large-scale malign influence campaign to reform
global governance, as they call it, such that the international
system is more conducive to its own interests.
As detailed in my report last fall on transatlantic
cooperation on China, the Chinese Communist Party does so in
part by inserting favorable language into U.N. resolutions,
orchestrating the election of its top diplomats at U.N.
agencies, and using its veto power as a member of the U.N.
Security Council to block efforts to expose human rights
violations.
This fall, the United States will have an opportunity to
negotiate the scales of assessment of U.N. peacekeeping to be
consistent with U.S. law. Currently, the United Nations
assesses the United States at 27.9 percent.
As you know, this is not congruent with U.S. law. No
country should pay more than 25 percent, and in 1994, the
Congress of the United States enacted a bill that imposed 25
percent on U.S. contributions for this program. That law
remains in effect today.
This mandate should be upheld during the upcoming
negotiations. I will remind the administration that this is
U.S. law and it must be used in the negotiating position.
I also remain concerned, really concerned, by the
administration's recent decision to resume funding to the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees
in the Near East, also known as UNRWA.
This was done without securing, without insisting on,
without even asking for any reforms. Over the years, the agency
has employed individuals affiliated with Hamas, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization.
UNRWA schools have been used to store Hamas weapons and
there have been numerous cases of UNRWA textbooks containing
material that is anti-Semitic. U.S. government assistance to
UNRWA should cease unless true reform, as described above, is
secured.
Finally, I am also concerned about the administration's
decision to seek a seat at the U.N. Human Rights Council,
again, without seeking any reforms.
The Council is a broken body that focuses the majority of
its time on bullying our ally, Israel, and allows some of the
greatest human rights abusers like China, Cuba, Russia, Iran,
and Venezuela a seat at the table.
I know it is a bumper sticker to say, oh, we are always
better off with a seat at the table when issues are being
discussed than not being there. That is not always true,
particularly in this instance, when you are sitting there
rubbing elbows with the worst human rights abusers on the
planet.
Only true reform will bring legitimacy back to that Council
and the administration should work to secure substantial
changes.
With that, I thank both of you for being here today, your
willingness to serve, and recognize the sacrifices of both you
and your families in this effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
We will now turn to the two nominees. We ask you to
summarize your testimony in about five minutes. Your full
statements will be included in the record.
And we will start off with Ambassador Nichols.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN A. NICHOLS OF RHODE ISLAND, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF CAREER MINISTER,
NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (WESTERN
HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS)
Mr. Nichols. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to
appear before you today as the President's nominee to serve as
the next Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs.
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to President Biden, Vice
President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for the confidence that
they have placed in me at this crucial moment in our
hemisphere.
The opportunity to appear before this committee for the
third time as a nominee to serve the American people steels my
resolve to fight for the values that our nation holds dear--
democracy, the rule of law, and the innate dignity of every
individual.
With over 32 years serving our nation at some of our most
challenging missions around the world, if confirmed, I look
forward to bringing all my skills and experience to bear in
that fight.
President Biden has said that democracy holds the key to
freedom, prosperity, peace, and dignity, and if we work
together with our democratic partners with strength and
confidence, we will meet every challenge and outpace every
challenger.
My experience serving in our embassies in North, Central,
and South America, as well as directing our policy towards the
Caribbean, convinces me of the vital urgency of the President's
words.
Our home, the Western Hemisphere, remains central to
America's welfare, our prosperity, and our future. America's
fortunes cannot be separated from those of our closest
neighbors.
If confirmed, I look forward to drawing on the enormous
talent and dedication of the community of professionals within
the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, as well as civil
society throughout the Americas, our own private sector, and,
of course, our Congress to advance America and the region's
progress toward a more democratic, secure, and prosperous
region.
I have spent most of my career within the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs. If confirmed, I will strive to build an
inclusive, compassionate, and diverse team that reflects our
nation's prowess and professionalism.
We will work to expand our engagement and partnerships
throughout the Western Hemisphere, especially with our closest
neighbors, Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean.
The situation in Central America demands our urgent
attention and unflagging efforts to promote democracy,
prosperity, and security, addressing the root causes of
irregular migration.
The disastrous effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate
change, and a recession in many countries have opened the door
to malign influences from outside our region.
We will build upon the shared values, family ties, economic
opportunities, and commitment to fundamental freedoms to
counter those malign actors and deliver a better future for the
people of our region.
My professional achievements owe to the women who surround
me: my wonderful wife, Geri, a retired senior Foreign Service
officer, my talented daughters, Alex and Sophie, and my
brilliant mother, Mildred.
They have pushed me to be a better person, sacrifice for my
career, and nurtured me with their love and support.
In 1959, my late father began our family's adventure in
diplomacy and foreign affairs, serving as a Fulbright Scholar
and then partnering with the U.S. Information Agency on various
projects in Europe, and helping to start the American Studies
Program at the Free University of Berlin.
My own past assignments provide rich experience, should the
Senate confirm me, to serve as Assistant Secretary. During my
tenure as ambassador to Zimbabwe, I have fought tenaciously for
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. I have led my
team in responding to the multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis
in Zimbabwe.
As ambassador to Peru, I led a large mission that focused
on improving the rule of law, fighting transnational crime and
corruption, and promoting respect for human rights,
particularly of women, girls, and disadvantaged groups.
I also led a unified mission initiative to promote American
businesses and grow American jobs, earning the department's
Charles Cobb Award for those efforts.
Prior to that, as the principal deputy assistant secretary
for international narcotics and law enforcement, I helped
direct a team of nearly 7,000 professionals who worked to
expand access to justice, protect civilians, and combat crime
around the world.
I have hands-on experience shaping our rule of law programs
in Mexico and Central America, as well as crafting innovative
justice sector outreach to Afro descendant and indigenous
populations in the Americas.
Should the Senate confirm me, I will aim to exemplify the
highest standards of our great nation and strengthen our
diplomacy. I look forward to partnering with you to advance
America's interests in the Western Hemisphere.
I stand ready to answer any questions you might have now
and in the future. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Brian A. Nichols
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members
of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the
President's nominee to serve as the next Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to
President Biden, Vice President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for the
confidence they have placed in me at this crucial moment in our
Hemisphere.
The opportunity to appear before this committee for the third time
as a nominee to serve the American people steels my resolve to fight
for the values that our nation holds dear: democracy, the rule of law,
and the innate dignity of every individual. With over 32 years serving
our nation at some of our most challenging missions around the world,
if confirmed I look forward to bringing all my skills and experience to
bear in that fight. President Biden has said that ``democracy holds the
key to freedom, prosperity, peace, and dignity. . . . And, if we work
together with our democratic partners, with strength and confidence, we
will meet every challenge and outpace every challenger.'' My experience
serving in our embassies in North, Central, and South America as well
as directing our policy towards the Caribbean convinces me of the vital
urgency of the President's words.
Our home, the Western Hemisphere, remains central to America's
welfare, our prosperity, and our future. America's fortunes cannot be
separated from those of our closest neighbors. If confirmed, I look
forward to drawing on the enormous talent and dedication of the
community of professionals within the Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs, as well as civil society throughout the Americas, our own
private sector, and, of course, our Congress to advance America and the
region's progress toward a more democratic, secure, and prosperous
region.
I have spent most of my career within the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs. If confirmed, I will strive to build an inclusive,
compassionate, and diverse team that reflects our nation's prowess and
professionalism. We will work to expand our engagement and partnerships
throughout the Western Hemisphere--and especially with our closest
neighbors Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. The situation in Central
America demands our urgent attention and unflagging efforts to promote
democracy, prosperity, and security--addressing the root causes of
irregular migration. The disastrous effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,
climate change and a recession in many countries have opened the door
to malign influences from outside our region. We will build on the
shared values, family ties, economic opportunities, and commitment to
fundamental freedoms to counter those malign actors and deliver a
better future for the people of our region.
My professional achievements owe to the women who surround me: my
wonderful wife Geri, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer, my
talented daughters Alex and Sophie, and my brilliant mother Mildred.
They have pushed me to be a better person, sacrificed for my career,
and nurtured me with their love and support. In 1959, my late father
began our family's adventure in diplomacy and foreign affairs, serving
as a Fulbright Scholar, then partnering with the U.S. Information
Agency on various projects in Europe, and helping to start the American
studies program at the Free University of Berlin.
My own past assignments provide rich experience, should the Senate
confirm me to serve as Assistant Secretary. During my tenure as
Ambassador to Zimbabwe, I have fought tenaciously for democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. I have led my team in responding to the
multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe. As Ambassador to
Peru, I led a large mission that focused on improving the rule of law,
fighting transnational crime and corruption, and promoting respect for
human rights, particularly of women, girls, and disadvantaged groups. I
also led a unified mission initiative to promote American businesses
and grow American jobs, earning the Department's Charles Cobb Award for
those efforts.
Prior to that, as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, I helped direct a
team of nearly 7,000 professionals who work to expand access to
justice, protect civilians, and combat crime around the world. I have
hands-on experience shaping our rule of law programs in Mexico and
Central America, as well as crafting innovative justice sector outreach
to Afro-descendant and Indigenous populations in the Americas.
Should the Senate confirm me, I will aim to exemplify the highest
standards of our great nation and strengthen our diplomacy. I look
forward to partnering with you to advance America's interests in the
Western Hemisphere.
I stand ready to answer any questions you might have now and in the
future.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Sison?
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE JEANNE SISON OF MARYLAND, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF CAREER
AMBASSADOR, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
(INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS)
Ms. Sison. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and distinguished members of the committee.
I am honored to appear before you as President Biden's
nominee to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, IO. I am grateful to
President Biden and to Secretary Blinken for this opportunity.
I want to recognize my daughters, Alexandra and Jessica,
who are watching virtually today. Their love has supported me
as I represented our country around the world and at the United
Nations.
Over the past 39 years, I have been privileged to serve
under six U.S. administrations and as ambassador four times
overseas to the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and
Maldives, and Haiti.
Given that experience, as well as service in Togo, Benin,
Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and at the U.S.
mission to the United Nations, I know that the United States
cannot address today's global challenges alone.
From climate change to the COVID-19 pandemic, we must work
in partnership with other nations. President Biden has made it
clear that we will put our core U.S. values at the center of
our foreign policy.
As U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative at the U.N. in New
York, I saw that our nation is stronger when we lead the way in
crafting strategic cross-regional partnerships. These alliances
are key in safeguarding multilateral institutions from those
such as the People's Republic of China that seek to bend the
U.N. system to their authoritarian agendas.
We must actively out compete efforts by nations that stand
in opposition to our U.S. values on human rights, democracy,
labor rights, and transparent economic practices.
If confirmed, this will be at the top of my agenda. It is
important that we uphold the rules-based order that upholds and
promotes our values, advances sustainable development, and
protects human rights.
The United States has a strong stake in leading efforts to
preserve a free and open market, a free and open internet, and
in advancing global governance in areas such as technology,
trade, and climate change.
These rules and values benefit American interests and the
American people. From the World Food Programme to UNICEF to the
International Telecommunication Union, we have a deep stake in
leading the international system, driving forward reforms with
our partners.
We must also ensure that the voices of civil society,
women, ethnic and religious minorities, and other marginalized
communities are heard.
I have seen firsthand how U.N. peacekeepers and
humanitarian workers protect civilians and save lives in places
critical to U.S. national interests.
I have witnessed the positive impact of U.S. leadership
when we insist on results and when we press for accountability,
including accountability related to sexual exploitation and
abuse.
We are the largest contributor to the U.N. system. It is in
our interest to lead in promoting genuine reform. Thus,
ensuring the transparency and integrity of multilateral bodies
is a key priority.
We must promote qualified independent candidates to lead
multilateral institutions and we must leverage the commitments
of other countries to ensure that financial burdens are shared.
We must also fight bias against Israel across the U.N.
system. The IO bureau support strong U.S. leadership at the
U.N. and multilateral venues to advance our U.S. national
interests, protect the American people, promote U.S.
prosperity, and drive the reforms needed to ensure the
effectiveness of international organizations.
As a Foreign Service practitioner, I know that our skilled
diplomats at our missions abroad, our talented negotiators, and
our amazing civil service subject matter experts are our force
multipliers in the multilateral arena and in mobilizing global
action.
If confirmed, prioritizing diversity and inclusion and
building strong morale within the IO bureau will be at the top
of my list, and if confirmed, I also pledge, number one, to
look hard at U.N. and international organization management and
budgeting practices and at how agencies implement ethics rules,
including whistleblower protection; number two, to insist on
effective peacekeeping operations that advance political
solutions, have realistic and achievable mandates, and include
women's participation; number three, to consult with you as we
work together to meet the challenges of today's strategic
competition and as we prove that respect for human rights,
transparency, and democratic norms can and will prevail.
If confirmed, I know that you will be counting on me to
make sure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are well spent and that
our multilateral policies and programs improve the lives of the
world's most vulnerable citizens, contribute to international
peace and security, and serve the American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and I
welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michele J. Sison
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished members of the committee.
I am honored to appear before you as President Biden's nominee to
serve as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs, IO. I am grateful to President Biden and to Secretary Blinken
for this opportunity.
I want to recognize my daughters, Alexandra and Jessica, who are
watching virtually today. Their love has supported me as I represented
our country around the world and at the United Nations.
Over the past 39 years, I've been privileged to serve under six
U.S. administrations and as U.S. Ambassador four times overseas: to the
United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Maldives, and Haiti.
Given this experience--as well as service in Togo, Benin, Cameroon,
Cote d'Ivoire, India, Pakistan, Iraq and at the U.S. Mission to the
U.N.--I know that the United States cannot address today's global
challenges alone.
From climate change to the COVID 19 pandemic, we must work in
partnership with other nations. President Biden has made clear that we
will put our core U.S. values at the center of our foreign policy.
As U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative at the U.N. in New York, I
saw that our nation is stronger when we lead the way in crafting
strategic, cross-regional partnerships. These alliances are key in
safeguarding multilateral institutions from those, such as the People's
Republic of China, that seek to bend the U.N. system to their
authoritarian agendas.
We must actively out-compete efforts by nations that stand in
opposition to U.S. values on human rights, democracy, labor rights, and
transparent economic practices. If confirmed, this will be at the top
of my agenda. It's important that we uphold the rules-based order that
upholds and promotes our values, advances sustainable development, and
protects human rights.
The United States has a strong stake in leading efforts to preserve
a free and open internet, and in advancing global governance in areas
such as technology, trade, and climate change.
These rules and values benefit American interests and the American
people. From the World Food Program, to UNICEF, to the International
Telecommunication Union, we have a deep stake in leading the
international system--driving forward reforms with our partners.
We must also ensure that the voices of civil society, women, ethnic
and religious minorities, and other marginalized communities are heard.
I've seen firsthand how U.N. peacekeepers and humanitarian workers
protect civilians and save lives in places critical to U.S. national
interests.
I've witnessed the positive impact of U.S. leadership when we
insist on results, and when we press for accountability--including
accountability related to sexual exploitation and abuse. We are the
largest contributor to the U.N. system; it is in our interest to lead
in promoting genuine reform.
Thus, ensuring the transparency and integrity of multilateral
bodies is a key priority. We must promote qualified, independent
candidates to lead multilateral institutions, and we must leverage the
commitments of other countries to ensure that financial burdens are
shared.
We must also fight bias against Israel across the U.N. system.
The IO Bureau supports strong U.S. leadership at the U.N. and
multilateral venues to advance our U.S. national interests, protect the
American people, promote U.S. prosperity, and drive the reforms needed
to ensure the effectiveness of international organizations.
As a Foreign Service practitioner, I know that our skilled
diplomats at our missions abroad, our talented negotiators, and our
amazing Civil Service subject matter experts are our force multipliers
in the multilateral arena and in mobilizing global action.
If confirmed, prioritizing diversity and inclusion and building
strong morale within the IO Bureau, will be at the top of my list. And,
if confirmed, I also pledge:
to look hard at U.N. and international organization management and
budgeting practices, and at how agencies implement their ethics
rules, including whistleblower protections;
to insist on effective peacekeeping operations that advance
political solutions, have realistic and achievable mandates,
and include women's participation; and,
to consult with you as we work to meet the challenges of today's
strategic competition--and as we prove that respect for human
rights, transparency, and democratic norms can and will
prevail.
If confirmed, I know you will be counting on me to make sure that
U.S. taxpayer dollars are well-spent, and that our multilateral
policies and programs improve the lives of the world's most vulnerable
citizens, contribute to international peace and security, and serve the
American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I welcome
your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
We will start a series of five-minute rounds and I will
start.
Ambassador Nichols, we had a good tour of the hemisphere
yesterday so I am not going to revisit all of those. But there
is one or two I do want to drill down on.
As Miguel Diaz-Canel assumed the leadership of Cuba's
Communist Party and completed his transition to what I believe
is dictator and chief, the Cuban regime repeatedly has used the
mantra of ``somos continuidad,'' which means ``we are the
continuation,'' to make it clear that they need to maintain a
single-party authoritarian state.
Nevertheless, in a renewed wave of civic activism,
including protest by artists, singers, and others in the San
Isidro movement, a, largely, Afro-Cuban movement, there is a
demanding greater respect for democratic values and an end to
human rights abuses.
So what our policy is, moving forward, is going to be
incredibly important. Let me ask you a couple of questions. Do
you believe that the attacks on our diplomatic personnel, known
as the Havana syndrome, either were conducted by the Cubans or
are known in terms of who conducted them by the Cubans?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just note, by way of entry, that I know that our
Cuba policy is under review within the administration. But let
me offer a few thoughts, and if confirmed, I look forward to
contributing to that process.
Our priority in Cuba, as the rest of the hemisphere, needs
to be democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Countries
should not be grandfathered because they have failed to respect
those tenets.
The new First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba does
not appear to me to be significantly different from his
predecessors. But time will tell on that point.
With regard to the Havana syndrome--my knowledge of the
process of looking into that is limited, but I certainly
believe that, given the amount of control that the Communist
Party has in Cuba, there are more things that they can tell us
about what was going on at that time.
And I think that the process that the Secretary has
designated, led by Ambassador Pamela Spratlen and the Health
Incident Response Team, working with our interagency partners,
is an important opportunity to get to the bottom of these
incidents, and if confirmed, I commit to contributing to that
process.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that.
It is impossible, if you understand Cuba's state-controlled
system and its security apparatus to believe that anything can
happen in the island without some knowledge of the Cuban
regime, which they, certainly, have not shared with us, and now
we find these attacks proliferating in other parts of the
world.
Do you believe that the practice of the Cuban regime of
taking 20 percent of remittances to Cuban families, then
converting the balance of the remittance to Cuban pesos that
are worth a fraction of what Americans send to their families,
that can only be used at state-owned stores is an acceptable
practice?
Mr. Nichols. Again, the Cuba policy is under review. But I
do believe that those who are most responsible for abuses of
human rights and democracy in Cuba should not benefit from
remittances going to the Cuban people.
Our priority needs to be what is best for the Cuban people
and focus our efforts on supporting them, and I believe that
the best ambassadors for doing that are the American people
and, particularly, the Diaspora here.
The Chairman. Well, let me hone in on my question because I
have a limited time.
I appreciate all of that but here is the point. If we want
to help the Cuban people, taking 20 percent off of the $100 I
send to my aunt, converting the other $80 of U.S. dollars into
pesos, which is worth a fraction, and then being able, largely,
to only buy at a government store, which is jacked up in
prices, is not helping the Cuban people.
It is, certainly, helping the regime. So I am for sending
my remittances to my aunt, but I want her to get the
remittances I send.
Let me ask you this. Do you believe that sending, as the
regime does, Cuban doctors abroad, then taking away their
passports and getting paid for their services without fully
paying the doctors is human trafficking?
Mr. Nichols. I believe that their labor rights are being
violated in large measure, and I think it has many
characteristics of human trafficking, yes.
The Chairman. And do you believe that the militarization of
the Cuban economy, whereas Raul Castro's son and son-in-law,
high-ranking officers of the Cuban military, is an acceptable
practice for U.S. businesses to engage with?
Mr. Nichols. I think that we should be working to promote
diversity in the economy in Cuba and focusing our efforts on
what is best for the Cuban people.
The roles of senior officials and family members in the
economy goes in the opposite direction and, if confirmed, I
look forward to contributing to the department's review of our
policies within the interagency.
The Chairman. Yeah. Well, let me just say that, and I will
end on this note, so an American business wants to do business
in Cuba or they want to do, you know, tourism or they want to
sell agricultural products.
They either have to go to Raul's son or son-in-law, both
high-ranking officials of the Cuban military who control the
two, quote/unquote, ``companies'' that are run by the regime.
You become a partner with the state, in essence, a partner
with those who oppress its people, and your partner is high-
ranking officials of the Cuban military.
I do not know if we, for example, would accept that in
China. I do not know if we would accept it elsewhere. And it
is, certainly, not a help to the Cuban people.
So I look forward to continuing that conversation.
Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Nichols, I want to talk about a parochial issue.
That is the Columbia River Treaty. How engaged have you been on
that issue or have you been, prior to coming on board here?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you. I have received a briefing on the
treaty from our negotiators and legal team. I have not
participated in the deliberations with regard to the
negotiation.
Senator Risch. Okay, thank you.
I hope you will familiarize yourself with this. I can tell
you, this is not a partisan issue. Indeed, we have been--we--
when I say we I am talking about the Senators, particularly
from the Northwest, have been working with the negotiating team
from the State Department, and we found them really good to
work with.
They are working on an issue that is incredibly complex and
incredibly difficult with a friend and neighbor but with whom
we have, obviously, competing interests as we try to complete
the negotiations.
I have trouble with some of my colleagues here whose last
brush with the Columbia River was when they took geography in
either grammar school or high school.
So they are learning how important the Columbia River is to
those of us that have water that flows into the Columbia and
the effects that it has upstream on us.
So, first of all, I do want to tell you, you have got a
good team in place. We intend to continue to work with them,
and it is bipartisan and I hope that we will continue down that
road, and I look forward to your help in that regard.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, and I look forward to
working with you on that, if confirmed.
The Columbia River and its basin have important
implications for hydroelectric power, green energy, the
environment and, obviously, flood control and the economy of
the western part of our nation.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Sison, I want to underscore to you the
disappointment a lot of us had when the administration jumped
right back into UNRWA.
What UNRWA has done over the years is very disheartening
and it is impossible to explain to the United States taxpayers,
particularly my constituents, how the funds that--U.S. taxpayer
dollars that flowed into UNRWA could be used to print textbooks
that I have no doubt you have seen that have anti-Semitic
materials in them--and this is paid for by U.S. dollars--and
also the other things that UNRWA has done, allowing their
facilities to be used for military facilities and that sort of
thing.
Again, we want to participate always in these things. But
when they are doing stuff like that, it becomes very difficult,
and particularly when the funds have now been freed up for
UNRWA to get those funds again, and we are a huge contributor
to that operation.
What are your thoughts on that?
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and thank you for that
question.
The issue of transparency, accountability, and oversight
with regard to the U.N. Relief Works Agency, UNRWA, and across
the U.N. system would be a key priority, if confirmed.
On UNRWA specifically, it is absolutely critical that we
insist on neutrality, and that goes for the staff of UNRWA, the
policies, the programs, the educational materials, that you
have mentioned.
If confirmed, I will be insisting on these red lines of
complete neutrality, no educational materials, whether it is
textbook or online educational resources that contain
references to anti-Semitism, incitement.
These are important issues and, if confirmed, I would be
working with U.N. counterparts and others in the IO bureau and
across our State Department to insist that these red lines are
not crossed and that internal controls are maintained.
Thank you.
Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that, and I appreciate
your commitment and your thoughts in that regard. It always
amazes me when something like this happens where the funds were
freed up without a commitment.
I mean, if they will not make the commitment before they
get the money, how in the world can you possibly think they
will make the commitment after they get the money?
So it amazes me how we transfer funds like this without
getting anything back for it.
And my time is up and I thank you for that commitment.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
I understand Senator Cardin is with us virtually.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want
to thank both of our distinguished nominees for their service
to our country.
Ambassador Sison, I am proud that you are a Marylander. I
heard Senator Van Hollen's introductions. We are very proud of
your career service, diplomatic service, to our country.
It is, clearly, going to be challenged as we reassert
America's diplomacy globally in the work that we do with our
international organizations.
So I look forward to working with you.
Ambassador Nichols, I, again, thank you for your career of
public service. Both of you have served our nation with
distinction and honor, and I join the chairman in thanking you
and your families for your willingness to continue in public
service.
Ambassador Nichols, you and I had a chance to talk. I just
want to underscore a few of the points.
One area that affects both of the individuals that are
before us is the U.S. role in the OAS. I mention that because
Senator Wicker and I had introduced legislation that became law
for a parliamentary dimension within the Organization of
American States.
And I point that out, the more that we can get legislators
working with our diplomats, particularly in international
organizations or regional organizations, I think the more
effective it will be.
So I look forward to a stronger parliamentary arm within
the OAS. We have a very strong parliamentary arm within OSCE. I
think we could improve our representation at the United
Nations.
We have two of our members who are designated to represent
the Senate. I think working with each other we can strengthen
unity in U.S. foreign policy goals.
Ambassador Nichols, I want to ask you about a subject that
we talked about at some length and that is making anti-
corruption a key part of our policy in our hemisphere. We have
seen an erosion of good governance.
We knew that in Northern and Central America. We see
significant challenges as countries have gone back on their
commitment for their anti-corruption institutions.
We see this in so many countries, of course, and Cuba is a
country that the chairman has mentioned frequently is a corrupt
country, Venezuela, et cetera.
We have legislation that you and I have talked about that
passed our Senate last Congress that we are going to try to get
to the finish line this time that will fine tune the missions--
each of our missions in each of our countries on anti-
corruption.
I want to just get your comments as to how high a priority
this will be when you are confirmed.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator.
Fighting corruption is vital to our efforts to strengthen
democracy in our hemisphere and around the world. I want to
thank you and the other members of this body for the tools that
you have given us.
I believe that we should robustly use our Treasury OFAC
sanctions, our 7031(c) sanctions, and the full range of tools
available to deal with those who would steal from the public
purse, deprive the peoples of the region of their resources and
their wealth.
And given my experience in my current assignment and
previously in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement, I look forward to deploying those tools robustly
in support of democracy around the region.
I would also like to note that I fully concur that the
Article One branch of government and its engagement around the
hemisphere with other legislatures will be an important tool in
supporting democracy.
Senator Cardin. Let me raise one more issue with you, if I
might, and that is the Caribbean states. For too long we have
not given them the attention that they need. We have not done
well with their voting at the United Nations or at OAS, for
that matter, and there are many Caribbean states. It does not
take too much attention or resources to strengthen our ties.
What strategy do you have in order to increase our
partnership with the Caribbean states?
Mr. Nichols. If confirmed, I look forward to building on
our shared values with the Caribbean and their commitment to
democracy and the rule of law.
I believe that our engagement with the Caribbean region
needs to include a robust presence and, if confirmed, I look
forward to advocating for that.
We need to leverage our development tools around the
region, work with our multilateral partners, and international
financial institutions to get them the resources that they
need, and to make sure that we are attending to those issues
that hold them back in their development.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Sison, I would just underscore the
point that we could do much better in getting support at the
United Nations if our missions recognized how important those
votes are to United States foreign policy.
We have got to connect the dots in more capitals around the
world so that we have stronger support at the United Nations,
and letting us know in Congress where we can be helpful and
getting those types of relationships that can help us advance
our foreign policy.
I hope you have a strategy to help us do that.
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and, indeed, the
necessity of building broad cross-regional alliances and
partnerships is critical across the U.N. and multilateral
venues, whether we are talking about New York or Geneva,
really, across the multilateral space.
And I do appreciate the offer that I just heard for the IO
Bureau and, if confirmed, I will take you up on this. I think
that so many of the members of this committee have built deep
relationships with leaders across the world and, if confirmed,
I would hope that I would be able to turn to you and ask for
some help but with enough advance notice and placing a call or
two when and if needed.
Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I look forward to working with
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young, I understand, is with us virtually.
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. I am not sure my
picture is appearing. Can I be heard?
The Chairman. You are certainly heard but not seen.
Senator Young. Okay. Well, I will just go ahead and dive
in.
So building on Senator Cardin's questions pertaining to the
Caribbean Basin, as you know, Mr. Nichols, the Senate is
considering a far-reaching China package, which includes
American policies towards the Western Hemisphere, which, if
confirmed, you will be tasked with overseeing.
One of your first responsibilities would be managing the
creation of a strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness,
good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
I want to know what policies you believe have worked in the
past in these areas and how we might better work to improve
some of these policies across the region to reduce our
neighbors' vulnerability to Chinese influence.
And, you know, you might include specifically how the
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative could be utilized to push
back on Chinese infrastructure developments.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
I think that we have a robust menu of policies and options
that I would seek to leverage, if confirmed. We need to work
across the board in institution strengthening, using our Agency
for International Development for political party
strengthening, for grass roots policy support at the human
level.
I think we've got to take advantage of our international
financial institution partners and make sure that they are
helping to advance democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
in the region, particularly the Inter-American Development Bank
as a tool within our own region.
The Organization of American States is similarly an
important tool that, within its Charter, it is committed to
those tenets of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
that we hold dear.
Working throughout the region, as I have, justice sector
support has been crucial and, I think, very successful in many
countries around the region, and providing units and
organizations that respect human rights and the rule of law
that support democracy and the extent to which we can build
upon those resources will be important.
I think CBSI has been an important tool throughout the
region. In terms of the future and the way forward, we need to
look to leverage that asset in building institutions, making
trade, communication, service sector improvements.
Senator Young. Okay. All right.
I am sorry to interject. Our time is just somewhat limited,
understandably, in this format. So, my apologies, sir, I am
going to move on because I have some other things I would like
to turn to.
I just returned from our southern border with Mexico. I
spent all day Friday down there in the Yuma, Arizona, area,
where I actually spent some time years ago as a United States
Marine, participating in counter trafficking operations and
monitoring some of the activities there, working with other
agencies.
The challenges continue. In fact, I think it is fair to say
we are hearing this, Republicans and Democrats alike, that we
have an ongoing crisis at the southern border, and that crisis
has underscored the importance of identifying the root cause of
unchecked immigration from the Northern Triangle region.
Despite $3.6 billion in U.S. aid over the 2016 to 2021
fiscal years, immigration policy from the new administration
has still resulted in a staggering number of migrants fleeing
these countries.
And I suppose we do not need to really fixate on the
massive uptick we have seen in the last couple of months.
Everyone is aware of it.
Despite billions of dollars in U.S. aid to these
economically distressed countries, why have we seen a recent
surge in immigration when it was, largely, controlled for the
past several years?
Mr. Nichols?
Mr. Nichols. I think there are a variety of reasons but I
point to a couple that are driving the uptick. One is a loss of
economic opportunities driven by climate disasters and climate
change in the region, corruption, violence, rule of law, a lack
of hope, and we need to work to address the root causes of
those challenges urgently.
I will keep my answer brief, but happy to go into it
further, if you would like, sir.
Senator Young. Well, thank you for your time. I would also
add the message from the White House has not been particularly
helpful. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for your past service to
this country and for your willingness to be considered for
these important posts at this critical time.
Ambassador Nichols, I want to begin with you. As we heard
from Senator Young, so much of the focus on America's borders
has been on the southern border between the United States and
Mexico.
But I want to ask about our northern border with Canada,
because for states like New Hampshire that border Canada, the
border closures have been very disruptive both for businesses
that go back and forth across the border to do business, but
also for many of our residents who have relatives in Canada and
have been limited in their travel.
Now, I understand that these were done because of the
pandemic. But we are coming up on an end to the most recent
extension of that border closure in May, and I wondered if you
have any sense of what will happen on May 21st when the current
restrictions expire and whether we need to keep this border
closed or how soon we might be able to safely reopen it.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
I am not yet confirmed. I have not been privy to the
deliberations on that topic. I know that the HHS and Homeland
Security are looking at this issue carefully.
I believe that the decision will be driven by the best
science available. We are making important progress in our own
country against the pandemic, and I hope that we'll be able to
see progress with regard to the border soon.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. Do I have your commitment
that, once confirmed, that you will look at this issue closely
and urge an examination that recognizes the challenges that are
faced by that border closure?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Sison, I still have fond memories of my visit to
Lebanon during your tenure there as ambassador. Sadly, things
have significantly declined in Lebanon since that time, and I
know that you are very familiar with UNIFIL's mission in
Lebanon, how important it has been to the country and to its
relations with its neighbors.
If confirmed, how will you approach the mandate renewal in
August and how can the U.S. be a moderator between the Lebanese
Armed Forces, UNIFIL, and Lebanon's neighbors?
Ms. Sison. Good to see you again, Senator, and good
morning.
As with all peacekeeping missions, we want to make sure
that at the time of mandate renewal and discussion at the U.N.
Security Council that we are looking at realistic and
achievable mandates, that we are looking at mandates that
include women in peacekeeping as both military and police
peacekeepers, that when possible that this mandate promotes the
political solution, and that we look at the reforms in terms of
effectiveness, efficiency, to deliver on that mandate, and, of
course, the mandates need to be well resourced as well to be
effective.
UNIFIL has played a stabilizing role in southern Lebanon,
and we are seeing this at the present time as well. If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to consult with you,
Senator, and other members of this committee on how we can make
peacekeeping the most effective and efficient investment and
that the peacekeepers are resourced to perform their mandates
effectively.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. One of the most pressing issues
facing the Security Council at the U.N. is the need to maintain
humanitarian aid in Syria.
How can you and the State Department and those of us in
Congress support Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield's efforts to push
back against Russia's obstructionism in allowing that
humanitarian aid to those who need it?
Ms. Sison. Senator, I absolutely agree with you on the
urgency of keeping humanitarian delivery, these corridors open.
The reauthorization of Bab al-Hawa for another 12 months is
completely a priority and, if confirmed, would be looking to
push on the other two cross-border points that are not
currently authorized to be used.
The suffering that we see, particularly in northeast and
northwestern Syria, is alarming: food insecurity, the inability
to deliver badly-needed medical and other items, particularly
in this period of the COVID pandemic.
So, if confirmed, I do look forward to consulting closely
with you and with working with Ambassador Linda Thomas-
Greenfield and her team on this critical issue of the
reauthorization of the cross-border delivery.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. But I just want to weigh in
in support of your point about the Havana syndrome and our
efforts that we should be making with the Cuban regime to press
them more on what they know.
And, Ambassador Nichols, I would also just like to weigh
in. I appreciate the administration's appointment of Ambassador
Spratlen.
But the fact is, in Congress, we are still not getting the
information we need on what is actually happening with so-
called Havana syndrome government wide, nor are we seeing the
coordination that I think we would all hope to see and the
assurance that those people who are affected are getting
absolutely the best health care that they need.
So I hope you will share that with the State Department.
Mr. Nichols. I will, Senator, and those who were injured in
those attacks and the health of our people throughout our
service and throughout our government are my highest priority.
The Chairman. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of you for your service to our country.
You, clearly, are both very well qualified and we appreciate
your offer of continued service.
Ambassador Nichols, I am concerned about, I guess, the
ongoing and, in some cases, increasing Chinese and Russian
engagement in the Western Hemisphere.
One example is China's launching of a vaccine diplomacy
strategy into Latin America, while Russia is launching
countless disinformation campaigns in Latin America to
discredit the West, specifically, the United States.
What do you think should be done to address this and what
resources are available to you for that purpose? I know that
you have indicated that there are some organizations and so
forth.
But when it comes to their very aggressive approach to
provide misinformation about our country but also to gather
additional leverage within the Western Hemisphere, share with
me your thoughts and what tools you would see available to you.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, and I fully share your
concerns.
We have a number of tools available to us. We have the
Global Engagement Center pushing back on disinformation. We are
bolstering our public diplomacy at the embassy level throughout
the hemisphere, and I think that is a very important tool.
We have shared values, and we need to point out to the
peoples of the region the shared values that we have, and the
difference between what we consider important and what the real
costs of the engagement that the malign actors from outside our
hemisphere, like China and Russia, are engaging in.
The Chinese offer all sorts of things. They don't come for
free. The Chinese are getting something out of it, and we need
to push back aggressively with a variety of tools.
They also offer in their economic engagement unfair
competition practices and corruption, and when we see that we
need to call it out.
Senator Rounds. I think sometimes their offer of assistance
to a contrary is seen as a first step in where, later on, they
will start asking for small favors and then move into more
demands.
In our case, I would suspect that there are times in which
we are seen as looking at some of our neighbors and saying, we
expect you to behave in a particular way, and rather than
talking about our shared values we try to impose values upon
them.
Share with me your thoughts about the differentiation
between our shared values and times in which we might be seen
as placing our values upon them. I think it is a critical
difference.
Mr. Nichols. I think that there are advantages in our
hemisphere and that our founding documents in this hemisphere
lay out what the nations of this region believe in and what
they have committed to.
The OAS is the world's oldest regional multilateral
organization, and its Charter lays out values very clearly that
all of the nations in this hemisphere have signed onto, and I
think we can point to those.
We can point to polling of the publics in this hemisphere
and their value for democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law, and I think when we talk about what the Chinese and the
Russians are really offering, what they are really asking of
governments, there is a big difference between what one
individual official in a government might want and what, I
think, the people of that nation might want.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Ambassador Sison, the COVID-19 pandemic, certainly, put a
spotlight on the World Health Organization. Concerns have been
expressed that the WHO lacks sufficient resources to manage a
global pandemic as well as maintain its integrity.
Do you think that the WHO is resourced to handle a global
pandemic, and do you believe that it is still an unbiased
organization, despite Chinese influence?
And, finally, how do you think the Department of State can
help to strengthen the organization?
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator.
Indeed, the issue of the World Health Organization--WHO's
need to be fit for purpose and modernized is an important one,
and there is an issue, of course, of the need for sustained
financing.
We do not want to start down a road and only to find that
we are not able to continue down the road as we work to
strengthen WHO's ability in surveillance detection, in
infectious disease prevention, the ability to respond, to
insist that all member states report transparently.
But, of course, that sustained financing needs to be
matched with a strong focus and, if confirmed, this would be a
top priority on transparency, accountability, and oversight of
the WHO's operations.
You mentioned the word integrity and, absolutely, we need
to make sure that the WHO's assessments, findings, reports, are
science based, expert led, free from outside influence.
And, again, we need to insist that all member states comply
with the international norms on infectious disease reporting,
international health regulations. We need full transparency on
this. Could not agree more, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you both for your willingness to continue to serve, especially
in these very important roles.
Ambassador Nichols, I wanted to turn to the topic of
Venezuela. You know, by no metric can anyone suggest that
President Trump's policy in Venezuela was a success. Maduro was
more cemented in power at the end of his four years.
But there has been some interesting developments over the
past few months. We have seen some compromises by the Maduro
government on humanitarian access, the creation of a new
electoral council, willingness to join the Norway-hosted talks.
And so I am interested to learn from you your early
thoughts about how the United States can help push this
momentum along, capitalize it, and then, specifically, whether
this is the time to talk about restoring diesel swaps.
I have believed for a while that the United States should
be engaged in this policy as a way to relieve humanitarian
suffering inside the country.
But I wonder if this policy now makes even more sense,
because not only does it provide an avenue to try to get much-
needed economic relief to people who are suffering, but it also
may be a way to show that the United States is open to helping
to be a part of these sort of grass shoots of negotiating room.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
There needs to be a key focus in our policy, in my view,
which I should caveat that I understand is under review within
the administration. So this will be my personal views.
But I believe that we have a major advantage in dealing
with Venezuela, that there is a broad multilateral coalition
working to promote democracy in Venezuela, and that is
something that we need to leverage aggressively to push the
Maduro regime towards free and fair elections.
We need to support the Venezuelan people, both at the
political level in the form of opposition leaders and interim
President Guaido, as well as pushing for humanitarian
assistance and ensuring that the people of Venezuela do have
access to the help that they need.
With regard to diesel swaps right now, as I understand it,
there is enough diesel capacity within Venezuela, at least for
the next six months or so.
I think that is something that needs to be watched, and if
we see that there is a problem there for the Venezuelan people
I think that is something to be looked at.
But I think maintaining economic pressure to negotiate on a
government that has shown that it will use dilatory tactics to
prevent progress toward free and fair elections in addition to
things like releasing political prisoners and allowing a free
press, we have to be very cautious on.
Senator Murphy. Yeah, no doubt, as Senator Menendez
regularly reminds us, this is Maduro's game is to sort of
entertain hopes of reform, stringing the international
community and the United States along with, you know, nothing
to be found at the end of the rainbow.
And so I think we go into this with eyes wide open. But it
is also interesting that Guaido himself has proposed the
incremental lifting of U.S. sanctions as an incentive to try to
continue along this path.
But I look forward to working with you on this as the
review continues.
Ambassador Sison, I wanted to talk to you about a topic
that regularly comes up in this committee, and that is Yemen.
We have a U.N. and WFP appeal that is right now about one-third
funded.
Now, it is never 100 percent funded, but in prior years we
have been able to stave off famine by making sure that we are
at least 80, 90 percent funded on that appeal. There are some
pretty important countries like Qatar that have made sort of no
contribution.
There is talk of a second donors conference to try to make
sure that we put our foot onto the pedal, because we are
looking at a 2021 famine, a new outbreak of cholera, if we do
not rally the world community through the U.N., through WFP, to
make sure that the money is there.
And by the way, the United States put in less money this
year than we did last year, which is not exactly helping the
situation.
Just your thoughts on how we can make sure we get the
humanitarian dollars we need in Yemen.
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and share your concern
about the food insecurity and the need for humanitarian access
to the vulnerable populations in Yemen and, in fact, just flew
up for the hearing from Haiti.
But we did have WFP Executive Director David Beasley with
us a couple of weeks ago, and we actually discussed Yemen and
the alarming situation there with the mounting food insecurity.
So, if confirmed, you have my absolute commitment that I
would be working both with stakeholders to create these broad
partnerships with other donors and like-minded countries, also
to support Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield and her team up
in New York because, of course, the U.N. Security Council has
put an enormous amount of effort and work into maintain
Security Council voice--united Security Council voice on Yemen.
If confirmed, I look forward to consulting and talking with
you more on this important topic.
Senator Murphy. Great. Thank you very much to you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty?
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch, thank you. And, Ambassadors, thank you for your service.
Greatly appreciated.
I would like to, first, talk about the Western Hemisphere.
I am from Tennessee. Since the border collapsed in late
January, we have experienced a dramatic increase in drug
trafficking, in overdoses, in human trafficking.
We have now got unaccompanied minors coming into Tennessee.
Our schools and hospitals are asking whether we have the
capacity to deal with this.
This has become the most urgent crisis in America from a
national security standpoint, from an economic security
standpoint, from a humanitarian standpoint.
So earlier this month, I traveled to Guatemala and to
Mexico to meet with leaders there to try to get at the bottom
of what the problem is, what is driving this.
I did not hear much talk about climate change. What I heard
was that we are sending messages from here, whether it is talk,
election talk, about how people will be treated if a certain
outcome occurs, whether it is talk about the potential for a
$15 minimum wage, whether it is talk about checks for illegal
immigrants, or the fact that we have extended unemployment--
plussed-up unemployment benefits all the way to September,
which is creating a giant job opening here in America.
Coyotes are taking these messages and marketing them to
very vulnerable people. They are encouraging these vulnerable
people to put their life savings on the line and to risk their
lives, to make a very dangerous journey, a journey in which
more than half of them are involved in some--in some way in
crime, whether they become part of the drug trafficking, part
of the sex trafficking, or in some other way violated horribly.
This is a very dangerous humanitarian crisis that is
occurring at our border. The leaders of these countries are not
happy about this at all. They blame us, in large part, but they
also see opportunity.
That is what I was trying to get at and I want to share
these with you, Ambassador Nichols, these observations, that
when I met with the president of Guatemala, he said, look, I am
not asking for you to send money or fund NGOs, but help us
technically--night vision goggles, technical training, so we
can manage our own border. Our own national sovereignty is
being violated, he told me. We want to cooperate. We think we
can cooperate, and if we can get our border under control and
bring the rule of law more in line, we will see more
infrastructure investment, which is what they desperately need.
We have tools here. This committee has jurisdiction over
some of the tools that we can help them with infrastructure
investment, but we need to get the rule of law and public
safety in order there.
I think there are great opportunities to cooperate with
them, and I would look forward to working with you toward those
ends.
They also want to see us stop the national security problem
that they have got too because they do not know who is entering
their country. It is a real issue.
It sounded even more so when I talked with the Mexican
Foreign Minister and the Minister of Economy of Mexico. They
have a grave concern about who is coming across their southern
border and, again, they highlighted that opportunity for us to
cooperate on a security basis, again, with training, with
technology, with equipment. These are ways to help them address
the problem.
But the most clear and urgent problem is dealing with our
own border, to stop sending the wrong messages that are
encouraging this sort of behavior. And what is happening,
particularly in Mexico, is that with the movement of coyotes,
the overwhelming force that is occurring at our southern
border, that it is creating an opening for the cartels to move
even more drugs, more sex trafficking, more contraband across
our borders.
The cartels are getting larger and more powerful by the day
and it is making it that much more difficult to manage the
situation in Mexico, in Guatemala, and other countries in that
region.
So I would look forward to working with you on this grave
national security crisis, and I hope that you will commit to do
that with me.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to working
with you and the other members of this body, if confirmed, on
these issues.
I know that colleagues within the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement and Population, Refugees and
Migration, under the leadership of Vice President Harris and
with the participation of Special Envoy Zuniga are working hard
on the issues that you have discussed.
Senator Hagerty. We need to do more, but thank you for that
commitment.
Ambassador Sison, again, thank you for your service.
Still related to this area, what was very clear to me is
that China is increasing the movement of fentanyl and fentanyl
precursors into Mexico. These are getting manufactured and then
trafficked across our border. It appears that all the
cooperation between Mexico and the United States to interdict
this has collapsed.
I would be very interested in your thoughts on how, in the
position that you are, hopefully, going to go to how you can
increase our cooperation with Mexico to push back against China
and their importation of this illegal drug that is killing our
children.
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and I share your concerns
about these illegal drugs coming into our country, as both a
mother and a grandmother.
There is, definitely, an important role within the U.N. and
multilateral space to push this U.S. priority forward and, if
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with you, working with
you and with stakeholders, in organizations such as the
Universal Postal Union because there is a postal piece of this.
And the work that we have done on some of the standards has
actually made a difference in the multilateral sphere in
enforcing and moving these norms into the international space
as well as in the U.N. body that deals with drugs and crime.
Senator Hagerty. I look forward to working with you, and I
will just add this. The Mexican authorities made clear to me
that they do not have the technology to examine the cargo that
is coming in from China. They felt like we could help them
significantly there.
You think about x-ray technology, heat-sensing technology,
the types of things that they could use to deal with the fact
that China has become very clever at hiding fentanyl and the
precursors that are being shipped in to their country and then
being remanufactured.
So I appreciate that commitment and look forward to working
with you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine is recognized and he has graciously agreed to
preside while I go to the Finance Committee. After Senator
Kaine, at this point, no Republican colleagues who have sought
recognition virtually are present.
So it would be Senator Booker, who is with us virtually,
and then Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and
congratulations to the witnesses for your service and for your
nominations.
I want to ask three Western Hemisphere questions to--
Ambassador Nichols, to you about the Northern Triangle, and
then I cannot resist taking advantage of having the Haitian
ambassador with us today to ask a question about Haiti,
Ambassador Sison.
So, Ambassador Nichols, the Northern Triangle. We have seen
real backsliding in the Northern Triangle on governments'
transparency, corruption, violence, economic opportunity
issues.
Recently, in both Guatemala and El Salvador, there have
been a sacking of judges and prosecutors who have been known
for trying to prosecute corruption. Even more troubling, in
Honduras the Honduran election of 2016 was a sham and the OAS
called for it to be rerun.
Instead of supporting the OAS, the U.S. recognized the
government of Honduras, and what did we get for it? What we got
for it was the government canceling transparency initiatives,
canceling anti-corruption initiatives, and now the president of
Honduras is implicated in a couple of high-profile drug
smuggling prosecutions in the United States.
Obviously, if we are going to try to deal with this
migration problem, one of the key pillars to it is
strengthening governance, security, transparency in the
Northern Triangle.
I suspect that there will be a request that we invest funds
to do that, and I want to be supportive. But how can we invest
funds to promote those ends when the governments in the
Northern Triangle are often the causes or at least, in some
cases, the causes of the problems rather than the solutions?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
It is not enough to win office democratically. People have
to govern democratically, and central to that is the importance
of the separation of powers and a strong independent judiciary,
and that is something, if confirmed, that I will argue for
vociferously with our partners throughout the hemisphere and,
particularly, in the Northern Triangle.
We have programming that has been successful around the
world in strengthening the justice sector, and we need to press
forward with those efforts, particularly in the Northern
Triangle countries.
Corruption is a noxious influence in that region, in that
part of our hemisphere, and we need to leverage the tools that
you have given us to call out those corrupt actors who are
preventing the course of justice from flowing properly.
We also need to leverage our development assistance and our
multilateral partners to ensure that the institutions are built
and people get the support that they need so they are not
attracted to populist and easy solutions that quickly turn to
ashes in their mouths.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Ambassador, I think all those are the
right answers and I also think they are the things that we have
tried to do for years with very little effect. So I hope we
will not be in a Groundhog Day of repeatedly doing something
and seeing it not work.
Let me make one point on economic opportunity in the
region. Again, we would want there to be stronger economic
opportunities so people can stay. But how do we invest in
stronger economies with governments that have not proven to be
reliable partners?
I have an idea. U.S. employers employ a lot of people in
the Northern Triangle in the retail sector, in the textile
sector.
Rather, if we are going to try to increase economic
opportunities, I would hope State and Commerce and others, the
vice president's office, would pull together American employers
who employ folks in the region and say, for example, what could
we do as policy that would make you hire and invest more in the
Northern Triangle.
I will give you an example. There is probably a couple
hundred thousand textile workers in the Northern Triangle who
are employed by American firms.
This is just a brainstorm, but if we were to say, for
example, the purchase of PPE during the pandemic was revealed
to be a critical national security issue, we should only buy
PPE that is American made or that is made with American product
in nations with whom we have free trade agreements.
That would pull a huge part of the PPE supply chain out of
China and it would give a strong preference for the production
of PPE in the Northern Triangle, which is produced with
American cotton in factories in that region. Something like
that would lead to significant economic expansion or
opportunities there.
So I hope, as we focus on economic opportunities, get the
advice of the American companies that are already there.
Ambassador Sison, there is this, you know, obviously, huge
challenge in Haiti, deep unrest over the term of the president,
and a five-year term, but there is huge unrest over when did it
start.
What is the U.S. doing to try to help solve this dilemma
and pave a way for a less corrupt Haiti, going forward?
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and good to see you
again.
The U.S. and, I will say as the sitting ambassador, U.S.
ambassador to Haiti, we have been really urging all
stakeholders, so the political actors, the economic leaders,
civil society leaders, to come together and work in an
inclusive manner to reach an accord that will serve the Haitian
people.
And I say this because the political impasse has had an
impact over the last two years on the security situation. We
see increased gang violence has had a negative effect on the
economic side, including economic development side.
The focus has got to be, I believe, on rule of law,
combating corruption, promoting justice sector reform, and
moving ahead on insisting that these overdue legislative
elections, which should have been held in late 2019, do move
ahead.
The president has been ruling by decree because there is no
legislature. So to get a president out of ruling by
presidential decree, there need to be free, fair, and credible
legislative elections later this year, as announced by the
government of Haiti, followed by a presidential election, so
that at the end of the sitting president's term there is an
elected president to take his place. The----
Senator Kaine. And thank you, Ambassador. I am over my time
and I need to gavel myself out of order and--but thank you for
that answer.
I believe Senator Cruz is on his way, but I believe Senator
Markey, we are going in seniority and you are up next.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Ambassador Nichols, thank you for your service over the
years. I want to talk a little bit about climate change and the
United States government and its ability to use Global
Magnitsky to strike back at those who are committing crimes
against environmental defenders.
I know that you have experience in working on these issues.
So could you please tell us what you believe we can do as a
country to counter environmental human rights violations in the
Western Hemisphere?
Because, clearly, we are at a tipping point and we have to
make sure that we are using all of the influence of our
government.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator.
It is a complex question. I will touch on a few examples.
For example, if you are dealing with a company that is
illegally dumping mining tailings in a river, suborning local
officials, and improperly taking resources out of a nation,
that seems to me like an example where you could leverage the
full range of anti-corruption tools in response to illegal
mining practices.
In Peru, artisanal and illegal gold mining was a huge
problem and linked to narcotics trafficking, and when I was
ambassador there, we worked intensively on leveraging law
enforcement tools against those responsible, especially in that
nexus of narcotics and illegal mining.
Senator Markey. Yeah, gold mining, logging, wildlife
trafficking, environmental degradation, all of that. I have
introduced legislation, the Targeting Environmental and Climate
Recklessness Act, and it is just to reinforce the reality that
all across these countries, brave climate defenders in Central
and South America are risking their lives peacefully in order
to ensure that these carbon-intensive industries and
unsustainable business practices are wreaking havoc on local
communities.
And what my legislation would do is it would give the
United States, give you, the ability to target foreign
individuals and companies engaged in destructive climate
actions to ensure that existing human rights and corruption
sanctions under Global Magnitsky are used to strike back at
those committing crimes against environmental defenders.
Can I just follow up? Just looking at the Amazon, if I may,
and the degradation of that forest, which are, as we know, the
lungs of the planet, how can we better work to prioritize its
protection with the countries that it spans across in South
America, in your opinion, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator.
I think engaging with the key Amazon nations, starting with
Brazil but also Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia that is crucial. Our
diplomacy can have an important effect on their policies.
I know Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Kerry is
deeply engaged in that exercise. Programmatically, we can
leverage our development assistance on the issue of climate,
particularly on the protection of forests and rain forests in
the region.
We also need to think about how do we leverage our trade
agreements, which include environmental provisions, to protect
the environment and, if confirmed, I look forward to working
with you on these issues.
Senator Markey. Thank you, sir. And just moving to
Colombia, quickly, if I could, I am very concerned about the
escalation of violence in Colombia.
My question to you is what do you believe we should be
doing? What steps should the United States government be doing
in order to use our political influence to decrease the--that
violence and the suppression of ordinary citizens in that
country?
Mr. Nichols. The situation in Colombia is a complicated
one. Colombia is a long-term ally of the United States and we
need to be engaging with President Duque, as I know, our
ambassador and key leaders in the administration are, one, to
work to deescalate the challenges, two, to address the economic
crisis caused by the pandemic, which sort of was one of the
reasons why the fiscal package that President Duque introduced
was introduced, and three, to prioritize getting back on track
to implementation of the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia.
And if confirmed, I look forward to working towards those
goals.
Senator Markey. Thank you, sir. Thank you both for your
service.
The Chairman. [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen?
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member, and again, congratulations to both of you on your
nominations.
Ambassador Sison, in my introduction this morning, I
mentioned your experience in the area of international
humanitarian relief, and in your new position and confirmed you
will be a key player in that arena.
Now, I support an immediate ceasefire in the fighting
between Israel and Hamas. But whenever the rockets and the
bombs stop falling, we will have a humanitarian disaster in
Gaza.
As you well know, there was a humanitarian crisis in Gaza
before the fighting started and now it is much worse. We all
know that Hamas is a terrorist organization that controls Gaza.
We also know that Israel has the right to self-defense, and
I am glad that the United States and this committee have
assisted Israel in the development and the deployment of the
Iron Dome, which has intercepted thousands of Hamas rockets.
But I also think that the United States and the
international community needs to do everything we can when the
fighting stops to assist the millions of innocent Gazans who
are trapped there and have nothing to do with Hamas.
So my first question is a simple one. Do you agree?
Ms. Sison. Yes, Senator, I certainly share your concern
about the human suffering associated with this outbreak in
violence, and I do believe that providing humanitarian
assistance to the Palestinian population with, again, all the
transparency, accountability, and oversight built into that,
while maintaining our long-standing security relationship with
Israel is in the U.S. interest.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Just to give an extent of the challenge we are going to
face with the international community, this is--I am just
quoting here from the New York Times' report today in terms of
the humanitarian crisis:
``The fighting has destroyed 17 hospitals and clinics in
Gaza, wrecked its only coronavirus test laboratory, sent fetid
wastewater into its streets, and broke water pipes serving at
least 800,000 people.
Sewage systems inside Gaza have been destroyed. A
desalinization plant that helped provide fresh water to 250,000
people in the territory is offline. Dozens of schools have been
damaged or closed, forcing some 600,000 students to miss class
and some 72,000 Gazans have been forced to flee their homes.''
Now, as your answer did and my question did, I am focused
now on post-conflict humanitarian relief to millions of people
who have nothing to do with the conflict in Gaza.
So do you agree that the United States and international
relief agencies should insist that all parties involved give
access consistent with security requirements, but access to
provide humanitarian relief in Gaza?
Ms. Sison. Senator, yes, the issue of humanitarian access
to provide needed food, medical items, particularly in this
time of the COVID pandemic, is absolutely critical.
If confirmed, I would be working with the IO team and other
stakeholders across our government and with U.N. partners not
only to emphasize the urgency of working towards sustainable
calm, but to ensuring that needed humanitarian relief with the
built-in safeguards on transparency, accountability, oversight
is delivered to the most vulnerable populations.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Now, we also have an ongoing humanitarian disaster in
Ethiopia. President Biden has called for a ceasefire in that
conflict and we, the United States, are working with
international relief agencies to try to get humanitarian relief
to those there.
This committee two days ago had a briefing with Ambassador
Feltman and I had a follow-up conversation with Ambassador
Feldman, the Special Envoy, yesterday. Can you just talk
briefly about what we need to be doing and demanding in terms
of providing humanitarian assistance in that conflict?
Ms. Sison. Indeed, Senator, I share your concern about the
increasing food insecurity that we see. The U.N. and the
International Organizations Bureau have an important role to
play and, if confirmed, I would be working with a number of
these U.N. agencies, including World Food Programme and others.
There are other associated human rights issues that I also
believe the IO Bureau would be working on and, if confirmed,
calling out those who are perpetrating these human rights
abuses, these armed actors, widespread reports of sex- and
gender-based violence and other atrocities.
We would want to continue to speak with one voice at the
U.N. Security Council on these issues, and I look forward, if
confirmed, to working with Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield
up there in New York as well as the U.N. agencies providing
this humanitarian relief and using the appropriate space to
call out those armed actors and others perpetrating these
atrocities and abuses.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you.
Senator Coons and I were in Sudan just a short time ago and
visited one of the refugee camps that have been set up by
UNHCR, and I think it is important the United States continues
to support that effort as well as the World Food Programme.
They are doing essential humanitarian work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
your service. Congratulations on your nominations.
Ambassador Sison, let me start with you. You have
emphasized repeatedly that you intend to work to ensure that
American taxpayer dollars are well spent at the U.N. and other
organizations.
But Americans are deeply concerned about the structure and
leadership of those organizations. Organizations like the Human
Rights Council are hopelessly biased, especially against the
nation of Israel, and they are mendaciously sympathetic to
countries like Iran that commit atrocious human rights abuses.
It is no surprise why that is the case, given that those
are the sorts of countries that make up a majority of the
members of the Human Rights Council.
To take another example, the U.N.'s Commission on the
Status of Women, the body's top legislative body on women's
rights, recently elected Iran as a member. The Iranian regime,
of course, enforces a broad array of gender apartheid policies
and, concerningly, when asked, the Biden administration
declined to condemn that farce.
I worry that no amount of financial accountability can
reform these deeply problematic organizations as long as we
allow them to be led by countries that are antithetical to
their purpose.
I would like your opinion on that. How can financial
oversight, which you have discussed, fix these deep problems,
especially if the Biden administration is unwilling to speak
out clearly against them?
Ms. Sison. Senator, the issue of U.S. leadership is
critical, I believe, to addressing the need for reform, and I
agree with you there is a need for reform in many of these
institutions.
We need the U.S. back at the table pushing for these
reforms. There is the issue, yes, of financial accountability,
transparency, oversight, but there is also the issue of U.S.
leadership building strong cross-regional partnerships and
alliances so that our U.S. core values--protection of human
rights, labor rights, and economic transparency--are at the
forefront.
We need to remind some of our like-minded of what we all
signed on to in the Charter of the United Nations because its
foundational document is strong on the human rights.
On the Human Rights Council, Senator, I do believe that
when we are at the table and as we are coming back to the--to
the HRC, we have the ability to better defend Israel from de-
legitimization, from unfair targeting, from discriminatory
efforts because we are there and we are present.
We have seen when we are there that the number of items
brought up under this article, Agenda Item 7, the only single
country targeting of Israel in that space, that we are able to
push back by coming back also and, of course, with our
candidacy better able to create these cross-regional alliances
to encourage more human rights right-minded countries to firm
up its members.
Senator Cruz. But does the hypocrisy of some of the worst
human rights abusers being themselves members, does that
concern you?
Ms. Sison. Indeed, it does. But we have also seen, Senator,
the Human Rights Council has put the spotlight on Venezuela.
The Human Rights Council has put the spotlight on China and the
treatment of Uighurs, has put the spotlight on Hong Kong.
So the issue of our people-to-people diplomacy creating
these strong cross-regional alliances of like-minded countries
to make sure that our core U.S. values are at the forefront.
This is why we need to be at the table and back.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
Ambassador Nichols, I would also like to ask you, briefly,
about Mexico, and our relationship with Mexico is complicated.
They are a neighbor. We share a land border.
But they are also a country with its own interests, and
when it comes to foreign policy we need to use all the foreign
policy tools we have.
Recently, the Mexican Government has taken a range of steps
to downgrade counternarcotics cooperation with the United
States, and in one incident, Mexico even released sensitive
information that we provided to them in violation of the U.S.-
Mexico Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.
I have introduced legislation to try to address some of
these concerns. But, of course, there is an enormous role for
the State Department to play in conveying American concerns and
priorities.
Do you also share these concerns with Mexico's behavior in
connection with, cooperation with, the United States in
counternarcotics and treaty violations, and how should we
address those issues?
Mr. Nichols. Our cooperation with Mexico on rule of law,
counternarcotics, justice issues, is vital. It is long
standing. I had the pleasure of working on those issues when I
was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement.
If confirmed, I look forward to engaging proactively with
the government of Mexico on our security cooperation. It is
vital for both of our nations. Mexican cooperation is something
that we need and they need.
The challenges as was discussed in terms of things like
fentanyl and precursors, other opiate trafficking into the
United States, illegal activities on the border--we need each
other to resolve those, and I look forward to working with our
law enforcement colleagues on the U.S. side, with our embassy
Law Enforcement Working Group in Mexico City, and with Mexican
officials, if confirmed, to press forward to ensure the highest
level of cooperation, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We normally do not have second rounds. But as I understand
it, Senator Hagerty has--I am going to extend the courtesy to
you.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, and Senator
Kaine, I am actually following up on a point that you raised.
If I could borrow you for two minutes. But I just wanted to add
a comment that Senator Kaine inspired.
In my recent visit to Guatemala and to Mexico, one thing
that was clear to me that they were very interested in
cooperating on was the fact that we are working very
aggressively to reshore businesses from China.
We are all very concerned about security of our supply
chain. Those companies that are coming back to the United
States, I want to get every job I can. Let me be clear. I want
every one of those jobs in America that I can get.
But to the extent that they are not coming back to America,
rather than have them go to some other Southeast Asian country,
why not find a way to work together to bring them into our
hemisphere and to bring them to our friends there who need the
economic opportunity, which this may help stem some of the root
cause?
I do not want to overlook the immediate concern. We have to
fix the border crisis now. But mid- and long-term, there is a
real opportunity here.
Leaders cited CAFTA as a way to address this. You wisely
brought this up, Senator, and I think taking a look at CAFTA,
which actually presents now some restrictions and some
constraints on what they can do, all of those constraints are
being actually picked up by China right now because they are
not part of that free trade agreement.
We need to look very aggressively at what we can do with
the FTAs that are in place, what we can do with economic
development on a joint basis.
I think that the United States can do a great deal to help
these countries improve the rule of law and create the proper
constructs.
Again, we have the mechanisms to help them with
infrastructure because of the various funding mechanisms that
exist here in Washington and elsewhere.
But creating that economic opportunity and seizing this
trend right now coming from China is something that I encourage
you very much to focus on.
Thank you.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with you on that.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
The Chairman. Thank you. One or two final questions.
Venezuela, despite the recent charm offensive, and that is
what I consider it, the fact remains that Nicolas Maduro is a
brutal dictator whose regime has committed, from my
perspective, crimes against humanity, perpetrated fraud in the
country's presidential and legislative elections, responsible
for Venezuela's massive humanitarian crisis.
So I, first of all, want to commend the president,
President Biden, for providing TPS for Venezuelans. But with
Venezuela descending into a failed state status, I know that
interim President Guaido and a coalition of democratic actors
are pushing for comprehensive negotiations, both presidential
and legislative ones, as well as a return to democratic
governance and increase aid to address the humanitarian crisis.
So, Ambassador Nichols, is not that something that we
should be able to get our arms around and supportive of and
seek an international mobilization for a simple proposition,
internationally supervise the fair and free presidential and
legislative elections?
Mr. Nichols. Mr. Chairman, I agree that is something that
the international coalition should be focused on. Our
multilateral partners play an important role.
As you wisely state, the Maduro regime's goal is to delay,
to deflect, to distract, and I think, cognizant of that, we
need to take an approach that limits the regime's ability to do
those things.
As I said earlier, our multilateral partners are a vital
tool in that regard. But the protagonists of this need to be
the Venezuelan people and the Venezuelan opposition, led by
interim President Guaido.
The Chairman. Mm-hmm. You are familiar, or maybe I should
add, are you familiar with the roles that, for example, Russia,
China, and Turkey are playing in Venezuela? Russia, not only
through its entity there that they use for what I call
mercenary soldiers, but also I hope you are familiar with
reports of Russia taking out gold bars out of Venezuela and
part of the national patrimony going to Russia, the realities
of Turkey's banks being used to flush the cash out of Venezuela
and try to evade our sanctions. Are you familiar with those
elements?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and the broad efforts by
China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, others, to work around the
sanctions regime that exists is deeply worrisome, and I think
that the--those of us who wish to see democracy in Venezuela
need to aggressively challenge those actions and work to ensure
that the profits of their criminal activities are not returned
to the regime.
The Chairman. Thank you.
One last question for you. President Bukele in El
Salvador--we had President Bukele here. We met with him before
after he was elected but before he took office. He said all the
right things then. He has done all the wrong things since then.
His firing of the attorney general, his elimination of
the--all of the judges of the Constitutional Court, have all of
the elements of a massive power grab consolidation in an
autocratic way.
You know, he probably thinks that if we do not just go
along with him he will turn to China. How should we face the
challenges there?
Because I think beyond El Salvador it is going to send a
hemispheric message that is very bad if we do not, you know,
stand up for the principles of observance of the Constitution,
rule of law, and other elements.
Mr. Nichols. As I said, Mr. Chairman, it is not enough to
win office democratically or win elections democratically. Our
friends and our rivals need to respect the rule of law and
govern democratically and we need to hold them to account when
they fail to do so.
El Salvador is a country that has been a long-time ally. I
served there from 1991 to 1993. We, as a nation, have
sacrificed much and provided a great deal of assistance to El
Salvador to try and put it on a path towards success, and we
need to use all of the tools that we can to ensure that El
Salvador remains on a forward path and that the challenges that
it faces can be overcome.
And I look forward to working on those issues, if
confirmed.
The Chairman. Mm-hmm.
And finally, Ambassador Sison, I do not want you to feel
that I have no affection for your position. So our legislation
that Senator Risch and I put together on a bipartisan basis
here passed the committee 21 to 1.
The Strategic Competition Act creates a special
representative for advancing U.S. leadership in the United
Nations.
That person would be responsible for, among other things,
promoting U.S. leadership and participation in the U.N. system
with a particular focus on issue areas in which authoritarian
countries are increasing their influence and steering the U.N.
agenda.
We are alarmed, as you have heard here from several
members, about the increasing influence and role of
authoritarian countries in U.N. bodies. What is your assessment
as to how we can best counter those efforts?
And I know that there has been within your department to be
a section that has been created. How do you see the role of
this Special Representative playing within it?
Ms. Sison. Thank you, Chairman, for this question and also
thank you to the members of this committee for the bipartisan
focus on this need for the U.S. to engage vigorously in this
strategic competition, and if confirmed, this is at the top of
my agenda.
Indeed, the International Organizations Bureau is in the
process of establishing and launching a new Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel office. You mentioned the Special
Representative position, and I look forward, if confirmed, to
working with all stakeholders in this space.
The Special Representative, the IO Office of Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel, what are we going to focus on? A,
making sure that we get independent qualified U.S. candidates
or like-minded candidates if there is no U.S. appropriate
individual into these top U.N. leadership positions.
This is critical running the State Department and the
Secretary of State, have put their weight behind, for example,
an excellent U.S. candidate at the International
Telecommunication Union, focused on that issue of candidates'
long game, looking ahead at investing in the U.N.'s Junior
Professional Officer program one to two years, having young
Americans gain this experience and then be set up for mid-level
and beyond positions to bring in our core U.S. values--
adherence to democratic norms, protection of human rights.
China uses this program extensively. We need to be in
there. Work with our embassies abroad, our ambassadors and
charges, our USAID missions, to make sure we are looking into
the weeds as well.
We do not want to see U.N. agency documents coming out of
these field offices that have Belt and Road Initiative or
Communist Party of China language in their strategic program
strategy documents out in the field. We need to be alert to
this.
And I would add to this list of priorities preserving this
space for Taiwan's participation at the expert technical level
in the World Health Assembly, which is coming up next week up
at ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and at
Interpol.
These are transnational threats: global health security,
civil aviation safety and security, transnational crime.
Taiwan's experts' input should be heard.
Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, and I strongly support your views
on Taiwan being included at those levels internationally.
Finally, for you, it was reassuring to hear Ambassador
Greenfield reiterate her commitment to countering anti-Israel
bias and unilateral Palestinian actions in international fora
and multilateral organizations like the U.N. and U.N. agencies.
I think such a commitment is more pressing than ever as we
search for ways to deescalate the current conflict and return
to a two-state solution process.
If confirmed, will you work to counter anti-Israel bias at
the U.N. and other multilateral organizations?
Ms. Sison. Yes, Senator, I will. I will push back, if
confirmed, as I have done in the past in many different tours
of duty against the de-legitimization of Israel, unfair bias,
discrimination against Israel, anti-Semitism.
Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Well, Senator Risch?
[No response.]
The Chairman. With that, we appreciate your testimony. This
record will remain open two business days. So right at--close
of business Thursday.
Okay, I have to check with my ever-ready staff.
This record will remain open until the close of business on
Thursday. There may be questions for the record that are
submitted by members.
I urge both of you to answer them fully and expeditiously
as soon as possible so that your nominations may be considered
at a business meeting.
And with the thanks of the committee for your presence,
this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Canada is a NATO ally, a NORAD partner, a member of the
Five Eyes, and a top trade partner to the United States, and our two
countries have worked in close strategic partnership around the world
in recent decades. However, the Trump administration introduced
unnecessary friction into this important relationship, including
imposing Section 232 tariffs on Canada. What is your assessment of the
U.S.-Canada relationship and what steps will you take to repair this
important bilateral partnership?
Answer. Our relationship with Canada is very strong. Relations with
the United States remain the centerpiece of Canada's foreign policy.
President Biden and PM Trudeau issued the ``Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-
Canada Partnership'' at their February virtual meeting. If confirmed, I
look forward to supporting the roadmap priorities, which include
combatting the pandemic and cooperating on economic recovery,
accelerating climate ambitions, advancing diversity and inclusion,
bolstering security and defense, and building global alliances.
Our two governments coordinate daily at multiple levels and across
multiple agencies on matters ranging from major global issues to our
shared border, rivers, and lakes, our trade relationship, and joint
security through NORAD and NATO. If confirmed, I look forward to
furthering that cooperation.
The United States and Canada enjoy the most extensive and
integrated economic partnership of any two nations in the world. While
the Section 232 actions were deeply unpopular in Canada, the almost
400,000 people in pre-pandemic times and the nearly $1.7 billion worth
of goods and services that crossed our border daily are a testament to
the importance and scale of our economic relationship. Canada is the
primary foreign market for more than 30 U.S. states. Millions of U.S.
and Canadian middle-class jobs--including well-paying jobs in the
manufacturing sector--depend on our partnership. Given the thousands of
businesses and the various, complex sectors operating across our
borders, disagreements arise from time to time. That is understandable
and expected. If confirmed, I would commit to working with our U.S.
interagency colleagues to resolve these issues with Canada in a fair
and transparent manner and ensure we put the interests of U.S. workers,
farmers, ranchers, and businesses at the forefront of our foreign
policy so that they are treated fairly under the terms of the United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.
Question. The Government of China arbitrarily detained two Canadian
citizens--Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor--in retaliation for
Canada's decision to detain Meng Wanzhou at the request of U.S.
prosecutors. For two years, Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor have been held in
substandard conditions and routinely denied consular access by the
Canadian Government. What is your assessment of the detention of Mr.
Kovrig and Mr. Spavor and how will you work with the Trudeau Government
to help secure their release?
Answer. If confirmed, I would make clear that the United States
stands with Canada in calling on Beijing to immediately release Mr.
Kovrig and Mr. Spavor. I will work closely with my counterparts in the
Canadian Government to help secure their release. The United States
rejects the PRC's use of arbitrary detention as a political tool. Human
beings are not bargaining chips.
The United States has endorsed the Canada-led multilateral
Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,
together with over 60 countries. We are in discussions with Canada and
other likeminded partners through the Partnership Action Plan to
coordinate collective action against the practice of politically
motivated, arbitrary detentions of foreign nationals to exert pressure
on their governments.
Question. Mexico was the deadliest country in the world for
journalists in 2020, accounting for almost a third of journalists
killed this year, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.
Despite President Lopez-Obrador's pledge to tackle violence against
journalists in 2018, his government continues to underfund the Federal
Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists.
How will you engage on the issue of press freedoms in Mexico and
advocate for increased protections for journalists?
Answer. Respect for human rights is fundamental, and a free and
active press is an integral part of a healthy democracy. The killing of
journalists and human rights activists undermines freedoms of
expression and association, as well as regional security.
The Department is committed to supporting efforts to increase
respect for human rights and press freedom. Through USAID, the
Department supports Mexico's National Protection Mechanism for
Journalists and Human Rights Defenders and works with state-level
counterparts to expand the protection measures available for these
groups. USAID also supports the Specialized Prosecutor's Office for
Crimes Against Freedom of Expression to investigate and sanction
aggressions against journalists and defenders.
If confirmed, I will strongly promote respect for human rights and
the rule of law and end impunity. We will continue to urge Mexican
authorities to investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes
against journalists and human rights activists wherever they occur.
Question. Arms trafficked from the United States into Mexico have
reached disturbing levels and, in some cases, transnational criminal
organizations operating in Mexico possess more sophisticated weapons
than those of Mexican law enforcement, all of which is enabling
dangerous groups to expand their influence and activities in the
country. If confirmed, what steps would you take to address
international arms trafficking from the U.S. into Mexico?
Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national
security priority. It is critical that the United States and Mexico
work together to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and
their operations, reduce impunity and corruption, and strengthen the
rule of law in Mexico. I recognize that illegal weapons trafficking
from the United States constitutes a major source of the arms used by
criminal organizations in Mexico. If confirmed, I commit to working
with you and other members of the U.S. Congress, my U.S. interagency
colleagues, and Mexican Government officials to address border security
and arms trafficking.
Question. Central America's Northern Triangle struggles with
widespread insecurity, weak rule of law and extreme levels of poverty.
These challenges are the main causes pushing people to leave their
countries. If confirmed, what priorities will you establish to address
citizens security, strengthen democratic governance, and facilitate
conditions for equitable economic growth in the Northern Triangle?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize programs that directly
impact everyday Central Americans to improve citizen security,
strengthen democratic governance, and create the conditions for
equitable economic growth, especially in areas prone to high
emigration. To build political will, I will work across the U.S.
Government to utilize a broad range of tools of diplomacy, public
diplomacy, sanctions and visa revocations, and targeted foreign
assistance programs to combat corruption, strengthen judiciaries, and
promote transparency.
Our citizen security programs seek to transform the relationship
between police and the communities they serve. We will work with civil
society and partner governments to address community needs, including
health and education, promote transparency, and hold government
institutions accountable. Finally, if confirmed, I will work with our
interagency partners to help create conditions for equitable economic
growth, including by supporting businesses owned by women and
disadvantaged groups.
Question. Across Central America, citizens have fled their homes
and migrated from their countries in search of safety and opportunity.
Additionally certain undemocratic leaders have facilitated the
criminality that leaves many Central Americans unable to see a future
in their country. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the use of
foreign assistance to support democratic civil society and struggling
citizens, while also holding accountable certain leaders that have
facilitated criminality and placed their own interests above their
citizens?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support assistance programs to
strengthen civil society and their efforts to denounce corruption,
promote justice, protect human rights, and advocate for the needs of
vulnerable populations. I will seek to build on administration efforts
to consult with civil society representatives, both throughout the
region and in the United States, to ensure their perspectives and input
inform our policies and program design. It is critical that we work to
guard civic space that allows for the free exercise of rights, and use
all available tools to promote accountability for corrupt actors in the
region.
Question. In November 2020, more than 7 million people were
affected and hundreds of thousands were forced into shelters after two
devastating hurricanes struck Central America, positioning already
vulnerable individuals at greater risk. If confirmed, how will
prioritize support for recovery and relief efforts from these
hurricanes and how will this align with a broader, longer-term effort
to aid Central America in mitigating the impacts of climate change?
Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate closely within the
Department and the interagency, including by supporting international
engagement efforts led by Vice President Harris to internationalize the
effort and secure more donor commitments for responding to the immense
humanitarian needs in Central America. The Department, together with
USAID and others, provided immediate humanitarian relief in the
aftermath of the hurricanes and continues to remain actively engaged in
rebuilding efforts. In April, the U.S. Government announced an
additional $310 million in humanitarian support to the region and is
working to secure increased donor commitments to address acute needs.
We will continue to work to address the immediate needs while
strengthening the capacity of Central American Governments for disaster
risk mitigation and preparedness.
Question. Since taking office in 2007, Nicaraguan President Daniel
Ortega has conducted widespread, systematic attacks against civilians,
including murder, torture, and arbitrary detentions. Moreover, in
recent weeks and months, the Ortega Government has taken a number of
steps to undermine the possibility of free, fair and transparent
elections in November 2021. If confirmed, how will you prioritize
support for Nicaraguan civil society in light of the enactment of these
troubling laws and how will you work with international partners to
promote a free, fair and transparent electoral process in Nicaragua?
Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by a series of
repressive laws that have been passed since October 2020 which aim to
suffocate civil society in Nicaragua and quash freedom of expression.
The regime has taken repressive action against several media outlets,
and the administration has publicly denounced these actions. President
Ortega's actions against civil society, the media, and the democratic
opposition will only further distance him from the global community. If
confirmed, I will actively work to defend Nicaragua's civil society
groups, and will continue to work through diplomatic efforts,
coordinated multilateral pressure, support for pro-democracy actors,
and targeted economic measures, as appropriate, to advocate for free
and fair presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. The
administration will continue to work closely with partners in the OAS,
EU, and elsewhere to urge the Nicaraguan Government to implement free
and fair elections.
Question. During his campaign, President-elect Biden characterized
Colombia as a ``keystone'' of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America,
pledging that restoring the partnership our countries would be a
priority. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for and approach
to strengthening the U.S.-Colombia relationship?
Answer. I agree with President Biden that Colombia is a vital
strategic partner. If confirmed, I will support efforts to advance the
many priorities we share with Colombia, including promoting sustainable
peace and reconciliation; combatting narcotics trafficking and the
transnational criminal groups that threaten hemispheric security;
coordinating an effective diplomatic and humanitarian response to the
crisis in Venezuela; protecting human rights; addressing the climate
crisis; assisting Colombia to strengthen its health system; expanding
economic ties, and promoting inclusive economic growth that will
benefit the citizens of both countries.
Question. Five years ago, Colombia signed a historic peace accord
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However, there
have been delays in implementation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Venezuela crisis, and the economic impacts of both, as well as
continued security challenges. How will you support Colombia as it
implements the accord amidst these many growing challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the efforts of the Colombian
Government and people as they continue to work towards a just and
lasting peace and a more prosperous future. I believe that successful
implementation of the 2016 peace accord is vital to sustainable
progress on a broad range of priorities, including security, stability,
counternarcotics, human rights, justice, and economic development. I
will ensure that the United States continues to support the
implementation of the accord through diplomatic engagement and foreign
assistance programming. Our priorities include assisting Colombia to
extend the benefits of the accord to vulnerable populations in
conflict-affected areas.
Question. In recent weeks, Colombia has confronted nationwide
protests. While the majority of the protests have been peaceful, there
have been incidents of violent protests, vandalism, and blockades--
which have had a negative impact on the broader population. There also
have been acts of violence and excessive use of force committed by
Colombian security forces. Additionally, there have been incidents of
citizens taking up arms and firing on protesters. What is your
assessment of the protests, the acts of excessive force committed by
security forces, and the attacks by armed citizens? How can the United
States best support Colombia during this difficult period?
Answer. Colombia is a long-time and close partner. I am saddened by
the loss of life during protests in Colombia this May. Citizens in
democratic countries have the unquestionable right to protest
peacefully. Violence and vandalism is not acceptable; nor are acts of
vigilantism. If confirmed, I will encourage the Colombian Government to
continue investigating all allegations of police misconduct and address
any violations of human rights. I will also support the efforts of the
Colombian Government and people as they continue to engage in dialogue
to resolve the current situation and work together toward a more
prosperous and peaceful future, particularly through continued
implementation of the 2016 peace accord.
Question. Over the past four years, the U.S.-Ecuador relationship
has improved significantly. After a decade of tensions, both countries
have advanced multiple security, development, and economic agreements.
What is your assessment of the U.S.-Ecuador relationship and if
confirmed, what steps will you take to support the U.S.-Ecuador
partnership?
Answer. Over the last few years, the United States and Ecuador have
improved relations and built a cooperative bilateral relationship based
on shared values related to democracy, sustainable development and
prosperity, transparency, security, and the fight against drug
trafficking, organized crime, and corruption. Ecuador is a steadfast
regional partner. The United States seized this opening to increase
bilateral cooperation across the board.
If confirmed, I will continue to pursue increased cooperation with
the Ecuadorian Government in areas of mutual benefit for both our
countries. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. interagency to
ensure we are exploring all areas of cooperation with Ecuador and
seeing where the U.S. can strategically provide assistance. The United
States will continue supporting Ecuador's efforts to implement much-
needed economic reforms to strengthen the economy, balance public
finances, and revive growth in Ecuador, which is imperative given the
devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States is proud
to stand with the Ecuadorian people as they continue on the path to
sustainable prosperity.
Question. The Bolsonaro Government in Brazil has been highly
criticized for its role in deforestation and forest destruction. While
annual deforestation has increased over the past 11 years, the spike
seen in 2019 is, according to many experts, was a direct result of the
Government's actions. President-elect Biden has been outspoken about
the need for a better approach to deforestation in the Amazon. If
confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing environmental issues as a core
agenda item for our bilateral relationship with Brazil and how will you
approach the issue of Amazon deforestation?
Answer. Addressing deforestation is key to achieving Brazil's
climate and development goals. If confirmed, I look forward to
prioritizing efforts to combat the climate crisis and other
environmental issues. We want to work with the Brazilian Government,
Indigenous and Quilombo communities, and civil society to build
economic value for Brazilians through forest management and protection
rather than deforestation and to explore ways to increase investment
into forests, combat conservation crimes, improve land titling, and
create sustainable value chains to conserve biodiversity.
Question. As the crisis in Venezuela poses continued risks for U.S.
national security and regional stability, what priority will you place
on strengthening coordination with our closest partners to improve the
effectiveness of our sanctions, humanitarian aid, and diplomacy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the State Department
continues to prioritize strengthening coordination with our closest
partners to improve the effectiveness of our sanctions, humanitarian
aid, and diplomacy. The United States needs to work with partners and
allies to build multilateral pressure on the illegitimate Maduro
regime, promote accountability for regime officials' and their
enablers' criminal activities, implement appropriate sanctions against
those who undermine democracy or abuse human rights, and provide
humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan
people.
Question. Given the Maduro regime's fraudulent legislative
elections in December 2020 and the seating of a new, illegitimate
National Assembly, what diplomatic efforts will you pursue to support
Interim President Juan Guaido and Venezuela's democratic opposition, as
well as their ability to address the suffering of the Venezuelan people
and counter Maduro's dictatorship?
Question. If confirmed, I will remain committed to working with our
Venezuelan and international partners to foster an environment where
all Venezuelans can chart a peaceful course out of the current crisis,
with full respect for the freedoms of expression, association, and
peaceful assembly, and an end to attacks against human rights
defenders, journalists, and political opposition actors.
I will work with partners and allies to increase multilateral
pressure on the illegitimate Maduro regime, promote accountability,
including through the use of appropriate sanctions, of regime officials
and their enablers for their criminal activities, undermining
democracy, or abuse of human rights. If confirmed, I will also
prioritize providing humanitarian aid to ease the suffering of people
affected by the Venezuelan regional crisis.
Question. What is your assessment of efforts by our geopolitical
competitors and adversaries--Russia, China, and Cuba--to prop up the
Maduro regime in Venezuela?
Answer. I understand Russian support for the Maduro regime includes
military advisors and proxies, disinformation mechanisms, political
influence on the world stage, and financial backing. PRC companies such
as ZTE support the Maduro regime by providing technology to surveil
Venezuelans and reward regime supporters while punishing critics. Cuban
military and intelligence advisors actively support Maduro through the
provision of security forces, intelligence officers, and providing
direction to regime actors. Collectively, these efforts provide
substantial and worrisome support to the Maduro regime, which I will
work to counter, if confirmed.
Question. China's presence in Latin America has grown over the past
four years amidst a combination of U.S. neglect and aggression towards
the region, as well as increased Chinese economic, diplomatic, and
military engagement. How will you improve cooperation with our
hemispheric partners, so as to reassert our leadership, deepen our ties
with partner governments, and improve our competitiveness in the
region?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) represents a serious
challenge to U.S. interests in the region, with its growing security
ties and infrastructure investments. If confirmed, I will lead our team
to meet this challenge by advancing our positive agenda for the
hemisphere. We will build on our shared values of democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. We will welcome our allies and partners'
expertise and resources to support the region's COVID-19 response,
entrepreneurship, and sustainable infrastructure. We will support high-
standard investment in infrastructure and transparent economic
development that creates jobs essential for regional pandemic recovery.
If confirmed, I will work to broaden our diplomatic presence, promote
increased educational and cultural exchanges, and help our partners
face rule of law challenges.
Question. As the Government of China has expanded its presence in
Latin America, aspects of its engagement have been characterized by
predatory foreign investment, unsustainable loans to the region, or
even through aggressive violations of international boundaries as we
saw in the case of large Chinese illegal fishing off of the coast of
the Galapagos Islands. What is your assessment of these aspects of
China's engagement in Latin America and as Assistant Secretary of State
what tools will you utilize to strengthen U.S. engagement and
competitiveness in the region?
Answer. The hemisphere faces longstanding challenges of economic
inequality, corruption, and weak democratic institutions, all of which
have been exacerbated by the pandemic and make the region more
vulnerable to aggressive and coercive practices, including by the
People's Republic of China (PRC).
If confirmed, I will continue U.S. efforts to work with partners
and share resources and expertise to support COVID-19 response,
entrepreneurship, and economic development that creates jobs essential
for regional pandemic recovery. With likeminded partners and allies, I
will continue efforts to offer higher-standard, transparently governed
infrastructure alternatives and push back on PRC economic pressure. I
will also continue to raise concerns and distinguish ourselves from PRC
infrastructure projects to advocate for the highest environmental,
social, and labor standards to ensure investments are beneficial,
sustainable in the long term, transparent and respect the rule of law.
If confirmed, I will support the continued engagement of constructive
actors who share our values, such as Taiwan.
I will also continue to work with the interagency and partners in
our region to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing,
which impacts local fisheries and national economies, including through
developing a coordinated regional response to increase regional
capacity to counter IUU fishing activities by PRC fleet and those of
other flag states.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Has the Biden administration determined a specific
timeline to complete its ongoing review of U.S. policy in Venezuela?
Answer. I understand the interagency is working diligently on the
Venezuela policy review, which remains ongoing. There is widespread
agreement on the need to restore democracy through free and fair
elections, and to adopt a multilateral approach toward a negotiated
solution to the crisis caused by the illegitimate Maduro regime. If
confirmed, I will continue our work to encourage free and fair
elections, urge the release of political prisoners, confront the
escalating humanitarian crisis, and bring relief to the Venezuelan
people, including the millions who have fled Venezuela.
Question. Do you commit to thoroughly and promptly brief the
committee on the outcome of this policy review as soon as it is
complete?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
Congress as we seek to address the Venezuela crisis.
Question. In your view, how would you describe the nature of the
Maduro regime?
Answer. The United States does not recognize Maduro's dictatorial
regime as the Government of Venezuela. His repression, corruption, and
mismanagement have created one of the worst humanitarian crises this
hemisphere has seen. The Maduro regime enables criminal and terrorist
networks and openly cooperates with many malign actors, which poses a
serious threat to U.S. national security.
Question. What would you say are the pitfalls and potential
incentives that could persuade such a regime to peacefully give up
control of Venezuela?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support a negotiated solution to the
Venezuelan crisis that leads to free and fair presidential and
parliamentary elections and a return of the rule of law and democracy
in Venezuela. The United States stands ready to support such a
negotiation, led by the Venezuelans themselves. I am committed to work
with our partners inside Venezuela and in the international community
to pressure Maduro to commit to a serious process. Recognizing the
difficulties of engaging with such a regime, a potential incentive
would be the lifting of economic sanctions and acknowledgement of the
legitimacy of a Government in Venezuela--which, as the administration
has noted previously, can and will only occur if democracy is restored.
A pitfall of engaging with the Maduro regime is that the regime
continues to buy time while dividing the opposition and the
international community, seeking only minimum concessions to obtain
some domestic and international legitimacy without addressing the main
issues that will lead to the restoration of democracy in Venezuela. I
commit to remaining clear-eyed about these risks, if confirmed. I will
seek to engage with Interim President Guaido and other Venezuelans who
wish to promote democracy and the international community to promote
positive change and mitigate the risks laid out above.
Question. To what extent is the Maduro regime providing safe haven
to transnational criminal organizations, including U.S.-designated
foreign terrorist organizations?
Answer. The illegitimate Maduro regime allows and tolerates the use
of its territory by terrorist organizations and non-state armed groups,
including the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident members of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, among others. The regime's
practically nonexistent international drug control cooperation,
usurpation of the judicial system and military and security services
for its own illicit ends, public corruption, and cooperation with
criminal elements have provided ideal conditions for transnational
criminal organizations to thrive.
Question. To what extent do senior members of the Maduro regime
support and protect various transnational criminal groups operating
within the borders of Venezuela?
Answer. I understand that, at times, regime officials have openly
welcomed transnational criminal groups' presence in Venezuela. During
the closing remarks of the 2019 Sao Paolo Forum in Caracas, Maduro
stated that Iv n M rquez and Jesus Santrich (former Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) leaders who were at that time missing and
widely presumed to have left the peace process and returned to
terrorist activities) were both welcome in Venezuela. The regime
leverages drug trafficking, illegal and illicit gold mining, and a
variety of black-market financial transactions to enrich its leaders
and evade sanctions, necessarily working with transnational criminal
organizations. These operations could not take place without
acquiescence or approval at the highest levels.
Question. In your view, what is the nature of the relationships
between senior members of the Maduro regime and transnational criminal
organizations?
Answer. I understand the regime is complicit with transnational
criminal organizations, including dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian-origin National Liberation
Army (ELN), and Hezbollah sympathizers. Maduro and his associates use
criminal activities to help maintain their illegitimate hold on power.
Profit-seeking networks between FARC dissidents, ELN, and other
Venezuelan non-state armed groups facilitate the regime's public
corruption and graft schemes, to include those involving senior members
of the Maduro regime.
Question. In your view, what is the nature of the relationships
between Venezuelan security forces and transnational criminal
organizations?
Answer. Profit-seeking ties between dissident members of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian-origin
National Liberation Army (ELN), and Venezuelan paramilitary groups
facilitate the public corruption and graft schemes of the regime to
include other members of the armed forces. According to the Department
of Justice indictments of Maduro and 14 other regime officials unsealed
in March 2020, some senior Venezuelan political, intelligence, and
military officials have facilitated drug trafficking through the
country since at least 1999. Venezuelan security services have also
clashed with transnational criminal organizations, such as FARC
dissident groups and the ELN. While Venezuelan security services do
occasionally confront and even kill non-state armed group members, it
is difficult to know if that reflects national strategy or local
conflicts of interest on the part of regime commanders.
Question. Do actions by the Maduro regime related to transnational
criminal activities undermine U.S. counter-narcotics cooperation with
Colombia? Do actions related to transnational criminal activities
undertaken by the Maduro regime undermine the 2016 Colombian agreement
with the FARC?
Answer. The historically weak government presence at the border
between Colombia and Venezuela has allowed terrorist groups to operate,
particularly Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents,
the National Liberation Army (ELN), and other criminal networks
involved in trafficking and smuggling. A number of FARC dissidents
engage in terrorist and other criminal activities, particularly in
border regions and areas previously controlled by the FARC. Colombian
drug-trafficking organizations--including various dissident FARC
factions, the ELN, and other criminal groups--orchestrate the shipment
of illicit drugs through Venezuela.
Question. Is the National Electoral Council named on May 5, 2021, a
credible step to advance a negotiated and peaceful solution to
Venezuela's political, economic, and humanitarian crises?
Answer. The goal of the United States is a peaceful, stable, and
democratic Venezuela. While the National Electoral Council (CNE) that
was named was slightly less imbalanced than others in recent memory, it
is no substitute for a comprehensive process leading to free and fair
presidential and parliamentary elections and other guarantees, which
are long overdue.
The CNE in question was composed by an illegitimate body--a
national assembly Maduro installed based on fraudulent elections on
December 6, 2020. The real test is whether the CNE guarantees the right
of Venezuelans to freely choose their representatives, not merely its
composition.
Given Maduro's track record, if confirmed, I will work assiduously
with our international partners to continue to press for the
fundamental changes needed, including lifting bans on political
parties, the unconditional release of political prisoners, invitations
to credible international electoral observers, a public electoral
calendar, and the unhindered access and distribution of humanitarian
aid.
Question. Can the humanitarian crisis affecting Venezuela be
resolved under Maduro's watch?
Answer. Venezuelans are suffering from one of the worst economic
and humanitarian crises outside of a war in modern history. Since 2017,
more than 5.6 million Venezuelans have been forced to flee their
country.
The illegitimate Maduro regime mismanages the economy, plunders
public coffers, and impedes access to critical humanitarian assistance,
including lifesaving food and nutrition aid. If confirmed, I will work
to open more possibilities for humanitarian workers, organizations, and
assistance to reach the Venezuelan people in Venezuela and beyond.
Since 2017, the United States has provided more than $1.2 billion
in humanitarian, economic, development, and health assistance to help
Venezuelans, including more than $1 billion in humanitarian assistance,
both inside Venezuela and throughout the region.
Question. Has the Biden administration determined a specific
timeline for completion of its ongoing review of U.S. policy in Cuba?
Answer. I understand the administration has committed to carefully
reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, to ensure it advances the goals the
administration is trying to achieve in empowering the Cuban people to
determine their future. I understand there is no set timeline for the
review, and the administration is eager to consider views from a
variety of stakeholders from various sectors and viewpoints. If
confirmed, I will support the Department's review with an eye toward
assessing its impact on the political and economic wellbeing of the
Cuban people as well as the promotion of democracy and human rights,
and I look forward to consulting with Congress regularly on this issue.
Question. Should Cuba be removed from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism (SST) while they continue to provide safe harbor to violent
U.S. fugitives?
Answer. I understand the administration has committed to carefully
reviewing decisions made in the prior administration, including the
decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. If
confirmed, I look forward to supporting the administration's review of
Cuba policy and consulting regularly with Congress. Our priority in
Cuba, as the rest of the Hemisphere, needs to be democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. Countries should not be grandfathered
because they have failed to respect those tenets.
Question. If confirmed, would you support Cuba's removal from the
SST list without verifiable assurances that it would cease to foster a
permissive environment for international terrorists?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully and thoroughly review all
material related to the decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor
of Terrorism, including the underlying rationale. I look forward to
supporting the administration's review of Cuba policy, if confirmed.
Question. The United States has extradition treaties with
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These treaties cover crimes that
are often committed in relation to human trafficking activities feeding
the illegal migration crisis at our southern border. If confirmed, do
you commit to consider and report to the committee ways in which the
U.S. could better leverage existing bilateral extradition treaties with
the countries in Northern Central America to combat illegal migration
from the region?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to evaluate our extradition treaties
with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These treaties can be
powerful tools for combatting crime, including human trafficking and
migrant smuggling. I will consider all available tools at the
Department's disposal to help address the root causes of irregular
migration in and from Central America, including corruption and
impunity, and I will continue to consult closely with Congress on these
issues.
Question. The United States has leveraged sanctions and diplomatic
efforts, but what other actions do you think are needed to
significantly ramp up pressure ahead of the November general elections
in Nicaragua?
Answer. I believe we need to continue to work through diplomatic
efforts, coordinated multilateral pressure, support for democratic
actors, and targeted economic measures, as appropriate, to advocate for
free and fair presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. The
United States will continue working closely with our partners in the
OAS, EU, and others to urge the Nicaraguan Government to implement free
and fair elections. If the Ortega regime fails to take meaningful
reforms by the May OAS deadline, if confirmed, I will work with our
partners to use the diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal, and
will continue to coordinate on targeted measures with Canada, the EU,
and the United Kingdom. The United States will keep using our voice,
vote, and influence so that international financial institution lending
does not support non-democratic actors in Nicaragua. It is important
that the United States and our allies clearly state that we will give
credibility to and work with the winner of a free and fair election,
but it will be extremely difficult to work constructively with a
government emerging from a fraudulent election.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend reviewing Nicaragua's
continued participation in--and access to--the full benefits afforded
under the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR) should the
November elections fail to meet international standards?
Answer. CAFTA-DR has improved the lives of the people of Nicaragua
and the United States. In order to continue to build on that
partnership and expand our economic partnership, the U.S. should make
clear that Nicaraguans would benefit from good governance,
transparency, and the rule of law. Given the deterioration of those
democratic principles in Nicaragua, we are already ensuring that trade
capacity building and technical assistance, including joint efforts on
customs and border management, labor, environment, and agriculture, are
not directed toward the Nicaraguan Government. If the November
elections are not free and fair, the U.S. would continue to review the
Nicaraguan Government's participation in these trade-related
activities, with a view toward promoting good governance and
transparency in the region.
Question. According to the 2019 State Department Report on Human
Rights in Nicaragua, ``there were numerous reports that the Government
or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings'' in response to
the April 2018 pro-democracy protests, where the Government's violent
crackdown left at least 325 people dead; over 2,000 injured; hundreds
illegally detained; tortured, and disappeared; and more than 80,000
exiled in neighboring countries. An Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) team concluded in July 2018 that the Nicaraguan security
forces' actions could be considered crimes against humanity. The Office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights also describes Nicaragua
as suffering from a ``climate of widespread terror.'' If confirmed,
what specific actions would you support to hold members of the Ortega-
Murillo regime accountable for serious human rights abuses and crimes
against humanity?
Answer. The administration is committed to promoting accountability
for Ortega and his collaborators who undermine democracy or violate
human rights, and will continue to call out abuses when they occur. The
United States was a co-sponsor, along with 51 countries, of the March
2021 U.N. Human Rights Council resolution which called for justice and
accountability in Nicaragua. If confirmed, I will intensify our efforts
to promote and protect freedoms of expression, association, and
peaceful assembly, and I will urge the Ortega regime to fully and
unconditionally release all arbitrarily detained persons. The United
States will continue to use the economic and diplomatic tools at our
disposal, including targeted sanctions and bilateral and multilateral
engagement, to support Nicaraguans' calls for human rights, democracy,
and justice.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work with my office to
clear the backlog of extraditions from Mexico to the United States?
Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national
security priority. It is critical that the United States and Mexico
work together to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and
their operations, reduce impunity and corruption, and strengthen the
rule of law in Mexico. If confirmed, I commit to working with you and
other members of the U.S. Congress, my U.S. interagency colleagues, and
Mexican Government officials to ensure we are working closely together
to move extradition requests as quickly and effectively as possible.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. How can the State Department and interagency partners
encourage Northern Triangle governments to promote a culture of tax
compliance among their citizens and businesses? Will you commit to
ensure that the State Department works with these governments to
fulfill the legal and financial obligations necessary to foster an
attractive investment environment and stimulate economic growth,
including the timely refund of excess taxes paid by U.S. companies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with interagency partners to
provide technical assistance to host governments as they pursue more
efficient, transparent, fair governance, including support for e-
government solutions. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring the Department
works with governments to foster a more attractive business environment
as an important component of our efforts to address the root causes of
migration.
Question. How can we work with Central American governments to
improve the operating environment for business, including U.S.
companies? What steps will you take to promote the speedy and fair
resolution of commercial disputes, especially in Honduras?
Answer. I share your commitment to support U.S. investor and
property interests in Central America. The Department urges foreign
governments, including at the highest levels when appropriate, to
resolve outstanding commercial disputes. The Department generally takes
no position on the merits of any specific claim or dispute but
advocates for a fair, transparent, and expeditious resolution. The
Department will continue to assist in resolution of outstanding U.S.
citizen claims as appropriate.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. What is your view of the state of democracy in Latin
America?
Answer. Our hemisphere is overwhelmingly committed to democracy,
but there are troubling signs of backsliding in the region that require
sustained and serious attention. September 11 will mark the 20th
anniversary of the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, which
reflects the commitment of OAS member states to promote and defend
democracy in the region. Through public diplomacy, increased engagement
by civil society, and coordination with like-minded partners, the
United States is promoting accountability for the actions of the Maduro
regime and Cuba that undermine democracy and human rights; using
diplomatic and economic measures and working multilaterally with
partners to urge Nicaragua to hold free and fair presidential and
legislative elections in November; and holding the government of Haiti
to its commitment to hold free and fair legislative and presidential
elections in 2021 to put an end to Haiti's prolonged rule by decree and
facilitate a peaceful transfer of power to a newly elected president in
February 2022.
The weakening of democratic institutions in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras, is troubling. If confirmed, I will join the
administration's commitment to supporting the rule of law and democracy
in these countries, including through the use of Congressionally
mandated corrupt actors lists to designate and sanction those
responsible for the degrading of democracy in Central America. If
confirmed, I will intensify efforts to work with allies and partners to
further strengthen democratic institutions and support democracy
throughout the region.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to bolster our
democratic partners in the region?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work toward our strategic goal of a
more inclusive, secure, prosperous, and democratic hemisphere aligned
with U.S. values and interests. I will lead our team to support
independent civil society throughout the region, and will encourage
governments to support and promote press freedom and the safety of
journalists and to counter those who may seek to undermine democracy
and security. We will seek to work with allies, partners, and
multilateral institutions to promote a shared vision to respect human
rights and fight corruption and impunity, such as we do with our
support of the Citizen Corruption Observatory. This initiative stemmed
from the 2018 Summit of the Americas and builds the capacity of civil
society to monitor governments' implementation of anticorruption
efforts. In addition, we will work with USAID to enhance the region's
anti-corruption efforts by bolstering the capacity of stakeholders to
engage in advocacy, oversight, and monitoring.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting ongoing U.S.
programs which promote democracy and human rights in Cuba, such as
through funding the office of Cuba Broadcasting?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to ensuring that support for
democracy and human rights is at the core of our efforts to empower the
Cuban people to determine their own future. I will also ensure the U.S.
continues its steadfast support and engagement with Cuban human rights
defenders, activists, and civil society members to bolster their
important work; promote human rights, fundamental freedoms, and
democracy; and facilitate the Cuban people's uncensored access to
information.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensure that the U.S. does
not lift restrictions or sanctions on Cuba until conditions are met
pursuant to U.S. law?
Answer. The administration has committed to carefully reviewing
U.S.-Cuba policy, including how it implements relevant legislation and
our posture regarding economic sanctions on Cuba, to ensure they
advance the goals the administration is trying to achieve in empowering
the Cuban people to determine their future. We will do so in adherence
to U.S. law. If confirmed, I will support the Department's review of
the policy with an eye toward assessing its impact on the political and
economic wellbeing of the Cuban people and the promotion of democracy.
If confirmed, I look forward to consulting regularly with Congress on
this issue. Throughout my career, I have worked diligently to promote
respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy. Democracy and
support for human rights will be at the core of our policy toward Cuba.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to prioritize Venezuela,
and continue to work with regional allies, to hold the Maduro regime
and his cronies accountable?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly with international
partners and regional allies to promote accountability for the Maduro
regime by building multilateral pressure and implementing appropriate
and coordinated sanctions against regime officials and their enablers
who undermine democracy, abuse human rights, or engage in other corrupt
or criminal activity. A secure, democratic, and prosperous Venezuela
would mean a more secure, democratic, and prosperous region. In this
fundamental aspect, Venezuela is a top priority for the region.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to supporting the legitimate
government of Venezuela under President Juan Guaido and working to
unify the opposition to the Maduro regime?
Answer. If confirmed, my team and I will continue to support the
efforts of the interim government led by Juan Guaido to peacefully
restore democracy and rule of law in Venezuela via free and fair
presidential and parliamentary elections. We are encouraged by and will
continue to support unity on the fundamental goal of free and fair
elections, and the pursuit of the guarantees required to restore
democracy and rule of law to the country.
Question. If confirmed, what would you propose the United States do
to support a free and fair elections?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to work through diplomatic
efforts, coordinated multilateral pressure, support for pro-democracy
actors, and targeted economic measures, as appropriate, to advocate for
free and fair presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. The
United States will continue to work closely with partners in the OAS,
EU, and others to urge the Nicaraguan government to implement free and
fair elections. If the Ortega regime fails to take meaningful reforms
by the May OAS deadline, we will work with our partners to use the
diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal. We will continue efforts
to coordinate on targeted measures with Canada, the EU, and the United
Kingdom. We will continue to use our voice, vote, and influence so that
international financial institution lending does not support non-
democratic actors in Nicaragua. It is important that the United States
and our allies clearly state that we will give credibility to and work
with the winner of a free and fair election, but it will be extremely
difficult to work constructively with a government emerging from a
fraudulent election.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing efforts to
counter vaccine diplomacy by China in the region?
Answer. COVID-19 is the most pressing challenge to our collective
health, well-being, and economic security in a century. If confirmed, I
will continue the U.S. commitment to collaborate with partners across
the globe, including Taiwan, to end the pandemic and mitigate its
severe public health and economic impacts. The Biden administration has
already loaned AstraZeneca vaccines to Mexico and Canada. If confirmed,
I will work to support a science-based approach that prioritizes an
equitable distribution of vaccines to countries in our region.
President Biden announced the United States will donate at least 80
million vaccine doses to meet global needs by the end of June, far more
than any other nation has donated, including the People's Republic of
China or Russia. Importantly, our shots do not come with strings
attached; the United States views vaccines as a tool to end the
pandemic, not a means to achieve political outcomes.
The United States is also the largest donor to Gavi for the COVAX
Facility, having contributed $2 billion with plans to donate an
additional $2 billion by 2022. I understand all countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean have received one or more COVAX shipments,
except for Cuba and Haiti who do not participate in COVAX. If
confirmed, I will continue to ensure our close coordination with COVAX
and other partners to ensure safe and effective vaccines are delivered
in a way that is equitable and follows the science and public health
data.
Question. What are your views on the need to prioritize the region
for distribution of excess and surplus vaccines?
Answer. Vaccine distribution is a priority in the region. If
confirmed, I will work within the administration to coordinate with our
partners in the region to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including
through the distribution of vaccines. The United States has loaned
Canada and Mexico 1.5 million and 2.7 million doses of AstraZeneca
vaccines, respectively, and the administration is currently considering
the best manner in which to implement President Biden's further
commitment to donate at least 80 million surplus vaccines. If
confirmed, I will work to prioritize the region and advocate that it
has the tools necessary, including via both bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms, to bring a quick end to the current pandemic and prepare
for, detect, and respond to the next pandemic.
Question. How might the United States support Ecuador's efforts to
diversify its economy and decouple from China?
Answer. The United States remains Ecuador's largest trading
partner, with $10.2 billion in total two-way trade in goods in 2020. In
December of 2020, the United States and Ecuador finalized the
negotiation of a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency, an agreement
that is a positive step forward in our trade relationship.
The United States is committed to increasing investment in Ecuador
through projects that support long-term sustainable growth and
prosperity. This includes enabling private sector investment in climate
mitigation, adaptation, and resilience, as well as investments in clean
energy. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)
will also look to support investments in gender equality, financial
inclusion, and recovery from COVID-19. The United States has provided
funding and training to help the energy ministry and electric utility
adopt new regulations to attract private investment in the electricity
sector, as well as design and conduct Ecuador's first-ever competitive
and transparent tenders for power sector projects, resulting in awards
to qualified companies. The United States also is helping women with
small businesses, through programs such as the Academy for Women
Entrepreneurs and providing lines of credit to Ecuadoran banks to
secure loans for small and medium enterprises. USAID in Ecuador is also
working to pursue the most impactful projects investing in the most
underserved communities. If confirmed, I will work with Ecuador to
expand our partnership.
Question. What steps can the administration take to support other
countries that would like to develop 5G networks without Huawei or
other Chinese tech support?
Answer. The Biden administration is working throughout the region
to communicate the risks associated with telecommunications equipment
from untrusted, high-risk vendors and to support the growing number of
governments and businesses concerned with safely capturing the benefits
of 5G without jeopardizing national and economic security or personal
privacy.
If confirmed, I would connect countries interested in developing
secure 5G networks with trusted equipment and service providers,
highlight available U.S. government financing tools, and underscore the
potential for emerging technologies like open radio access networks
(open RAN) to increase diversity, innovation, and transparency in 5G
supply chains.
Question. As Colombia is facing many challenges, including the
influx of almost 2 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants, in
addition to violence presented in the country. What U.S. assistance to
Colombia do you think would be most effective to ensure Colombia can
face these challenges while also respecting the civil rights of
protesters?
Answer. Colombia is a vital strategic partner that shares our
democratic values. I recognize the devastating impacts the COVID-19
pandemic has had on the Colombian people and economy, as well as the
fiscal challenges associated with its generous reception of Venezuelan
refugees and migrants. If confirmed, I will ensure the United States
continues to leverage diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance to
help Colombia address urgent needs, including strengthening its health
system, promoting inclusive economic growth to recover from the
pandemic, facilitating an effective humanitarian response to the
Venezuela crisis, and expanding security, state presence, and access to
justice throughout the country, including continuing human rights
training for security personnel.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to encourage the
government of Haiti conducts upcoming presidential elections in a
manner that is free and fair?
Answer. I believe the Haitian people deserve the opportunity to
elect their leaders and restore Haiti's democratic institutions. If
confirmed, I will prioritize efforts to hold the government of Haiti to
its commitment to hold free and fair legislative and presidential
elections in 2021, and to work with Haitian political, economic, and
civil society stakeholders across the spectrum, as well as
international partners, in support of elections this year.
I recognize that the legitimacy of Haiti's 2021 elections and the
government's credibility with the Haitian population will depend on
factors such as whether there is consensus on a political accord, the
participation of credible political actors, widespread voter
registration, and security and voter turnout on election day. The U.S.
government is providing more than $3 million to the Consortium for
Elections and Political Processes Strengthening, which includes the
National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. The Consortium's pre-
elections activities include focusing on improving electoral
administration, strengthening the competitiveness of political parties,
educating voters on electoral processes, promoting transparent
electoral processes, and ensuring inclusive voter participation in
Haiti. The United States also provides advice, training, and equipment
to build the Haitian National Police's capacity to provide security.
U.S.-supported training and equipment for the police's public order
unit will help them prevent and respond to potential violence at voting
centers.
Observers from organizations such as the Organization of American
States (OAS) provide a regional voice and can help ensure free and fair
elections. If confirmed, I will seek support from multilateral
organizations, such as the OAS, and would welcome other international
observers.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What are the Biden administration's plans to address
increasing COVID-19 concerns in Central and South America considering
the growing number of illegal migrants who are currently crossing the
border?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to rebuilding
a safe, orderly, and humane immigration system while ensuring public
safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the weeks ahead, working with
the world's democracies, if confirmed I will help coordinate a
multilateral effort to end the pandemic. The United States will
continue to review non-essential travel restrictions at land borders to
help protect against cross-border transmission of COVID-19 and will
consider easing restrictions when it is safe to do so. The
administration is considering the best manner in which to implement
President Biden's further commitment to donate at least 80 million
surplus vaccines. The United States is also the largest donor to Gavi
for the U.N. COVAX Facility, having already contributed $2 billion with
plans to donate an additional $2 billion by 2022.
Question. Do you believe that the Biden administration should
prioritize providing COVID-19 vaccines to countries in Central and
South America given the proximity to the United States and the growing
number of illegal migrants who are currently crossing the border?
Answer. Vaccine distribution is a priority in the region, and if
confirmed, I will work with the interagency, COVAX, and other partners
to prioritize the equitable delivery of COVID-19 vaccines in a way that
follows the science and public health data. The administration has
loaned Canada and Mexico 1.5 million and 2.7 million doses of
AstraZeneca vaccines, respectively, and is currently considering the
best manner in which to implement President Biden's further commitment
to donate at least 80 million surplus vaccines. If confirmed, I will
work to prioritize the region and advocate that it has the tools
necessary, especially vaccines, including via both bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms, to bring a quick end to the current pandemic
and prepare for, detect, and respond to the next pandemic.
Question. What is the United States currently doing to counter
China's growing influence in Central and South America and what can the
United States do more?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) represents a serious
challenge to U.S. interests in the region, with its growing security
ties and infrastructure investments. If confirmed, I will lead our team
to meet this challenge by advancing our positive agenda for the
hemisphere. We will build on our shared values of democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. We will welcome our allies and partners'
expertise and resources to support the region's COVID-19 response,
entrepreneurship, and sustainable infrastructure. We will support high-
standard investment in infrastructure and transparent economic
development that creates jobs essential for regional pandemic recovery.
If confirmed, I will continue to work with our allies and partners
in Central and South America to help the region address the pandemic
and recover from the related economic crisis. We will work to ensure
competitive and transparent investment environments that help level the
playing field for U.S. and other trusted businesses, strengthen our
security and law enforcement cooperation, and promote secure
telecommunications networks. We will draw attention to and counter
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. We will support and
expand Taiwan's bilateral relationships in Central and South America.
Question. Do you believe that Taiwan's ability to maintain formal
diplomatic relations with countries in the Western hemisphere benefits
U.S. strategic interests? Nine out of fifteen countries with formal
diplomatic relations are in the Western hemisphere. As part of China's
push to de-legitimize Taiwan, Beijing has used various tactics,
including COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy, infrastructure assistance, elite
capture, corrupt practices, to compel countries in the Western
hemisphere to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Answer. As a strong democracy, Taiwan is an essential partner in a
region overwhelmingly committed to democratic values, human rights, and
the rule of law. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. efforts to support
Taiwan's diplomatic and unofficial relationships across the Western
Hemisphere region. Together with like-minded countries we can support
good governance, transparent investments, and economic growth.
Question. What is the Biden's administration's plans to address the
increasing COVID-19 concerns in Central and South America considering
the high number of migrants that are crossing the border each day?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration remains committed to
rebuilding a safe, orderly, and humane immigration system while
ensuring public safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with the world's democracies to coordinate a
multilateral effort to end the pandemic. The United States will
continue to review non-essential travel restrictions at land borders to
help protect against cross-border transmission of COVID-19 and will
consider easing restrictions when it is safe to do so. The
administration is considering the best manner in which to implement
President Biden's further commitment to donate at least 80 million
surplus vaccines. The United States is also the largest donor to Gavi
for the U.N. COVAX Facility, having already contributed $2 billion with
plans to donate an additional $2 billion by 2022.
Question. Do you agree that the Biden administration should
prioritize COVID-19 vaccines to countries in Central and South America
considering the proximity to the United States and the high number of
migrants that are crossing the border?
Answer. I agree that the United States should continue to do more
to help the world by taking a leading role in ending the pandemic
globally and building a coordinated, multilateral effort around the
world aimed at ending the pandemic. Our overarching aim is to get as
many safe and effective vaccines to as many people as fast as possible.
If confirmed, I will work with COVAX and other partners to prioritize
the equitable delivery of COVID-19 vaccines that follows the science
and public health data.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Brian Schatz
Question. The Caribbean region has abundant solar and wind
resources, yet its electricity is overwhelmingly generated by fossil
fuels. In 2012, Aruba set a target of 100 percent renewable energy by
2020. In 2019, 81 percent of its electricity still came from fossil
fuels. Likewise, in 2011, Grenada established a goal of 100 percent
renewable energy by 2030. With diesel currently providing 98.5 percent
of the island's electricity, it is not on track to meet its goal.
Question. The United States works with Caribbean partners to
promote energy supply diversification, to develop cost-effective and
resilient power systems, and to help create investment opportunities
for U.S. and Caribbean firms.
The Department has identified diversification of energy supplies
away from a single source of fuel and promotion of U.S. exports,
particularly renewable energy, as two primary objectives in promoting
Caribbean energy security.
If confirmed, I will redouble our commitment to these efforts. The
Caribbean's high dependency on imported diesel for power generation and
low reliability of electric service and frequent power outages have led
to the highest average electricity prices in the Western Hemisphere.
Question. What are the barriers to renewable energy development in
the Caribbean, and how will you work to address these barriers and
expedite renewable energy development as Assistant Secretary of State
of Western Hemisphere Affairs?
Answer. Barriers to renewable energy development in the Caribbean
include limited economies of scale, inadequate policy and regulatory
frameworks, and antiquated transmission and distribution
infrastructure. Integrating clean power generation also requires
significant investments in transmission infrastructure and technologies
such as battery storage to accommodate variable generation.
Caribbean nations have nevertheless made progress in energy
diversification and U.S. cooperation has worked to advance stronger,
more resilient, and more efficient power systems.
Question. Would it make sense to help an initial island or two
decarbonize as models for the region?
Answer. Several Caribbean islands, including Jamaica and Nevis,
have engaged with the United States to develop renewable energy
sources. These are indeed model projects.
Our whole of government effort promotes energy diversification and
resilient energy systems through improved governance, increased access
to financing, and donor coordination. If confirmed, I will work with
interagency partners, multilateral organizations, and Caribbean nations
to advance those efforts.
We address the barrier of high-cost financing for energy project
development through a $25 million guarantee agreement with National
Commercial Bank of Jamaica to help provide loans for clean energy
projects across the Caribbean and a $10 million credit guaranty to
catalyze $20 million in loans for clean energy borrowers, focused on
off-grid solar projects.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. President Biden's recent Presidential Memorandum on
Advancing the Human rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender,
Queer and Intersex Persons Around the World calls on the State
Department to build coalitions of like-minded nations in international
organizations to fight against LGBTQI+ discrimination. What more could
the International Organization Bureau do to advance that mandate?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to utilizing the diversity and
talent within the IO Bureau to play a leadership role in promoting the
human rights and social inclusion of LGBTQI+ persons abroad. IO leads
an Interagency Working Group on leveraging multilateral tools to
address LGBTQI+ issues and, if confirmed, I will ensure this group
works to advance these issues across various multilateral fora, to
include the United Nations, regional organizations, international
development banks, and multi-stakeholder coalitions, such as the Equal
Rights Coalition as well as the U.N. LGBTI Core Group. If confirmed, I
will also work to strengthen existing multilateral mandates like the
U.N. Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and
advance efforts to increase Global South support for the human rights
of LGBTQI+ persons. If confirmed, I will also work to increase civil
society engagement in the IO Bureau's efforts to advance the human
rights of LGBTQI+ individuals.
Question. Debates at the U.N., and the programmatic activities of
U.N. agencies, often revolve around government repression that leads to
refugee flows, terrorism, and civil conflict.? Some of the populations
most directly impacted by that repression are minority populations--
whether sexual, ethnic, gender or racial in character. How can the U.N.
be more active and impactful in heading off the causes of this
repression, and in condemning it when it occurs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage U.N. leadership to enhance
its advocacy as well as U.N. monitoring and implementation efforts to
address such repression. I will work closely with our U.N. partners to
condemn violations of international law and continue the United States'
strong support for the promotion and protection of human rights,
including through access to justice, and humanitarian response and
durable solutions for displaced persons. I will maintain strong U.S.
engagement with and support for key U.N. mechanisms and bodies such as
the Human Rights Council. I will encourage U.N. partners to take
concrete measures to protect minority rights and deepen partnerships
with stakeholders to address the root causes of repression.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator James E. Risch
Question. The upcoming U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Syria Cross
Border mandate renewal is of grave concern to me and my colleagues in
Congress. Not only should this administration work to renew the one
remaining crossing, Bab Al-Hawa, but it should actively work to build
consensus in the Security Council to re-open two previously closed
crossings, Bab Al-Salam and Yarubiyah.
If confirmed, how would you engage with partners in the UNSC to
ensure this mandate renewal passes?
Answer. Unhindered access to humanitarian assistance in Syria is an
urgent priority for the United States, as it should be for all nations.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues its sustained
high-level engagement with Security Council members and regional
stakeholders, as well as with U.N. leadership, to include Secretary-
General Antonio Guterres, to underscore the importance of the
reauthorization and expansion of the U.N. cross-border humanitarian
assistance mechanism.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend that Secretary Blinken
and even President Biden engage at the highest possible levels on this
important issue?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will recommend that senior Department
and White House officials continue to engage with key stakeholders on
this issue, as that engagement is already underway. President Biden
encouraged Security Council action on Syria when he hosted Permanent
Representatives from the U.N. Security Council in March during the U.S.
presidency of the Security Council. Also in March, Secretary Blinken
represented the United States in the Syria humanitarian briefing to the
Security Council and made clear the importance of this issue to help
relieve the humanitarian crisis in Syria.
Question. How will you, if confirmed, work to ensure that U.S.
taxpayer dollars that fund U.N. humanitarian assistance are not being
used to effectively subsidize the Assad regime, which blockades
assistance to innocent Syrians through seizure of cross-line assistance
attempts?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with Department of
State and USAID colleagues, U.N. stakeholders, and NGOs to ensure that
aid intended for Syrians in need reaches its intended recipients and
does not benefit the Assad regime. The United States remains the single
largest humanitarian donor to the Syrian people. The United States
further supports all methods of delivering humanitarian assistance to
the Syrian people throughout the country, including both cross-border
and cross-line deliveries; however, cross-line deliveries from Damascus
alone, even if executed properly and unhindered, do not have the
capacity to fully address the needs of the Syrian people.
Question. The recent establishment of the office of ``Multilateral
Personnel and Strategy'' within the bureau of International
Organizations structure presents new avenues to address the growing
malign influence across the U.N. system.
How will you empower this office to address the systematic Chinese
and/or Russia malign influence within the U.N.?
Answer. I believe the establishment of the new office of
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel in the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs will enable the United States to more
strategically engage across the multilateral system to counter
authoritarian countries' efforts to undermine its institutions, values,
and principles. The U.S. approach toward China and Russia at the U.N.
will derive from a clear and compelling affirmative U.S. policy agenda
centered on human rights, individual freedoms, transparency, and good
governance. When China and Russia seek to undermine the international
rules-based order, the United States will take decisive action to
oppose those efforts. If confirmed, I will work to empower the new
office and look forward to working with Congress to ensure it is well-
equipped to lead this work.
Question. What is your strategy for increasing American
representation in the U.N. system including through the Junior
Professional Officer program, appointments, and elections?
Answer. Successfully increasing the number of U.S. citizens
employed at all levels of the U.N. system requires a multifaceted
approach that will involve identifying and recruiting qualified
candidates, providing information on the application or election
process, and advocating for their selection where appropriate. If
confirmed, I will institutionalize efforts to establish and expand
these capabilities on behalf of qualified U.S. candidates, and to
consult closely with Congress to ensure that these efforts are
sufficiently resourced. I will also work with the interagency and our
allies and partners to support the election of qualified, independent
U.S. citizens and other likeminded candidates for key leadership roles
in the U.N. system.
Question. Do you believe that a designated U.N. Integrity
Coordinator should be appointment and empowered to work across the
Department to lead this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize ensuring that the IO Bureau
has the resources and staffing it needs to coordinate across the
Department and with our partners and allies to advance an affirmative
agenda and counter efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
other countries to undermine the values at the foundation of the U.N.
and multilateral system. That includes working with all relevant
players, and in consultation with Congress. Addressing the challenges
posed by these countries requires strong U.S. leadership to defend the
foundational principles, values, and rules of the international system,
and to support qualified and independent candidates for key leadership
roles. I understand that IO appreciates the support that Congress has
provided to date on strengthening these efforts, and has already begun
to adapt its structure to prioritize this work.
Question. Please detail your strategy for engaging with the
International Criminal Court, including with relevant bureaus like
Global Criminal Justice, regarding their ongoing investigations into
U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Israel.
Answer. I strongly agree with the administration's objection to
attempts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to assert
jurisdiction over U.S. and Israeli personnel. President Biden and
Secretary Blinken have been clear that the United States will continue
to oppose attempts by the ICC to assert such jurisdiction. The United
States and Israel are not States Parties to the Rome Statute, and the
Palestinians do not qualify as a State.
Question. U.S. Taxpayers have sent billions to U.N. Relief and
Works Agency since the 1950s when it was originally established. Given
the administrations resumption of funds without securing much needed
reform, please detail your engagement plans to ensure no more taxpayer
dollars are sent to a bloated organization straying from its mandate.
Answer. If confirmed, I will insist that UNRWA adhere to the U.N.
principles of neutrality, tolerance, anti-discrimination, and
protection of human rights, as well as insist on strict UNRWA internal
controls. The best way for the United States to influence UNRWA's
operations and ensure its provision of quality education, health
services, and emergency humanitarian relief consistent with U.N.
principles is to maintain our close working relationship with and
assistance to UNRWA. This allows the United States to direct funding to
priority areas of focus, especially ensuring neutrality in teaching
materials, staff activities, and operations, while strengthening
transparency, accountability, and internal oversight. If confirmed, I
commit to working with you to ensure the Agency has the capacity to
fulfill its service delivery mandate from the U.N. General Assembly in
line with U.N. principles, and to achieving meaningful and sustainable
reforms to UNRWA's operations.
Question. Preparations for the next scales of assessment
negotiation are underway. The Biden administration should make this a
top priority by negotiating a 25% cap on peacekeeping assessments
without compromising the existing fixed rate of 22% for the regular
budget. No one nation should pay over 25% for either budget. What
strategies will you use, if confirmed, to negotiate our assessed
peacekeeping dues to 25%?
Answer. The next negotiations among member states on U.N.
assessment rates will take place later in 2021, and I understand the
administration is strategizing for engagement on this issue. If
confirmed, I will work with Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield and her team
to advance U.S. interests in reaching agreement in the U.N. General
Assembly to lower the U.S. assessment rates and to make sure other
countries pay their fair share.
Question. Do you believe this administration should pay back
arrears accrued before 2017?
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with
Congress to determine how best to meet our financial obligations,
including addressing the substantial level of arrears that have
accumulated over the past four years and the 25-percent cap on
peacekeeping funding.
Question. U.S.-assessed and voluntary contributions to the U.N., as
appropriated under the Contributions to International Organizations
(CIO), Contributions for International Peacekeeping Operations (CIPA),
and International Organizations and Program (IO&P) accounts, represent
only a small fraction of total U.S. contributions to the U.N. system.
If confirmed, will you assist in compiling and sharing with
Congress a comprehensive report on total U.S. contributions,
from all sources, to the U.N. and its specialized agencies and
programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the efforts of the State
Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs to meet its
statutory responsibility to publish annual reports to Congress on all
U.S. Government contributions to international organizations.
Question. Will you ensure that other donors remain apprised of the
full depth and breadth of U.S. contributions from all sources?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the annual reports on
contributions created by the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs are published on the Department of State's public website,
thereby ensuring that they are available to other donors and the public
generally.
Question. Whereas assessed contributions are determined on a scale
and provide no discretion to nations, voluntary contributions are
provided to advance specific U.S. goals and objectives. Moreover,
voluntarily funded agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP)
and the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), must compete for resources and
are subject to rigorous transparency and accountability measures. If
confirmed, will you seek to ensure that the Secretary General adopts a
rigorous performance matrix, transparency requirements, and
accountability measures that apply across the U.N. system, including to
agencies and programs funded through assessed contributions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to achieve a coordinated,
government-wide effort to assess the performance of, and promote
transparency and accountability at, international organizations in the
U.N. system, including those funded through assessed contributions.
Question. Last Congress, I introduced the Multilateral Aid Review
Act to assess the value of U.S. taxpayer investments in multilateral
entities, including the U.N. and its affiliated agencies. If confirmed,
would you support a comprehensive review of U.S. investments in
multilateral organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing this issue
closely and working with Congress to ensure effective oversight of the
U.N. and its affiliated agencies. I am committed to ensuring prudent
management of U.S. taxpayer investments in multilateral entities,
including a constant focus on results, accountability, and the
elimination of waste, fraud, and mismanagement.
Question. What is your view of the relationship between the United
States and the United Nations (U.N.)?
Answer. I agree with the view of President Biden and Secretary
Blinken that many of the biggest threats we face are transnational in
nature and must be addressed collectively, including through
international organizations. Since the U.N.'s founding 75 years ago,
the United States has been critical to the U.N.'s success, and the
United Nations, in turn, has been central to U.S. efforts to secure
international peace and security. If confirmed, I will look forward to
working with Congress to ensure the U.S. relationship with the United
Nations remains constructive, continues to serve America's national
security interests, and promotes our core U.S. values.
Question. What are your thoughts regarding the U.N. Human Rights
Council (HRC)?
Answer. The U.N. Human Rights Council plays an important role in
promoting and protecting human rights, humanitarian access, and
fundamental freedoms globally, but has serious flaws as well. I am
committed to seeking HRC reforms, particularly regarding the Council's
disproportionate focus on Israel, and to its membership. When the
United States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we
can better advocate to protect Israel from unfair bias on the Council.
Recently, our engagement has helped lead to a reduction in the number
of resolutions targeting Israel. Our engagement also helps us in our
efforts to keep some of the countries with the worst human rights
records off the Council, and to encourage countries with better records
to run.
If confirmed, I will ensure the United States continues to
prioritize needed reforms as part of our re-engagement with the
Council.
Question. Now that the Biden administration has stated its intent
to run for re-election to the HRC, what reforms will the Biden
administration seek?
Answer. The United States is committed to seeking reforms of the
U.N. Human Rights Council, particularly with respect to the Council's
disproportionate focus on Israel and its problematic membership. When
we have had a seat at the table, we have been able to advocate on
Israel's behalf, and we have seen changes like a reduction in the
number of resolutions targeting Israel. We have also seen that when the
United States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we
have been able to engage with our allies and partners to keep off some
of the countries with the worst human rights records and to encourage
countries with better records to run for seats. If confirmed, I will
ensure the United States prioritizes these specific reforms.
Question. Does the Biden administration believe the HRC devotes a
disproportionate amount of attention to criticizing Israel while
ignoring more pressing human rights crises?
Answer. Yes. The United States remains concerned about the
disproportionate focus by the U.N. Human Rights Council on Israel,
including Agenda Item 7. If confirmed, I will oppose efforts to
unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through one-sided
resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United Nations,
including at the Human Rights Council. It is critical that the U.S.
show up and engage with the Council directly. U.S. engagement at the
Council can be a force for positive change and for holding countries
with the worst human rights records to account.
Question. Understanding that the HRC has been ``broken,'' in large
part, by allowing human rights abusers to obtain seats on the Council,
do you believe that conditioning U.S. participation on reform is
beneficial?
Answer. I am committed to seeking reforms of the Human Rights
Council, particularly with respect to the Council's membership and its
disproportionate focus on Israel. We have seen that when the United
States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we can
engage with our allies and partners to keep some of the countries with
the worst human rights records off the Council and to encourage
countries with better records to run for seats. We can also advocate on
Israel's behalf. With U.S. engagement, we have seen changes such as a
reduction in the number of resolutions targeting Israel. If confirmed,
I will ensure the United States continues to prioritize needed reforms
as part of our re-engagement with the Human Rights Council.
Question. There have been efforts to have the United States rejoin
the World Tourism Organization. If confirmed, would you support the re-
entry of the United States to the World Tourism Organization? What
benefits would the United States receive by re-joining this
organization?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure careful consideration and
review before any efforts are made to rejoin the World Tourism
Organization.
Question. What are your views on the need for management reform at
the U.N.?
Answer. If confirmed, I pledge to look hard at U.N. and
international organization management and budgeting practices, and at
how agencies implement their ethics rules, including whistleblower
protections.
Question. How will you work to address barriers to advancing U.N.
management reforms, especially those created by the different
priorities among member states?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to harness allies and likeminded
member states who strongly support U.N. management reform to overcome
any barriers that stand in the way of advancing reforms. It must be in
the interests of all members to make implementation of reforms an
urgent priority to make the United Nations the effective, efficient,
and responsive organization it needs to be in the 21st century.
Question. How will you measure success in implementing management
reforms at the U.N.?
Answer. If confirmed, my metric of success will be to ensure that
U.S. taxpayer dollars are well-spent, and that our multilateral
policies and programs improve the lives of the world's most vulnerable
citizens, contribute to international peace and security, and serve the
American people.
Question. What policies does the U.N. need to implement to maintain
fiscal responsibility and accountability within the U.N. system?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that international
organizations within the U.N. system are accountable and responsible
for the U.S. taxpayer resources they receive. This includes continuing
the longstanding U.S. policy of promoting budget discipline, as well as
continuing efforts to ensure that other countries pay their fair share.
Question. While the U.N. has taken steps to improve its efficiency,
operational effectiveness, and accountability, the continuing need for
reform is obvious to most observers, including strong supporters of the
institution. The U.N. Secretary-General has committed to an agenda of
reform. The push for reform by the United States is one of the main
drivers behind the reform movement's progress to date.
In your opinion, what are the top three reforms that the U.N. could
undertake over the next two years that will have the greatest
impact?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure international
organizations in the U.N. system adhere to the best management and
oversight practices, including in the areas of protecting
whistleblowers, addressing sexual exploitation and abuse, promoting
zero tolerance for corruption, and ensuring financial and managerial
transparency. This means greater transparency not only in budgeting
practices, but also in U.N. procurement practices.
The United States expects to see tangible results from management
reforms, including improved program delivery and greater
accountability. Delegating more authority to U.N. teams in the field,
closer to the point of mandate implementation, is also a key and
necessary reform.
Question. The United States is the largest donor to the World Food
Programme, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and other U.N.
agencies. Will you continue this pattern of voluntary donations to
address some of the world's most pressing issues?
Answer. I am fully committed to upholding the Biden-Harris
administration's promise to restore U.S. leadership and support for
U.N. agencies, and to advance U.S. priorities in multilateral fora and
at the United Nations. Voluntary contributions are an effective tool of
U.S. leadership that allow us to ensure organizations are accountable,
transparent, and responsive to humanitarian needs. The United States
has long been the largest global contributor of humanitarian assistance
and has increased its contributions due to the devastating impacts of
COVID-19. Of course, we owe it to U.S. taxpayers and to the
beneficiaries whose lives depend on U.N. programs to insist on
continued reforms aimed at greater U.N. effectiveness and efficiency.
Question. How do you plan to monitor the activities of the U.N.
Population Fund (UNFPA) and ensure that it is not complicit in China's
campaign of coercive abortion and sterilization of Uyghur women?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue our government's due
diligence through our membership on the U.N. Population Fund's (UNFPA)
Executive Board, including through the Board's country program document
review mechanism. UNFPA does not condone China's coercive population
policies nor does it operate in Xinjiang.
Question. There have been credible allegations that the U.N. Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights shared the names of Chinese
dissidents who were attending U.N. Human Rights Council sessions with
the Chinese Government.
If confirmed, how will you investigate these allegations?
Answer. President Biden has said he would defend the rights of
activists, political dissidents, and journalists around the world to
speak their minds freely without fear of persecution and violence. If
confirmed, I will ask relevant Department officials for a detailed
understanding of this issue and will ensure that U.S. Government
personnel prioritize this matter in engagements with the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Question. What reforms will you seek to ensure that this practice
is never again used?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ask relevant Department officials for
a detailed understanding of this issue and will ensure that U.S.
Government personnel prioritize this matter in engagements with the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Question. The United States is the single largest financial
contributor to U.N. peacekeeping activities. Congress authorizes and
appropriates U.S. contributions, and it has an ongoing interest in
ensuring such funding is used as efficiently and effectively as
possible.
Do you believe that any nation, including the United States, should
pay more than 25 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget?
Answer. The next negotiations among member states on U.N.
assessment rates will take place later in 2021, and I understand that
the administration is currently strategizing on how to engage on this
issue. If confirmed, my team and I will do everything we can to make
sure that other countries pay their fair share. If confirmed, I commit
to consulting with you and your staff on this important matter.
Question. What is your position on U.S. repayment of U.N.
peacekeeping arrears? As memorialized in the 1999 Helms-Biden
agreement, the Late Ambassador Holbrooke, then-President Clinton, then-
Secretary General Kofi Anan, and then-Senator Biden all believed that
the United States has no obligation to pay, and thus should not pay,
the roughly $500 million in ``contested arrears'' that were explicitly
excluded from the $1.6 billion Helms-Biden agreement. However, since
then, the U.N. has insisted upon keeping on its books, and the Obama
administration sought to pay over Congressional objections. Do you
commit not to pay these ``contested arrears'' per Congressional intent
as outlined in the Helms-Biden agreement?
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with
Congress to allow the United States to meet our financial obligations,
including addressing the substantial level of arrears that have
accumulated over the past four years and the 25-percent cap on
peacekeeping funding.
Question. Are there any specific steps you believe the U.N. should
take to reduce the overall size of the U.N. peacekeeping budget? If so,
what are they?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing and assessing all
existing peacekeeping missions to ensure they are still necessary for
the promotion of international peace and security. I will also work to
ensure they are as effective and efficient as possible, while providing
they have the necessary resources to fully implement their mandates,
including well-trained and well-equipped troops and police. I would
press for structural changes, including aligning U.N. procurement with
industry best practices, right-sizing mission support components, and
reforming human resources to reduce staff costs. I would also press for
the U.N. to implement financial reimbursement penalties for troop- and
police-contributing countries for poor or under-performance, in line
with the U.N. Security Council resolution 2436.
Question. Are there any specific U.N. peacekeeping missions you
would support reducing or terminating in order to reduce U.N.
peacekeeping costs? If so, what active and ongoing missions do you
believe should be reduced or terminated?
Answer. U.N. peacekeeping operations are among the most effective
mechanisms of burden-sharing in addressing the global challenges to
international peace and security. We must ensure peacekeeping
operations are using their resources as effectively and efficiently as
possible to promote sustainable political solutions to conflict. Toward
that end, I will, if confirmed, closely scrutinize missions, especially
when their mandates come up for renewal by the U.N. Security Council.
Question. There have been numerous proposals to expand U.N. support
for regional peacekeeping operations-particularly those deployed under
the auspices of the African Union-ranging from providing limited
logistical support to fully financing training, equipment, deployment,
and sustainment costs through the use of assessed U.N. peacekeeping
contributions. Whether regional missions would initially be subject to
approval by the U.N. Security Council (like the AMISOM mission in
Somalia was) is a topic of debate. However, using the U.N. as a
financing mechanism for peacekeeping operations that do not fall under
the command and control of the U.N.; lack adequate accountability
measures; and place long-term political and financial obligations upon
Member states absent Security Council oversight is a matter of serious
concern. If confirmed, will you pledge to ensure that any peacekeeping
mission funded by U.N. peacekeeping dollars is mandated and overseen by
the Security Council?
Answer. The United States has long supported strengthening
strategic AU-U.N. partnerships to better address collective peace and
security threats on the continent. If confirmed, I will strive to
ensure that any AU peace operation that receives U.N. financial support
is mandated by and preserves the primacy of the U.N. Security Council
and complies with applicable international human rights law and U.N.
conduct and discipline standards.
Question. The United Nations maintains several particular bodies
and departments that focus on the Palestinians. These include the
Division on Palestinian Rights (DPR), the Committee on the Exercise of
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP), and the
United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine
(UNISPAL).
Will you work to challenge the existence and funding of these
departments?
Answer. If confirmed, I will oppose efforts to unfairly single out
or delegitimize Israel through one-sided resolutions, reports, and
other actions across the United Nations.
Question. The United States lacks a veto over membership decisions
in U.N.-specialized agencies that the Palestinians could target for
membership. When the Palestinians obtain membership, the United States
must cut funding to that organization as required under two laws
enacted by a Democratic-led Congress in the early 1990's. U.S. Code
Title 22, Section 287e note, states:
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other
Act shall be available for the United Nations or any
specialized agency thereof which accords the Palestine
Liberation Organization the same standing as member states.''
(Adopted as Public Law 101-246 in 1990.)
The United States shall not make any voluntary or assessed
contribution: (1) to any affiliated organization of the United
Nations which grants full membership as a state to any
organization or group that does not have the internationally
recognized attributes of statehood, or (2) to the United
Nations, if the United Nations grants full membership as a
state in the United Nations to any organization or group that
does not have the internationally recognized attributes of
statehood, during any period in which such membership is
effective.'' (Adopted as Public Law 103-236 in 1994.)
The language in these provisions is clear and provides no
discretion or waiver authority. Will you support their enforcement as
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support compliance with U.S. laws.
Question. Over the past several years, the Palestinian Authority
has received votes in various U.N. bodies to upgrade its status. Such
attempts undermine the long-held belief that peace between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority can only come about as a direct result of
direct negotiations.
What is your plan to stop initiatives like this from even coming
before U.N. entities, or the General Assembly, for a vote?
Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join
international entities are premature and counterproductive. There are
no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct negotiations
between the parties. If confirmed, I will continue to make clear, both
with the parties and with international partners, that the only
realistic path forward to end this conflict is through direct
negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace.
Question. How will you address future attempts by the Palestinian
Authority to achieve statehood through the United Nations?
Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join
international entities are premature and counterproductive. There are
no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct negotiations
between the parties. If confirmed, I will continue to make clear, both
with the parties and with international partners, that the only
realistic path forward to end this conflict is through direct
negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace.
Question. The United States has long maintained a policy of
opposing many one-sided Security Council resolutions that, more often
than not, criticize Israel but fail to address other issues such as
Palestinian terrorism.
Do you support the use of an American veto to block one-sided anti-
Israel resolutions in the Security Council?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to uphold President Biden's
strong commitment to Israel and its security. This includes opposing
efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through one-sided
resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United Nations,
including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights
Council, and other bodies.
Each decision to employ the veto is considered on the basis of U.S.
policy interests and how they relate to the issue under consideration.
Question. What do you believe should be the standard employed in
deciding whether to veto or not?
Answer. Each decision to employ the veto is considered on the basis
of U.S. policy interests and how they relate to the issue under
consideration.
Question. Do you believe that there is a disproportionate focus on
Israel at the U.N.? How would you counter this at the U.N.?
Answer. Yes, and if confirmed I will continue the United States'
opposition to efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel
through one-sided resolutions, reports, and other actions across the
United Nations, including the Security Council, the General Assembly,
the Human Rights Council, and other bodies. If confirmed, I also look
forward to working with our Israeli diplomatic colleagues to promote
the election of Israel to U.N. leadership posts, inclusion in U.N.
working groups, and support for qualified Israeli candidates for U.N.
positions.
Question. In a report requested by the U.N. Human Rights Council,
the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi said in September 2020 that there
had been ``little'' in the way of ``positive changes'' since President
Evariste Ndayishimiye ``assumed office'' in June 2020, and concerns
remain about human rights abuses committed both domestically against
Burundian citizens and through Burundi's engagements in the region.
What are your views on the human rights situation in Burundi? Do
you believe the United States is in a position to reset its
relationship with Ndayishimiye's Government, given the seeming
continuity in human rights abuses from the former Nkurunziza
Government?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by ongoing serious human rights
violations in Burundi, while recognizing some recent positive signs.
The Government has committed to releasing over 4,000 prisoners and
released some journalists jailed during the 2020 elections, convicted
perpetrators of elections related crimes, started dialogue with
previously banned local media, and engaged the international community.
If confirmed, I will carefully assess the human rights situation in
Burundi and seek to build on that progress.
Question. How would you evaluate the performance of Burundian
troops in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)? How can the
U.S. better monitor their human rights record in Somalia? Are there
opportunities to build in stronger human rights reporting for AMISOM,
including to better monitor the human rights record of Burundian troops
in Somalia? How can the U.S. push for greater capabilities of AMISOM to
monitor the human rights performance of Burundi and other peacekeeper
contributing countries under mission? What can the U.N. do regarding
the AMISOM Mission to decrease dependency on Burundian troops in
Somalia?
Answer. I share your concerns about AMISOM's abilities to monitor
the performance and conduct of contingents assigned to it. Somalia is a
very challenging operating environment. The United States attempts to
mitigate these challenges by drawing on multiple sources, including
NGOs, media, U.N. agencies, intelligence reporting, and diplomatic
contacts. We also regularly urge the AU to monitor contingents'
performance and conduct and investigate and respond to reported abuse.
If confirmed, I will work with the U.N., the Bureau of African Affairs,
and AMISOM to continue to improve these efforts.
Question. The Anglophone conflict in Cameroon is one of the world's
most neglected yet intensely brutal conflicts.
How can the U.S. better push for the U.N. Security Council to hold
regular formal briefings and discussions on the Anglophone
crisis in Cameroon, adding it formally to its agenda? If so,
how do you propose the U.S. engage member states that have
worked to block previous efforts to prioritize and regularize
the Anglophone crisis within the U.N. Security Council?
Answer. The United States engages U.N. Security Council member
states regarding the need to resolve the Anglophone crisis and the
severity of the humanitarian crisis in Cameroon. For example, we raise
the Anglophone crisis during briefings by the Secretary-General's
Special Representative and Head of the U.N. Office for Central Africa
(UNOCA) Francois Fall. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage UNOCA
to engage the Government of Cameroon and ask other U.N. member states
to play a constructive role to resolve the Anglophone crisis.
Question. Do you agree that the U.N. has a vital role in supporting
inclusive internationally-mediated dialogue among the many actors in
the Anglophone Crisis to find a lasting and sustainable solution to the
crisis, addressing root causes and underlying grievances? If yes, what
precisely should that role be, and how will you push for that within
the U.N.?
Answer. Yes. The United States fully supports the U.N. Office in
Central Africa (UNOCA)'s role in promoting inclusive political dialogue
in Cameroon, which includes the resolution of the Anglophone crisis.
The importance of this work was reinforced in the strategic review of
UNOCA conducted in 2020. If confirmed, I will support UNOCA's role and
priorities when its mandate expires on August 31, 2021. The United
States also fully supports the Swiss-led mediation of the Anglophone
crisis, which the U.N. also supports.
Question. The Cameroonian Government has consistently failed to
investigate and prosecute perpetrators of atrocities committed against
its civilians. It has proven itself unable to hold high-ranking
government and military officials responsible for these crimes. How can
the U.S. engage other like-minded countries in the U.N. to pursue
accountability for atrocities committed in Cameroon, both by government
and armed group actors?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the tools we have at the United
Nations to press for a resolution to this conflict and to hold
accountable those responsible for human rights violations and abuses. I
will also seek opportunities to engage with like-minded countries that
share a desire to bring this conflict to an end. If confirmed, I will
also engage other U.N. member states on the importance of the rule of
law and ending impunity in Cameroon and explore ways we can work
together to move toward a resolution.
Question. How can the United States more effectively encourage
France to use its significant leverage in Cameroon to encourage the
government to engage in meaningful dialogue and end the Anglophone
conflict?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the different tools we have to
press for a resolution of this conflict, including through discussions
with counterparts from France and the UK. The United States routinely
raises the situation in Cameroon with French officials and will
continue to pursue a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the
Anglophone regions.
Question. Russia's dominant presence in CAR is alarming on several
fronts, not just as it relates to the Central African country's
internal and regional security, but also vital U.S. national security
interests. Will you commit to closely monitoring Russia's presence in
CAR and corresponding activity at the U.N., particularly as it relates
to internal and regional security arrangements and the arms embargo?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will closely monitor Russia's presence
in CAR and corresponding activity at the U.N., with a particular focus
on internal and regional security arrangements and the arms embargo.
Russia's close ties to the Touadera Government, involvement in CAR's
security sector, and stake in its natural resources are extremely
concerning. If confirmed, I will carefully review all the diplomatic
tools available to respond appropriately to Russia's activities in CAR.
Question. How can the United States best protect its interests in
CAR and the broader region while also ensuring that other members of
the U.N. Security Council are prioritizing the MINUSCA mission over
their own foreign military operations in the country?
Answer. The humanitarian situation and ongoing conflict in CAR is
deeply concerning. So, too, are reports of anti-MINUSCA propaganda and
allegations that foreign security actors are failing to deconflict
their activities with MINUSCA, committing human rights abuses, and
impeding humanitarian access. MINUSCA continues to provide crucial
stabilization support, human rights monitoring, assistance to CAR's
justice sector, and support for elections. If confirmed, I will engage
with our partners in the region and in Europe, as well as in the U.N.,
to ensure that MINUSCA remains well-resourced and can fully carry out
its mandate, especially the protection of civilians.
Question. How does the United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) contribute to
the peace and security of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)? How
effective is MONUSCO's current mandate and what changes might you
propose should you be confirmed? What should the U.S., our European
allies, and the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) be doing to support
a peace process and end of the conflict in Eastern Congo?
Answer. MONUSCO serves U.S. national security interests by
assisting the DRC Government in its stabilization and peace
consolidation efforts and supporting DRC's security forces to combat
threats posed by armed groups and transnational criminal networks. The
mission also uses its good offices to assist President Tshisekedi's
efforts to end impunity for certain human rights violations and to
advance security sector reform. If confirmed, I will continue U.S.
engagement through our ambassador, the U.N., and regional and
international partners to support efforts to stabilize the region. I
will also press for the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to implement
reforms to improve performance and for MONUSCO's responsible and
sustainable transition and drawdown.
Question. How can the U.S. better push for the U.N. Security
Council to hold regular formal briefings and make statements about the
ongoing conflicts and humanitarian crises in Ethiopia, including but
not limited to the conflict in the Tigray region? How should the US.
engage member states that have worked to block previous efforts to
prioritize and regularize discussion of Ethiopia by the U.N. Security
Council?
Answer. Opposition from Russia, China, and other member states to
formal meetings and public statements on the deeply troubling
humanitarian and security situation in Ethiopia impedes the Security
Council from speaking with one voice. If confirmed, I am committed to
calling out those member states for their unwillingness to uphold the
fundamental responsibility of the Security Council to address threats
to international peace and security like the crisis in Ethiopia. I will
also work closely with likeminded partners to raise the profile of
Ethiopia in other fora and press for other U.N. bodies like the Human
Rights Council to take up this important issue.
Question. There has been considerable discussion about modifying
the mandate of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and
AMISOM to better address the challenges faced in Somalia.
In your view, how can the U.S. engage in future mandate renewal
processes, including with the penholder (U.K.), to have frank
discussions about what we hope to achieve through UNSOS/AMISOM
and how to push the government of Somalia to make progress?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing AMISOM's mandate
closely with the UK, the AU, and other key stakeholders to ensure that
it advances an approach that is sustainable, holistic, and
appropriately geared toward supporting stabilization, counterterrorism,
and transitioning security responsibilities to more capable,
professional, and accountable Somali security forces. While military
operations remain critical, addressing the drivers of Somalia's
persistent instability, and the evolving hybrid threat posed by al-
Shabaab, will require the Somalis and the international community,
including AMISOM and the U.N., to utilize a broader range of tools.
Question. U.N. Special Representative James Swan commented in
November 2020, following Somalia's decision to forgo direct universal
suffrage elections for a selection process similar to that of 2016,
that ``we urge Somali leaders to prepare consensually a roadmap with
clear timelines and benchmarks to ensure one-person-one-vote elections
take place in 2024/25.'' To what extent do you feel, in reviewing the
mandate for AMISOM, that consideration should to be given as to how the
U.N. could play a bigger role in supporting and making preparations for
universal suffrage elections in the future?
Answer. The U.N. plays a critical role in assisting Somalia with
stabilization and democratic development reforms. Among the U.N.
elements operating in Somalia, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Somalia
(UNSOM) is mandated with advising and assisting Somalia on political
reforms, and is best suited to lead U.N. efforts in preparing the
country for universal suffrage in the future. If confirmed, when
UNSOM's mandate comes up for renewal in August 2021, I will work to
ensure that support for democratic and electoral reforms, including
supporting preparations for universal suffrage elections, remain at the
core of UNSOM's responsibilities.
Question. The United States voted with other members of the
Security Council in December to end the mandate of the United Nations--
African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), despite warnings
that Sudan's Government had not yet demonstrated its ability to protect
civilians in Darfur. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights notes
``severe gaps in protection by State authorities, as well as a lack of
accountability for violations.''
What, in your view, should UNITAMS' role be in helping to address
these issues?
Answer. The United States is committed to supporting Sudanese
efforts to address civilian protection concerns in Darfur and
throughout the country. I believe UNITAMS can play an important role in
supporting Sudan's civilian-led transitional government as it works to
address protection concerns, strengthen rule of law institutions, and
build trust among the Sudanese people. If confirmed, I will push the
Security Council to provide UNITAMS the resources and tools to support
these important initiatives.
Question. What is your view of the request by Sudan's transitional
government to lift the U.N. arms embargo on Darfur? What changes if any
should be made to the U.N. sanctions regime established pursuant to
resolution 1591 (2005)?
Answer. U.N. sanctions remain an important tool in the
international community's response to the situation in Darfur. With the
adoption of resolution 2562, the U.N. Security Council has requested
the Secretary-General to conduct a review of the situation in Darfur
and to provide by July 31, 2021 a report containing recommendations for
clear and well identified benchmarks that could serve in guiding the
Security Council to review the measures on Darfur under the 1591
regime. If confirmed, I will carefully assess the appropriateness of
adjustments to the U.N. Sudan sanctions regime.
Question. How does the United Nations Interim Security Force for
Abyei (UNISFA) contribute to the peace and security of Sudan and South
Sudan? How effective is UNISFA's current mandate and what changes might
you propose should you be confirmed?
Answer. UNISFA has effectively prevented tensions over the status
of Abyei or other border areas from escalating into conflict between
Sudan and South Sudan. It has also played an important role in
preventing and responding to conflict between local communities in the
absence of local administration. However, both Sudan and South Sudan
need to renew efforts to establish interim administrative and security
bodies and restart talks on resolving Abyei's political status. If
confirmed, I will work with colleagues to ensure that UNISFA's mandate
remains appropriately focused, particularly with regard to the
protection of civilians.
Question. One of the key lessons from the Brahimi Report was that
if a peace operation is to be part of implementing a peace agreement,
it should have a role in the process and a seat at the table--in South
Sudan, though the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) does
not. Should UNMISS's political strategy be reexamined, and if so how,
and how would you go about building support within the Council for a
more robust role for the mission? Should UNMISS have a greater role in
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and/or security
sector reform (SSR)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor closely the U.N. Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS) with a view to making it as efficient and
effective as possible to fulfill its mandate of protecting civilians,
facilitating humanitarian assistance, supporting implementation of the
Revitalized Peace Agreement and supporting respect for human rights.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector
reform are essential building blocks for the peace process in South
Sudan. If confirmed, I will evaluate the role of UNMISS in these areas.
Question. The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and
Response recently released its final report, in which the authors
evaluated the WHO's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and made
recommendations to prevent future pandemics from occurring. Included
were recommendations to reduce the WHO Director General's term to a
single seven-year term and adopt merit-based recruitment standards for
other leadership staff; refocus the WHO on its core capabilities
(upholding norms, providing policy and technical guidance, collecting
and sharing critical global health data, and coordinating--rather than
implementing--emergency responses); strengthen the International Health
Regulations, including by giving WHO the right to conduct assessments
without advance approval by Member States; create a Heads of State-
level Global Health Threats Council; and create a multilateral
incentive fund to sustainably finance pandemic preparedness and
response. Do you agree that the World Health Organization is in need of
reform and, if so, what specific reforms should the United States seek
to advance at the upcoming World Health Assembly?
Answer. Yes, the World Health Organization is in need of reform,
and if confirmed I will support our efforts to make the WHO stronger,
more independent and efficient. Proposed reforms will be informed by
assessments of the COVID-19 response and past outbreaks, including the
Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response and the other
two independent reviews of WHO and Member State performance. The United
States is working with partners in bilateral and multilateral fora to
improve WHO's functioning, transparency, and accountability. This
includes a focus on core areas such as science, data collection, and
evaluation and promotion of evidence-based approaches. Reform requires
improved human resources and financial management practices. Reform
proposals should also incorporate policies throughout the organization
that are gender-sensitive and respect human rights as well as the
social determinants of health. Member states also need to live up to
their commitments as expressed within the International Health
Regulations.
Question. Do you agree with the recommendations of the IPPPR? Which
ones?
Answer. I understand that the State Department and other agencies
are reviewing the IPPPR recommendations alongside those of other
assessments. After so many lives lost, the global community and each
country must take immediate, tangible actions to both end this pandemic
and to prepare for the next by taking steps to improve preparedness and
response capabilities, including by increasing sustainable financing,
enhancing biosurveillance with clear ``triggers'' for action, and
expanding pandemic-related manufacturing with rapid surge capacity. If
confirmed, I will seek to strengthen the global health architecture to
promote preparedness, transparency, accountability, innovation, and
impact, so that the global community will be better prepared to
successfully prevent the next outbreak from becoming a pandemic.
Question. If the U.S. is unwilling to leverage contributions, how
will you ensure that far-reaching reforms are enacted?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advance reforms at the WHO through
advocacy, diplomacy, and dialogue, and will work with a broad coalition
of like-minded member states to ensure that WHO reforms advance and
apply lessons learned from the pandemic response. I would also seek to
implement innovative approaches such as the non-binding U.S.-WHO
Partnership Arrangement, a model pioneered by the United Kingdom, to
include defined metrics and timelines for improvement. If confirmed, I
look forward to consulting with you and your staff on this important
matter.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. If confirmed, what will you advise the Biden
administration do regarding UNRWA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advise that the administration
continue to make clear to UNRWA that adhering to the U.N. principles of
strict neutrality, tolerance, anti-discrimination and protection of
human rights is non-negotiable. UNRWA's mandate is set by the U.N.
General Assembly and is to provide essential services directly to
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. U.S. resumption of aid allows the Department to ensure UNRWA
provides cost-efficient and effective services to its beneficiaries and
that UNRWA upholds the highest level of transparency, accountability,
tolerance, and neutrality. If confirmed, I would work with others in
the Department to advise the administration on meaningful and
sustainable reforms to UNRWA's operations, including strengthening
UNRWA internal controls and the Advisory Committee's oversight of UNRWA
management.
Question. If confirmed, will you continue U.S. efforts to push back
against international organizations, like the U.N., as they single out
and attack Israel?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the United States' work in
opposing efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through
one-sided resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United
Nations, including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the
Human Rights Council, and other bodies. If confirmed, I also look
forward to working with our Israeli diplomatic colleagues, to promote
the election of Israel to U.N. leadership posts, inclusion in U.N.
working groups, and support for qualified Israeli candidates for U.N.
positions.
Question. Iran was recently elected to the U.N. Commission on the
Status of Women. Given Iran's treatment of women, this election damages
the credibility of this institution. If confirmed, will you actively
work to oppose Iranian membership in such international bodies?
Answer. I deeply share the concern that is the premise of your
question, which is that some U.N. bodies include countries that do not
live up to the objectives of the organization. In some cases, this is
because the objectionable country runs on a clean regional slate which
the majority of U.N. member states are unwilling to oppose.
For the CSW, the United States wants to see member state candidates
who champion gender equality, oppose discrimination against women,
promote women's empowerment, and further their well-being. In the case
of this election, the U.S. called for a vote despite a clean regional
slate due to the presence of countries on the slate that do not uphold
these values. If confirmed, for each particular election, I will ensure
we examine the entire list of candidates and determine who we should
support and who we should oppose.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to direct U.S.
representatives at international organizations to oppose growing
Russian and Chinese influence at these institutions?
Answer. At the U.N., the People's Republic of China drives an
authoritarian agenda that stands in opposition to the values of the
United States and is inconsistent with the founding documents and
principles of the U.N. itself, including on human rights, labor rights,
transparency, and coercive economic practices. The PRC's efforts harm
international organizations and their transparency, efficiency, values,
and influence. If confirmed, I commit to work with U.S. representatives
to international organizations to oppose the influence of the People's
Republic of China, Russia, and others and to work with our partners and
allies to lead on an affirmative agenda that strengthens the
international rules-based order and its foundational values and
principles.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Todd Young
Question. Do you agree that international organizations and
multinational forums have become a key battleground in the strategic
competition between the United States and China?
Answer. Yes, and strategic competition with the People's Republic
of China is one of the central challenges of the 21st century. The
United States is able to respond to this challenge from a position of
strength when we are engaged and leading international organizations,
not pulling back and ceding the terrain to China to write the rules and
norms that animate international institutions. If confirmed, I will use
our engagement in the U.N. system to push back against the influence of
China, and any country that seeks to undermine the rules-based order. I
will steadfastly oppose activities that undermine the values,
principles, and rules of the U.N. and other international
organizations, and I will promote U.S. values and interests alongside
our allies and partners.
Question. The United States has repeatedly been boxed out by
China's comprehensive strategy of whipping votes for leadership
positions of specialized agencies: how would you lead the IO Bureau to
ensure that the United States is laying the groundwork years in advance
of vacancies to increase American or allied representation of these
agencies?
Answer. The integrity of the U.N. and other international
organizations is vital to U.S. multilateral interests. If confirmed, I
will ensure that the IO Bureau, including the new Office of
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel, prioritize and implement a robust
and timely strategy to identify opportunities across the U.N. system to
increase the representation of qualified and independent American and
likeminded candidates at all levels. I will also coordinate closely
with our allies and partners to plan for and support the election of
qualified, independent candidates who will uphold the U.N.'s
foundational principles, values, and norms, including a focus on human
rights and economic transparency.
Question. What lessons can be learned by the 2020 election for the
Director General role at the World I.P. Organization--or, WIPO--and how
the United States proactively helped win support for the Singaporean
candidate, beating out a Chinese official?
Answer. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 2020
election was a powerful example of the strength of U.S. diplomacy and
the importance of ensuring strong leadership in standard-setting
bodies. Coordinating with partners and allies to rally support for
qualified and independent candidates who promote transparency,
accountability, and the rule of law is and will continue to be a recipe
for success in future leadership elections within U.N./international
bodies. We also need to emphasize that the PRC is driving an
authoritarian agenda that stands in opposition to the values of the
United States and the U.N.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What more should the United States do to ensure China
does not achieve its objective of reshaping and dominating
international institutions? PRC nationals now lead four of the United
Nations' 15 specialized agencies and groups, and have added many
Chinese nationals to the staff of these organizations. Some 30 United
Nations agencies and institutions have signed memorandums in support of
China's Belt and Road project.
Answer. I believe the United States must engage strategically to
defend, strengthen, and revitalize the international order and its
foundational values, rules, and principles, including through
rebuilding and strengthening our alliances and partnerships. If
confirmed, I will seek to improve the U.N.'s effectiveness and
transparency, support qualified and independent candidates for key
positions in U.N. agencies, advance strong reforms including
whistleblower protections, and take targeted actions to oppose efforts
by the PRC that undermine a rules-based international order. If
confirmed, I commit to combatting PRC attempts to insert its domestic
ideology and policy language into U.N. and multilateral policy
documents. We must also work with the boards of U.N. organizations to
increase oversight of the U.N.'s work in order to uphold the U.N.'s
values rather than the promotion of a single country's flagship
program.
Question. If confirmed, do you support standing up an office within
the Bureau of International Organization to specifically address the
threat of growing Chinese influence in global institutions?
Answer. Yes, I believe the establishment of the new office of
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel in the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs will enable the United States to more
strategically engage across the multilateral system and uphold its
foundational principles, values, and norms. Our approach toward the
People's Republic of China (PRC) at the U.N. and other international
organizations will derive from a clear and compelling affirmative U.S.
policy agenda, and when the PRC seeks to undermine the international
rules-based order, we will take action to oppose those efforts. If
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Congress to consider
other ways to effectively outcompete the PRC and advance U.S.
multilateral priorities.
Question. Do you agree that China under the Chinese Communist Party
is pursuing a systematic, decades-long campaign to achieve global
preeminence and reshape the international order to the CCP's benefit?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) engages in conduct
around the world that undermines the international system that has
supported global peace and security, stability, prosperity, and human
rights for more than 75 years. The PRC drives an authoritarian agenda
that stands in opposition to the foundational values and principles of
the U.N. and other international organizations. If confirmed, pushing
back against the PRC's attempts to reshape the international system
will be a top priority of mine. I will rally support with allies,
partners, and other countries to oppose the PRC's efforts to undercut
international institutions, values, and rules, and will ensure that the
United States advances an affirmative agenda centered on human rights,
individual freedoms, transparency, and good governance.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to pushing the World Health
Organization to conduct a transparent and thorough investigation
regarding the origin of COVID-19 as a critical step to preventing the
next pandemic?
Answer. Yes. If I am confirmed, I will press the WHO to conduct a
thorough second phase of the COVID-19 study in China. The world needs
to understand how this pandemic originated so that we can better
prepare our governments, our people and our public health institutions
for future health crises. That is why we are continuing to work with
the WHO and with other Member States to support a science-based and
expert-driven study of the pandemic's origins that is free from
interference or politicization.
Question. Do you believe it is prudent for the United States to
support gain-of-function research in China?
Answer. As underscored by the COVID-19 pandemic, all nations,
including China, must commit to cooperation that is rooted in openness,
transparency, and scientific independence. As a general matter, I
believe scientific cooperation between nations is crucial to addressing
transnational threats to global health.
On the particular matter of research funding, I would defer to the
relevant authorities, including the Department of Health and Human
Services and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. via
Videoconference, Hon. Chris Van Hollen, presiding.
Present: Senators Van Hollen [presiding], Kaine, Booker,
Young, and Rounds.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Van Hollen. The nominations hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
Welcome, everybody, to the committee, and I do want to
begin by giving a special salute and shout out to my colleague,
Senator Mike Rounds, who is the ranking member of the Global
Health and Africa Subcommittee, and look forward to working
with him and all our colleagues on the subcommittee and the
full committee on the large range of pressing issues that are
before the subcommittee and the full committee.
I see we have also been joined by my colleague, Senator
Kaine from Virginia, and I am sure others will be joining us as
we go.
Let me acknowledge our nominees and congratulations to all
of you on your nominations to be ambassadors to these
countries, and thank you for your service.
We have with us today Ambassador Larry Edward Andre, Jr.,
to be the United States Ambassador to Somalia, Ambassador Maria
E. Brewer to be the United States Ambassador to Lesotho,
Ambassador Tulinabo Mushingi to be U.S. Ambassador to Angola
and Sao Tome and Principe, and Ms. Elizabeth Moore Aubin to be
the U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, and Mr. Eugene S. Young to be
the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Congo, and
finally, last but not least, Mr. Christopher John Lamora to be
the United States Ambassador to Cameroon.
Again, welcome everybody, and I am going to give some brief
opening remarks, turn it over to my colleague, Senator Rounds,
and then we will hear from each of you.
Today's hearing is first and foremost a nominations
hearing. But in the broader sense, it is an opportunity for us
to reexamine our nation's diplomatic relationships with
countries across Africa.
President Biden has made clear his mission to restore
America's role on the world stage as a force for democracy, for
diplomacy, for human rights, and for international cooperation.
Those principles must be front and center in our ongoing
engagement with African countries and with their citizens. The
best way to advance that cause is by focusing on the
opportunities for action, opportunities to invest in and engage
with some of the fastest growing countries and economies in the
world.
By 2050, the population of Africa is expected to double and
will account for one quarter of the world's population. Africa
is also the youngest continent in the world, and 60 percent of
Africans are under the age of 25.
These young people will be at the vanguard of the next
global generation, helping to lead the charge in innovation,
technology, business, and economic growth. Our investment in
their futures will help ensure greater prosperity, opportunity,
peace, and security, both abroad but also here at home.
That cause holds an added measure of urgency as we confront
the reality that many of our biggest threats are interconnected
and global.
As we have seen throughout the past year, viruses know no
borders and our ability to defeat COVID-19 and tackle future
outbreaks as well as outbreaks of other diseases requires our
participation and our leadership in a global and coordinated
response.
The same is true for taking on the climate crisis, which,
obviously, has impact here at home and everywhere in the world.
It is a key driver of the plight of displacement in many
countries like Somalia.
It also represents a real opportunity at home and around
the world for the production of new sources of clean energy,
both for Africa and for the global economy.
We are engaging in projects that advance these goals and
others through ventures lie the Power Africa initiative and
President Biden's pledge on the coronavirus fight front to
donate now hundreds of millions of doses worldwide and our
contribution to COVAX.
So the United States has now pledged $4 billion to fight
COVID-19 through COVAX. Prior to today, the president has
announced 80 million doses that we would contribute to
countries around the world, and just this afternoon it was it
was indicated that tomorrow the president will announce the
United States intends to purchase another 500 million doses to
help defeat COVID-19 around the world.
Of the 25 million original doses, the first tranche of
doses that the United States will distribute 5 million will be
devoted to Africa. So this is an important moment for the
United States to take a leadership role in that area, and so
many others.
My colleagues on both sides of the aisle, Republicans and
Democrats, have been right to also recognize that China is
using its mercantilist and debt trap strategies to gain more
influence in countries around the world, including Africa, and
if we keep up business as usual we will give China a free pass
to use that leverage to export its model of authoritarianism to
governments in developing countries.
I think we are all pleased that just yesterday the United
States Senate passed on a bipartisan basis legislation to
significantly increase our competitiveness here at home but
also to reassert U.S. leadership in many of these areas
overseas.
So, for example, a part of that bill that emerged from the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee included an increase of $100
billion authorization for the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation, which we hope will be investing in Africa.
Africa, of course, is not a monolith. All of you know that
better than anybody. You are all going to countries that have
their own unique histories and own complex issues and
challenges.
And so today gives us an opportunity both to address those
individual issues as well as a take a look at the broader
situation.
So let me now turn it over to Senator Rounds for any
opening statement he wishes to give, and then I will introduce
our nominees and then turn it over to them for questioning.
Senator Rounds?
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROUNDS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I most
certainly appreciate your opening comments, and I think that
this is one of those committees where bipartisan agreement can
be found and I think we begin today in a very good way.
I am very pleased to see such a qualified panel of nominees
before us today, with three previously confirmed by the
committee to serve in ambassadorial posts as well as
experienced State Department personnel with great records of
service.
I want to thank you and your families for your service to
our country.
Ambassador Andre, your deep background with Africa will
serve you well if you are confirmed to be our next ambassador
to Somalia. I look forward to hearing your views on Somalia, a
country struggling to overcome 30 years of instability in order
to achieve democratic development and viable national
institutions.
Somalia's successful revolution, socially, politically and
economically, is vital for our interests in the region to
include significant counterterrorism efforts against the
violent extremist group al-Shabaab.
If confirmed, it will be critical that you maintain a close
relationship with Congress to help assure a prudent way
forward.
Ambassador Brewer, if confirmed, your experience as
ambassador to Sierra Leone, a small nation where the U.S.
relationship focuses on foreign assistance, particularly in the
health sector, would make you well placed to serve as our
ambassador to Lesotho, and I commend you for your desire to
lead a U.S. embassy and a USAID team, a small mission to help
mentor the next generation of the Foreign Service.
Given the challenges in fully staffing posts in Africa,
seasoned diplomats willing to serve in such a mentorship role
are definitely needed. I look forward to hearing your thoughts
on how USAID programs and trade relations with Lesotho can help
that nation advance politically and economically.
Ambassador Mushingi, if you are confirmed, I will be glad
that we will be sending such an experienced diplomat with
experience in five African countries to be our next ambassador
to Angola and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe.
Seems to me that Angola's reformist President Lourenco
continues to provide an opportunity to deepen our relationship
with that nation. I look forward to hearing how you, if
confirmed, would support those reform efforts.
Ms. Aubin, your experience in Algeria would well qualify
you, if confirmed, to be our next ambassador to that nation. I
look forward to hearing from you about how you would lead our
embassy in Algiers, in context of the problem sets facing the
North African region, and Algeria's ongoing political
challenges.
Also Of particular interest to me are your views on how we
can best meet the challenges of Morocco's unfortunate
annexation with U.S. approval, I might add, of Western Sahara,
an action which I find deeply troubling.
Mr. Young, your experience in sub-Saharan Africa and as an
economic and commercial officer at numerous posts will prepare
you well, if confirmed, to be our next ambassador to the
Republic of Congo. I look forward to hearing from you about
Congo and particularly how you would advance our relationship
with that nation in the face of tremendous corruption and
increased Chinese influence.
Mr. Lamora, your Africa experience makes you well prepared
for the difficult post for which you have been nominated.
I am interested in your views on how the U.S. can work with
the Cameroonian institutions as well as with other nations to
address violent extremism, as well as the Anglophone crisis
affecting the northwest and southwest regions of Cameroon.
I would also like to hear from you on the tremendous
challenges to democratic development posed by the Government's
crackdown on political opposition and press, the president's
reelection to a seventh term in 2018 election marred by
violence and absence of a clear successor with concerns for
further instability should he die or become incapacitated.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank you
for providing some background on each of these nominees.
I am going to provide a little more background on each of
them because I think it is important that people who are tuning
in to the committee recognize the breadth and depth of
experience that these diplomats have, and I think we can take
great pride in the fact that the president has nominated this
distinguished group of individuals.
So Ambassador Andre, Jr., is currently the charge
d'affaires ad interim at the U.S. Embassy in Juba, South Sudan.
He is a former ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
and to the Republic of Djibouti, which has a majority ethnic
Somali population and a peacekeeping contingent in Somalia.
Ambassador Andre's earlier assignments also include service
as the political counselor in Nairobi, Kenya, at which time his
section oversaw Somali affairs.
He is the recipient of more than a dozen notable senior
State Department awards, including the Director General Award
for reporting. So thank you for joining us.
Ambassador Brewer recently served as the United States
Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra Leone. Prior to that role,
Ambassador Brewer was the Deputy Director of Career Development
and Assignments at the State Department's Bureau of Human
Resources, and she also served as the deputy chief of mission
and charge ad interim at the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria.
In Nigeria, she oversaw a $500 million annual PEPFAR
program as part of a global campaign to fight HIV/AIDS. She
earned the State Department's Distinguished Honor Award.
Ambassador Mushingi is currently the U.S. ambassador to
Senegal and the Republic of Guinea Bissau. Earlier in his
career, Ambassador Mushingi served as the United States
Ambassador to Burkina Faso and as the deputy chief of mission
to the United States Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
In Washington, Ambassador Mushingi served as executive
director at the Executive Office of the Secretary of State, and
in 2017 he received the prestigious Palmer Award for the
Advancement of Democracy.
Ms. Aubin is currently the acting Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
Throughout her three decades of service she has held the posts
as executive director of the Joint Executive Office of the
Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian
Affairs, deputy chief of mission of the United States Embassy
in Ottawa, Canada, executive director of the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, and deputy chief of mission at the United
States Embassy in Algiers, Algeria.
Ms. Aubin has received numerous State Department awards,
including multiple performance awards for her work in the
senior Foreign Service.
Mr. Young is the economic counselor at the U.S. Embassy in
Jerusalem, Israel. Previously, Mr. Young was the charge
d'affaires and ad interim and deputy chief of mission at the
United States Embassy in Vienna, Austria, and counsel and
senior civilian representative at the U.S. consulate in Herat,
Afghanistan, and deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in
Ljubljana, Slovenia.
He has also served as the economic counselor at the United
States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and U.S. Consul General in
Durban, South Africa. His service has been honored with several
State Department awards, and I welcome him as well.
Mr. Lamora is currently the deputy chief of mission at the
United States Embassy in Accra, Ghana, which is the fifth
largest U.S. embassy in sub-Saharan Africa. Previously, he was
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Africa
and African Security Affairs.
Mr. Lamora has nearly 30 years of Foreign Service
experience, 12 of which has been spent focused on African
policy security, economic development, and partnerships, and he
has served in three African countries including Cameroon. He is
the recipient of numerous State Department awards as well.
So thank you all very much, again, for your prior service.
We look forward to the discussion today.
And with that, I call upon Ambassador Andre to deliver an
opening statement.
Ambassador Andre?
STATEMENT HON. LARRY EDWARD ANDRE, JR., OF TEXAS, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINSTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA
Mr. Andre. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished
members of the committee, greetings from South Sudan. I am
honored to come before you today as President Biden's nominee
to be the next United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic
of Somalia.
I am grateful to the president and Secretary Blinken for
their confidence in me. My wife, Ouroukou Andre, and my
children, Ruhiyyih and Isidore Andre, are watching online.
I thank all my family, friends, and colleagues for their
support.
Mr. Chairman, I first came to Africa in 1983 as a Peace
Corps volunteer in Senegal. I then worked in Chad on post-war
reconstruction. I joined the State Department in 1990,
intending to continue my focus on Africa. I am now serving my
tenth tour on the continent.
My three domestic assignments were also Africa related. I
have served at our embassies in each of the countries that
border Somalia.
If confirmed, I will draw on these experiences to lead our
U.S. Embassy Mogadishu team in advancing our partnership with
Somalia's people and their federal and state governments for
greater peace and prosperity.
I commit to keep you and your staff informed of our
progress.
Mr. Chairman, having spent much of my career serving in
dangerous places, I feel deeply the responsibility of an
ambassador toward all resident Americans and toward all U.S.
Government employees in country.
If confirmed, I will promote the safety of American
citizens and of my embassy colleagues.
Mr. Chairman, the United States needs a stable Somalia as
do the Somali people, East Africa, and the international
community. If confirmed, I will work with Somalia's federal and
state governments, Somali civil society, regional organizations
and like-minded international partners to promote stability
through credible elections and governance reforms that advance
peace and prosperity.
Mr. Chairman, among other needed reforms, Somalia would
benefit from a compromise leading to national consensus on the
relationship between the federal government and state
governments. The nature of Somali federalism has remained an
open question for too long.
Mr. Chairman, the people of Somalia and their neighbors are
attacked regularly by al-Qaeda's East Africa branch al-Shabaab.
There is a smaller ISIS Somalia presence in the north. Both
international terrorist networks threaten our interests in the
region and aspire to attack Americans.
If confirmed, I will continue the work of Ambassador
Yamamoto, applying the full range of tools to help Somalis
defend themselves and rid their country of terrorism.
I will also coordinate with the African Union's
peacekeeping operation in Somalia. I will be guided by our
shared goal of more operationally capable and professional
Somali security forces that respect human rights, protect
civilians, and hold accountable those responsible for abuses.
In recent years, Somali security forces have made progress
in this direction. The U.S. military, the European Union, and
the United Nations has contributed to that progress.
Mr. Chairman, aside from political and security challenges,
Somalis also confront a variety of natural calamities, economic
dysfunction, and deficient educational and other public
services. These difficulties contribute to poverty, hunger, and
displacement.
If confirmed, I would support the work of our development,
humanitarian, and economic professionals in coordination with
Somali authorities and international organizations to provide
aid from the American people to Somalis in need and to promote
inclusive economic growth.
Ethnic Somali communities around the world are known for
their resourcefulness, dynamism, and entrepreneurial spirit.
Under the right conditions, Somalia will thrive due to the
qualities of the Somali people.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. I am eager
to respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Larry Edward Andre
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Larry Edward Andre, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the
committee, greetings from Juba, South Sudan. I am honored to come
before you today as President Biden's nominee to be the next United
States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Somalia. I am grateful to
the President and Secretary Blinken for their confidence in me.
My wife, Ouroukou Andre, and my children, Ruhiyyih Andre and
Isidore Andre, are watching online. I thank all my family, friends, and
colleagues for their support.
Mr. Chairman, I first came to Africa in 1983 as a Peace Corps
Volunteer in Senegal, and then in Chad working on post-war
reconstruction. I joined the State Department in 1990. I am now serving
my tenth tour in Africa. With an additional three domestic Africa-
related assignments, my over 31-year diplomatic career has focused
almost exclusively on the continent. I have served at our embassies in
each of the countries that border Somalia. If confirmed, I will draw on
these experiences to advance our partnership with Somalia's people and
their federal and state-level governments toward greater peace and
prosperity.
The United States needs a stable Somalia, as do the Somali people,
East Africa and the international community. If confirmed, I will work
with the Somali federal government, Somalia's state governments,
regional organizations, and like-minded international partners to
promote stability through credible elections that advance peace and
prosperity. Mr. Chairman, Somalia's political stability also requires
compromise leading to national consensus on the relationship between
the federal government and state governments. The nature of Somali
federalism has remained an open question for too long.
Mr. Chairman, the people of Somalia and their neighbors are
attacked regularly by al-Qaeda's East Africa branch, al-Shabaab. There
is a smaller ISIS-Somalia presence in the north. Both international
terrorist networks threaten our interests in the region and aspire to
attack our country. If confirmed, I will continue the work of
Ambassador Yamamoto to bring to bear the full range of tools to help
Somalis defend themselves and rid their country of terrorism. I will
also coordinate with AMISOM, the African Union's peacekeeping
operation. I will be guided by our shared goal of more operationally
capable and professional Somali security forces that respect human
rights, protect civilians, and hold accountable those responsible for
abuses. In recent years, the Somali National Army has made progress in
this direction. The U.S. military, the European Union, and the United
Nations have contributed to that progress.
Mr. Chairman, having spent much of my career serving at U.S.
embassies in dangerous places, I feel deeply the responsibility of an
Ambassador toward all resident Americans and to all U.S. Government
employees and contractors. If confirmed, I will lead our team in
Somalia to take all necessary measures to promote the security of
American citizens and of U.S. Government colleagues while we work with
the Somali people, their government, and our international partners to
advance shared objectives.
Aside from political and security challenges, Somalis also confront
a variety of natural calamities, economic dysfunction, and deficient
educational and other public services that contribute to poverty,
hunger, and displacement. If confirmed, I would support the work of our
development, humanitarian, and economic professionals, in coordination
with Somali authorities and international organizations, to provide aid
from the American people to Somalis in need and to promote inclusive
economic growth.
If confirmed, I will lead our U.S. Embassy Mogadishu team to
advance peace and prosperity through diplomacy, defense, and
development efforts in partnership with the Somali people and their
federal and state governments. I commit to keep you and your staff
informed.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you. I am eager to respond to
your questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
And next, we will hear from Ambassador Brewer.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA E. BREWER OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER MEMBER
OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR,
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO
Ms. Brewer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rounds,
members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you
as you consider my nomination as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom
of Lesotho.
I thank President Biden for this opportunity and for the
trust that he and Secretary Blinken have shown in my ability to
serve our country again as U.S. Ambassador.
If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with this
committee as we advance U.S. objectives in Lesotho. I would
like to thank my husband, Mark, and our 12-year-old daughter,
Arina, for their love and support, along with my parents,
William and Maria Pallick, who are watching from their home in
Texas. Also, today is my father's 77th birthday. So I would
like to say happy birthday, Dad.
Having served nearly 25 years with the U.S. Department of
State, I have substantial experience working on African
affairs, most recently as the U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone.
My experience has taught me the need to develop diverse
teams that reflect the countries we serve and to foster high
morale in challenging environments.
If confirmed, I will draw on this experience to pursue U.S.
goals and protect U.S. interests in Lesotho. Promoting
democratic governance is at the core of U.S. values and of what
we wish to accomplish in Lesotho.
Lesotho seeks to implement reforms to reduce political
instability, strengthen its institutions, and professionalize
its military. These goals align with our own.
Our embassy has made great strides in promoting the rule of
law, civilian control of the Lesotho's military, and government
accountability.
If confirmed, I will collaborate with this committee, the
interagency, and the Government of Lesotho to strengthen
Lesotho's institutions, reinforce its ability to meet the needs
of its people, and build capacity to be a better partner to us.
Last year taught every country that promoting the health of
its people is a core imperative. In Lesotho, health system
strengthening is at the center of our assistance.
With one in four adults afflicted by HIV/AIDS, and many
children orphaned by it, shoring up the Lesotho's capacity to
fight HIV/AIDS will remain a critical component of U.S.
engagement.
The President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR,
generously funded by Congress, has transformed the Lesotho.
Lesotho is one of the first countries to reach epidemic
control, surpassing U.N. AIDS targets and cutting new
infections by half. Our health partnerships have also bolstered
Lesotho's capacity to confront COVID-19.
Curbing the spread of these pandemics contributes to global
health security, which benefits Americans here at home. To
increase internal stability and its ability to be an effective
partner, Lesotho needs economic development.
AGOA, the African Growth and Opportunity Act,
revolutionized Lesotho's economy, creating more than 45,000
private sector jobs. More progress is needed improving work
conditions and preparing Lesotho for its post-AGOA future.
I will support economic diversification, continued progress
on AGOA eligibility criteria, and overall improvement of the
business climate, if confirmed. Doing so not only improves the
lives of Basotho, but also improves conditions for U.S.
companies seeking to do business with Lesotho.
The Department of State in 2020 ranked Lesotho among the
countries whose governments do not fully comply with the
minimum standards in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
The State Department has worked with the Government of Lesotho
to urge it to devote resources to combating trafficking in
persons. Lesotho and its people are receptive to this message
and we are seeing real progress.
If confirmed, I commit to pressing Lesotho for increased
prevention and prosecution of these crimes and increased
protection for victims. I will paramount the safety and
security of U.S. citizens in Lesotho and the entire U.S.
Embassy team, including U.S. citizen employees, their families,
and our Lesotho colleagues.
If confirmed, I would do all within my power to ensure the
security of our mission and oversee its operation.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you.
If confirmed, I welcome the challenge and privilege of
protecting and advancing U.S. interests in Maseru as the U.S.
ambassador. I look forward to any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Maria E. Brewer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Maria E. Brewer
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee,
It is an honor to appear before you as you consider my nomination as
U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho. I want to thank President
Biden for this opportunity and for the trust that he and Secretary
Blinken have in my ability to serve our country again as U.S.
ambassador. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with this
committee as we advance U.S. foreign policy objectives in Lesotho. I am
honored and fortunate to have my husband, Mark, and our twelve-year-old
daughter, Arina, here with me today. I thank them for their constant
love and support, along with my parents, William and Maria Pallick, who
are watching from their home in Texas.
Having served nearly 25 years with the U.S. Department of State, I
have substantial experience working on African affairs, most recently
as U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone. My experience has taught me the
need to develop diverse teams that reflect the country we serve and to
foster high morale in challenging environments. If confirmed, I will
draw upon this wealth of knowledge and management experience to pursue
U.S. goals and to protect U.S. interests in Lesotho.
Promoting democratic governance is at the core of U.S. values and
of what we seek to accomplish in Lesotho. As Secretary Blinken noted,
``strong democracies are more stable, better partners to us, more
committed to human rights, less prone to conflict, and more dependable
markets for our goods and services.'' Along with its Southern African
Development Community partners, Lesotho seeks to implement reforms to
reduce political instability, strengthen its institutions, and
professionalize its military. Our embassy has already made great
strides in promoting the rule of law, civilian control of Lesotho's
military, and government accountability. If confirmed, I will
collaborate with this committee, the interagency, and the Government of
Lesotho to strengthen Lesotho's institutions, to reinforce its ability
to meet the needs of its people, and to build its capacity to be a
better partner to us.
The last year taught every country that promoting the health of its
people is a core imperative. In Lesotho, health system strengthening is
at the center of our assistance efforts. With one in four adults living
with HIV/AIDS and many more children orphaned by it, shoring up
Lesotho's capacity to confront HIV/AIDS will remain a critical
component to U.S. engagement. PEPFAR, which Congress generously funds,
has transformed Lesotho, which was one of the first countries to reach
epidemic control, surpassing UNAIDS targets and cutting new infections
by half. Our health partnerships have also bolstered Lesotho's capacity
to confront COVID-19. Curbing the spread of these pandemics in Lesotho
contributes to global health security which benefits Americans at home.
If confirmed, I will seek to sustain momentum in these areas.
To increase internal stability and its ability to be an effective
partner, Lesotho needs economic development. AGOA--the African Growth
and Opportunity Act--revolutionized Lesotho's economy, creating over
45,000 private sector jobs in Lesotho, making it the second largest
sub-Saharan supplier of textiles and apparel to the United States.
Nevertheless, there is still important progress to be made,
particularly improving work conditions and preparing Lesotho for its
post-AGOA future once the Act expires in 2025. I will work diligently
to support economic diversification, continued progress on AGOA
eligibility criteria, and overall improvement of the business climate,
if confirmed. Doing so not only improves the lives of Basotho, but also
improves conditions for U.S. companies seeking to do business with
Lesotho.
The Department of State in 2020 ranked Lesotho among the countries
whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards in the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act and which are not making significant
efforts to comply. The Department has worked assiduously with the
Government of Lesotho to urge it to devote resources to combatting
trafficking in persons. Lesotho and its people are receptive to this
message and making real progress. If confirmed, I will commit to
pushing Lesotho for increased prevention and prosecution of these
crimes and increased protection for victims.
In addition to these policy aims, I hold paramount the safety and
security of U.S. citizens in Lesotho, and the entire U.S. Embassy team,
including U.S. citizen employees, their families, and our Basotho
colleagues. If confirmed, I would do all within my power to ensure the
security of our Mission and oversee its operations.
In closing, I would like to thank you all again for the opportunity
to appear before you today. If confirmed, I would welcome the challenge
and privilege of protecting and advancing U.S. interests in Maseru as
the U.S. Ambassador. I look forward to any questions you may have.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. I think
the full committee would like to extend a happy birthday to
your father.
And now we will turn to Ambassador Mushingi. The floor is
yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. TULINABO S. MUSHINGI OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO
BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, AND TO SERVE
CONCURRENTLY AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AS AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the
committee, it is a privilege, indeed, to appear before you
today as President Biden's nominee to serve as the U.S.
Ambassador to the Republic of Angola and to the Democratic
Republic of Sao Tome and Principe.
I thank the president and the secretary of state for their
confidence in me. I am equally grateful for this distinguished
committee's consideration.
I appear today with unfailing support of my wife of 40
years, Rebecca, who has also served our country, working for 13
years with the U.S. Peace Corps, and of our beloved daughter,
Furaha.
My work across Africa, from Mozambique to Morocco, from
Ethiopia to Senegal, as well as through various assignments in
Washington, D.C., have prepared me to deliver meaningful
results for the American people in the role for which I have
been nominated.
If confirmed, I will work to foster stronger ties between
the United States and Angola and Sao Tome and Principe.
President Lourenco's economic and political reform agenda
aligns with U.S. interests and presents us a unique opportunity
to develop a mutually beneficial partnership with this fast-
emerging economy and rising African nation.
As the Government of Angola fosters a better business
climate, U.S. companies seek tremendous trade and investment
opportunities, and recently, U.S. companies have achieved major
successes in the energy and IT sectors.
Angola's legacy of land mines continues to impede economic
development and conservation efforts. Since 1995, U.S.A. has
been the largest donor to demining efforts in Angola, investing
more than $145 million dollars to clear land mines.
The 2018 Defending Economic Livelihoods and Threatened
Animals Act helps to combat wildlife trafficking and to protect
land and water resources.
If confirmed, I will reinforce our commitment to help
Angola eliminate the threat of land mines and protect its
natural resources.
Deep ties bind the United States and Angola. An estimated
one-quarter of all African Americans have Angolan roots. In
fact, the first enslaved Africans to arrive in what is now the
United States in 1619 were from what is now Angola.
If confirmed, I will look to be honest about this history
while sharing the experience of the United States of America as
we continue to seek to improve our nation.
Turning to Sao Tome, Sao Tome and Principe has a small land
footprint but a large and strategically important maritime
domain in the Gulf of Guinea shipping lanes.
Enhancing the country's ability to monitor its waters and
share information on maritime activity and piracy is a key
component to improve regional security. Sao Tome and Principe
also has a long tradition of democracy and peaceful transfers
of power.
I will focus on these priorities, if confirmed. As the
world hopefully emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic, we expect
to see more Americans coming to Angola and Sao Tome and
Principe. The safety of our staff and U.S. citizens is always
paramount.
Finally, American diplomacy works best when our diplomats
best exemplify our nation. If confirmed, I will promote an
interagency embassy team that reflects the values of our
country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished
members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear before
you today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the
committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as
President Biden's nominee to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the
Republic of Angola and to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and
Principe. I thank the President and the Secretary of State for their
confidence in me. I am equally grateful for this distinguished
committee's consideration.
I appear today with the unfailing support of my wife Rebecca, who
has also served our country working for 13 years with the U.S. Peace
Corps, and our beloved daughter Furaha.
My work across Africa, from Mozambique to Morocco, Ethiopia to
Senegal, as well as through assignments in Washington, DC, has prepared
me to deliver meaningful results for the American people in the role I
have been nominated for. If confirmed, I will work hard to foster
stronger ties between the United States and Angola and Sao Tome &
Principe.
Bilateral relations between the United States and Angola have
markedly improved in recent years. President Lourenco's economic and
political reform agenda aligns with U.S. interests and presents a
unique opportunity to develop a mutually beneficial partnership with
this fast-emerging economy and rising African nation.
Angola plays an influential role in Africa and is looking to
diversify its ties away from historic alliances. As such, it has
attracted high-level U.S. visits and interaction since 2019, and if
confirmed, with your help, I will work to deepen the U.S.-Angola
partnership.
Angola has made tangible progress towards transparency and good
governance, while initiating the fight against corruption and promoting
accountability for human rights violations. Angola still faces many
challenges as it addresses a stagnant economy, exacerbated by the
impacts of the COVID pandemic. If confirmed, I will continue to press
for political and economic reforms, support the fight against
corruption, and buttress Angola's development efforts.
As the Government of Angola fosters a better business climate, U.S.
companies see tremendous trade and investment opportunities. Recently,
U.S. companies have achieved major successes in the energy and IT
sectors. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. interagency team to
advocate for U.S. businesses while supporting Angolan efforts to comply
with international standards and improve regulatory adherence.
Angola's legacy of land mines continues to impede economic
development and environmental conservation. Since 1995, the United
States has been the largest donor to demining efforts in Angola,
investing more than $145 million to clear landmines and other dangerous
explosive hazards so the people of Angola can advance a wide range of
social and economic development efforts safe from buried bombs. The
2018 Defending Economic Livelihoods and Threatened Animals (DELTA) Act
helps to combat wildlife trafficking and coordinate with transboundary
land and water resource governance authorities. If confirmed, I will
reinforce our commitment to help Angola eliminate the threat of
landmines and protect its natural resources.
Deep ties bind the United States and Angola: an estimated one-
quarter of African-Americans have Angolan roots. The first enslaved
Africans to arrive in what is now the United States in 1619 were from
what is now Angola. If confirmed, I will look to be honest about this
history, while sharing the experience of the United States as we
continue to seek improve our nation. I will seek to expand our growing
people-to-people ties and promote programs focusing on talented Angolan
youth.
Sao Tome and Principe (STP) has a small land footprint but a large
and strategically important maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea
shipping lanes. Enhancing the country's ability to monitor its waters
and share information on maritime activity and piracy is a key
component to improve regional security. STP successfully completed a
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program in 2011, and
further MCC engagement is a priority for the future. STP also has a
long tradition of democracy and peaceful transfers of power. I will
focus on these priorities if confirmed.
As the world hopefully emerges from the COVID pandemic, we expect
to see a resurgence in the number of Americans coming to Angola. The
safety of our staff and U.S. citizens is always paramount.
Finally, American diplomacy works best when American diplomats best
exemplify our nation. If confirmed, I will promote an interagency
Embassy team that reflects the values of the United States.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Next, we will turn to Ms. Aubin for her testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH MOORE AUBIN OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PEOPLE'S
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
Ms. Aubin. Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member
Rounds, and members of this committee for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
As the Texas-born child of a U.S. Air Force officer, I feel
an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my parents, Tom and
Virginia Moore, who raised me to put country over self, and I
owe them everything for preparing me to take on my chosen
vocation 31 years ago as a Foreign Service officer, and to my
husband, Daniel Aubin, for his incredible love and support.
It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden to
serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the Democratic People's
Republic of Algeria, and I appreciate deeply the confidence he
and Secretary Blinken have shown.
I served in Algeria from 2011 to 2014 as the Deputy Chief
of Mission, so I was there for the 2013 terrorist attack at the
Amenas gas production facility, and I, along with every member
of the embassy, did not stop working until American hostages
were released and three deceased Americans brought back to
their families.
It was a formative experience. If confirmed, my highest
priority will be to keep all Americans in Algeria safe.
If confirmed, I hope to advance three critical priorities:
first, strengthening our security cooperation to fight
terrorism and promote regional stability; second, expanding
investment opportunities for U.S. companies to deliver economic
benefits to the American people; third, advocating for
necessary political and economic reforms to foster stability as
Algeria navigates a post-COVID economy.
Although it rarely makes the front page, we have an
important relationship with Algeria, and I will work to
increase the impact of U.S. activities there. I also believe in
the enduring value of deepening people-to-people ties. Embassy
Algiers supports an ever-growing spectrum of programs that
strengthen our security, economic governance, educational, and
cultural ties.
Algeria's large youth population is curious about America
and wants to learn English. That is an opportunity I hope to
make the most of.
If confirmed, I will return to a country that has changed
in important ways since I last lived there. Last year, the
Algerian Government adopted a package of constitutional reforms
to strengthen Algeria's political system. Legislative elections
will occur in three days. The Algerian public continues to
demonstrate peacefully for core civil rights and liberties.
I will continue to press for expanding observance of human
rights, including freedoms of expression and association and
space for civil society.
Algeria fought against violent extremism in the 1990s and
it has maintained its stability through rigorous
counterterrorism efforts, national reconciliation programs, and
de-radicalization initiatives.
Algeria has found ways to export this peace dividend in a
difficult neighborhood. It played a critical role in brokering
reconciliation in Mali with the 2015 Algiers Accord.
Algeria provides security assistance to Tunisia and Niger.
It actively participates in the African Union, the Arab League,
the OIC, and it hosts AFRIPOL and the African Union Center for
Study and Research on Terrorism.
While new investments are essential, Algeria also remains
one of the key regional producers of oil and gas, ranking ninth
in the world in gas reserves and sixteenth in oil reserves, and
has vast promise for renewables.
If confirmed, I will promote U.S. companies as they seek to
partner with Algerian firms to advance development of this
vital energy sector for our mutual benefit.
The United States and Algeria have a rich history on which
to continue to build. From the Treaty of Peace and Amity with
the U.S. signed in Algiers in 1795 to American troops
liberating Algeria in World War II, to the United States being
the first country to recognize Algerian independence on July
3rd, 1962 to Algeria playing a role of creative and active
mediation to help release the 52 American diplomat hostages
from Iran, we have an enduring partnership that can face the
opportunities and the challenges of the 21st century together.
Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Rounds, and
members of the committee for this opportunity to address you.
If confirmed, it will be the honor of my life to represent
America to the Algerian people and to lead our tremendous and
talented mission there.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin
Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen and Ranking Member Rounds, and
members of this committee for the opportunity to appear before you
today. As the Texas-born child of a U.S. Air Force officer, I feel an
immeasurable debt of gratitude to my parents, Tom and Virginia Moore,
who raised me to put country over self, and I owe them everything for
preparing me to take on my chosen vocation 31 years ago as a Foreign
Service Officer; and to my husband, Daniel Aubin, for his incredible
love and support.
It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden to serve as
the U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, and I deeply appreciate the confidence
he and Secretary Blinken have shown in me.
I served in Algeria from 2011-2014 as the Deputy Chief of Mission,
so I was there for the 2013 terrorist attack at the In Amenas gas
production facility. I, along with every member of the Embassy, did not
stop working until American hostages were released, and three deceased
Americans brought back to their families. It was a formative
experience. If confirmed, my highest priority will be to keep every
American safe in Algeria.
If confirmed, I hope to advance three critical priorities. First,
strengthening our security cooperation to fight terrorism and promote
regional stability. Second, expanding investment opportunities for U.S.
companies to deliver economic benefits to the American people. Third,
advocating for necessary political and economic reforms to foster
stability as Algeria navigates a post-COVID economy.
Although it rarely makes the front page, we have an important
relationship with Algeria, and I will work to increase the impact of
U.S. activities there.
I also believe in the enduring value of deepening people-to-people
ties. Embassy Algiers supports an ever-growing spectrum of programs
that strengthen our security, economic, governance, educational and
cultural ties. Algeria's large youth population is curious about
America and wants to learn English. That's an opportunity I hope to
make the most of.
If confirmed, I will return to a country that is changed in
important ways since I last lived there. Last year, the Algerian
Government adopted a package of constitutional reforms to strengthen
Algeria's political system. Legislative elections will occur in three
days. The Algerian public continues to demonstrate peacefully for core
civil rights and liberties. I will continue to press for expanding
observance of human rights, including freedoms of expression and
association, and space for civil society.
Algeria fought against violent extremism in the 1990s. It has
maintained its stability through rigorous counterterrorism efforts,
national reconciliation programs, and de-radicalization initiatives.
Algeria has found ways to export this peace dividend in a difficult
neighborhood: it played a critical role in brokering reconciliation in
Mali with the 2015 Algiers Accord; it provides security assistance to
Tunisia and Niger; it actively participates in the African Union, the
Arab League, and the OIC; and it hosts AFRIPOL and the African Union
Center for Study and Research on Terrorism.
While new investments are essential, Algeria also remains one of
the key regional producers of oil and gas ranking ninth in the world in
gas reserves and 16th in oil reserves, and has vast promise for
renewables. If confirmed, I will promote U.S. companies as they seek to
partner with Algerian firms to advance development of this vital energy
sector for our mutual benefit.
The United States and Algeria have a rich history on which to
continue to build. From the Treaty of Peace and Amity with the U.S.
signed in Algiers in September of 1795, to American troops liberating
Algeria in World War II; from the United States being the first country
to recognize Algerian independence on July 3, 1962, to Algeria playing
a role of creative and active mediation to help release the 52 American
diplomat hostages from Iran. We have an enduring partnership that can
face the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century together.
Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen and Ranking Member Rounds, and
members of the committee for this opportunity to address you. If
confirmed, it will be the honor of my life to represent America to the
Algerian people and to lead our tremendous and talented mission there.
I look forward to your questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you very much for your
testimony.
Next, we are going to hear from Mr. Young.
STATEMENT OF EUGENE S. YOUNG OF NEW YORK, A CAREER MEMBER OF
THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR,
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Mr. Young. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of
the committee, it really is an honor to appear before you today
as the president's nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of
the Congo.
I am very grateful for the trust and confidence that
President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed in me. I want
to acknowledge my remarkable wife, Zoe, and our two boys today.
I know they are watching and I thank them for their enduring
support and love.
I believe my mother, Margaret, is also watching from home
and I am so grateful to her and my late father, Sanford, for
their encouragement, their care, and their rock-solid
upbringing. I think my brother, Roland, is out there too, and I
am grateful to him as well with his family. So thanks for this
chance.
Thanks to the hard work of our diplomats on the ground in
Brazzaville and the local staff at the embassy, the United
States has built a strong relationship with the Republic of the
Congo. We have been able to deepen the ties between our
governments, engage in regular and serious dialogue, and work
on issues of mutual concern.
Our countries are working together to effectively fight
COVID, to protect our shared environmental heritage, and to
combat trafficking in persons. If confirmed, I will seek to
maintain this improved U.S.-Congo partnership.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as you well
know, the Republic of the Congo occupies a vital but tenuous
position in Central Africa. Congo itself is stable, but it lies
in a region beset with challenges.
In the past year, Congo has dealt with a suspected Ebola
outbreak from across the Congo River and accommodated refugees
fleeing the Central African Republic.
Congo is also home to the Great Congo Rain Forest, an
invaluable ecological treasure known as the second lung of the
world, but one--I am sorry, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. It is okay. Take your time.
Mr. Young. Congo is also home to the Great Congo Rain
Forest, an invaluable ecological treasure known as the second
lung of the world, but one that is in danger of imprudent
exploitation.
Congo's significant oil reserves, which have boosted its
economy but also fueled corruption, will still be crucial to
the country's immediate future.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to
address these challenges and to ensure the safety and security
of American citizens in Congo as well as for our American and
Congolese staff at the embassy.
Working with this committee, the various agencies of the
U.S. Government active in Congo, other donor nations, and
multilateral organizations, I will continue the good work our
mission is supporting across key economic and social sectors in
Congo.
If confirmed, I will focus on encouraging democratic
progress, supporting efforts to protect the Congo Basin,
working with Congo to protect against this, our current
pandemic and future pandemics, as well as encouraging the
diversification of the Congolese economy.
And for U.S. business, I will continue the efforts of our
embassy team in seeking a level playing field and a more
transparent and inviting business environment.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee,
thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee
and other interested members of Congress to advance U.S.
interests in Congo, and I am very happy to respond to any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eugene S. Young
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the President's
nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo. I am grateful
for the trust and confidence that President Biden and Secretary Blinken
have placed in me.
I would like to acknowledge my wife, Zoe, and our two sons today
and thank them for their enduring support and love. I believe my mother
Margaret is also watching from home and I am so grateful to her and my
late father, Sanford, for their encouragement, care and rock solid
upbringing.
Thanks to the hard work of our diplomats on the ground in
Brazzaville and the local staff at the Embassy, the United States has
built a strong relationship with the Republic of the Congo. We've been
able to deepen the ties between our governments, engage in regular and
serious dialogue, and work on issues of mutual concern. Our countries
are working together to effectively fight COVID, to protect our shared
environmental heritage, and to combat trafficking in persons. If
confirmed, I will seek to maintain this improved U.S.-Congo
partnership.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as you well know, the
Republic of the Congo occupies a vital but tenuous position in Central
Africa. Congo itself is stable, but it lies in a region beset with
challenges. In the past year, Congo has dealt with a suspected Ebola
outbreak from across the Congo river and accommodated refugees fleeing
the Central African Republic. Congo is also home to the great Congo
rainforest, an invaluable ecological treasure, known as the second lung
of the world, but one that is in danger of imprudent exploitation.
Congo's significant oil reserves, which have boosted its economy, but
also fueled corruption, will still be crucial to the country's
immediate future.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to address these
challenges and to ensure the safety and security of American citizens
in Congo as well as for our American and Congolese staff at the
Embassy. Working with this committee, the various agencies of the U.S.
Government active in Congo, other donor nations and multilateral
organizations, I will continue the good work our mission is supporting
across key economic and social sectors in Congo. If confirmed, I will
focus on encouraging democratic progress, supporting efforts to protect
the Congo Basin, working with Congo to protect against this and future
pandemics, as well as encouraging the diversification of the Congolese
economy. And for U.S. business, I will continue the efforts of our
Embassy team in seeking a level playing field and a more transparent
and inviting business environment.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, thank
you once again for the opportunity to appear before you today. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and other
interested members of Congress to advance U.S. interests in Congo and I
am happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you for your testimony.
And now we will turn to Mr. Lamora. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER JOHN LAMORA OF RHODE ISLAND, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC
OF CAMEROON
Mr. Lamora. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rounds,
distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege and
an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's
nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of
Cameroon.
I thank the president and the secretary of state for their
confidence in me, and I am equally grateful for this
distinguished committee's consideration.
While the virtual nature of this hearing precludes my
family from joining us in person, I nonetheless want to
recognize my husband, Eric, my sister, Michelle, and my
nephews, Jack and Patrick, who have all supported and
encouraged me over many years and who are watching today from
home.
I also want to pay homage to my late parents, Thomas and
Elizabeth Lamora, without whose love and support I would not be
here today.
The United States was one of the first countries to
establish diplomatic relations with Cameroon in 1960. Since
then, nearly 4,000 Peace Corps volunteers have served in
Cameroon. It is a country with great cultural and geographic
diversity, a capsule of the entire continent: active volcanoes,
rain forest jungles teeming with wildlife, broad savannas, and
a beautiful coastline.
I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to experience
much of this personally when I served in Cameroon previously.
Unfortunately, this beautiful, warm, and welcoming country that
launched my love of Africa nearly 30 years ago also faces
significant challenges, as you well know.
The United States is deeply concerned by the continued
violence in Cameroon's Anglophone regions. What began as
peaceful protests in late 2016 have tragically escalated into a
protracted violent crisis with more than 3,000 persons killed
and more than 1 million internally displaced.
Children have been threatened and in some places killed for
attending school. Schools, hospitals, and religious sites have
been attacked. Humanitarian actors continue to face numerous
obstacles in carrying out their work.
We condemn violence in all its forms regardless of who is
perpetrating it, and call for an end to the suffering of the
civilian population, regardless of their location or
affiliation.
No one undermining peace in Cameroon has our support or our
tolerance, whether members of the security forces or of armed
separatists groups. We are acting vigorously to help resolve
the crisis and, if confirmed, I commit that that will be my
highest priority.
This week, secretary of state established a policy imposing
visa restrictions on those undermining efforts to peacefully
resolve the situation.
We continue to have discussions about Cameroon with the
Cameroonian Government and to other Cameroonians, as well as
with key international partners to foster greater, stronger,
and more unified engagement. This will remain our highest
priority in our Cameroon policy.
Cameroon also faces a number of other challenges that are
all too common in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, including
health, security, and governance.
The Cameroonian people have enormous potential. I have seen
it firsthand. If I am confirmed, our embassy team and I will do
everything we can to help the people and Government of Cameroon
make that potential a reality.
The coronavirus pandemic has added a layer of difficulty to
reaching that day. As a global health security agenda Phase 1
country, Cameroon partners with the United States to strengthen
its ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious
diseases with pandemic potential.
Cameroon also benefits from U.S. assistance through PEPFAR
and the president's Malaria Initiative, such that it has
reduced its HIV prevalence and is working to achieve epidemic
control within the next two years.
On security, the United States continues to support
Cameroon and its Lake Chad Basin neighbors in their joint
effort to defeat Boko Haram and its offshoot, ISIS West Africa.
This is a key element of the fight against global
terrorism. Our support, however, is neither limitless nor
without conditions. Cameroonian security forces must abide by
accepted human rights norms and those who violate those norms
must be held appropriately accountable.
In the same vein, there is still substantial work to be
done to promote democracy, human rights, combat corruption, and
ensure accountability of those who violate Cameroonian laws or
the citizens' trust.
We must continue to press on all these important issues
while helping the Cameroonian Government and people, including
civil society, to find a path to peace.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the committee,
I thank you once again for this opportunity to appear before
you, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with you and
others in Congress to advance U.S. interests in Cameroon.
I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Christopher John Lamora
follows:]
Statement of Christopher John Lamora
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the
committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as
President Biden's nominee to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the
Republic of Cameroon. I thank the President and the Secretary of State
for their confidence in me. I am equally grateful for this
distinguished committee's consideration.
While the virtual nature of this hearing precludes my family from
joining us in person, I nonetheless want to recognize my husband Eric,
my sister Michelle, and my nephews Jack and Patrick, who have all
supported and encouraged me over many years and who are watching today
from home. I also want to pay homage to my late parents, Thomas and
Elizabeth Lamora, without whose love and support I would not be here
today.
I'm grateful as well to my Africa Bureau family, whose
collegiality, confidence, friendship, and mentoring have sustained me
and fostered my personal and professional growth for nearly three
decades -- from my first assignment at the U.S. Consulate in Douala,
Cameroon from 1992-1993 to my past three years as Deputy Chief of
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Accra, Ghana.
The United States was one of the first countries to establish
diplomatic relations with Cameroon in 1960. Since then, nearly 4,000
Peace Corps Volunteers have served in Cameroon. It is a country with
great cultural and geographic diversity, a capsule of the entire
continent: active volcanoes, rainforest jungles teeming with wildlife,
broad savannahs, and a beautiful coastline. I was fortunate to have had
the opportunity to experience much of this personally when I served in
Cameroon previously.
Unfortunately, this beautiful, warm, and welcoming country that
launched my love of Africa nearly 30 years ago also faces significant
challenges, as you well know.
The United States is deeply concerned by the continued violence in
Cameroon's Anglophone regions. What began as peaceful protests in late
2016 has tragically escalated into a protracted violent crisis with
more than 3,000 persons killed and more than one million internally
displaced. Children have been threatened, and in some cases killed, for
attending school. Schools, hospitals, and religious sites have been
attacked. Humanitarian actors continue to face numerous obstacles in
carrying out their work.
We condemn violence in all its forms, regardless of who is
perpetrating it, and call for an end to the suffering of the civilian
population regardless of their location or affiliation. No one
undermining peace in Cameroon has our support or tolerance, whether
members of the security forces or of armed separatist groups.
We are acting vigorously to help resolve the crisis. This week, the
Secretary of State established a policy imposing visa restrictions on
those undermining efforts to peacefully resolve the crisis. We continue
to have discussions about Cameroon with the Cameroonian Government and
other Cameroonians, as well as with key international partners to
foster greater, stronger, and more unified engagement. Working to
resolve this crisis is, and will continue to be, the single highest
priority in our Cameroon policy.
Cameroon also faces a number of other challenges that are all too
common in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, including health, security,
and governance. The Cameroonian people have enormous potential; I've
seen it first-hand. If I am confirmed, our Embassy team and I will do
everything we can to help the people and Government of Cameroon to make
that potential a reality.
The coronavirus pandemic has added a layer of difficulty to
reaching that day. As a Global Health Security Agenda Phase I country,
Cameroon partners with the United States to strengthen its ability to
prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases with pandemic
potential. Cameroon also benefits from U.S. assistance through PEPFAR
and the Presidential Malaria Initiative, such that it has reduced its
HIV prevalence and is working to achieve epidemic control within the
next two years.
On security, the United States continues to support Cameroon and
its Lake Chad Basin neighbors in their joint effort to defeat Boko
Haram and its offshoot, ISIS-West Africa. This is a key element of the
fight against global terrorism. Our support, however, is neither
limitless nor without conditions. Cameroonian security forces must
abide by accepted human rights norms, and those who violate these norms
must be held appropriately accountable.
In that same vein, there is still substantial work to be done to
promote democracy, and human rights, combat corruption, and ensure
accountability of those who violate Cameroonian laws or the citizens'
trust. We must continue to press on all these important issues while
helping the Cameroonian Government and people, including civil society
find a path to peace.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you once again
for this opportunity to appear before you. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with you and others in Congress to advance U.S. interests in
Cameroon. I would be happy to answer any questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Lamora, and thank you
all very much for your testimony. And as somebody who grew up
in a Foreign Service family, I understand and grateful you
acknowledged that representing United States is a family affair
and a team effort.
With that, given my colleague's, Senator Rounds, time
constraints, I think I will just turn it over to you, Mike, if
you want to begin the questioning. I understood you said you
had to leave shortly. So I do not know how much time you have
got.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You were cutting
out a little bit there. But if you would allow me, I would make
quick work of my time and ask a few questions if that is okay
with you, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. Absolutely. No, I want to make sure you
have a chance to ask whatever you want. So why do you not lead
off?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
courtesy.
Ambassador Andre, as you know, Somalia is wracked by a
political crisis over the September 17th agreement to forego a
``one person one vote'' election in favor of an indirect
selection process similar to that of 2016 and 2017.
However, I am particularly curious about how you see
Somalia as a longer-term political situation. Looking past the
current political crisis, what are the reasonable benchmarks
the United States should expect with regard to Somalia's
democratic development?
Mr. Andre. Thank you, Senator, for that question. Looking
forward to the immediate situation, as you said, we need to
assist the Somalis to develop a permanent constitution.
They are using a provisional one right now. The Somali
political class recognizes that the indirect method that they
have used in the past and that they are intending to use this
time is a stop-gap measure until they are able to have the
``one person one vote'' direct elections, which all seem to
agree is their ending point.
They do not control all of their territory at this point
and they do not want to disadvantage Somalis who, having
nothing to do with their own will, are trapped behind the lines
and territory controlled by terrorist networks.
So the constitution and getting to that direct election
that you refer to.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Aubin, I am very concerned about the recent U.S. policy
change to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
I have been to the Sahrawi people's refugee camps twice. I
was impressed by their strong desire for independence and
frustration with the long delay of the time period for a
referendum to determine whether Western Sahara should become a
part of Morocco or be an independent nation.
Please tell me how you think this change in U.S. policy has
impacted U.S.-Algeria relations, and also under what
conditions, if any, might Algeria increase military assistance
to the Polisario to support it against Morocco?
Ms. Aubin. Thank you for the question, Senator Rounds.
Algeria has supported the political process led by the U.N.
and by the U.N. Secretary General's personal envoy for Western
Sahara.
So I think Algeria welcomes the fact that we are resuming
active diplomacy and supported of the U.N., and together with
our international partners want to bring a halt to the violence
and restart a credible U.N. process.
We are working privately with all the parties involved and
discussing the path forward. To your question about military
assistance, I do not believe Algeria is providing military
assistance. It is not something they highlight.
But, most definitively, they have called for a de-
escalation of violence and for the political process to
continue.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, I have a couple questions that I will
offer for the record. But I appreciate your courtesy in
allowing me to move forward first and I thank you, and at this
point I will have to step out of the meeting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the nominees
before us. I most certainly have appreciated your comments
today.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank you
for your questions, and look forward to working with you. So I
am going to also start with Ambassador Andre.
And, you know, as was referenced earlier in this hearing,
we have a continued al-Shabaab presence in Somalia. We also
have the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Somalia, a
decision made by the previous president.
How has that decision to withdraw U.S. forces impacted the
situation in Somalia, in your opinion?
Mr. Andre. Well, Senator, in my capacity as ambassador in
Djibouti, I was present in January when AFRICOM took on that
instruction. It was a repositioning of U.S. forces from Somalia
to elsewhere in the region, which has slowed the tempo of our
efforts to assist the Somali people with their security but it
has not stopped it.
We continue to build the capacity of Somalia security
forces, support AMISOM, African Union's peacekeeping force, and
to keep the U.S. embassy open and operational.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, I appreciate that. In fact, I was
just speaking the other day with the mayor of the city of
Salisbury, Maryland, who happens to be a member of the Maryland
National Guard and was recently deployed to Djibouti as well,
and we talked a little bit about that sort of redeployment, as
you said.
I have also heard concerns from others in the region that
there has been some vacuum created, although there is,
obviously, an attempt to compensate for that.
You referenced in your testimony Somali federalism. So how
does the--and we are heading into elections here. Can you just
talk a little bit about how the situation in Somalia compares
with the regional situation in Somaliland and then Puntland?
And I know that Somaliland and Puntland have different
relationships than with the national sort of government, at
least as seen by Puntland.
So could you just describe that and what the challenges are
and what role, if any, the United States should play in
mediating this effort, especially in the context of elections?
Mr. Andre. Yes, Senator.
I want to emphasize, as I said in the testimony, the
importance of establishing, through consensus and compromise, a
consistent pattern, a framework, for the relations between the
central government and the states.
Twenty years ago, I spent some time in Puntland. I was
there looking mostly at fisheries issues, and they have been
able to govern themselves well.
They see themselves very much as a part of Somalia. But
they are also very interested in having significant control
over their own governance.
There are other federal states of Somalia that have
different understandings and different relationships.
Somaliland, as you know, does not consider itself part of
Somalia.
The United States recognizes a single Somalia, which
includes Somaliland. So the picture here is a bit confused
because there is not a consistent relationship between the
center and the states.
That is something for Somalis to work out. They have many
international examples to choose from, to consider, as the
Somali people build that compromised national consensus on what
the nature of Somali federalism should be.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador.
Turning to Ambassador Brewer and Lesotho, you referenced in
your testimony the AGOA agreement, which has helped the Lesotho
economy. But at the same time, I think Lesotho would like to
see greater diversification in its economy outside the textile
sector.
Are there things that the United States can do to be
helpful to that effort by the Government of Lesotho?
Ms. Brewer. Thank you, sir, for that question. Thank you,
Senator.
We do see that AGOA has been a massive help to that
country. About 12 percent of the GDP in 2019 came from AGOA
from the export of mainly textiles, as you note, sir.
But there are many opportunities for U.S. companies, and
one of the challenges of serving in Africa, particularly in
smaller countries such as Sierra Leone and Lesotho, is how to
attract those U.S. companies, how to encourage them that they
will have their goods and services treated fairly and they will
have a level playing field when they get there.
So one of the issues that, if confirmed, I will be carrying
forward with the host nation will be the need to have a
welcoming climate, a business climate that encourages
international companies, including those from the U.S., to
come. That means anti-corruption. That means a rule of law.
That means political stability.
All of these are ingredients that lead to, you know,
diversification. So, certainly, we see potential in the energy
sector through Power Africa, through a whole of U.S. Government
engagement.
We understand that the Government of Lesotho would like to
increase their agricultural output.
I am originally from Indiana, a state with a proud
agricultural tradition, and I think there is a lot that America
can do, certainly, through the commercial sector to be able to
help them with goods, services, and equipment.
So I think there is great potential and I believe that the
U.S. is there ready to help. We are the partner of choice, we
have a great reputation, and I think we can assist them through
a commercial context, not just through foreign assistance.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
And you mentioned also the success of our efforts on HIV/
AIDS in Lesotho and we look forward to keeping in touch with
you on that, especially the extent to which Lesotho has been
able to take ownership of that.
I am told that there are no other committee members on
right now. And if that is the case, I will continue asking
questions of our nominees.
Ambassador Mushingi, the United States has signed a number
of cooperative agreements with Angola in recent years,
including engagements with Prosper Africa, the Women's Global
Development and Prosperity Initiative, Young African Leaders
Initiative.
Could you talk about the areas that you think create the
most, you know, fruitful opportunities of engagement with
Angola and also what you see is our biggest challenges? And I
should say a lot of you covered a lot of our questions in your
opening statements.
That will cut down on the questions. But I do want to talk
to you about some of the issues that do remain.
Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, Senator. Clearly, we see an
opportunity here to engage now with Angola, especially since
the new regime took over about three years ago.
Where we have a big opening here is really on promoting
economic recovery, promoting a two-way trade between our two
countries, and opening these opportunities to U.S. companies in
Angola, a country of more than 30 million people, and we see
this desire of the Angolans to move away from their traditional
historic alliances and that is where we come in as the U.S.
The majority of the Angolans, as you described in your
opening remarks about the youth born in Angola or in many of
the other African countries, know what is going on outside of
Angola, know what the U.S. can bring to the table.
And each American company, what I call the U.S. model, has
these three ingredients that so far have been missing in Angola
and that really--Angolans want to take advantage of.
One of them is the transparency, the second one is the
transfer of technology, and the third one is creation of jobs.
So those are the opportunities that I see for American
companies in Angola.
But moving forward as far as extending the cooperative
agreement you were talking about, on the security cooperation
we see also an opportunity here to get into the door because
the history of Angola has been--their security cooperation with
Russia has been there for a long time, and now the signing of
our cooperative agreement a few years ago between the ministry
of defense and our DOD we see an opening where the security
forces are eager to be trained by us, are eager to be equipped
by us, are eager to see the intelligence technologies and how
they can use that for their own security in the region.
Finally is, of course, the security of the region and to
everyone that Angola can help us in the region, whether we are
talking about southern Africa region but also Central Africa
and what is in that, in the Central African Republic, in the
DRC--Democratic Republic of the Congo--in Uganda and Rwanda as
well.
Over to you.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I think you
have covered some of this. You mentioned Russia. But I think of
all the countries that we are talking about at this hearing,
China probably has established the greatest amount of influence
and footprint in Angola.
To what extent does China's economic and diplomatic and
military influence in Angola impact our interests there?
Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
Yes, China and Russia have these traditional relations with
Angola. It is no secret to anybody that, indeed, when we look
at the major infrastructure projects many of them have been
developed by China. But also, when we look at the debt issue,
again, China is at the top of the list for that country.
Now, where we come in is, again, as I said, for our U.S.
companies, and we saw a few successes that I referred to
earlier in my testimony, in the last few months three American
companies that have been able to penetrate the market and win
over the competition in various sectors.
We have looked at telecommunication, IT, solar energy, but
also energy, and both were U.S. companies, the latest three
successes we have seen. And I think, for me, the way I see this
is for us to talk about what we, the U.S.A, are bringing to the
table and let the Angolans decide themselves.
At the end of the day, I am confident that we can compete
in this market and, indeed, not only compete, but we can win in
this market. Over to you, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Ambassador.
Just one question on Sao Tome and Principe, which is you
mentioned their sort of government structure and process, which
has been, I think, one that we have encouraged and supported.
With respect to their economy, my understanding is they
would also like to diversify their economy a little bit more.
What role can the United States play with respect to that
objective?
Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, Senator.
One role that we can play is, really, to build on what we
already have. As I said, it is a small land footprint but the
long maritime borders and for us talking about maritime
security, that is one thing where, really, we can play the
biggest role.
But I was really happy to see that when I looked at the
American companies that are on the ground--Kosmos Energy,
Caterpillar, Dell--so that gives me an idea of the openness
that Sao Tome has to American businesses with American models
and, if confirmed, that is what I will be pushing, and
especially many of those companies or agencies that work in the
security area when we are talking about maritime security in
the Gulf of Guinea. Over.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Ms. Aubin, the United States, as you know, has praised
Algeria for its cooperation on counterterrorism issues and
regional matters, and you referenced in your testimony its role
as a mediator, notably, in Mali in 2015.
At the same time, its close ties to and its arms deals with
Russia, especially in the aftermath of the CAATSA legislation
passed here in Congress, have been concerning.
So what do you see as the main areas of agreement between
the United States and Algeria and some of the areas of
friction?
Ms. Aubin. Thank you for the question, Senator Van Hollen.
I see the U.S. and Algeria having a lot of areas of
agreement: regional stability in the Maghreb, the desire to
have a more inclusive economic environment, and, certainly,
they are very interested in the Human Rights Report--
Trafficking in Persons Report and other reports that we do, and
they are working to make gains in those areas.
You are right about Russia and Algeria's military
relationship. Algeria procured two-thirds of its arms from
Russia between 2015 and 2019. So that is an issue, and the sale
of C-130s were part of the United States' larger policy goal of
deterring Algeria from engaging in sanctionable activity.
And if confirmed, I will prioritize that in my
conversations with Algerian officials.
Senator Van Hollen. No, I appreciate that, because there
were the arms sales, as you say, dating back to 2015 and
before. But I think more concerning have been some of the arms
sales since the CAATSA legislation passed.
What impact, if any, have you seen has that had on the
calculations of the Algerian Government in terms of purchases?
Ms. Aubin. So thank you for allowing me to clarify that I
think the C-130 sales helped deter that, and I think the United
States needs to continue conversations with Algeria to explain
what Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
really means and how that will impact our relationship, moving
forward.
And so that is something that I will prioritize in my
conversations when I get there. Algeria has had a policy of
sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs and that is
how they have moved forward in their bilateral relationships.
But I think this is a really important point and if
confirmed, I will continue to raise that with Algerian
colleagues.
Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. No, I appreciate that, and
Senator Rounds mentioned his opposition to the former
administration's policy change with respect to recognition of
Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
You already answered that question. I do want to go on
record in agreement with my colleague, Senator Rounds, on that
matter.
So let me turn now to Mr. Young, if I may, and a couple
questions, because you covered a lot of it in your testimony
with respect to the Republic of Congo.
One of the concerns I am sure you have seen expressed here
on the Hill, in the United States, and elsewhere, has been the
regional impact of weak control over the security sector and
abuses committed by Congolese peacekeepers and park rangers.
Can you speak a little bit to that issue and, you know,
what role you can play in expressing our concerns and what kind
of changes that we can expect?
Mr. Young. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is really important that we continue to direct
dialogue with the Government on issues like these that my
predecessor and our embassy is still having at this point, to
have that regular dialogue, to have an open discussion.
In terms of the peacekeepers that you mentioned, sir, my
understanding, and this is one of the positive signs that we
have seen, and that is that those peacekeepers that I think you
are referring to were, in fact, held accountable for the crimes
that they committed.
So that was one plus that we have seen recently. But it is
important that we--across this and across all of these issues
around democratic progress that we have a dialogue with the
Government, we have dialogue with civil society, with youth,
with the security and maintain some of the training programs we
have had with security forces and with law enforcement. I think
those can help address the issues that you are referring to,
sir.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, right. No, I am referring to the
situation in Central African Republic, their troops there, and
we do look forward to working with you to make sure that
everyone is held accountable in what happened there.
Let me turn to Mr. Lamora. And as you referenced in your
testimony, Cameroon has seen significant violence in recent
years owing to the Anglophone Conflict as well as the Boko
Haram insurgency in the far north.
I represent a very active and engaged and terrific
Cameroonian-American constituency in the state of Maryland and
I have been engaged with them in conversations about their
concerns about what is happening.
Can you talk a little more about what the United States can
do to support a peaceful resolution of Cameroon's Anglophone
Conflict?
Mr. Lamora. Thank you, Senator.
Yes. One of the things that we have been trying to do and
will try to do with Cameroon is to bring the parties together
to get them to talk. There has not been complete willingness on
any side thus far to come to the table.
As you are aware I know, sir, the Swiss have led a process
of trying to do that and we have supported and aligned
ourselves with that. I think an important thing that we have
been doing increasingly in recent weeks is to engage the French
at higher levels.
France has a long-standing close relationship with the
Government in Yaounde. Secretary Blinken recently raised his
concerns, our concerns, about Cameroon with his French
counterpart. I think greater French engagement certainly would
help. We are hopeful that we can move that forward.
As I mentioned in my testimony also, following on the
resolution that the Senate passed, S.R. 684, that talked about
the possibility of sanctions, Secretary Blinken announced these
visa sanctions, visa restrictions, earlier this week on those
who are impeding peace in the Anglophone regions, in
particular.
So I think there is a variety of things that we can do and
that our international partners can do. But, ultimately, we can
help move them all in the best direction we can.
But it will have to be the Cameroonian Government, the
parties to the violence, and the Cameroonian people who really
commit themselves to finding a peaceful way forward.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
Thank you all. I am getting word that another committee I
serve on with the attorney general may be wrapping up and I
hope to get over there and have a chance to ask him some
questions.
So let me thank all of you, again, for your previous
service to our country. I look forward to supporting your
nominations and, again, thank you for what you do and to your
families.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Larry Edward Andre by Senator Robert Menendez
Gulf Influence in Somalia
Question. Countries such as the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey are playing an increasing role in the Horn of Africa,
particularly in Somalia, though much of their efforts remain bilateral
and somewhat opaque. What seems certain, however, is that despite all
four of these countries being allies and friends of the United States,
their agendas and efforts often do not align with our own.
What is your assessment of the influence of these actors in the
Horn of Africa?
Answer. The Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Qatar, have
significant influence in Somalia by virtue of their political,
economic, and security engagement.
Our NATO ally Turkey's relationship with Somalia is strong. Turkey
has built schools, hospitals, and infrastructure in Somalia. It also
provides extensive security assistance focused on the recruitment,
training, and equipping of both police and Somali National Army forces.
Question. Are their collective efforts contributing to or taking
away from peace and stability in the region?
Answer. The Gulf rift has had a destabilizing impact on Somalia, as
Gulf states vied for influence with the Federal Government (FGS) in
Mogadishu and Federal Member States (FMS). The dispute distracted the
FGS and its FMS from implementing security sector, political, and
economic reforms critical to stabilizing the country, including
countering the influence of al-Shabaab and ISIS.
Meanwhile, in recent months Turkey joined other countries when the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) issued a joint
statement welcoming the May 20 Summit. It did not join statements of
concern about President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's term extension or
subsequent violence in Mogadishu, which were issued immediately prior.
Question. If the latter, what is the United States doing to try and
bring their efforts more in line with our own?
Answer. The United States repeatedly has urged external actors,
including the Gulf states, not to use Somalia as a proxy battleground
for bilateral disputes. We hold regular consultations with these
governments and demarche them to join us and likeminded partners in
seeking political progress and stability in Somalia.
Vision for Somalia
Question. Infighting between Somalia's Federal Member States and
the central member states continues to threaten the stability of the
country; the United States conducted airstrikes in Somalia against Al
Shabab and Al Qaeda for over a decade while Al Shabab continues to
carry out major attacks in cities and in the countryside; and Gulf
actors compete for influence. Tensions between Ethiopia, Sudan,
Eritrea, Kenya, and Somalia threaten the stability of the entire Horn
of Africa.
What are the United States' goals in Somalia in the short, medium,
and long term?
With the grave potential for instability in yet another country in
the Horn of Africa, what will be your priorities if confirmed?
How do you plan to work with Special Envoy Feltman and other
Ambassadors in the region to develop a coherent and integrated
approach to U.S. policy in the Horn?
Answer. The United States' near- and medium-term objectives in
Somalia are to degrade terrorist groups that pose a threat to U.S.
persons and interests; strengthen Somalia's security forces so that
they can assume greater responsibility from the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM); advance political reconciliation and governance
reforms necessary for lasting stability; and promote economic growth
and opportunity that will reduce Somalia's dependence on U.S. and
international assistance, while delivering humanitarian aid to people
in need. It is our hope that, over time, these efforts will lead to a
peaceful, stable, democratic Somalia that respects human rights and
fundamental freedoms and that can provide security and services for its
citizens.
If confirmed, I will build on the work of Ambassador Yamamoto to
bring to bear the full range of tools to help Somalis defend themselves
and rid their country of terrorism. I will support Somalia's completion
of a peaceful, inclusive, transparent, and timely electoral process and
strengthened cooperation among Somalia's national and federal member
state governments. And I will support the work of our development,
humanitarian, and economic professionals to provide aid to Somalis in
need and to promote inclusive economic growth.
The stabilization of Somalia is an international challenge that
requires close coordination with its neighbors and other international
stakeholders. I am committed to working closely with our Special Envoy
for the Horn of Africa Envoy Jeffrey Feltman and our ambassadors in
East Africa and in other critical partner capitals to ensure a cohesive
and coordinated approach.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Larry Edward Andre, Jr. by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report, Somalia was identified as a special case due to ongoing
conflict, insecurity, and protracted humanitarian crises. Given the
complicated security situation and sustained insurgency by Al-Shabaab
across the country, how will you work with the host government and U.S.
Government interagency to help Somalia improve efforts of protection,
prosecution, and prevention?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. Government's
interagency commitment to working with the Somali federal and member
state governments to help build the capacity of Somali institutions to
prevent trafficking, prosecute those engaged in the illicit activity,
and protect victims.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious
Freedom report, the Somalian Government is listed as continuing to
discriminate against non-Islamic religions, including Christianity. In
addition, Al-Shabaab has committed egregious crimes against those who
practice religions other than Islam. What is your assessment of this
particular issue and if confirmed, how will you work with the Office of
International Religious Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-
country?
Answer. Al-Shabaab's brutal treatment of those whose beliefs differ
from their own is appalling. If confirmed, I would condemn Al-Shabaab's
ruthless acts and urge that Somalia's laws allow all people to worship
in a manner of their choosing. If confirmed, I would engage senior
officials in the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as its Federal
Member States, to advocate for religious freedom and express concern
over actions by authorities against individuals and groups attempting
to practice their faith freely. If confirmed, my team will continue to
work closely with the Office of International Religious Freedom.
Question. In the 2020 Human Rights Report, Somalia was identified
as having committed or baring witness to severe human rights abuses
specifically committed by Al-Shabaab.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances
with the host government?
How will you direct your embassy to work with civil society
organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. Al-Shabaab is the leading perpetrator of human rights
violations in Somalia. Working with the Somali Government, AMISOM, and
like-minded partners to degrade al-Shabaab militarily and economically
while bolstering Somali governance and institutions should reduce their
operational space to commit abuses against Somali and foreign
nationals.
If confirmed, I would continue to engage with the highest levels of
the Somali Government, sub-national authorities, and local communities,
members of the diplomatic corps, the U.N., and NGOs to promote respect
for human rights for all Somalis.
AMISOM
Question. There is much discussion about AMISOM's mandate in
Somalia and potential realignments. If your opinion, what adjustments
to AMISOM's mandate are needed to improve its effectiveness?
Answer. AMISOM remains critical to Somalia's stabilization, and its
continued presence is necessary to provide time and space to build
effective Somali security institutions. The United States supports a
smart and deliberate conditions-based transition from AMISOM to Somali
security forces. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with
the African Union, AMISOM troop contributors, the U.N., EU, and other
international stakeholders to support revisions to AMISOM's mandate to
enable it to conduct more effective operations against al-Shabaab,
while supporting the development of Somali security forces that can
ultimately take over the country's security.
Somaliland
Question. What is your perspective on U.S. policy toward
Somaliland? Do you think the U.S. has missed an important opportunity
over the last several years to support and engage more fully with a
more stable and democratic entity at the behest of Mogadishu?
Answer. The United States recognizes a single Somalia, which
includes Somaliland. Given Somalia's federal system, I believe it is in
the U.S. interest to maintain positive engagement with Somalia's
national and regional government authorities, while also encouraging
those authorities to strengthen cooperation with one another. In June
2020, in my capacity as U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, I attended
Djibouti-hosted talks between senior representatives of Somaliland and
Somalia. This experience provided insights into the points of view of
both sides and where their interests overlap. If confirmed, I am
committed to continuing to engage with regional administrations like
Somaliland to promote good governance, stability, and economic
development, and to explore opportunities to strengthen cooperation.
__________
'Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Larry Edward Andre by Senator Cory A. Booker
Violence and Instability in Cameroon and Beyond
Question. U.S. relations with Cameroon have been mostly positive,
although?they have been adversely affected by concerns over human
rights abuses, in particular in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest
Regions, and the pace of political and economic liberalization.
Cameroon plays a key role in regional stability and remains a regional
partner in countering terrorism in the Lake Chad Region.
Last year, I joined with 19 of my Senate colleagues to sign a
resolution calling for a ceasefire in Cameroon, and remain
deeply concerned by the ongoing violence there. I am curious as
to what you think it will take to conclude and uphold a
ceasefire, guaranteed humanitarian access, and establish a
process of political dialogue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make resolving the Anglophone crisis
my top policy priority. Our position remains that all sides must end
violence and engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The
Government is focused on countering armed separatists in the field and
maintains that its convening of a Grand National Dialogue in 2019 and
decentralization efforts thus far, including regional elections in late
2020 and the establishment of a special status for the two Anglophone
regions, address the root causes of the crisis. I believe the
Government must do more to resolve the crisis. Specifically, it must be
willing to engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The
armed separatist groups, as well, must be willing to engage peacefully
in such a dialogue and cease human rights abuses, as called for in the
Senate resolution.
If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on
the ground and look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.
Question. In 2019, the United States took the relatively rare step
of terminating Cameroon's AGOA eligibility due to persistent gross
violations of human rights. Unfortunately, this does not appear to have
impacted the Government's behavior in the ongoing conflict. If
confirmed, what other measures do you plan to take to hold state and
non-state actors in Cameroon accountable for human rights abuses?
Answer. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the
United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on
individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in,
undermining the peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Anglophone
regions of Cameroon. This decision reflects the continuing U.S.
commitment to advance dialogue and promote respect for human rights.
This decision followed cuts in security assistance in recent years,
and, as you noted, the determination that Cameroon was ineligible for
AGOA starting on January 1, 2020. These actions demonstrate the U.S.
Government's resolve to back up words with actions.
If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on
the ground, as well as the Cameroonian Government and people, to
identify tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.
Question. In addition to the internal violence related to the
Anglophone Crisis, Cameroon is also facing threats from Boko Haram and
ISIS West Africa. How do we square our support for Cameroon's efforts
against Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa with our concerns about human
rights abuses and political abuses inside Cameroon? In other words, how
can the State Department ensure that President Biya does not use
foreign counterterrorism assistance to fund its efforts against
Anglophone separatists in the Southwest and Northwest part of the
country?
Answer. Cameroon has long played a crucial role in regional
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic,
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and
ISIS-West Africa, and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining
stability in the region is even more important. Since early 2019, we
have significantly reduced security assistance because the Government
of Cameroon had not taken sufficient action to investigate credible
accusations of gross violations of human rights by its security forces
or hold the perpetrators accountable. The United States continues to
review security assistance on a case-by-case basis so that assistance
we provide aligns with U.S. interests, including promotion of respect
for human rights. We vet potential recipients of security assistance,
consistent with the Leahy laws, and do not provide assistance to
Cameroonian security force units where there is credible information
that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. U.S.-
granted assistance is explicitly prohibited from being used in the
Anglophone regions. We have made this prohibition clear at all levels
of the Cameroonian Government and we carefully monitor the use of U.S.
assistance to ensure this commitment is followed. Risk of misuse or
potential diversion to the Anglophone regions are key criteria in our
security assistance decision-making.
Since our cuts, the Cameroonian Government has taken some limited
steps towards holding security forces accountable, including the
conviction of four soldiers for murder in August 2020 and the arrest of
soldiers believed to be responsible for one case of extrajudicial
killings and one case of alleged torture of a detainee. While we hope
these steps indicate a willingness to address the problem, abuses by
government forces continue.
Between FY 2019 (the last year for which there is full obligation
data) and FY 2020 funding, the State Department has obligated
approximately $8.3 million in assistance to support the Cameroonian
military. This funding supported professional military education;
technical support for unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms; small boat training; communications training;
and air-to-ground integration training. If confirmed, I would work to
ensure that U.S.-provided equipment is not misused by Cameroonian
security forces, and would actively and fully address verified reports
of such misuse.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Larry Edward Andre by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. Ambassador Andre, The U.S. maintains a very modest
embassy on the compound of the Mogadishu International Airport, and our
diplomats are extremely limited in their ability to leave the airport
complex.
What is your perspective on this posture, and what do you believe
is its impact on U.S. diplomatic relations with Somalia and our allies?
Answer. If confirmed, the safety of U.S. citizens in Somalia and of
U.S. Embassy personnel will be my highest priority. I will work with
the Diplomatic Security Service to maximize the ability of our
diplomats to advance our goals and interests through engagements
throughout Somalia whenever possible through effective risk mitigation
and management decisions. I am doing that now in my role as Charge
d'affaires in South Sudan, which can be a dangerous place. I will
consider both the security environment in Somalia and specific
opportunities to advance the goals assigned to us through an
interagency process. I will ensure we remain able to engage effectively
with all levels of the Somali Government as well as with our
international partners, many of whom are also located on the Mogadishu
International Airport compound.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Maria E. Brewer by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Ambassador Brewer, as you know, Lesotho has been plagued
with political instability since independence in 1966, and no prime
minister has served a full term for the past decade.
In light of Lesotho's recurrent political instability, what are
some opportunities that you see for the U.S. to support the
development of Lesotho's democratic institutions?
Answer. Promoting democratic governance is at the core of U.S.
values and of what we seek to accomplish in Lesotho. Lesotho has a
complicated history with several instances of political and armed
instability, driven in part by politicians pulling the security
services into political disputes and the security sector's inability to
remain neutral. In recent years, Embassy Maseru has worked to improve
civilian-military relationships, encourage the neutrality of security
and law enforcement bodies, and support Lesotho's ongoing efforts to
depoliticize its security forces. The mission also collaborates with
like-minded partners (including the UK) to advance these goals.
Building on existing U.S. Embassy efforts to promote civilian control
of Lesotho's military and government accountability, if confirmed, I
look forward to working with this committee, the interagency, and the
Government of Lesotho to strengthen Lesotho's institutions, to further
promote the professionalization of Lesotho's security forces and to
foster improved civilian oversight of the military and law enforcement.
I will also continue to work with the interagency to identify ways to
reinforce Lesotho's ability to meet the needs of its people and build
its capacity to be a better partner to us.
Question. Ambassador Brewer, support to the health sector, mainly
through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is a
significant element of the U.S./Lesotho bilateral relationship.
What is your assessment of the importance and effectiveness of U.S.
support to combatting HIV/AIDs and other public health
emergencies in Lesotho, including the COVID pandemic?
Answer. America's interests at home are strengthened by improving
lives globally. Investments in preventing disease and improving public
health and nutrition are among our best means to articulate and embody
our values, while simultaneously pursuing our national security
interests. U.S. support to combat HIV/AIDS and other public health
emergencies in Lesotho is important because it is both the right and
the smart thing to do. In Lesotho, our PEPFAR investment has seen a
remarkable return in terms of lives saved and increased social
stability.
Largely because of U.S. support, Lesotho is one of the first PEPFAR
countries to achieve the UNAIDS targets for epidemic control; moreover,
it has cut its rate of new HIV infections in half since 2016. These
historic achievements lay the groundwork for an HIV/AIDS-free
generation and are landmarks in PEPFAR's 18-year history.
U.S. health and development investments in Lesotho, including but
not limited to PEPFAR, are important and effective, certainly in terms
of controlling the HIV/AIDS pandemic, but also in terms of combatting
COVID-19, TB and other communicable diseases; confronting health-
related issues such as immunizations, clean water, and sanitation; and
enhancing health security by preventing, detecting, and responding to
infectious disease threats.
If confirmed, I will ensure good stewardship of U.S. taxpayers'
investment in health and development in Lesotho. Building on the
outstanding success achieved through our previous and existing
partnerships with the Government and people of Lesotho, I will also
work to secure sustainability and help Lesotho move towards self-
reliance in meeting the future needs of its population.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Maria E. Brewer by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report (TIP), Lesotho was identified as Tier 3 due to lack of
significant efforts by the Government to increase prosecution,
protection, and prevention. How will you work with the Lesotho
Government to address these issues if you are confirmed as Ambassador?
Answer. I understand Lesotho was placed on Tier 3 due to chronic
poor progress towards addressing our recommendations and credible
allegations of official complicity. The Government of Lesotho has taken
many steps to combat trafficking in persons since the release of the
2020 TIP Report. The Government convicted and sentenced the first
trafficker in four years; closed key legislative gaps in anti-
trafficking laws; criminalized all forms of sex trafficking and
outlined stringent penalties; increased its investigations into
official complicity; and launched a five-year anti-trafficking national
action plan. The Secretary will release the 2021 TIP Report with
updated tier rankings and updated prioritized recommendations this
summer. If confirmed, I will continue to press for progress on
recommendations in the TIP Report.
Question. Given Lesotho's enclosure by South Africa, a Tier 2
country, are there connections to be made with South Africa and the
U.S. Embassy there to improve trafficking regionally?
Answer. Trafficking is indeed a regional problem that demands a
regional response. If confirmed, I will not only lead our bilateral
engagement urging the Government of Lesotho to pursue and punish
traffickers and better protect victims, but will also work with the
State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
and the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria to encourage regional solutions and
inter-governmental cooperation to combat cross-border trafficking.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious
Freedom report, Lesotho was identified as partially tolerant of
religious freedom. What is your assessment of this particular issue and
if confirmed, how will you work with the Office of International
Religious Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-country and expand on
the work the U.S. Embassy is currently undertaking to prevent further
discrimination of religious minorities?
Answer. As noted in the 2020 International Religious Freedom
report, the constitution of Lesotho prohibits religious discrimination
and provides for freedom of conscience, thought, and religion,
including the freedom to change religion or belief and to manifest and
propagate one's religion. Religious leaders of all faiths have told the
U.S. Embassy that there is broad religious tolerance among the people
of Lesotho.
Some business and government leaders occasionally express distrust
of entrepreneurs of South Asian origin, many of whom are Muslim.
Nonetheless, the U.S. Embassy is unaware of any act of discrimination
targeting Lesotho's Muslims, whether those who have recently immigrated
to Lesotho or the longstanding Muslim communities in the north of the
country.
If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. Embassy's regular contact
with religious, government, business, and civil society leaders to
discuss religious freedom and tolerance and the need to be proactive in
preventing discrimination against adherents of the country's growing
minority religions, particularly Islam.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report,
Lesotho was identified as having committed human rights abuses,
including using the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdown as a
fac*ade to stifle freedom of assembly and movement.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances
with the host government?
Answer. Many observers argued that Lesotho's previous
administration used the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext to stifle
freedoms of peaceful assembly and movement. That was a clear human
rights concern, as are ongoing problems such as trafficking in persons,
police brutality, and child labor. The United States is also concerned
about prolonged pretrial detentions and prison conditions. Some other
concerns detailed in the 2020 Human Rights Report include reports of
unlawful or arbitrary killings by security forces, arbitrary arrest and
detention, and mistreatment while in custody. There are also issues
with official corruption, a lack of judicial independence, violence
against women, and continued criminalization of consensual same-sex
sexual conduct between adults.
The mission pushes for greater accountability in cases of police
abuse and encourages the Lesotho Mounted Police Service to strengthen
its police complaints board, with some success. The mission also works
to promote better understanding of community-based policing via
training programs at the International Law Enforcement Academy in
Botswana. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts as I engage the
Government of Lesotho to address concerns detailed in the 2020 Human
Rights Report.
Question. How will you direct your embassy to work with civil
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy maintains excellent relationships with all
of Lesotho's major civil society organizations, who rely on us to act
as a voice of conscience both in the public sphere and in our private
consultations with the Government. If confirmed, I will continue to
work closely with Lesotho's community of civil society organizations. I
will also encourage them to focus their attentions on the most pressing
human rights concerns and will look for synergistic opportunities to
cooperate with these groups to advocate for reform, accountability, and
protection of human rights.
Question. In your opinion, is Lesotho a potential target for
improved U.S. trade and investment? What tools should the U.S. apply in
Lesotho to encourage export diversification and investment by American
firms?
Answer. Yes. Several economic sectors in Lesotho have growth
potential, including water (hydropower and pipeline infrastructure),
diamonds, tourism, agriculture, and power generation. The Government
has also noted that it seeks to improve transportation and its
information technology infrastructure. In 2019, the United States
exported about $1 million in goods to Lesotho, mostly machinery,
medical instruments, and aircraft. In the same year, the United States
imported around $325 million in goods, mostly apparel, precious stones,
and some machinery.
Lesotho is a long-time beneficiary of trade benefits under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which has helped create over
45,000 jobs in the textile industry. According to 2019 numbers, AGOA
exports accounted for approximately 12% of Lesotho's GDP ($325 million
out of $2.7 billion). One of the AGOA eligibility requirements is that
a country must have established, or make progress towards establishing,
a market-based economy. This creates a more-level playing field for
U.S. companies and serves as a useful counterweight to actors seeking
to influence Lesotho to adopt policies that would be counter to U.S.
interests. By creating a more-level playing field for U.S. companies
overseas, we contribute to economic prosperity at home, too. Several
U.S. brands already manufacture products in Lesotho. If confirmed, I
will utilize initiatives such as Prosper Africa to actively seek
opportunities to increase reciprocal trade and investment.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Maria E. Brewer by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. Ambassador Brewer, As you know, Lesotho has been plagued
with political instability since independence in 1966, and no prime
minister has served a full term for the past decade.
In light of Lesotho's recurrent political instability, what are
some opportunities that you see for the U.S. to support the
development of Lesotho's democratic institutions?
Answer. Promoting democratic governance is at the core of U.S.
values and of what we seek to accomplish in Lesotho. Lesotho has a
complicated history with several instances of political and armed
instability, driven in part by politicians pulling the security
services into political disputes and the security sector's inability to
remain neutral. In recent years, Embassy Maseru has worked to improve
civilian-military relationships, encourage the neutrality of security
and law enforcement bodies, and support Lesotho's ongoing efforts to
depoliticize its security forces. The mission also collaborates with
like-minded partners (including the UK) to advance these goals.
Building on existing U.S. Embassy efforts to promote civilian control
of Lesotho's military and government accountability, if confirmed, I
look forward to working with this committee, the interagency, and the
Government of Lesotho to strengthen Lesotho's institutions, to further
promote the professionalization of Lesotho's security forces and to
foster improved civilian oversight of the military and law enforcement.
I will also continue to work with the interagency to identify ways to
reinforce Lesotho's ability to meet the needs of its people and build
its capacity to be a better partner to us.
Question. Ambassador Brewer, Support to the health sector, mainly
through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is a
significant element of the U.S./Lesotho bilateral relationship.
What is your assessment of the importance and effectiveness of U.S.
support to combatting HIV/AIDs and other public health emergencies in
Lesotho, including the COVID pandemic?
Answer. America's interests at home are strengthened by improving
lives globally. Investments in preventing disease and improving public
health and nutrition are among our best means to articulate and embody
our values, while simultaneously pursuing our national security
interests. U.S. support to combat HIV/AIDS and other public health
emergencies in Lesotho is important because it is both the right and
the smart thing to do. In Lesotho, our PEPFAR investment has seen a
remarkable return in terms of lives saved and increased social
stability.
Largely because of U.S. support, Lesotho is one of the first PEPFAR
countries to achieve the UNAIDS targets for epidemic control; moreover,
it has cut its rate of new HIV infections in half since 2016. These
historic achievements lay the groundwork for an HIV/AIDS-free
generation and are landmarks in PEPFAR's 18-year history.
U.S. health and development investments in Lesotho, including but
not limited to PEPFAR, are important and effective, certainly in terms
of controlling the HIV/AIDS pandemic, but also in terms of combatting
COVID-19, TB and other communicable diseases; confronting health-
related issues such as immunizations, clean water, and sanitation; and
enhancing health security by preventing, detecting, and responding to
infectious disease threats.
If confirmed, I will ensure good stewardship of U.S. taxpayers'
investment in health and development in Lesotho. Building on the
outstanding success achieved through our previous and existing
partnerships with the Government and people of Lesotho, I will also
work to secure sustainability and help Lesotho move towards self-
reliance in meeting the future needs of its population.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. What role can the United States play in efforts of the
Lourenco administration to root out corruption and repatriate stolen
assets?
Answer. The Government of Angola needs to continue to improve its
public financial management capacity as well as to strengthen
accounting, oversight, and auditing capabilities. It should also
increase law enforcement and judicial capacity to investigate and
prosecute corruption and financial crimes and better coordinate the
efforts of public institutions working on the investigations. The
Government should also ensure that private sector financial
institutions are regularly reporting suspicious transactions to the
appropriate authorities for action.
U.S. engagement includes technical assistance for Angola's
Financial Intelligence Unit and Ministry of Finance. If confirmed, I
would seek to expand cooperation on potential corruption
investigations, capacity building in the justice system in constructing
corruption cases, and capacity building in the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI) reporting mechanisms.
Question. In advance of elections in 2022, what can the U.S.
Embassy do to ensure free political expression and the conduct of fair
elections?
Answer. The U.S. Government has encouraged the Government of Angola
to follow through on its commitment to hold local government elections,
which would be a positive step in the democratization process of
Angola, giving people direct representation at the local level of
government. If confirmed, I will continue to communicate this message.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that Embassy Luanda
exercises proper management and oversight of the U.S. presence in Sao
Tome and Principe?
Answer. If confirmed, with your help, I will work to deepen the
U.S. partnership with both Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. I have
experience being accredited as ambassador to two countries
concurrently, and will draw on that experience to ensure proper
management and oversight of the U.S. presence in Sao Tome and Principe.
Question. What are the most important actions you have taken in
your career to date to support democracy and human rights? What has
been the impact of your actions?
Answer. Promoting democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human
rights has been a central theme throughout my 30-year career at the
Department of State. From my early postings to the current one, I have
endeavored to share with host country counterparts the U.S. position on
human rights and democracy. My strategy has always been to honestly
explain our position showing the benefits of respecting human rights
and promoting democratic principles, a winning proposition for the host
country as well.
I have supported the conduct of peaceful elections, passing laws on
inclusive participation in elections, and raising disability awareness.
I have advocated against restrictive LGBTQI+ laws, empowered women's
participation in elections, given a voice to civil society, and
emphasized the importance of a free press.
As Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, our promotion of free and fair
elections with credible and appropriately transparent processes led to
the first ever peaceful transition of power between two civilian
presidents in the history of the country.
During my tenure as Ambassador in Burkina Faso, I advised against a
proposed constitutional amendment to presidential term limits, designed
to extend the time in office of an already long-term sitting president.
Additionally, I pushed the Government of Transition of Burkina Faso for
timely elections during a sensitive time when some voices were
considering a delay. Finally, following the free and fair presidential
election, Burkina Faso and its people witnessed the first ever peaceful
transition of power from one civilian government to another.
Previously, in Mozambique I participated as an international observer
in the country's first-ever democratic elections and worked closely
with the rest of the Embassy team to empower the Mozambican people as
they freely elected their leaders.
As the Deputy Chief of Mission in Ethiopia from 2009-2011, I
encouraged the Ethiopian Government to allow civil society and
opposition political parties to operate freely. Our Embassy efforts
helped provide a path for opposition parties in Ethiopia to publicize
their platforms, thus allowing a broader range of Ethiopian citizens to
have a voice in their government, resulting in an increase in voter
registration and participation.
Based on my dedication to promote and support respect for human
rights and democracy during my career, I am honored to have been
selected for the AFSA's Mark Palmer Award for the Advancement of
Democracy in 2017. This award is given to members of the Foreign
Service, by their peers, for the promotion of U.S. policies focused on
advancing democracy, freedom and governance through bold, exemplary,
imaginative and effective efforts during one or more assignments.
Question. What issues are the most pressing challenges to democracy
or democratic development in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe? These
challenges might include obstacles to participatory and accountable
governance and institutions, rule of law, authentic political
competition, civil society, human rights and press freedom. Please be
as specific as possible.
Answer. Angola has made tangible progress towards transparency and
good governance, while initiating the fight against corruption and
promoting accountability for human rights violations and abuses.
However, the legacy of corruption, lack of capacity and weak
institutions are the biggest challenges, along with the need for
increased professionalism in law enforcement. Civil society, press
freedoms and political competition exist in Angola, but would benefit
from further strengthening.
Sao Tome and Principe (STP) has a small land footprint but a large
and strategically important maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea
shipping lanes. Enhancing the country's ability to monitor its waters
and share information on maritime activity and piracy is a key
component to improve regional security. If confirmed, I will continue
to encourage Sao Tome's support for democracy, human rights, and rule
of law and to support its development efforts.
Question. What steps will you take--if confirmed--to support
democracy in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe? What do you hope to
accomplish through these actions? What are the potential impediments to
addressing the specific obstacles you have identified?
Answer. The Government of Angola has made significant improvements
on human rights-related issues over the last few years, and if
confirmed, I will continue to engage with Angolan Government officials
to support progress in this area. I will work to ensure the United
States and Angola hold a human rights dialogue in 2021, which will give
the United States an opportunity to assess progress and press on
remaining human rights and democracy issues. Finally, the United States
has encouraged the Government of Angola to follow through on its
commitment to hold local government elections in 2022, which would be a
positive step in the democratization process of Angola, giving people
direct representation at the local level of government and if
confirmed, I will continue to encourage the Government to prioritize
forward progress in this area.
Sao Tome and Principe has a long record of good governance and
support for democracy and human rights, and if confirmed, I will work
with its government to encourage and support these priorities.
Question. How will you utilize U.S. Government assistance resources
at your disposal, including the Democracy Commission Small Grants
program and other sources of State Department and USAID funding, to
support democracy and governance, and what will you prioritize in
processes to administer such assistance?
Answer. U.S. Government assistance to Angola currently advances
democracy and governance through several avenues, including by
providing assistance to advance electoral reforms, enhance fiscal
transparency and accountability, and promote increased participation by
women in the political process. Additionally, the United States
supports the introduction and expansion of good governance within
financial administration and service delivery systems, which bolsters
transparency, citizen participation, and accountability within planning
and financial management processes. If confirmed, I will continue to
engage within the Department and with interagency partners to support
the establishment and continuation of complementary and expanded
programs that advance U.S. interests in Angola and Sao Tome and
Principe. I also will emphasize the importance of making continual
progress on democracy and governance as an element of both countries'
AGOA eligibility.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with civil society
members, human rights and other non-governmental organizations in the
U.S. and with local human rights NGOs, and other members of civil
society in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe? What steps will you
take to pro-actively address efforts to restrict or penalize NGOs and
civil society via legal or regulatory measures?
Answer. Human rights NGOs--local, regional, and international--are
active in both Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. Civil society
organizations, regardless of where they are registered or where they
operate, can be critical allies in advancing democratic governance,
expanding respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
assisting the United States to strengthen its bilateral and
multilateral relationships. If confirmed, I am committed to engaging
broadly to help advance these objectives. I will leverage our strong
relationships in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe to communicate
privately or publicly (as the situation dictates) to proactively
address efforts to restrict or penalize civil society through legal or
regulatory measures.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with democratically
oriented political opposition figures and parties? What steps will you
take to encourage genuine political competition? Will you advocate for
access and inclusivity for women, minorities and youth within political
parties?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to meet with democratically
oriented political opposition figures and parties, and I will advocate
openly in support of access and inclusivity for all individuals in
Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe, including women, minorities, and
youth. If confirmed, I will work with the host governments, civil
society, and like-minded missions to encourage genuine political
competition. I will emphasize the importance of promoting diverse
viewpoints and supporting an open arena for peaceful, good faith
discussions of political differences.
Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with
Angola and Sao Tome and Principe on freedom of the press and address
any government efforts designed to control or undermine press freedom
through legal, regulatory or other measures? Will you commit to meeting
regularly with independent, local press in both Angola and Sao Tome and
Principe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with media practitioners, like-
minded missions, civil society, government, and international partners
to underscore the importance of an independent, professional, and open
media to a free and democratic society. I will seek resources to
continue support to Angola and Sao Tome and Principe's media, including
professional exchanges, targeted training programs, and seminars to
educate journalists and media stakeholders about their rights. Angolan
and Sao Tomean journalists have participated in U.S. Government-
sponsored professional exchange programs on investigative reporting,
safeguarding freedom of expression, and the media's role in
strengthening democratic institutions.
Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with civil
society and government counterparts on countering disinformation and
propaganda disseminated by foreign state or non-state actors in the
country?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with civil society and
government actors on countering disinformation and malign propaganda by
foreign state and non-state actors. I also will commit to working with
like-minded partners in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe to counter
disinformation and malign propaganda campaigns.
Question. Will you and your embassy teams actively engage with
Angola and Sao Tome and Principe on the right of labor groups to
organize, including for independent trade unions?
Answer. The United States has a long and proud tradition of
supporting the rights of workers, including to form labor
organizations, internationally. If confirmed, I will commit to engage
with unions, relevant government offices, and the private sector to
support labor rights.
Question. Will you commit to using your position, if confirmed, to
defend the human rights and dignity of all people in Angola and Sao
Tome and Principe, no matter their sexual orientation or gender
identity?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will strive to defend the human rights
and dignity of all individuals in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe, no
matter their sexual orientation or gender identity.
Question. What challenges do the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and queer (LGBTQ) people face in Angola and in Sao Tome and
Principe?
Answer. President Lourenco has expanded legal protections for
LGTBQI+ persons since he was elected, including decriminalization of
homosexuality. However, LGBTQI+ persons in Angola tell us culturally
they face resistance in being accepted, even at the family level. While
not criminalized, homosexuality is stigmatized in Sao Tome and
Principe. Members of the LGBTQI+ community can face ostracism and
violence.
Question. What specifically will you commit to do to help LGBTQ
people in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to defend the human rights and
dignity of all individuals in Angola, no matter their sexual
orientation or gender identity. I will seek ways to expand Embassy
support for the efforts of LGBTQI+ NGOs in Angola, including through
advocacy, leadership development opportunities, and programmatic
support. Similarly, I will reach out to the LGBTQI+ community in Sao
Tome and Principe to respond to its concerns.
Question. Will you commit, if confirmed, to ensuring that you fully
brief Members of Congress and/or their staff each time you are in
Washington for visits or consultations during your tenure as Ambassador
to Angola and Sao Tome and Principe?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit, in coordination with the State
Department's Bureau of Legislative Affairs, to appropriately respond to
requests for briefings and information by this committee.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator James E. Risch
Strengthening Angola and the Region
Question. After decades of corrupt and authoritarian rule under
former President dos Santos, Angola has undergone a remarkable
transition since President Lourenco came to power in 2017. Under
Lourenco, Angola has undertaken an economic and political reform agenda
that aligns with U.S. interests and presents a unique opportunity to
develop a mutually beneficial partnership.
Four years into President Lourenco's term, Angola appears headed in
the right direction with a growing economy, tangible efforts at
political reform, and a focus on combatting corruption. What
can the United States do to help Angola as it seeks to
diversify its economy, improve governance, and continue
combatting corruption?
Answer. Angola still faces many challenges in the form of high
debt, a legacy of corruption, lack of capacity, and weak institutions,
along with the need for increased professionalism in law enforcement.
Civil society, press freedoms and political competition exist in
Angola, but would benefit from further strengthening. If confirmed, I
will continue to press for political and economic reforms, support the
fight against corruption, and buttress Angola's development efforts.
Opportunities exist for the U.S. Government to continue providing
technical assistance and to cooperate further on potential corruption
investigations, and on capacity building in the justice system in
constructing corruption cases. As Angola explores options to diversify
its economy and to create an environment more welcoming to investors, I
will seek to foster continued U.S. investment if confirmed.
Question. Angola has a reasonably strong military, and recently
played a helpful role in mediating conflict between Uganda and Rwanda.
Is Angola prepared to take more of a leadership role in the region? Do
you see potential for Angola increasing its participation in
peacekeeping or other stability operations on the continent?
Answer. I understand that under President Lourenco, Angola has
systematically raised its level of active participation in
international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC), successfully proposing candidates
for leadership roles. Using these leadership roles, Angola has shown a
willingness to be at the forefront of resolving some of the continent's
most difficult crises, including its current role in encouraging
stability in the Central African Republic and Chad.
Angola also recently enacted legislation which provides the
structure for its military to be deployed in peacekeeping operations.
The United States can better engage Angola to serve as a constructive
voice in Southern and Central Africa by consulting with the Angolan
Government in Luanda and in Washington, exchanging views and
encouraging mutually beneficial courses of action.
Question. Despite Angola's vast natural resource reserves and
economic reforms that have pleased international financial
institutions, much of the country still lives in poverty and remains in
need of assistance? How can the United States help ensure that Angola's
wealth and opportunity reach all corners of the country?
Answer. U.S. Government assistance programs in health and landmine
clearance improve the health and living conditions for Angolans
throughout the country. Our programs stress capacity building within
the Angolan Government and reinforce the need to address the issues of
all Angolans. In addition, multiple small grant programs target
economic development throughout the country. If confirmed, I will
continue to engage within the U.S. Government to support the
establishment and continuation of complementary and expanded programs
that advance U.S. interests in Angola.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator Cory A. Booker
Strengthening Angola and the Region
Question. After decades of corrupt and authoritarian rule under
former President dos Santos, Angola has undergone a remarkable
transition since President Lourenco came to power in 2017. Under
Lourenco, Angola has undertaken an economic and political reform agenda
that aligns with U.S. interests and presents a unique opportunity to
develop a mutually beneficial partnership.
Four years into President Lourenco's term, Angola appears headed in
the right direction with a growing economy, tangible efforts at
political reform, and a focus on combatting corruption. What
can the United States do to help Angola as it seeks to
diversify its economy, improve governance, and continue
combatting corruption?
Answer. Angola still faces many challenges in the form of high
debt, a legacy of corruption, lack of capacity, and weak institutions,
along with the need for increased professionalism in law enforcement.
Civil society, press freedoms and political competition exist in
Angola, but would benefit from further strengthening. If confirmed, I
will continue to press for political and economic reforms, support the
fight against corruption, and buttress Angola's development efforts.
Opportunities exist for the U.S. Government to continue providing
technical assistance and to cooperate further on potential corruption
investigations, and on capacity building in the justice system in
constructing corruption cases. As Angola explores options to diversify
its economy and to create an environment more welcoming to investors, I
will seek to foster continued U.S. investment if confirmed.
Question. Angola has a reasonably strong military, and recently
played a helpful role in mediating conflict between Uganda and Rwanda.
Is Angola prepared to take more of a leadership role in the region? Do
you see potential for Angola increasing its participation in
peacekeeping or other stability operations on the continent?
Answer. I understand that under President Lourenco, Angola has
systematically raised its level of active participation in
international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC), successfully proposing candidates
for leadership roles. Using these leadership roles, Angola has shown a
willingness to be at the forefront of resolving some of the continent's
most difficult crises, including its current role in encouraging
stability in the Central African Republic and Chad.
Angola also recently enacted legislation which provides the
structure for its military to be deployed in peacekeeping operations.
The United States can better engage Angola to serve as a constructive
voice in Southern and Central Africa by consulting with the Angolan
Government in Luanda and in Washington, exchanging views and
encouraging mutually beneficial courses of action.
Question. Despite Angola's vast natural resource reserves and
economic reforms that have pleased international financial
institutions, much of the country still lives in poverty and remains in
need of assistance? How can the United States help ensure that Angola's
wealth and opportunity reach all corners of the country?
Answer. U.S. Government assistance programs in health and landmine
clearance improve the health and living conditions for Angolans
throughout the country. Our programs stress capacity building within
the Angolan Government and reinforce the need to address the issues of
all Angolans. In addition, multiple small grant programs target
economic development throughout the country. If confirmed, I will
continue to engage within the U.S. Government to support the
establishment and continuation of complementary and expanded programs
that advance U.S. interests in Angola.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. Ambassador Mushingi, the election of a new president in
Angola in 2017 provided a clear opportunity for the U.S. to support
political and economic reforms, including in the areas of anti-
corruption and human rights. While the Angolan administration continues
to make progress, there continues to be limited U.S.-support for Angola
in the democracy and governance space.
What opportunities do you see for U.S. engagement and assistance in
this space?
Answer. The Government of Angola needs to continue to improve its
public financial management capacity as well as to strengthen
accounting, oversight, and auditing capabilities. It should also
increase law enforcement and judicial capacity to investigate and
prosecute corruption and financial crimes and better coordinate the
efforts of public institutions working on the investigations. The
Government should also ensure that private sector financial
institutions are regularly reporting suspicious transactions to the
appropriate authorities for action.
U.S. engagement in this space will include technical assistance for
Angola's Financial Intelligence Unit and Ministry of Finance.
Additional opportunities exist for the USG to cooperate further on
potential corruption investigations and possible sanctions, capacity
building in the justice system in constructing corruption cases/
prosecutions in international courts, and capacity building in the
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) reporting
mechanisms.
The Government of Angola has made significant improvements on human
rights-related issues over the last few years, and if confirmed, I and
the Embassy will continue to engage with Angolan Government officials
to support progress in this area. In 2020, the United States and Angola
held their third ministerial level dialogue on human rights, discussing
the need for respect for freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of
expression as well as the continued need for training of law
enforcement, which the U.S. will continue to support, consistent with
Leahy law and Department policy. I understand the United States and
Angola are planning the 2021 human rights dialogue, which will give the
U.S. an opportunity to assess progress and press on any remaining
issues. Finally, Post has encouraged the Government of Angola to follow
through on its commitment to hold local government elections, which
would be a positive step in the democratization process of Angola,
giving people direct representation at the local level of government.
Question. Ambassador Mushingi, China's presence looms large in
Angola. Angola is one of China's largest borrowers in Africa, with more
than $20 billion in outstanding debt to some Chinese entities.
How can the United States help Angola to begin chipping away at
that debt and the restraint put on Angola's economy and
political system by China?
Answer. As a key condition of its IMF program, Angola cannot hold
new oil collateralized debt. The United States supports the Debt
Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) agreed to by the G-20 which has
suspended official bilateral debt payments for 40 countries including
Angola since May 2020. Rolling back dependency on oil will require
significant investment in other economic sectors to stimulate growth.
The Embassy has leveraged U.S. interagency technical assistance and
high-level messaging to support Angola's anti-corruption campaign and
economic reforms, especially ongoing efforts to improve transparency
and compliance in the financial sector. An improved environment will
make U.S. firms more competitive in Angola. I understand that the
Embassy has successfully advocated for U.S. investors to break into
sectors long dominated by Chinese companies, such as
telecommunications. President Lourenco lobbied U.S. private sector
representatives in a December 2020 virtual roundtable to invest in
Angola, demonstrating the high-level desire to attract U.S. investment
in various sectors. If confirmed, I will lead the Embassy to continue
reporting on opportunities for American companies and advocate for them
to compete for tenders and other investment opportunities as the
Angolan economy diversifies. Programs such as the DFC and Prosper
Africa will also help target alternatives to Chinese investment and
commercial interests.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report, Algeria was identified as Tier 3 due to lack of significant
efforts to combat human trafficking in the reporting period. The
Government made little to no attempts to improve resources for victims,
including punishing victims for crimes their traffickers forced them to
commit. What steps would you take as Ambassador, if confirmed, to
engage with the host government and civil society organizations on
bolstering efforts to improve prosecution and protection efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, improving Algeria's efforts to combat human
trafficking will be one of my highest priorities. The Embassy is
already working with the Algerian Government to improve its efforts to
investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers and proactively
identify and assist trafficking victims, including by offering
technical support. If confirmed, I will urge Algerian officials to pass
a standalone Trafficking in Persons (TIP) law this year to bring their
legal framework in line with international commitments and to formalize
their victim referral mechanism. We will continue to support Algerian
efforts to raise awareness of TIP in the law enforcement community,
including through trainings for prosecutors and judges.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious
Freedom Report and the 2021 U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom Annual Report, the U.S. identified Algeria as having poor
religious freedom conditions, with the Government continuing its
repression of Christian and minority Muslim communities. What is your
assessment of this particular issue and if confirmed, how will you work
with the Office of International Religious Freedom to bolster religious
freedom in-country?
Answer. Government-led persecution of marginalized minorities,
including Christian and minority Muslim and non-Muslim religious
groups, continues to be a significant issue in Algeria. Our Embassy is
in regular contact with a wide variety of religious leaders in Algeria
and maintains an active dialogue with the Algerian Government on
religious freedom issues. The United States Government has publicly and
privately stressed the importance of religious tolerance and the equal
and transparent application of the laws governing religious
organizations. If confirmed, I will raise issues of religious
persecution identified by the Office of International Religious Freedom
with the Algerian Government and encourage embassy reporting on
specific cases.
Question. Algeria was subsequently designated as a Special Watch
List country by USCIRF for its actions to systematically repress
religious minorities. If confirmed, will you suggest Algeria for the
State Department's Special Watch List for engaging and tolerating
severe violations of religious freedom?
Answer. USCIRF's Special Watch List (SWL) functions as a warning to
avoid possible Country of Particular Concern (CPC) designation by the
Department of State. For countries designated as CPCs, the
International Religious Freedom Act provides the Secretary of State
with a range of policy options to address serious violations of
religious freedom. The SWL applies to countries that we deem to have
engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom, but
that do not meet all of the CPC criteria. If confirmed, I will
prioritize the promotion of religious tolerance and impress upon the
Algerian Government the seriousness of the potentiality of a SWL or CPC
designation, and actions that could be taken now to preclude these
designations.
Question. If confirmed, will you encourage embassy officials to
attend public country proceedings on church closures to emphasize USG
concern regarding this issue?
Answer. The Algerian Government continues to use COVID-19
restrictions and the status of churches as un-registered associations
to justify closures. If confirmed, I will encourage embassy officials
to attend public proceedings on church closures, as appropriate, to
emphasize U.S. Government concern regarding this issue and to urge the
Algerian Government to allow the legalization of religious minority
groups by approving their requests to be registered associations.
Question. The constitutional referendum passed in November
indicates a further erosion of religious freedom conditions in country.
Please describe your potential engagement with the Algerian Government
regarding this referendum.
Answer. The Algerian constitution provides for freedom of worship,
but religious minorities continue to face difficulty registering as
legally recognized organizations. Though the new constitution allows
for the creation of a religious organization by declaration, the
Government needs to amend the 2012 Law of Associations to implement
this change. The State Department's Annual Human Rights and Religious
Freedom Reports for Algeria cite this need and, if confirmed, I will
continue to advocate for religious freedom.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report,
Algeria was identified as having committed severe human rights abuses,
including government sanctioned attacks on freedom of assembly for
protestors in early 2020. If confirmed, what steps will you take to
address these instances with the host government?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize the promotion of human
rights and impress upon Algerian leaders the importance of these
issues. The annual Human Rights Report regularly garners press
attention and is studied carefully in Algeria. If confirmed, I commit
to continuing my predecessors' tradition of meeting with human rights,
civil society, and other non-governmental organizations in the United
States and in Algeria to support their efforts on advancing human
rights. Our embassy is in regular contact with human rights activists
and journalists in Algeria and maintains an active dialogue with the
Algerian Government on human rights issues.
Question. How will you direct your embassy to work with civil
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct my embassy to maintain contact
with civil society organizations in Algeria to support civil society
development. Funding for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)
and other civil society assistance programs will empower nascent civil
society in Algeria, building capacity to better represent citizens'
interests and hold the Government accountable. If confirmed, I will
also urge the Algerian Government to issue an updated NGO law to ease
restrictions on registering and operating civil society organizations.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. During the last two years we have seen significant
political events in Algeria. These include a mass leaderless protest
movement, a contentious election resulting in a successor to the long
serving former president and a new constitution. What are your thoughts
about how the events of the past two years have affected the U.S.-
Algeria partnership and what opportunities do you think it creates for
the U.S.?
Answer. The U.S.-Algeria bilateral relationship has remained strong
through the momentous events of the last two years. Algeria has taken
steps towards political and economic reform and the United States will
continue to support efforts that expand observance of human rights,
including freedoms of expression and association. We will also work to
facilitate U.S. investment opportunities to deliver economic benefits
to the American and the Algerian people. If confirmed, I will also
promote the embassy's entrepreneurship programs for youth and women as
well as pursue a grant-funded project to expand English language
instruction in Algeria to better prepare Algerians for professional and
commercial opportunities at home and abroad.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Eugene S. Young by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report, Republic of the Congo was upgraded to Tier 2 due to increased
efforts to eliminate trafficking, but the Government still lacks
adequate resources to screen vulnerable populations and lacks a
national action plan and clear understanding of anti-tracking laws. How
will you work with the host government and local civil society
organizations to address these issues if you are confirmed as
Ambassador?
Answer. As you note, the Congolese Government has shown the
political will to address trafficking issues. The Government has
drafted a national action plan against Trafficking in Persons but has
yet to ratify it. The Congolese successfully prosecuted seven human
traffickers and successfully repatriated eight victims in the past
year. If confirmed, I will continue the positive work begun under my
predecessor. My team and I will use the resources available from the
State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
to help train and equip the Congolese police, judiciary, and
legislators, as well as support the NGOs on the ground doing the heroic
day-to-day work of identifying trafficking victims and their
traffickers.
Question. The U.S. Embassy is actively engaging with government
officials and organizations on religious freedom issues, including
supporting virtual events with religious leaders and youths. How will
you, if confirmed, continue this work and bolster efforts already
underway?
Answer. One of the major components of Congo's stability is the
ability of different religious groups to coordinate and work together
to promote civil society and meet the needs of the Congolese people.
This collaboration dates all the way back to the 1960s at the formation
of Congo as an independent country. If confirmed, I will continue our
Embassy team's efforts to bring together religious organizations,
international partners, private businesses, and members of the
Government to ensure international religious freedom continues to be a
priority of our bilateral relationship.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, the
Republic of the Congo was identified as having committed human rights
abuses, notably that political activists and civil society members,
including human rights defenders, continued to face intimidation,
harassment and arbitrary detention by the Government or other state
actors.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances
with the host government?
How will you direct your embassy to work with civil society
organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. I share your concern about these developments and the
treatment of journalists and human rights activists in the Republic of
the Congo. This concern is something repeatedly conveyed by our staff
at Embassy Brazzaville to the highest levels of the Government. This
focus on human rights is a practice that I will continue if confirmed.
While Congo's human rights record is far from clean, we have seen
some progress. Congolese peacekeeping troops who were accused of human
rights violations while in CAR in 2016 did face consequences, and our
ongoing training with the Congo military educates troops about human
rights protections. If confirmed I would work alongside civil society
organizations to bring increased attention to human rights violations
and abuses and to offer what we can in terms of training programs and
other resources to promote respect for human rights.
Question. As U.S. Ambassador, how will you engage with the
international financial institutions, including the IMF, in the
Republic of Congo over their engagement with the Sassou Nguesso
administration despite significant corruption and lack of transparency
in finances and debts?
Answer. Across Africa our goal is to increase debt transparency.
Debt transparency is vital for maintaining debt sustainability,
facilitating resolutions when necessary, and minimizing corruption. The
Republic of Congo is in debt distress in part due to non-transparent
Chinese lending. We can't always stop governments from excessive and
corrupt borrowing, but setting the standard of transparency makes it
harder to borrow corruptly and unsustainably. In fora such as the IMF
where we can better control the terms of loan and financial programs,
if confirmed, I will seek to engage in the process to insist on the
inclusion of transparency measures.
Question. The Congo River Basin is one of the major focuses of U.S.
supported conservation and environment programming, including through
the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). How
can the U.S. better engage with the Republic of Congo these efforts?
Answer. Our embassy in Brazzaville has been hard at work ramping up
our environmental cooperation with the Congolese. Thanks to the team's
efforts, Congo's Minister of Tourism and Environment was the first
African to speak at the international round table discussion before the
recent Leaders' Summit on Climate. Our embassy is also working with the
Congolese to develop side events focusing on the Congo rainforest for
the upcoming COP 26 conference. Finally, a new USAID position in
Brazzaville is set to come online later this summer. If confirmed, I
will continue these efforts to engage Congo on this important area of
bilateral cooperation.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Eugene S. Young by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. As you know, Congo's president is one of Africa's longest
serving leaders with power vested in him and a network of family and
associates. One result has been prolific corruption in the oil sector.
I'm curious about your thoughts on what tools you think you would
employ as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Congo to encourage anti-
corruption and democratic development in one of the most kleptocratic
and closed political and civic environments in Africa?
Answer. Corruption inhibits economic and democratic development and
runs counter to American values. It damages trade, guts institutions,
and destroys citizens' confidence in their government. Recent calls for
more American investment in Congo to counter malign influence show me
the Congolese people want to address this problem as well. If
confirmed, I will push hard for that investment, and the transparency
and fair dealing it brings. In addition, I will work with international
partners such as the World Bank and IMF to increase transparency in
Congo's borrowing, procurement, and financial systems.
Question. Congo has seen a rapid accumulation of debt over the past
decade--much of it owed to China. Given this increase in China's
influence, what opportunities do you think there are for us to increase
our engagement with the Republic of Congo, both to support development
in line with American values and to counter China's role in the
country?
Answer. China's investment in the Republic of Congo is
considerable. Chinese debt of over $4 billion risks permanent damage to
Congo's future growth. However, there are important strengths in the
U.S.-Congolese relationship that we can focus and build on to help
counter Chinese influence. America's continued appeal as a country of
ideas, future trends, and freedom resonates with the Congolese,
especially the youth. Drawing a distinction with China by highlighting
and demonstrating America's strengths is our best way of countering
China's influence over the long term. Our areas of collaboration with
the Government of Congo include environmental protection, human rights,
and health development, among many others. These are areas where we
believe the United States can do the most good for the American and
Congolese people.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Christopher John Lamora by Senator Robert Menendez
Politics and Economy
Question. How do you intend to capitalize on the heightened
attention Secretary Blinken and recent sanctions have brought to the
Anglophone crisis, and how will you advance engagement with the French
to work toward a peaceful resolution?
Answer. The Secretary's decision to impose visa restrictions on
those involved in undermining peace in Cameroon reflects the U.S.
commitment to advance dialogue to peacefully resolve the Anglophone
crisis and support respect for human rights. This decision followed
cuts in security assistance in recent years and the determination that
Cameroon was ineligible for AGOA starting on January 1, 2020. These
actions demonstrate the U.S. Government's resolve to back up words with
actions. The United States will continue to consider all potential
diplomatic tools to advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone
Northwest and Southwest Regions.
We continue to engage other UN member states, particularly the
French, in bilateral and multilateral fora and at all levels on the
importance of rule of law and ending impunity in Cameroon and to
explore ways we can work together to move towards a resolution of the
violence in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. If confirmed, I will
make resolving the Anglophone crisis my top policy priority and will
engage in discussions with France and other partners on the ground and
look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.
Question. What have been the impacts on Cameroon's economy and
U.S.-Cameroon commercial ties of the termination of Cameroon's AGOA
eligibility, and how would you seek to expand and protect U.S.
commercial interests there?
Answer. Cameroon was found ineligible for AGOA in 2019 and lost
AGOA benefits starting on January 1, 2020 under the criterion that
excludes countries that engage in gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights. Cameroon can regain AGOA eligibility by
preventing such violations, by strengthening human rights protections
in the law, and by impartially and transparently investigating reports
of such violations and holding accountable those responsible.
In 2018, Cameroon exported roughly $220 million in goods and
services to the United States; of that figure, $63 million was exported
under AGOA, over 90 percent of which was crude petroleum. The United
States will continue to pursue robust and diverse commercial ties,
deploying other tools at our disposal toward realizing the enormous
potential of this relationship for our mutual prosperity and economic
growth. More than any government program, however, the entrepreneurial
initiative of Cameroonian and American businesses and a business
climate that helps them flourish will be the key to stronger commercial
ties between the United States and Cameroon. If confirmed, I will urge
the Government to take tangible steps to improve the business climate,
advocate on behalf of U.S. companies, and direct our embassy to
continue to look for opportunities to expand commercial ties, using all
the tools and resources that we have at our disposal.
Question. It was recently reported that most of a $335 million
loan to fight COVID-19 from the IMF could not be accounted for. How
will you address endemic corruption and work to increase transparency
and accountability of the Government of Cameroon?
Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the challenges in the
fight against corruption in Cameroon. The United States is concerned
about allegations about misuse of funding aimed at helping Cameroon
respond to the pandemic. The Embassy provides financial and technical
support to the fight against corruption. The Department of Treasury's
Office of Technical Assistance assists the Ministry of Finance,
specifically the Taxation Directorate, to identify and manage
compliance and institutional risks and facilitate the efficacy of
internal audit and employee anti-corruption investigations. Another
transparency and good governance activity is the Fiscal Transparency
Innovation Fund (FTIF). In 2018, the Department of State, through the
FTIF, granted $276,500 to a financial auditing firm to train financial
practitioners in the public and public sector on modern financial
reporting norms and develop a plan for the adoption of International
Financial Reporting Standards.
If confirmed, I would continue to explore opportunities like these
to address endemic corruption in Cameroon and engage other diplomatic
and international missions with a view to leveraging our resources and
voices to advocate for change. I would also urge the Government to take
meaningful steps to hold those complicit in corrupt practices
accountable, change institutional practices that facilitate corruption,
and do so transparently to help restore public faith in governance
practices.
COVID-19
Question. How has COVID-19 impacted our health programs, and how do
you intend to leverage U.S. Government bilateral global health program
platforms to help the people of Cameroon respond to and address the
impacts?
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