Building Resilient Networks: Senate Hearing 117-801, June 22, 2021
Summary
Transcript of S. Hrg. 117-801, "Building Resilient Networks," a June 22, 2021 hearing of the Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, opened by Senators Lujan and Thune. Witnesses were Chief Jeffrey D. Johnson of the Western Fire Chiefs Association, Jonathan Adelstein of the Wireless Infrastructure Association, Denny Law of Golden West Telecommunications Cooperative, Inc. and Harold Feld of Public Knowledge. The appendix opens with a letter dated June 17, 2021 from Free Press. A closing written answer says Congress should explicitly prohibit agencies from penalizing applicants who have successfully applied for a different grant.
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“Building Resilient Networks: Senate Hearing 117-801, June 22, 2021.”
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[Senate Hearing 117-801]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-801
BUILDING RESILIENT NETWORKS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA,
AND BROADBAND
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 22, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-372 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Ranking
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii ROY BLUNT, Missouri
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts TED CRUZ, Texas
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MIKE LEE, Utah
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
David Strickland, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
George Greenwell, Policy Coordinator and Security Manager
John Keast, Republican Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA, AND BROADBAND
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico, Chair JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota ROY BLUNT, Missouri
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TED CRUZ, Texas
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts JERRY MORAN, Kansas
GARY PETERS, Michigan DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JON TESTER, Montana MIKE LEE, Utah
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado Virginia
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 22, 2021.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 3
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 46
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 48
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 51
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 53
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 55
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 57
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 59
Statement of Senator Capito...................................... 61
Statement of Senator Young....................................... 64
Witnesses
Chief Jeffrey D. Johnson, Chief Executive, Western Fire Chiefs
Association.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Jonathan Adelstein, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Wireless Infrastructure Association............................ 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Denny Law, Chief Executive Officer, Golden West
Telecommunications Cooperative, Inc............................ 24
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Harold Feld, Senior Vice President, Public Knowledge............. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Appendix
Letter dated June 17, 2021 to Hon. Ben Ray Lujan and Hon. John
Thune from Joseph Torres, Lep Fitzpatrick, and Carmen Scurato,
Free Press..................................................... 75
Letter dated June 21, 2021 to Senator Ben Ray Lujan and Senator
John Thune from Tony DeTora, VP, Government Affairs, Lynk
Global, Inc.................................................... 119
Letter dated June 22, 2021 to Hon. Ben Ray Lujan and Hon. John
Thune from Steven K. Berry, President & CEO, Competitive
Carriers Association........................................... 120
Response to written question submitted to Jeffrey D. Johnson by:
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 121
Response to written questions submitted to Jonathan Adelstein by:
Hon. Ben Ray Lujan........................................... 122
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 124
Response to written question submitted to Denny Law by:
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 125
Response to written questions submitted to Harold Feld by:
Hon. Ben Ray Lujan........................................... 125
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 128
BUILDING RESILIENT NETWORKS
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ben Ray
Lujan, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lujan [presiding], Klobuchar, Blumenthal,
Markey, Peters, Rosen, Warnock, Thune, Fischer, Moran,
Blackburn, Young, Capito, and Scott.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Lujan. Appreciate everyone giving us a little bit
of time this afternoon, as we are coming from a vote off the
Senate floor. And our colleagues will be joining us here
shortly, as well. So, thank you again for being with us today
on this important hearing on Building Resilient Networks.
In today's world, broadband is essential and
telecommunications, including voice and Internet are basic and
critical services that every American deserves. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, broadband kept students in school and
learning. The Internet kept us connected to our friends and
loved ones that we could not be together with in person. For
many of these networks connected us to our jobs and our
livelihood. For so many, just access to basic healthcare.
Just as important, these networks support how we
communicate in times of emergency. When disaster strikes, these
services connect us to someone who can help--firefighters,
police officers, EMTs. In these vulnerable moments, we rely on
these networks with our lives. Unfortunately, in times of
emergency, too many Americans are not able to connect to
someone who can get help. They get a busy signal. They get dead
air. Connection does not work.
Native, Hispanic and other communities of color are most at
risk. In the fallout from Hurricane Maria, millions of
Americans in Puerto Rico experienced telecommunication outages
that lasted for months and left them stranded without vital
services.
Wildfires across the West caused cell phone services to go
dark for more than 3 million people. They were left without
access to 911 or emergency alerts, while wildfires raged.
These are the stories that made the headlines, but similar
stories are all too common across the country. In my home state
of New Mexico, there was an incident in Sierra County where
broadband outages caused a disruption on medical services.
Hospitals were forced to transfer patients that they could no
longer care for, because the hospital lost access to the
network.
Another outage impacted our Rail Runner, which is our
public transportation train that runs through the center of the
state--our main commuter line between Santa Fe and Albuquerque,
where a network outage brought the train to a crawl. The outage
shut down systems designed to prevent collisions.
There are too many stories where 911 call centers lost
access for up to a week, due to service outages.
New Mexicans and all Americans deserve better than this. We
need to remember that some of the worst outages are not even
tied to natural disasters. In 2018, CenturyLink, now Lumen,
experienced a 37-hour nationwide outage that disrupted 911
service for millions of Americans. The cause? Faulty equipment
and a configuration error. Thirty-seven-hour outage due to
faulty equipment. It is unacceptable.
And the U.S. Government has committed tens of billions of
dollars to get Americans connected and telecommunication
services are recording massive profits. It is time for these
companies to step up. Reaching 100 percent connectivity, it is
essential, but we must do more.
It is time that these companies reinvest those profits
toward ensuring that their users have access to resilient,
redundant, and secure networks. Our connections must be
resilient. They must be built to standards that correspond to
the investment the Federal Government and states have made.
When a natural disaster strikes, and we dial 911, the sound we
hear should be someone ready to help.
Our connections must be redundant. A single piece of faulty
equipment or a burst gas main, should not disrupt
telecommunication service, let alone national service across
multiple carriers. Networks should have built in redundancies
and consumers should have multiple options for providers in
times of crisis.
And finally, our connections must be secure. Malicious
actors continue to target communication networks. Just this
year, nationwide energy and health infrastructure have been
held hostage. On Christmas Day last year, a bombing in
Nashville caused a network outage that reached across three
states. Planes were grounded and doctors were unable to reach
electronic health records. Just imagine the consequences of
future outages in a world where an interconnected, smart,
electrical grid and autonomous vehicles, that rely on mobile
broadband for communication.
Our networks must be built to prevent and be resilient
against these threats. The priorities I listed--resilient,
redundant, and secure--are fundamental principles we must
consider, as we look at existing infrastructure and as we build
the next generation of networks.
And I am grateful to Senator Thune and his work on this
hearing. I know he recognizes the importance of reliable and
resilient infrastructure. And I thank our witnesses for being
here. They each represent critical perspectives in this issue--
public interest, emergency services, local carriers, and
wireless infrastructure. I look forward to continuing our work
together to make progress on this issue, for all Americans and
all my fellow brothers and sisters, the people of New Mexico.
And with that, I recognize the Ranking Member for his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, and welcome to
our panelists today. Expanding reliable and resilient broadband
access in rural areas has long been a priority of mine, her in
the Senate. So, I appreciate you holding this important hearing
today.
Reliable and resilient networks across all parts of the
United States have never been more critical. The COVID-19
pandemic changed the way we live, work, and is some places,
educate our kids, which led to the most significant real-world
test to date, of the resiliency of our broadband networks.
Overnight, our networks faced new demands, as consumer and
business usage of fixed and mobile broadband networks soared.
As the Nation locked down, demand for reliable Internet
connectivity shot up. Some reports have found that fixed
broadband went up by 40 percent. Mobile data traffic shot up by
over 20 percent. Voice traffic, on wireless networks, increased
in some cases by nearly 40 percent.
While networks in Europe and elsewhere reduced streaming
quality in order to minimize the stress on their networks, U.S.
broadband networks were able to accommodate this increased
traffic and exceed expectations. This is largely because of the
United States light touch regulatory approach to broadband
policy, which has led to sustained investment by
telecommunications companies, who have made network reliability
and resiliency a priority.
Even though our networks performed very well during the
pandemic, I think we can all agree there is still more work to
be done. Far too many times, however, Congress has attempted to
spur broadband deployment by providing large sums of funding,
with little to show. A 2009 stimulus package provided more than
$7 billion to support broadband, but due to the lack of
coordination and mapping, and a host of other factors, multiple
agencies squandered away the funding, resulting in just a
fraction of the access to connectivity that was promised.
Today, as Congress considers a larger infrastructure
package, this committee has an opportunity before it, to
support the deployment of reliable and resilient networks and
it is imperative that we get it right. Which is why I believe
we should make smart investments, while maintaining a
regulatory regime that allows companies to make the kind of
choices in investments that have resulted in strong and
resilient U.S. networks.
We must remove the regulatory and permitting hurdles that
delay the build out of networks, particularly to more rural
areas. I will continue to advocate for updated regulatory
measures, like the Streamline Small Cell Deployment Act, which
would update current law to better reflect emerging technology
and speed up permitting, while respecting the role of State and
local governments, in making deployment decisions.
Additional funding should also be targeted to unserved
areas and not used to overbuild existing networks. In the last
year alone, Congress, acting in a bipartisan manner, provided a
significant amount of funding for broadband services, through
the CARES Act and the year-end Coronavirus Relief Package.
USDA's Connect--ReConnect Program received $735 million and
NTIA was provided $1 billion to build networks in Tribal areas,
and another $300 million to support broadband infrastructure in
more rural areas. At the same time, Congress was appropriating
additional broadband funding, the FCC, under the Rural Digital
Opportunity Fund--or the RDOT Fund--has committed over $9
billion to support broadband services over the next 10 years
and another $11.2 billion, through that program's second phase.
Additionally, the FCC is expected to distribute up to $9
billion, over the next 10 years, to bring voice and mobile
broadband services, under the 5G Fund for Rural America.
The bipartisan Broadband DATA Act, signed into law last
March, also requires the FCC to produce new maps. Having new,
accurate maps is critically important to ensure that this
funding, most of which is largely unspent, goes to truly
unserved areas.
At the same time, I believe it is equally important that
this committee conduct oversight of the FCC's development of
the new maps. And I hope that the Committee will hold an FCC
oversight hearing so members can discuss this important issue.
Recognizing the significant amount of funding already made
available, finding common sense ways to efficiently deliver
reliable broadband services in a technology neutral manner,
like the framework under the bipartisan Rural Connectivity
Advancement Program Act, should be part of any infrastructure
conversation.
We also need to be mindful that the deployment of reliable
and resilient networks does not happen overnight. It takes time
and it requires providers to have sustainable and predictable
funding.
States like my home state of South Dakota, have short build
seasons, which leads me to my last point. Having a sufficient
workforce and resilient supply chain in place, will be critical
to keep networks up and running in times of emergencies,
support the build out of broadband networks, meet the demands
of 5G deployment, and perform maintenance and upgrades on the
networks in the future. Which is why I hope the full Senate
will soon pass the Telecommunications Skilled Workforce Act
legislation that would increase the number of workers enrolled
in telecommunications training programs.
And before I close, I would like to reiterate a point I
made earlier. The committee, which has jurisdiction over
telecommunications policy, has a real opportunity to support
efforts to close the digital divide. And if we work together in
a bipartisan manner, we can ensure Americans have access to
these important services.
I appreciate all the witnesses for being here today. I look
forward to hearing from them about how we can support resilient
networks and ensure that any additional efforts focus on the
areas that need it the most.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am delighted that on our panel today,
we have not one but two South Dakota witnesses. Jonathan
Adelstein hails from South Dakota. And of course, Denny Law,
who this committee has heard from before, who runs Golden West
Telecommunications out of Wall, South Dakota, is someone who
brings great knowledge and expertise to these issues, and I
look forward, as always, to hearing from him. And he has with
him today his son, Andrew, who is a State champion hurdler,
both the 100s and the 300 hurdlers--hurdles, I should say. So,
he has won the State Championship in the State of South Dakota,
which is a pretty--a pretty big deal.
So, anyway, delighted to have them here and look forward to
hearing from all out panelists and to engage in a discussion
about what we can do better, where we can make improvements,
and continue to build out networks that serve people everywhere
across this country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that, Mr. Thune, and I join you
in welcoming our panelists, and also, future generations of
leaders who join them, as well. It is good to see them joining
family today.
In addition to both Mr. Law and Former Commissioner
Adelstein, as well, we are also joined by Mr. Feld, who is the
Senior Vice President of Public Knowledge, here from
Washington, D.C.. And the first panelist that we will hear from
today is Chief Jeffrey Johnson, who is the Chief Executive of
the Western Fire Chiefs Association, out of Sisters, Oregon.
Chief, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHIEF JEFFREY D. JOHNSON,
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, WESTERN FIRE CHIEFS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member
Thune, and distinguished Senators of this committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear in front of this committee and
discuss such an important topic.
My name is Jeff Johnson, as mentioned, and I serve as a
Chief Executive for the Western Fire Chiefs. We serve from Guam
and Saipan to Colorado's border, and from Alaska to the border
with Mexico. Two of our top priorities at the Western Fire
Chiefs are wildfire, technology, and the intersection of
wildfire and technology.
The chiefs of the West serve some of the most wildfire
prone, challenging terrain, and extreme fire conditions in the
United States. In 2020 alone, 10.1 million acres burned, and
9,248 structures were lost, which drew assistance from fire
departments across the United States. We know factually that
the fuels are dryer, the fires come earlier and last later in
the year, and they are burning with previously unwitnessed
intensity, which undermines our fire attack efforts.
In my home state of Oregon, megafires last year
simultaneously burned in the Clackamas, Santiam, Umpqua, and
Rogue River drainages, destroying entire communities, homes,
businesses, valuable timber assets, and critical communications
infrastructure. Other Western States had similar experiences,
in terms of the frequency and scale of the fires. For example,
California saw its first ever gigafire, which burned over one
million acres, and had its worst year on record since the Big
Burn of 1910.
As an Incident Commander, I know firsthand the value of
communications to an effective operation. Unfortunately, fire
of this magnitude often destroy back haul, burn over
mountaintop antennas, and level buildings critical to network
operations. To make matters worse, the communications
infrastructure is critical, not only to responders, but to the
civilians to whom we are trying to evacuate ahead of the flame
front.
Additionally, our challenges are often exacerbated by an
unreliable power grid and public safety power shutoffs, which
take down communicationsites that do not have adequate backup
power to outlast the interruption. The Western Fire Chiefs have
been working with our Member State Fire Chiefs Association to
improve permitting and regulations processes for placement of
backup power generation at communicationsites, and to inform
communication providers and lawmakers of public safety's needs.
As public safety and the public at large become
increasingly reliant on our communications infrastructure, the
need for reliable and expanded communications has never been
more important to us. FirstNet, as the Nationwide Public Safety
Broadband Network, has greatly enhanced communications
availability, resilience, and reliability for first responders
with dedicated spectrum for public safety and the ability for
first responders to have access to portable cell towers that
provide wireless connectivity during emergency events. As we
approach the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, I
would like to thank this committee for having played such a key
role in advancing FirstNet, enacting law.
Last, given the vast stretches of land in the West, that
are publicly owned, passing law or regulation that ease and
speed the placement of communication infrastructure on Federal
lands, would be beneficial. By way of illustration, Oregon is
60.4 percent public lands, California 52 percent, Washington
41.9 percent, Alaska 95.8 percent, and Nevada at 87.8 percent,
contrasted to Iowa at 2.8 percent public lands. As you can tell
by this illustration, having expedited processes for placement
of public--or communications infrastructure on public lands,
would in fact be helpful.
Because communications are so important to an effective
fire attack, assistance by Congress to remove barriers and
improve communications would be meaningful to incident
commanders.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions and
comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chief Jeffrey D. Johnson, Chief Executive,
Western Fire Chiefs Association
I am Jeffrey Johnson, Executive Chief for the Western Fire Chiefs
Association (WFCA). I previously served as president of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and a chief fire
officer of the Tualatin Valley Fire and Rescue Department in Beaverton,
Oregon where I served as chief of the department for 15 years before
retiring in 2010 after a 32-year career. The WFCA serves fire chiefs in
the 11 western states, including Oregon, Washington, California, Idaho,
Nevada, Utah, Montana, Arizona, Alaska, Hawaii, as well as Guam/Saipan.
I thank Chairman Ben Ray Lujan and Ranking Member John Thune, as
well as the other esteemed members of the subcommittee, for convening
this hearing to examine ways the Federal government can support
``resilient, redundant, and secure broadband and telecommunications
infrastructure'' and review lessons learned to improve our Nation's
resiliency and reliability. It is an honor to join you, and I thank you
for requesting guidance and input from the WFCA. The WFCA's membership
includes the career and volunteer leaders of fire related emergency
service organizations throughout the WFCA member states and the Western
Pacific Islands.
Prevention, Preparedness and Response to the Growing Threat of
Wildfires. The WFCA's membership provides critical protection of
people, critical infrastructure, and the environment from the
occurrence and outcomes of fires and other natural, technological, and
manmade emergencies. Over the past year, our membership and their
departments have answered the call to support our country's response to
the COVID-19 pandemic, while simultaneously responding to yet another
unprecedented fire season in 2020. The 2021 fire season is already upon
us and we are preparing for another record year, with fires that have
already ignited this year and dry conditions and unseasonably high
temperatures across much of the Midwest and West. After consecutive
years of devastating fire seasons, it has become clear that the major
wildfires in the West are not one-off anomalies, but becoming a pattern
and creating a new normal.
History has taught us that planning and preparedness are key to
mitigating risk and bolstering our readiness to achieve the best
possible outcomes. Preparedness includes evacuation planning and
drills, fuel management, hardening of structures against the threat of
wildfire, and increasing the response resources that are available to
respond to wildland fires through codified agreements. Once a fire has
started, the goal is to contain the fire to the smallest area possible
and minimize the amount of damage to our communities, critical
infrastructure, and natural resources, which involves the notification
and evacuation of all persons who are at risk, resource requests, and
dispatching and coordinating with inter-and intra-state responders.
Following a fire incident, the focus shifts to recovery and learning
from the events that transpired during the emergency.
Criticality of Broadband Communications for Public Safety and
Emergency Response. Modern technology and broadband have provided new
tools for citizens, emergency response personnel, and state and Federal
forestry managers, including ``smart'' tools using drones and unmanned
aerial systems/vehicles for land management and to detect small fires
before they become large forest fires using broadband connectivity.
Advanced technology solutions are equipping public safety with new
capabilities to communicate and coordinate during emergencies. For
example, an incident commander can enhance how resources are dispatched
and deployed to emergencies. The ability to access information and
situational awareness is also essential because the location, mapping,
weather, terrain, and predictive fire behavior intelligence can help to
inform the response and coordination during the fire event.
In order for first responders to actually utilize these advanced
solutions, they need to be able to count on the technology and
underlying network performing in operationally critical situations. It
is essential for emergency response personnel to have reliable access
to broadband and the correspondingly essential resilient commercial
power grid and backup power sources. Additionally, mobile wireless
applications serving public safety should be built in accordance with
commonly accepted standards, such as the 3GPP international wireless
industry standards, to enhance their quality performance,
interoperability, and reliable operation.
While I expect there will be many compelling proposals discussed
during today's hearing, I also want to recognize the tremendous
progress that's been made -thanks to the U.S. Congress enacting
legislation to establish the Nationwide Public Safety Broadband
Network-to address the communications challenges that historically
hindered emergency response. Before FirstNet, field-based first
responders, such as wildland firefighters, were hesitant to adopt new
technology solutions because they couldn't count on it working when
they needed it most. Now that we have FirstNet, first responders have
priority and preemption, dedicated 700 MHz public safety spectrum that
has been built out across the country (with aggressive rural coverage
build benchmarks--an important priority for the WFCA), and the ability
to request portable cell towers (Colts and Cows) to make sure first
responders have connectivity, such as in the event infrastructure has
been damaged by a fire or when a command post is staged in a remote
mountainous area. I had the opportunity to appear before the Senate
Commerce Committee in 2010 during a hearing to discuss the 9/11
Commission Report's recommendation to build a nationwide, public
safety, wireless, interoperable, broadband network. As we approach the
20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this committee and your
colleagues in the House of Representatives and Senate can be proud of
the successful fruit that's resulted from your legislative action.
Thank you for working with the public safety community to make our
vision become a reality.
Enhancing Network Resiliency and Reliability: Cannot Be Achieved in
a Silo. Our country won't be able to tackle the pressing issue of
broadband and telecommunications network resiliency in a silo. I have
seen firsthand the devastation caused by massive conflagrations, such
as the deadly and destructive Camp Fire in Paradise, CA in 2018. While
resiliency practices, like burying fiber underground can certainly
improve resiliency, the reality is that above-ground communication and
power infrastructure in the path of a catastrophic fire will have
difficulty withstanding the heat, wind and conditions of these massive
fire events--even if built to the highest possible level of physical
resiliency. As a country, we must properly invest in fire mitigation
activities, land management, community readiness, and ensure there are
the necessary resources to support fire suppression. We are entering a
new age of wildland firefighting, and state and local budgets and the
workforce in the fire service are becoming strained as wildfire season
becomes increasingly long, frequent, dangerous, and destructive.
Commercial Power Grid. It is also important to recognize the need
for improved power resiliency. Access to reliable commercial power
isn't only important for the communications industry, but also for
health care, first responders, citizens, and virtually every other
facet of our economy. The recent and significant power failure events
in California and Texas call into question the resiliency of the
commercial power grid. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, society
has transitioned to ``remote-everything,'' which further reinforces the
critical need for a robust and resilient commercial power grid.
Temporary and Fixed Backup Power. The placement of backup power
generators at communications facilities can help enhance resiliency and
power redundancy. The need for backup power has been evident during the
public safety power shutdown (PSPS) in California. The WFCA has
collaborated with local lawmakers and other stakeholders in California
to streamline the process for siting backup power facilities. Local and
state siting rules, environmental, and other regulations governing the
placement of backup power generators can make it exceedingly difficult
to get this equipment installed at communication towers. This is not
unique to California and is an issue that hinders backup generator
placement at sites in jurisdictions across the country. The Federal
government could consider preemptive siting and environmental
streamlining rules to make it easier for these backup power facilities
to be installed.
Streamlining the Process to Deploy Broadband Infrastructure.
Especially in the case of wireless networks, greater reliability can be
achieved from the number of cell towers in an area. This functions as a
form of redundancy. As such, Congress should consider ways to expedite
the process to deploy broadband infrastructure. Streamlining the
deployment of both wireline and wireless broadband will also help to
narrow the digital divide, boost the capacity and speeds available for
broadband users, and expand available fiber backhaul-diversity. In
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress approved record levels of
Federal stimulus that can be used to support the deployment of
broadband and telecommunications infrastructure. While this is an
important step forward, we should not stop there. Action should also be
taken to streamline the process to make it easier, faster, and less
costly to deploy wireless and wireline broadband across the federal,
state, tribal, and local levels. With the passage of the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021 and current efforts underway to advance
bipartisan infrastructure legislation, the time is now to move forward
with broadband streamlining legislation or (at a minimum) approve a
temporary window for expedited state, local, tribal, and Federal review
and approvals while communities across America work to harness this
opportunity to expand access to broadband.
Difficulty and Delay Deploying Broadband Infrastructure on Federal
Lands. The WFCA membership is regularly called upon to support fire
suppression efforts on Federal lands to protect people, property, and
some of America's most beloved landscapes. We also respond to other
emergency situations on Federal lands to support and protect Federal
government employees, local residents, and visitors, such as when first
responders support a search and rescue for a missing person in a
National Park or respond to a medical issue for an injured hiker at a
U.S. National Forest. There is a critical public safety need for more
robust and available broadband communications on Federal lands.
Especially along major roadways, areas commonly used as incident
command posts or other emergency staging grounds, and in recreation
areas attracting large numbers of residents and visitors, the inability
to have reliable and available wireless communications on Federal lands
is no longer a mere inconvenience, it is a serious public safety issue.
Congress should take action to overhaul, expedite, and streamline the
Federal leasing, easement, appraisal, review, and approval processes
for broadband projects on lands managed by the Federal government.
The Federal government maintains a significant presence in rural
areas and across the western United States. As Congress and the Biden-
Harris Administration endeavor to close the digital divide and bolster
network resiliency, I am concerned this mission could be hampered
unless there is a fundamental change in how many Federal agencies
approach their responsibility to review and approve broadband
infrastructure projects. Aesthetic, historical, and cultural
considerations on Federal lands should not wholly outweigh or supersede
concerns about the life and safety of first responders and the public
visiting, working, and living on or near Federal lands. The ability to
communicate should be recognized as critically important, and I'm
hopeful the Federal government can find ways to make it easier for this
critical infrastructure to be deployed.
Cybersecurity and the Evolving Threat Landscape. Cybersecurity is
another important pillar that must be included in our Nation's efforts
to enhance our resiliency. Particularly given the recent high-profile
ransomware attacks impacting the meat processing and energy sectors,
the growing cyber threat landscape underscores the need for the Federal
government to ensure the security of government infrastructure and
systems. Additionally, Congress could consider proposals to help
federal, state, tribal, local, and territorial governments modernize
and update their security capabilities, including providing support for
education and training to expand the available cybersecurity workforce.
Voluntary cybersecurity grant funding could also be considered for
other critical infrastructure sectors, including the communications
industry.
Next Generation 9-1-1: An Important National Priority. When
discussing resiliency, reliability, and redundancy for the
communications sector, we must not overlook the critical need to reform
and invest in Next Generation (NG) 9-1-1. Federal funding for NG 9-1-1
implementation will equip public safety answering points (PSAPs) and
emergency communications centers (ECCs) with the ability to modernize
their operations. This will bolster redundancy by allowing a 911 center
to load-share with other PSAPs/ECCs. It will also allow PSAPs/ECCs to
receive rich Internet protocol (IP)-based data and information in the
form of video, photos, and multimedia from the public, and then send
this critical and life-saving information directly to field-based first
responders, including those using FirstNet. Transitioning our country's
existing patchwork of 9-1-1 jurisdictions (many still using legacy
systems) to NG 9-1-1 is critical for our Nation's communications
resiliency. As bipartisan infrastructure legislation is considered by
Congress, I urge this committee and your colleagues in the House and
Senate to include the NG 9-1-1 reform and funding bill. We must ensure
9-1-1 centers regardless of state or jurisdiction--can receive IP-based
data and information, which will better inform emergency response,
reduce response times, and improve outcomes.
Public Safety Communications Priorities at the FCC. Finally, on
behalf of the public safety community, I would like to take this
opportunity to commend the Acting Chairwoman of the Federal
Communications Commission and express my appreciation for her
leadership and steadfast commitment to public safety communications.
Acting Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel has been a longstanding champion
for first responders. On behalf of the WFCA, we are hopeful the Biden-
Harris Administration will nominate her to serve as Chair. Should this
happen, I urge this committee to advance her nomination.
Throughout her career, Ms. Rosenworcel has meaningfully contributed
to bipartisan legislative and regulatory efforts to modernize emergency
communications for first responders in America. For example, as a
senior congressional aid for this committee, Ms. Rosenworcel helped to
author the bipartisan legislation that created the Federal First
Responder Network Authority and set aside 20 MHz of Band 14 spectrum
for public safety's use. In her role as Acting Chairwoman, she has
continued to listen to the needs of public safety and recently helped
lead bipartisan action to stay \1\ the reallocation of 4.9 GHz
spectrum, which would have taken away this vital spectrum resource from
public safety. The public safety community now has the opportunity to
work with the FCC and other stakeholders to help shape the future use
of the 4.9 GHz spectrum. With changes in broadband technology, public
safety's communications resilience can be strengthened by preserving
the spectrum for public safety's use, including facilitating the
introduction of new 5G capabilities into the public safety
communications ecosystem and meeting the urgent need for dedicated
nationwide 5G spectrum for the public safety community.
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\1\ https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-49-ghz-stay-order
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Thank you. Thank you for inviting me to testify. I appreciate your
efforts to bolster our Nation's communications resiliency, reliability,
security, and redundancy. On behalf of the WFCA, thank you for allowing
us to share public safety's views on these topics. I am available to
respond to any questions you may have.
Senator Lujan. Chief Johnson, thank you so very much. Next
we will hear from the Honorable Jonathan Adelstein, the
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Wireless
Infrastructure Association. The floor is yours, sir, for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN ADELSTEIN,
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
WIRELESS INFRASTRUCTURE ASSOCIATION
Mr. Adelstein. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, and Ranking
Member Thune for holding this hearing and for getting the
perspective of the wireless industry on providing resilient and
reliable and redundant networks. Your priority on this is well-
founded because people's lives are at stake here.
In the infrastructure package you are considering, I think
is the biggest opportunity in decades to build more resilient
networks that save Americans lives. Resiliency is a real
priority, and you make it real priority by, not limiting
funding to single, potentially less resilient, technology. That
will be the way that you enable Congress to maximize the
disaster prevention response and recovery we have been talking
about. And it will help you to harness strengths in
redundancies of multiple technologies. A flexible ``all of the
above'' approach deploying fiber, mobile and fixed wireless,
will be the best way to achieve all of Congress' both broadband
and climate change goals.
Now, when I ran RUS, during the Recovery Act, then Vice-
President Biden called me into his office, and I will never
forget what he said. He said, ``Give yourselves freaking
flexibility''. And that is a quote, not a PG version. I will
never forget it because we made that our watch word at RUS. We
were trying to get the money out the door and flexibility, I
think, should be Congress' watch word, as well, when you try to
get this money out the door. It would be unprecedented to
direct all funding to a single technology, excluding others
that may provide more resiliency.
An investment of this magnitude is a dangerous time to
experiment with putting all your eggs in the single wireline
basket. Data speeds, both upload and download, are important to
consumers. Congress can make them a priority. Yet cementing law
of static level data speeds, as a gating eligibility factor--
you are not even eligible if you do not meet those--you could
be hamstringing your ability to advance other goals that you
care about. Seize this moment to promote all of your goals--
resiliency, speeding broadband service to your constituents,
providing them mobility, serving public safety, like Chief
Johnson here, promoting affordability and fighting climate
change.
This committee's long-standing approach has enabled the
U.S. to build the world's strongest telecommunications
networks. And as Senator Thune noted, we rose to the occasion
during this pandemic. We saved the entire economy. You set
goals, traditionally, and priorities for Federal agencies to
execute. You do not cement, in law, narrow technological
standards, like specific data speeds.
Congress should, again, direct agencies to execute your
priorities. Let all technologies that promote your goals
compete for funding, including fixed and mobile 5G services. On
resiliency, wireless networks have real advantages. They tend
to go out less often in disasters and they tend to get restored
more quickly--much more quickly, in some cases, than wireline
networks.
Rather than exclude wireless, Congress can make resiliency
a priority funding factor. Reward applicants with the most
resilient solutions. Let multiple technologies compete and let
the best ones win. And get people who do not have access to the
Internet connected as quickly as possible. Wireless networks
get up and running much quicker than fiber. Your constituents
need broadband now. Do not make consumers wait for a decade, or
that long, by limiting the range of eligible providers. Future
proof should not mean deployed far into the future.
Connectivity delayed is connectivity denied.
And excluding mobile solutions could inadvertently grow a
rural mobility digital divide. Do not tether rural residents to
the Internet through a wire to the home or to the farmhouse.
Rural Americans need mobile networks for their daily lives, for
precision ag, and for rural economic development. Prioritize
public safety. First responders, like Jeff Johnson, do not have
a fiber line trailing his fire truck. They go into harm's way
to protect us all. Let us make sure the solutions meet their
needs.
And to combat climate change, which is causing so much
trouble, right now, in your state, Chairman. 5G networks can
help reduce carbon emissions by up to 15 percent--one-third of
the 50 percent reduction required by 2030 by funding always a
challenge for climate change solutions. Target your broadband
dollars, which we think we can get, to prioritize projects that
contribute the most to reducing carbon emissions. Do not
eliminate options like 5G that are best documented to combat
climate change and mitigate future disasters.
Make affordability a priority. One in five Americans, many
in our state of South Dakota, are smartphone only. Many are
low-income, rural residents who will not give up their phone,
their smartphone. But funding only wireline solutions means
they have to purchase a costly new fiber service.
So, inviting multiple technologies is the best way to
attract qualified applicants in every service area, give
agencies the flexibility to consider providers for each
location. Otherwise, the hardest to reach areas by phone
disrepair never get service. Congress has valued all these,
many priorities. You do not have to choose one at the expense
of the others.
If rigid eligibility requirements are locked in statute,
like symmetrical speeds that most consumers do not use, it
precludes the technological flexibility to address other
priorities, like resiliency and it can leave many people
unserved.
Thank you for holding this hearing and thank for the
opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Adelstein follows:]
Executive Summary, Jonathan Adelstein, President and CEO of WIA
By making resiliency a priority in the infrastructure plan, rather
than limiting funding to a single, potentially less resilient,
broadband technology, Congress can maximize disaster prevention,
response, and recovery. A flexible all-of-the-above strategy, including
fiber, fixed and mobile wireless improves redundancy and best employs
this historic opportunity to achieve all Congressional broadband and
climate change goals, not just one.
Congress should set agencies' funding goals, not set technological
gating factors that preclude other priorities. Otherwise, Congress may
tie agencies down with limited flexibility, preventing consideration of
innovative and geographically appropriate provider applications that
address many essential consumer needs beyond data speeds. Rather than
cement specific broadband speeds in statute, Congress should set a
checklist of priority factors including:
Resiliency: Congress can instruct agencies to consider
resiliency as a primary factor for funding. Applicants that
provide resilient solutions are rewarded with priority
consideration.
Higher download and upload speeds: Download and upload speeds
are valued by consumers. Faster offerings deserve priority. In
terms of symmetrical speeds, data show consumers use over ten
times the downstream bandwidth compared to upstream. To make
the primary gating criteria for eligibility a service most
consumers do not require would foreclose providers from even
applying that could better address many Congressional
priorities and more urgent rural consumer needs.
Mobility: If wireless broadband is excluded, Congress could
inadvertently grow a rural mobility digital divide. Many
unserved residents would be tethered to accessing the Internet
through a wired connection at the home or farmhouse. Fixed
wireless supports 5G mobile broadband that is indispensable for
rural Americans' daily needs, precision ag, and rural economic
development.
Speed of deployment: Given the urgent need for broadband in
rural areas, prioritize connecting consumers as quickly as
possible provide flexibility to expert agencies to consider
applicants that get networks up and running. Don't make
consumers wait for many years by limiting the range of eligible
providers. Future proof should not mean deployed far in the
future.
Public safety and first responders: First responders rely on
mobile networks as they go into harm's way to protect the
public. Service to those who serve us all should be a priority
goal.
Battling climate change: Congress can set as a priority factor
for agencies the degree to which proposed projects will
contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions. If only one
technology is allowed, Congress would eliminate options like 5G
that can best achieve this clear priority. Let the best
technology win.
Targeting unserved areas: Congress should target funds to truly
unserved areas. Define ``unserved'' areas as those lacking
service through either wired or wireless technology. Accurate
maps are needed to identify truly unserved areas with already
committed build plans to target support.
Affordability: Limiting funding to wireline providers saddles
smartphone-only consumers with the need to purchase costly new
fiber service or require large ongoing Federal subsidies. Few
rural consumers are willing to give up mobility.
Cost efficiency: Technological flexibility provides consumers
with the most megabits for the taxpayer dollar. No single
technology is likely to garner a qualified applicant in every
unserved area. Allow agencies flexibility to consider providers
with the most appropriate solution for the given deployment.
Ensure every awardee can cover its costs to remain viable so
service and quality is maintained. Otherwise, the hardest areas
to reach will fall into disrepair or remain unserved.
Congress has long expressed the value of each of these factors--and
should not choose one as a gating criterion at the expense of all
others. If rigid requirements, such as symmetrical speeds, are locked
in statute, it precludes the flexibility to consider providers that
address other key priorities including resiliency, an evolving mix of
speeds, mobility, quicker deployment, public safety, climate change,
and affordability for rural consumers. Lack of flexibility may leave
many areas unserved.
______
Prepared Statement of Jonathan Adelstein, President and CEO,
Wireless Infrastructure Association
Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for holding this important hearing and for the
opportunity to testify. I am the President and CEO of the Wireless
Infrastructure Association (WIA), representing the companies that
build, develop, own, and operate the Nation's wireless facilities. Our
members include infrastructure providers, wireless carriers, equipment
manufacturers, and professional services firms. WIA advocates for the
widespread, responsible deployment of wireless infrastructure to enable
mobile and fixed wireless broadband access for communities everywhere.
The wireless infrastructure industry is committed to making next-
generation communications technology widely available to every corner
of America. The importance of connectivity is dramatically underscored
by the increased reliance on broadband during this unprecedented COVID-
19 pandemic. WIA and our members are grateful for the leadership of
your Subcommittee in promoting our shared goal of closing the digital
divide with ubiquitous, reliable, resilient, and redundant broadband
networks.
The Importance of Resilient and Redundant Networks During Pandemic
The focus of this hearing is on building resilient and redundant
broadband networks. COVID-19 brought forth new challenges and new
opportunities for broadband deployment. The pandemic created an even
deeper recognition of how essential reliable broadband connectivity is
to every household and to every business. The wireless industry's
network investments enabled the entire economy to sustain itself during
the pandemic. We helped businesses to stay afloat, children to continue
learning, and first responders and health care providers to offer
critical care.
Dramatic consumer usage changes, including work-from-home, remote
learning, and telehealth, generated an unprecedented demand for
wireless connectivity anchored by the need for wireless infrastructure.
Wireless networks rose to the challenge and performed magnificently.
U.S. networks' performance during the pandemic continues to demonstrate
why our networks are the envy of the world. COVID-19 drove mobile
traffic up 20 percent, essentially overnight. Yet, mobile data speeds
kept pace. This was not the case in other countries. According to an
Ookla report, China's mobile download speeds saw speed decreases of up
to 40 percent during their peak COVID-19 restrictions, while Italy saw
decreases of up to 23 percent, and Spain saw decreases up to 15
percent.\1\ Over two-thirds of European countries experienced mobile
speed decreases of up to 30 percent in late March, according to
OpenSignal.\2\
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\1\ Tracking COVID-19's Impact on Global Internet Performance,
Ookla, https://www.speed
test.net/insights/blog/tracking-covid-19-impact-global-internet-
performance/#/United%20States (last updated July 20, 2020).
\2\ Francesco Rizzato, Sam Fenwick, & Ian Fogg, Mobile Experience
During the COVID-19 Pandemic: 4G Download Speed, Opensignal (Apr. 08,
2020), https://www.opensignal.com/2020/04/08/mobile-experience-during-
the-covid-19-pandemic-4g-download-speed.
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The wireless success story is not accidental. Thanks to the
wireless industry's innovation, the nearly $30 billion invested every
year by the wireless industry,\3\ a timely supply of spectrum due to
the leadership of this Subcommittee and the FCC, and a regulatory
framework that promotes investment in responsible wireless
infrastructure, the U.S. was in a better position than the rest of the
world during the pandemic.
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\3\ See 2020 Annual Survey Highlights, CTIA at 3 (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020-Annual-Survey-
final.pdf (noting industry investment was $29.1 billion in 2019).
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The pandemic was only the most dramatic and recent example of the
need for reliable and resilient broadband networks. I was honored to be
appointed by the Federal Communications Commission as the Vice-Chair of
its Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee (BDAC) Disaster Response
and Recovery Working Group (DRRWG). Our group delivered a unanimous,
consensus report that outlined the challenges and solutions to ensure
that reliable, resilient broadband was available before, during, and
after natural disasters.\4\
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\4\ Report and Recommendations: COVID-19 Response, Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Broadband Dep. Advis. Comm. Disaster Response & Recovery Working
Grp., (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/bdac-
disaster-response-recovery-approved-rec-10292020.pdf [hereinafter BDAC
DRRWG Report].
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The single greatest legislative opportunity for Congress to enhance
the reliability and redundancy of broadband networks is in the
transformative infrastructure package now under consideration and
proposed in President Biden's American Jobs Plan. That is why one of
the most important recommendations of the BDAC's DRRWG was for Congress
to make major investments to expand the availability of broadband
access. The expert group concluded that resiliency and deployment go
hand in hand. The report stated, ``the most obvious and immediate means
of infusing the necessary capital to address these availability
challenges is for Congress to appropriate the additional funds needed
to deploy broadband in unserved areas in a timely manner.'' \5\
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\5\ Id. at 33.
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The Need for Multiple Technologies to Address Broadband Reliability and
Redundancy
Wireless broadband serves as a key lifeline during storms, natural
disasters, and other emergencies. Providing that lifeline is the
industry's goal every day. Wireless providers and builders have
invested significant resources to strengthen and harden networks and
improve network resiliency and planning.\6\ In 2017, Hurricane Harvey's
unprecedented floodwaters affected only 5 percent of the thousands of
wireless facilities in the affected areas of Texas and Louisiana.\7\ In
the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 1.75 million telecommunications lines
were downed while only 1,000 cellular transmission towers were
affected.\8\ Six months after the storm, 130,000 lines remained out
while cellular service was fully operational.\9\ After the catastrophic
events of 9/11, many point-to-point wireless links were established to
supplement the loss of a main switching station housed in the World
Trade Center. These links were installed in a matter of days, and many
remain as a source of permanent backup.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See 2019 Annual Survey Highlights, CTIA at 5 (June 20, 2019),
https://api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06-/2019-Annual-Survey-
Highlights-FINAL.pdf (stating that the wireless industry invested over
$253 billion between 2010 and 2019).
\7\ Nick Ludlum, The Wireless Industry Responds to a Historic
Hurricane Season, CTIA (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.ctia.org/news/the-
wireless-industry-responds-to-a-historic-hurricane-season.
\8\ Paula Rhea, Hurricane Katrina: Telecom Infrastructure Impacts,
Solutions, and Opportunities, Verizonbusiness (Feb. 12-16, 2006),
https://archive.nanog.org/meetings/nanog36/presentations/rhea.pdf.
\9\ Id.
\10\ Zayan EL Khaled & Hamid Mcheick, Case Studies of
Communications Systems During Harsh Environments: A Review of
Approaches, Weaknesses, and Limitations to Improve Quality of Service,
15 Int'l J. Distrib. Sens. Nets. (Feb. 24, 2019), https://doi.org/
10.1177%2
F1550147719829960.
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Once disasters occur, the availability of multiple providers and
networks can help consumers and businesses stay connected to critical
services and information. Fiber is a state-of-the art network
architecture that provides outstanding bandwidth and broadband service
and is an essential element of any national broadband buildout effort
but comes with its own tradeoffs. WIA members own and operate most of
the fiber in the U.S. Regarding its resiliency, like other wireline
infrastructure, we are aware that fiber can be vulnerable to damage
from natural forces.\11\ In rural areas, fiber is usually deployed
aerially on utility poles. Aerially deployed networks may be subject to
interruptions from environmental events such as wind, ice loading,
trees falling, snow and storms, fire, and hurricanes.\12\
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\11\ See, e.g., The Real Cost of Fiber Cuts: How to solve using
Gigabit Wireless, Gigabit Wireless (Mar. 15, 2016) (noting, among
common reasons for outage such as tornadoes and hurricanes, squirrels
accounted for 28 percent of damages to fiber lines in 2010).
\12\ See The Complete Guide to Fiber to the Premises Deployment,
PPC at 8 (2020), https://www.ppc-online.com/fiber-to-the-premises-
ebook.
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Fiber buried underground is still subject to fiber cuts and other
disruption often caused by excavations, and while it can be more
resilient than aerial, it can also be far more costly, time consuming
to deploy and repair, and sometimes impractical depending on the soil
and topography.\13\ Wireless networks help to ensure that multiple
providers and networks are available when disaster strikes. Through
overlapping site coverage, diverse deployment of fiber backhaul, and
extensive investments in deployable assets, wireless providers can
mitigate the impact of disasters on their networks and often restore
service more quickly than wireline fiber.
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\13\ See Cost Efficiency infra pp.15-16 and related discussion.
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As climate change continues to increase the severity of weather
events, fiber and other wireline infrastructure will face increased
exposure to risk. It is estimated that over 1,000 miles of long-haul
fiber conduit and almost 2,500 miles of metro fiber conduit will be
underwater by 2032.\14\ Unfortunately, these trends are not improving.
Extreme heat waves and large storms are predicted to become more
common.\15\ Wireline infrastructure will continue to face
vulnerabilities that are different than wireless options.\16\
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\14\ Ramakrishnan Durairajan et al., Lights Out: Climate Change
Risk to Internet Infrastructure, In Proceedings of the Applied
Networking Research Workshop 2018 (July 16, 2018).
\15\ See Climate Change Indicators: Weather and Climate, Environ.
Prot. Agen., https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/weather-climate
(last visited June 16, 2021).
\16\ Anthony Townsend & Mitchell Moss, Telecommunication
Infrastructure in Disasters: Preparing for Crisis Communications,
N.Y.U. Ctr. for Catastrophe Prep. and Resp. at 8 (April 2005)
(``Wireless links, whose links are constructed out of intangible
electromagnetic radiation, reduce some of the vulnerability of wired
networks''); see also David Theodore, A Climate-Proof Internet is Here
and Critical Infrastructure Needs it Yesterday, Climate Resilient
Internet (Feb. 6, 2020) (suggesting a wireless alternative using point-
to-point millimeter wave links as a fail safe for when fiber lines are
downed).
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Loss of electrical power can create outages of telecommunications
service for wired and wireless networks. Telecommunications providers
of both fiber and wireless broadband are equally and deeply committed
to serving their customers' needs in emergencies. Yet, each is
subject--in differing degrees--to the lack of a reliable electric grid.
Fiber-to-the-premise (FTTP) networks face the more intractable problem
of loss of power to the premise in addition to the network. Most in-
home fiber includes a battery backup that lasts twenty-four hours.\17\
After those twenty-four hours, services including telephone and 9-1-1
services are lost. Power is often lost in rural areas for weeks even in
regularly occurring ice storms and even longer in the wake of
disasters. Restoring electrical service to all the homes in the wide
areas often affected by these larger natural disasters is a lengthy
process. Wireless connectivity requires the difficult, but far less
onerous, challenge of providing power only to the transmission site
such as a tower to serve all the households in the service area
regardless of if they have power on their premises. And consumers can
often find alternative locations to re-charge their devices, including
in their cars.
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\17\ See Public Notice, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
Reminds Providers of Facilities-Based Residential Voice Services That
are Not Line-Powered of Upcoming Requirement to Offer Subscribers 24
Hours of Backup Power for Customer Premises Equipment, Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n DA 18-1205 (rel. Nov. 27, 2018), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
attachments/DA-18-1205A1.pdf.
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Wireless assets, such as cell on wheels (``COWs''), can be quickly
rolled in to provide temporary network capacity--including backhaul
when a fiber connection is lost--and restore connectivity. This speed
of response is simply not always possible in primarily wireline
networks that much reach many affected premises. Wireless networks also
can be rerouted and optimized during and after a disaster. If one cell
site is offline, the network can use capacity from another site to
maintain connectivity.\18\
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\18\ How Wireless Kept Americans Connected During COVID-19, CTIA at
3 (June 23, 2020), https://api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/How-
Wireless-Kept-Americans-Connected-During-COVID-19-2.pdf.
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Wireless networks also have unparalleled self-healing capabilities
that are being enhanced with 5G technology. Fiber networks in rural
areas, particularly aerial fiber that is damaged by storms, tend to
take longer to restore. Restoring one tower can quickly provide service
to an entire area, versus having to repair numerous fiber breaks or
entire areas of poles washed, burned, or blown away. A resilient
network is a redundant network. Resiliency is a key factor Congress
should consider in prioritizing funding for broadband buildout.
Public Safety and First Responders Rely on Mobile Wireless Networks
In terms of disaster response and resiliency, first responders also
need universal coverage. First responders rely on wireless broadband as
they rush to the front lines for fires, crime scenes, and disasters and
need mobile connectivity on site to protect themselves and the public.
In many rural areas, the closest hospital can be an hour or more away.
Wireless broadband like 5G can turn an ambulance into a mobile
emergency room during that ``golden hour,'' saving lives and preventing
disabilities.\19\
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\19\ Sanjay Joshi, 5G and Me: And the Golden Hour, Dell
Technologies (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.delltechnologies.com/en-us/
blog/5g-me-and-golden-hour/.
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Many current and potential applications for public safety officials
are powered by wireless broadband. A combination of wearables, sensors,
cameras, and other Internet-connected technologies are being used by
public safety departments to enhance their efforts in a variety of
settings. For example, FirstNet, the dedicated network that Congress
established to support first responders, has nearly eighty deployable
assets available at no cost to subscriber agencies, utilizing Band 14
for best public safety experience.\20\ In Chicago and Miami, for
example, police departments are utilizing technology that uses an array
of smart acoustic sensors to identify gunshots and isolate their
location.\21\ In Sea Isle City, New Jersey, cameras and sensors are
being used to monitor flood risk.\22\ Electronic flashing road signs
are automatically activated to alert drivers when the flood risk is
high.
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\20\ Understanding the FirstNet Deployable Program: High-impact
Solutions for Public Safety Operations, FirstNet Auth., https://
firstnet.gov/system/tdf/Deployables_factsheet_2021.pdf?
file=1&type=node&id=1342&force=0.
\21\ Smaller Cities Increasingly Turn to Gunshot Detection
Technology to Prevent and Reduce Gun Violence, Intrado Globe Newswire
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2020/12/
22/2149702/0/en/Smaller-Cities-Increasingly-Turn-to-Gunshot-Detection
-Technology-to-Prevent-and-Reduce-Gun-Violence.html.
\22\ Tech Help With Floods Begins with Sea Isle City Alert System,
Press of Atlantic City (June 10, 2019), https://
pressofatlanticcity.com/opinion/editorials /tech-help-with-floods-
begins-with-sea-isle-city-alert-system/article_58d476e4-1feb-5644-a7c8-
a91a5bb19e71.html.
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, often referred to as ``drones'', can get
information to first responders faster in an emergency. Drones equipped
with cameras are increasingly being used in search and rescue
situations to scour areas that may be difficult for people to access.
In January 2019, a search and rescue team in Utah used a drone to
locate a 60-year-old hiker stranded on a ledge.\23\ During the Camp
Fire, sixteen Northern California emergency responder agencies worked
together using a team of drones to map and track the fire, helping them
develop and implement their containment strategies.\24\
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\23\ Zacc Dukowitz, Drones in Search and Rescue: 5 Stories
Showcasing Ways Search and Rescue Uses Drones to Save Lives, UAV Coach
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://uavcoach.com/search-and-rescue-drones/.
\24\ Joe Rosato Jr., How a Squadron of Drones Mapped the Entire
Paradise Camp Fire Zone in Two Days¸ NBC Bay Area, https://
www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/how-a-squadron-of-drones-mapped-the-
entire-paradise-camp-fire-zone-in-two-days/201896/ (last updated Nov.
29, 2018).
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Advances in wireless technology have helped spur the development of
tools utilized by public safety officials. As next-generation wireless
devices and networks roll out across America, 5G will enable a whole
new generation of public safety innovations. Public safety and disaster
response is another key factor Congress should prioritize for funding
broadband infrastructure.
Wireless Networks are Vital to Addressing Climate Change
Reliable and redundant telecommunications networks have the unique
ability to help prevent and to mitigate the destruction of disasters
before they occur, as well as providing the means to respond to them.
Scientific reports indicate that climate change is a major factor
spurring the increasing number and severity of natural disasters--and
one that humans can address.\25\ Studies have shown how dramatically
the latest advances in broadband, wireless broadband, and particularly
5G networks, can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Global e-
Sustainability Initiative documented that Internet-enabled solutions
could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 16.5 percent.\26\
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\25\ See, e.g., Climate Change Indicators: Weather and Climate,
Envtl. Prot. Agen., https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/weather-
climate (last visited June 16, 2021) (noting heat weaves and large
storms are likely to become more frequent); The Effects of Climate
Change, Nat'l Aero. and Space Admin., https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/
(last visited June 17, 2021) (``Effects that scientists had predicted
in the past would result from global climate change are now occurring:
loss of sea ice, accelerated sea level rise and longer, more intense
heat waves.'').
\26\ GeSI Smarter 2020: The Role of ICT in Driving a Sustainable
Future, Global e-Sustainability Initiative and Boston Cons. Grp. at 9
(Dec. 2012), https://www.telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
SMARTer-2020-The-Role-of-ICT-in-Driving-a-Sustainable-Future-December-
2012._2.pdf.
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The characteristics of wireless networks' wide area coverage,
mobility, and speed of deployment offer unique benefits that address
every policy goal of President Biden's American Jobs Plan. In fact,
every element of the President's plan will rely on rapid deployment of
wireless connectivity, including energy and smart grid, transportation
and connected cars, agriculture, water and land use, building
efficiency, and advanced manufacturing. The World Economic Forum
documents that the digital technology sector, relying on 5G
connectivity, ``is probably the world's most powerful influencer to
accelerate action to stabilize global temperatures well below 2+C.''
\27\ Indeed, ``digital technologies could already help reduce global
carbon emissions by up to 15 percent--or one-third of the 50 percent
reduction required by 2030.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Borje Ekholm & Johan Rockstrom, Digital technology can cut
global emissions by 15 percent. Here's how, World Econ. Forum (Jan. 15,
2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/why-digitalization-is-
the-key-to-exponential-climate-action/.
\28\ Id. (emphasis added).
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To ensure that Federal broadband infrastructure investments
effectively target climate change, Congress should keep in mind the
most important applications that accomplish the goal. Each of the most
fundamental green technologies enabled by broadband requires wide-area
and ideally universal and mobile coverage of rural America. These
include smart grid, smart transportation and autonomous vehicles,
precision agriculture, and water conservation.
Wireless networks provide additional benefits to emerging
technologies that will rely on resilient networks. Smart
transportation, such as self-driving and electric vehicles, rely on
advanced mobile networks to provide instantaneous connectivity for
numerous operations, especially safety sensors. Vehicle traffic
congestion is a major source of emissions. It is estimated that cars
are responsible for about 30 percent of CO2 emissions.\29\
Deloitte estimates that self-driving cars, which rely on wireless
connectivity, could reduce emissions by 40 percent to 90 percent, cut
travel times by nearly 40 percent, and reduce delays by 20 percent.\30\
In addition, smart city and smart building technologies could result in
$20 billion in savings if the energy efficiency of buildings is
increased by just 10 percent.\31\
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\29\ Digital Transformation of Industries: Automotive Industry,
World Econ. Forum at 4 (Jan. 2016), https://reports.weforum.org/
digital-transformation/wp-content/blogs.dir/94/mp/files/pages/files/
wef-dti-automotivewhitepaper-final-january-2016.v1.pdf.
\30\ Wireless Connectivity Fuels Industry Growth and Innovation in
Energy, Health, Public Safety, and Transportation, CTIA (Jan. 19,
2017), https://www.ctia.org/news/deloitte-wireless-connectivity-fuels-
industry-growth-and-innovation.
\31\ Darrell M. West, Achieving Sustainability in a 5G World,
Brookings at 4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads /2016/11/gs_20161201_smartcities_paper.pdf.
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5G networks will increase manufacturing efficiency and
sustainability goals. 5G can enable more efficient compressors that
waste less energy, increase boiler efficiency to reduce air waste
energy, and improve motor voltage imbalances to reduce energy
consumption.\32\ Furthermore, 5G will reduce greenhouse gas emissions
in numerous ways, such as making smarter electric grids that are more
efficient and resilient.\33\
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\32\ See generally id. (describing ways that 5G technology will
enable resource management and sustainability).
\33\ See, e.g., Sofana Reka et al., Future Generation 5G Wireless
Networks for Smart Grid: A Comprehensive Review, 12 Energies 2140 at
2145-49 (June 4, 2019) (detailing several benefits 5G will provide to
electrical systems including real time demand response).
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For example, WIA member Anterix is working with utilities to deploy
utility-grade private networks, providing capabilities, features,
functions, and equipment for reliable and resilient connections for
essential services. These new networks enable a range of new use cases,
such as the Falling Conductor Protection capability developed by San
Diego Gas & Electric and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. It relies
on the low latency of LTE--the same technology used in our phones--to
enable broken power lines to be de-powered in the interval between
breakage and hitting the ground, which reduces their likelihood to
ignite wildfires that have recently plagued so much of the country and
contributed to global warming.\34\
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\34\ Wildfire Safety Innovation: Cutting off Power to a Broken
Power Line Before it Hits the Ground!, San Diego gas and energy (Mar.
20, 2019), https://sdgenews.com/article/wildfire-safety-innovation-
cutting-power-broken-power-line-it-hits-ground.
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Internet of Things (``IoT'') technologies in appliances, buildings,
factories, and homes employ sensors that rely on 5G as they monitor and
analyze energy usage. These technologies alone could cut carbon
emissions 15 percent by 2030.\35\ Smart energy grids also employ 5G.
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory found that it could directly
reduce energy usage and carbon impact by 12 percent and indirectly by 6
percent.\36\ Having resilient electrical grids has become increasingly
important during destructive wildfire seasons. As electrical grid
operators aim to enhance their networks for greater reliability and
resiliency, sensors and analytics enabled by 5G applications are
increasingly critical, ``allowing for timely diagnosis, prediction, and
prescription of all system variables and assets during normal and
extreme-event conditions.'' \37\
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\35\ Renee Cho, The Coming 5G Revolution: How Will it Affect the
Environment?, Colum. Climate School (Aug. 13, 2020), https://
news.climate.columbia.edu/2020/08/13/coming-5g-revolution-will-affect-
environment/.
\36\ R. Pratt, et al., The Smart Grid: An Estimation of the Energy
and CO2 Benefits, Pacific Nw. Nat'l Lab. (Jan. 2010); see
also Bruce Weindelt, Digital Transformation of Industries: Automotive
Industry, World Econ. Forum at 4 (Jan. 2016).
\37\ Louis Brasington, Digital Smart Grid Resilience: Wildfire
Mitigation and Reliability, Cleantech Grp. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://
www.cleantech.com/digital-smart-grid-resilience-wildfire-mitigation-
and-reliability/.
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Water conservation and efficient farming is another benefit of
wireless broadband. Agriculture accounts for 80 percent of water use in
the U.S.\38\ Agricultural IoT technologies, like precision agriculture,
monitors, soil property and yield mapping, and satellite imagery, can
help to reduce agricultural water consumption by as much as 15 percent
per year.\39\
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\38\ Darrell M. West, Achieving Sustainability in a 5G World,
Brookings at 2 (Dec. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads /2016/11/gs_20161201_smartcities_paper.pdf.
\39\ E.J. Sadler et al., Opportunities for Conservation with
Precision Irrigation, 60 J. of Soil and Water Conserv. 374, 377 (Oct.
27. 2015).
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For the telecommunications industry itself, 5G networks are
estimated to be 40 percent more energy efficient due to technological
evolution, which has dramatically increased energy efficiency,
particularly in chipsets.\40\ 5G processors and radios are tightly
designed together, which promotes smart, integrated, energy saving
features.
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\40\ GeSI Smarter 2020: The Role of ICT in Driving a Sustainable
Future, supra note 7 at 209.
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There is much debate in Congress today about the level of resources
the infrastructure plan should dedicate to combatting climate change.
Yet, there seems to be wide agreement on the need for broadband
deployment funding. Congress should target resources to deploy
broadband infrastructure to maximize the beneficial impact on climate
change. No broadband technology is better documented to achieve climate
change goals than wireless broadband. If even a fraction of the 15
percent reduction in carbon emissions estimated by WEF is achieved, it
would be a monumental contribution toward saving the planet. Excluding
wireless broadband would miss an urgently needed opportunity to combat
global warming and to prevent untold disasters from occurring in our
lifetimes and those of generations to come.
Lessons from the Recovery Act and then Vice-President Biden: The Need
for Flexibility
My experience overseeing the Broadband Initiatives Program as
Administrator of the Rural Utilities Service at the Department of
Agriculture (``USDA'') for the Obama-Biden Administration can provide
useful lessons as this Committee deliberates on how best to accomplish
its broadband deployment objectives. It turns out that this can be much
more complicated in practice than it might appear.
I am very familiar with financing FTTP projects: the RUS under the
Recovery Act ultimately approved 221 fiber wireline projects, 60
wireless projects and 28 combined wireless/wireline.\41\ Given the
severity of the economic downturn, we strove to move as quickly as
possible seeking ``shovel ready projects.'' These were fewer and
farther between than hoped. I was confirmed by the U.S. Senate in June
2009 after the policy was already established for the first round
Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA). Of the roughly $3.5 billion
ultimately awarded, the first round awarded $1.067 billion for 68
broadband projects.
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\41\ Distribution of Broadband Stimulus Grants and Loans, Cong.
Research Serv. at 6 (January 4, 2011).
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However, funding was going out the door more slowly than the White
House wanted to see. As we were devising the rules for the second and
final NOFA, I was first called into the office of Chief of Staff Rahm
Emmanuel, who admonished RUS to speed up the process. Shortly
thereafter, I was called into the office of then-Vice President Biden,
who had been charged by President Obama with overseeing the Recovery
Act. Needless to say, this second meeting was more pleasant.
The guidance Vice President Biden shared was as clear as it was
sound: ``Give yourselves more freaking flexibility.'' I will never
forget those words--which is a direct quote, not a PG-rated version--
because they became our motto as we made policy cuts in the second
NOFA. When deliberating on decisions, I often called for more
``freaking flexibility.''
Vice President Biden's advice proved as wise as it was piquant. We
made major changes in the second NOFA, including the mix of grants and
loans, that were critical to the success of the program.\42\ It is a
heretofore unreported fact that RUS had almost more funding than it had
qualified projects. RUS received $28.965 billion in total applications
for grants and loans that resulted in $3.529 billion RUS ultimately
awarded. Yet, in the final process, almost every award that passed both
our financial feasibility and our technical feasibility screens won
funding--with only a handful that could have met those screens left at
the end of the process. In other words, only about one in eight
projects penciled out as technically and financially feasible.
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\42\ Mark A. Abramson and Paul R. Lawrence, Paths to Making a
Difference, Leading in Government ch. 4 (revised ed. 2012).
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The lesson of the Recovery Act is that Congress cannot assume that
if it provides funding with narrow strictures that its vision can be
achieved--even if funding levels are very large as to appear
sufficient. From the perspective of an Administrator, the agency does
not choose who applies and which private or municipal actors are
willing to step up. The agencies to which Congress allocates funding
can only rely upon and consider what comes in through their doors.
Agencies are limited to those operators that are prepared to offer the
service specified. Even more fundamentally, implementing agencies can
and should only fund those operators among them--whether for-profit,
non-profit or municipal--that are not only willing, but able to
demonstrate a plan that is both financially and technically feasible.
The way telecommunications networks are structured geographically,
typically only providers already serving an area or with existing
infrastructure in the region are interested in or capable of expanding
to the most hard-to-reach areas.
Clearly, we learned that finding feasible projects is difficult.
The more rural and less densely populated the area, the more difficult
it becomes. The essential limiting factor is often whether--even if
Congress pays for 100 percent of the capital expenses--the ongoing
revenues from end users cover the operating expenses. Again, the less
densely populated the service area (those Congress most seeks to reach)
the more difficult this long-term business case becomes.
I am concerned that if Congress does not provide implementing
agencies with needed flexibility, it will find that for many areas, no
qualified applications will come in the door and areas will remain
unserved. Worse, if financially infeasible projects are nevertheless
approved, the networks will be unsustainable, and consumers will lose
the quality of service or end up having no service at all. For example,
as noted above, fiber cuts in areas with long fiber runs (such as
through rural, wooded areas) are expensive to repair, particularly
considering that few customers are providing the revenue to cover those
costs. If overly prescriptive technological parameters are sealed in
statute, it may be too late to for Congress to change course, as we did
at RUS in the second NOFA.
The lesson is that applications are very provider specific and
geographically specific. The unique history of network investment in a
particular service area dictates feasibility along with the financial
and technical strength of the operator proposing to provide service.
Two areas similar in geography and density may not have similarly
strong providers or existing networks from which to extend further into
rural areas. For example, there may be an area in West Virginia that is
similarly rugged and sparsely populated to one in Montana. However, one
might have a local cooperative that has long invested in building out
fiber connectivity, with a solid balance sheet girded by years of RUS
and Universal Service funding, while the other has not benefited from
similar investments in infrastructure or have a similarly strong local
provider. One might offer a feasible project proposal while the other
does not--or one area may not even get a qualified application to serve
it. If Congress does not provide the funding agencies flexibility to
take in the door a wider variety of proposals, one area may go
unserved--or worse, become unserved when the provider is unable to
cover its costs due to limited ongoing customer revenues after it is
built at taxpayer expense.
Solution: Congress Establishes Priority Goals, not Limiting Technology
Decisions about How to Achieve Them
Congress should set funding agencies' goals and not set
technological gating factors. Otherwise, Congress may tie funding
agencies down with limited flexibility to even consider innovative,
cost-effective, and geographically appropriate provider applications
that would have likely met Congressional priorities or have met them
sooner.
In the history of this distinguished Committee, the Communications
Act is a model of setting goals and priorities rather than specific
technological solutions that may or may not be sustainable or even meet
all of Congress's objectives.
Rather than cementing specific broadband speeds in statute,
Congress can set a checklist of priority factors, including the
following based on Congressional and Administration priorities:
Resiliency of networks: both vulnerabilities and the speed
of restoration;
Higher broadbands speeds;
Mobility, highly valued by consumers in rural and other
areas, which is also an added benefit of fixed wireless
broadband investment;
Speed of deployment and infrastructure siting;
Public safety: the needs of first responders and emergency
response;
Contribution to reducing carbon emissions and thus
preventing future natural disasters;
Target unserved areas;
Affordability to consumers;
Cost efficiency;
Workforce development.
Congress has long expressed the value of each of these factors and
should not choose one at the expense of all others, which would happen
if certain priorities were locked in as gating factors that preclude
the consideration of other factors. Consider each in turn:
Resiliency: As indicated by this hearing, the resiliency of
telecommunications networks is a priority for the Committee. American
lives and property depend upon it, as we have seen in the pandemic. All
telecommunications technologies, including wireless broadband, have
their own vulnerabilities. As noted above, for obvious reasons, long
stretches of aerially deployed fiber optic cable, or for that matter
any wireline service deployed overhead, are exposed to many natural
forces, and can take long periods to restore. Moreover, FTTH is
dependent on electrical service at the home, which is often disrupted
for long stretches. Whether one agrees with this analysis or not,
Congress should not tie agencies' hands to one technology that may be
more exposed to risk. It can charge funding agencies with considering
resiliency as a factor in ``future-proofing'' funding choices. Agencies
can ask applicants to identify the level of resiliency for its proposed
broadband delivery mechanism--and make them prove their capability to
meet their promises, both technically and financially. They can ask:
how vulnerable is your technology to outages? What steps are you taking
to ensure resiliency? How long will it take to restore service and what
will it cost? Is your network financially sustainable considering those
costs and the likelihood of disruptions in the proposed service
territory?
Resilient networks mean sustainable networks. Real ``future
proofing'' requires that the companies that are provided funding to
build networks will remain in business to provide service to customers
into the future. Resiliency is key because ongoing operating costs must
be covered by the revenue stream, or the networks will fall into
disrepair and will not remain open consistently, provide adequate
customer service or quick outage restoration, or could become
inoperable.
Higher speeds: Members of Congress have expressed an interest in
prioritizing symmetrical speeds. Consumers clearly separately value
both download and upload speeds, and it makes sense for agencies to
prioritize them independently. The gap between downstream and upstream
traffic has consistently grown over the last ten years. Recently, the
ratio of downstream consumption to upstream is fourteen to one.\43\
Current consumer trends demonstrate significant increases in downstream
consumption while upstream increases at a fraction of the rate.\44\
Today's consumers do not utilize upstream bandwidth at the same rate
they use downstream and speak to it with their dollars and usage. Video
streaming makes up over 80 percent of all Internet traffic, two thirds
of which is traffic from downloads.\45\ Even popular applications that
utilize relatively high upload bandwidth, such as two-way video
conferencing, do not require anything near symmetrical speeds. Studies
have shown video conferencing requires approximately one third of the
upstream bandwidth compared to downstream.\46\
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\43\ See John Ulm & Tom Cloonan, The Broadband Network Evolution
Continues, CommScope 9 (2019), https://www.nctatechnicalpapers.com/
Paper/2019/2019-the-broadband-network-evolution-continues; see also The
Asymmetric Nature of Internet Traffic, NCTA (Mar. 22, 2021), https://
www.ncta.com/whats-new/the-asymmetric-nature-of-internet-traffic
(stating that the downstream to upstream traffic ration was sixteen to
one at the end of 2020. But see, e.g., Peter Rysavy, The Folly of
Attempting to Future-Proof Broadband, Light Reading (June 15, 2021),
https://www.lightreading.com/opticalip/the-folly-of-attempting-to-
future-proof-broadband/a/d-id/770204 (noting a reverse in the trend
that the gap between downstream and upstream grows every year due to
increased use of video learning, telemedicine, and telelearning
bringing the ratio down to ten to one).
\44\ See id. at fig. 3, 4 (demonstrating a 37.8 percent average
growth rate over five years for downstream while upstream has a 18.8
percent growth rate for the same time).
\45\ The Global Internet Phenomena Report, Sandvine at 6 (Sept.
2019), https://www
.sandvine.com/hubfs/ Sandvine_Redesign_2019/Downloads/
Internet%20Phenomena/Internet%
20Phenomena%20Report%20Q32019%2020190910.pdf; see also Distribution of
Global Downstream Internet Traffic as of October 2018, By Category,
Statista (Feb 13, 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/271735/
internet-traffic-share-by-category-worldwide/.
\46\ Jay Zhu et al., Testing Bandwidth Usage of Popular Video
Conferencing Applications, Cable Labs (Nov. 5, 2020), https://
www.cablelabs.com/testing-bandwidth-usage-of-popular-video-
conferencing-applications (studying various video conferencing
applications utilization of upstream and downstream bandwidth).
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Networks are optimized based on consumer use patterns. The
telecommunications industry has responded by engineering networks to
favor downloads to meet their customers' demand. It is possible that
consumers will reverse long-term trends favoring download speeds;
however, even if upload speeds demand doubles, it will remain far below
download speed demand. The speculative prediction that upload speed
demand will dramatically rise can justify making it a priority, but it
is not a good basis to make symmetrical speeds the sole eligibility
requirement for an entire planned investment of this magnitude--to the
exclusion of other priorities.
To make symmetrical upload the primary gating criterion for funding
would shortchange addressing resiliency, climate change and disaster
prevention, the speed of getting service to rural Americans, mobility,
public safety, affordability and other key factors we know consumers
value now and urgent crises Congress seeks to address.
Mobility: We know for certain that Americans value mobility. Rural
Americans traverse longer distances and rely on mobility even more
heavily. If wireless technology to serve fixed or in-home or mobile
broadband is excluded from an infrastructure plan, Congress could
inadvertently grow a rural mobility digital divide in which many
unserved residents would be limited to accessing the Internet through a
wired connection in the home or farmhouse. All broadband technologies,
including wireless broadband, are needed to provide communities with
robust connectivity. And if Congress gives wireless broadband
technology a fair chance to compete for the same funding, including for
the in-home market, consumers will benefit from mobility that is
provided by all wireless broadband investments including fixed wireless
that supports 5G.
This rural mobility divide would preclude rural Americans from
access to similar interconnected solutions that are available to their
urban counterparts. Rural residents should not be tethered to the
relatively short leash of ethernet or a Wi-Fi signal when they need a
high-speed connection. Further, many applications, such as precision
agriculture, require wireless broadband to blanket vast acres of
farmland to be useful. The larger properties and distance between
houses that many Americans seek out by living in rural areas require
larger areas of service. For children doing homework on hour-long bus
rides in rural areas, for example, waiting until they get back home to
go online is not a good option. In terms of a priority, you might ask
your rural constituents what they value more: greater broadband
mobility on the road and across their farm fields--or upload speeds at
home. For those like me who have lived in rural America, I expect you
can guess the answer.
Speed of deployment, infrastructure siting and workforce needs:
Fiber can take months to years to deploy even in easy geography, but
more complex deployments can take many years. Wireless broadband links
can be installed and ready for operation in a matter of days in a
variety of scenarios.\47\ According to a study by the Fiber Broadband
Association, it would take 10 years and an additional $70 billion to
pass 90 percent of U.S. households--before even reaching the last 10
percent which are of greatest concern for rural access.\48\ To connect
that 90 percent would require an additional $15 billion.\49\
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\47\ Dori Erann, Fiber VS Wireless-The Greatest Debate of the
Decade, Ceragon (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.ceragon.com/blog/fiber-vs-
wireless-the-greatest-debate-of-the-decade.
\48\ FTTH Study 2019, Cartesian at 2 (June 4, 2019), https://
optics.fiberbroadband.org/
Portals/0/
Cartesian%202019%20FTTH%20Study%20Summary%20Findings%2020190604%20
SENT.pdf at 2.
\49\ Id. at 4.
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Given rural consumers urgent need for broadband, especially in
rural and unserved areas, the focus should be on utilizing all
technologies to connect all communities as quickly as possible. And
wireless broadband can be deployed quickly. WIA members report that, on
average, it can take about six months for a wireless collocation and
about eighteen months for a new tower to be built.
Future proof should not mean deployed far in the future. Rural
consumers should not have to wait in the back of a long line for many
years to finally get the broadband Congress promised. Connectivity
delayed is connectivity denied. Speed to market should be a priority
Congress charges funding agencies to consider. In terms of keeping up
with consumer needs--real future proofing--wireless networks are
upgraded constantly. 5G is the most readily upgradeable generation of
wireless broadband. Once deployed, it is easier to upgrade networks to
handle varying demands and ultimately to upgrade to the next generation
of wireless broadband. To achieve Congressional goals, placing a
priority on getting networks up and running will meet rural Americans'
urgent needs. Speeding deployment will require working to encourage
providers to offer plans customized to different communities--not one-
size-fits all. Congress should provide priority and flexibility for
expert funding agencies to evaluate how quickly providers can deliver.
Public safety and first responders: As noted above, first
responders rely on mobile networks as they go in harm's way to protect
the public. Fiber to the premise will not help them as they race to put
out fires, deliver health care in ambulances that can become a mobile
emergency room with 5G, or protect the public from crimes in progress.
Public safety has always and will always rely on mobile networks.
Service to those who serve us should be a priority goal established by
Congress for funding agencies.
Battling climate change: As noted above, broadband and digital
technologies can contribute to solving the crisis of climate change.
Wireless broadband and 5G solutions play a particularly strong role
given the need for wide-area coverage, mobility and distributed IoT
applications. Congress can set as a priority factor that funding
agencies consider the degree to which the proposed project will
contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions. Again, if only
wireline technology can be considered, Congress could tie agencies'
hands in terms of considering the full range of options to achieve this
clear priority. Let the best technology win. Target unserved areas:
Congress should target funds to truly unserved areas as defined by the
FCC as lacking broadband service. To close the broadband gap, define
``unserved'' as those locations lacking service delivered through
either wired or wireless technology. Accurate broadband maps are needed
that take into consideration areas with already committed build plans
so that support is targeted where it is needed.
Congress can also reduce barriers to deployment by creating
incentives for local jurisdictions who are able to demonstrate 5G and
broadband readiness through siting-friendly rules such as the adoption
of efficient, simplified processes, and cost-based access to the right
of way. WIA supports a priority for funding to communities that
demonstrate 5G and broadband readiness by implementing streamlined and
cost-based access to the rights-of-way. Importantly, Congress can
maximize the value of broadband investments, address concerns of city
leaders about aesthetics and disruption to communities, reduce
environmental impact, and speed deployment by prioritizing the use of
existing infrastructure. Policies, like those Congress approved in Sec.
6409 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 to
prioritize the use of existing infrastructure, and dig once policies
that are widely supported for fiber deployment, are prime examples.
This ensures that networks can be deployed expeditiously while
recipients are held accountable for outcomes.
Affordability: As the technological capabilities of mobile devices
continue to grow to rival traditional computers, many users have
decided to prioritize their mobile connections over fixed.\50\ This
choice is most clear among rural and low-income Americans, the majority
of individuals who identify as ``smartphone only users.'' \51\ In rural
America, nearly one in five residents has decided to rely solely on
their wireless devices for broadband, while over one in four Americans
who make less than thirty thousand dollars a year have made the switch
to smartphone only; the same is true for those that have a high school
degree or less.\52\ All of these groups, and all Americans, would
benefit from an upgrade to 5G to support their choice. If FTTH is the
only choice, millions of rural Americans would need to spend an
additional $75 a month, or more, for a wireline connection that they
already decided they do not want or cannot afford.
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\50\ Monica Anderson, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2019,
Pew Research Ctr. (June 13, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/
internet/2019/06/13/mobile-technology-and-home-broadband-2019/ (stating
45 percent of non-broadband users said they do not have a connection at
home because their smartphone meets all of their online needs).
\51\ Andrew Perrin, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2021, Pew
Research Ctr. (June 3, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2021/06/03/mobile-technology-and-home-broadband-2021/ (providing a
demographic breakdown of smartphone only users).
\52\ Id.
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Congress should build on steps it has taken in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2021 that established an Emergency Broadband
Connectivity Fund of $3.2 billion to help Americans afford Internet
service during the pandemic. It should fund a permanent affordability
support program with sufficient subsidies to ensure low-income families
obtain quality broadband. Saddling consumers with the need to purchase
a new wireline service on top of their smartphone connection could
unnecessarily add to the burden of large ongoing Federal subsidies
because few low-income consumers are willing to give up their
smartphone and the mobility it provides.
Cost efficiency: Technological flexibility can also provide
consumers with the most megabits for the taxpayer dollar. The wireless
industry is committed to closing the digital divide and has an
indispensable role to play. Fiber is critical, yet it is one of many
tools for closing the digital divide. The last mile--or last 10 miles
in some cases in rural America--is most costly to provide with fiber,
when simply connecting fiber to a tower for mobile or fixed wireless
can cover many premises for a fraction of the cost and in a much
shorter time. To provide connectivity to all communities, every
broadband technology can contribute based on a community's specific
needs and the capabilities of existing providers.
Wireless broadband is an economically efficient solution that must
be considered as part of the plan. When considering barriers to
deployment, including the capital expenditure required to reach each
new subscriber, time to market, and physical limitations of deploying
infrastructure across diverse terrains, wireless service that covers
long distances in some cases makes more sense than a home-by-home
approach.
Underground fiber deployments must consider a myriad of factors to
ensure the longevity of the deployment, all of which add to cost and
time for completion of a project. In coastal cities and areas prone to
flooding, deployments must work around the water table often digging
deeper to avoid water damage. In some of our hardiest states, including
Alaska, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Dakotas, frost lines can require
deployments to bury conduit six feet underground or deeper.\53\ Soil
and buried obstacles also play a role in determining speed and cost.
For example, clay is harder to excavate than other soils and may
contain rocky particles that can impinge on conduit, requiring
additional hardening.\54\ Unexpected tree roots and boulders are also
sources of significant delays.\55\ While insulated from some weather
patterns and physical disruption, underground deployments are simply
not technologically or economically feasible in all situations.
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\53\ Frost Line by State 2021, World Population Review, https://
worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/frost-lines-by-state (last
visited June 17, 2021).
\54\ The Complete Guide to Fiber to the Premises Deployment, PPC at
8 (2020), https://www.ppc-online.com/fiber-to-the-premises-ebook.
\55\ See Joe Byrne, Key Factors When Choosing Between Buried and
Aerial Fiber Deployments, PPC https://www.ppc-online.com/blog/key-
factors-when-choosing-between-buried-and-aerial-fiber-deployments (last
visited June 17, 2021).
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Workforce development: Another source of broadband deployment delay
is the lack of a sufficient skilled workforce. To help ensure a diverse
pipeline of job-ready workers ready for these jobs, Congress should
take bold action to invest in registered apprenticeships and evidence-
based job training and support.
Today, registered apprenticeship in the broadband industry is new
and would quickly need resources to scale to the level needed to
support the level of funding contemplated by Congress and the Biden
Administration. To solve this ``good problem'' from creating high-wage,
high-skilled jobs, and to increase the efficiency, equity, and success
of a broadband infrastructure investment, a corresponding initiative is
needed to develop and diversify the broadband workforce through
additional support for registered apprenticeships and the educational
and training system. An immediate expansion of education and skills
training will create a pipeline for broadband infrastructure jobs in a
growing industry of the future.
Conclusion
Every community, regardless of size, location, or geography
deserves broadband service. Congress has an extraordinary opportunity
to expand digital inclusion and take dramatic steps to bridge the
digital divide. Industry and the government must step up to meet this
moment. This is no small task and will take every tool available. We
must ensure the rapid deployment of networks that can meet consumer
demands. We must ensure that these networks work in all scenarios from
natural disasters to pandemics.
While no technology alone will meet all these needs, wireless
broadband is a key component of a resilient broadband network. With its
distributed architecture, wireless broadband is inherently resistant to
disruption; if one node goes down, traffic is rerouted to nearby
antennas. Further, during times of disaster, we turn to wireless assets
to help supplement telecommunications and broadband services, keeping
people informed, allowing them to contact emergency services, and
allowing first responders to coordinate efforts. Beyond today, wireless
technology, particularly 5G, will allow for revolutionary, and life-
saving applications in disaster preparedness and response. These
applications will directly contribute to U.S. commitments to mitigate
climate change through increasing energy efficiency and will mitigate
the frequency and severity of future disasters. Deploying this
technology will also create millions of jobs across the country, many
of which will not require a college degree. These jobs will elevate
individuals as they build their own communities, providing
opportunities and services that will benefit everyone. Congress can
maximize this potential with support for registered apprenticeships and
training for the telecommunications workforce.
Realizing these benefits and bridging the digital divide will take
continued, dedicated efforts by the entire telecommunications industry
and the Federal government. WIA and its members stand ready to deliver.
Wireless broadband helps to drive America's innovation economy and
fuels the Nation's economic future. The U.S. has always been the global
leader in wireless innovation. Broadband infrastructure legislation
offers a unique opportunity to increase network resiliency if Congress
designs the program with sufficient flexibility to address it and other
Congressional priorities such as combatting climate change.
That is why the leadership of this Subcommittee is so critical. WIA
appreciates the opportunity to partner with the Subcommittee in
addressing these important issues. We are deeply grateful for the
bipartisan recognition of the importance of infrastructure by this
Subcommittee, by Congress, by the FCC, and the Biden Administration.
All have implemented policies to promote wireless broadband deployment,
and all are working to build on recent successes.
Thank you again, Chairman Lujan and Ranking Member Thune, for
holding this hearing and inviting me to testify. I look forward to
continuing to work with you and the rest of the Subcommittee to make
real progress on these very important issues.
Senator Lujan. Thank you so very much, Mr. Adelstein. Next,
we are going to hear from Mr. Denny Law, the Chief Executive
Officer and General Manager, from Golden West
Telecommunications from Wall, South Dakota. The floor is yours
for five minutes, sir.
STATEMENT OF DENNY LAW, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GOLDEN WEST
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COOPERATIVE, INC.
Mr. Law. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune,
members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to
participate in today's hearing on network resiliency.
For over a century, Golden West has provided communications
services to rural South Dakota. Today, we have more than 30,000
accounts, located across a geographic area, the size of
Maryland, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Delaware combined. That
is fewer than 2 customers per square mile. In addition to
robust service for consumers and businesses within our
territory, we serve several Tribal reservations, numerous
anchor institutions, including schools and hospitals, VA
facilities, and five Public Safety Answering Points.
Golden 111--The Rural Broadband Association, which
represents approximately 850 rural, community-based carriers
like Golden West that offer advanced communications services
throughout the most sparsely populated areas of the Nation. We
operate in deeply rural markets where the cost of deploying and
operating networks is high and a tailored approach to managing
risk and resiliency, as necessary, to create sustainable
networks.
The first step to achieving resilient and reliable
communications services begins with the network infrastructure.
Golden West technology infrastructure is designed with
resiliency in mind, including the construction of hardened
buildings to withstand extreme weather conditions, large banks
of redundant batteries in every network office, that are also
backed up by standby generators.
Golden West has also invested in physically diverse fiber
routes, connecting to each of our network offices, coupled with
redundant electronics with multiple connections to prevent
large numbers of customers from being isolated from Golden
West's local networks. We have also established connections to
statewide fiber networks that provide middle mile transport and
added redundant connections to separate Internet points of
presence where possible.
To mitigate the cost of purchasing this capacity from
larger regional or national carriers, SDN Communications--an
entity owned by Golden West--and a number of other small
community-based providers in South Dakota enables connectivity
between rural South Dakota and the rest of the world. SDN was
created 30 years ago to connect rural markets to better long
distance telephone service. And today, it is because of SDN's
50,000-mile fiber network, that Golden West customers do not
get isolated from the world in the event of a fiber cut, or a
single network disruption.
Deployment of cheaper technologies than fiber, often sounds
attractive in rural markets. But it comes at a different kind
of cost. Technology that causes connectivity to be spotty when
it rains or snows, suffers from degradation or complete
shutdown in extreme temperatures, and counters line of sight
issues with seasonal foliage growth, or have network components
exposed to the elements, may be less expensive to install
initially.
But those technologies often come with a higher operating
cost over time, and lack the kind of reliability for essential
functions, which could leave consumers without the ability to
dial 911 during a hurricane, because the underlying network
does not perform reliably in the rain.
Another leading threat to network resiliency involves
security. Each day, our networks can face the same security
threats and denial of service attacks as the larger national
broadband providers. To help mitigate those risks, Golden West,
again, partnered with SDN to collectively deploy distributed
denial of service protection across our networks.
Knowing where to monitor, or take steps to manage risk on a
network, can be the hardest part for many smaller providers. To
support those efforts, NTCA created Cybershare which, among
other things, is an information sharing center that provides
access to daily threat indicators and a weekly technical
analysis for small broadband providers, like Golden West.
Finally, while high cost is the most imposing obstacle to
deploying and maintaining reliable broadband in rural areas,
other barriers can affect the ability to achieve resiliency,
redundancy, and security objectives, including permitting
delays or other access issues, like crossing railroads, supply
chain shortages for critical communications equipment such as
fiber or customer premise equipment, and shortages of skilled
telecommunications workers, that help all providers deploy or
repair networks.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, thank you for this
opportunity to testify today and I look forward to your
questions later.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Law follows:]
Prepared Statement of Denny Law, Chief Executive Officer, Golden West
Telecommunications Cooperative, Inc.
Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's
hearing focused on building resilient networks.
I am Denny Law, Chief Executive Officer of Golden West
Telecommunications Cooperative, Inc. in Wall, South Dakota. For over a
century, Golden West and its subsidiaries have provided communications
services to rural South Dakota, starting in 1916 with the stringing of
a telephone line along fence posts. Today, Golden West has more than
30,000 accounts, including 29,000 broadband subscribers and nearly
9,000 cable television customers. Our customers are located across
24,500 square miles--an area approximately the size of Maryland, New
Jersey, Connecticut, and Delaware combined--which equates to fewer than
2 customers per square mile. In addition to robust service for
consumers and businesses within our territory, we serve numerous anchor
institutions, including 73 K-12 schools, 62 health clinics and
hospitals, 20 libraries, five Veterans Administration facilities, and
five Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs).
Golden West is a member of NTCA--The Rural Broadband Association
(NTCA), which represents approximately 850 rural, community-based
carriers like Golden West that offer advanced communications services
throughout the most sparsely populated areas of the Nation. All NTCA
members are fixed voice and broadband providers, and many members also
provide mobile, video, and other communications-related services in
their communities. Operators like those in NTCA's membership serve less
than five percent of the population of the United States but cover
about one third of its landmass. We operate in rural areas left behind
decades ago when networks were first being built out by other service
providers because the markets were too sparsely populated, too high
cost, or just too difficult to serve in terms of terrain. In the vast
majority of these rural areas, companies like Golden West are the only
full-service fixed communications networks available.
Despite the challenges of distance and density, Golden West and its
fellow small broadband providers have led the charge in deploying
advanced communications infrastructure that responds to consumer and
business demands and connects rural America with the rest of the world.
In rural America, broadband infrastructure enables economic development
and job creation not only in agriculture, but for any other industry or
enterprise that requires advanced connections to operate in today's
economy. Yet those networks need to keep pace with consumer demand and
provide reliable connections that deliver consistent performance for
users when they depend on those services the most. Throughout the
pandemic, as Americans worked and learned from home, consumers drove up
network bandwidth usage and demand. Golden West and other small rural
operators were able to meet those demands thanks to years of network
investments and upgrades in robust and reliable networks.
Yet, for all our progress to date, we still have more work to do in
deploying and operating this critical infrastructure, as too many rural
consumers still lack sufficient connectivity altogether. And, even
where networks exist, operators face the challenges of: (1) sustaining
and upgrading them to keep pace with consumer demand; (2) delivering
affordable services that can be relied upon both for everyday functions
that have become increasingly important during the pandemic; (3)
ensuring users have access to them in the face of emergencies that may
range from extreme heat or cold to wildfires, earthquakes, or other
natural disasters; and (4) taking reasonable steps to manage risk and
promote the security of networks from intrusions of all kinds.
In short, network deployment is an essential goal and a condition
precedent to achieving national connectivity objectives, which includes
making sure that these networks are there for consumers in their times
of greatest need. But the job is not done when the network is built, as
community-based providers like Golden West and other smaller rural
broadband providers know all too well. Living in the communities we
serve, we can see firsthand how the decisions we make and the measures
we implement affect our neighbors, friends, and family, and we
therefore have substantial incentive to do what we can to make sure
they have access to the best possible communications services. At the
same time, however, the fact is that we operate in deeply rural markets
where the costs of deploying and operating networks can be higher, and
a tailored approach to managing risk, resiliency, and redundancy is
necessary to create sustainable networks that provide services
customers can afford. In this testimony I will provide examples of the
kinds of measures we take--starting with network architecture and
deployment and continuing through ongoing operations--to promote the
availability of robust and reliable communications services for our
users.
Network Resiliency Starts with Smart Network Investment
As an initial matter, networks must address the rising demand of
consumers' bandwidth needs and be easily scalable to meet that demand.
The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the essential nature of high-
speed download and upload connectivity for every American, whether at
work or at home. For years, small rural community-based providers like
Golden West have seen that high-speed broadband facilitates so much
more than just downstream applications like streaming video
entertainment, and the value of these other uses (and a network capable
of supporting them) have been recognized and realized more widely now
during the pandemic. Indeed, many Americans now realize the importance
of robust broadband in connecting with a doctor without traveling to
the medical office or hospital and for students to continue their
education even when the classroom is hundreds of miles away or just
right down the street but closed. A high-capacity network capable of
handling significant upload speeds is also critical for people to
continue receiving paychecks by working remotely using secure and
bandwidth-intensive virtual private networks. Additionally higher
upload speeds enable better two-way capability and network performance
that not only allows us to video conference during the work day, but to
maintain social interactions with friends, family, and other loved
ones.
A robust network is also important of course to accommodate the
needs of public safety--and the public served by first responders and
other professionals in the case of emergencies. Deployment of cheaper
technologies often sounds attractive in rural markets, but it comes at
a different kind of cost. Connectivity that is spotty when it rains,
unreliable when it snows, suffers from degradation or complete shutdown
in higher or lower temperatures, encounters line-of-sight issues when
foliage grows back on trees, or has network components exposed to the
elements may be less expensive to install initially, but these
technologies often come with higher operating costs over time, are
often unable to keep pace with ever-escalating consumer demand, and
lack the kind of reliability that one wants for the conduct of everyday
life such as telework, remote learning, or telemedicine, and especially
in the case of an emergency. In short, no one wants to be in the
position of being unable to access 911 in the event of a hurricane
because the underlying network does not perform reliably in the rain.
Golden West and other small rural broadband providers have used a
variety of methods over the years to deploy service and, as a result,
have gained first-hand experience with the differing capabilities and
shortcomings of certain technologies. As we look to future needs of our
customers and our communities, we have taken aggressive steps to focus
on anticipated increases in usage and make network choices that will
give our communities that they can rely upon for essential functions
such as working or learning from home--and to reach public safety or
others in the event of emergencies. Put plainly, we are investing in
more and more fiber technology to meet that demand. Golden West has
invested in physically-diverse fiber routes connecting to each Golden
West network office, coupled with redundant electronics with multiple
connections to the network to prevent large numbers of customers from
being isolated from Golden West's local network.
In addition to continuing to deploy ``last mile'' fiber as fast as
we can where we can, we have taken measures to establish robust and
reliable connections to statewide fiber networks that provide ``middle
mile transport'' between our local communities and the rest of the
world, and by adding redundant connections to separate Internet points-
of-presence where possible. SDN Communications, an entity owned by
Golden West and a number of other small community-based providers in
South Dakota, was created 30 years ago to help connect rural markets to
better long distance telephone service and today it has a 50,000-mile
fiber network that enables more robust broadband data connectivity
between rural South Dakota and the rest of the world. In partnership
with SDN, Golden West maintains multiple connections to the Internet
backbone to ensure Golden West customers do not get isolated from the
world in the event of a fiber cut or single network disruption.
Efforts to deploy more robust and resilient networks, however, come
at a cost. Whether we are talking about wired or wireless networks,
building redundancy and greater resiliency into networks--especially in
rural areas where distances are great and densities are low--can be a
challenge. For example, redundancy in a wireless network translates to
placement of more antennas or towers and more backhaul capacity such as
fiber. Similarly, burying fiber provides relatively greater resiliency
and security for both wired connections themselves and for the wireless
services that depend upon that fiber foundation. Indeed, one must not
overlook how critical a fiber foundation is to every kind of
communications technology--wired or wireless. Fiber not only offers the
most efficient and economical means of meeting consumer demand well
into the future,\1\ but it also is essential to our Nation's 5G future.
As the Wireless Infrastructure Association aptly captured in a report
last year, ``The buzz around 5G focuses on the wireless aspect of the
technology. However, the connectivity it advances is only made possible
by extremely dense fiber networks.'' \2\
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\1\ See BROADBAND TODAY: Rural America's Critical Connection,
Foundation for Rural Service (Mar. 8, 2021) (``BROADBAND TODAY''),
available at: https://www.ntca.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021-
02/Rural%20America%27s%20Critical%20Connection%20--%20FRS%20
White%20Paper.pdf.
\2\ Fiber, An Essential Facet of the Connected Community, WIA
Innovation & Technology Council (Jul. 22, 2020), p. 4, available at:
https://wia.org/wp-content/uploads/Fiber-v3-1.pdf.
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But burying wires to fulfill the needs of users for better and more
reliable wired and wireless connections alike can often be more costly
than if one were to string aerial fiber on poles--and in certain parts
of the country, it is difficult to impossible at this point to bury
fiber for a variety of logistical, environmental, and economic reasons.
Similarly, procuring redundant connections to distant peering points
hundreds if not thousands of miles away for Internet connectivity is
expensive, and it is a cost that is not entirely under our control as
many smaller providers must purchase such capacity from larger regional
or national operators. In a number of rural states, smaller operators
have taken steps to mitigate such costs by banding together to form
statewide fiber networks; as noted above, and Golden West is proud to
be a member of SDN Communications one of the earliest such statewide
collaborative ventures that today provides robust connections to
multiple Tier 1 Internet backbone providers. Nonetheless, even as we
have taken these great strides to become more efficient while putting
into place such redundancy and promoting the reliability of our
connections to the rest of the world, we still are forced to rely
upon--and pay--the Tier 1 operators.
Local providers like Golden West are well-positioned to assess the
balance needed in investment strategies and have sound incentives to do
all they reasonably can to ensure the communities they serve have
services they can depend upon. Our commitment can be seen in the
efforts we have made to deploy the best possible networks. Indeed, as
NTCA's annual broadband survey confirms year after year, small
community-based providers like Golden West have consistently led the
charge in rural broadband deployment, with the most recent report
indicating that nearly two-thirds of NTCA members' rural customers have
access to fiber-to-the-premises connectivity and speeds in excess of
100 Mbps. Golden West is in the midst of a multi-year upgrade to
replace our decades-old copper network with fiber optics. With more
than 14,000 network route miles within South Dakota, at the end of 2021
we will have successfully completed 70 percent of the copper network
replacement with fiber optic service. This is the kind of connectivity
that provides a reliable foundation for users when emergencies strike
and a platform for community development and sustainability in rural
areas that face many other challenges as well.
Nonetheless, because of the higher costs of operating in rural
areas, there is a need for governmental support to make the business
case work and ultimately to support the kinds of networks that will
provide greater resiliency, reliability, redundancy, and capability for
rural users. Smaller rural telecom providers like Golden West have long
leveraged support from the High-Cost Universal Service Fund (USF)
overseen by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Rural
Utilities Service (RUS) loans through the Department of Agriculture in
concert to deploy advanced telecommunications services in the most
rural areas of the United States. Many smaller providers have
successfully leveraged a mix of funds from these programs and private
investment to deploy robust broadband to millions of homes, businesses,
farms, and anchor institutions including public safety entities. While
RUS lending programs have helped to finance the substantial upfront
costs of network deployment, the USF High-Cost Fund helps make the
business case for construction and sustains ongoing operations at
affordable rates. More specifically, USF by law aims to ensure
``reasonably comparable'' services are available at ``reasonably
comparable'' rates.
Both the RUS loan programs and the FCC's USF programs are therefore
critical to the deployment of the best possible networks in rural areas
that meet the objectives of this Subcommittee and other policymakers
when it comes to network performance and reliability. It is worth
noting, however, that these programs are limited in their resources.
Indeed, at times over the past decade, we have seen caps and even cuts
in support enacted to the FCC programs in particular that have
undermined, rather than furthered, the goal of deploying more robust
and reliable networks more deeply into rural areas. In fact, we even
saw for a time some policies that encouraged providers not to invest in
network deployment as rapidly or that penalized perceived ``gold-
plating'' of networks that would be more robust and reliable--these
caps and constraints certainly did not place value on the notion of
redundant connections or help in spurring their deployment. In recent
years, however, steps have been taken to enhance and address such
concerns in these programs, but the fundamental point remains--rural
broadband is not easy, it faces challenges of distance and density that
make it higher cost than deploying and operating networks in an urban
or suburban area, and without sufficient and predictable support, the
goal of promoting resilient and redundant networks in rural American
will be far more difficult to achieve.
Ongoing Efforts to Promote Resilient, Reliable, and More Secure
Networks
Often, the primary focus in national broadband discussions is on
the one-time act of building networks while insufficient attention is
paid to what comes next. Once built, networks must be maintained,
upgraded, and made useful over their entire lives, or those investment
could be wasted or ultimately become incapable of meeting consumer
demands whether in everyday life or in the context of an emergency.
Services must be delivered over that infrastructure on an ongoing
basis, at rates that are affordable enough for consumers to make good
use of them and at consistent and reliable levels of performance.
Maintenance must be performed, customer calls must be answered,
``middle mile'' capacity to reach distant Internet points of presence
must be procured, and upgrades must be made to facilities and
electronics to enable services to keep pace with consumer demand and
business needs. Constant concerns arise too in the form of bad weather,
natural disasters, and third-party risks that make it important both to
make sound choices in what kinds of networks to deploy in the first
instance and then how those networks will be managed over time.
All of this bears witness to the fact that as policymakers consider
how best to promote broadband access going forward, we need to consider
not only current demand, but also reliability and future projections
for performance. When being built--or being funded--networks must
account for potential surges or shifts in utilization and how demands
on networks continue to increase at astounding rates. The pandemic has
certainly highlighted the need for such advance planning and
forethought, with a recent report indicating that broadband providers
saw a 40 percent increase in broadband usage between the end of 2019
and 2020 and estimating that around 30 percent of the modern workforce
could be working from home multiple days a week by as soon as the end
of 2021, creating a permanent demand for higher speeds and upload
capacity.\3\ Similarly, OpenVault has found that upstream broadband
that upstream broadband traffic increased by 63 percent from December
2019 to December 2020,\4\ underscoring the shifts in network
utilization and the need for reliable networks that will deliver
consistent performance for those working, learning, or seeking medical
assistance from home. Golden West's network usage during the pandemic
experienced dramatic changes. In the span of just 90 days from January
2020 to April 2020, Golden West's overall network usage increased by 25
percent, and the bandwidth usage for upstream alone increased by 41
percent in that time. Golden West's network was able to withstand the
sudden and unpredicted increase in usage and our customers were able to
seamlessly transition to their remote work and education activities.
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\3\ BROADBAND TODAY, pp. 2, 15.
\4\ Dan O'Shea, Pandemic Drove Upstream Broadband Traffic Boom:
OpenVault, Fierce Telecom (April 1, 2021, 12:46 PM), https://
www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/pandemic-drove-upstream-broadband-
traffic-boom-openvault.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fortunately, networks like those built by Golden West, SDN, and
other providers based in rural America were architected to meet such
demands brought on by shifting consumer and business usage. Indeed, as
NTCA's annual broadband survey confirms year after year, NTCA members
have led the charge in rural broadband deployment, with the most recent
report indicating that nearly two-thirds of their rural customers have
access to fiber-to-the-premises connectivity and speeds in excess of
100 Mbps. Throughout the pandemic, NTCA members reported that their
networks performed as designed, without congestion or disruption
despite unprecedented increases in demand.
Continued growth in demand is expected to increase significantly in
coming years, such that peak demand for a family of four is projected
to exceed 400 Mbps symmetric in just seven years, with bandwidth needs
accelerating in the years after that.\5\ These imminent increases are
anticipated due to an array of new technologies that hold substantial
promise for consumers and businesses alike, such as greatly improved
virtual education, telemedicine, agriculture, business, security, and
entertainment. Golden West submits that federally funded broadband
programs should therefore focus on the consumer experience and the
long-term implications for rural communities by requiring the
deployment of networks that in a decade or more will still deliver
reliable and resilient services that consumers can depend upon. More
specifically, we believe that fiber represents the best choice of
network technologies to promote reliability in meeting these demands
and ensuring that users have reliable access to public safety and other
essential services as well. We also support an increase in the minimum
broadband deployment performance benchmark to at least a symmetrical
speed of 100 Mbps/100 Mbps to ensure that federally supported networks
will meet the future needs of consumers. Any funding programs going
forward should generally aim to ensure that new deployments perform at
least at this speed threshold.
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\5\ See Comments of The Fiber Broadband Association, GN Docket No.
20-269 (fil. Sep. 18, 2020), pp. 9-10.
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The same reasoning with respect to ``planning ahead'' and not
treating the job as done once the network is built in the first
instance follows with respect to promoting network reliability,
resiliency, and security. Achieving these objectives in more rural
areas turns not just upon the kind of network built--although that is
certainly an important factor for the reasons discussed above--but also
on the efforts made to operate and upgrade that network over time.
Golden West's technology infrastructure is designed with resiliency in
mind, including the construction of hardened buildings to withstand
extreme weather conditions and large banks of redundant batteries in
every network office that are also backed up by standby generators. For
all of our customers that are served directly by fiber optics, Golden
West installs UPS batteries at customer's homes and businesses to
ensure performance during limited power interruptions.
Golden West and smaller broadband providers also take seriously
network security. On a daily basis, our networks can face the same
security threats of intrusion and denial of service attacks as the
larger, nationally known broadband providers. As one example of the
measures we take to help mitigate these risks, Golden West has
partnered with SDN Communications and its other members to collectively
deploy Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection across our
respective networks. More broadly, smaller rural network owners again
have sound incentives to take reasonable steps to secure their
operations and manage risks given that any threats to their networks
affect the communities in which they live and work--any incidents can
affect their own homes and their friends, family, and neighbors. The
hardest part for many smaller providers can simply be monitoring
threats and taking reasonable steps to manage risk. To enable and
empower such efforts, NTCA has worked with a number of members and
collaborated with other stakeholders in a variety of ways to raise
awareness of cybersecurity issues and to provide tools and actionable
information to members regarding cyber risks. Such efforts include
participation on the Executive Committee of the Communications Sector
Coordinating Council and co-chairing of the Small and Medium-Size
Business Working Group organized under the Information and
Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force. NTCA
also hosts an annual Cyber Summit for members and other small broadband
providers that often includes presenters from key agencies such as the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Finally, NTCA created
CyberShare: The Small Broadband Provider Information Sharing and
Analysis Center, a member of the National Council of Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers, that among other things provides access
to daily threat indicators curated for smaller operators' needs along
with weekly technical analysis and bi-monthly calls in which providers
can share experiences and resources.
It is worth noting again, however, that these efforts do not come
at a small cost in rural America. As noted earlier, Golden West's
serving area is 24,500 square miles--roughly equal in scale to
Maryland, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Delaware combined. Dispatching
technicians to address network resiliency or redundancy needs across
such a wide swath of rural America is not easy, and recovering the
costs of doing so from 30,000 customers stretched across this vast
terrain would render services unaffordable. For this reason, I must
emphasize again the significance of predictable and sufficient ongoing
USF support for smaller operators--without such resources, efforts to
promote greater resiliency, redundancy, and security in rural networks
will run headfirst into the economic realities of operating in areas
where there are at most a handful of customers per square mile.
Other Considerations
While high costs are perhaps the most imposing obstacle to
deploying and maintaining reliable broadband in rural areas, other
barriers can affect the ability to achieve resiliency, redundancy, and
security objectives. Several of these are discussed below.
Permitting Delays
Infrastructure investment depends on prompt acquisition or receipt
of permissions to build networks. Roadblocks, delays, and increased
costs associated with permitting and approval processes are
particularly problematic for Golden West and other NTCA members, each
of which is a small business that operates only in rural areas where
construction projects are undertaken over wide swaths of land. The time
involved in obtaining construction permits can take substantial amounts
of time, undermining the ability to plan for and deploy broadband
infrastructure--especially in those areas of the country with shorter
construction seasons due to winter temperatures that freeze the soil
and prevent any excavation for burying fiber. Additionally, in some
areas of the country, obtaining reasonable terms and conditions for
attaching network facilities to poles that are owned and operated by
other entities or for installing fiber near or under railroad crossings
can result in long delays and costly fees charged to providers seeking
to build out networks to rural communities lacking service. These can
all affect both the timing for and economics of deploying resilient
networks, and redundant facilities in particular.
Navigating complicated application and review processes within
individual Federal land-managing and property-managing agencies can be
burdensome for any network provider, but particularly the smaller
network operators that serve the most rural portions of the country.
The lack of coordination and standardization in application and
approval processes across Federal agencies further complicates the
deployment of broadband infrastructure. Congress should look to
implement the recommendations of the FCC's Broadband Deployment
Advisory Committee's Streamlining Federal Siting Working Group final
report issued in January 2018.\6\ NTCA participated in the development
of these recommendations, which address streamlining of environmental
and historical reviews and application review periods, among other
pertinent recommendations in removing further regulatory barriers to
broadband deployment. Such measures will be critical to the deployment
and sustainability of wired and wireless networks alike, all of which
rely in many rural areas upon robust fiber backbones that must often
traverse Federal lands.
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\6\ Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee, Streamlining Federal
Siting Working Group, Final Report, Federal Communications Commission,
(Jan. 23-24, 2018), available at: https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/
files/bdac-federalsiting-01232018.pdf.
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Addressing Supply Chain Concerns
In recent years, Congress has provided significant funding through
several agencies to deploy broadband infrastructure with the goal of
bridging the digital divide. However, as broadband providers construct
these networks, it is important to monitor the status of the
communications supply chain. Many have been rightly focused on supply
chain security in recent years--but there is a looming concern about
supply chain resiliency as well, and this has the potential to
undermine national objectives to deploy the best possible networks to
as many Americans as possible in the coming years.
Specifically, NTCA members are beginning to report significant
backlogs for critical communications equipment like fiber, routers,
antennas, network terminals, and customer premise equipment--ranging
from several weeks to more than one year. As an example, Golden West is
now finalizing our 2022 network and fiber optic buildout plans. As
recently as last week, our fiber optic suppliers have indicated the
delivery date for fiber-optics is 42 to 65 weeks out. Delays in
production of necessary equipment appear to be related to both
increased demand for broadband investment as well as ongoing effects of
the pandemic. To ensure that existing and new infrastructure
initiatives are as successful as possible in responding to consumer
needs and demands, we believe it is important that the Federal
government work closely and directly with manufacturers, distributors,
and other suppliers to avoid disruptions in the communications supply
chain. For these reasons, while there has been a great deal of focus on
the security of our supply chains, we strongly encourage Congress to
consider supply chain resiliency as a key component of delivering on
national broadband objectives.
Workforce Development
We also recommend Congress help in the development of a skilled
telecommunications workforce that can help providers of all sizes
deploy robust networks and help to keep them resilient and more secure.
Earlier this year, NTCA and a number of other telecommunications
associations sent a letter to the White House regarding how the United
States currently faces a shortfall of skilled workers needed to ensure
the deployment of robust fiber, mobile, and fixed wireless networks. A
concerted effort by industry and government will likely be needed to
develop a skilled workforce able to deploy next generation wired and
wireless networks. To develop the telecommunications jobs needed,
Congress could help by bolstering the capabilities of institutions of
higher education and other institutions and providing support for
employers to expand registered apprenticeships and associated technical
instruction and certification costs. Several legislative proposals,
including Senator Thune's Telecommunications Skilled Workforce Act,
which would establish an interagency working group to develop
telecommunications industry workforce solutions, or Senators Wicker and
Sinema's Improving Minority Participation and Careers in
Telecommunications Act to address this need by awarding grants to
Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Tribal Colleges and
Universities for workforce training, could go a long way in achieving
this goal. We cannot build the networks of tomorrow without a skilled
and diverse workforce today.
Conclusion
Community-based providers like Golden West are deeply committed to
the customers we serve and, given our experience and success in serving
the most rural areas, we are critical components of any strategy
seeking to achieve the Nation's broadband goals. We look forward to
working with policymakers and other stakeholders to ensure that all
Americans have access to sustainable and affordable networks that
successfully manage risk, resiliency, and redundancy, so that those
services are available when needed the most.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and for the
Subcommittee's commitment to broadband infrastructure investment in
rural America.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Law, and it is very
impressive what you all have built out there, as well. And
again, thank you so much for being with us today.
Next, we are going to hear from Mr. Harold Feld, who is the
Senior Vice President with Public Knowledge, here in
Washington, DC. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HAROLD FELD, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE
Mr. Feld. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune.
Thank you for inviting me to testify today on this important
subject.
As our economy and society have gone digital, our
dependence on our communications networks has increased
exponentially. Some of us may remember a time growing up, when
the whole family shared a single telephone line. Today, nearly
all of us have cell phones, sometimes more than one. And our
digital communication does not stop there. At any given time,
parents may be working remotely, while their children attend
different virtual classrooms. Even our houses and devices may
depend on constant connection with the Internet to function
properly.
But as our dependence on constant connectivity has grown,
our networks have become more fragile. Those who grew up with
the one telephone line to the home, will remember that it
worked regularly and reliably, every time you called someone.
Even in a blackout, as long as the copper lines remained
connected, you could call family to make sure everyone was all
right, call 911 if you had an emergency, and call the power
company to ask how long until the power came back on.
Today, we can wake up on a sunny day to discover that a cut
fiber cable, or misconfigured router, has cutoff everything
from our phone service to our video streams. An electric
blackout, caused by a brutal heatwave, can now knock out
communications when people desperately need to reach 911. A
hurricane or wildfire can shut down phone and Internet in a
geographic region for weeks, or even months. This is especially
true for island communities and other geographically isolate
communities, as we saw not only after Maria, but also after
Sandy and Katrina.
How did this happen? Briefly, our rules have not kept pace
with changes in technology. The traditional copper network was
reliable because we chose to make it reliable. We have not made
this choice for our current IP based and mobile networks. To
the contrary, our aggressive regulation has left us
increasingly unable to address the threat of our fragile
network ecosystem.
The FCC has systemically divested itself of its authority
to take the necessary leadership role by refusing to clarify
the regulatory status of interconnected voiceover IP carriers,
and by reclassifying broadband as a Title I information
service. The FCC has rolled back its cybersecurity initiatives,
at times claiming that it lacks authority to even consider
cybersecurity.
As a GAO report published last April 29 found, the FCC's
role in restoring telecommunications networks remains unclear.
This can create confusion in post-disaster situations over how
to allocate resources, such as generators and fuel.
Congress alone can resolve this confusion by creating clear
priorities and clear lines of authority. None of this means
returning to the days of monopoly network. To the contrary,
competition among networks creates much needed redundancy. In
small and rural markets that cannot support competition, we
should be willing to invest public money to create the needed
level of redundancy.
Congress has a tremendous opportunity to resolve these
issues and restore resilience and reliability to our critical
communications infrastructure. Both our wireline and wireless
networks are undergoing significant upgrades. Legacy carriers
are retiring their copper networks. Wireless providers are
shutting off their 3G networks and deploying 5G.
States and Congress are currently debating how to close the
digital divide and bring affordable high-speed broadband to all
Americans. Legislation providing the necessary reliability
framework and resources can ensure that these new networks will
be resilient, reliable, redundant, and sustainable.
My written testimony includes multiple recommendations for
Congressional action. To highlight the most important here--
first, require the FCC to make outage data publicly available
and to publish report after every major outage. Both markets
and policymakers need information and, right now, there is a
dearth of that in the market.
Clearly empower and require the FCC, State governments, and
Tribal governments to make rules and set standards for
communications network reliability, including onsite power
backup, and backup power in the home. Prioritize restoration of
communications networks and establish agreed upon metrics to
measure reliability.
Fund network upgrades to improve reliability and permit
governments to make communications assets, such as fiber
inspection available to avert outages and to assist network
recovery.
To conclude, network resilience does not happen on its own.
When something is everyone's general responsibility, it is no
one's actual responsibility. We must upgrade our rules as we
upgrade our networks to provide to all Americans,
communications networks that will be there whenever we need
them, whatever the emergency.
Thank you and I am happy to take any questions, at this
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feld follows:]
Prepared Statement of Harold Feld, Senior Vice President,
Public Knowledge
Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune: Thank you for inviting me to
testify on this important topic. My name is Harold Feld and I am the
Senior Vice President of Public Knowledge, an organization that is
celebrating its 20th anniversary this year, and is dedicated to
promoting freedom of expression, an open internet, and access to
affordable communications tools and creative works.
Consumers and businesses expect a reliable communications network.
In fact, our economy depends on it. But our very lives depend on
reaching emergency responders every time we call 911. In disasters, the
ability of first responders to communicate instantly with the public
and with each other can mean the difference between life and death.\1\
In theory, upgrading our Nation's communications networks to Internet
protocol (IP) should enhance resiliency because the protocol allows
information to be broken up into packets, transmitted across multiple
networks using different physical media (such as fiber and wireless),
and reassembled at the endpoint. The protocol also establishes and
confirms that packets are sent and received, and provides mechanisms
for adjusting to congestion.
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\1\ Lisa Krieger, 911 Failure During California Wildfire Prompt
Changes, The Mercury News, June 2019 (``When lives are at risk,
communication is critical, said Christina Taft, 25, a business student
at CSU Chico who lost her mother, Victoria, in the fire. She and her
mom received no emergency warnings. And she was unable to get help for
her mother after repeatedly calling 911. She is researching new
approaches to emergency communications--calling the proposed platform
``Victoria'' after her mother--so others don't suffer the same
fate.'').
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Instead of proving more resilient, our networks have grown
increasingly fragile. A 2018 report by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) noted that ``from 2009 to 2016, about one third of all
wireless outages reported to [the] FCC (6,002 of 18,325) were
attributed to physical incidents.'' \2\ These outages have also grown
longer in duration, especially when they are the result of a natural
disaster or involve a concurrent failure of the electric grid.\3\ In
addition to outages caused by natural disasters such as wildfires and
hurricanes, outages can occur when telephone infrastructure is targeted
in physical attacks, or from cybersecurity attacks.\4\
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\2\ GAO, Telecommunications: FCC Should Improve Monitoring of
Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network Resiliency at 10
(2018), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688927.pdf.
Accidents accounted for 75 percent of outages; natural disasters
accounted for 24 percent and manmade incidents accounted for 1 percent
of outages during the period of 2009-2016. Id. at 12.
\3\ Id. at 14-15 (From 2009 to 2016, the annual median duration of
wireless outages attributed to accidents ranged from 8 hours to 16
hours, compared to natural disasters, which ranged from 19 to 36
hours.)
\4\ Id. at 10. See also Mariah Timms, AT&T Outage: Internet, 911
Disrupted, Planes Grounded, After Nashville Explosion, Nashville
Tennessean (January 5, 2021).
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Unfortunately, outages can occur as a consequence of technical
issues and carrier neglect, as well as from external events. In 2014, a
``preventable coding error'' in a single router in Washington State
resulted in a 911 failure covering more than 11 million people.\5\ In
2020, a server failure in Georgia resulted in a multi-state blackout of
T-Mobile's network.\6\ In other places, carriers have allowed legacy
infrastructure to rot.\7\ In too many rural areas and small towns in
America, people cannot reliably reach 911 on a good day, let alone in
the wake of a catastrophe. In the 20th century, our telecommunications
infrastructure was the envy of the world. We reached 98 percent of the
population with reliable, affordable voice service. Today, we have
communities that lack basic phone service, and those who have access to
modern networks can wake even on a sunny day to find themselves cut off
from vital services for no apparent reason--and for an unknown time.
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\5\ April 2014 Multi-State 911 Outage: Cause and Impact, Report and
Recommendations, PS Docket No. 14-72 (Pub. Safety Bur. 2014), 29 FCC
Rcd 9327 (2014). Bishr Tabbaa, Busy Signal: Behind CenturyLink's 911
Service Outage of 2014, Medium, April 2019 (``On the early morning of
April 9 2014, more than 6000 calls to 911 failed to reach call centers
during a system outage that lasted more than six hours and affected a
population of 11 million U.S. residents living in 60 counties across
seven states including Washington, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Minnesota, California, Florida, and Pennsylvania. Networks owned by
CenturyLink, Verizon, and others were involved with the outage, and the
root cause of the failure was related to a software defect in the call
routing service of Intrado, a 3rd party contractor used by the
telecommunication providers.'')
\6\ Jon Brodkin, T-Mobile Screwups Cause Nationwide Outage, but FCC
isn't Punishing Carrier, ArsTechnica, Oct. 23, 2020.
\7\ Kristina Panos, DSL is Hanging on the Line as Telcos Stop
Selling New Service, Hackaday, Oct. 29, 2020. In re Technology
Transitions, Policies and Rules Governing Retirement of Copper Loops by
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Special Access for Price Cap Local
Exchange Carriers AT&T Corporation Petition for Rulemaking to Reform
Regulation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier Rates for Interstate
Special Access Services, WC Docket No. 05-25, GN Docket No. 13-5 RM-
11358 RM-10593, Report and Order, Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, and Order on Reconsideration, 30 FCC Rcd 9372 (2015) at
90-92.
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In addition to these nationwide problems, specific geographic areas
and Tribal lands may face unique challenges. As we saw in the aftermath
of Hurricane Maria, restoring service to islands presents a set of
challenges not shared by mainland communities. This includes reliance
on undersea cables, which may be damaged in a disaster, and the high
cost of transporting equipment and supplies to the impacted area.
Extreme temperatures in desert Tribal lands can range in excess of 59
degrees in a day.\8\ The stress these temperature swings put on
networks creates challenges for maintaining connectivity and requires
additional hardening to withstand these ranges. Additionally,
challenges exist in communities where terrain such as mountains or
forests may hamper post-disaster restoration efforts, or in sparsely
populated rural areas. In urban areas, it is imperative that providers
and local governments invest equally in traditionally marginalized
communities such as minority and low-income neighborhoods. Tribal
authorities need to be empowered and resourced to restore
communications on Tribal lands and to coordinate as equals with state
and Federal authorities.
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\8\ Weather and Climate Inventory National Park Service Sonoran
Desert Network, National Park Service Sonoran Desert Network at 10
(2007).
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Only Congress can remedy this situation. For reasons I will discuss
in greater detail below, it is unrealistic to expect the market to
solve this on its own. Public safety has always been regarded as a
classic case of ``market failure,'' because market forces alone cannot
ensure the optimal result. Widespread deregulation of IP-based services
at the state level and by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
has had the unintended consequence of muddying the overall authority of
the agency and the states to ensure network reliability as they
traditionally did for the analog phone network.
Additionally, post-disaster restoration of modern communications
networks requires coordination across multiple industries, Federal
agencies, and local authorities, further diluting the ability of a
single agency such as the FCC to address these resiliency problems
without new Congressional authority. A GAO report released this month
found that the failure of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
clarify the FCC's role in network restoration post-disaster
significantly impeded the restoration of communications networks in
Puerto Rico.\9\ Disaster relief has not traditionally prioritized
restoration of communications. Federal and state agencies have not
uniformly recognized the vital importance of restoring communications
to the overall disaster recovery. Restoring communications to the
public, not merely to first responders, is critically important to
modern public safety and disaster response. The Wireless Emergency
Alert System (WEAS) and the Integrated Public Alert Warning System
(IPAWS) are the most obvious examples of the need to restore
communications to the public as well as maintain communications for
first responders. But the flow of communications in an emergency is
two-way, especially as telemedicine becomes more integrated into our
healthcare system and emergency response. Restoring communications to
everyone needs to be fully integrated with disaster response efforts in
the same way restoring power or clean water is prioritized. Only a
clear mandate from Congress can make this happen across federal, state,
and local authorities.
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\9\ GAO, Telecommunications: FCC Assisted in Hurricane Maria
Network Restoration, but a Clarified Disaster Response Role and
Enhanced Communication Are Needed, available at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-21-297.pdf (Apr. 2021).
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Happily, the current transition of our national wireline networks
to all-IP systems, and our deployment of 5G wireless networks, provides
an ideal opportunity for Congress to act. As we upgrade to an all-IP
framework, retire legacy copper networks, and build out 5G, we can
upgrade our resiliency standards to take advantage of the new technical
capacities of these networks. In the days of the AT&T monopoly, we
could require the network be hardened to 99.999 percent (``five 9s'')
reliability and incorporate the added cost into the regulated rate.
That approach is simply not viable today. We enjoy the fruits of
competition enabled by IP-based services. We welcome the ability to
break up functions and aggregate functions in ways that were impossible
using older technologies, because, when done correctly, doing so
enables providers to offer better service more efficiently. IP-based
services can allow local providers to offer their communities the same
level of service as in larger markets at an affordable cost, taking
advantage of the economies of scale from a world-wide market in IP-
based and mobile equipment.
At the same time, we must recognize the inherent weaknesses of IP-
based and mobile technologies. First and foremost, these systems need
power. Not merely power to cell phone towers and network operating
centers, but power in the home. The traditional copper landline system
was self-powered. It could operate even when the electric grid went
down. Modern IP-based landlines and mobile networks are not self-
powered. Mandatory back-up power requirements must include mandatory
back-up power in people's homes as well as to cellular towers.
Moreover, the traditional landline network had clear lines of
responsibility for maintaining reliable communications. Modern systems
may be distributed among numerous vendors and network operators without
a clear understanding of the architecture. As a result, it can take
hours for a network operator to become aware of the scope and extent of
an outage, and even more time to find the source of the outage. Cheap
off-the-shelf equipment dramatically lowers cost, but may not be as
reliable as custom-built equipment.
Finally, for competition to work, markets need information. If we
want carriers to prioritize resilience and reliability, we must make it
possible for them to reap the rewards of these efforts. The current
reporting requirements treat network outage information as confidential
business information. Publicly available information, such as the
Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS), suffers from being
voluntary and from homogenizing the information to prevent comparison
in performance between carriers. As a result, subscribers who wish to
prioritize reliability over cost savings have no information on which
to make that choice. Investment in reliability will produce no reward,
and failure to invest in reliability will have no lasting consequence.
Carriers are therefore disincentivized from investing in resilience and
reliability.
Public Knowledge has several specific recommendations that address
these factors, which I provide at the end of my testimony.
I. Why Congress Must Act
In the days of traditional landline networks, Congress typically
left issues of reliability to the states, with broad support from the
FCC under Section 1 and Section 214 of the Communications Act.\10\ This
approach made sense at a time when the primary communications providers
were closely regulated monopolies with self-powered networks. But
today's universe is radically different. Some of these differences
reflect changes in technology. Some differences reflect the increased
centrality of communications in all aspects of our lives, including
disaster recovery. Some differences are the result of deliberate policy
choices that have allowed our communications infrastructure to grow
increasingly fragile. Only Congress can provide the necessary guidance,
authority, and resources to ensure that our national communications
infrastructure can reliably meet our needs--whether in times of crisis
or in our daily lives.
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\10\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 151, 214.
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It is worth noting that Congress has, in the past, stepped in where
necessary to create national policy and provide funding for
implementation. For example, as part of the 1996 Act, Congress
established the 911 system as our national emergency number, creating
needed uniformity.\11\ In 2008, Congress required all providers of
public safety access points (PSAPs) to interconnect with providers of
advanced communications services regardless of regulatory
classification.\12\ Congress has provided funding for the national
first responder network, FirstNet, as well as funding for E911.\13\
While the scope of the challenge here is significantly greater, it is
not unprecedented.
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\11\ Codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 251(e)(3).
\12\ New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-283, 122 Stat. 2620 (2008) (NET 911 Act) (amending
Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
81, 113 Stat. 1286 (1999) (Wireless 911 Act)).
\13\ Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-96, Title VI (Spectrum Act of 2012), Sec. 6409(a), 126 Stat.
156, 232-33 (Feb. 22, 2012) (codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 1455(a)).
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A. Moving From a Single, Regulated Monopoly Network to Multiple,
Competing
Networks Has Fundamentally Altered the Communications Landscape
To appreciate why our communications networks have gone from robust
and resilient to fragile and unreliable, we must briefly review how our
modern network ecosystem evolved. In the 1990s, two technologies began
mass deployment: mobile networks and the internet. These technologies
were in their infancy and therefore we expected only ``best efforts''
service. To be clear, ``best efforts'' does not mean that the providers
are cavalier about the quality of their service. Best efforts means
that customers are not entitled as a matter of right to a particular
quality of service. Instead, all the provider promises is to make best
efforts to deliver the message. For the vast majority of uses in life,
``best efforts'' is good enough. This is particularly true because IP-
based technologies are designed to deal with the lack of reliability in
best efforts networks. Packets are broken up and can move along
multiple pathways and multiple networks. Wireless networks must move
from tower to tower without dropping the call, and between networks for
roaming when the carrier lacks sufficient capacity.
This inherent flexibility not only produced cheaper service but
also allowed new, competitive offerings. It enabled carriers to break
up functions that traditionally had to be done in the ``core'' of the
network and allowed these functions to take place at the edge. For
example, in the traditional network, the local incumbent telephone
network maintained the local PSAP networks. As networks evolved, new
companies emerged capable of managing PSAPs on multiple networks.
Packet switching allowed carriers to employ multiple routes for the
same transmission instead of relying on and using a single circuit for
each call. It also allowed them to outsource routing to specialized
companies that could find the most efficient and least expensive
routes. New services, such as video and geolocation, were easy and
cheap to support when compared to the traditional regulated public
switched telephone network (PSTN). Best efforts allowed these
technologies to grow and proliferate.
These advantages also gave rise to significant issues. First,
packet-switched technologies and mobile technologies are not self-
powered. When the power goes out, communications stop. But as recently
as 2019, the Senior Director of Emergency Preparedness for California's
electric utility PG&E advised people to use landlines to communicate
during power blackouts without any apparent awareness that modern
landlines are not self-powered.\14\ Networks have grown so complex that
even the companies themselves cannot predict how a failure in one part
of the network impacts another part of the network. Nor is it clear
whether a service is being provided by the carrier itself or by a
contractor. This can make it difficult to trace the source of an
outage, or take the needed steps to resolve the outage.\15\
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\14\ Jonathan J. Cooper and Julliet Williams, Anger Grows as
Utility Struggles to Get Its Blackouts Right, Associated Press (Oct.
31, 2019) (quoting PG&E Senior Vice President for Disaster Recovery as
urging people to get blackout information ``the old fashioned way,
through calling on a landline'').
\15\ See Tali Arbel, Over 12,000 Calls to 911 Failed in AT&T
Outage, Baltimore Sun (March 23, 2017) (network configuration error);
December 27, 2018 CenturyLink Network Outage Report (single server
generating malformed packets disabled the entire network); April 2014
Outage Report supra note 5 (``preventable coding error'' in
contractor's router created multi-state 911 outage).
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As long as self-powered traditional copper networks provided a
reliable service alternative, the policy of treating competing networks
as best efforts was manageable from a public safety perspective. Any
traffic too important for best efforts went over the telephone
networks. The failure of a dial-up Internet service provider might be
an inconvenience, but hardly a matter of life and death. As long as
people kept a traditional copper landline, they could guarantee
themselves reliable access to 911 and to communications even during a
power outage.
Today, however, mobile networks and IP-based networks have long
displaced traditional copper as the primary communications networks for
the majority of the public.\16\ Indeed, it has become our national
policy to sunset the traditional PSTN and transition to an all IP-based
communications network. Additionally, the services that used to be
considered secondary to voice, such as video communications and data
transmission, have now become critically important. In 2002, when a
peering dispute between Cogent and America Online caused a severe
slowdown of Internet traffic in the D.C. region, it was an
inconvenience.\17\ Today, a comparable slowdown of Internet traffic to
the D.C. region would result in severe impacts on schools, businesses,
and government operations.
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\16\ Federal Communications Commission, Communications Marketplace
Report, GN Docket No. 20-60, 35 FCC Rcd 13188 at para. 147, Dec. 2020
(``as of December 2019, residential fixed voice connections were about
30 percent switched access and 70 percent interconnected VoIP, with
residential switched access connections comprising only 14.4 percent of
all fixed retail voice connections.'').
\17\ 'Peering' Dispute With AOL Slows Cogent Customer Access, The
Washington Post, July 2012.
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B. Deregulation and Preemption Have Eliminated Needed Oversight By the
FCC and the States
Clearly we can no longer afford to treat these networks as best
efforts. But neither Federal nor state policy has kept pace with these
changes. Despite debate over the growing use of voice-over-IP
technologies and their potential to displace the traditional telephone
network as early as 1998,\18\ and a study of the impact on resilience
from the phase out of the PSTN by the FCC's Technical Advisory
Committee in 2013,\19\ the FCC and the states have moved in the
opposite direction. The FCC has imposed no reliability obligations on
providers of broadband service--not even outage reporting requirements.
Most states have divested themselves of authority over IP-based
services.\20\ Even where states have retained (or reclaimed) authority
over reliability requirements for voice service, the FCC has repeatedly
acted to broadly preempt state authority to regulate either IP-based
voice services or mobile voice services.\21\
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\18\ Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No.
96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd 11501(1998) (Stevens Report).
\19\ Post-PSTN Public Network Resiliency: FCC Technological
Advisory Council: Communications Resiliency Working Group, Dec. 2013.
\20\ Telecommunications Oversight 2017: A State Perspective ,
National Regulatory Research Institute (2018) (``As of December 2017,
35 states had passed legislation limiting direct oversight of the
retail wireline telecommunications services provided by the large
incumbent price cap service providers. In addition, Iowa, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and Rhode Island had reduced oversight in either all or
part of the state after a formal commission examination and review
proceeding.'').
\21\ See Charter Advanced Services, LLC v. Lange, 903 F.3d 715 (8th
Cir. 2018); MN PUC v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2007).
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The FCC has imposed certain limited obligations on interconnected
VOIP providers and mobile voice providers (but not on their data or
text messaging services). Mobile voice providers and interconnected
VOIP providers must comply with the FCC's discontinuance notification
rules under Section 214 of the Communications Act. In theory, this
requires providers to demonstrate that discontinuing or impairing
service to the community will not harm the public interest.\22\
Streamlined discontinuance processes, however, allow discontinuances to
be granted with little review. Interconnected VOIP and mobile voice
providers are obligated to participate in the FCC outage reporting
system.\23\ As with all participants in the NORS and DIRS systems,
these reports are kept confidential, preventing subscribers from making
provider choices based on reliability.
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\22\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214.
\23\ See FCC Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) and Disaster
Information Reporting System (DIRS).
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Additional problems have emerged as providers of copper networks
continue to discontinue these networks. In 2017 and 2018, the FCC
relieved carriers of the bulk of their obligations to provide notice to
customers when discontinuing networks. The FCC also eliminated the
requirement to provide a comparable replacement network. Carriers may
now discontinue all legacy copper service by asserting the presence of
a broadband provider with sufficient capacity to support a VOIP product
regardless of whether the broadband provider offers facilities-based
VOIP.\24\ The FCC also eliminated customers' ability to file complaints
when carriers simply allow facilities to rot or fail to replace
facilities after a disaster. As a consequence, customers currently
served by legacy copper have no enforceable right to continued service,
let alone reliable and resilient continued service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by Removing
Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, Report and Order, Declaratory
Ruling, and Further Notice of Rulemaking, WC Docket. No. 17-84, 32 FCC
Rcd 11128 (2017); Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by
Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, Second Report and
Order, WC Docket No. 17-84, 33 FCC Rcd 5660 (2018).
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Unfortunately, the FCC is not alone in deregulating even the legacy
telephone network. The majority of the states have broadly deregulated
their legacy telephone networks as well as IP-based networks. Those
states that have investigated after deregulation have found that legacy
networks have fallen into widespread disrepair--particularly in rural
areas.\25\ Many of these rural areas lack cable systems or wireless
networks; when the legacy copper stops working, communications in these
regions simply stops. As a consequence of permitting legacy carriers to
abandon, or constructively abandon, their networks, we now have
communities in the United States that lack even basic 20th century
communications infrastructure.
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\25\ In re Commission Inquiry into the Service Quality, Customer
Service, and Billing Practices of Frontier Communications, P407, 405/
CI-18-122 (2019); see generally Telecommunications Service Carriers'
Service Quality Report.
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Finally, the FCC has taken affirmative steps to limit its own
authority over communications networks. The FCC reclassified broadband
service (fixed and mobile) as a Title I service in 2017, abandoning the
agency's traditional authority to require network resilience and
reliability. Given the 2017 Order's elimination of Section 706 (47
U.S.C. 1302) as an alternative source of authority over broadband, and
general determination that it lacks significant ancillary authority
over broadband, it is unclear whether the FCC could even require
broadband networks to provide mandatory outage reports.
It is also uncertain to what extent the FCC will retain authority
over interconnected VOIP providers or mobile providers. The FCC has
declined to classify interconnected VOIP. In the Orders imposing outage
reporting requirements on interconnected VOIP providers, the FCC has
relied on both its Title II authority (in the event interconnected VOIP
is Title II) and its ``ancillary authority'' as ancillary to Title II.
When the legacy copper network is retired, however, any existing
ancillary authority will disappear. In other words, if the Commission's
efforts to sunset the PSTN in the next few years are successful, the
Commission will have effectively terminated its authority over the
landline communications network.
A similar fate awaits the FCC's authority over mobile networks.
Section 332(d) defines Commercial Mobile Radio Networks (CMRS) as
mobile networks that provide service to the public when interconnected
with the ``public switched network.'' \26\ The 2017 ``Restoring
Internet Freedom Order'' explicitly defined the ``public switched
network'' as consisting of the traditional legacy phone network.\27\
Once the existing legacy phone network is retired, CMRS will cease to
exist as a legal category. All mobile services will be ``Private Mobile
Radio Service'' (PMRS).
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\26\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 332(d).
\27\ Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Order, Report
and Order, WC Docket No. 17-108, 33 FCC Rcd 311, 355 para.75 (2017).
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While the Commission will arguably retain its Title III authority
over mobile providers, it is unclear how much that authority allows it
to regulate in the name of reliability and resilience. When the FCC
attempted to impose a backup power obligation on licensees following
Hurricane Katrina, the rule was challenged in the D.C. Circuit.\28\
Because the case was rendered moot by the FCC withdrawing the relevant
regulation,\29\ the question of the FCC's Title III authority to impose
reliability and resiliency regulations remains unresolved.
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\28\ RCR Wireless, Appeals Court Questions FCC Authority on Backup
Power Rule, May 9, 2008.
\29\ Matthew Lasar, FCC: Back to Square One on Cell Phone Tower
Backup, Ars Technica (Dec. 8, 2008)
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Finally, the Trump FCC consistently refused to acknowledge any
authority to address issues of cybersecurity. The United States is thus
the only developed nation whose telecommunications regulatory
affirmatively avoids any consideration of cybersecurity as part of its
deliberations. For the last four years, the FCC has assiduously avoided
any hint of leadership or oversight in securing our critical
communications infrastructure from cyber threats. This leaves, and will
continue to leave until remedied, a giant and exploitable hole in our
defenses. It is ironic indeed that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and Department of Energy have a mandate from Congress to
consider cybersecurity threats to the electric grid and energy
infrastructure, and meanwhile the Department of Transportation
considers cybersecurity concerns to our transportation infrastructure,
but the Federal Communications Commission is considered unsuited to
protect the Internet from cybersecurity threats. The humor of this
delightful irony will, alas, be of small comfort in the event our
communications infrastructure is subverted by state-sponsored hackers
or criminals seeking ransomware.
II. Unregulated Markets Are Not Capable of Adequately Protecting
Resiliency
Carriers and proponents of deregulation have justified the risk to
public safety by arguing that carrier's have sufficient financial
incentive to invest in resilience and reliability.\30\ There are
several problems with this. First, empirical evidence clearly
contradicts this hypothesis. As noted above, the number of outages and
the length of outages have both increased with deregulation--not
decreased. Rural communities have seen legacy networks degrade and
disappear without replacement by the promised advanced networks. Even
setting this empirical evidence aside, classic economic theory
demonstrates why public safety concerns such as network resiliency have
traditionally been considered a case of market failure requiring
regulatory intervention to achieve the desired result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Technology Transitions; USTelecom Petition for Declaratory
Ruling That Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Are Non-Dominant in the
Provision of Switched Access Services, GN Docket No. 13-5, WC Docket
No. 13-3, RM-11358, Declaratory Ruling, Second Report and Order and
Order on Reconsideration, 31 FCC Rcd 8283 (2017).
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First, as noted above, networks have become far too complicated for
carriers to assess what is required to maintain resiliency. This is why
``sunny day'' outages keep occurring. Fragility in the network from
equipment failure or routing errors only becomes apparent after the
fact. Nor can carriers force electric utilities to cooperate with them
and agree to prioritize services. Carriers cannot prevent third parties
from cutting fiber lines. While carriers can--and should--do more to
improve their own networks, they cannot address the entire problem.
Only the Federal government can do that.
Second, while carriers have incentive to avoid outages, they also
have substantial incentive to cut costs--especially where investment
does not yield back immediate short-term profit. This makes carriers
especially subject to what is called the ``optimism fallacy.'' Carriers
believe that their preparations are sufficient because they take an
optimistic view of likely outcomes (even when preparing for the worst).
While economics likes to conceptualize corporations as rational actors
immune to wishful thinking, corporations are managed by human beings.
We should therefore expect that while those closest to the problem have
valuable expertise, they may also have their own difficulty in
remaining objective.
Third, even putting that aside, carriers that invest in reliability
cannot expect to be rewarded for their efforts in the market. Because
the FCC keeps reliability data confidential, customers cannot make
purchasing choices based on reliability. Certainly carriers can (and
do) claim to have the ``most reliable network,'' but why should
consumers believe these advertising claims? And even a network that is
``most reliable'' on average nationwide may not be particularly
reliable in a specific county or recover quickly after a natural
disaster.
By contrast, carriers will generally escape consumer backlash after
a disaster-based outage because consumers blame the storm for the
damage. Even when service is particularly bad by a specific carrier,
outages are rare enough that consumer memory fades over time.
Additionally, consumers face the uncertainty over whether the carrier
they switch to will be a significant enough improvement in reliability
to justify the cost and aggravation of switching. Finally, if mandatory
network sharing agreements are in effect (which they should be),
carriers that invest in more reliable networks face a free-rider
problem. Other networks that chose to invest less in reliability will
still remain operational by leveraging the responsible carrier's
investments in resiliency. Because the public has no way of knowing
that these networks are only operational as a consequence of the
``prudent carrier's'' investment, the prudent carrier will receive no
recognition or marketplace reward for prioritizing network resiliency.
Instead, the investment will reward the rival who failed to adequately
prepare.
Finally, we must recognize that most of the costs we are concerned
about do not fall directly on the carrier. Loss of business revenue, or
even loss of life, from a communications outage is not charged to the
carrier, whereas the cost of making reliability investments is. It is
rational for carriers to discount the external costs. This is also why
the Federal and state governments should not only require carriers to
meet standards of reliability, but also invest public money. While it
is appropriate to have communications carriers serve the public
interest as well as their private interests, it is equally appropriate
for public money to be spent for broad societal benefits.
III. Recommendations
Public Knowledge notes that Senators Markey and Wyden have
introduced a bill that would address many of the problems of network
resilience, and provide incentives to do so in an environmentally
sustainable manner. Public Knowledge is pleased to support the
Generating Resilient and Energy Efficient Network (GREEN)
Communications Act as an important step forward. In addition, Public
Knowledge endorsed the RESILIENT Act introduced last Congress in the
House by Chairman Palone and Representative McNerny. These two bills
are examples of Congressional action that would help to restore
reliability to our critical communications infrastructure.
Public Knowledge makes the following recommendations for
Congressional action. While some of these are reflected in the GREEN
Communications Act, or were reflected in the RESILIENT Act, others were
not. We hope you consider including these recommendations in any future
legislation:
1. Provide the information necessary for proper planning and for the
market to reward investment. Direct the FCC to combine the
National Outage Reporting System (NORS) NORS and the Disaster
Information Reporting Service (DIRS) into a single, publicly
available database that permits the public to identify carrier
performance on a granular level. Direct the FCC to conduct a
full report after every significant outage.
2. Provide clear authority to the FCC and the States. Clearly
empower the FCC and states to create necessary rules for
network reliability, cybersecurity, and cooperation among
relevant stakeholders. Congress should direct DHS to fully
integrate the FCC into its disaster response in line with the
GAO recommendations. Additionally, Congress should require the
FCC and the Department of Energy to develop enforceable
guidelines for cooperation between power companies and
communications providers.
3. Create metrics necessary to set standards and promote
accountability. Require the FCC, National Telecommunications
Information Administration (NTIA), National Institute of
Standards (NIST), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
to develop suitable metrics to measure reliability and
resiliency for wireline, fixed wireless, mobile terrestrial
wireless, and satellite networks.
4. Promote sustainability and avoid environmental degradation.
Require further study to create recommendations for
environmentally friendly and sustainable solutions, and to
reduce existing practices that risk degrading the environment.
5. Make Federal and state assets available in disaster recovery.
Permit and encourage the Federal government and state
governments to make available in an emergency communications
resources such as fiber, spectrum, operating government
networks, or other assets to communications providers to
restore communications to the general public.
6. Fund network upgrades that promote reliability. Provide Federal
money to pay for necessary upgrades to communications networks
to enhance reliability. In particular, provide funding to
replace aging copper networks with modern fiber networks built
to modern resiliency standards. Where legacy carriers wish to
retire their copper networks without replacement, create
incentives to sell these networks to alternative providers
(including state or local governments, community anchor
institutions, and cooperatives) willing to provide wireline
service. Additionally, Federal grant programs that fund
deployment should include mandatory reliability metrics.
7. FCC studies that address the specialized needs of specific
communities. Require the FCC to report to Congress on the
special needs of island communities, geographically isolated
communities, Tribal lands, low-income and traditionally
marginalized communities of color, and communities in
environmentally sensitive areas. The report should include
steps the FCC will take under its existing authority to address
identified special needs, and recommendations to Congress for
any other necessary action.
Thank you. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Lujan. Thank you very much, Mr. Feld. I will now
recognize members for questions, as well. I will recognize
myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Feld, resilient, redundant, secure broadband is a core
focus of today's hearing. However, before we can really address
this problem, we need to understand the current state of
broadband resiliency in the United States. In your testimony,
you state that the FCC currently does not have broadband
resiliency requirements. Does the FCC presently enforce
broadband network resiliency standards, yes or no?
Mr. Feld. No, it does not.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Feld, in times of a disaster, when
Americans lose access to broadband services, are there
currently any nationwide requirements for reporting those
outages as they are occurring, yes or no?
Mr. Feld. No, there are not.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Feld, are there any requirements for
reporting broadband outages, after they have occurred, so
consumers can make informed decisions between carriers, yes or
no?
Mr. Feld. No, there are not.
Senator Lujan. This is unacceptable, and Americans deserve
to know the reliability of the critical infrastructure. And I
think this is an area that we can find some common ground and
legislate on.
Mr. Law, thank you for being here today. South Dakota and
New Mexico are similar in many ways when it comes to broadband
build out. Both are highly rural, and each has one unique
challenge in laying fiber across the Federal, State, and Tribal
land. Mr. Thune touched on it. It is getting all of that
approved, and the topography that we face, and the challenges
are significant. So, thank you so much for your testimony and
your perspective.
I want to highlight one part of your written statement. You
``operate in deeply rural markets, where the cost of deploying
and operating networks can be higher, and a tailored approach
to managing risk, resiliency, and redundancy is necessary to
create sustainable networks that provide services customers can
afford''. Mr. Law, how has your decision to deploy fiber led to
more sustainable, resilient, and affordable networks?
Mr. Law. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think the first way is
both the resiliency, in terms of its durability and performance
characteristics. There is nothing superior to it on the market
as it relates to, I will say, technology performance, whether
it be broadband, voice, or whatever application you choose to
put on it.
The second item is its scalability. And so, we still use
fiber that was--was deployed in the 1990s, in the early 2000s
to 2010s. Throughout all of that, fiber has proven to be a very
resilient medium to deploy, upgrade, and scale throughout those
times and we have not needed to replace it, in some cases going
on 30+ years. So, fiber has been a great benefit for rural
customers, such as those served by Golden West.
Senator Lujan. Can Congress support providers like yours in
constructing future-proof networks that meet the highest
standards of resiliency by passing an infrastructure package
that would allow more investment in these areas?
Mr. Law. I think, certainly, an infrastructure package
would be a great start, in terms of continuing to expand and
deploy broadband into rural and underserved areas. I think that
is only one act, though, Mr. Chair, in terms of, that is a
great first step, but you also have to consider, as part of
that, both the sustainability of that network going forward--it
is one thing to build it. Anybody with enough money can build a
network. However, I have learned it is more challenging to
actually operate a network, over a long period of time and you
can spend a lot of money doing that, if it is not done
properly.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that reminder, Mr. Law. Mr.
Adelstein, in your testimony you state, ``Loss of electrical
power can create outages of telecommunication service for wired
and wireless networks''. And certainly, I agree with the
statement that many energy grids are in desperate need of
maintenance and repair. However, effective disaster response
requires redundancy. It is important to anticipate failures and
prepare accordingly. Do you believe the FCC states should
regularly--I am sorry. Do you believe the FCC and states should
regularly evaluate whether essential telecommunication networks
are sufficiently resilient, to continue providing essential
communication services during catastrophic events?
Mr. Adelstein. Yes, I think it is very important that the
regulators keep a close eye on the resiliency and redundancy
networks. When it comes to redundancy, more network deployment
leads to more resiliency, to your earlier question. That is
what the BDAC actually concluded at the FCC.
I think it is important that, when you think about, you
know, resilient networks that, you know, in the case of
wireless networks, if one node goes out, it can be rerouted
traffic to another. And we try to build, now, overlapping
densified networks that can--essentially, if there is a problem
in one area, they can be rerouted to another. And so, when you
have redundancy, in terms of coverage like that, it actually
increases resiliency and ability to survive when there is an
outage of any kind.
Senator Lujan. If the FCC or a state finds essential
networks are not adequately resilient, should they engage in
rulemaking on the subject?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, I mean, you know, there have been
rulemakings on this. The FCC has done rulemakings on this and
they have concluded, and the industry has risen up to a
voluntary agreement, basically, that is, I think, dramatically
improved resiliency. We have seen really wonderful performance,
not only during the pandemic, but during recent disasters,
especially with regard to wireless networks. We have seen,
while often cases the wireline network is gone for weeks and
months at a time--often no fault of their own, as a result of
the electric going down--we have seen wireless networks quickly
restored, in the case of recent hurricanes and fires. And
people then depend upon their wireless device.
So, I think, when you are looking about spending an
unprecedented sum of funding on a new infrastructure package,
you have got to think about the resiliency of different types
of technologies, as well as improving resiliency within those
technologies. We can make wireless networks more resilient. We
can make fiber more resilient. But both of them have different
characteristics. And this kind of redundancy, and having
multiplicity of technologies, makes it more likely that you
will have the emergency services when people's lives actually
depend upon them.
Senator Lujan. So, just to clarify, when a state or the FCC
finds that essential networks are not adequately resilient, you
do support them engaging in rulemaking on the subject?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, I mean, rulemaking proceeding. I am
not sure what rulemaking, in the end, they would need to do. I
mean, right now, what we have found is, it is very hard to do a
one size fits all approach on regulation. What works in New
Mexico might now work in South Dakota, depending on the
ability, for example, to get backup generators in place. You
know we try to get them to as many sites as we can, but some
sites do not have room. Sometimes it is a sacred national
monument, where we cannot get, you know, certain types of
devices in.
I mean, it is important that the regulators really stay on
top of this and make sure that they are--that the public is
protected. But the industry, I think, is working very hard. And
we will work hand in hand with regulators to make sure that all
of the resiliency needs of our customers are met.
Senator Lujan. I will explore that a little bit more later.
Appreciate your time today.
I will now recognize Mr. Thune for five minutes.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Law, as you
know, ensuring there are reliable and resilient broadband
networks in rural America means not just having Federal
resources to deploy these networks, but also having the Federal
support available to maintain them over the lifetime of the
network.
Over the years, the FCC's Universal Service Fund High-Cost
Program has provided the reliable support needed to sustain
these networks. However, the USF contribution factor is now
above 30 percent for the first time, which puts at risk the
ability of the USF to ensure predictable and sufficient
support, as required by law. It is for that reason that I
introduced the Rural Connectivity Advancement Program Act,
which would help strengthen connectivity in rural areas by
providing funding for both the build out of networks, and to
support the sustainability of those networks.
Can you speak to the importance of the USF continuing to
provide reliable support for companies, like Golden West, over
the long run? And if that funding went away, what effect would
that have on your customers?
Mr. Law. Thank you, Ranking Member Thune. Absolutely.
Universal Service Funding has been foundational to the
broadband build out in much of rural America. I can
specifically speak for the entirety of Golden West service
territory, which I mentioned is about the size of Maryland, New
Jersey, Connecticut, and Delaware combined. Quite frankly, we
could not have built out the broadband network that we have to
date, and will continue to build, without the support of
Universal Service funding, now and in the future. Both in terms
of affordability, but as well as sustainability for networks.
I applaud your efforts, as it relates to putting the
Universal Service Funding on a sound financial footing, because
that is in question. When you start seeing contribution to
rates to fund something in the 30 percent territory, I think
your draft legislation would do a lot, in terms of providing
additional funding that would, perhaps, take the pressure off
of the primary funding over periods of time, depending on the
needs of the Universal Service Fund.
But I absolutely think, regardless of infrastructure
packages that are being discussed, or that have already been
approved, you cannot have those discussions without having a
similar discussion of, how do we keep Universal Service funding
on firm support, both now and in the future.
Senator Thune. And you, sort of, answered it, but just to
reiterate the point, the bill I mentioned, RCAP or Rural
Connectivity Advancement Program Act, would help the USF
program over the long term.
Mr. Law. Absolutely.
Senator Thune. Yes, thank you. Mr. Adelstein, ensuring that
our Nation's broadband networks are resilient to natural
disasters and able to handle increases in network traffic
requires technology to be deployed to all parts of the country.
What can Congress do to ease the regulatory permitting burdens
that slow down the deployment of redundant and resilient
networks, particularly on federally owned lands?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, you know, Federal lands, there are
enormous obstacles in getting wireless infrastructure placed.
And those areas require these networks for emergency response.
I mean, you have fires. You know, we see what is happening
right now and what happened in Black Hills recently. We have
got to have access to those lands and the FCC--I chaired a
working group that came up with an entire report. For many
years we have been trying to get these things implemented.
Administration after administration, we have not been able to
get it done.
So, I think, you know, it is time for legislation to
require Federal agencies to, basically, treat wireless on
Federal lands like they would, you know, in the--like we would
in the private sector, where we can get long term leases, where
we can get access, where we can get these things expedited.
Because it not only protects the public, but it protects
Federal--Federal workers, as well.
And when it comes to, you know, citing for resiliency, we
need to be able to get things like generators placed. A lot of
places do not even allow us to do that. We talked about backup
power but, you know, if you are going to put funding into this
bill, maybe you could require that there be streamlined types
of approaches for things like that.
And some of the progress that the FCC has made on allowing
quick access for colocation to existing facilities, no allowing
small cells to be cited in the rights of way, within certain
limits. Making sure those do not get rolled back and making
sure that, you know, funding goes to communities that have met
model standards.
Senator Thune. Very good. Mr. Law, any regulatory barriers
that you face, in this respect?
Mr. Law. We have certainly faced the challenges of
accessing Federal lands, whether they be National Park,
National Forest, BLM, lands administered by BIA, in certain
cases. I would echo my colleague Mr. Adelstein's comments. I
also would strongly urge there be a streamlining of the
permitting process for access of Federal lands, both in terms
of the processing, the forms, and also, I will tell you, in
terms of the visibility into the process.
I will tell you, Golden West has several projects ongoing,
across various Federal lands this year. And when you make those
applications for rights of way, each agency, A, handles them
differently, B, there is no way for a provider to have any
idea, short of repeated phone calls or e-mails that may or may
not get answered, about what is the status of our application.
In South Dakota, for example, with a 5-month construction
window, if we do not have an answer in a April-May-June
territory, receiving an answer that we can do it in November
does us no good, nor will it do customers any good.
So, I would--I would echo those comments that, absolutely,
the recommendations from the FCC's BDAC committee a couple of
years ago. Absolutely, whether it is by statute, order, or some
other decree, I would wholly support.
Senator Thune. So--and this I would direct, again, to
either or both of you. And I will try to make this quick, Mr.
Chairman. My time has run out.
Multiple agencies are dispersing broadband funds, which
could ultimately lead to duplication of broadband services. So,
as Congress considers additional broadband funding, do you
believe having funding go through one agency reduces the risk
of overbuilding? And if so, which agency do you think is best
suited to handle the disbursement of funds?
Mr. Law. I would start by saying, I think--I think very
clearly, the Federal Communications Commission is the preferred
agency for the distribution of these types of funds, both in
terms of their agency expertise and knowledge of networks,
deployment, availability, affordability, sustainability--all of
those items. But also, more importantly, beyond just the fact
of getting these networks built, there has to be some level of
monitoring and commitment capabilities that are done following
up what are, to me, staggering amounts of money for broadband
deployment. Great, but staggering amounts. There has to be
follow up. The FCC is equipped to do that. I do not believe
there are other Federal agencies that are adequately equipped,
in the broadband field, to have that capability.
Mr. Adelstein. And I would certainly agree that, if we are
going to have multiple agencies having funding, you have got to
make sure you avoid overbuilding. You have to have some kind
of--if Congress is going to provide funding to multiple
agencies, that there by some kind of a coordinating mechanism
that is made within the legislation itself, to ensure that
there is proper coordination and that there is not any
overbuilding, particularly over other fellow programs, but
certainly over existing networks. Limited resources need to go
to truly unserved areas and there have to be good maps in place
to get that done.
Senator Thune. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Thune. Senator Klobuchar, you
are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you to you and Senator Thune for this important
hearing.
As we consider major investments, and this could not be
more timely, this hearing, in infrastructure, we want to make
sure that our networks are, what we call, future proof and that
they also, as the focus here today, are better able to respond
to emergencies. And the bill that Representative Clyburn and I
are leading would make major investments in broadband
infrastructure.
Mr. Law, in your testimony, you highlighted the importance
of capacity in broadband speeds, particularly for responding to
emergencies. Can you elaborate on that about, particularly, for
rural communities?
Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Yes, I think one of
the most important characteristics is not simply what is a
network currently capable of delivering, but what is it able to
capably deliver in the future, or in the event of a specific
situation.
I will use the pandemic as an example, from Golden West's
perspective. In the span of 90 days, from January 2020 to April
2020, Golden West's network usage, overall, increased 25
percent. Our upstream usage increased 40 percent in 90 days.
Our network was able and capable of handling that type of
capacity change, I will say, somewhat at a moment's notice.
Ninety days, in a network operator's world, is indeed a
moment's notice, with no warning.
So, I think it is absolutely critical that any future
broadband funding that is discussed as part of an
infrastructure bill or otherwise, begin the discussion about
what type of network do we wish to have, what do we wish to
accomplish with those networks--not just today, but tomorrow.
Because if you only view the speed capabilities by the
applications that you use today, it will be outdated by the
time this money gets out the door.
I have been in this industry a number of years and I have
watched policy discussions in the last 10 years go from 4 by 1
to 10 by 1 to 25 by 3, in the last 10 years. I will ask, you
know, how many times do we wish to have this discussion, as we
talk about these types of investments?
Senator Klobuchar. Yes, I think that is a good rate and yes
and I think it is time for action.
Chief Johnson, Mr. Adelstein, good to see you again. The
Next Generation 911 Bill that I have with Senator Cortez Masto,
that would create a Federal grant program to help states and
local communities upgrade their 911 infrastructure. And I
actually got interested in this, in part, with interoperability
issues and we had a--someone was killed, and the murderer was
out, and they were trying to find them. And we had something
like seven different systems that could not hook up, as police
officers were frantically trying to find this perpetrator. And
it was a memorable moment in our state. And this was in the
metro area, much less what happens in the rural area.
Chief Johnson, in your testimony you emphasize the need to
invest in the next-generation 911. As the former Vice Chair of
FirstNet, what lessons can we learn from FirstNet? And then, I
would ask you, Mr. Adelstein, a recent study found that 240
million 911 calls are made every year. Talk about upgrading
911. I will start with you, Chief Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Yes, it is true.
All emergencies start at a public safety answering point and it
is next-generation 911 that will drive the capability of those
centers into the future. Unfortunately, we are a bit behind in
that area.
So, public safety community would urge Congress to support
the Next Generation 911 legislation and update these important
centers. Again, that is where all emergencies start.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Mr. Adelstein. And I would agree. I think it is very
important that we do invest in that. I am particularly
concerned about states that divert E911 funding to non-E911
purposes, which is happening across the country. Those funds
that are being raised for that purpose, should be used for that
purpose.
When it comes to future proofing--I just want to go back to
the earlier question, I mean, we have to be careful about
investing in networks that only have one type of capability.
For example, aerial fiber is particularly exposed to the
elements. And what can happen, in the case of a fire or wind or
storm or hurricane, even ice storms, those networks can go
down. That is not future proof. You put all your eggs in the
basket of one type of technology that is very exposed, and not
have multiple technologies be allowed to be considered, I do
not think you are going to have networks up and running when
you need it.
When it comes to operational expenses that Mr. Law was
talking about, if there is not enough customers, basically, to
sustain that project going forward, and there is an ice storm,
there is fiber cuts, in a fiber line that is going over long
aerial distances, serving a very few number of customers, there
is not the wherewithal to do that. And those networks will not
be around for the long haul. They will not be there to provide
decent service to customers. Or if they survive at all, they
will not be there to provide service.
So, when it comes to future proofing, we better make sure
that we are only giving funding to well-run organizations like
Mr. Law's in Golden West. And we better make sure that it is
being distributed widely to a number of technologies that can
be a sustainable network, with a multiplicity of options.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Mr. Feld, just one last
question. You note that natural disasters accounted for 24
percent of outages. Our country has the second-highest number
of natural disasters in the world. In your view, what key
measures should we consider to ensure our networks are less
vulnerable to the natural disaster outages? Mr. Feld?
Mr. Feld. We need to prioritize backup power, not merely
onsite, which a number of folks have pointed out, but also, in
people's homes. Communications is, in public safety and
emergency, two-way now, not simply one-way. And so, we need to
make sure that we have reliable backup power everywhere in the
network.
We need to have more public information, so that consumers
can choose the most reliable networks. Reward those companies
that choose to invest in reliability. And ensure that
policymakers have access to appropriate information, and
develop standardized metrics, so that we can hold those
carriers who are not investing sufficient resources in
reliability accountable.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Senator
Fischer, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Lujan. I appreciate the
witnesses here today, as we discuss network resiliency.
Mr. Law, as you might know, the FCC updated its rules for
recording for major network outages among the FCC states and
Federal agencies in March. Information sharing is critical for
managing threats to network infrastructure and restoring
services. Do you feel that there is enough communication
between the FCC and states to quickly respond to these network
outages?
Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Fischer. I think there could be
more that could be done, in terms of the, I will say, both the
channels of the communication, as well as the substance of
information as it relates to the NORS, Network Outage
Reporting, as well as, potentially, the DIRS, Disaster
Information Reporting System. I think there could be
improvement. Do I think they are necessarily bad? No, but I am
confident they could be improved to provide better visibility
to states, as well as consumers.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. For farmers and ranchers,
having a fast broadband connection to their homes is important.
But that may fall short when they cannot get access to those
connections when they are on a tractor or working cattle, a
mile or more from their house. It is essential that America's
producers have reliable connectivity to control and power
precision agriculture technologies.
Mr. Adelstein, is wireless or satellite broadband service
more likely to provide our producers with high-speed Internet
connections where they need it?
Mr. Adelstein. Absolutely. I think, you know, when it comes
to precision agriculture, it is required that the entire field
be covered, not just the farmhouse. So, if you limit funding
only to fiber that goes to one location, you do not cover the
entire field.
And you--not only do you lose the agricultural production
advantages, but you lose the reduction in use of water. And
right now, we are seeing vast droughts in the West. And they
are really damaging, you know, the ecosystem for years to come.
And the President's plan talks about trying to deal with this
water crisis. Let us use the broadband funding to do that. The
way you do that is by allowing coverage of the entire farm
field, so that we can use precision agriculture to save water
resources, especially at a time when we are seeing these
droughts, and the disasters as a result, I think personally, of
global warming. We need to address that.
And you know, if you just go to the farmhouse, and the
farmer has to run back to the farmhouse, it does not do him any
good when he is trying to control his use of water, he is
trying to increase crop yields. Make that, I think, a priority
in funding so that there is a reward for that. There might be a
little bit more----
Senator Fischer. Yes, you know, we have so many new great
technologies, especially when it comes to water conservation
through irrigation practices, where that can be monitored, but
you have to have that connectivity to do it.
Mr. Adelstein. That is right. There are sensors throughout
the field and there is also algorithms they put in, in terms of
where they need to have the water.
Senator Fischer. And on irrigation systems, as well.
Mr. Adelstein. Yes, absolutely. Irrigation systems are now
being used with extensive data sensors that rely on wireless
connectivity throughout the field.
Senator Fischer. Right, thank you. I am going to zoom out a
little bit here. But a fundamental consideration for our
conversation here today is knowing the actual scope and reach
of our fixed and mobile broadband networks. I know it gets
mentioned a lot in this committee's hearings, but broadband
mapping and ensuring the FCC uses the most accurate data
available affects many of these related issues.
Mr. Law, could you touch on the importance of broadband
mapping and the timing of updating those maps at the FCC, as it
relates to building resilient networks, and beyond? Should we
not have the most up to date, reliable information before we
start putting money out there to deploy broadband?
Mr. Law. I absolutely agree, Senator Fischer, that it is
highly important that we know both where broadband services is
available and what it is capable of? And more importantly,
where is it not and where are the places that we need to fill
in?
Maps are always an interesting exercise. They are a
snapshot in time. It is hard to make them dynamic, however, I
am hopeful that the FCC continues to improve its process to
develop, generate, and deploy those maps. And as a small rural
provider, we certainly have tried to do our part to provide the
FCC with timely information to reflect that.
Senator Fischer. Right. Thank you. We have seen many
different suggestions for what the current definition of
broadband should be updated to. We hear about 25 megabytes per
second download speeds is not enough for a family with high
Internet usage and that demand is growing for upload speeds.
Mr. Law and Mr. Adelstein, from your perspective, what
makes more sense for future broadband build out? And how do we
ensure that areas that currently do not have access to
broadband, meeting the FCC definition of 25/3, that they do not
slip through the cracks, as we--as we move forward on that well
intended pursuit in building out?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, first, we certainly, you know, need to
target unserved areas and under, you know, 25/3 would be a good
place--would be a good place to start. Generally speaking,
Congress does not set these standards and statutes. They leave
it to the agencies. Because, as the Universal Service Law says,
it is an evolving standard of technology. Today's gigabit speed
is, you know, yesterday's telegraph.
We need to let the agencies continue to upgrade it, but
right now, consumers are using 10 times more download than
upload. And that is the way the entire system is networked. So,
to go to asymmetrical speeds is something that is not often
used. There might be a handful of customers that use it, but
generally speaking, the average user does not get anywhere--
anywhere near that.
So, to engineer an entire system, and basically, in the
case of wireless, they cannot always reach that. So, if you do
say that you need a symmetrical speed, you basically cut out
wireless from the entire bill, in today's marketplace. And you
have cut out the ability to deal with precision agriculture.
You cut out the ability to deal with the global warming, that
actually causes some of the issues that we are talking about.
You are dealing with resiliency of wireless networks. All that
is cut out and you are putting everything into one technology
because it meets this speed.
Now, if people want to value those speeds, I think we could
do that. You could make that a priority. Say we want higher
upload; we want higher download. Just do not make it a gating
factor, in law, that is set forever in this kind of cement that
cannot be visited, that is inflexible, and suddenly find out,
after you set that in law, that it cannot be revisited.
That is why, traditionally, this committee and this
Congress, in the Telecommunications Act that Senator Markey
helped to pioneer, set standards, like an evolving definition
of telecommunications service, that allows the continued
evolution. And some day it will be more than 100/100, but
today, that would, I think, artificially move the networks
toward one single solution that does not meet your other goals
including, what you mentioned, precision agriculture.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. My time is up. Mr. Law, if you
would like to answer that for the record, I would appreciate
it. Thank you.
Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Lujan. Senator Fischer and Mr. Markey--Senator
Markey, you are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. So, as
we assemble the broadband components of the next infrastructure
bill, I believe that we must address issues at the intersection
of climate change and telecommunications policy.
Scientists have projected that sea level rise will submerge
more than 4,000 miles of fiber optic cables within the next 15
years. Increasing extreme weather events, like hurricanes and
wildfires also raise the likelihood of severe outages in our
communications networks. And at the same time, studies estimate
that our digital technologies and the Internet account for
nearly 4 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, a number
that is only expected to rise as broadband adoption continues
to grow.
So, it is crystal clear that climate change is a threat to
our networks, while our communications infrastructure is,
itself, fueling this ever-growing crisis. So, that is why
Senator Wyden and I have introduced legislation to tackle both
ends of the problem, the Generating Resilient and Energy
Efficient Network Communications Act, or the GREEN
Communications Act. Our legislation will create a new $5
billion program at the NTIA, which will fund projects to
increase network resiliency, as well as initiatives to reduce
the environmental footprint of communications technologies.
Mr. Adelstein, do you agree that we need to invest in both
network resiliency and carbon reducing technologies, as part of
any broadband infrastructure package?
Mr. Adelstein. Absolutely. I think, you know, our industry
has certainly stepped up to deal with and reduce the carbon
footprint of every one of our--my major members. You know, you
look at our own footprint and what we have done to reduce it,
and I can put in for the record those numbers, which are
impressive. But I think the bigger picture is that Internet
enabled solutions can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 16.5
percent, according to independent experts. That is one-third of
the way, by 2030, to the goal of 50 percent that we are
shooting for. This is an enormous contribution. I do not know
of any other technology that is more important.
And 5G, of all the technologies, is the most important of
those to get us to that goal. Because smart transportation--the
biggest problem with emissions is transportation and smart cars
and autonomous vehicles can contribute dramatically by 40-90
percent reduced emissions. So, if we get 5G into this bill, you
have got, suddenly, the ability to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions enormously. But if we limit it to one type of
technology--and all telecom does help--but mobility is the most
important because you have sensors in factories, you have the
water we talked about.
I mean, we are willing to do more than just reduce the
footprint within our own industry, we are in a position, as an
industry, to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions in a dramatic fashion. But if you take the $65
billion--we all read the same articles in the paper where we
see there is pressure on the funding for climate change. Here
you have got $65 billion, potentially, you want to target every
one of those dollars to try to maximize the reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions.
So, why not make it eligible to all technologies and let
the agencies rate them? Say, which one of these--which one of
these projects that you are proposing does the most to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions? And the wireless industry thinks we
will be first in line, but we will see. Let the agencies
decide. We think our technology can do more to save the planet
than almost any other technology, besides renewable energy.
Senator Markey. Love it. Mr. Feld, I would like to ask you
two questions, if I could. One is just following up on Mr.
Adelstein, it is explaining why, in addition to robust funding,
we also need strong resiliency rules on the books, to require
better preparedness before and after the inevitable disasters
strike us.
But also, if you would, just ruminate for a second, as
well, on municipalities and this broadband industry march to
state to state to prohibit municipalities from even deploying
broadbands. What would you recommend that we do, in both of
those areas?
Mr. Feld. Well, we need this to be a fully integrated and
fully coordinated at every level of government. I have
recommended, in my testimony, that the Federal legislation
preempt these State laws and not simply in the case of building
out municipal networks, which are critical, but also that
networks can--State and local government, as well as the
Federal Government, can make assets available in time of
emergency, as backup.
There is often time, plenty of fiber in the ground to
provide back haul, or plenty of spectrum that is going fallow,
that is held by Federal agencies or by State and local
governments, and they should be encouraged to put those to
productive use, particularly in times of crisis.
Senator Markey. Are we in a paradoxical situation where
many of these municipalities might have acted themselves and
there is a State law that the broadband companies have that
prohibit them from acting on their own? And now, we are passing
Federal legislation to provide funding that the broadband
companies want to use in order to go in to solve a problem that
the municipalities were saying they were willing to solve in
the first place?
Mr. Feld. Yes. This is a--it rates four out of five
Morrisette's on the irony scale, as I like to say.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Feld. The local governments are closest to their
citizens. They often have a much greater awareness of what the
particular risks are, in the community. In addition, we have
problems of communities that have traditionally been
marginalized or underfunded, such as on Tribal lands, or in
communities of color. These communities are uniquely situated
to contribute and yet, in many states, they are prohibited from
doing so. This is now trying to take on a problem where we need
to focus everything in saying, well, instead, why do we not put
a bucket of cement on your right foot and tie your hand behind
your back, and now go out and fix the problem. But give the
money to the people who put the cement on your foot and tied
your hand behind your back.
Senator Markey. Oh, you are definitely winning the metaphor
contest today in the Commerce Committee. But I love each one of
them because they are accurate, in terms of where we are. And I
guess, all I would say is, if you can in 10 seconds say, do you
believe we need strong rules on resiliency, to make sure that
it gets done?
Mr. Feld. We absolutely need rules on resiliency. It is not
going to happen on its own, and we have 10 years of evidence--
20 years of evidence now to prove it.
Senator Markey. Beautiful, thank you.
Senator Lujan. Thank you so much, Senator Markey. Senator
Moran, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you. Let me begin with,
thank you all for being here. And then, let me begin with
Commissioner Adelstein. I am part of this group working on
infrastructure. One of the common denominators, even though we
have had a debate as to what infrastructure--how it should be
defined--one of the things that has been defined, from every
iteration of this infrastructure plan, or plans that I have
seen, is broadband. So, it has won the hearts, minds, and souls
of Members of Congress and the public. We recognize its
importance. And should we pass a bipartisan, or--infrastructure
plan, I think that it, or whatever might come from
infrastructure, will include broadband.
So, what does that mean? The number, generally, has been
$65 billion that is in nearly every plan. And what is your
advice on how best that money should be spent? And let me give
you this caveat. It seems to me that we elected officials, have
the habit of creating a new program every time we decide we
want to provide better services in broadband for our
constituents. And then, I struggle to explain what the programs
are that are available at the FCC, or the Department of
Agricultural Rural Utility Services.
What is it that we could do, perhaps even with an existing
program, that would provide the depth and speed and the
coverage that we are looking for, across the country, in regard
to broadband?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, it is a great question. It is not
really one size fits all solution. I mean, you need to give the
broad guidance to the agencies as to what you want. You know,
if speed is a factor, you make that a priority factor. If you
want resiliency, you want these networks to be up, make sure
that you put that in.
We talk about regulations, etc. You have got the biggest
carrot here, to feed resilience that you have ever had, if you
are talking about $65 billion. Make sure those networks say
that they can be up and running. But do not just pick one
technology or come up with some standard that is a gating
factor, that just says one technology, that may or may not be
more resilient. If you want resilience, let the agencies
decide, you know, which applications come in the door.
You know, what I learned at RUS is, you cannot really
decide who is going to apply or who is going to offer to
provide service. You never know who is going to come in the
door. And if you have, you know, hurricanes and--I am sorry,
tornadoes in your part of the country that would wipe out
aerial fiber and leave everybody with no service, I would kind
of wonder, why did Congress only pay for, you know, aerial
fiber in my district, when we could have had, you know, a
wireless network that we would have had to replace one spot? We
would replace the tower, get the power there, and we would have
everybody covered, as opposed to having to go back and clean up
all of the many fiber lines that got wiped out by a tornado.
I mean, so, if that is a factor, make that a factor. But
give some flexibility to the agencies to follow the goals of
Congress. Today we are talking about resilience. We are talking
about redundancy. But other goals that you have include
precision agriculture, of course, we talked about before today.
Mobility--rural customers want mobility more than anything
else. And if you do not make that a factor that rewards it, you
say, we are only going to do some gating factor that precludes
wireless and fixed wireless, we will never get mobility.
Senator Moran. Are there programs that exist today, at any
Federal agency, that we could add the resources to, without
creating a new program?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, the Rural Utility Service runs and
outstanding program. You know, NTIA has done things, never on
this scale before. The Federal Communications Commission ran
the RDOF and has reverse auction mechanisms in place that could
be used. Those are the three existing mechanisms. None of them
have dealt with funding on this level. So, you have a bit of a
challenge there.
I think it is very important to give the agencies
administrative funding, frankly, to be able to really kick the
tires of these proposals. You know, you have got to make sure
that they are there for the long haul. We talked about future
proofing. Make sure you do not give money to programs that will
not be around for years to come. Like, Denny will be there, but
you give it to some new company that is a startup, it will not
be around to provide service.
Senator Moran. That is good point about the personnel and
resources to manage the program. I am also an appropriator for
both the Department of Agriculture and the FCC. The $65 billion
may need to include some capabilities of those agencies to
manage the program. I appreciate that.
Mr. Law, anything that I ought to know, in regard to, like,
the practical application? If we wanted to improve broadband,
is there something that stands out to you that is most in need
of attention? I know today's hearing is on resiliency, but I
give you the license to talk beyond that.
Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Moran. I will say a couple of
things. One is, while I agree with my colleague that the--that
the--that the technology that deploys has to have certain
capabilities, I would caution Congress against setting the bar
too low. It is easy to give talk about applications that are in
use today, when you are talking about a generational
investment, quite frankly. And I would not want to focus on the
applications that any of us may use in our home today as those
of the applications tomorrow. Because 3 years ago, there are
applications we were not using then that we are using now. And
that is just getting more rapid, not less.
The second part it is, resiliency and redundancy, I think,
is a great topic. I thoroughly enjoy talking about it. It is
not cheap. And so, do you want the cheapest network? Do you
want the best network? Or do you want something in between? And
I think there is a possibility for both Congress, as well as
the Agency, to define those items. But I will caution you, you
cannot have both. You cannot ask for the cheapest network, but
it has to be the most resilient, the most redundant, and
perform in all capabilities because that will not be the
cheapest network, and understandably so. Occasionally, that has
been lost in earlier programs.
And I would advocate, Senator, that from my perspective,
the FCC is, indeed, the best agency to administer some type of
significant broadband funding program.
Senator Moran. I felt that way when there were two Kansans
on the commission. Less so today.
[Laughing.]
Senator Moran. I do not what the clock says, but I will try
one more question. I will ask you it, Mr. Law. You mentioned in
your testimony, the ongoing support for Universal Service. It
is important to resiliency and rural broadband, I think, was
your testimony. Why is the stability of USF important for
small, rural broadband providers and their consumers,
particularly when it comes to the resiliency of the network?
Mr. Law. So, when you look at what companies, such as
Golden West, or those in Kansas--a Nex-Tech or a Pioneer or
some of the other quality providers in Kansas, Universal
Service Funding has been foundational for the platform and the
network topologies that they have built. And they have built
reliable networks and they have built quality networks that
scale. We all have to operate those over long periods of time
with low customer numbers and low density and the
sustainability, which is key for Universal Service Funding.
The sustainability of a company like a Golden West or a
Pioneer being available to offer those services in 2021, 2031,
or 2041--it is great to talk about $65 billion investment in
broadband. But I will tell you, from my perspective, the
Universal Service Fund will be the underpinning that will allow
Golden West to be able to continue to provide whatever
technologies are necessary in those years.
Senator Moran. I assume you could have a caveat, if we make
the Universal Service Fund more stable.
Mr. Law. Thank you for that. I wish I had added that myself
and concur entirely.
Senator Moran. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Moran. Senator Peters,
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to our
witnesses, thank you for your testimony here today.
I am--I serve as Chairman of the Homeland Security
Committee, here in the Senate and I am certainly focused every
day on ensuring that America's critical infrastructure is
resilient to attacks, as well as national disasters.
At DHS, the Office of Infrastructure Protection's
Infrastructure, Development, and Recovery, IDR Program, works,
with both Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governmental officials, and infrastructure owners and
operators, to plan, design, implement solutions that are going
to enhance security and resilience of critical infrastructure
against the whole gambit of threats that they face.
Mr. Feld, my question is for you. What are the ways the
Federal Government can better coordinate recovery of
telecommunication networks, during outages caused by either a
natural disaster and also, improve network resilience against
other types of attacks against this critical infrastructure?
Mr. Feld. It is critically important that we clarify and
expand the role of the Federal Communications Commission, in
terms of priority in restoring communications when it is down.
Our--the GAO report that I mentioned in my testimony, shows
that there is a tremendous amount of confusion about the right
role of the FCC that needs to be clarified. There needs to be
greater coordination, particularly between energy providers,
the power companies, and the telecommunications providers,
which can only be provided by leadership at the Federal level.
With regard to cybersecurity, we have to get the FCC off
the bench. We are talking about the agency that supervises the
physical infrastructure of the Internet and it has,
essentially, been benched for the last 4 years, on
cybersecurity. The FCC is in the best position to monitor
network providers, to ensure that they are taking appropriate
precautions, to, as license conditions require that they show
that they are taking cybersecurity responsible and seriously.
And without the FCC involved, we have a giant and exploitable
hole in our Federal response to cybersecurity threats.
Senator Peters. Well, you mentioned several items. Are
there some priorities that just jump right out at you, in terms
of the FCC's oversight?
Mr. Feld. Well, one of the key issues is the FCC's overall
authority, which is in jeopardy at the moment, because of the
failure to classify voiceover IP as a Title II service, and the
classification of broadband as a Title II service. We are on
track to see the FCC's oversight of wireline communications in
this country completely disappear within the next five to 10
years, as traditional copper networks are retired. That needs
to be corrected.
Senator Peters. Again, Mr. Feld, participation in the
Disaster Information Reporting System, as you know, is
voluntary for providers. It only collects data about outages at
certain times and certain criteria that have to be met. The
Network Outage Reporting System only requires reporting of
longer outages, impacting a certain number of people, as well.
And while participation in NORS is mandatory for voice
providers, it is not mandatory for broadband providers. Plus,
the information is not available to the public.
My question to you is, how can regular collection of data,
about a broader array of both sunny day and disaster outages
prevent future outages? And what should we do, in Congress, to
ensure the FCC is getting consistent, reliable data for all
outages?
Mr. Feld. Well, the FCC must be provided with appropriate
data to make important decisions and policymakers need
information about frequency of outages, where these outages are
occurring, what factors are going into these. The single most
important thing that Congress can do, is to provide clear
authority for the FCC, to mandate the collection of this
information, and funding to allow the FCC and carriers to
provide this information.
We can imbed, in every network, automatic outage reporting
requirements. We can replicate what the FCC has done on speed
testing, with regard to reliability testing, where we have
carriers place the devices and software within their network,
so that the FCC can track these things while respecting trade
secrets and privacy. This does not have to be hard. And it does
not have to impose significant long-term burdens, if we do this
properly and fund it properly, so that we can deploy it now,
when we need it.
Senator Peters. And I say, sunny time outages, too. I have
complaints I hear from constituents that their broadband is out
consistently. Not for--it may not fit any of the criteria that
I mentioned here, but it is a persistent problem and clearly,
the resilience is not in the network. You think what you are
discussing would help us address that? Or should we do even
more?
Mr. Feld. Well, I think what I am suggesting is a good
first step. And it is important to recognize that repeated
short outages can be as crippling as a long-term outage. The
network must be reliable. It means that I have to be able--if I
am saying we are going to do distance education, then that has
to work for the school day. It cannot be something that works,
kind of-sort of, during the school day and tomorrow it might
not work, or it might work in the morning, but I might have
to--there are just too many problems going on in our networks.
We need--but the critical need, right now, is to establish
the authority of the FCC to act, to mandate that the FCC act,
and to provide the means to collect all this information.
Because right now, we do not even have the metrics to say what
is a reliable network. But I am also confident, as a consumer
and as somebody who talks to consumers, that if we made
information available, that consumers could trust, as to which
networks were the most reliable, that network would be rewarded
for its investment. But we must make that information
available.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator
Blackburn, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And do
our witnesses, we appreciate you all being with us.
I represent Tennessee and in 2020, Tennesseans really came
to appreciate the resiliency of their networks. In 2020, we had
tornadoes, we had storms, we had floods, we had other natural
disasters, and then, on Christmas Day, we had the bombing--a
car bomb was detonated outside the AT&T downtown building in
Nashville. And that is where the switching capabilities for
much of the Southeast is located. And at that point, we had
people in several states who where affected by that Christmas
Day bombing.
And during my work here in Congress, whether in the House
or here in the Senate, working on broadband infrastructure
resiliency is something that has taken a good bit of my
efforts. And we have the Internet Exchange Act, which recently
passed the Senate as part of a larger package and will help in
building these resilient and redundant networks. And right now,
in Tennessee, what we know is that we have 400,000 Tennesseans
that are living in a census block that has no provider for
service that hits that 25/3 mark. And the average cost of
streaming that fiber is $30,000-40,000 per mile. And then, to
trench that fiber, it is $50,000-70,000 per mile. So, the costs
add up quickly.
Tennesseans realize this and they are very concerned. We
have heard from some of our--our Tennesseans about Congress
considering this 100 by 100 standard for broadband, when they
really have not been able to get the 25/3 FCC minimum.
So, Mr. Law, I would like for you to talk about what this
would do. If you had the 100/100 standard, what that would do
to rural communities that are still trying to get the 25/3?
Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Blackburn, for your question. I
totally agree that, in terms of broadband availability and
capability, the focus of any infrastructure program has to
begin with focusing those dollars, targeted on those who do not
have service today.
And if the standard is, indeed, 100 megs symmetrical, that
does not mean that somebody who has 75 meg or 100 by 10, or
some other thing, has, you know, insufficient broadband. They
may have adequate broadband. But I think any funding program
would need to begin--let us begin with the hardest first. And
the ones you just described, in Tennessee, I think would meet
my definition of what is the hardest first.
Then, the second part is, to make it available. The second
part is, what are the capabilities that we want to have
associated with that, along with both the affordability, and
then, finally, the sustainability. So, it would really be, kind
of, a four-part process--availability, capability,
affordability, and sustainability. But I would propose you
begin with how do you solve for the 25/3 customers first.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you for that. Mr. Adelstein, let
me ask you this. And this is an area we have talked about in
the past. Should we stay technologically neutral when we are
distributing broadband funding and looking at broadband access?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, absolutely. I think, you know, your
point, fiber costs 10 times more than wireless to deploy,
according to the Carmel Group's study that I have seen. Capital
outlays, per individual, are much, much higher. And you
actually may not get the service that you ultimately want. I
mean, you have got a lot of resiliency issues that could come
with, particularly, aerial fiber and, as you mentioned, it is
much more expensive if you bury it. And Denny was mentioning
the--it gets more expensive the more resilient it is.
The beauty of not doing 100/100 but being technologically
neutral is that you can then pick more resilient technologies
that might actually be less expensive in this case. Because
instead of having to restore service at $30,000 a mile to
$60,000 a mile, you only have to restore service to one site--
to a tower, to a water tower, wherever the facility might be.
Get the back haul to that. Get the power to that, when the
power goes down.
If you have a fiber network that you spent all this money
on, all of a sudden, there is no power. Nobody can get
broadband in their home, because those require--fiber to the
home requires power in the house. Getting power to the tower,
getting power to the wireless transmission facility is a lot
easier to do. So, not only is it more expensive to put in, but
if you ever have a problem, you have got to restore it, it is
more expensive to restore, and where is the money going to come
to pay for that, once Congress has opened up its wallet for
this enormous amount, on a non-resilient network, potentially?
So, when you are spending these money--these moneys, make
sure you target the most efficient technologies, ones that are
the most resilient. You can reward these things. Now, getting
higher upload speeds is wonderful. Make that a priority, too.
But do not make that a gating factor, where you cut out all
other technologies. You cut out fixed wireless, you cut out
mobile wireless, you cut out other options that can do it
cheaper, that can actually do it better, and that can be more
resilient. That is why Congress, traditionally, has always been
technologically flexible and has not set standards and statute
that lock it down.
Admirable though the standard might be, whatever--you know,
100/100 is what we all want. Someday that is going to be very
low, even for wireless networks. But today, you could end up
using those fundings--those funds to architect a network that
is not what you had in mind. And in fact, you will not reach
many unserved customers because you spent so much on
inefficient, expensive technology that, in the end, you do not
get everywhere you need to go.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lujan. Thank you so much, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Rosen, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, really appreciate
you holding this important hearing. Witnesses, I really
appreciate you being here.
I just want to say a little something, building on what
Senator Peters said about--and everyone is talking about
network resilience. But I just want to add my few cents about
wildfires and network resilience to address wildfires. As the
Chair knows all too well, wildfires, unfortunately, have become
an ever-present threat to the Southwest. And 95 percent of the
West Coast is under extreme drought, all across California,
Oregon, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona. Lake Mead, in Nevada, has
hit its lowest water level on record last week, since the
inception, I believe, of the dam. Forty-six percent of my state
are living in elevated risk of wildfires.
So, it is imperative that communities, in my state, all
across the West, but really, all across the country, have
access to reliable and resilient communications network. I am
not going to go on about that because other witnesses have, but
I just wanted to put that out there. Resilience is really,
really important.
But I would like to talk a little bit about, what we are
calling, the middle mile. In some of the most rural and
underserved parts of Nevada and across the country, the lack of
basic fiber infrastructure remains a barrier to bringing
broadband service to many homes and businesses. Small Internet
providers, in particular, often lack resources to invest in
extensive networks. But by partnering with middle mile network
providers, it can reduce their capital expenditures that often
serve as a barrier to rural deployment.
And so, Mr. Adelstein, how does the lack of middle mile
infrastructure hinder the ability of ISPs, particularly in
rural areas, to provide sufficient broadband service by either
wireline, wireless, or both? And what do you think Congress can
do to fill in the middle mile gap?
Mr. Adelstein. It is a great question. Getting fiber deeper
in the network is essential to meet the needs of people in
Nevada and every other rural city in the country. The question
is where do you terminate that? Do you take it all the way to
the home? Or do you take it to an antenna? And sometimes, it is
appropriate to take it to the home. Denny Law, in his
territory, is somebody I would trust to do that. He has already
built a very strong foundation and he just needs to finish out
some exchanges that are not fiber to the home, yet.
You might have areas of Nevada where, if you can get close
to those end users, they are very widely dispersed once you get
to the end of that line. So, you get the middle mile out there.
And it may be that you want to take fiber to the end user, but
you may want to use a wireless solution that will get out to
those hard-to-reach Nevadans and get to them much cheaper and
get to them much quicker.
I mean, I know that people in Nevada need broadband now. It
could take years to get fiber networks built out to the very
farthest reaches, or you can put up a single tower, or co-
locate on an existing tower, and almost, you know, within 6
months get service to an entire area. Whereas, one estimate is,
it could take 10 years to even get to 90 percent fiber
penetration in the United States.
Senator Rosen. Wow, thank you. I want to talk a--ask Mr.
Feld, too, a little bit more about the middle mile. Because, as
we have discussed, smaller ISPs, they lack the capital
expenditure to expand their footprint to high-cost areas, to
meet the needs of rural communities--maybe even underserved
communities. But in order to make it feasible for these smaller
ISPs to deliver broadband service to underserved communities,
should we consider, here in Congress, ensuring middle mile
infrastructure as eligible for Federal resources, especially
when partnered with an ISP that is committed to providing the
middle mile and helping potentiate for those last mile
connections?
Mr. Feld. Middle mile is absolutely critical to rural
America. It is absolutely critical to the deployment of 5G. I
would highly recommend making these available for--eligible for
grants, particularly if we are talking about open
infrastructure, where we have public dollars go to pay to lay
down fiber that will be open to multiple competitors, so that
we can get the biggest bang for the buck.
I have heard some people denigrate the BTOP program from 10
years ago. But one of the most important things it did was to
fund middle mile in a number of rural areas. In Maine, they, in
particular, have something called the Three Ring Binder Fiber
Backbone, which is, even now, paying dividends to rural
communities in Maine. We can do this here, as part of build out
and, indeed, we must, if we want to make sure that rural
America has access to high-speed, reliable broadband.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I really appreciate everyone
being here today and I look forward to having a little bit more
robust discussion on middle mile access. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Capito,
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Capito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today. I am from West Virginia. We
have some of the lowest broadband deployment in the country,
unfortunately. We also are subject to flooding, flash flooding
in particular. And actually, I think about today on a day--
tomorrow will be the 5-year anniversary of a very devastating
flood we had in Southern and, sort of, middle West Virginia.
But I wanted to ask Chief Johnson this question about
FirstNet. I was able to go to Kingwood, West Virginia, where we
dedicated a FirstNet facility and tower sites, built in West
Virginia. But in your testimony, you mentioned that, for
resiliency, the importance of backup power generators. So, is
that a--is that a frequent thing for first responders in the
Western part of the United States, where people have backup
generators for first response, to keep their systems up and
running?
Mr. Johnson. Thank you--excuse me. Thank you, Senator. It
is a frequent issue in the West. It has been exacerbated by
public safety power shutoffs, which are deenergizing the
electrical grid, to avoid starting fires. So, when you take
down the power grid, intentionally, to avoid starting a fire,
it is only a matter of time until the towers, the facilities,
etc., their backup power expires.
So, that is why we are working with the California Fire
Chiefs Association, etc., to work with the State legislature to
speed the process by which we get permits and get backup power
generation to these towers. That is what maintains our wireless
connectivity.
Senator Capito. Thank you. That reminds me, and you brought
this up about the permitting. I know that some of these--well,
I look at permitting major lines in West Virginia. You have to
go under streams, or you try to get the right of way, or you
want to work with the power company.
I do not know, Mr. Law, if you have the same kind of issue
in your home. What could we do to speed up the permitting?
Because it is time and money. We are going to have the money.
We just need to make sure we shorten the time to get to those
last places.
Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Capito. I have two suggestions,
I think, that could be implemented relatively simply. There
were recommendations from the FCC's BDAC committee, Broadband
Deployment Advisor Committee, which Mr. Adelstein was involved
in, that had some excellent recommendations to streamline the
application process for crossing Federal lands, particularly,
which I know was also an issue in West Virginia.
Senator Capito. Poor--poor service, yes.
Mr. Law. Yep. Any--for us--for Golden West, my
organization, for our service, BLM, just a whole--national
parks, all sorts of things. Again, I do not think it is
anything that the Federal agencies are doing intentionally, but
obviously, their primary jobs are not to manage the rights of
way on their--on their lands.
Senator Capito. Right.
Mr. Law. However, once you make an application for right of
way, I will tell you it is a deep dark whole, it feels like,
that goes in and you do not see it come to light until 2 years
later. And you have no visibility into the part of the process
and that has to be changed. That is one suggestion.
The second suggestion is, you need to be cognizant of
environmental and all of those items. So, I am not suggesting
otherwise. However, when you are in particularly road right of
way, that has been disturbed, they use that to build the road,
yet still being required to do all, and then some, of the
environmental reviews, when you are in the road right of way.
It seems a little bit redundant to me.
I understand if I am going cross country across, what I
would term to be, virgin territory. There should be
environmental reviews. There should be a higher standard set
for that. But when I am in a disturbed road right of way, some
of the permitting and application processes for that--which is
our--I will say our main trunking and backbone lines--that has
to be speeded up and I would think we could do that.
Senator Capito. Yes, and we are trying to build that into
the Surface Transportation Act. I know a lot of states have
tried to do that, that dig once prospect, and I think that
makes a whole lot of sense.
Mr. Adelstein, let me ask you a question. You mentioned
BTOP--or not BTOP. You mentioned RDOF and Rural USDA and
Department of Commerce. We have ARC in West Virginia,
Appalachian Regional Commission, which has a broadband
component to it. What we are finding is, for instance, if we
have auctioned off the census track in the rural auction, but
it may be surrounded by something that the ARC is going to
work, and you have to go through one to get to the other. These
agencies just fight one another, rather than try to work with
one another. Let us just say the ARC could build it quicker,
could the FCC work with them to make that happen, why does that
not happen? It makes too--does it make too much sense?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, you know, when I was running Rural
Utility Service, we used to get called to the White House--I
told a story earlier about Vice President Biden calling me in
to try and coordinate and make sure the agencies were working
together. What I really learned, from the perspective of
somebody who is on the receiving end of applications, people
saying, I want to serve your area. What is really important, I
think, in West Virginia, in particular, is that we did not get
to choose who came in and applied. We did not say, we want
fiber here. We want wireless there. It depended on who came in
the door.
Senator Capito. Right.
Mr. Adelstein. And when you are in a state like yours--and
I worked with your predecessor, Senator Rockefeller and Senator
Byrd on this--you know, we--you do not have really a great
history. You have really pretty, you know, second-rate
infrastructure in some ways, because of the history. Nothing to
do with the senators, nothing to do with the providers. It is
just that they did not have the rural co-ops that, for years,
were getting RUS funding, USF funding. And so, when you are
thinking, in West Virginia, about who is going to come in the
door to serve us, it is--you cannot get some company just--that
is newer, that does not have good infrastructure nearby, that
is going to come in and do it. You have got to give
flexibility, I think, to the agencies that you are giving it
to.
Make sure they are coordinated. Maybe, put in place in the
statute, actually, if you are to go to more than one--and you
can decide if they put it all through RDOF or something else--
but have a coordinating function, within the law itself so that
they are required to coordinate. But then, watch out, because
you have got to make sure that whoever comes in the door is in
a position to actually serve West Virginia, and kick the tires
of what comes through.
Senator Capito. Well, I have got a real problem with one of
the providers that is going to walk out with several hundred
million dollars in the RDOF, in the State of West Virginia. And
they have a terrible track record. They have not lived up to
their obligations in the past. And yet--and yet, they were
awarded--they are still in Process 2. Now, they did not get all
of it, but they got a big bunch of it. And my understanding is,
if they do not move forward, well, in 5 years, the only thing
they have to do is pay a fine. And then, you have got 5 years
of people who are not served, or underserved, and--well, you
can tell. Very frustrating with me.
Last question, Mr. Law. One of the things the
Administration, I think, wants to do with the funding--and you
mentioned that you thought the FCC was the best place for the
increased funding--they are really high on municipal networks.
We have had a couple municipalities in our state that have
tried them. A couple that have failed. But could you talk about
municipal networks and, you know, without disparaging a
municipality?
Mr. Law. Sure. And--and I would say, in general terms--and
I would stress that my comments are in general terms--I do not
necessarily think municipal networks are the preferred method
for delivering broadband. And there are a couple of reasons for
that. I do not think there is a great track record of success
of governmental entities, whether they be communities or
otherwise, competing with a private business. Even if that
private business is lousy, for lack of a better word,
communities competing, governmental entities competing is
historically not beneficial. That is item one.
The second item is, you are still going to have a large
number of constituents that are haves and have nots. Because
whatever governmental entity you pick--so, let us pick towns
municipalities. That border of that municipality ends
somewhere. Or, if you want to go counties, that county boundary
ends somewhere. Or go beyond that to whatever district you
wish, I guarantee you there will be a broadband subscriber 30
feet the other side of that boundary that says, I do not have
service.
And so, for those reasons--again, in general terms--I do
not--Do I think there should be laws banning it? Not
necessarily. But at the same time, do I think that the funding
should be specifically directed toward municipalities? No.
Senator Capito. Yes, and I have a question, too, on the
ability to maintain. They may be able to stand them up and they
may be able to get them moving, but you are talking about over
a long period of time, to have the expertise and the longevity
to be able to maintain and adapt to the technology. Thank you.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Capito. We have Senator
Young. Senator Young, you are recognized for your 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This--I am going to
direct several questions to Mr. Adelstein. And I thank you for
your appearance here today.
Sir, I believe we need an all-of-the-above technology
approach to close the digital divide. No single technology is,
by my lights, going to be the right solution for every
household's needs. There is a role to be played by multiple
proven technologies, including fixed, mobile, satellite, wired,
wireless, licensed, unlicensed, and others, to deliver
connectivity throughout America's vast geography and diverse
economy.
Mr. Adelstein, in your testimony you talk about the
importance of technological flexibility for resilient broadband
networks. Can you tell us, why is technological flexibility so
important? And what role does technological flexibility play in
ensuring resilient networks?
Mr. Adelstein. Great question. You know, technological
flexibility is important because--you know, one-size-fits-all
is an overused term, but what I was just saying to the Senator
was that you do not know what is going to come in the door. It
depends on the particular geography. It depends on the history
of network investment in that particular geography.
Sometimes, like in Denny's territory, fiber to his
remaining exchanges makes perfect sense and it goes right to
the end user. But another area that does not have that fiber
that he has built, and he does not have a provider that comes
in the door with a solid balance sheet, like he has, cannot be
able to provide that and stay in business because it is not a
very profitable area. There is a reason these areas are
unserved.
So, you want to find solid applicants and Congress does not
get to pick them. Ultimately, it has got to be whatever comes
in the door it is going to be--businesses decide they can serve
that area. Let the best technology win that meets a number of
concerns that Congress has.
If you have a gating criteria, for example symmetrical
speed service, then you are taking one priority, whether you
think it is important or not, or the upload speed, and saying
that is more important than mobility. You are saying upload
speed is more important than getting consumers broadband
quickly. Sometimes wireless can be deployed much more quickly.
And you asked about resiliency. When it comes to
resiliency, if you are talking about only fiber networks, they
can be very exposed to damage and they require power in the
home to work. Whereas, a fiber system, could more quickly be
restored because you only have to get power to the transmission
site and you only have to get back haul to that versus getting
fiber back up to, literally, you know, thousands and thousands
of homes that may be wiped out, and hundreds of fiber cuts. So,
you know--but in some places, that actually might make more
sense.
Particularly, in terms of resiliency, it is not even one-
size-fits-all within a category. Denny was talking about buried
fiber versus aerial. Buried is more resilient, but it is a lot
more expensive. So, you know, that is a tradeoff. And if you
sit here and----
Senator Young. So, this----
Mr. Adelstein. Go ahead.
Senator Young. I am sorry, sir. So, in short, or in
summary, this all-of-the-above approach that gives you
technological flexibility, you might call it, there is a
straight line from that approach to enticing your private
carriers and your not for profits and others into service
provision and in closing the digital divide. Is that accurate?
Mr. Adelstein. Yes, if you--yes, it is exactly right.
Because if you pick one technology, you are not going to close
the digital divide, because you are not necessarily going to
find a provider of that technology that is in a good position
to serve that area. Depending on the nature of that area,
whether it is mountainous, whether it is flat, whether they had
invested in fiber, whether they have not yet, whether there is
a nice tower there, whether there is not.
Senator Young. Yes.
Mr. Adelstein. I mean, you cannot, as a Congress, say we
are going to pick one standard and nobody gets in unless you
can do big, fat upload speeds. And that only allows one
technology and, by the way, not many people actually use upload
speeds. But guess what? They all use mobility. They want
resiliency. They want those networks to be there.
Senator Young. Yes.
Mr. Adelstein. Why do you not let the agencies have the
flexibility to consider other factors, besides just upload
speed and cutting out everybody that cannot do certain upload
speeds?
Senator Young. I can tell this is an area of passion for
you. And it is a really important area, as we contemplate how
to best use taxpayer dollars, and in closing the digital
divide. So, thank you for that answer.
I am going to ask you another question. One of my areas of
focus is ensuring that the United States is positioned to lead
the world in innovation and the development of new
technologies. As we think about advancing our international
competitiveness and leading the world in wireless innovation,
does it concern you that neither the Administration's budget
blueprint, nor its broadband plan seem to speak at all to the
need to win the race to deploy 5G?
Mr. Adelstein. I would like to see it mentioned. You know,
all the objectives of the President's American Jobs Plan
requires 5G and relies on 5G. From water to advanced
manufacturing to, of course, the broadband, but the jobs--we
are talking about creating 4.5 million jobs with 5G, which is
more than the entire American Jobs Plan. I think it might make
sense that it should be included, since the green future that
the President is committed to, really is going to rely on
mobile connectivity. Smart transportation, which is the big
focus, electric vehicles, reducing emissions all require 5G,
all of them.
So, I think, yes, it should be mentioned, and I think it
should be a part of the plan. If we want to meet the
President's objectives, it is going to have to be funded. And
to say that we are only going to fund wireline networks, when
everything else the President wants to see, from reducing
climate change to smart transportation to electric cars,
autonomous vehicles, is going to require wireless connectivity.
Why would you take these funds that you have and use them
to achieve all of these goals, instead of saying we only have
one goal, and by the way, that goal is upload speed? That is
it. You cannot make the upload speed; we are not going to worry
about global warming. We are not going to worry about electric
vehicles. We are not going to worry about autonomous vehicles.
We are not going to worry about mobility. That is what would
happen if you put a narrow technological standard in statute,
and you do not allow the flexibility for the agencies to
consider other Congressional priorities, other Administration
priorities.
Senator Young. Thanks so much for that answer. Let it be
known to my constituents and colleagues that, ensuring the U.S.
wins the race to deploy 5G is a priority of their senator.
Mr. Adelstein. Well, we appreciate that very much.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Young. Chief Johnson, the
threat of wildfires has become a constant factor in states like
New Mexico. Just last week, New Mexico communities, like those
in much of the West, we experienced, for the most part, record-
breaking, triple degree heat earlier than we have experienced
it in some time, even before Summer officially even really
began.
The increasing threat of wildfires to communication
networks, has prompted states to act. The California Public
Utilities Commission issued orders to require wireless and
wireline providers, in the areas most prone to wildfire, to
equip cell towers with 72 hours of backup power.
Chief Johnson, can you discuss the role backup power
sources play for emergency response during wildfire?
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator. Well, I think the most
important thing is that those networks work, and the wireless
capacity is adequate, and that they sustain long enough so that
the--so that the operational period is sustained, with that
wireless infrastructure.
That cost has currently been borne by the wireless carriers
themselves, or by the people that own the towers and the
infrastructure associated with it. That is currently who is
funding that. So, anything that the Federal Government can do--
can do that would be a dollar in from the government or a
dollar in from industry--anything that speeds deployment of
backup power, we think is a wise choice.
Senator Lujan. And Chief Johnson, should cell towers in
areas susceptible to wildfires be equipped with backup power
sources, when technically feasible?
Mr. Johnson. We believe that wireless towers should be
equipped with backup power. Now, that does not mean,
necessarily, that every tower for every purpose needs backup
power. A lot of that depends on the architecture of the
network. What we would encourage, and you have heard it here by
some of the witnesses today, is to provide the agencies the
flexibility to take a look at the network architecture and
achieve the goal and measure the goal. But we believe they do
require backup power when it is a key site and that will only
be determined by the architecture itself.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. And Chief Johnson, the next
question I am asking is, because I have heard this from critics
and folks that have been pushing back against getting redundant
power and backup power. How do you ensure that the backup power
itself does not become a risk? No one wants anyone to be
hauling diesel fuel through what is, effectively, dry timber.
What are your thoughts there?
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator. Well, you know, as a
firefighter, I do not see hauling diesel, or diesel's presence
in a wildfire environment as a risk. These wildfires are moving
commonly at a mile a minute. The are moving ahead of the fire
front, five and six miles at a time. If the ember cast
component to wildfires is the risk, the intensity of these
wildfires is consuming everything on the top of a mountaintop
or the infrastructure. Adding a few hundred gallons of diesel
will not materially affect the size, scope, and scale of that
fire.
So, to us, the most important thing is that those towers
and facilities are operating for as long as possible. And you
can deal with the combustibility and the survivability of those
sites, through the size of the compounds, by making sure that
the setbacks of the vegetation are such that we can do
retardant drops ahead of the fire and that we can actually
deploy resources in there to protect those sites. It is a
priority operationally to protect those sites. That said, you
can protect three or four sites and lose an aerial back haul
fiber line and lose the whole thing.
So, you do have to look at this systemically, Senator.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate your clarification. Now, it is
no secret that this hearing is taking place in the middle of
ongoing negotiations of what could be historic Federal funding
for broadband infrastructure. Now is the time to get Federal
investment in broadband right and that means investing in
resilient, redundant, secure broadband networks.
Just a couple questions that I have left. When a single
community has access to multiple broadband providers, does that
benefit the community's resilience to communications outages?
Chief Johnson, yes or no?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, in general.
Senator Lujan. I will come back to you.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Law, yes or no?
Mr. Law. Not necessarily, no.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Adelstein?
Mr. Adelstein. Yes.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Feld?
Mr. Feld. Absolutely.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. Chief Johnson, you want to
expand on that?
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator. When market conditions
exist that would allow for the presence of multiple providers,
then I think adding redundancy to any network adds
survivability of the network. And I operate from that
assumption.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Law, do you have a quick response, sir?
Mr. Law. To clarify a little further, Mr. Chair, two items.
As it relates to who are the second network providers, or the
additional network providers connected to? So, you may have
situations where there may be a second provider in town. They
came in, quite frankly, they provided service to the five
largest customers in Wall, South Dakota, where I grew up, and
they go out the other side of town, and away they go. I do not
find a large material amount of value to that, from a
resiliency and a redundancy perspective, as it relates to those
small, you know, situations of competitors picking and choosing
who they may serve, but say, you know, providing these large
community benefits.
So, that is a reason for my not necessarily answer. It
depends if there is another provider that is committing to
serve all those institutions, residential, not redlining
neighborhoods and other items, then, yes, that would be the
case.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. Mr. Feld, we have seen a
lot of different responses, including from Federal agencies
like the FCC, when it comes to natural disasters and full
recovery, delaying families, schools, and businesses trying to
rebuild. How did the responses to Hurricane Maria differ from
FCC responses to other disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina,
Superstorm Sandy, and Hurricane Michael? Commissioner and
Acting Chair Rosenworcel has said, for example, ``It's time for
the FCC to develop a consistent and reliable approach to
ensuring the resiliency of networks in disaster''.
Mr. Feld. Yes, the response to Maria was highly unusual. In
the case of Katrina and Sandy both, the FCC, number one,
engaged in significant on the ground activity. I participated
in a conference call that was hosted by then FCC Chair Kevin
Martin, in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, where all
stakeholders were brought together to solve the problem of,
what can we do in this catastrophe.
During Katrina, the FCC, the Chair of the Relevant Bureau,
David Turetsky, and Chairman Genachowski were constantly
keeping the public informed, bringing together stakeholders to
ensure that there was activity. And in both of those cases,
they convened taskforce to conduct an investigation. Hundreds
of pages of testimony that culminated in Commission reports
with significant recommendations and many rule changes that
have put in place and have benefited resilient networks to this
day.
None of this was done in response to Hurricane Maria. The
public inquiry that the FCC conducted afterwards was grudging
and handled at an extremely low level of the bureau. I find it
unfortunate that, whereas after both Katrina and Sandy there
were full Commission hearings in the devastation zone. After
Maria, there were a few press junkets by the Chair to Puerto
Rico. But it was--frankly, the FCC's response was inadequate
and disgraceful.
And yes, we need to have standardized responses to
disaster. And Congress should include a mandatory reporting
requirement, investigation requirement to ensure that the FCC
takes appropriate steps following a disaster, particularly one
of that magnitude.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. What happened with Maria
is just simply unacceptable. People were left without access to
anything, including lack of a timely response with getting
connected.
Mr. Adelstein, after hearing from Chief Johnson and Mr.
Feld and the question that I asked around Hurricane Maria, do
you support FCC regulation that requires a certain level of
resiliency in communication infrastructure and mandates the
restoration of services in a timely fashion?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, you know, Maria is a good example. I
mean, there was--it was devastating in Puerto Rico what
happened. I mean, it was unbelievable devastation. And you look
at the response from my industry--and I can only speak for my
industry--80 percent of the citizens of Puerto Rico were
restored service by wireless.
Now, this is something, when we go to resiliency, it is
different for different technologies in different areas. Within
2 weeks we had cells on light trucks, providing 2,800 calls an
hour. The wireless industry can respond very quickly and did
respond very quickly. And it is not the fault, or lack of
commitment by wireline providers that they could not respond
more quickly. When you have devastation to every--to every pole
in the state of--in the territory of Puerto Rico, what can they
do? You know, you cannot restore it.
But when you think about resiliency, one size really does
not fit all. And the industry did look at that and said, what
can we do. As a matter of fact, we buried back haul after
Maria--one of our providers, one of my members said, we cannot
have our back haul up there on aerial anymore. And we talked
about being more expensive, well, now we are learning lessons
from that. And I think one of the great lessons that we learned
is that wireless service was restored much more quickly than
wireline service.
And this is not just in that situation. In Florida, I mean,
I could give example after example. I would like to put in
record examples of how quickly we have restored wireless
service. And it is not because we care more than fiber
providers. They care equally. We are all committed. We
understand we are in an industry that people rely on for life
and death. But the question is, we have a technology that if we
can just get one transmissionsite up, we can cover vast areas.
And when you have a technology that is, for example, fiber to
the home, where you have--you have wires out to every single
home, you have got to restore, potentially hundreds or
thousands--in the case of, you know, Puerto Rico, hundreds of
thousands of connections that you have to restore.
And that is why, when you think about resiliency, I think
it is important to think about having multiple technologies.
The advantages of each one--and it is very hard--as a former
regulator myself, I think regulators do need to be vigilant. I
think Harold is right that, the fact that they really rode hard
after Sandy, we have made major improvements. The fact that
they really ride on the industry and say, you know, tell us
what you did. Tell us how you can improve. Let us work
together. The industry has come together in consortia. They
have come together working with electrical companies, because
so much of it relies on the electric grid. We have done much
better, and I think we can continue to do better. And I do not
think that regulators ought to let up.
But I am not sure--and, you know, we are willing to engage
in these rulemakings--that there is one rule that we could put
in place that fits for all these different circumstances. And
certainly, it is a very different circumstance for wireline and
wireless.
So, when you have got, as you mentioned, this enormous pot
of money--you have the biggest carrot you have ever had to feed
resiliency, instead of regulations--saying do it this way, do
it that way--say, we are going to reward those applications
that are more resilient. Make us prove that we are going to be
able to get service restored quickly. Say, you are not getting
the funding unless you can reliably--and we will kick the tires
to make sure you can really do it--get service restored quickly
to all the customers, or to a certain percentage of them.
And you know, I think that if you do that, you will find
out that mobile networks actually can--and wireless, fixed
wireless, as well--can respond really quite quickly, and more
quickly, in some cases, than wireline. In other cases, wireline
can be very reliable. You know, within each technology--buried
fiber can be more some resilient, in some cases, than aerial
fiber. And buried fiber might not be resilient in an area where
there is--it is flood prone, like in--in the south of the
country, along the coast.
So, you know, it is hard to come up with a regulation that
fits for everybody. But it is very, I think, easy for Congress
to say, we have all this money. What are we going to do with
it? What are we going to prioritize? Do not tie agencies' hands
and say you can only consider one type of application. You can
only consider wireline, without thinking about, does that limit
the flexibility to have more resilient networks that can
respond like they did in Puerto Rico.
Senator Lujan. So, would you say that is a yes or no to
supporting the FCC regulation that--or supporting the FCC
regulation that requires a certain level of resiliency and
communication infrastructure and mandates the restoration of
services in a timely fashion?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, it depends what it says. I would say--
I would say maybe. And we will certainly work with the FCC and
I think we might be able to come behind it. There is a
resilient act that you have----
Senator Lujan. Maybe is OK. So, you would be--you feel
comfortable representing the organization that you are doing,
that is substantial, to participate with the FCC and with your
expertise as a former FCC Commissioner and rulemaking, around
this.
Mr. Adelstein. We would certainly work with them in a
rulemaking and see if we could come up with something that
deals with all of the many different categories. But, you know,
narrow requirements and mandates, I think, ultimately------
Senator Lujan. I will take yes or no here.
Mr. Adelstein. OK.
Senator Lujan. Because you went on a little longer and I
did not gavel you down. But that--that is--I appreciate that.
And anything else, please submit it to the record on that one,
Mr. Adelstein.
There has been a lot of chatter about rural areas, and I
very much appreciate the attention to modernization, when it
comes to precision agriculture. Mr. Law, as discussed,
precision agriculture, its critical application. In 2019, the
USDA published a report that stated, ``As technology advances,
and the volumes of data to manage agriculture production grow,
higher speeds will likely be necessary, requiring more
symmetric data flows''. Should there be a minimum standard
required for both up and down connections, to prepare the
network for precision agriculture?
Mr. Law. I think there should be, Senator--or Chairman, for
a couple of reasons. One is, in terms of, again, the
applications and the usage of the network, both today and for
tomorrow, I will say connected ag is a great example, in terms
of the gigabytes of data that is generated from the connected
ag environment. Whether it is in live time, or in a stored
basis that is later uploaded to the--I will say, to the cloud,
for lack of a better phrase, I do think that there should be
minimum standards.
And I think that is also a cautionary tale, in terms of
understanding the need between deploying the technology and
things that technology--current technologies are capable of
doing versus deploying technology that will meet the needs of
broadband subscribers, not just today, not just tomorrow, but
generations in the future. That is the question I think
Congress will have to answer with that. But yes.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. Mr. Adelstein, I am going
to ask you the same question I asked Mr. O'Rielly, former FCC
Commissioner. What broadband speed do you have at home?
Mr. Adelstein. It is about 80--I happen to have Fios. I do
have fiber to the home spot--80 down and similar up, a little
less than 100.
Senator Lujan. That is pretty good, really good. I will
share with you what I shared with Mr. O'Rielly is, that is all
that I am asking for people to be able to get. Whether they
live in a city or they live out in the country. You know, we
can have a conversation, a debate about this, but what I am
looking at is, what is it going to take for us to live up to
the commitment, to make sure that we have equitable speeds in
rural, as well as urban? And it is my understanding that most
people that live in urban settings and in cities, they have a
choice between a cable company or a fiber line that they can
get up to gigabit connection. That is just not something that
is available in rural areas.
Our national commitments in this area has always been to
make sure that rural and underserved communities be on that
equal playing field. And what I am looking at is for an
investment with public funds to ensure that kind of equal
opportunity.
And the reason I am raising this with you is because of the
back and forth with looking at wireless versus wireline. It
should not be seen that way. Wireless depends on fiber, too, as
we all know. We need to be making investments that will help us
achieve those same opportunities in rural America and in the
frontier communities, as we have in cities.
And so, as a matter of engineering and technology and
economics, would you say that wireless performs and scales the
same as fiber?
Mr. Adelstein. Not in terms of upload speeds. As a matter
of fact, the way the networks are engineered, that is why
upload speed is, kind of, being used as something that can
block mobile service.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate--I appreciate--that is--I agree
with that. Now, the last question that I have is, it surprised
me when I read this, which I think goes to a big part of the
conversation we are having today. I believe that we need to
have the inclusion of a comprehensive network solution in
America. While I joined many of my colleagues in asking for
Chairman Pai to delay the RDOF auctions, because of the
concerns that were shared today by Senator Capito, we are now
finding that areas that have the highest Internet connection
speeds in the country qualify as areas that will benefit from
the RDOF auction. I do not think that was the intent. And it is
why we all should be looking at this.
Now, with that being said, recently, AT&T, the Senior EVP
and CFO, Mr. Desroches said that he thinks, I quote, ``Fiber is
the only product out there that delivers the performance
necessary for telehealth, online education, remote work--''. He
even goes on to talk about the importance of demand for
symmetrical speeds over time.
If AT&T, who is one of the most significant wireless
providers today is now saying--and this was from January--
sorry, June 18, 2021--that that is where they are going, what
do I read into that?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, AT&T is a member of mine and my
understanding is that they seek flexibility, as well. I mean,
we all think fiber is wonderful if it makes sense for a
particular area, like it would in Mr. Law's territory. I think
that Congress has to think about getting good wireless and
wireline service. It is not fiber versus wireless--fiber and
wireless.
We have talked before about how many people are frustrated
that there is not wireless service in certain areas. And even
in my, you know, neighborhood sometimes this thing, it does not
work as well as I might want but, you know, we want to make
that comparable, too. And so, the question is, what gets the
consumer what they need? And consumers really----
Senator Lujan. Can I ask you a follow up in that space?
Mr. Adelstein. Yes.
Senator Lujan. Does wireless substitute for wireline
connectivity?
Mr. Adelstein. It absolutely does. It is doing it today.
Senator Lujan. It does?
Mr. Adelstein. It does. You have got 20 percent of the
population today----
Senator Lujan. So, what I--and I am going to push back a
little bit here. When I asked the question about the
engineering, your response to me was no, that in fact, what I
stated, which is that the engineering and technology and
economies that wireless performs and scales the same as fiber,
the answer to that question is no, it is not.
So, it is hard for me to not push back in saying that it
does replace wireline. There is a reason why you and I both
have a wireline connection where we live, not a wireless
connection that is providing us the up and down speeds that we
need to communicate with our constituents, with consumers, and
with members.
So, I agree that they should--we should be working to look
at a comprehensive approach here. But you would still argue
that, in fact, wireless can replace wireline and get the same
architecture that I just laid out, with the foundation of that
question, is that from an engineering and technological and
economic perspective, wireless performs and scales the same as
fiber?
Mr. Adelstein. Not only can it, it is. One in five
Americans are using their smartphone as their only broadband
connection. You can put this into a laptop and get 100--in 5G
you can get--and even 4G, get 100 megabit download speed.
Consumers, our customers, are not using upload, 1 to 10, using
one-tenth the amount of upload they are download. So, your
question was can they do equal to upload? And I said, you know,
really they cannot, because these things--the power coming out
of this is not the same as the power coming out of the tower.
So, an advantage of fiber is it has better upload. That
should not be used as something to not allow rural consumers
the choice to use this, and 1 in 5 consumers have, as their
connection to the internet. It is absolutely substitutable. If
you get fixed wireless into the home, you can get even better
levels of service, and you can do it more quickly. Instead of
waiting, potentially, 10 years, as the Fiber Broadband
Association studies showed, you can get it done within months,
or a year or two.
I mean, there is a lot of tradeoffs. But if upload speed is
the only thing you want, I would say, yes, fiber is going to
give you bigger upload speeds, due to the nature of the
architecture. But if you are saying what do consumers need,
they are using 1 to 10. Even if it doubles, 1 in 5, you are not
going to need fiber to meet the vast bulk of consumers'
applications. And for precision ag, it does not need that level
of upload.
Senator Lujan. So, would you support eliminating data caps
from wireless companies?
Mr. Adelstein. Well, when you go to a fixed wireless, there
are no data caps, generally speaking. You can get a service
that has no data caps. Now, if you are doing mobile----
Senator Lujan. Would you support eliminating data caps from
wireless plans in America?
Mr. Adelstein. No, I mean, it is up to the--to the company
to decide if they--what they want to do. And it is up to the
customers to decide what they want to buy. If the customer
wants to buy an unlimited plan, they can. And fixed wireless,
which is the best substitute----
Senator Lujan. Let me push back on you there, Mr.
Adelstein. And I know I have to close this hearing. If
someone--you said, if someone wants to get an unlimited plan,
they can. No, they cannot. Not if they cannot afford it. When
there is a 16-year--16-year-old little girl from New Mexico,
her name is Helene Archuleta, that lives on the Navajo Nation.
She was my special guest for President Biden's Joint Address to
the Congress earlier this year. Because we did it remotely, she
could not watch it because her and her mom cannot afford an
unlimited plan. She can barely do her homework.
And using the example that, if 5G in wireless is the answer
here, there cannot be data caps on these families. It is a
thing of the past. That is an old technology. It is like long
distance calling. People should not be charged for long
distance calling anymore, I believe. Because, if you have a
wireless phone in your house--I do this with my mom all the
time. When she is going to call a family member that lives out
of state and she picks up her landline, I say, ``Wait a minute,
Mom, you are going to pay for that one''. She goes, ``Oh, yes,
yes'', and she pulls out her wireless phone and then, she makes
the call, and it does not charge her that extra fee.
And then, you know, we talk about funding USF and--that is
not a responsible way for us to be looking at funding Lifeline
or USF. We have got to modernize there. And so, I just want to
make sure that when we are making these investments, and I
completely agree with the goals here to find ways to make
investments that we are going to reduce emissions in America.
In the biggest cities, yes. Precision farming, those tractors
are going to work. They communicate both ways.
How do we make sure we get those speeds? Wireless is going
to be a solution, but it is going to take long. It is going to
take intense back haul when it comes to the fiber, as well.
But I want rural customers to be able to have those speeds,
as well. I want my firefighters to be equipped. When they have
technology on them, that becomes their eyes and ears, so that a
camera can be on their back and on their front and you have
someone at the command center saying, be careful. There is
something coming right at you or something behind you. Or if
someone goes down because of an accident or inhalation, you can
get them out of there. That is what 5G is going to help
deliver.
I want us all to work together but not diminish another
while we are trying to promote another here. And so, this has
been an important hearing for me. I think it has been an
important hearing for our colleagues. And I very much
appreciate the perspective of each and every one of the
witnesses today.
Now, with that, if I do not close this hearing correctly, I
am going to get into some trouble. So, I want to thank all of
the witnesses for their productive discussion today. And the
hearing record will remain open for two weeks, until July 6,
2021. Any senators that would like to submit questions for the
record for the witnesses, should do so by that date. And we ask
that your responses be returned to the Committee by July 20 of
2021.
That concludes today's hearing and again, I thank everyone
for their time today. Thanks so much.
[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Table of Contents
Introduction
The Perfect Storm: Colonialism and Government Apathy Meet Hurricanes
Irma and Maria
Just Reconstruction Efforts Must Include Just Access to Communications
The Voices of Puerto Ricans Must Be Heard
What Congress and the FCC Must Do to Help Puerto Rico Build a Resilient
Communications System
Timeline of Events and Related Oversight Questions
Next Steps
Appendix: Puerto Ricans Share Their Stories on How Puerto Rico's
Communications Crisis Impacted Their Lives After Hurricane Maria
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Acknowledgements
REPORT AUTHORS
Leo Fitzpatrick, Carmen Scurato and Joseph Torres
The Free Press Puerto Rico working group made this report possible.
Members include Teresa Basilio Gaztambide, Lucia Martinez, Nilda Muhr,
Yesenia Perez-Algarin and Misty Perez Truedson.
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Introduction
The ability to communicate during and after a disaster is a life-
and-death matter. And few disasters better exemplify this need than
Hurricanes Irma and Maria, which devastated Puerto Rico in September
2017.
Hurricane Irma struck on Sept. 6 and left more than a million
people without power while weakening Puerto Rico's already fragile
infrastructure. Then on Sept. 20, Hurricane Maria--a Category 4 storm--
destroyed the islands' infrastructure. It left nearly the entire
population without power and knocked out Puerto Rico's communications
networks.
Between 3,000-5,000 people died, making Maria one of the deadliest
disasters in U.S. history.\1\ And the inability of Puerto Ricans to
make calls or access life-saving information contributed to the death
toll.
Nazario Lugo, president of Puerto Rico's Association of Emergency
Managers, captured the crisis in an interview with the Associated Press
in March 2019: ``The biggest crisis after Maria was communication . . .
that unleashed an endless number of problems.'' \2\
The tragedy that continues to unfold in Puerto Rico isn't just the
result of the storm. The word ``natural''--often used to describe a
disaster like Hurricane Maria--should be removed from any descriptions
of what happened on the islands.
The disaster can't be separated from the history of more than 100
years of U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico, a history of wealth
extraction, systemic racism and economic exploitation that left the
islands' critical infrastructure--including the communications
networks--fragile and vulnerable.
Colonialism has also led to the willful neglect of Puerto Ricans'
basic needs. This has been the case in the wake of Hurricanes Irma and
Maria, where the focus has been on debt repayment and austerity
measures to ``reduce costs'' rather than on rebuilding and ensuring
access to critical services. Meanwhile, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and other government entities--including the Federal
Communications Commission--have failed to respond adequately to the
disasters that unfolded.
The FCC, the government agency responsible for ensuring that the
media and telecom companies it regulates serve the public interest, has
yet to conduct a vigorous investigation into the failure of the
islands' communications infrastructure, which was a major factor in the
death toll.
This report's goal is to call attention to the critical need to
examine and investigate all of the causes for the collapse of the
communications networks. There are dozens of key questions posed
throughout this document that Congress must demand answers to if we are
to ensure a crisis like this isn't repeated.
It's deeply troubling how little interest the FCC has shown in
analyzing what went wrong and using this information to shape its
policies on communication rights and public safety.
So far, the FCC has failed to:
Convene an independent commission--as it did after Hurricane
Katrina--tasked with thoroughly investigating the
communications blackout.
Directly engage with the affected communities in Puerto Rico
through field hearings to inform the agency's policies.
Be forthcoming and transparent with information regarding
its work to restore communications after the 2017 hurricanes.
Adequately respond to the gravity of the communications
crisis in Puerto Rico as it has to crises in other parts of the
United States.
Abandon its efforts to dismantle the Lifeline program, which
would directly undermine Puerto Ricans' ability to afford
telephone and broadband services.
Hold telecom companies accountable for the amount of time
they took to restore services.
Implement sufficient measures to identify potential misuse
of the Federal funds the FCC set aside for recovery work.
Take necessary steps to ensure that telecom companies
deliver on promises to accelerate reconstruction.
Provide access to Spanish-language translations for all
Puerto Rico-related material.
This is why we're calling on Congress to ensure the FCC adopts
policies that address the underlying causes of the prolonged outage in
Puerto Rico. Affected communities should be part of the design and
governance of their local communications infrastructure and funds
should be allocated to support self-sustaining and resilient
communities.
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The Perfect Storm: Colonialism and Government Apathy Meet Hurricanes
Irma and Maria
Understanding the history of colonialism in Puerto Rico is
essential to creating policies that will address the economic,
political, social and racial inequities shaping the islands'
reconstruction efforts. These inequities played a central role in the
tragedy of Hurricanes Irma and Maria. And they're why the fight for a
just reconstruction of Puerto Rico is a critical racial-justice issue.
Puerto Rico has been a colonial possession of the United States for
more than a century. During this time, the Federal government has
imposed predatory economic policies that have allowed U.S. companies to
extract enormous profits from the islands at the expense of Puerto
Ricans and Puerto Rico itself.
That legacy of colonialism continues to this day. In 2016, Congress
passed legislation that created an unelected fiscal-oversight board
tasked with restructuring Puerto Rico's debt, which had ballooned to
$120 billion after Federal tax breaks \3\ for U.S. companies operating
in Puerto Rico ended in 2006.
Unlike other cities in the United States, Puerto Rico doesn't have
the legal recourse to declare bankruptcy. The islands lost that right
in 1984 due to an amendment inserted into a bankruptcy bill.\4\ Now,
the fiscal-oversight board is implementing punitive austerity measures
that will further punish Puerto Ricans trying to recover from a
historic tragedy.
The U.S. government has failed to provide the kind of economic
support needed for the recovery and reconstruction of the islands.
Puerto Rico has received less Federal relief in the wake of Hurricanes
Irma and Maria than other parts of the United States that suffered
significant hurricane-related damages in 2017.
In addition, President Donald Trump reportedly told congressional
leaders that Puerto Rico should not receive further Federal assistance
for programs like food stamps.\5\
Trump has also repeatedly lied about how much Federal assistance
Puerto Rico has received and has made racist statements about Puerto
Ricans.\6\ His message is clear: Puerto Ricans don't deserve help, an
attitude that's reflected in his administration's failure to respond
adequately to the disaster on the islands.\7\
This refusal to respond appropriately extends to the FCC.
Just Reconstruction Efforts Must Include Just Access to Communications
The FCC has failed to conduct a comprehensive investigation that
examines all of the factors that led to the collapse of the islands'
communications networks--or to hold telecom providers accountable for
the slow pace of service restoration.
While the FCC has allocated more than $100 million in new Federal
funding to restore communications services and build more resilient
networks on the islands, the Commission has failed to put in place an
adequate oversight process to ensure that the telecom companies
receiving this funding spend the money for its intended purposes.
The FCC has a history of investigating communication failures and
holding public hearings following disasters. It's historically done so
to inform its policymaking and prevent such failures from happening
again. For example, this is what the FCC did after Hurricane Katrina
devastated communications in Louisiana and other Gulf states.
Chairman Ajit Pai's indifference to the communications crisis in
Puerto Rico speaks volumes about the islands' colonial status. When Pai
visited Puerto Rico, he met with telecom-company officials but failed
to hold a single public hearing.
By contrast, consider Pai's urgent response in October 2018 after
Hurricane Michael struck the Florida Panhandle. Pai immediately ordered
his agency to investigate the failure of telecommunications providers
to quickly restore service. The chairman's decisive action came just
weeks before Election Day, which saw Republican candidates in that
region running in close gubernatorial and senatorial races.
Chairman Pai has failed to show the same urgency with Puerto Rico.
This is unacceptable.
Over the past year, Free Press has called on the FCC to appoint an
independent commission to investigate the causes of the islands'
communications failure. And last November, we submitted Freedom of
Information Act requests to both the FCC and FEMA to learn more about
how our government agencies responded to the islands' communications
crises. FEMA is as critical as the FCC to rebuilding the communications
networks due to the agency's central role in coordinating disaster-
recovery efforts.
To date, only the FCC has provided documents, with an initial
production of 52 consumer complaints received on April 30, 2019. The
agency has claimed it will take years to provide all of the complaints
it has received, and this delay is further evidence of how it's failing
to prioritize Puerto Ricans' essential communication needs.
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The Voices of Puerto Ricans Must Be Heard
It's crucial that we hold the FCC accountable so we understand why
communications networks in Puerto Rico collapsed and how that breakdown
has impacted the lives of the people on the islands. Congress has an
essential role to play in ensuring the FCC fulfills its
responsibilities in this regard.
Since Hurricane Maria hit, Free Press has worked to ensure the
voices of Puerto Ricans are heard and prioritized when it comes to
policies adopted to restore and rebuild Puerto Rico's
telecommunications infrastructure. This is a personal issue for many
Free Press staffers who are Puerto Rican and have family living on the
islands.
Last year, we submitted comments to the FCC that included
heartbreaking stories that Puerto Ricans shared with us on how the
islands' communications crisis prevented them from learning whether
their loved ones were alive or able to access the help they desperately
needed (see appendix).
Free Press and Resilient Just Technologies also traveled to Puerto
Rico and held story circles--intimate community gatherings--to allow
participants to share their stories on how the loss of communications
affected their lives. Residents of Comerio and Vieques discussed how
the communications blackout limited their mobility, their ability to
find food, water and medical care, and their capacity to seek out their
loved ones.\8\
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What Congress and the FCC Must Do to Help Puerto Rico Build a Resilient
Communications System
As U.S. government actions--and inactions--have worsened a massive
humanitarian crisis, it's the FCC's duty to investigate what went wrong
and to adopt policies that prevent the islands' communications networks
from collapsing in the future.
In this report, Free Press shares essential actions Congress should
compel the FCC to take in Puerto Rico and offers key policy suggestions
that can be applied to future disasters anywhere in the country:
The FCC, in coordination with other Federal agencies or
Congress, must form an independent commission to conduct a
comprehensive and expedited investigation of every major or
prolonged communications outage, regardless of where it occurs
in the country. The Commission must produce a detailed report
for each discrete outage that includes a critical assessment of
agency actions, or inactions, and provides clear, actionable
recommendations or proposed regulations to prevent the
recurrence of such outages.
he FCC must immediately and directly engage with affected
communities, hold public field hearings in such communities,
and provide access to potentially life-saving information in
languages appropriate for these communities.
The FCC must apply its expertise and promulgate regulations,
including recommending actions or regulations for other
federal, state or territorial agencies, to a) address the known
underlying causes of prolonged outages and b) engage in a
longer-term examination and rulemaking to strengthen resilient-
network infrastructure.
The FCC must be more transparent, provide clear and
measurable requirements for funds allocated to network-recovery
work, and hold telecom providers accountable for unreasonable
delays to ensure recovery efforts accelerate the restoration of
services and increase network resiliency.
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Timeline of Events and Related Oversight Questions
As Congress works to address Puerto Rico's urgent and unmet needs,
Free Press offers the following timeline of events along with key
questions for lawmakers to ask the FCC about rebuilding resilient
communications networks for the islands.
2017
SEPTEMBER. Hurricane Irma unleashes tropical storm-force winds in
Puerto Rico, knocking out electricity for 1.1 million people. Two weeks
later, Hurricane Maria makes landfall as a Category 4 storm. As a
result, Puerto Rico experiences one of the most extensive and lengthy
communication blackouts in modern U.S. history.\9\ Right away 95
percent of cell sites are knocked out of service; two days after
landfall, 97 percent of radio stations remain off the air, and not a
single TV station is broadcasting.\10\ Subsequent reports indicate that
the lack of power and accessible communications contributed to the
3,000-5,000 lives lost and hindered recovery work.\11\ The FCC
activates the Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS), a web-based
system launched in 2007 in response to Hurricane Katrina that telecom
carriers use to report communications-infrastructure status and
situational-awareness information during a disaster to coordinating
agencies and first responders. DIRS functions on an entirely voluntary
basis.
OCTOBER. Free Press joins a letter commending the FCC for advancing
$76.9 million to restore communications services and urges the
implementation of additional measures to swiftly restore
communications.\12\ The agency forms an internal Hurricane Recovery
Task Force to: coordinate across bureaus and offices throughout the
FCC; support the restoration of communications services following the
2017 hurricane season; and focus on the ``challenges facing Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.'' \13\
Then-Ranking Member Frank Pallone Jr. of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee calls for a ``Commission level review'' to
strengthen the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework based on his
own constituents' experiences following Superstorm Sandy (2017 Pallone
Wireless Framework Letter).\14\ The framework is an industry-led, self-
policing and voluntary guidance that defines the actions wireless
providers agree to take following a disaster.
NOVEMBER. FCC Chairman Pai visits the islands to survey the damage
and meets with government officials coordinating recovery efforts. He
also meets with various representatives from communications entities,
including AT&T, Claro, Liberty, Open Mobile, T-Mobile and Verizon--but
fails to hold a single public hearing.\15\
DECEMBER. The pace of recovery is excruciatingly slow: Less than 5
percent of TV stations are back on the air; 66 percent of radio
stations are still out; and cable and landline phone services are, in
the FCC's own words, ``generally nonexistent.'' \16\
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
How effective and accurate was the information the FCC
collected through DIRS and does that information hold insights
on how each telecom provider restored services?
Did inaccuracies or lack of access to information slow down
or impede subsequent recovery efforts? How can the FCC remedy
the way it addresses such obstacles?
Should DIRS, and another arrangement with industry discussed
below, continue to be entirely voluntary?
How did Puerto Ricans rely on these aggregated DIRS reports
to make decisions for their families? Considering that publicly
available DIRS information provides only the percentage of cell
sites operating in a given area, how would the public and on-
the-ground first responders benefit from having access to more
accurate coverage maps and outage information?
DECEMBER. The FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
opens an inquiry into the ``resiliency of the communications
infrastructure, the effectiveness of emergency communications, and
government and industry responses to the 2017 hurricane season.'' \17\
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why has the FCC refused to assemble an independent panel
like the one it convened after Hurricane Katrina?
Why has the agency failed to examine whether stakeholders
actually applied the lessons learned from past investigations?
What is the composition of the agency's Hurricane Recovery
Task Force? How often does it meet and what activities is it
undertaking? What is the task force's role in responding to the
2017 Atlantic hurricane season?
2018
JANUARY. The Government Accountability Office releases a report on
the industry-led Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework.
In response to extensive network outages following Superstorm
Sandy, the FCC opened a rulemaking proceeding in 2013 to ``promote
transparency to consumers as to how mobile wireless networks compare in
maintaining operations during major emergencies'' to spur providers
into improving network resiliency.\18\ After a fierce backlash from
providers, the agency closed the 2013 proceeding and adopted the
industry-proposed framework in place of regulations protecting the
public.
The GAO report on the framework finds the FCC doesn't have a means
to evaluate the progress of the initial implementation of the
framework; the FCC and industry's broad goals for the framework don't
have any specific metrics to assess progress toward these goals; and
the FCC didn't have plans to communicate information about the
framework to public-safety officials and other stakeholders.\19\ The
report recommends ``[m]ore robust measures and a better plan to monitor
the framework [to] help [the] FCC collect information on the framework
and evaluate its effectiveness.'' \20\
The FCC agrees with the GAO's recommendations.
MARCH. Chairman Pai again visits the islands with unidentified
members of his internal Hurricane Recovery Task Force. The related
press release and subsequent mentions of the visit include no
information on the makeup or activities of the group.\21\ FCC
Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel also visits Puerto Rico and speaks
with members of communities most impacted by the hurricane.\22\
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why has the FCC publicized the chairman's visits to Puerto
Rico but withheld important details about the task force's
policy priorities, or even its membership?
Who serves on the task force, what has it done, and who has
it interacted with in government and industry?
The FCC proposes a $954-million plan for rebuilding telecom
networks in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Hurricane Maria's severity forces the agency to track and publish
DIRS outage reports for 182 days--the longest, by a wide margin, for
any U.S. disaster-recovery effort since DIRS' creation.
APRIL. Free Press and the National Hispanic Media Coalition (NHMC)
file joint comments in the FCC's inquiry, highlighting stories from
Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rican diaspora and demanding that the agency
fully engage with Puerto Ricans by holding field hearings on the
islands, publishing key documents in Spanish, and giving the public
information on the task force.
Free Press and NHMC also call on the FCC to consider how its plan
to gut the Lifeline program would disconnect many Puerto Ricans--who
participate in the subsidy program at twice the national average.\23\
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why did the FCC largely ignore the reasonable requests
issued by Free Press and NHMC?
Why didn't the FCC and FEMA have the Spanish-language
expertise to communicate critical public-safety information?
Why is the FCC still considering its 2017 proposed changes
to Lifeline--a program expanded under President George W. Bush
in response to the displacement Hurricane Katrina caused--given
that this plan would directly undermine families in Puerto Rico
who are still living under precarious conditions?
The FCC's Public Safety Bureau holds a single public workshop on
its inquiry--in Washington, D.C.--to ``identify communications
information needs of government and consumers to improve preparation
and response efforts during crises.'' The FCC invites federal, state,
local and territorial government representatives to attend and includes
a panel of consumer groups--but excludes industry stakeholders, the
very carriers the agency is supposed to regulate.\24\
This exclusion insulates the providers from exposure to public
scrutiny. As a result, there's no opportunity to learn about the
conversations these carriers had with the FCC on restoring and
rebuilding the islands' communications networks. Excluding these
providers also allows the FCC to avoid public discussion of potential
regulation that could hold the carriers accountable.
For example, during the event, the FCC presses the consumer panel
to discuss one tangible ``improvement'' for a crowdsourced disaster-
information application. Such thinking reveals how the FCC may consider
shifting responsibility for disaster readiness and situational
awareness from the FCC and industry to members of the public, despite
the enormous quantity of actionable information already in the hands of
these actors during disasters.
At the workshop, Jarrett Devine, the regional emergency
communications coordinator for FEMA Region I, provides an important
observation:
We've heard a lot of things today. Folks saying ``voluntary.''
Folks saying ``trend analysis'' . . . This is life-safety
equipment. We have to do better. Post-disaster, we have an
extremely fragile environment with a vulnerable population.
This ``voluntary'' word needs to go away. We have commercial
entities selling themselves as public-safety grade. If you are
going to make a profit saying you are serving the community
with public-safety grade communications, then you need to be
able to prepare an answer and response as to where your
communications are available. Specifically post-disaster
response events.\25\
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why did the FCC shield these regulated entities from public
questioning and take the industry's assertions at face value?
How has Chairman Pai's myopic deregulatory agenda allowed
industry to ceaselessly avoid regulatory scrutiny, even on
public-safety matters?
Why has the FCC resisted shifting from the voluntary
approach of DIRS and the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative
Framework (see June below) to one that mandates first-responder
access to communications services during and after a disaster,
consumer information on outages and service-restoration
estimates, and improving telecom-network resiliency?
JUNE. Rep. Nydia Velazquez of New York introduces the National
Commission of the Federal Response to Natural Disasters in Puerto Rico
Act of 2018, which would convene a commission to consider a broad array
of factors that impacted the disaster response, including the adequacy
of the islands' telecom networks. The bill remains in committee through
the conclusion of the legislative session.
The FCC opens a proceeding for comments on the creation of the
$954-million Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund and the Connect USVI Fund,
which plans to divvy out hundreds of millions of dollars over 10 years
to accelerate telecom recovery in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.\26\ The FCC forgives the earlier $76.9-million advance in
funds to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands announced in October
and allocates approximately another $100 million for Puerto Rico.
Notably, the bulk of the total simply renames existing commitments
from long-standing Universal Service Fund programs that predate the
hurricanes. These programs support buildout of telecom infrastructure
to areas that are otherwise too expensive to serve. Barring any pending
changes from the FCC, the programs will continue to use a methodology
that's independent of Hurricane Maria specifically or disaster relief
generally.
In addition, the FCC doesn't include any coordinated oversight
measures, metrics or requirements to ensure funds are used to
accelerate recovery of telecommunications.
The Public Safety Bureau opens a proceeding seeking comments on the
effectiveness of the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework. Even
though the unique devastation of the 2017 hurricane season revealed the
vulnerability of Puerto Rico's communications infrastructure--and first
responders and consumers alike advocated for more resilient networks--
the FCC is only now considering whether the voluntary framework is
appropriate or effective.
However, the inquiry stops short of asking whether the voluntary
framework should be replaced with a mandatory one.
JULY. FEMA releases a report noting that the loss of communications
in Puerto Rico impeded the agency's response and recovery efforts:
``FEMA and supporting Federal agencies struggled to gain situational
awareness and assess the status of critical infrastructure, in part due
to communications outages across Puerto Rico.'' \27\
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why did the FCC--the expert agency on telecom matters--fail
to recognize and address the clear threat to first responders'
ability to communicate during and after a disaster?
Why did FEMA's assessment fail to further explore the causes
of the communications outage and its effect on recovery work?
Why did the FCC fail to conduct a similar self-critique?
Free Press submits a letter on the proceeding on the Uniendo a
Puerto Rico Fund that expresses concern that without more robust
accountability measures, money will be used to offset already planned
deployments or simply end up in shareholders' pockets.\28\ Free Press
also flags an investor call in which a telecom CEO expresses skepticism
about the company's ability to fully restore its network in Puerto
Rico.
The FCC suggests no meaningful changes to the Wireless Resiliency
Cooperative Framework (aside from suggesting that other entities, such
as backhaul providers, be enveloped into this voluntary framework).
AUGUST. The FCC releases an initial round of $64.2 million from the
Uniendo Fund to telecom providers that serve Puerto Rico. To date, the
agency has not disclosed what accountability processes, resiliency
requirements or measures will be used to determine how the funds will
accelerate recovery and promote network resiliency.
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Is the FCC keeping track of how the additional funds are
spent? If so, how has the money contributed to network
resiliency?
What measures are in place to ensure that these funds are
being used to expedite recovery?
The FCC's Public Safety Bureau concludes the 2017 hurricane-
response inquiry by releasing a paltry 36-page report (the ``2017
Hurricane Season Report'').\29\ The report fails to reflect the gravity
of one of the most catastrophic communications crises and deadliest
hurricanes in U.S. history. The report also fails to determine whether
any FCC-regulated entity should be held accountable for the slow
restoration of service and includes only information that was already
publicly available.
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why did the FCC fail to conduct a self-critical review as it
did after prior disasters?
Did the FCC's Public Safety Bureau have sufficient staff and
resources to conduct a comprehensive examination on par with
the staff and resources involved in the Hurricane Katrina
investigation?
Did FCC staff in the Public Safety Bureau provide an honest
critique of FEMA or their own agency's response to the
hurricanes, or are such insights best captured through an
independent commission?
Why didn't the existing internal Hurricane Recovery Task
Force prepare the 2017 Hurricane Season Report, as it was well-
situated to discuss its own activities and to note how the
various agency bureaus and offices coordinated their hurricane
response? If task-force members contributed in unacknowledged
ways, how did they do so?
Why didn't the 2017 Hurricane Season Report provide any
useful details about the task force's activities?
SEPTEMBER. The Government Accountability Office releases a report
revealing how woefully unprepared FEMA was in responding to the
disaster in Puerto Rico.\30\
On the first anniversary of Hurricane Maria, Free Press joins a
coalition of Puerto Rican advocates, racial- and social-justice
organizations, and media and telecom experts to urge Chairman Pai to
convene an independent commission to conduct a comprehensive
investigation of the communications crisis in Puerto Rico.\31\
Alongside allies, Free Press hosts a Facebook Live discussion on
Maria's impact and the future of communications.\32\
Free Press files comments calling on the FCC to gather more
complete and accurate data to better coordinate the work needed to
build resilient networks and disburse recovery funds effectively. We
urge the FCC to conduct a deep and thorough analysis of its current
policies to address the resiliency of communications networks.\33\
OCTOBER. Free Press teams up with Resilient Just Technologies, the
Center for Embodied Pedagogy & Action and other organizations in Puerto
Rico to host small-group discussions in Comerio and Vieques to hear
Puerto Ricans talk about how the loss of communications has impacted
them. Residents discuss how the loss of communications limited their
mobility as well as their ability to find food or water or medical care
or seek out their loved ones.\34\
In the wake of Hurricane Michael, Chairman Pai admonishes telecom
providers for their slow response to the week-and-a-half-long telecom
outage in the Florida Panhandle and demands that the Public Safety
Bureau investigate the matter. Free Press criticizes Pai for failing to
show the same urgency in response to Hurricane Maria. Pai is more
critical of telecom providers in Florida than he is about the
communications crisis that continues to affect Puerto Rico more than a
year after the storm made landfall.\35\ Wireline and wireless service
remains spotty and in some parts of the islands not all services are
restored to the level available prior to Hurricane Maria.
A year after then-Ranking Member Pallone of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee first wrote to the FCC on the matter (see 2017
Pallone Wireless Framework Letter above), he requests a rulemaking to
expand and make enforceable the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative
Framework (2018 Pallone Wireless Framework Letter).\36\
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why was the FCC's response to Hurricane Michael so different
from its response to Hurricane Maria?
Why did it take several letters from Congress starting in
2017--and several massive disasters--to prompt Chairman Pai to
move toward engaging in his agency's public-safety charge
against carriers and the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative
Framework? \37\
NOVEMBER. The FCC relaunches an examination of the Wireless
Resiliency Cooperative Framework after Hurricane Michael and long after
allowing its related June inquiry to sit dormant. This time, the agency
demands information from telecom providers on how they responded to
both the 2017 and 2018 hurricane seasons. While such an inquiry is
welcome, it comes more than 400 days after Hurricane Maria's landfall,
and 74 days after the FCC closed its inquiry into the 2017 season.
Various providers' responses are cursory or heavily redacted. The
information the providers offer is general in nature and doesn't allow
the public, or advocates acting on its behalf, to assess the resiliency
and restoration of carriers' networks or to compare variations in
disaster response from one state or territory to the next or over time
from one hurricane to the next.
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why didn't the FCC conduct this review earlier, and why
didn't the agency demand the carriers provide more
comprehensive information on its response to the 2017 and 2018
hurricane seasons?
What prompted the FCC to conduct this review after Hurricane
Michael but not after Maria? \38\
Why was it necessary for the FCC to re-launch an inquiry
that was already open and allowed to sit dormant following one
of the most destructive disasters?
Free Press files Freedom of Information Act requests with the FCC
and FEMA, seeking a clearer understanding of each agency's role in
response to Hurricane Maria and ensuing recovery efforts. The FCC
should have completed this type of inquiry on its own initiative by
convening an independent commission when the 115th Congress was in
session, ideally in coordination with congressional investigations.\39\
Free Press requests consumer complaints in the aftermath of the 2017
and 2018 seasons and records of the FCC's actions--with a particular
focus on the task force's work.
The FCC later tells Free Press that the requested information will
take years to produce.
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why didn't the FCC request this kind of information after
receiving either Rep. Pallone's 2017 or 2018 Wireless Framework
letters, and why wasn't the information Free Press requested
included as part of the FCC's 2017 hurricane report in the
first place?
» Why hasn't the FCC proactively analyzed the consumer
complaints that came from hurricane-stricken Puerto Rico? Why
did the FCC fail to cite the Hurricane Maria-related consumer
complaints in its 2017 hurricane report or relevant dockets?
DECEMBER. The FCC expands its inquiry on the Wireless Resiliency
Cooperative Framework to include the role of backhaul and power
companies in promoting resilient telecom systems. The FCC fails to
assess how telecom providers performed during the 2017 and 2018
hurricane seasons or implement new requirements to improve network-
infrastructure resilience.
While we welcome the FCC's newfound desire to more comprehensively
analyze the problem of network resiliency, the fact that the agency
expanded the inquiry to entities it doesn't regulate while asking
nothing more from the entities it does regulate is telling.
Essentially, this act shifts attention elsewhere and sidesteps any
accountability from telecom providers for failing to mitigate the long
delay in restoring communications in Puerto Rico. Instead, this inquiry
represents a continuation of the agency's belated examination of
telecom issues directly impacting public health and safety in Puerto
Rico.
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why has the FCC gone to great lengths to excuse the telecom
providers for any responsibility in the months-long
telecommunications blackout in Puerto Rico?
Given the Trump administration's widespread efforts to
obscure its role in the excruciatingly slow recovery efforts in
Puerto Rico, how can rigorous congressional oversight produce
more information on the telecom aspect of the recovery efforts?
2019
FEBRUARY. House Energy and Commerce Chairman Pallone submits a
letter demanding a status update from the FCC on its current workload
and backlog, including FOIA requests. On the same day, the agency
contacts Free Press regarding our pending FOIA request.\40\
APRIL. Almost six months after filing its FOIA request, Free Press
receives the initial production, which is comprised of 52 consumer
complaints from Puerto Rico for a period after Hurricane Maria. The FCC
doesn't provide carriers' responses to these complaints.
The comments from consumers offer a small window into a much larger
problem: Providers promised automatic refunds and relief for the
extensive loss of services but failed to deliver.
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Why has the FCC failed to cite or acknowledge these consumer
issues publicly, including in its 2017 Hurricane Season Report?
Why did the FCC fail to launch a more skeptical
investigation of the carriers when it began receiving these
complaints?
MAY. The FCC releases a report on its investigation into
communications providers' preparation for and response to Hurricane
Michael.\41\ The investigation criticizes the lack of coordination
among wireless and landline service providers, power crews and
municipalities in restoring communications in the wake of the storm.
Furthermore, the Public Safety Bureau identifies a credibility
issue: ``the effusive praise given by [Wireless Resiliency Cooperative]
Framework signatories that commented in this docket simply does not
ring true, in light of the lengthy wireless outages in Bay and Gulf
Counties. . . . At least tens of thousands [of] wireless customers had
to wait days, unnecessarily, for their mobile phone service to be
restored while their provider held off entering into roaming
arrangements'' (emphasis added).\42\
While the report doesn't go far enough, it nonetheless reveals the
FCC's ability to provide a critical analysis of telecom companies'
conduct. Such analysis was woefully absent from the agency's report on
the 2017 hurricane season. The agency's condemnation of days-long
outages in Florida contrasts its lack of outrage over the months-long
outages millions of Puerto Ricans experienced.
These are the questions that remain unanswered:
Given how the FCC raised concerns in the Hurricane Michael
report over the carriers' failures in Florida, will the agency
revisit the conduct of carriers operating in Puerto Rico--and
approach it with greater skepticism?
Why was the tone of the FCC's 2019 Hurricane Michael report
so different from the tone of its 2017 Hurricane Season report?
And why did the FCC provide a critical analysis of the effects
of Hurricane Michael and no critical analysis of the impact of
Hurricane Maria?
Next Steps
Puerto Rico needs a comprehensive and community-governed plan to
build a resilient communications system. To create such a plan, the FCC
needs to first conduct a full independent investigation of the
communications crisis in Puerto Rico.
Free Press recommends the following actions:
The FCC should promulgate regulations--and recommend related
actions or rules for other federal, state and territorial
agencies--to address the underlying causes of the prolonged
outage in Puerto Rico.
The FCC must engage in a long-term examination and
rulemaking to strengthen the resiliency-network infrastructure
not just in Puerto Rico but throughout the United States.
Congress and the FCC should provide more funding for
restoration efforts and offer coordination and oversight to
ensure those funds accelerate restoration and incorporate
network resiliency. Lawmakers and agency officials should
mandate that affected communities are part of the design and
governance of their local infrastructure and that funds are
allocated to support self-sustaining and resilient communities.
Congress should hold hearings to provide robust and regular
oversight of the FCC's response to Hurricane Maria and recovery
efforts in Puerto Rico.
Congress should launch an investigation focused on what
happened in Puerto Rico and should mandate the creation of an
independent FCC commission to examine the roots of the
communications crisis.
Congress should use its subpoena power to ensure the prompt
delivery of all requested documents from the FCC and FEMA in
response to FOIA requests from Free Press and existing
congressional-information requests.
Lawmakers should request reports from both the Government
Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service on
the history of telecom in Puerto Rico. These reports should
analyze how the islands' colonial status contributed to the
2017 disaster.
The FCC should abandon its Lifeline proposals, which would
directly harm Puerto Ricans and other disaster survivors.
Lawmakers should hold industry accountable by requiring
regular reports to Congress, clear and public guidance and
monitoring from the FCC, and publicly available data for
advocates to a) identify potential misuse of the funds set
aside for recovery work and b) ensure that telecom companies
deliver on their promises to accelerate reconstruction.
The FCC and other relevant agencies must provide Spanish-
language translations of all Puerto Rico-related material, and
the FCC should create a Spanish-language consumer-complaint
portal.
Puerto Ricans Share Their Stories on How Puerto Rico's Communications
Crisis Impacted Their Lives After Hurricane Maria
In the absence of adequate FCC outreach, Free Press and the
National Hispanic Media Coalition invited their members and the public
to share their experiences of losing communications during and after
Hurricane Maria through a public comment-collection tool on the Free
Press website.
Beginning on Jan. 29, 2018, Free Press reached out to its members
and asked: ``What's your story about the impact Hurricane Maria has had
on Puerto Ricans' ability to access communications services?'' \43\
Despite the extreme hardships that many Puerto Ricans faced--and
despite the lack of access to basic necessities, including
communications services--many people sent feedback via this tool with
the hope that the FCC would hear them and heed their concerns.
For instance, Sandralis Rivera of Woodland Park, New Jersey, said
on Jan. 31, 2018:
My grandfather died 4 days after the hurricane hit [Puerto
Rico]. . . . We weren't able to find out about his death until
3 days later in a brief 3 min. phone call. The lack of service
had us extremely concern[ed] over the welfare of my grandmother
who was in an elderly home without any power nor access to cell
service. It took at least 3 weeks before I was able to speak to
my in-laws and my cousins. Up until last week, when I visited
[Puerto Rico], I experienced several dropped calls and no
internet[.]
This tragic story is all too common and is an important piece of
the larger story of the communications crisis--a story the FCC failed
to hear due to its indifference and subpar outreach. Many commenters
noted in January 2018 that providers had only recently restored
reliable communications services--more than four months after Hurricane
Maria struck.
Many stories of uncertainty and heart-wrenching silence from loved
ones came to the fore as power and service were slowly restored and
some survivors were finally able to speak for themselves by submitting
their stories through Free Press' comment tool. One commenter noted the
difficulty caused by the timing and conduct of the FCC's proceeding:
How can the FCC possibly ask for comments regarding the impact
of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico when many of [the] citizens
of the island still remain without power or internet[?] Is the
FCC actually going [to] the . . . island and knocking on doors?
Is the FCC going to drop fliers on the island that citizens can
mail back to them? \44\
Such outreach does not relieve the Commission of the obligation to
do more and learn from the people it serves. But the comments we
collected tell a powerful narrative about the hardships suffered by
people disconnected from their communication services and from each
other in the wake of the storms.
Patricia in Bayamon, Puerto Rico (Jan. 31, 2018):
Communication was down for weeks, making it hard for everyone
to stay sane, calm, and collected. Thus . . . our mental health
decreased, worse than what it already was. . . . My boyfriend's
family still does not have home Internet access thanks to the
hurricane. Many areas that provide Internet (theirs being
Claro, the telephone company) were severely damaged thanks to
water coming in the central buildings.
Michael Slayder in Luquillo, Puerto Rico (Jan. 29, 2018):
Ever since the Hurricane hit us I wasn't able to contact my
friends for about two weeks before my parents took a very long
trip to the center of the island which was crowded with cars
and people where a few stores had signal for everyone to
communicate with, I got in contact with my friends from the
U.S. but I haven't heard anything from the ones here in Puerto
Rico due to school being closed and me not knowing where they
live.
Luis Lugo in Adjuntas, Puerto Rico (Feb. 12, 2018):
As of today, the AT&T tower has not been replaced or rebuilt,
leaving us with a mediocre service. However, last weekend there
was a service outage with one of Claro's fiber-optic cable,
leaving all Claro customers in Adjuntas without phone or
Internet service until today. I feel that the telecommunication
companies have left the people in the mountain area behind. My
parents had AT&T postpaid accounts. One of the numbers was
transferred to Claro and the other was not paid because of the
lack of service from AT&T, who refused to give us a fourth
month of credit (emphases added).
Hector Santana in Carolina, Puerto Rico (Jan. 31, 2018):
In the beginning of the hurricane the hospital my mom worked at
was filled with people who were on the floor crying over the
fact that their homes were more than likely destroyed and that
their families were still in their homes and [they had] no way
of being able to contact them.
Maria Colon in San Juan, Puerto Rico (Feb. 2, 2018):
I live in the San Juan metropolitan area. My mother lives on
the west side of the island. I was not able to communicate with
her for 5 days. I couldn't access any reception and her land
line was completely out of service. Due to lack of gas and road
obstructions I couldn't get to her. I [must] say those were the
most difficult days since she is elderly and depends on the
phone to let her needs known. Finally, I was able to go see her
in person (emphasis added).
When I go visit her, as of today, the communications are
difficult and at times I need to go out of my community to get
reception. It is extremely urgent and important that the FCC
investigates and reassure[s] the Puerto Ricans, USA citizens,
that this will never happen again (emphasis added).
Otoniel Cajigas in Aguada, Puerto Rico (Jan. 29, 2018):
On September 19, 2017 my family [and] I were about to go sleep
knowing that early in the mornings we will begin to feel the
impact of the hurricane Maria at our home in Bo Espinal,
Aguada, PR. To our surprise before any wind or rain began there
was a power outage (which later we lived [through] for 75
straight days), which caused that around 2 or 3 am we end up
without any broadband Internet access at our home (ISP Liberty
Cable), but at least we still had the cellphone. . . .
[H]owever around 4:30 [or] 5:00 am we also [lost] any cellular
signal from our provider (AT&T and Tmobile). At this point we
decided to try capturing local channels, however none [were]
available, therefore we tried the radio . . . [no] FM radio was
available in the spectrum, so we switched to AM. [F]inally we
were able to locate one local radio station: 1340AM.
Unfortunately, even while they were trying to provide
information to the audience, they were blind as well. [N]o
information was received from any government agency, neither
status of the Hurricane and how much additional time we should
expect to receive [the] impact (emphasis added).
[A]t around 7:00AM [on] September 21st we wake up to our new
reality, no running water, no electricity, but worse than that
No communications at all . . . basically it passed 1 week
before we heard that the communications provider Claro had part
of their cell towers working, therefore we looked for people
with their service to load a cell phone in order to communicate
with our family members out in U.S. mainland. AT&T cellular
signal took almost a month to begin working for calls and SMS,
however . . . data service wasn't available until 6 weeks, but
very unstable and extremely slow (emphasis added).
3 months later the service [stabilized] and was near to normal,
however broadband service for home wasn't available. Finally,
on day 75 our neighborhood was re-energized, therefore I began
contacting Liberty to get estimates on when should I get the
service back, but there weren't any estimates given. Finally,
last week, January 23, 2018 the [fiber] cable was installed at
the neighborhood, however my coax cable from the fiber to my
home was cut, so I contacted Liberty to get it replaced. I have
contacted them more than 5 times and thru all possible channels
however I'm still without the service and they aren't even
providing any installation date. So this is a summary of our
story so far . . . (emphases added).
Sheila Ward in San Juan, Puerto Rico (Jan. 31, 2018):
We did not have electricity at our house in San Juan until
January 11. Therefore, our access to our landline telephone
service was limited. Concerning the cell phone, it was about 10
days before I could talk well with my husband. I was off island
and he was in PR for Hurricane Maria.
Maritza Stanchich in San Juan, Puerto Rico (Jan. 31, 2018):
For me, not having any cell phone connection or access to
Internet in the immediate aftermath of the storm was worse than
not having electricity or water service. We had little idea
what had happened in the rest of the country, as only one radio
station was left operating (WAPA).
Once I managed to get hold of a newspaper (by driving about
half an hour to the newspaper with a friend), I learned that
the mayors and authorities of five municipalities of the
country's southwest had achieved no contact with the governor
or emergency officials, this [was] five-six days after the
storm.
In addition, I knew personally of someone living nearby who
contracted potentially life-threatening leptospirosis but could
not seek medical attention from the hospital military ship in
port because doing so required a referral, yet there was no way
to call or reach his doctors for one.
Gerardo Talavera in Brookline, Massachusetts (Jan. 29,
2018):
It was me and my uncle putting our phones outside, against
anything we thought could work as an antenna. No service for
days, no reliable service for weeks. It was an absolute
nightmare to let everyone know we were OK. Communication was at
such a premium that when PREPA offered an Internet `oasis' it
was flooded with people trying to get on WiFi. Such things
should never happen again (emphasis added).
The communications blackout also harmed people on the U.S. mainland
who had friends and family in Puerto Rico. Here are some of their
comments:
Sonia Acevedo in Alexandria, Virginia (Feb. 12, 2018):
Most of my family lives in the . . . southeast of the Island,
to be exact in the town next to where the hurricane Maria
landfall. It wasn't until 12 days after Maria . . . that I was
able to talk with my mom. She had to drive at least 30-40 min
far from my town, park in the shoulder of a highway to be able
to talk with me and my sister. The 10 min or so that . . . the
call [lasted] it was very difficult to understand what she was
saying because the signal was bad. It wasn't until a week later
that I was able to talk with her again. I went to the Island
[in the beginning] of November and I had no signal all the
time. Almost 5 months after the hurricane communications still
bad. I used to talk with my parents almost every day. Now if we
are lucky, we talk twice a week. People in Puerto Rico pay a
lot for cellphone and internet. They are U.S. Citizens, they
deserve to be treated the same way [as] the people that live in
the U.S. mainland (emphasis added).
Ahmad Moradi in Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Jan. 30, 2018):
As an Expat who lives in PR, communication is vital to our
business operation. We cannot conduct business when struggle
continues with lack of power, Internet, and other related
services.
N. L. in Long Grove, Illinois (Jan. 30, 2018):
Six months following Hurricane Maria and we still are not able
to directly communicate with our friends in parts of the
mainland and Vieques[.]
Magdaliz Figueroa in Silver Spring, Maryland (Feb. 11,
2018):
My immediate family, my parents, my mom and sister had phone
signal on and off during the whole ordeal they live in
Bayam[o]n . . . and I am more than thankful for that because I
will have gone crazy if I wouldn't have listen from them for 14
or 20 days like it happened to so many of my friends here.. . .
My friend decided to go stay with her parents in her hometown
of Cidra[.] They didn't have any radio or cellphone signal
[and] didn't know what was happening. . . . [W]ith no
communications they couldn't know if the hurricane passed or if
it was still there (emphasis added).
[T]he death toll of the aftermath of the hurricane is more
[than] 1,000 people[.] [T]he mayor of Orocovis walked for a day
or more with a corpse just to be able to get signal on a
cellphone [for the corpse to] be pick[ed] up. There are
thousands of stories like the ones I just wrote here. Still to
this day there're people without power, water and phone
signal[.] [I]t's been 5 months, and all I can think is that the
2018 hurricane season will start in a few months.
Sandra Wilkes in Perth Amboy, New Jersey (Jan. 29, 2018):
It took two whole weeks to try to communicate with my parents.
Those two weeks were heart wrenching not knowing if my parents
were safe as [images] of devastation were spreading. They
couldn't use their cellphone because the cell towers were down
and landlines were destroyed.
Clarinda Low in New York City (Feb. 2, 2018):
For several people I know, even in San Juan, Internet services
have been very spotty at best. Because phone service is even
worse, this has interrupted every aspect of life. Professors
are unable to communicate with students, parents [are] unable
to communicate with their children['s] schools, information
flow in general has come to a standstill (emphasis added).
Marta Landrieu in New York City (Jan. 30, 2018):
My family, sister, cousins [and] other close relatives live in
Patillas and Guayama areas [most devastated] by Maria. Today,
months after Maria most are still without electricity and no
access [to] the internet. . . . One cousin, [struggling with]
multiple cancers, was unable to reach anyone nor use the
Internet to receive updated information/news as to her town's
condition and for information on the distribution of needed
water, food that would reach her remote area. FEMA
irresponsibly was/is asking folks to file their claims on the
Internet and was closing its doors to those who were unable to
do so.
Endnotes
\1\ See New England Journal of Medicine, ``Mortality in Puerto Rico
after Hurricane Maria,'' July 12, 2018: https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMsa1803972; GW Today, ``GW Researchers: 29,75 Excess Deaths
Linked to Hurricane Maria,'' August 29, 2018: https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/
gw-researchers-2975-excess-deaths-linked-hurricane-maria.
\2\ Danica Coto, ``Puerto Rico Lures Tech Developers as Hurricane
Season Looms,'' Associated Press, March 20, 2019: https://
www.apnews.com/36ad55904ab6459db6a0521d92490b90.
\3\ Puerto Rico and possession-tax credit, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 936
(fully repealed 2006).
\4\ See Juan Gonzalez, ``Puerto Rico's $123 Billion Bankruptcy Is
The Cost Of U.S. Colonialism,'' The Intercept, May 9, 2017: https://
theintercept.com/2017/05/09/puerto-ricos-123-billion-bankruptcy-is-the-
cost-of-u-s-colonialism/.
\5\ See Gabriela Martinez, ``Why This Disaster Relief Bill Is Stuck
on a Debate over Puerto Rico Food Stamps,'' PBS NewsHour, March 28,
2019: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/why-this-disaster-relief-
bill-is-stuck-on-a-debate-over-puerto-rico-food-stamps.
\6\ See, e.g., Annie Karni & Patricia Mazzei, ``Trump Lashes Out
Again at Puerto Rico, Bewildering the Island,'' The New York Times,
April 2, 2019: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/02/us/trump-puerto-
rico.html; Aaron Rupar, ``Trump's Latest Outburst Against Puerto Rico,
Explained,'' Vox, April 2, 2019: https://www.vox.com/2019/4/2/18291975/
trump-puerto-rico-disaster-relief-funding-bill-explained.
\7\ See Amy Sherman, ``Donald Trump Falsely Tweets That Puerto Rico
Got $91 Billion in Hurricane Aid,'' Politifact Florida, April 3, 2019:
https://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2019/apr/03/donald-trump/
trumps-false-tweet-puerto-rico-got-91-billion-hurr/
\8\ See Joseph Torres, ``Puerto Ricans Speak Out About Islands'
Communications Crisis,'' Free Press, Oct. 18, 2018: https://
www.freepress.net/our-response/advocacy-organizing/stories-field/
puerto-ricans-speak-out-about-islands-communications
\9\ See Trevor Houser & Peter Marsters, ``The World's Second
Largest Blackout,'' Rhodium Group, April 12, 2018: https://rhg.com/
research/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-worlds-second-largest-blackout/
(``What was already the largest blackout in American history has now
likely become . . . the second largest blackout in the world''); see
also Alexia Fernandez Campbell, ``It Took 11 Months to Restore Power to
Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria. A Similar Crisis Could Happen
Again,'' Vox, Aug. 15, 2018: https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/15/
17692414/puerto-rico-power-electricity-restored-hurricane-maria
(reporting the restoration of ``power to the last neighborhood that
lost electricity after Hurricane Maria--328 days after the Category 4
storm hit the island'').
\10\ See FCC, ``Communications Status Report for Areas Impacted by
Hurricane Maria,'' released Sept. 23, 2017: https://docs.fcc.gov/
public/attachments/DOC-346860A1.pdf.
\11\ See Milken Institute School of Public Health, George
Washington University, Ascertainment of the Estimated Excess Mortality
from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico (2018); Nishant Kishore et al.,
``Mortality in Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria,'' 379 New England
Journal of Medicine 162, 162-170 (2018); see also Nidhi Prakash, ``A
New Study Says Nearly 6,000 Died In Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria.
The Government Still Says 64 People Died,'' BuzzFeed News, May 29, 2018
(noting that the collapse of the cell networks ``prevented many people
from seeking help if they were unwell,'' and those ``who relied on home
oxygen and dialysis machines or refrigeration for diabetes medication
were left vulnerable, cut off from medical professionals and unable to
call for help''); Danica Coto, ``Puerto Rico Unveils New Emergency
Preparations After Maria,'' Associated Press, Sept. 11, 2018 (noting
the recent installation of direct emergency lines to nursing homes to
address the fact that many of the people who died as a result of Maria
were elderly), https://www.apnews.com/b6651a23cc51481497f7f64eafc4bf78.
\12\ See Letter from the Center for Media Justice, Color Of Change,
Free Press, the National Hispanic Media Coalition and Public Knowledge
to FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, Oct. 6, 2017: http://www.nhmc.org/fcc-must-
aid-puerto-rico.
\13\ FCC, ``FCC Chair Announces Hurricane Recovery Task Force,''
released Oct. 6, 2017: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-chairman-
announces-hurricane-recovery-task-force
\14\ See Letter from Rep. Frank Pallone Jr. to FCC Chairman Ajit
Pai, OL 17-18, Oct. 6, 2017: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/
DOC-347575A2.pdf.
\15\ See FCC, ``Chairman Pai Meets with Officials in Puerto Rico,''
Nov. 7, 2017: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-chairman-pai-meets-
officials-puerto-rico
\16\ See FCC, ``Communications Status Report for Areas Impacted by
Hurricane Maria,'' released Dec. 6, 2017.
\17\ See ``Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Seeks Comment
on Response Efforts Undertaken During 2017 Hurricane Season,'' PS
Docket No. 17-344, Public Notice, 32 FCC Rcd 10245 (Dec. 7, 2017).
\18\ ``Improving the Resiliency of Mobile Wireless Communications
Networks; Reliability and Continuity of Communications Networks,
Including Broadband Technologies,'' PS Docket Nos. 13-239 & 11-60,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd 14373, 14373-74 1, 3
(2013).
\19\ See GAO, ``FCC Should Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts
to Strengthen Wireless Network Resiliency,'' December 2017 https://
www.gao.gov/assets/690/688927.pdf.
\20\ Id.
\21\ See FCC press release, ``FCC Chairman Announces Visit to
Puerto Rico & U.S. Virgin Islands in March,'' Feb. 21, 2018: https://
docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-349352A1.pdf.
\22\ See Sharon Minelli Perez, ``La FCC Fiscalizara el Uso de los
Fondos para las Telecomunicaciones,'' El Nuevo Dia, March 8,
2018:https://www.elnuevodia.com/negocios/econo
mia/nota/lafccfiscalizaraelusodelosfondosparalastelecomunicaciones-
2404761.
\23\ See Joint Comments of Free Press and the National Hispanic
Media Coalition, PS Docket No. 17-344 & WC Docket No. 17-287, filed
April 17, 2018: https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/ 2018-04/
joint_comments_nhmc_freepress_2017_hurricane_season.pdf.
\24\ See Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces
Workshop to Identify Critical Information Needs to Improve
Communications During Disasters, Public Notice, DA 18-292, released
March 23, 2018: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-
292A1.pdf; see also FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
announces the agenda for the April 13, 2018 public workshop to identify
critical information needs to improve communications during disasters,
Public Notice, DA 18-357, released April 10, 2018: https://
docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-292A1.pdf.
\25\ Id.
\26\ See Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund and the Connect USVI Fund,
Order and NPRM, WC Docket Nos. 18-143, 10-90, 14-58, FCC 18-57, May 29,
2018: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-670A1.pdf.
\27\ See Federal Emergency Management Agency, ``2017 Hurricane
Season FEMA After-Action Report'' (2018): https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/
10720156823712/FP%20Rosenworcel%20Ex%20Parte
%20re%20Puerto%20Rico%20-%20July%2020%202018.pdf.
\28\ See Letter from Joseph Torres, Free Press, to FCC Secretary
Marlene H. Dortch, WC Docket No. 18-143, filed July 20, 2018.
\29\ See ``2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on Communications
Report and Recommendations,'' Public Safety Docket No. 17-344, Aug. 24,
2018: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-353805A1.pdf.
\30\ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-18-472, ``2017
Hurricanes and Wildfires: Initial Observations on the Federal Response
and Key Recovery Challenges,'' 32 (2018): https://www.gao.gov/assets/
700/694231.pdf.
\31\ See Letter from Free Press et al. to FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, PS
Docket No. 17-344 & WC Docket No. 18-143, filed Sept. 20, 2018: https:/
/www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/ 2018-09/
Call_for_Independent_Commission_on_Puerto_Rico.pdf.
\32\ See Free Press, ``Reflections on Hurricane Maria:
Communications in Puerto Rico,'' https://www.facebook.com/freepress/
videos/992587910924018/ (last visited March 5, 2019).
\33\ See Comments of Free Press, PS Docket No. 17-344 et al., filed
Sept. 17, 2018: https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/ 2018-09/
free_press_puerto_rico_recovery_comments.pdf.
\34\ See Free Press, ``Puerto Ricans Speak Out About Islands'
Communications Crisis,'' Oct. 18, 2018: https://www.freepress.net/our-
response/advocacy-organizing/stories-field/puerto-ricans-speak-out-
about-islands-communications.
\35\ Free Press press release, ``Chairman Pai's Call for an
Investigation of Communication Failures in Florida Contrasts His
Inaction in Puerto Rico,'' Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.freepress
.net/news/press-releases/free-press-chairman-pais-call-investigation-
communication-failures-florida
\36\ See Letter from Rep. Frank Pallone Jr. to FCC Chairman Ajit
Pai, OL 17-18, Oct. 26, 2018: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/
DOC-355997A2.pdf.
\37\ Congress created the FCC to ``promot[e] safety of life and
property through the use of wire and radio communications.'' 47 U.S.C.
Sec. 151 and it ``is required to consider public safety . . . its
enabling act.'' Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 307-08 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
\38\ See Letter from Joseph Torres, Free Press, to FCC Secretary
Marlene H. Dortch, PS Docket No. 18-339 & WC Docket Nos. 09-197, 11-42
& 17-287, filed Dec. 17, 2018.
\39\ See Letter from Carmen Scurato, Free Press, to the FCC, filed
Nov. 9, 2018 https://www.freepress.net/ sites/default/files/2019-05/
free_press_foia_request_11_09_18.pdf.
\40\ See Letter from Reps. Frank Pallone Jr. and Mike Doyle to FCC
Chairman Ajit Pai, OL 18-17, Feb. 4, 2019.
\41\ See ``October 2018 Hurricane Michael's Impact on
Communications: Preparation, Effect, and Recovery,'' Public Safety
Docket No. 18-339, May 9, 2019: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
attachments/DOC-357387A1.pdf.
\42\ Id.
\43\ See Free Press, ``Cuente su historia: La FCC necesita saber
sobre el impacto del huracan Maria en los servicios de comunicacion en
Puerto Rico,'' (last visited April 16, 2018): https://
act.freepress.net/act/ internet_fcc_pr_spanish/; ``Free Press, Tell
Your Story: The FCC Needs to Know About the Impact of Hurricane Maria
on Communications Services in Puerto Rico'' (last visited March 6,
2018): http://act.freepress.net/letter/internet_fcc_pr/.
\44\ Comment of Michael Brossi, Framingham, Massachusetts (Feb. 1,
2018).
______
Telecommunications Policy 45 (2021) 102094
Emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico: Interaction between
regulatory institutions and telecommunications companies during
Hurricane Maria
Luis Rosario-Alberta, Bruno Takahashib
a Department of Liberal Arts, Program of Communication,
Universidad Ana G. Mendez, Carolina Campus, USA
b School of Journalism and AgBioResearch, College of
Communication Arts and Sciences, Michigan State University, USA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keywords: Extreme infrastructure collapse poses unique
Emergency challenges to emergency communications. This
communications was the case in Puerto Rico in 2017 after
Communication hurricanes Irma and Maria. In this study, we
administration first examined telecommunications carriers
Puerto Rico representatives' views of the adequateness of
Hurricane Maria emergency communications policies. Their views
Telecommunications were contrasted with the perspectives of a
policy selection of telecommunications experts and
regulators. Secondly, we conducted a policy
analysis to assess the FCC, the
Telecommunications Bureau of Puerto Rico, and
telecommunications companies' emergency
communications processes and outcomes. An
electronic questionnaire and in-depth
interviews with telecommunications companies'
representatives, and secondary data analysis
were used. The analysis revealed that most
participants considered favorably the 2017
Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework but
did not look favorably upon various state-
level emergency communications policies. The
policy analysis points to ineffective state
emergency communications policies due to the
impact of external factors and the lack of
coordination of the state government
electrical power provider and private
telecommunications companies. The results also
revealed that between 2017 and 2019, policy
makers and the application of policy tools in
regard to emergency communications were
largely reactive and relied on vigorous state
level intervention through a prescriptive
regulatory approach. The analysis includes
policy recommendations for emergency
communications.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Introduction
Natural and human-made disasters validate the social importance of
traditional news media, new media, and emergency warning systems.
Extreme infrastructure collapse poses unique challenges to emergency
communications. This was the case in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in
2017 after hurricanes Irma and Maria battered the island and left its
citizens without access to communication channels and emergency
communication services. This study examines emergency communications
policies carried out by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
the Telecommunications Bureau of Puerto Rico (TBPR), and Privately-
Owned Telecommunications Companies (PTCs) during Hurricane Maria
response and recovery phases.
Federal and state laws and rules adopted or enforced by the FCC and
the TBPR \1\--the regulatory agencies for telecommunications services
in Puerto Rico--serve to define roles and emergency communications
policy objectives. These objectives are adopted by a range of policy
actors such as public safety organizations, regulatory institutions,
citizenry, and PTCs. During emergency situations, PTCs (e.g., wireline
carriers, wireless carriers, broadband services companies,
telecommunications infrastructure companies) rely on a combination of
legal mandates, policy tools (e.g., technical standards, licensing,
subsidies, tax credits) and industry self-regulatory standards (e.g.,
best practices, codes), and agreements (e.g., cooperative frameworks).
Also, PTCs' activities are integrated to federal, state, and municipal
governments, private organizations (non-governmental organizations),
and volunteer emergency response activities. In particular, PTCs'
conduct is aimed at providing continuity of emergency communications
services for public safety services (e.g., 911 emergency services) and
commercial services to citizens (e.g., wireline and wireless
telephony).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On August 12, 2018 the Act to Execute the Reorganization Plan
of the Puerto Rico Public Service Regulatory Board (Law Num. 211) was
signed into law. The law created the Puerto Rico Public Service
Regulatory Board (PRPSRB). The law renamed the Puerto Rico
Telecommunications Regulatory Board (PRTRB) to the Telecommunications
Bureau of Puerto Rico. With the exception of the resolutions and
orders, the study will refer to the state telecommunications regulator
as the Telecommunications Bureau of Puerto Rico (TBPR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This study of emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico is
articulated at two levels of analysis. First, adopting a stakeholder
approach, we analyze PTCs' (i.e., carriers, broadband & network
services, communications infrastructure) views of the adequacy of
emergency communications regulatory policies and the need to strengthen
them. Their views were contrasted with a selection of five interviews
with state level telecommunications experts and regulatory officials.
This second group of interviews contributed to the analysis by
providing a better understanding of the regulatory framework for
emergency communications in Puerto Rico, but their responses are not
included in the results. Therefore, the study only analyzes carriers'
perspectives. Secondly, we carried out a policy examination of FCC,
TBPR, and PTCs' interaction and outcomes through a detailed analysis of
the emergency management activities and adoption of policy tools during
the emergency situation in 2017.
The analysis is conceptually grounded in policy studies and media
and telecommunications policy analysis. Since the study focused on
PTCs' opinions, it followed an inductive and exploratory approach but
was grounded in an analytical framework proposed by Picard and Pickard
(2017) for media and telecommunications policy making and policy
analysis. This framework served as the starting point for the analysis
of PTCs' opinions about emergency communications policies and the
analysis of the organizations' conduct during the response and recovery
phases. The policy problem explored is the extent to which emergency
communications policies carried out in Puerto Rico provided citizens
and public safety authorities effective use of emergency communications
services during the response and recovery phases. The policy problem is
framed in three types of relationships and influences: 1) FCC and
telecommunications industry interaction, 2) TBPR and telecommunications
industry interaction, and 3) Wireless industry self-regulatory
practices during emergency situations, specifically the roaming service
agreement in 2017.
This study also presents a detailed narrative of the diverse,
overlapping, and complementary Federal and state emergency
communications policies at play after Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico.
The analysis of governmental literature and other documentation,
embedded within the accounts of companies' representatives, provide a
unique in-depth view of emergency communications policy processes. Our
purpose is to contribute to the academic literature examining contexts
of extreme infrastructure collapse in relation to emergency
communications policy objectives, policy mechanisms, and policy tools.
In addition, we draw from the participants' in-depth interviews to
present practical recommendations (as suggested by Enserink et al.,
2013) for telecommunications at the federal and state levels that could
be implemented to strengthen emergency communications in Puerto Rico
and other contexts.
2. Conceptual considerations of emergency communications policies
2.1. Policy analysis and telecommunications policy
The literature on policy analysis for public policymaking shows
that changes in the legal sphere and technological innovation have been
two significant factors in the evolution of emergency communications
regulatory policies. First, telephone companies have to provide access
to local public safety emergency systems such as 911 and E911
(Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2007; Ten, 2001). Also, Ryan and Peha (2008)
recommended the deployment of a single nationwide network that serves
all public safety personnel, and Peha (2009) analyzed long-term
spectrum policy reform in relation to public safety spectrum. Moreover,
given the wide adoption of wireless communication services, Seeman et
al., (2018) analyzed the policies for implementing and funding the
transition from Enhanced 911 to Next Generation 911 (NG911) and its
integration into the Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network.
Several scholars have addressed some of the challenges for media
and communications policy analysis. For instance, Napoli (1999)
elaborated on the unique characteristics of media regulation in
relation to other industries' regulatory regimes and proposed a
symmetrical approach to communications policymaking. For Napoli, policy
makers should base their decisions on analytical assessments that take
into account economic and social values for policy objectives in an
equitable way.
Another perspective within a framework based on legal principles
has been proposed to address how economic viability and political
feasibility limit the adoption of sustainable policy options for
telecommunications regulation (Cherry, 2006). Cherry pointed out a
trend in academic research on the relationship between? deregulatory
policies and the design of regulatory incentives to affect the behavior
of private parties in order to achieve expected policy goals. More
recently, Picard (2020) has addressed the historical evolution and the
normative topics for media, information, and telecommunications
policies (e.g., policy mechanisms, policy tools and policy outcomes).
Picard and Pickard (2017) proposed a framework for media and
telecommunications policy making and policy analysis based on seven
principles. The framework serves to ``inform the development of policy
objectives and policy mechanisms and to provide consistency across
varying issues, technologies, and actions by defining fundamental
criteria that can be used to inform discussion and guide policy
decisions'' (5). Their emphasis was on defining fundamental principles
from which specific policy objectives, policy tools, and desired
outcomes can be originated. For Picard and Pickard (2017, 5), policy
analysis for policymakers, policy advocates, and scholars should start
from ``a more principled level and then link policy objectives and
tools to these normative foundations rather than merely seeking
immediate problem solutions.'' These principles for media and
communications policymaking and policy analysis are:
1) Meeting fundamental communication and content needs;
2) Providing effective ability for public use of media and
communications;
3) Promoting diversity/plurality in ownership of media and content
available;
4) Affording protection for users and society;
5) Providing transparency and accountability;
6) Pursuing developmental and economic benefits; and
7) Pursuing equitable and effective policy outcomes.
Picard and Pickard (2017) argue that the main stakeholders in
emergency communications are the citizenry and authorities (e.g., first
responders), and that during emergency situations the primary
objectives of communications are: 1) To allow the public to communicate
with authorities and among themselves, and 2) To allow authorities to
communicate directly with the public and to enhance communication among
authorities themselves. In this study we used these two principles as
conceptual lenses for a policy examination of emergency communications
processes and outcomes during the response and recovery phases in
Puerto Rico. The lack of existing theoretical models or frameworks for
emergency communication policy analysis requires an exploratory and
inductive approach that allows for the development of emergency
communications performance analysis instruments.
2.2. Law, regulation, and self-regulation
The legal and regulatory literature distinguishes Federal and state
provisions for public safety communication services from those
emergency communications requirements specific for PTCs. In this
section we will refer to Federal and state laws and rules for emergency
communications that make up a dynamic framework that sets different
types of requirements, either mandatory or voluntary, for Public Safety
Organizations and PTCs.
The FCC's definition of emergency communications details roles and
services related to the 911/E911 Service, the Emergency Alert System,
Commercial Mobile Alert System, Emergency Management Information
Systems (e.g., Disaster Information Reporting System, Network Outage
Reporting System), and spectrum interoperability for public safety
systems.\2\ The Communications Act of 1934 sets the principle of
universal service; that is, telephone access for all citizens (Jayakar,
2009) and eligible telecommunications carriers receiving
UniversalService low-income support are required to meet emergency
communications provisions. According to the Federal requirement on 47
CFR54, Subpart-C-Carriers Eligible for UniversalService Support, 54.202
(a) (2), a company must:
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\2\ FCC. 2015. Emergency Communications. Retrieved from: https://
www.fcc.gov/general/emergency-communications.
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Demonstrate its ability to remain functional in emergency
situations, including a demonstration that it has a reasonable amount
of back-up power to ensure functionality without an external power
source, that it is able to reroute traffic around damaged facilities,
and that it is capable of managing traffic spikes resulting from
emergency situations.\3\
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\3\ 47 CFR 12. PS Docket No. 14-174. FCC 15-98. See also FCC.
(2015). Ensuring Continuity of 911 Communications.
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At the state level, Telecommunications Law 213-1996, created the
Puerto Rico Telecommunications Regulatory Board (PRTRB) and reaffirmed
the Universal Service principle of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
As in the Federal statute, state law provided that eligible
telecommunications carriers could receive subsidies through the Puerto
Rico Universal Service Fund (a complementary fund) to provide
vulnerable groups and low income households access to
telecommunications services (e.g., Lifeline Program and Link-Up America
Program).\4\
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\4\ Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 254(b) and the Puerto
Rico Telecommunications Law 213-1996, Statement of Reasons.
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The TBPR requires telecommunications companies to demonstrate the
ability to deal with emergency situations. The Reglamento para la
Expedicion de Certificaciones y Franquicias (Regulations for the
Issuance of Certifications and Franchises) and the Reglamento de
Servicio Universal (Regulations for Universal Service) also set the
legal and procedural basis for the state regulator to certify ETCs
every two years, and to formulate new requirements related to the
ability of companies to continue providing services during emergency
situations. Also, Article 2 of Chapter III of Law 213-1996 provides
that companies must demonstrate ``moral and economic solvency, their
experience or history in the area in which they request
certification.'' Therefore, the regulatory regime at the Federal and
state level impose on telecommunications carriers and PTCs the
responsibility, and require of them the ability, to restore
telecommunications services to consumers during emergency situations
(e.g., require the capacity to provide continuity of services, reroute
traffic, network interconnection, and interoperability).\5\
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\5\ See Article 9.3 in Puerto Rico Telecommunications Board
(PRTRB). (1997). Reglamento para la Expedicion de Certificaciones y
Franquicias (Regulations for the Issuance of Certifications and
Franchises). PRTRB, 2009.
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As noted by Picard and Pickard (2017), self-regulation is a topic
of growing importance for international and industry professional
organizations, telecommunications companies, and media and
communications policymaking organizations.\6\ Emergency communications
intra-industry standards (e.g., best practices, codes) and agreements
(e.g., cooperative frameworks) for emergency situations are important
self-regulatory provisions.\7\ In 2016 the Wireless Resiliency
Cooperative Framework adopted by U.S. wireless carriers and industry
associations and endorsed by the FCC was the basis for an important, if
not historic agreement and collaboration between wireless carriers in
Puerto Rico, later endorsed by the TBPR. This agreement's main outcome
was that it provided roaming service to wireless subscribers during the
recovery phase. This cooperative initiative fits under what Freeman
refers to as business and top-down approaches to crisis informatics, in
which ``an overarching policy effort (e.g., national) is used to assist
and make decisions on how the technology can be used by citizens''
(Freeman, 2011, p. 74).
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\6\ See International Telecommunications Union. (2020a). ITU
Guidelines for national emergency telecommunication plans; The World
Bank/GFDDR. ``Communication during Disaster Recovery. Disaster Recovery
Guidance Series''.
\7\ Cited in Picard and Pickard, Haufler, V. (2001). A Public Role
for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy.
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace.
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2.3. Emergency communications framework
In natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made
disasters, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 USC 101 et seq.)
identifies communications networks as critical infrastructure. During
emergency situations, communications networks' response and recovery
activities are led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS
has designated a group of agencies that provide communications support
to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, agencies,
and first responders ``when their systems have been impacted and
provides communications and information technology (IT) support to the
Joint Field Office (JFO) and JFO field teams.'' \8\ The FCC and the
TBPR are Emergency Support Function #2 (ESF#2) organizations with
specific emergency plans \9\ and calls to action.\10\ Under these
considerations, first responders' organizations and citizenry are the
main subjects of a dynamic emergency communication model that entails
various emergency warning systems (e.g., Emergency Alert System,
Wireless Emergency Alerts/Commercial Mobile Service Alerts, and the
Integrated Public Alert & Warning System), emergency management
information systems (e.g., Disaster Information Reporting System,
Network Outage Reporting System), use of multiple technologies (e.g.,
wireless services, broadcasting services), and a dedicated segment of
the electromagnetic spectrum to provide access to emergency
communications services.
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\8\ DHS. (2016). National Response Framework (3rd ed); NRF. (2008),
Emergency Support Function Annexes: Introduction.
\9\ As an ESF#2 organization the TBPR during an emergency situation
supports the restoration of communications infrastructure and services
and in the coordination between PTC's and federal, state, and local
public safety organizations. See Torres Lopez (2017, November 7).
Letter to Hon. Miguel A. Laureano Correa. President, Innovation,
Telecommunications, Urban and Infrastructure Commission, Senate of
Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 457).
\10\ DHS (2008). National Emergency Communications Plan. P.11; DHS
(2013). NIPP 2013. Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience. P. 21-25; Torres Lopez (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry
Neumann Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto
Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708).
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At the state level, since 1999 the TBPR has had a dual role in
emergency communications. First, it is the coordinator of the
communications component in the Puerto Rico Agency for Emergency and
Disaster Management (PRAEDM). Over the years following 1999, the TBPR's
mission was to provide assistance for the continuity of public
communications services in PRAEDM and more than a dozen other state
agencies. This role includes providing support in the coordination of
federal, state, and local communications during emergency situations.
Secondly, in 1999 the TBPR created the Emergency Management Program.
This program is based on a cooperation agreement between the state
regulator and ETCs. The agreement was the foundation for the creation
of the Committee of the Telecommunications Industry for Emergency
Management (CTIEM). The committee's main objective is to restore and
protect the telecommunications and cable television infrastructure, as
well as to be responsive to the communications needs that arise out of
emergency or disaster situations (Rosario-Albert, 2016).
3. Background to emergency communications in Puerto Rico
In this study we examine emergency communications policies in
Puerto Rico around the time of Hurricane Maria because of the
uniqueness of the case, one in which the telecommunications
infrastructure collapsed entirely. In this section we provide an
overview of the telecommunications sector, including access to and
adoption metrics of main electronic media and telephone services, and
economic and historical trends.
In 2017, Puerto Rico's telecommunications industry profile showed
that in the wireline sector, Claro/Puerto Rico Telephone Company
(Claro/PRTC) was the Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier, and that AT&T,
Liberty of Puerto Rico, T-Mobile, Sprint, and Open Mobile were the
other Competitive Local Exchange Carriers. By then, Liberty of Puerto
Rico was the only cable television service, which also provided
telephony (VoIP) and Internet services. Up until 2017,
telecommunications industry revenues reported consecutive gains from
2011 ($2,329,985,690) to 2016 ($2,269,116,256), while in 2017, the year
of hurricanes Irma and Maria, telecommunications industry revenues
($1,912,882,859) decreased 16 percent.\11\
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\11\ Puerto Rico Telecommunications Bureau. (2020). Statistics for
Telecommunications and Cable Television Industries in Puerto Rico.
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In 2017, mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants reached 107.04
percent, while only 70.60 percent of the population used the
Internet.\12\ Mobile telephony accounted for 81 percent (3,389,402) of
all telephone lines, while wireline telephony accounted for 19 percent
(783,739 lines). In 2017 the consolidated total (4,173,141) of wireline
and wireless lines, as well as for total broadband subscribers
(3,372,768), reached its peak. Another indicator is the number of low-
income customers (556,455) subscribed to the Lifeline Program in
relation to the consolidated total of lines for 2017.\13\ By the time
of Hurricane Maria, 13 percent of the consolidated total (wireline and
wireless) lines represented low-income subscribers (a vulnerable
group). Since 2017 was a year of record growth in broadband subscribers
and in wireless services, which are provided by PTCs, the analysis of
emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico becomes more relevant,
and may provide data for other emergency communications policies
reviews.
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\12\ ITU (2020b). Mobile-Cellular Subscriptions; Puerto Rico
Telecommunications Bureau. (2020). Statistics for Telecommunications
and Cable Television Industries in Puerto Rico.
\13\ The Lifeline Program was established in 1985. The FSU has two
items: one item is to company infrastructure and the other item is for
the Lifeline grant program, which is a telephone subsidy for low income
families.
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The analysis of emergency communications polices in Puerto Rico
also considers historical trends in infrastructure and the economy.
First, in 2015 the state government's credit classification had been
progressively degraded and in 2016, for the first time in its history,
a Federal District Court decided that the island's government was
insolvent and unable to pay its obligations. This finding deepened the
political, social, and economic crisis that the island was already
undergoing. In 2017 the island's poverty rate was 44.4 percent and its
unemployment rate had reached 10.8 percent.\14\
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\14\ U.S. Census Bureau (2019) More Puerto Ricans Move to Mainland
United States, Poverty Declines. (September 26, 2019); Center for
Economic and Policy Research. (2017). Life After Debt in Puerto Rico:
How Many More Lost Decades?.
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The second consideration was the devastation of the already
degraded electric power infrastructure. As the Government
Accountability Office (2017)pointed out, wireline and wireless networks
are dependent on external and commercial electrical power companies in
order to provide uninterrupted telecommunications services. Also, to
provide wireless services to consumers, wireless carriers' networks
interconnect to wireline networks (e.g., local telephone company or
cable company). Hence, power failures in wireline services can create
outages in the backhaul network, affecting wireless networks. In
relation to backup power at cell sites, a GAO report stated that in
2007 the FCC had set a requirement of 8 h of backup power for wireless
carriers. However, the Office of Management and Budget disapproved
FCC's requirement because of the rule's information collection
requirements, with the effect of withdrawing the rule.\15\
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\15\ The report affirmed that nine of the stakeholders interviewed
for their study were open ``about the feasibility of guidance.'' See
U.S. Government Accountability Office (2017). FCC Should Improve
Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network
Resiliency. DC: GAO. P. p.6-7, 31.
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Miller et al., (2018) analyzed the destruction and inability of the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) to restore electricity
production and distribution after Hurricane Maria, leading to the
largest power outage in U.S. history. The collapse of the electrical
network had a cascade effect on public safety services (e.g., 911
emergency service and first responders' activities, access to
healthcare, nutrition, and housing services) and in wireless telephony,
resulting in more than three million wireless lines out of service for
weeks during the emergency situation. Access to and adoption of
wireless telephony services is paramount in the effectiveness of plans
to restore telecommunications services to citizens and its use by news
organizations (Nieves-Pizarro et al., 2019; Takahashi et al., 2019).
The considerations above serve to contextualize the process of
restoring emergency communications services, particularly through
wireless telephony. As stated by the FCC, in Puerto Rico ``service was
restored gradually over a six-month period, considerably longer than
for any other storm.'' \16\ The combination of the historical trends in
the economy and in the electrical power infrastructure, together with
the devastation caused by hurricanes Irma and Maria, meant from the
outset unique challenges to public safety organizations and PTCs'
readiness and capacity to restore emergency communications.
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\16\ FCC (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on
Communications Report and Recommendations. Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. p.15.
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Based on the discussion above, we pose the following research
questions:
RQ1 In what ways and to what extent did Federal regulations
facilitate the continuity of emergency communication services?
RQ2 In what ways and to what extent did state regulations
facilitate the continuity of emergency communication services?
RQ3 What external and structural factors were the most
influential in the reestablishment of emergency communications?
4. Methods
The study integrates two approaches. First, we conducted an
analysis of Private Telecommunications Companies' opinions about
telecommunications policies and emergency communications using the
following methods: 1) an electronic questionnaire; 2) semi-structured
in-depth interviews; and 3) institutional documentation from Federal
and state agencies, the local and national press, and academic studies.
Second, a policy examination was conducted focusing on the FCC,
TBPR, and PTCs' emergency communications processes and outcomes during
Hurricane Maria response and recovery phases. The research used a
qualitative approach supported by the analysis of data compiled mainly
by regulatory agencies. This provided a granular look at the
implementation of regulatory policies for emergency communications.
4.1. Interview and questionnaire data collection and analysis
A purposive sampling approach was used to select a group of
eligible telecommunications companies certified by the TBPR. After
Hurricane Maria, and for the next 60 days, the TBPR organized daily
meetings with representatives of both telecommunications and
telecommunications infrastructure companies. During the process to
reestablish telecommunications services, 17 telecommunications service
companies participated in the meetings at the Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) of the Government of Puerto Rico (GPR). In 2019, to
facilitate the participation of these companies in the study, we used a
list with the companies' contact details that the TBPR provided. E-mail
invitations were sent to 16 companies and follow-up calls were made to
explain the purpose of the research project. The qualitative analysis
is based on the answers to the electronic questionnaire and in-depth
interviews. Eight of the 16 companies responded to the electronic
questionnaire (Table 1). The response rate to the electronic
questionnaire was 50 percent. The questionnaire used closed and
multiple-choice questions that reflected the research questions to
gather the opinions and different emphasis of PTCs.
The PTCs that participated in the in-depth interviews include all
companies listed in Table 1 plus Neptuno Networks (Broadband & Network
Services) and T-Mobile Puerto Rico (Wireless Carrier). Ten interviews
were conducted, and two interviews included more than one participant
for a total of 13 participants. The response rate for the in-depth
interviews was 62 percent. Of the interviews, eight were conducted in
Spanish and two in English. The audio files of the interviews were
transcribed verbatim by professional transcribers. Transcripts in
Spanish were analyzed directly, with only those quotes used in the
results section translated into English by the authors. The list of the
de-identified interview subjects' information appears in Appendix 1.
The participants' PTCs represent different industry sectors (e.g.,
broadband providers, cable TV providers, network infrastructure,
network services and wireless telephony) providing an outlook on the
opinions for emergency communications in Puerto Rico. Most of them are
members of the Puerto Rican Alliance for Telecommunications (PRTA), an
industry organization that represents eligible telecommunications
companies in Puerto Rico.
In-depth interviews followed a semi-structured approach using open-
ended questions based on the research questions and organized
thematically and chronologically (before and after September 17, 2017,
three days before the hurricane made landfall in Puerto Rico). The
qualitative data analysis application Deedose was used to analyze
interview transcripts. The answers and content obtained were coded
according to the research questions, the three subjects (i.e., FCC,
TBPR and PTCs) and relationships analyzed, and factors that influenced
restoring emergency communications services (e.g., infrastructure,
regulatory, logistical). The analysis of the interviews focused on
identifying themes related to emergency communications and other
emerging and complementary themes directly related to the research
questions. Due to respondents' availability, data collection was
conducted during two time periods: May to December 2019 (nine
companies) and February 2020 (one company). The data collected from the
answers to the electronic questionnaire and the in-depth research
interviews from carriers (T-Mobile Puerto Rico, Liberty of Puerto Rico)
is a limited representation of the total eligible telecommunications
carriers at the time of Hurricane Maria. The data from the remaining
PTCs (8) and those that actively participated during the rehabilitation
of telecommunications services provide a more representative account of
their point of views on the research questions. In addition to
interviews with PTCs, five interviews were conducted with state
telecommunications experts (1) and regulatory officials (4) between
January 2018 and September 2019. This second group of interviews
contributed to a better understanding of the regulatory framework for
emergency communications in Puerto Rico, but their responses are not
included in the electronic survey results.
4.2. Policy examination: data collection and analysis
In regard to emergency communications during the response and
recovery phases after Hurricane Maria, the FCC and the TBPR were the
two government agencies with the responsibility to assist in the
restoration of communication and telecommunications services. These
organizations interacted primarily with PTCs and public safety
organizations. Therefore, our analysis takes into account the
activities of the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
(PSHSB) and the TBPR's Committee of the Telecommunications Industry for
Emergency Management (CTIME). To provide a comprehensive assessment of
the FCC, TBPR, and PTC's activities, secondary data analysis results
are organized under two rubrics: emergency management activities (e.g.,
daily emergency incident reports, fact-finding visits, interagency
committees), and adoption of policy tools (e.g., resolutions and
orders, thematic reports).
The study used secondary research sources (e.g., government
documents) for two objectives: 1) To summarize and assess FCC, TBPR and
PTC's emergency communications processes and outcomes during the
response and recovery phases, and 2) To triangulate the answers to the
research questions providing a deeper and multifactorial understanding
of the respondents' opinions about the feasibility of strengthening
emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico.
Table 1
Companies that answered the electronic questionnaire.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Companies Services
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AeroNet --Broadband & Network Services
Crown Castle --Communications Infrastructure
DatAccess --Broadband & Network Services
Liberty Cablevision of Puerto --Carrier, Cable TV, Telephony,
Rico LLC. Broadband Services
PREPA Networks --Network Infrastructure
Verizon --Network Infrastructure
VPnet --Broadband & Network Services
WorldNet Telecommunications, --Broadband & Network Services
Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The research examined Federal and state institutional documentation
published by the Department of Homeland Security, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), and the Government of Puerto Rico.\17\ In
particular, the review included documents and statistical and economic
data published by the FCC and TBPR.\18\ Also, we considered reports and
journalistic accounts on the social and economic effects after the
passage of hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico, carried out by
international organizations (e.g., World Meteorological Organization),
non-governmental organizations (e.g., Resilient Puerto Rico Advisory
Commission), research centers (Free Press), and journalistic
organizations (e.g., Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, El Nuevo Dia,
NotiCel).
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\17\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2018). 2017 Hurricanes
and Wildfires. Initial Observations on The Federal Response and Key
Recovery Challenges. DC: GAO; Puerto Rico Emergency Management Bureau,
Puerto Rico Department of Public Safety. (2019). Joint Operational
Catastrophic Incident Plan of Puerto Rico (Version 1.10); Resilient
Puerto Rico Advisory Commission. (2018). Reimagina Puerto Rico Informe
Sectorial de Infraestructura Fisica. San Juan PR.
\18\ In regard to Hurricane Maria and Puerto Rico, the FCC
published Public Notices (16); news releases, statements and
presentations (12); reports (1); and communications status reports
(107). On the other hand, between September 18 and December 28, 2017,
the TBPR issued 74 resolutions and orders, as well as participating in
legislative hearings (6) of the State Legislature on issues related to
the vulnerabilities of the telecommunications industry and public
safety communication systems after the passage of hurricanes Irma and
Maria.
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The second analysis focuses on three types of relationships between
regulatory organizations and PTCs during the aftermath of Hurricane
Maria: 1) FCC and telecommunications industry interaction, 2) TBPR and
telecommunications industry interaction, and 3) industry self-
regulatory practices during emergency situations, specifically the
roaming service agreement in 2017.
5. Results and discussion
The results section first presents a short summary of responses
from PTC representatives to the preliminary closed-ended questionnaire
and follow-up interviews that sought to establish the position of the
companies on the topic of Federal and state emergency communications
policies. The second part of this section presents a more detailed
account of the emerging themes related to those questions that were
extracted from the interviews and supported by the analysis of
secondary data.
The results show that half of the companies considered the Federal
regulation for emergency communications inadequate. A participant
considered it necessary to improve control and access to
telecommunications infrastructure. The participant commented: ``Federal
entities seemed to take over jurisdiction over private tower owners and
block access to certain facilities as they pleased and take control of
private property as they pleased without providing proper
documentation.'' \19\ Another participant expressed that regulation
must consider employees of telecommunications companies as a priority
group that support access ``to infrastructure services that allow for a
faster and more effective recovery.'' \20\
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\19\ Interview #2 with Senior Executive.
\20\ Interview #9 with Senior Executives (2 participants).
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Second, representatives of four companies disagreed or strongly
disagreed about the need to strengthen Federal regulation. Several
telecommunications companies stated that it was not necessary to
strengthen regulation but rather to improve the application of
administrative procedures and the distribution of detailed information
on contacts with the Federal government. In this sense, a participant
said, ``I don't think it is a matter of the regulations but a matter of
well documented and agreed upon procedures.'' \21\
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\21\ Interview #10 with Executive.
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Third, most of the responses (n = 5) expressed disagreement with
state regulation for emergency communications. One participant said:
``What I believe was missing was the communication from all government
agencies with the telecom providers. We had to extract information from
them.'' Another participant stated: ``I mean if there was regulation
and cooperation and a good plan, I think, communications could have
been up weeks before it was.'' \22\
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\22\ Interview #7 with Senior Executives (3 participants).
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Fourth, representatives of four companies favored strengthening
state regulation. Several respondents indicated the importance of
communication and coordination for the state government to facilitate
and accelerate the processing of permits during the response and
recovery phase. Regarding cooperation and emergency communications, one
participant stated that ``regulation needs to be strengthened in the
area of company cooperation . . . These types of situation are exactly
where government needs to regulate, when market forces work against the
safety of society.'' \23\ Another participant provided a singular view
on the need to strengthen state emergency communications regulatory
policies. For instance, the viability of a non-governmental
organization responsible for the emergency communications services. On
this matter the participant said:
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\23\ Interview #7 with Senior Executives (3 participants).
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I think the hardest part of that was who manages the network. You
don't want the government managing it. It's going to be inefficient . .
. But then who is? And maybe the answer is, you know, you got to get
the board to hire an external, independent party, to manage it because
it's got to be fair and equal for everybody to get access.\24\
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\24\ Interview with Senior Executive #10.
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The remaining remarks from the results and discussion section are
organized in six sub-sections. The first two sections derived mostly
inductively from the interview data. The first sub-section addresses
telecommunications infrastructure damages, while the second sub-section
discusses the factors that influenced the effective use of emergency
communications. References to press articles and government
documentation are used to develop and support various themes. The next
three sub-sections entail the policy examination on the interaction of
the FCC and TBPR with PTCs, and the roaming service agreement, as an
industry self-regulatory practice adopted in Puerto Rico during the
emergency situation. The last sub-section provides an analysis of
recent Emergency Communications State Regulatory Reform.
5.1. Telecommunications infrastructure and services after Hurricane
Maria
The analysis of damages to emergency communications associated with
Hurricane Maria shows the complex process to restore emergency
communications services. For instance, the National Oceanic Graphic
Administration's weather radar was destroyed.\25\ The FCC reported that
the two call centers in Puerto Rico managed by the Government of Puerto
Rico were out of service for a period of time or ``could not receive
the types of information (location, call back number, etc.), as
happened in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), that
both they and the American public have come to expect.'' \26\
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\25\ World Meteorological Organization. (2018). Center for Economic
and Policy Research, 2017 Hurricane Season an Evidence-Based Assessment
of the Early Warning System. Geneva, Switzerland. P.19.
\26\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on
Communications Report and Recommendations. Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P.3.
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In regard to Public Safety Systems, restoring the 911 service
required technical assistance from the Department of Defense's Joint
Force Land Component Command. For instance, the Air Force 85th
Engineering and Installation Squadron was deployed to restore radio
communications for local emergency personnel and first responders
across the island. This account provides information related to the
resiliency of public safety networks, as the following remark shows:
``What most would consider a redundant communication system in the
[mainland] United States, they don't have here . . . As soon as we get
that back up, I think it will definitely help that level of
communication.'' \27\ During the in-depth interviews, the resiliency of
public safety communication systems was also addressed. In regard to
compliance with Federal government standards, a state regulatory
official stated that:
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\27\ State News Service. Airmen work to restore Radio
Communications in Puerto Rico. Oct. 23, 2017.
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And what happens is that each agency chooses . . . the one that
it's going to provide service and most of the time those systems do not
talk to each other . . . that explains a lot of what happened in the
hurricane . . . At the time of the event, some government agencies did
not meet the P25 standard of government emergency management
organizations.\28\
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\28\ Interview #12 with Telecommunications Regulatory Official.
Project 25 (P25) is a process to establish wireless communication
standards for the public safety community. Associated Public-Safety
Communications Officers, 2018. Project 25 Steering Committee BY-LAWS.
(April 16, 2018).
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Damage to public safety networks were numerous. Even though PTCs'
networks, which interconnect with emergency communications services,
were active for a period of time, they were unable to activate their
services due to power outages and damages to other networks with which
they interconnect.\29\ Based on interview data, the portfolio of
government clients of some PTCs included security and emergency
organizations such as firefighters, health services, and hospitals.
When discussing the effects of the telecommunications collapse on
health services, a participant mentioned the following:
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\29\ Some of them also contracted services from private
telecommunications companies for data transmission services, support
tasks, maintenance and security.
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A lot of communication couldn't be done and that could possibly
have had an impact on the accounting of the missing and the deaths.
Ultimately, the effect it had on communications for first responders
was disastrous.\30\
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\30\ Interview #11 with Telecommunications Regulation Specialist.
See Kishore et al., (2018) for an assessment on the total number of
official reported deaths and the lack of telephone services during the
response and recovery phases.
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Wireless telecommunication services between the 78 municipalities
of Puerto Rico, including the islands of Vieques and Culebra, were very
scarce, if not null, during the following weeks. On this matter, the
FCC affirmed that ``All municipios in Puerto Rico had greater than 75
percent of their cell sites out of service. Forty-eight out of the 78
municipios in Puerto Rico had 100 percent of their cell sites out of
service.'' \31\ With respect to wireless telecommunications services,
the dominant telephone service, one respondent noted that ``at the
worst point, 95.6 percent of cell sites were out of service in Puerto
Rico.'' \32\
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\31\ FFC. (2018). Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on
Communications Report and Recommendations. Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. DC: FCC. P.5. The word municipios refers to counties.
\32\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on
Communications Report and Recommendations. Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P.15.
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Six months after Hurricane Maria, as part of a fact-finding visit
to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai's remarks
provide a description of Puerto Rico's communications infrastructure
damages that still included ``poles down, cell towers toppled,
electrical power depleted, and otherwise unavailable, wireless
infrastructure completely destroyed, many radio and television
broadcast facilities impacted.'' \33\ The TBPR estimated damages to the
communications network at $1.5 billion.\34\
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\33\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on
Communications Report and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P. 27.
\34\ Torres Lopez, S. E. (2017). Letter to Ajit Pai, Chairman. FCC
WC Docket No. 10-90, at 1 (filed Dec. 13, 2017).
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5.2. Factors affecting the restoration of telecommunications services
In regard to the third research question, participants identified
the following factors as the most influential in the process of
restoring emergency communications services during the response and
recovery phases: 1) Lack of electricity and dependence on PREPA's
electricity service, 2) Difficulties in access and security of fuels
for backup power systems and transportation, 3) Hurricane Irma's
degrading effects on the electrical power and telecommunications
networks, 4) Human-caused damage (i.e., questionable practices during
debris cleaning and restoration of the electrical system), and 5)
Aerial deployment of fiber optics.
On the issue of lack of electricity and dependence on the Puerto
Rico Electric Power Authority service, all participants considered this
to be the main factor in the restoration process. With respect to the
extended power outages and wireless telephone service availability, one
participant stated that:
If the electrical power connection was lost, they used the backup
power, which are generally small because they serve small areas and
their specifications at the tolerance level that will be given for a
certain time. It is possible that the plants could supply energy for 8
h and after that the tanks had to be refilled and without the
transportation mechanisms or the closed or blocked roads, the cell
tower lost its service and left all the clients of that area without
service. That was what caused more than 95 percent of cell phone
customers to lose their service after the hurricane. That experience
was very similar for almost all cell phone companies.\35\
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\35\ Interview #11 with Telecommunications Regulation Specialist.
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Participants also discussed the difficulties in fuel access and
security for backup power systems and transportation. Regarding the
distribution of fuels, a participant commented:
When the event occurred, Federal agencies arrived, specifically
FEMA, and took control of all fuel supplies with the intention of them
establishing their recovery process . . . But that in turn meant that
local operators did not have access to fuel when they needed it. And
that's one of the critical points because everything runs on power and
we need the generators running.\36\
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\36\ Interview #6 with Senior Executive.
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A particular feature of the restoration process was the ongoing
recovery mode in place after Hurricane Irma's impact just two weeks
before Hurricane Maria. According to some participants, that was a main
factor in the difficulty of restoring telecommunications services after
Hurricane Maria.\37\ On this matter, a participant commented: ``I
think, back-to-back events posed a unique challenge because you were
already in emergency mode and you had to beat another emergency mode.''
\38\
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\37\ This opinion was also subscribed by the FCC. FCC. (2018). 2017
Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on Communications Report and Recom-
mendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-344. P.5.
\38\ Interview #4 with Senior Executive.
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Participants also mentioned human-caused damage related to
difficulties in coordination during debris cleaning and restoration of
the electrical system, particularly between the Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority, the TBPR, and telecommunications companies. For
example, transmission paths and fiber optic and coaxial cables were
accidentally cut as branches and trees were removed in order to allow
vehicular access and restoration work. With respect to this practice, a
telecommunications regulatory specialist stated:
The Electric Power Authority in its process of reestablishing
service cut fiber optic cables for telephone distribution. We did not
lose the service as a consequence of the hurricane, but we did lose it
in the recovery process because contractors or employees of the
Authority motu propio decided to cut them in order to advance the
restoration of the electrical power service.\39\
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\39\ Interview #12 with Telecommunications Regulatory Official.
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Another factor identified by some of the participants was the
aerial deployment of fiber optics. Historically, fiber optics were
deployed mainly overhead, with underground fiber optics lagging behind,
mostly due to high installation costs for underground fiber optics. On
this matter, a participant stated:
When we left the metropolitan area, and this is what happens to
most carriers, almost all infrastructure is overhead. In the wake of
the storm, initiatives have been made to bury sections to help mitigate
the impact on future events. But most of the infrastructure outside the
metropolitan area is aerial.\40\
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\40\ Interview #6 with Senior Executive. In relation to fiber
optics costs another participant stated: ``I mean we looked into this.
I mean the cost was prohibitive. It was like 10 times the cost of
aerial which is why people don't do it. . . . So that may be another
example of where you need government assistance.'' Interview #10 with
Senior Executive.
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5.3. Policy examination of the interaction and outcomes between the
FCC, TBPR, and PTCs
This section addresses the interaction between the FCC and the
telecommunications industry during the response and recovery phases,
outlined under two rubrics: emergency management activities and
adoption of policy tools.
5.3.1. Emergency management activities
The FCC activated its Incident Management Team (IMT), a technical
and policy experts group from other FCC's Bureaus and Offices. The
IMT's activities included addressing information and action requests
from Federal and state government agencies such as the Emergency
Operations Center of the GPR, the TBPR, and PTCs. During the response
and recovery phases the FCC activated the Disaster Information
Reporting System (DIRS) and over the next two months issued daily
Communications Status Reports about Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.\41\
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\41\ The Communications Status Reports were generally organized
under the following categories: 911 Services, Wireless Services, and
Cable Systems and Wireline and Broadcasting (combined).
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With respect to Puerto Rico, the FCC deployed three employees to
its Joint Field Office in San Juan. Also, on October 6, 2017, the FCC
created a Hurricane Recovery Task Force to transition from a short-term
to a longer-term recovery phase. Both groups provided support in areas
such as waivers of FCC rules, the extension of the period for
regulatory filings, the granting of Special Temporary Authority (STA),
personnel support to Roll Call, support in shipping of equipment and
materials, and other regulatory filings and requests to Federal
agencies (e.g., United States Environmental Protection Agency).
For the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season and related to Hurricane
Maria, the FCC's Bureaus and Offices granted 824 STAs (Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau--717, Public Safety & Homeland Security
Bureau--8, Media Bureau--85, International Bureau--5, Office of
Engineering & Technology--9).\42\ The FCC data are useful in recounting
the complexities and scale of FCC's activities during Hurricane Maria.
However, a specific breakdown of STAs for Puerto Rico was not found. In
regard to the specific number of STAs for Puerto Rico, one participant
stated that because of having the Emergency Operations Center, the FCC
granted over 300 STAs to just one company during the recovery
phase.\43\ Participants stated that FCC staff approved ``the needed
Special Temporary Authority to operate in Puerto Rico as part of our
efforts to support a roaming partner on the island.'' \44\
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\42\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on
Communications Report and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P.21.
\43\ Interview #7 with Senior Executives (3 participants).
\44\ Interview #10 with Senior Executive.
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The FCC STAs facilitated access to frequencies and use of
technologies, such as microwaves, granted a request from the American
Radio Relay League (ARRL) for amateur data transmissions to facilitate
hurricane relief communications between the continental United States
and Puerto Rico, waived location accuracy obligations for 911 calls for
certain service providers, and waived rules that allowed public safety
use of interoperable channels in Puerto Rico. Other examples of FCC and
industry interaction in the restoration of telecommunications services
was the FCC's permission for deployment of the 600 band and the
temporary use of some of our frequencies in the radio spectrum to
support Google Looms technology. Also, after the event and for two
years approximately, on a one week per month basis, the FCC had an
expert in public safety spectrum issues available in Puerto Rico.
For over a year, the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau issued additional public reports on the status of communications
services, published public notices seeking comment on communications
infrastructure resiliency, and hosted a workshop of government and
consumer stakeholders to identify critical information needs and
facilitate access to information in support of preparedness and
response activities. Also, Ajit Pai, FCC Chairman, made two fact-
finding visits (November 2017 and March 2018) to Puerto Rico during the
response and recovery phases. These visits included meeting with
stakeholders (state government and public safety officials, industry
representatives, and community members in Utuado, Puerto Rico).\45\
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\45\ Gonzalez, J. (2017, December 19). La FCC abre proceso sobre
efectividad de telecomunicaciones tras Maria (The FCC opens a process
on telecommunications effectiveness after Maria). El Nuevo Dia; FCC.
(2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on Communications Report
and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-344. P. 27. Also on
March 2018 FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel visited Puerto Rico to
assess damages to the communications sector and recovery efforts. More
recently, in February 2020 FCC Commissioner Geofrey Starks visited
Puerto Rico. See Minelli Perez, S. (March 8, 2018). La FCC fizcalizara
el uso de los fondos para las telecomunicaciones (The FCC will monitor
the use of funds for telecommunications). El Nuevo Dia.
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5.3.2. Adoption of policy tools
As part of the administrative provisions, the FCC activated the
DIRS system and provided public information regarding the state of
communications services in Puerto Rico.\46\ By December 2017, along
with the funding allocations to telecommunications carriers in Puerto
Rico, the FCC announced a public consultation process seeking comments
from stakeholders on the resiliency of the communications
infrastructure during hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and Nate. The
purpose was to obtain ``information to better understand how well such
access was provided during these hurricanes in order to assess what
lessons may be learned for the future.'' \47\ El Nuevo Dia, the
newspaper of record in Puerto Rico, reported the FCC public notice and
based on their journalistic investigation found that approximately 80
percent of mobile antennas were operating 90 days after the event. This
means between six and seven out of 10 antennas were still working with
backup power generators due to the extended power outage across the
island.\48\
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\46\ Torres Lopez, S. E. (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry
Neumann Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto
Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708).
\47\ FCC. (December 7, 2017). Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau seeks comment on response efforts undertaken during 2017
Hurricane Season. Public Notice.
\48\ Gonzalez, J. (2017, December 19). La FCC abre proceso sobre
efectividad de telecomunicaciones tras Maria. (The FCC opens a process
on telecommunications effectiveness after Maria). El Nuevo Dia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the FCC's first economic measures during the restoration of
telecommunications services was a first allocation of funds for
telecommunications companies in Puerto Rico (Supplemental Emergency
Support). Telecommunications companies had already expressed the need
for financial assistance to restore telecommunications services. In
regard to supplemental Federal emergency assistance to PTCs, on October
4, 2017, the FCC authorized a first allocation of $77 million for
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands from the Universal Service Fund High
Cost Program to PTCs. Later, on August 7, 2018, the FCC issued a Public
Notice announcing the allocation of $64 million for Stage 1 for
telecommunications service providers in Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands. By May of 2018, in response to the damage to
telecommunications infrastructure in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, the FCC created the Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund (Bringing
Puerto Rico Together Fund) and the Connect USVI Fund.\49\
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\49\ FCC. (October 4, 2017). FCC Approves Advance of $77 M to
Restore Connectivity in PR and USVI. FCC. WC Docket No. 10-90. Retrived
from https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-approves-advance-77m-restore-
connectivity-pr-and-usvi; FCC. (2019, May 8). FCC Gives Additional
Funding to Restore Networks in PR and USVI. FCC. Docket 18-143,10-90,
14-58. Retrieved from https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-18-
57A1.pdf; FCC. (2020, February 5). Uniendo A Puerto Rico Fund and
Connect USVI Fund Procedures PN.; FCC. Docket 18-143, 10-90, 15-58.
Retrieved from https://www.fcc.gov/document/uniendo-puerto-rico-fund-
and-connect-usvi-fund-procedures-pn.
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More recently, in 2019 the FCC approved $750 million in funding
over ten years to strengthen communications networks in Puerto Rico,
500 million for fixed broadband and $250 million over three years for
mobile broadband.\50\ Since telecommunications companies are
responsible for restoring service, maintaining and hardening
infrastructure, the FCC's financial assistance goes to companies and
that economic assistance indirectly benefits customer service. In this
sense, according to one of the participants, ``as there is more money
for companies to have infrastructure, I think that this is beneficial
for all of us.'' \51\ The policy objectives of this Federal funding
allocation are to improve, expand, and harden communications networks.
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\50\ FCC. (September 26, 2019). FCC Invests $950 Million to Improve
Broadband in Puerto Rico, USVI (Press Release); FCC. (February 5,
2020). The Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund and Connect USVI Fund Notice and
Filing Requirements and Other Procedures for Stage 2 Fixed Competitive
Proposal Process. WC Docket Nos. 18-143, 10-90, 14-58; FCC WC Docket
Nos. 18-143, 10-90, 14-58. Retrieved from https://www.fcc.gov/document/
uniendo-puerto-rico-fund-and-connect-usvi-fund-procedures-pn.
\51\ Interview #12 with Telecommunications Regulatory Official. The
TBPR supported the allocation of financial aid to companies through the
Universal Service Fund.
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5.4. TBPR and the telecommunications industry interaction
This section addresses the TBPR's emergency management Activities
and adoption of policy tools.
5.4.1. Emergency management activities
Prior to hurricanes Irma and Maria, on August 22, 2017, the major
telecommunications providers in Puerto Rico signed a cooperation
agreement with the TBPR.\52\ The purpose of the cooperation agreement
was to ``to unite efforts between public and private entities in order
to restore and protect the telecommunications and cable television
infrastructure, and meet priorities arising from disasters or
emergencies.'' \53\
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\52\ The signatory companies were AT&T, Puerto Rico Telephone Co./
Claro, Open Mobile, Sprint, Telefonica Larga Distancia, T-Mobile Puerto
Rico, WorldNet Telecommunications, Liberty Cablevision & PREPA
Networks. Torres Lopez (February 4, 2019). Letter to Hon. Victor L.
Pares Otero. President, Economic Development, Planning,
Telecommunications, Public & Private Alliances and Energy Commission,
Representatives of Representatives of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report
for House of Representatives Resolution 64).
\53\ The agreement was renewed in June 2019. See Serrano-Roman,
(2019, June 19). Acuerdo permitira mejorar el restablecimiento de las
telecomunicaciones despues de una emergencia (Agreement will improve
the restoration of telecommunications after an emergency). El Nuevo
Dia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After Hurricane Maria and for the following 60 days approximately,
the TBPR organized daily meetings with representatives of
telecommunications companies and established its own Telecommunications
Operations Center (COT) in the facilities of the Government Command
Center, with the purpose of dealing with incidents from the
telecommunications industry and government agencies. There, in
collaboration with DHS, FEMA, the FCC and other Federal entities, TBPR
staff, and the Puerto Rico Innovation and Technology Service (PRITS),
the telecommunications companies carried out support activities for the
restoration of telecommunications services (e.g., PTCs Daily Status
Reports).\54\ Other activities of the TBPR, in conjunction with CTIME,
included the management of a telephone bank for first responders and
people in transit at airport and ports.\55\
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\54\ The Telecommunications Operations Center was opened on PRTRB
(September 20, 2017). See PRTRB Administrative Order JRT 2017-004,
PRTRB (October 10, 2017); PRTRB. Order JRT-2017-OA-0003, September 18,
2017; Torres Lopez, S. E. (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry Neumann
Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto Rico
(Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708).
\55\ For instance, AT&T supplied 103 telephones for First
Responders. Also, the TBPR and CTIEM's agreement provided for an
inventory of ``at least thirty (30) cell phones activated by company
(subject to availability) to be used by representatives of the state
and Federal government, according to priorities during an emergency,
and after these have exhausted their resources.'' See Torres Lopez, S.
E. (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry Neumann Zayas, President,
Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for
Senate Resolution 708).
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In addition to providing satellite telephones (22) to the
Governor's Office and heads of designated agencies for use during
emergency situations, during this period the activities of the TBPR
included the use of an interactive map of the critical
telecommunications infrastructure in Puerto Rico, identification and
security for the distribution of fuels, support for several orders for
telecommunications companies' exemptions from state and municipal
permits making arrangements for and constructing their infrastructure,
relief of taxes for equipment and materials destined for the recovery
phase, and access to back yards and easements without civil or Criminal
liability.\56\
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\56\ See Torres Lopez, S. E. (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry
Neumann Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto
Rico(Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708); Interview #12 with
Telecommunications Regulatory Official.
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Several participants favorably described TBPR's emergency
management activities during the response and recovery phases.\57\ In
response to the need for information to restore emergency
communications and wireless telecommunications services, one project
developed by the TBPR was the adoption of Map Plus, an electronic
platform that traced telecommunications service connectivity and
outages according to geographical coverage areas. This initiative was
mentioned by several participants as an important instrument in support
of the restoration of emergency communications.\58\
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\57\ Interview #5 with Senior Executive.
\58\ The context for this resource is traced back to Hurricane
Irma. After Hurricane Irma the TBPR asked the FCC's Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau for information about critical
telecommunications infrastructure in Puerto Rico. Because the
information reported by the companies to the DIRS system was
confidential, the information request didn't materialize. It is
noteworthy that in the order of October 10, 2017, that reported the
problems in getting information from the PTC's, the state regulator
also stated that it had not received information related to critical
telecommunications infrastructure from the FCC.
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5.4.2. Adoption of policy tools
With regard to TBPR's resolutions and orders during the first three
weeks after Hurricane Maria, on October 10, 2017, the state regulator
requested that PTCs provide detailed information on the recovery of
essential telecommunications infrastructure. According to the TBPR,
aside from the voluntary information provided by the PTCs during the
response phase, the state regulator ``still continues to face problems
with getting data from companies, despite the fact that they have a
duty to report to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) once the
Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS) has been activated. This
information is not shared with the states.'' \59\ The order's mandate,
a prescriptive policy measure, required daily information reports from
PTCs with fines for noncompliance, and a Restoration Plan from each
company.\60\
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\59\ PRTRB. Administrative Order JRT 2017-004, October 10, 2017.
Translation by the authors.
\60\ On the matter of compliance with the voluntary reporting to
the DIRS system, later, in 2018, the FCC provided information on PTCs
participation in DIRS in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria. It stated:
``During Hurricane Maria, the major incumbent local exchange carrier
and cable providers in Puerto Rico and the USVI did not provide
detailed information in DIRS. In some cases, the lack of participation
was due to service providers' loss of communications, which precluded
access to the DIRS platform. In other cases, service providers may not
have been aware of DIRS prior to the hurricanes.'' FCC. (2018). 2017
Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on Communications Report and
Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-344. P.28.
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With respect to consumers, the TBPR issued a statement and order
requiring PTCs to provide information related to the granting of
credits to consumers, specifically to include a description of the type
of credit and the time without service, the number of billing cycles
with credits to consumers, how the credits were communicated to their
clients, and how many clients had requested credit for service outages.
It is worth mentioning that before the order, telephone service
providers offered credits to consumers for 60 or 90 days of service.
PTCs also voluntarily agreed to give credits to other
telecommunications companies due to the inability to interconnect
between them.\61\
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\61\ See PRTRB. Resolution and Order JRT-2017-CCG-0002, PRTRB
(November 11, 2017); Torres Lopez, S. E. (November 7, 2017). Letter to
Hon. Miguel A. Laureano Correa. President, Innovation,
Telecommunications, Urban and Infrastructure Commission, Senate of
Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 457).
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After the response and recovery phases, other policy tools to
further emergency communications objectives were TBPR's agreements with
the Patriot Amateur Radio Emergency Club and the Federation of Radio
Amateurs of Puerto Rico (Federacion de Radioaficionados de Puerto
Rico).\62\ Also, in regard to public safety organizations, the TBPR
collaborated with other emergency communications partners in the
Central Recovery and Reconstruction Office's Report on Puerto Rico
Critical Communications Preparedness for the 2018 Hurricane Season,\63\
and in 2019, with the Puerto Rico Emergency Management and Disaster
Bureau's Joint Operational Catastrophic Incident Plan of Puerto Rico,
the renewal of cooperation agreements between the TBPR and the Puerto
Rican Alliance for Telecommunications, and policy briefs to several
state hearings on the telecommunications industry's emergency
plans.\64\
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\62\ Torres Lopez (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Victor L. Pares
Otero. President, Economic Development, Planning, Telecommunications,
Public & Private Alliances and Energy Commission, Representatives of
Representatives of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for House of
Representatives Resolution 64).
\63\ The agencies that collaborated in the report were the TBPR,
Puerto Rico Department of Public Safety, DHS, FEMA, FCC National
Coordinating Center for Communications, Mobile Emergency Response
Support Team, and the National Telecommunications and Information
Systems. See (2018, May 25). Torres Lopez (2018, May 25). Letter to
Hon. Henry Neumann Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate
of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708).
\64\ The Joint Operational Catastrophic Incident Plan of Puerto
Rico was approved on August 18, 2019. However, in 2018, a year after
Hurricane Maria, the Puerto Rican Alliance for Telecommunications, a
professional organization representing telecommunications companies in
Puerto Rico, expressed its disappointment because the GPR had not
submitted its new emergency communications plan to the
telecommunications industry. On the contrary, by then PTCs had complied
with the legal and regulatory mandates to provide new emergency
communications plans to the regulator while undertaking voluntary
network hardening and emergency communications-related investments. See
Suarez, D. (2018, September 12). Desconectadas empresas de
comunicaciones de nuevo plan emergencia. Noticel; Minelli Perez, S.
(2018, December 30). La reparacion en telecomunicaciones dio paso a
sentar las bases para 5G (Telecommunications repair gave way to laying
the groundwork for 5G). El Nuevo Dia.
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5.5. Wireless industry self-regulatory practices during emergency
situations: the roaming service agreement
Before and during the first days after Hurricane Maria's landfall,
several PTCs reached confidential cooperation agreements for the
transportation of generators, materials, and personnel, access to
submarine cables, and preliminary agreements for roaming services
between companies. Also, during the process of reestablishing
telecommunications networks, other companies adopted written and verbal
agreements of cooperation for interconnection services, exchange of
materials and equipment, and acquisition and repair of equipment.\65\
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\65\ Interview with Senior Executives #7.
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Other initiatives adopted by the telecommunications providers to
mitigate the loss of telecommunications services were the deployment of
Satellite Cells on Light Trucks (COLTs) and Cell on Wheels (COWs). Of
these PTC cooperation initiatives, with regard to citizenry's and first
responders' emergency communications access, several respondents
considered the cooperation agreement between the wireless carriers as
the most important. This agreement is based on the 2016 Wireless
Resiliency Cooperative Framework, supported by the FCC on December 14,
2016.\66\ The framework is a voluntary mechanism enacted by wireless
carriers during emergency situations that provides continuity of
wireless services (roaming) to subscribers of wireless services
(citizens), first responders, and public safety systems. As noted by
the GAO, the agreement was in response to ``FCC's 2013 notice of
proposed rule-making on wireless network resiliency.'' \67\
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\66\ The Competitive Carriers Association also endorsed the
cooperative framework. FCC (2016a, 2016b). Wireless Resiliency
Cooperative Framework.
\67\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2017). FCC Should
Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network
Resiliency. DC: GAO. P. 23.
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In 2016 the signatory companies of the framework included AT&T
Mobility, the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA),
General Communication Inc., Southern Linc, Sprint, T-Mobile, U.S.
Cellular, and Verizon Wireless. The agreement sets five objectives, of
which four are directly related to restoring mobile telephony services
during emergency situations.\68\
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\68\ The objectives related to our analysis are: 1) Provide
reasonable roaming under disaster arrangements when technically
feasible, 2) Foster mutual aid among wireless providers during
emergencies, 3) Support municipal preparedness and restoration with
local government public safety representatives and develop best
practices and establishing a provider/PSAP contact database, 4) Improve
public awareness and stakeholder communications on service and
restoration status, through Commission posting of data on cell site
outages on an aggregated, county-by-county basis in the relevant area
through its Disaster Information Reporting System.
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Based on the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework of 2016 and
the fact that no single company could restore mobile phone services,
the agreement was adopted to establish a roaming phone service. The
Puerto Rican Alliance for Telecommunications supported the agreement
and the TBPR endorsed it. For instance, there were companies that could
extend the roaming service to other competing companies, allowing the
coverage area to be expanded. In this regard, a participant mentioned:
There were pieces of Sprint and Open that could roam on Claro. But
Claro, AT&T, and T-Mobile could roam based on their LTE and based on
their GSM infrastructure under lane. And then we quickly found out that
some of the handsets that Sprint had actually sold came from Europe
which meant they had a GSM chip set. So, we quickly then started
turning on those numbers as well to allow those guys to roam on our
network . . . It actually cost a lot of problems because there was no
continuous coverage all the way to any one place . . . So it wasn't the
most perfect of networks but at least it allowed somebody to call
somebody to say, ``I need help''.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Interview #7 with Senior Executives (3 participants).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A favorable outcome of the framework was that alongside the
wireless carriers' efforts to provide a roaming service, other
telecommunications companies endorsed and provided support for this
initiative. Another group that benefited from this cooperative
agreement was first responders, as they obtained another communication
system to carry out safety, health, and other support activities.
Approximately three weeks after Hurricane Maria, on October 10,
2017, the FCC reported that the four major wireless companies had
opened a roaming service that could benefit 54 percent of the
population subscribed to wireless services.\70\ The roaming agreement
concluded once wireless carriers reached between 50 and 60 percent of
their service in order to avoid affecting the service of other
companies.\71\ Later, on November 5, 2017, almost seven weeks after
Hurricane Maria, the TBPR reported that service had reached 50
percent.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ FCC. (October 10, 2017). Communications Status Report for
Areas Impacted by Hurricane Maria October 10, 2017. Primera Hora, a
local newspaper provided an earlier date, circa October 2, 2017,
approximately two weeks after Hurricane Maria. The source indicates the
agreement to provide a roaming service benefits nearly 2.5 million
mobile subscribers. By then, only 12 percent-15 percent of the
telecommunications infrastructure had been repaired. See Rivera Cruz,
Y. (2017, October 2). Acuerdo entre Claro, T-Mobile y AT&T beneficia a
2.5 millones de usuarios (Agreement between Claro, T-Mobile and AT&T
benefits 2.5 million users). Primera Hora.
\71\ Interview #12 with Telecommunications Regulatory Official.
\72\ The report doesn't specify if the 50 percent refers to a
specific service (e.g., wireline, wireless) or is an aggregated number.
Torres Lopez, S. E. (May 25, 2018) Letter to Hon. Henry Neumann Zayas,
President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto Rico (Explanatory
Report for Senate Resolution 708). P.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The roaming service agreement adopted in 2017 by the principal
wireless carriers (AT&T, Claro, Open Mobile, Sprint, and T-Mobile) was
a positive factor in the restoration of emergency communications and
telecommunications services during the response and recovery
phases.\73\ The roaming agreement was considered by various
participants a historic initiative and it had a direct impact on
citizens and on first responders' ability to perform their work.
Nonetheless, data show that initially half of the total wireless
subscribers benefited from the roaming service, and that due to the
prolonged restoration of wireless services and other telecommunications
services in order to provide access to emergency communications
services--a policy objective--was significantly limited to citizens.
Hence, outages in emergency communications (i.e., 911 emergency
service, wireless services) compromised the citizenry's use of safety
and health services and social media platforms (e.g., Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp) for communication activities during the
emergency.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Other telecommunications companies endorsed the roaming
service agreement, such as Verizon and Neptuno Networks.
\74\ See Fitzpatrick et al., (2019). Connecting the dots. The
telecommunications crisis in Puerto Rico. Free Press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.5.1. GAO and FCC assessments of the wireless resiliency framework
In December of 2017 the GAO published a report entitled FCC Should
Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network
Resiliency. The report covered the years 2009-2016 and its focuses were
trends in mobile wireless outages attributed to physical incidents,
Federal agencies' and industry's steps to improve wireless network
resiliency, and a classification of stakeholders' proposed measures
that could be adopted by Federal agencies. With respect to the Wireless
Resiliency Cooperative Framework as it relates to our analysis of
emergency communications in Puerto Rico, the main consideration to be
taken from the GAO's report is the concern expressed by various
stakeholders as to whether the framework represented a sufficient path
forward, due to the following factors: 1) Lack of Federal agency
enforcement or monitoring, 2) Adequate testing to enable roaming during
and after disasters, and 3) High threshold to trigger the response
elements to the detriment of local events.\75\ In light of the previous
issues and to improve wireless network resiliency, the GAO submitted
recommendations in three areas of action: preparedness, response, and
awareness. Three executive actions were submitted to the FCC: 1)
Develop specific and measurable objectives, 2) Plan to monitor the
outputs and outcomes that serve to document and evaluate results, 3)
Promote awareness in state and local public safety officials and
industry stakeholders through outreach mechanisms.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2017). FCC Should
Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network
Resiliency. DC: GAO. P. 3-4, 27.
\76\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2017). FCC Should
Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network
Resiliency. DC: GAO. P. 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Later, in 2018, the FCC published the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane
Season Impact on Communications Report and Recommendations, which
completed the documentation and assessment of the 2017 hurricane
season. With respect to the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework,
the FCC reported various stakeholders' favorable opinion of the
Framework's outcomes. The report also adopted T-Mobile's broader view
of the Framework, recommending to the FCC that it consider ``a similar
approach to cover the entire communications ecosystem, including
backhaul providers to provide faster and more complete service
restoration.'' \77\ With respect to the Framework, the report made a
series of voluntary recommendations that we have classified under two
categories: emergency management initiatives and communication and
outreach Activities. The emergency management initiatives aim to: 1)
Widen the number of signatory companies and encourage backhaul
providers to work cooperatively with wireless service providers, 2)
Promote other voluntary industry commitments from Framework signatory
companies to provide detailed information when the Framework is active
and making it public on an aggregated and anonymous basis, and 3) PSHSB
active engagement with emergency management partners (e.g., Critical
Infrastructure and SLTT governments) during disaster situations to
better address and position communications needs.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on
Communications Report and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P. 29.
\78\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on
Communications Report and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P. 28-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.6. Review of the Emergency Communications State Regulatory Reform
During the response and restoration phases, the Senate of Puerto
Rico approved three resolutions to carry out investigations of the
telecommunications industry's response to Hurricane Maria and industry
readiness in 2018.\79\ Moreover, Table 2 shows three state laws
approved between January 2018 and mid-2019 that reformed the state
emergency communications regulatory regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Puerto Rico's Senate Resolution Num. 457, October 23, 2017;
Puerto Rico Senate Resolution Num. 467, October 24, 2017; Puerto Rico
Senate Resolution Num. 708, April 16, 2018; Puerto Rico Senate
Resolution Num. 708, April 16, 2018. In response to Puerto Rico's House
of Representatives Resolution Num. 64, from January 18, 2017, the TBPR
also submitted a detailed report on the state of the telecommunications
industry after Hurricane Maria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2018, Law No. 5-2018 declared it public policy to recognize
``telecommunications as an essential service,'' placing it on equal
footing with other essential services such as the production and
distribution of electrical power and potable water. With regard to Law
No. 5-2018, a telecommunications regulatory specialist stated: that
came because the telecommunications service was not seen as a priority.
. . . Now the Bureau can require other government agencies to
contribute to maintaining the service because it helps the Government,
first responders, and recovery efforts. It allows the Bureau to ask for
certain things within its design plan to make the system more
resilient. As the ministerial function of the Bureau is to ensure
compliance with public policy at the telecommunications level, it can
request it and at the same time Federal agencies are involved in the
process.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Interview with Telecommunications Regulatory Official #12. See
Torres Lopez (December 7, 2017). Letter to Hon. Miguel A. Laureano
Correa. President, Innovation, Telecommunications, Urban and
Infrastructure Commission, Senate of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report
for Senate Project 711). The TBPR endorsed the state senate project
that resulted in the approval of Law No. 5-2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second measure was Law No. 211, of August 12, 2018, known as
the Execution Law of the Reorganization Plan of the Puerto Rico Public
Service Regulatory Board (PRPSRB), which created a new regulatory
agency. According to the statement of intentions, the ``Law is not
intended to change the public policy of the Government of Puerto Rico
on this subject. Its main intention is to bring the new organizational
and administrative structure into conformity with the current legal
order''.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ As an umbrella organization, the PRPSRB brings together the
Telecommunications Bureau of Puerto Rico, the Energy Bureau of Puerto
Rico, and the Transportation and Other Public Services Bureau of Puerto
Rico.
Table 2
Laws approved for the Telecommunications State Regulator, 2018-2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law Purpose
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law No. 5, January 20, 2018 To amend subsection (a) of Article 2 of
Chapter I of Act 213-1996, known as the
Puerto Rico Telecommunications Act.
Law No. 211, August 12, Law of Execution of the Reorganization Plan
2018 of the Public Service Regulatory Board of
Puerto Rico
Law No. 22, May 15, 2019 To add new Article 8 A to Chapter III of
Act 213-1996, as amended, known as the
``Puerto Rico Telecommunications Act
1996'', in order to require providers of
telecommunications services to have a
contingency and continuity plan for
services in the face of a duly declared
emergency or disaster, and for other
related purposes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law No. 22, of May 15, 2019, directed its attention to emergency
communications. The legislators' objective was to strengthen state
regulation in the field of emergency communications through a series of
policy measures aimed at two subjects: the TBPR and PTCs. Law No. 22-
2019 mandates to the state regulator new policy objectives such as:
1) Establishing TBPR's functions during an emergency situation aimed
at to restoring communications infrastructure and networks.
2) Leading efforts to coordinate, establish, and maintain federal,
state, and local communications during emergency situations.
3) Creating and managing a pool of amateur radio operators to
support public safety activities during emergency situations.
4) Supporting the 911 Emergency System Bureau under the Department
of Public Safety.
5) Giving the TBPR the authority to carry out inspections,
investigations, and audits, if necessary, to achieve the
purposes of this Law.
Law No. 22-2019, while reaffirming the jurisdiction of the state
regulator, conditioned PTC's licensing to the state regulator
examination and approval of their contingency and continuity plans for
a duly declared emergency or disaster. Article III--8 A of the new law
provided that ``through this plan, the Company will, to the extent
possible, establish the necessary mechanisms for maintaining the
continuity of the services and operations that they offer to the
public.''
Law No. 22-2019 charged the state regulator with the responsibility
for the approval of the contingency plans and ordered that they be in
accordance with the Government of Puerto Rico's State Emergency
Management Plan. However, Law No. 22-2019 establishes an administrative
procedure consistent with Law No. 5-2018, that sets a shared
responsibility between the Department of Public Safety and the TBPR. In
this sense, and in order to comply with Law 5-2018, the Department of
Public Safety was ordered to coordinate the integration of the TBPR and
certified telecommunications providers in the development, management,
and implementation of the State Plan for Emergency Management.
Furthermore, Law No. 22-2019 established in situ inspection of
infrastructure sites by the state regulator as part of the
certifications process and gave the regulator the ability to take
administrative measures, ``including notifications of non-compliance
and, if necessary, the imposition of fines up to a maximum of five
thousand dollars, to ensure faithful compliance with what is
established herein.'' \82\ Prior to 2019, mandatory state regulatory
field inspections related to emergency communications were not
required. In sum, Law No. 22-2019 reflects the state government's
intervention in the telecommunications industry through a prescriptive
regulatory approach, that establishes new legal mandates through the
PTCs' licensing process--a structural intervention tool--and specific
emergency communications policy objectives to the state
telecommunications regulator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ Puerto Rico. Law No. 22, of May 15, 2019. P.2. Translation by
the authors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The laws discussed above were approved for the telecommunications
state regulator and aimed at strengthening the TBPR's powers, setting
new policy objectives, and defining intergovernmental procedures for
the TBPR. These laws amended the Puerto Rico Telecommunications Act of
1996 (Law No. 213-1996), and during the legislative process received
TBPR support. In particular, Law No. 22-2019 showed that at a state
level the policymaking process had resulted in a political and legal
reform aimed at strengthening emergency communications policies. Based
on these developments, we can conclude that state legislators and the
state regulator took a vigorous stand, as opposed to simply adopting
other regulatory tools (e.g., incentives) in the emergency
communications field.
6. Conclusions
This study examined emergency communications policies in Puerto
Rico during the response and recovery phases after Hurricane Maria in
September of 2017 using a qualitative analysis of PTCs' responses and a
policy analysis of the emergency communications regulatory framework,
the conduct of Federal and state regulatory institutions, PTCs'
adoption of the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework, and the
intervention measures taken by the state legislature between 2017 and
2019.
Due to the limited number of participants in the survey, the
research questions presented in the paper can only partially be
answered and cannot be generalized to all other PCTs. A general
conclusion drawn for the results is that the majority of participants
had no particular opinion on strengthening emergency communications
polices at the Federal level (RQ1). Similarly, the results show that
the majority of opinions considered emergency communications policies
at the state level not adequate, yet that only half the participants
favored strengthening state regulation (RQ2).
In regard to the role of external and structural factors (RQ3), the
results suggest that such factors such as lack of fuel and backup power
systems, inadequate debris cleaning practices, and reliance on the
deployment of aerial fiber optics were highly consequential and
affected the execution of existing emergency communications policies.
At a more nuanced level of analysis, the policy analysis of
emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico examined the
interaction of the FCC, the TBPR, and PTCs based on the emergency
management activities carried out and the policy tools adopted. Their
activities were contextualized according to emergency communications
policy objectives, the historical trends mentioned above, and the
specific factors related to Hurricane Maria's catastrophic impact noted
by the research's participants, regulatory institutions, and
governmental and academic literature.
This study was grounded in two principles of telecommunications
policymaking proposed by Picard and Pickard (2017). The first principle
suggests that policies should allow the public to communicate with
authorities and among themselves. The 911 emergency service was an
active designated emergency service number before the hurricane, but
for several months after Hurricane Maria, access and adoption of the
911 emergency service was largely limited to citizens and first
responders due to the technical damage and an extended power outage.
Aside from the adoption of the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative
Framework, the results demonstrate that in Puerto Rico, in the
immediate aftermath of Hurricane Maria, both Federal and state
emergency communications policies already in place were initially
ineffective, largely due to the external factors discussed above and to
limited short-term policy requirements regarding power outages.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ See FCC Commisioner Geoffrey Starks' comments on PTCs outcomes
during Hurricaine Maria recovery phase. Pacheco Santa, G. (2020,
February 22). La FCC admite que su respuesta tras el paso de Maria
debio ser mas eficiente (The FCC admits that its response after Maria's
passage should have been more efficient). El Nuevo Dia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In comparison, state legislation was more vigorous than the Federal
efforts by mostly intervening in the telecommunications sector, through
a prescriptive regulatory policy approach. Additionally, restoring the
power grid had an impact on the restoration of telecommunications
systems, revealing the lack of coordination between the Puerto Rico
Electrical Power Authority, the TBPR, and PTCs during the recovery
phase. During 2017 and 2019, several policy agreements between PTCs and
government agencies were put in place to address the structural and
implementation failures. Hence, policymaking and policy tools
application in regard to emergency communications were largely
reactive.
The second principle suggests that policies should allow
authorities to communicate directly to the public and should be aimed
at enhancing communication among authorities themselves. The results
show that communication from authorities to the public was hampered by
the same factors described above under the first principle. In regard
to communication between authorities, the results show that at the time
of the event, access to early warning systems such as EAS, WEA/CMAS,
and IPAWS were available.\84\ After the event these services were
limited due to technical damage and an extended power outage. The
information examined suggests that access and adoption of enhanced
technology to support first responders' activities was limited. Data
from the in-depth interviews indicated funding difficulties to meet
Federal technological standards. After the event, broadcasting services
(e.g., terrestrial and satellite), wireless services (e.g., Wireless
Resiliency Cooperative Framework), FCC's DIRS system, and TBPR's Map
Plus System provided a multiple-technologies approach to avoid single
technology disruption during emergency situation. Further research is
needed in order to address public safety organizations communications
networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Interview with Telecommunications Regulatory Official #12,
Interview with Telecommunications Regulatory Official #15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drawing from Cherry (2006), after Hurricane Maria the reform of the
emergency communications regime shows two distinctive policymaking
processes at the Federal and state levels. The FCC has addressed the
financial viability for carriers' network reconstruction and hardening,
through supplemental and long-term funding allocations. Meanwhile the
political feasibility of emergency communications polices was the state
legislator's task, as its intervention resulted in new rules and
workflows for PTCs and the TBPR. This study also aimed at improving
emergency communications policymaking processes and their outcomes by
providing practical recommendations based on the findings reported in
the results section. One of the study's findings is that after
Hurricane Maria, telecommunications companies made investments in
technology and have reevaluated their emergency plans.\86\ Based on the
participants' responses, nine applicable recommendations were
identified:
1. Establish government-approved procedures for the distribution of
fuel to telecommunications companies during emergency
situations.
2. Strengthen public safety communication systems.
3. Create a tax incentive program for the broadband market in order
to encourage competition and to acquire resilient technologies.
4. Establish a subsidy program to improve infrastructure such as
underground fiber optics and to acquire resilient technologies.
5. Strengthen the exchange of information between Federal and state
agencies during emergency communications.
6. Evaluate underwater infrastructure vulnerabilities due to the
island's geographical position and increase and decentralize
the number of cable mooring points.
7. Revisit the proposal to use the underground infrastructure of the
Department of Transportation and Public Works in the
metropolitan area (San Juan).
8. Designate Hot Zones across the island so that telecommunications
service providers are required to offer free access to Wi-Fi.
9. Re-evaluate the use of satellite technology in regard to
satellite bandwidth to support emergency communications.
These recommendations include a mix of policy tools that are aimed
at strengthening Federal or state emergency communications policies,
and some of them are already at a development stage.
The implications and recommendations of this study, although
particular to Puerto Rico, may further research in emergency
communications in contexts of extreme infrastructure collapse.
Furthermore, other media and telecommunications policy research topics
are derived when emergency communications policies are considered as a
legal framework that asserts citizens' right to communicate with their
community and public safety organizations during emergency situations.
Declaration of competing interest
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. This
research was funded by the National Science Foundation (Grant number
#1824976); Division of Civil, Mechanical and Manufacturing Innovation.
APPENDIX 1
Interviewee List
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Telecommunications Company Position Code
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Telecommunications Company #1 Senior Executive 1
Telecommunications Company #2 Senior Executive 2
Telecommunications Company #3 Senior Executive 3
Telecommunications Company #4 Senior Executive 4
Telecommunications Company #5 Senior Executive 5
Telecommunications Company #6 Senior Executive 6
Telecommunications Company #7 Senior Executives (3 7
participants)
Telecommunications Company #8 Senior Executive 8
Telecommunications Company #9 Senior Executives (2 9
participants)
Telecommunications Company #10 Senior Executive 10
Telecommunications Expert 11
Telecommunications Regulatory 12
Official
Telecommunications Regulatory 13
Official
Telecommunications Expert 14
Telecommunications Regulatory 15
Official
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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______
EXPLAINER Internet Access (/articles/8), Communications Justice (/
articles/33)
GAO Confirms Inadequate FCC Disaster Response in Puerto Rico
June 8, 2021--Carmen Scurato, Leo Fitzpatrick
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), the government's in-
house watchdog, recently released a report ( https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-21-297.pdf) that examines the Trump FCC's protracted
attempts to restore communications in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria
struck in September of 2017. This report was years in the making and is
part of a long struggle to learn the whole truth of the government's
response to this disaster.
The report found that the FCC's role was not clearly defined and
that the agency wasn't transparent about its efforts. On this last
point, the GAO noted that the FCC did not sufficiently engage with the
Puerto Ricans on the islands who were most impacted by the devastation.
Unfortunately, the report does not offer any specifics about how the
FCC's murky role and lack of engagement harmed affected communities.
There are still many questions left to be answered. The Trump FCC
ignored our constant (https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/
2018-09/Call_for_Indepen
dent_Commission_on_Puerto_Rico.pdf) and repeated (https://
www.freepress.net/news/press-releases/free-press-report-and-foia-
documents-expose-trump-fccs-neglect-toward-puerto) requests (https://
www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2020-05/
free_press_comments_puerto_rico_fcc.pdf) to thoroughly investigate the
near-collapse of Puerto Rico's communications infrastructure and the
delayed recovery efforts that left people on the islands without the
ability to communicate for months. With hurricane season underway, we
urge the Biden FCC to undertake this long-overdue task.
What led to the GAO report
Hurricane Maria obliterated the communications infrastructure on
the islands of Puerto Rico in 2017: 95 percent of cell sites were out
of service, TV and radio stations went dark, and, for those fortunate
few who had phone service, calls to 911 went unanswered.
Free Press, along with our allies, immediately urged (https://
www.nhmc.org/release-fcc-must-aid-puerto-rico-virgin-islands-proactive-
steps-restore-communications-says-national-hispanic-media-coalition-
four-public-interest-groups/) the FCC to use its expert knowledge to
closely monitor and help accelerate recovery and restoration efforts.
Over a year after the hurricane devastated the islands, it was clear
that an investigation into the agency's role was necessary (https://
www.freepress.net/our-response/expert-analysis/explainers/building-
future-communications-puerto-rico) to truly understand why Puerto
Ricans were still struggling to get reliable access to communications.
And yet we met resistance to our questions when we called on the Trump
FCC to be more transparent and engage with the affected
populations.
In an attempt to get some answers on our own, Free Press filed a
Freedom of Information Act request (https://www.freepress.net/sites/
default/files/2019-05/free_press_foia_request_11_09_18.pdf) asking the
FCC for several types of documents--including documents related to its
secretive Hurricane Recovery Task Force. We received wired and wireless
consumer complaints (https://www.freepress.net/policy-library/fcc-foia-
response-puerto-rico) in response to the FOIA, which offered a small
window into a much larger problem where carriers promoted refunds and
relief for the extensive loss in services, but failed to deliver on
those promises.
One complainant in Bayamon, Puerto Rico, wrote that communications
remained unreliable nearly two months after Maria made landfall:
``I live in Puerto Rico and system was down for 2 months (September
and October) due to hurricane Maria. Cellphone service is still not
working at 100 percent capacity. No signal available in some areas.
[The carriers] said they were going to credit two months of service
towards the bill and when I called today they said no credit due to
data usage which makes no sense since we were using the Internet from
the landline and had to go to the freeway to get a little service.
Communication right now in PR is essential to keep us safe. I want what
they promised: no payment for September and October since we did not
have service.''
Our report Connecting the Dots: The Telecommunications Crisis in
Puerto Rico (https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2019-05/
connecting_the_dots
_the_telecom_crisis_in_puerto_rico_free_press.pdf) showed how much was
unknown about the destruction of communications networks following
Hurricanes Irma and Maria. Our report documented how the communications
blackout contributed to the unfolding tragedy and loss of life and
illustrated how the Trump FCC acted in secrecy and treated Puerto Rico
differently than parts of the mainland that had experienced disasters.
Our report also raised questions to try to bring light to why this
failure in communications occurred and understand the FCC's role in
restoring communications services.
In response to our report, House Energy and Commerce Committee
Chairman Frank Pallone Jr. wrote a letter (https://
energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/
files/documents/GAO.2019.10.3.%20
Letter%20re%20Puerto%20Rico%20and%20US%20VI.CAT_.pdf) on Oct. 3, 2019
to the GAO and requested an investigation into the FCC's role after
Hurricane Maria. The letter listed a series of questions for the GAO to
investigate, including:
Has the FCC adequately responded to the communications
problems in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands following
Hurricane Maria?
To the extent the FCC took action, were the actions timely
or could the FCC have acted more quickly?
Did the FCC's response differ from the agency's response to
hurricanes that hit the U.S. mainland?
Now in May 2021--nearly four years after the storm--we've made
progress with the release of the GAO report. But we still don't have
all the answers.
What the GAO found
The GAO report affirmed much of what we already knew: The ability
to communicate is a life-and-death issue. The report rightly notes that
``[t]he loss of telecommunications in an emergency has cascading
detrimental effects on other critical infrastructures due to
interdependencies among sectors, including the transportation, medical,
and financial sectors.''
And resilient communications networks are key to recovery and
rebuilding efforts.
People need to ensure loved ones are safe and can call emergency
services, receive emergency alerts and find out where to access
emergency food and water supplies. Puerto Ricans felt abandoned after
the storm, with little-to-no clarity of when life would return to
normal. That's why we urged the FCC to conduct field hearings (https://
www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2018-04/joint_comments_nhmc
_freepress_2017_hurricane_season.pdf) and directly reach out and engage
with Puerto Ricans on the islands to better inform agency regulations
and policies to accelerate recovery efforts at the time.
The first recommendation: The FCC's emergency role must be clearly
defined
The GAO report notes that the ``lack of clarity could have
contributed to confusion and delays in the hurricane's aftermath.''
However, we already knew that this delay was no mere possibility.
FEMA's report of its own response to Hurricane Maria, released in July
2018, describes how ``FEMA and supporting Federal agencies struggled to
gain situational awareness and assess the status of critical
infrastructure, in part due to communications outages[.]''
At a critical time, the government struggled to gather and
disseminate important information about what infrastructure and
services were available and where to deploy its limited resources--and
this struggle surely contributed to delays. The GAO report recommends
that the Department of Homeland Security (which includes FEMA) define
specific actions for the FCC in its emergency guidance on how to
restore communications infrastructure.
The second recommendation: The FCC must be more transparent in its
efforts to help restore communications
While the FCC established an internal cross-bureau Hurricane
Recovery Task Force soon after Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico,
it was not clear what the task force was doing. Even after we submitted
our FOIA request over a year after Hurricane Maria, the FCC was
unwilling to share any information regarding the task force's actions
or recommendations.
It should come as no surprise that the GAO report ``found that FCC
obtained limited public input and that the Hurricane Recovery Task
Force's efforts lacked transparency because FCC had not publicly
communicated the task force's actions or findings.''
While the report confirmed much of what we already knew, what's
important now is what comes next.
Where do we go from here? An FCC investigation & a new playbook
The GAO report lays the groundwork for the Biden FCC to step into
its role as the expert agency in communications and take the lead in
restoring communications after a disaster. The FCC should create
regulations to ensure our communications infrastructure is more
resilient--which is an urgent need in light of the climate crisis.
The agency should also commit to greater transparency with the
public to help people know what it's doing after a disaster strikes.
That means incorporating feedback that addresses the needs of the
public--not corporations. Here, the FCC must start with the largely
unexamined disaster in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria.
We urge the Biden FCC and Acting Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel to
preserve documents related to its response to Hurricane Maria and
expeditiously release relevant documents publicly, as the GAO
recommends. These two acts can set in motion an investigation and a
full accounting of what happened in Puerto Rico after the storm.
We also agree with Acting Chairwoman Rosenworcel that the FCC needs
a ``new playbook (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-
359891A5.pdf)'' when it comes to disaster preparedness and recovery--
and a playbook that accounts for the impact of the climate crisis. The
Biden FCC should propose new rules to ensure the resiliency of our
networks--and to prevent a total collapse of communications from ever
happening again.
______
Lynk Global, Inc.
Falls Church, VA, June 21, 2021
Senator Ben Ray Lujan,
Chair, Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,
Washington, DC.
Senator John Thune,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chair Lujan and Ranking Member Thune:
Thank you for joint efforts to examine potential Federal government
actions to support the deployment of resilient, redundant, and secure
broadband and telecommunications infrastructure. Reviewing lessons from
past outage incidents as well as current proposals to improve network
resiliency and reliability is an important step in enhancing
connectivity for consumers and first responders throughout the United
States and the world.
Lynk Global, Inc. (Lynk) fully supports your work and appreciates
the Subcommittee's focus on this critical issue.
Lynk was founded on the belief that by keeping consumers connected
wherever they are, at all times, the phones in their pockets can save
their lives. To accomplish this goal, Lynk is building a constellation
of small satellites which will essentially function as cell towers in
space. When fully built, Lynk's constellation will automatically fill
in unconnected areas on Earth for mobile phone users everywhere. The
Lynk constellation fills in unserved areas where there is simply no--or
very limited--infrastructure, such as at our national and state parks.
Notably, the Lynk system can also be utilized in areas where
infrastructure exists but is unavailable due to natural disasters,
power failures, or intentional shutdowns to prevent fires. In those
situations, Lynk will provide an automatic, instantaneous backup system
from space--resilient against threats and damage to infrastructure on
the ground.
As Acting FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel stated during her
testimony to the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications & Technology
during a hearing in the last Congress: ``When utilities in California
turned off power to mitigate wildfires last year it exposed a glaring
weakness in our preparation for disaster. In some areas more than half
the cell sites were rendered inoperable.'' Such circumstances surely
call for new, different, and better approaches to keeping consumers and
first responders connected to critical communications services, like
911 and Wireless Emergency Alerts.
Lynk is currently demonstrating its capabilities through its
ongoing test program. To date we have launched four demonstration
missions, with our fifth planned for June 25, 2021. Last year, Lynk
achieved an historic ``first''--sending the world's first ever text
message from an orbiting satellite to a standard mobile phone on Earth.
For that demonstration, we sent a Wireless Emergency Alert from one of
our American-built satellites in space directly to phones on the
ground. That capability alone could save lives, notifying affected
residents of evacuations or other emergencies, even when terrestrial
towers are down or not working.
As you evaluate potential Federal actions or requirements, Lynk
respectfully submits that it is critical that solutions do not create
unintended consequences. Specifically, some proposals to ensure
resiliency may create additional threats or challenges. Requiring
mobile phone towers to have on-site backup power, for example, may
require large tanks of fuel or numerous batteries in a fire zone.
Obviously, this creates a host of additional risks, not to mention
inconsistencies with state or Federal environmental laws.
In contrast, satellite systems like that proposed by Lynk can
provide a resilient communications option without requiring additional,
potentially hazardous ground equipment. Moreover, Lynk's approach
eliminates the need for specialized handsets or equipment--the
satellites connect directly to the phones already in the pocket of
hundreds of millions of Americans.
We therefore urge consideration of satellite systems like that
proposed by Lynk as part of America's resiliency and reliability
solutions.
Again, thank you for your leadership on this critical matter.
Tony DeTora,
VP, Government Affairs.
______
Competitive Carriers Association
Washington, DC, June 22, 2021
Hon. Ben Ray Lujan,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. John Thune,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Lujan and Ranking Member Thune:
Competitive Carriers Association \1\ (``CCA'') commends the
Subcommittee for holding today's hearing on ``Building Resilient
Networks'' and respectfully requests that this letter be included in
the hearing record. CCA and our members are deeply committed to
ensuring the resiliency and security of the Nation's communications
infrastructure, and CCA members work to harden networks to increase
resiliency and take decisive steps before, during, and after
emergencies and disasters to maintain and restore connectivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CCA is the Nation's leading trade association for competitive
wireless providers and stakeholders across the United States, and our
members range from small, rural carriers serving fewer than 5,000
customers to regional and nationwide providers serving millions of
customers, as well as vendors and suppliers that provide products and
services throughout the wireless communications ecosystem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CCA has endorsed the voluntary Wireless Network Resiliency
Cooperative Framework, and CCA members have individually committed to
many of its principles, with proven results including sharing
information and resources among carriers and with authorities in
response to natural disasters, expanding roaming access for consumers
on compatible networks to maintain connectivity, and positioning mobile
assets, including generators and fuel, in advance of anticipated
events. This approach has allowed each carrier to prioritize the needs
of their consumers based on unique network and resource needs to serve
distinctive topography and challenges related to a particular disaster.
Just as all disasters are different, there is no one-size-fits-all
framework for responding to recovery efforts, and policymakers should
support continued flexibility to allow each carrier to appropriately
take steps to maintain connectivity or restore services as
expeditiously as possible. Further, CCA participates in the Cross-
Sector Resiliency Forum with telecommunications and power companies to
improve communications before, during, and after emergencies.
Any consideration of generational investment in our Nation's
infrastructure, including broadband and digital infrastructure,
provides a rare opportunity to significantly increase the resiliency of
our communications networks and ensure that consumers and wireless
networks are adequately prepared to respond to emergencies and
disasters. But to take advantage of this opportunity, investing in our
digital infrastructure must include a focus on wireless services in
addition to fiber connections.
Wireless network resiliency is a critical priority because
consumers turn to mobile devices and wireless networks for information
and to communicate during natural disasters and catastrophic events,
especially if they are not in a fixed location during the event or are
forced to evacuate. These technologies deliver wireless emergency
alerts and other notifications and connect consumers with emergency
services, recovery assistance, and their loved ones during challenging
times. Wireless assets, such as Cells on Wheels, Cells on Light Trucks,
and other deployables, can be swiftly positioned to enhance coverage or
capacity or provide connectivity while impacted base stations or
wireline networks are restored. Even in instances where an individual
remains in a fixed location, wireless networks provide an important
layer of redundancy for voice and data communications should wired
networks go down.
Because of the critical role wireless services take on during
emergency situations, it is crucial that support for the latest
wireless networks, including 5G services, is included in any broadband
infrastructure legislation. Not only will policies that advance
wireless deployment increase mobile services and drive economic growth,
but they are also vital to ensuring that resilient communications
services are available when and where Americans depend on them most.
CCA strongly agrees with the bipartisan goal to close the digital
divide and connecting all Americans with broadband that meets future
demands for communications services. With the focus today on
resiliency, we are again reminded that to truly provide ubiquitous
connectivity, policy efforts must support both wired and wireless
networks. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or if
CCA can be helpful to your efforts in any way.
Sincerely,
Steven K. Berry,
President & CEO,
Competitive Carriers Association.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Jeffrey D. Johnson
Technical Assistance. I am glad we are having this timely
conversation on how to increase network availability and resiliency. As
you've noted, different communities in Georgia, and across America,
face different challenges when it comes to deploying, operating, and
securing broadband networks.
Question. In light of these diverse requirements, what steps can
Congress take to ensure that Federal agencies involved in our
communications networks, including the FCC, USDA, and NTIA, meet the
needs of all our communities?
Do you feel they are providing adequate technical assistance
in order to comply with regulations and/or access available
programs and funding?
If not, what are your recommendations for improvement?
Answer. Federal Agencies could best help by streamlining Broadband
Construction and related permitting on Federal lands especially for
FirstNet, our National Public Safety Broadband Network built with and
for public safety. The FirstNet Authority is a Federal agency which
governs the public-private partnership so other Federal agencies could
easily assist in this mission. This could best be accomplished by
setting a ``shot clock'' on Federal permitting processes, avoiding
needless delays. Furthermore, establishment of a FirstNet liaison
within the Departments of Agriculture and Interior would aid in
streamlining processes.
Regarding NTIA, this administration will need the full support of
the Department of Commerce and other agencies to quickly, and with
accountability, distribute the current Broadband Stimulus Funding. The
allocation of stimulus funding for wireless Public Safety Broadband
needs, cannot just be for fiber/wireline but also tower infrastructure,
and should incentivize public private partnerships on infrastructure to
further leverage the Federal funding.
Technical Assistance is often difficult for practitioners to access
due to confusion over what assistance exists and for whom. There are
concerns in the public safety community that DHS and S&T often cause
confusion and/or redundancy for public safety and their programs often
serve technical needs from the last technical generation rather than
the current generation. An example is the recent emphasis by DHS on the
wireless priority program, which in its prime was horribly
underutilized and clumsy, as opposed to FirstNet which has priority for
public safety embedded in the technology and requires no further action
by responders.
With respect to Next Generation 911 (NG911) funding, this funding
needs a nationwide refresh to become current with technology. In the
same action, diversion of 911 funds should be stopped and the future
funding tied to 3 key factors:
1. Require non-proprietary technology to avoid excessive costs for
the local 911 center.
2. Future NG911 funds should incentivize but not require PSAP
consolidation.
3. Our ability to afford security and technology upgrades will be
enhanced if there are
Ideally, both the Senate and the House of Representatives would
embrace FCC Chairwoman Rosenworcel's approach for NG911 refresh as part
of the FCC's spectrum auction authority.
Chairwoman Rosenworcel has steadfastly engaged and supported the
public safety community and has a great sense of what will address our
communication issues. We applaud her efforts.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ben Ray Lujan to
Jonathan Adelstein
Cellular Wireless and Fiber Wireline
During questioning, in response to my question whether or not
wireless can perform and scale at the same level as fiber, you stated
that it is already doing so. Furthermore, in response to my question on
whether wireless can replace wireline broadband infrastructure, you
stated:
``Not only can, it is. One in five Americans are using their
smartphone as their only broadband connection.''
Many Americans in rural communities that experience dead-zones and
service interruptions on their smartphones may express skepticism that
a smartphone can effectively serve as their primary broadband
connection. Especially in states like New Mexico, it's critical that we
support solutions that suit challenging geography. We need solutions
that keep Americans connected to their work, healthcare, and emergency
services without interruption. To restate my question,
Question 1. Is cellular wireless comparative to fiber connectivity
for a connection to a household? In the scope of the question, is
cellular wireless a complete and competitive substitute to fiber in
terms of upload and download speeds, resiliency against outages from
weather and disasters, line of site, and other topographic challenges?
Answer. For many consumers, wireless is the only viable primary
broadband connection. For some, it is the only connection they have.
Fifteen percent of all U.S. adults nationwide now rely solely on their
smartphone for Internet connectivity. In rural communities, nearly 20
percent of users rely on smartphones only and more than 25 percent of
low-income users are smartphone only.\1\ In addition, all three
nationwide wireless carriers currently offer mobile home Internet at
broadband speeds, with many smaller carriers offering home broadband,
as well. The quality and speed of these programs will only increase as
5G is rolled out.
Wireless broadband's high download speeds and mobility are why
consumers increasingly view it as a substitute for wireline
connections. Wireless networks are responsive and optimized based on
consumer use patterns. Wireless networks are engineered to favor
downloads to meet their customers' demand. While upload speeds are not
as high as for fiber, data shows that consumers use over ten times the
downstream bandwidth compared to upstream. The gap between downstream
and upstream traffic has consistently grown over the last ten years.
Recently, the ratio of downstream consumption to upstream is fourteen
to one. Current consumer trends demonstrate significant increases in
downstream consumption while upstream increases at a fraction of the
rate. Even if upload speed demand doubles, it will remain far below
download speed demand.
Network resiliency is also a key focus for wireless providers. This
is also a high priority issue for WIA and we appreciate you bringing
attention to it. In 2017, during Hurricane Harvey, only 5 percent of
wireless facilities in the affected areas of Texas and Louisiana were
taken offline by flooding. After Hurricane Katrina, cellular service
was fully operational within six months, while over 100,000
telecommunications lines were still offline. After a disaster, wireless
providers can minimize network disruptions through traffic management
and reestablish service quickly, as restoring one tower can provide
service to an entire area. Additionally, wireless providers have made
significant investments in deployable assets, allowing for supplemental
service while repairs are being made.
Wireless can be easier to maintain, meaning greater connection
reliability.\1\ Wireless technology is less subject to external
disruption than other technologies. If one wireless facility goes
offline, traffic can quickly be rerouted throughout the network to
minimize disruptions. Furthermore, wireless Internet uses point-to-
point connections, which makes identifying technical issues much
quicker and simpler.\2\ As noted in your question, there are some
physical limitations that must be accounted for when planning a
wireless network, such as line of sight. However, fiber must also
consider geographic limitations in planning to avoid areas that are
difficult to deploy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Riviera Networks, Line of Sight Internet: What is it, and What
are the Benefits, https://www.riviera-networks.co.uk/blog/internet/
what-is-line-of-sight-internet/.
\2\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ultimately, it is not an apples-to-apples comparison. Certain
technologies will be better suited for certain deployments. I do not
claim that one technology is better than another, rather we should let
all technologies compete and communities can pick the best technology
for their unique requirements.
Question 2. And to follow up, under what conditions should Congress
consider wireless broadband as a viable primary broadband connection
for a fixed connection to a household?
Answer. Wireless is part of any solution to close the digital
divide and end the homework gap. Current consumer usage already
suggests that wireless is viable as a primary form of broadband
connection for many households. Many customers across the country have
decided to prioritize their mobile connections over fixed.\3\ According
to a recent survey by Pew Research Center, among individuals who do not
have a home broadband connection, 45 percent say they do not subscribe
because their smartphone lets them do everything they need to do
online.\4\ In rural America, nearly one in five residents has decided
to rely solely on wireless devices for broadband, while over one in
four Americans, who make less than thirty thousand dollars a year, have
made the switch to smartphone only; the same is true for those that
have a high school degree or less.\5\ Thus, millions of Americans
already rely on wireless broadband as their primary broadband
connection given the reliability and mobility it provides.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Andrew Perrin, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2021, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (June 3, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2021/06/03/mobile-technology-and-home
-broadband-2021/.
\4\ Id.
\5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research and Next Generation Resilience
Mr. Adelstein. It's important to highlight the vital role that
technological research, especially done in collaboration with our
national labs has on improving the resilience and reliability of
critical communications infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Energy's
Argonne National Laboratory recently partnered with AT&T on a series of
projects to enhance the resilience of AT&T's infrastructure to climate
change. Similarly, in New Mexico, Sandia National Labs has been a
leader in research to modernize the electrical grid through safety,
security, and resiliency research.
Question 3. Can you elaborate on the importance of investing in new
technologies that support network resilience?
Answer. The innovation that occurs at places like Sandia National
Laboratories is essential to resolving our most challenging security
and resiliency issues. For instance, having resilient electrical grids
has become increasingly important during destructive wildfire seasons.
As electrical grid operators aim to enhance their networks for greater
reliability and resiliency, sensors and analytics enabled by 5G
applications are increasingly critical, ``allowing for timely
diagnosis, prediction, and prescription of all system variables and
assets during normal and extreme-event conditions.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Louis Brasington, Digital Smart Grid Resilience: Wildfire
Mitigation and Reliability, CLEANTECH GRP. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://
www.cleantech.com/digital-smart-grid-resilience-wildfire-mitigation-
and-reliability/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond responding to emerging threats, wireless networks enable
efficiencies that can help reduce contributors to climate change. The
World Economic Forum documents that the digital technology sector,
relying on 5G connectivity, ``is probably the world's most powerful
influencer to accelerate action to stabilize global temperatures well
below 2+C.'' \7\ Indeed, ``digital technologies could already help
reduce global carbon emissions by up to 15 percent--or one-third of the
50 percent reduction required by 2030.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Borje Ekholm & Johan Rockstrom, Digital technology can cut
global emissions by 15 percent. Here's how, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Jan. 15,
2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/why-digitalization-is-
the-key-to-exponential-climate-action.
\8\ Andrew Perrin, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2021, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (June 3, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2021/06/03/mobile-technology-and-home
-broadband-2021/ (providing a demographic breakdown of smartphone only
users).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All telecommunications technologies, including wireless broadband,
have their own vulnerabilities. Resilient networks are sustainable
networks. Real ``future proofing'' requires that the companies that are
provided funding to build networks will remain in business to provide
service to customers into the future. Resiliency is key because ongoing
operating costs must be covered by the revenue stream, or the networks
will fall into disrepair and will not remain open consistently, provide
adequate customer service or quick outage restoration, or could become
inoperable.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Jonathan Adelstein
Technical Assistance. I am glad we are having this timely
conversation on how to increase network availability and resiliency. As
you've noted, different communities in Georgia, and across America,
face different challenges when it comes to deploying, operating, and
securing broadband networks.
Question. In light of these diverse requirements, what steps can
Congress take to ensure that Federal agencies involved in our
communications networks, including the FCC, USDA, and NTIA, meet the
needs of all our communities?
Do you feel they are providing adequate technical assistance
in order to comply with regulations and/or access available
programs and funding?
If not, what are your recommendations for improvement?
Answer. Thank you, Senator Warnock, for highlighting the importance
of digital equity. In particular, the bipartisan infrastructure bill
that recently passed the Senate makes great strides toward closing the
digital divide. The bill wisely creates digital equity programs whose
purpose is ``to promote the achievement of digital equity, support
digital inclusion activities, and build capacity for efforts by States
relating to the adoption of broadband by residents of those States.''
By allocating $2.75 billion for Digital Equity Act programs, as well as
another $14.2 billion for broadband assistance to households that are
not able to afford a connection, Congress will ensure that NTIA is
involved in our communications networks as it considers whether an
applicant will increase Internet access and the adoption of broadband
among covered populations to be served and the comparative geographic
diversity of the application in relation to other eligible
applications.
Title III of the infrastructure bill states that for both the State
Digital Equity Plans and the Digital Equity Competitive Grant program,
NTIA ``shall, to the extent practicable, carry out this title in a
technologically neutral manner.'' This guidance is crucial to promoting
network resiliency and ensuring that the programs meet the needs of all
our communities. In rural America, nearly one in five residents has
decided to rely solely on their wireless devices for broadband, while
over one in four Americans who make less than thirty thousand dollars a
year have made the switch to smartphone only; the same is true for
those that have a high school degree or less.\7\
Federal agencies, including the ones mentioned, have an excellent
track record of supporting broadband initiatives. As a former FCC
Commissioner and Administrator of the Rural Utilities Service (RUS)
under the USDA, I know that these agencies are staffed with highly
skilled and professional public servants who want to see broadband
brought to every American. One thing these agencies need from Congress
is flexibility. I quickly learned as Administrator of RUS that you do
not get to pick which applications come in the door. We received
requests for nearly three times the amount of total funding. However,
only one in eight of those applications were deemed financially and
technically feasible. However, almost all the projects that made it
through the screening ultimately won funding. By allowing expert
agencies to use their best judgment, rather than unnecessarily
proscriptive gating requirements, they can find the best solutions to
address the various challenges we face in deploying broadband across
the country, especially to communities that have not had the same
opportunities as others.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Denny Law
Technical Assistance. I am glad we are having this timely
conversation on how to increase network availability and resiliency. As
you've noted, different communities in Georgia, and across America,
face different challenges when it comes to deploying, operating, and
securing broadband networks.
Question. In light of these diverse requirements, what steps can
Congress take to ensure that Federal agencies involved in our
communications networks, including the FCC, USDA, and NTIA, meet the
needs of all our communities?
Do you feel they are providing adequate technical assistance
in order to comply with regulations and/or access available
programs and funding?
If not, what are your recommendations for improvement?
Answer. As Congress has appropriated funding related to broadband
service, including funds for the deployment of new broadband networks,
sustainability of existing networks, or affordability programs for
customers to access broadband services, I recommend Congress do more
than merely require the respective Federal agencies to ``consult'' with
each other to prevent duplicative or conflicting spending efforts. With
increasing amounts of Federal funds being spent to address broadband
availability and affordability, it is important these dollars are not
wasted with one federally funded program being used to potentially
compete or duplicate a different federally funded program. It is also
important for federally funded programs to adhere to similar
(preferably identical) broadband qualification standards, such as
desired speed and capability requirements for new broadband networks
constructed using Federal funds, or qualification standards for
recipients to receive funds designed for affordability programs.
When allocating funds to the various Federal agencies to
administer, Congress should require a report be provided to Congress
indicating the specific actions taken by the agencies to ensure that
allocated funds did not overlap or conflict with funds or programs from
other programs.
Regarding the technical assistance provided by these Federal
agencies in order to comply with regulations and/or access to available
funding, I believe it will be critical for Federal agencies to closely
evaluate state and local governments, who will be tasked with
implementing several new Federal programs--including the distribution
of funds to sub-grantees--to ensure state and local officials possess
the resources to properly implement these new broadband programs and to
provide these eligible entities with sufficient guidance and technical
assistance.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ben Ray Lujan to
Harold Feld
Cellular Wireless and Fiber Wireline
Mr. Feld. Many households in rural America are currently either
unserved by broadband, or underserved with legacy DSL systems that are
not being maintained. As we consider options to connect these
communities, some have advocated for wireless as a viable alternative
to fiber.
Question 1. Under what conditions should Congress consider wireless
broadband as a viable primary broadband connection?
Answer. Modern households need broadband that will suit their needs
in terms of speed and reliability both now and into the future.
Investing money in networks that don't meet these needs is a waste of
taxpayer money, and ensures that Congress will have to continuously
invest in order to close the digital divide, instead of investing once
and being done for decades. Currently, households need high-speed
broadband connections with symmetrical upload and download speeds.
Speeds of 100/100 should meet needs household needs for the next few
years, but the further out we look to ensure connectivity, the faster
speeds will need to be.
At the same time, mobile wireless networks aren't suitable for
modern household needs--including working and learning from home. As an
initial matter, the quality of mobile service can vary wildly
throughout a service area depending on factors such as terrain,
foliage, weather conditions, and the distance between the home and the
receiving tower. Consumers know from their daily lives that even within
the same neighborhood--or even within the same house--signal quality
can vary wildly. Mobile network providers do not monitor the quality of
the network signal for each individual location, and doing so would be
a difficult and expensive process.\1\ Additionally, many wireless
connections have data caps that force households to ration
connectivity. The difficulty in connecting multiple devices through
tethering to a mobile phone makes it even more difficult for a
household to have multiple users engaged in bandwidth-intensive work
(such as distance learning or telework) simultaneously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Standard testing for a region is to do ``drive throughs'' with
vans and sensing equipment. But this cannot tell even the most diligent
network operator how the home environment (e.g., thickness of walls) or
weather conditions might alter the strength and reliability of the
signal for a specific address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fixed wireless networks, by contrast, can attain stronger and more
reliable connections. Because these networks use different technologies
than mobile networks, fixed wireless networks can test signal quality
to each premises in the same way a wireline connection can. Because
they do not need to accommodate mobility, they can route around terrain
obstacles. Because they employ a receiving antenna on a fixed point in
the premises, the home environment is no more relevant to fixed
wireless than to wireline. In geographic areas where terrain makes
pulling fiber difficult, fixed wireless networks may well offer a more
cost-effective alternative without sacrificing quality. ``Technology
neutral'' should mean that any technology that can meet the standard
for a future-proof network that meets our many and growing needs for
connectivity can receive funding. It should not mean lowering the
standards so that inferior technologies that do not meet our needs are
eligible.
With this in mind, Congress should only consider wireless broadband
as a viable primary broadband connection if that wireless connection
offers speeds of at least 100/100, is fixed, and does not have data
caps.
Question 2. Even if wireless is not a substitute for wireline
connectivity, should Federal funds be used to support expanding access
to mobile wireless technologies?
Answer. Yes. Although wireless is not a substitute for wireline
connectivity, it is nevertheless a needed connection. Most households
expect to have both fixed and mobile connectivity. Mobile enables
participation in the Wireless Emergency Alert System (WEAS) and
connection with 911. Mobile telephony is so ubiquitous that it is
assumed by most employers, school systems and others that individuals
have a cell phone. In the event of an emergency evacuation--such as in
the case of a wildfire or a hurricane--a cell phone is the only means
by which people can remain in contact with emergency responders and
loved ones.
Additionally, two factor identification, which cybersecurity
experts recommend as one of the best ways for individuals to protect
themselves online, often requires texting a confirmation code to a cell
phone. Furthermore, although many online tasks such as completing forms
cannot be easily done (or done at all) with a cell phone, many
applications are now designed for mobile devices rather than for
laptops or desktops.
Every American deserves access to the communications networks
necessary to participate fully in our digital society. That means both
an affordable broadband connection in the home and an affordable mobile
phone service.
Next Generation Networks
Mr. Feld. Right now, legacy carriers are in the process of retiring
their copper lines, and wireless providers are shutting down their 3G
networks. As you highlight in your testimony, critical decisions are
being made right now that will determine how the next generation of
American communications infrastructure will take shape.
Question 3. What opportunities does this period of transition
present to Congress? How can it best use this moment to restore
resilience and reliability requirements for critical communications
infrastructure in rural America?
Answer. When networks are shut down, we can build new, reliable,
future proof networks in their place. Network transitions must be an
upgrade for all, not an upgrade for some and a downgrade for others.
Because carriers are replacing their older equipment and replacing it
with newer equipment, the Federal government can impose new standards
of reliability and quality without the added difficulty of trying to
retrofit existing networks. The widespread upgrade in the industry
introduces economies of scale for equipment that will meet any new
reliability or quality of service standards. The total replacement
brought about by the phase out of old wireless and legacy wireline
technologies essentially creates a new ``greenfield'' opportunity to
deploy more resilient, superior networks. Once these assets are
deployed, they will be subject to the usual depreciation cycle. Network
operators will seek to minimize capital expenditures and maintain the
legacy technology for as long as possible--as we have seen with the
legacy copper network.
But this will require Federal regulation of appropriate standards.
As we have seen, for-profit companies are poor judges of what is
required to maintain reliable networks. Reliability and preparation for
emergencies that occur infrequently, does not immediately offer
tangible return on investment--whereas reducing capital expenditures is
rewarded with higher stock valuations and fatter bottom lines. This
creates strong incentives to skimp on reliability and to take unduly
optimistic views about the network's resiliency. This is a classic
example of ``market failure,'' i.e., the unregulated market creates
incentives for the wrong behavior. Regulatory action is necessary to
remedy the failure of the market incentive in this case. Such action
should include direct grants/subsidies to cover the added cost of
higher reliability standards. If reliability is a public benefit that
is unrewarded in the marketplace, it is only reasonable to subsidize it
with public funds. This was traditionally done in telecom through rate
regulation, which included reliability costs in the rate base. Today,
it should include targeted grants.
Unfortunately, the FCC doesn't currently guide the shutdown of
these networks, leaving ISPs free to replace the network with anything
they want, and consumers without a promise of a suitable replacement.
One reason for this is the absence of clear authority following the
FCC's reclassification of broadband as a Title I ``Information
Service'' and failure to determine the regulatory status of voice-over-
IP (VOIP). Congress designed Title II so that the FCC could impose
adequate oversight through standard setting and rulemakings to ensure
adequate reliability and quality of service. If Congress were to
reclassify broadband as a Title II service--the FCC could regulate
these transitions and ensure that any new networks are future proof,
reliable, and resilient.
Next Generation Networks
Mr. Feld. As you discuss in your testimony, cybersecurity must be a
central point in network resilience. As we have seen from recent
national cybersecurity incidents, this is critical. Unless we take this
threat seriously, we risk massive vulnerabilities to our critical
communications networks.
Question 4. How should the FCC and Congress work to set standards
for cybersecurity in our national telecommunications infrastructure?
Answer. The United States is the only developed nation whose
telecommunications regulatory does not play a significant role in
cybersecurity. This has created a significant FCC-shaped hole in
protecting our national communications infrastructure. It is time to
take the FCC off the bench when we need a ``whole of government''
approach.
Communications networks are the circulatory system for data, and
therefore the primary vector by which infection can spread from system
to system. The FCC and Congress can work together to set and enforce
standards for communications networks that achieve the following:
1. Ensure that the communications providers networks are themselves
secure. Penetrating the security of a communications network
can give bad actors unlimited access the devices connected to
the network and the traffic that rides on the network.
2. Detection of cyberattacks and countermeasures, in ways that
respect privacy and national security. Communications carriers
are ideally positioned to detect when devices across the
network are being hijacked for nefarious purposes by detecting
significant deviations in traffic output. If devices are
infected and injecting harmful traffic into the network, the
network operator can take steps to alert the relevant device
owners and authorities and, if necessary, temporarily block the
sources of harmful traffic. Because of the enormous sensitivity
of using carriers as ``traffic cops'' (e.g., the potential for
carriers to abuse this gatekeeper position to accumulate
private data for commercial purposes or discriminate against
purportedly ``suspicious'' traffic to advantage their own
services and products), carrier activity in this area must
subject to strict oversight by the FCC. Although the FCC
already possess adequate authority pursuant to Title II of the
Act, Congress may wish to remove any uncertainty with targeted
legislation (and, of course, classification of broadband
service as Title II).
3. Wireless vulnerabilities. The FCC can, and should, require
wireless licensees to take adequate precautions to guard
against unauthorized interception of wireless traffic or
hijacking of consumer devices. For example, the FCC recently
opened a proceeding to require carriers to take appropriate
precautions to prevent ``SIM-swapping,'' a form of identity-
theft/cyberattack where the bad actor persuades the wireless
carrier to transfer the customer's account to a device
controlled by the bad actor, is an example of how the FCC can
use its authority to improve cybersecurity for consumers.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See ``In the matter of Protecting Consumers from SIM SWAP and
Port-Out Fraud, WC Docket No. 21-341, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(Sept 30, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Harold Feld
Technical Assistance. I am glad we are having this timely
conversation on how to increase network availability and resiliency. As
you've noted, different communities in Georgia, and across America,
face different challenges when it comes to deploying, operating, and
securing broadband networks.
Question. In light of these diverse requirements, what steps can
Congress take to ensure that Federal agencies involved in our
communications networks, including the FCC, USDA, and NTIA, meet the
needs of all our communities?
Do you feel they are providing adequate technical assistance
in order to comply with regulations and/or access available
programs and funding?
If not, what are your recommendations for improvement?
Answer. Congress should ensure that all of the agencies working on
network deployment communicate with each other, set similar standards,
and make it easy for entities to coordinate applying for money.
We should recall that Congress created the different grant and
subsidy programs to address different aspects of the digital divide
challenge, and to take advantage of the different expertise of each
agency. These are not competing pots of money where a community must
choose between one or the other. Just as we do not require those in
need of Federal assistance to choose between subsidized school lunches
for their children or subsidized heating oil for their homes, we should
not require communities to choose between funding designed to expand
rural networks, expand educational access, or address affordability.
Certainly, agencies should coordinate to prevent ``double dipping'' by
having the same set of costs covered multiple times. But where a grant
program only covers a portion of the cost, or only covers costs
associated with a specific portion or function of the network,
applicants should be helped and encouraged to apply for multiple grants
that will provide the necessary funding for their communities. At the
least, Congress should explicitly prohibit these agencies from
penalizing applicants who have successfully applied for a different
grant, or force applicants to forgo application to programs for which
they are qualified.
Moreover, many eligible entities report difficulties with
navigating the landscape of grants. It would be helpful if there was a
one stop shop for those entities to seek technical assistance, so they
don't have to go to multiple agencies.
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