Semiannual Report to Congress, Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Labor, Volume 94 (April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025)

Summary

This is Volume 94 of the Semiannual Report to Congress of the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), covering April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025, with a message from Inspector General Anthony P. D’Esposito. The OIG reports issuing 15 audit reports with 25 recommendations, including a finding that Employment and Training Administration oversight did not detect that Michigan and Massachusetts improperly waived the recovery of overpayments, a federal loss estimated to exceed $240 million. It reports 169 investigations completed, 300 indictments, 196 convictions and more than $671 million in monetary accomplishments. It also says the OIG facilitated the recovery of $520 million in suspected fraudulent pandemic-era unemployment insurance payments.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Full text

Volume 94 April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025

Semiannual Report
to Congress
Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Labor
A Message from the Inspector General
I am pleased to present our Semiannual Report
to Congress, summarizing the activities and
accomplishments of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL),
Office of Inspector General (OIG), for the six-month period
ending September 30, 2025. Our audits and investigations
continue to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and
integrity of DOL’s programs and operations, including those
performed by its contractors and grant recipients. The OIG
continues to investigate the influence of labor racketeering
and organized crime in internal union affairs, employee
benefit plans, and labor-management relations. In addition,
the OIG continues to partner with other law-enforcement
agencies on labor trafficking matters.

OIG Accomplishments

During this reporting period, the OIG issued 15 audit reports with 25 recommendations. Among
our many significant findings, we reported the following:

• Pandemic-Related UI Oversight: The Employment and Training Administration’s (ETA)
guidance and oversight did not detect that Michigan and Massachusetts improperly waived
the recovery of overpayments that did not meet federal requirements, including those
resulting from fraud. As a result, the federal government incurred a financial loss estimated
to exceed $240 million.

• States’ Efforts to Identify Unemployment Insurance (UI) Fraud Using Suspicious
Emails: ETA, among other things, did not monitor nor require states to report the results
of research or investigations of potentially fraudulent UI claims, which would have assisted
ETA in identifying high-risk areas for UI fraud.

• Payment Integrity Information Act (PIIA): DOL met five of the six requirements for
compliance with PIIA for the Federal-State UI program, five of the six requirements for
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act program, and none of the six requirements
for the pandemic programs: Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, Pandemic
Emergency Unemployment Compensation, and Pandemic Unemployment Assistance.

• Grants Oversight: ETA did not ensure grant recipients and subrecipients utilized grant
funds for the intended purposes during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting, among other

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 1
things, in grant recipients and their subrecipients inaccurately reporting enrollment levels
and not serving only eligible participants.

• Child Labor Law Challenges: The Wage and Hour Division encountered several
challenges in enforcing child labor laws, including resource constraints, communication
barriers, and confusion caused by differences in state and federal child labor.

Our investigative work also produced impressive results, with a total of 169
investigations completed, 300 indictments, 196 convictions, and more than $671 million
in monetary accomplishments. Notable cases include:

• A bank contractor was sentenced to 18 months in prison and ordered to pay more than
$8.5 million for her role in a UI program fraud scheme. The contractor used her access
to the bank’s internal systems to credit pre-paid debit cards with fraudulently obtained UI
benefits

• A Michigan man pled guilty to several charges for his role in an identity theft and UI fraud
scheme in which he stole more than $4 million. As a result of the scheme, hundreds of
debit cards were mailed to addresses controlled by his co-conspirators.

• A Kentucky man pled guilty to conspiring to cover up a coal mine fire in Illinois. Rather than
implementing the approved evacuation and firefighting plan, he and his co-conspirators
agreed that they would not evacuate miners or notify the Mine Safety and Health
Administration of the fire.

• Three Mexican nationals were ordered to pay restitution of $574,000, jointly and severally,
for their roles in a smuggling and labor trafficking scheme. Two of the defendants were
sentenced to 51 months and 40 months in prison, respectively. To date, the investigation
has identified 18 trafficked undocumented workers.

• A former union official and two business executives pled guilty for their roles in schemes
to provide and receive prohibited labor payments and/or kickbacks. The former union
official served as both an officer and employee of a labor union representing protective
security officers at federal worksites.

• The OIG facilitated the recovery of $520 million in suspected fraudulent pandemic-era
unemployment insurance payments made during the COVID-19 pandemic.

2 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
These are just a few examples of the exceptional work done by our dedicated OIG staff.
I would like to express my gratitude to them for their significant achievements during this
reporting period.

I look forward to working constructively with the Department and the Congress on our shared
goals of identifying improvements to DOL programs and operations, and protecting the
interests and benefits of workers and retirees.

Anthony P. D’Esposito
Inspector General

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 3
OIG Fiscal Year 2022–2026 Strategic Plan

OIG Mission
We serve the American people, DOL, and Congress by providing independent and
objective oversight of Departmental programs through audits and investigations,
and by combatting the influence of labor racketeering in the workplace.

Core Values
Excellence
We deliver relevant, quality, timely, high-impact products and services, through a
workforce committed to accountability and the highest professional standards.

Integrity
We adhere to the highest ethical principles and perform our work in an honest and
trustworthy manner.

Independence
We are committed to being free of conflicts of interest through objectivity and impartiality.

Service
We are a unified team, vigilant to duty through dedicated public service.

Transparency
We promote an environment of open communication through information sharing,
accountability, and accurate reporting.

Strategic Goals

Goal 1: Deliver timely, relevant, and high-impact results.

Goal 2: Foster an internal OIG culture that drives high performance and engagement.

Goal 3: Promote responsible stewardship of OIG financial and non-financial resources.

4 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Contents
Selected Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Funds Recommended for Better Use . . . . . . 72
Questioned Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Top Management and Performance
Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Final Audit Reports Issued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Other Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs . . . . 9
Unresolved Audit Reports Over
Unemployment Insurance Programs . . . . 10 6 Months Old . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Office of Workers’ Compensation Management Decision Made During this
Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Reporting Period on Audits, Inspections,
or Evaluations Issued during a Previous
Reporting Period: Final Audit Reports
Worker Safety, Health, and
Issued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Workplace Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Management Decision Made During This
Mine Safety and Health Administration . . 38
Reporting Period on Audits, Inspections,
Wage and Hour Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 or Evaluations Issued During a Previous
Reporting Period: Other Reports . . . . . . . . . 82

Employment and Training Programs . . . . 43 Corrective Actions Taken by
the Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Workforce Development Programs . . . . 44
Unimplemented Recommendations . . . . . . . 86
Foreign Labor Certification Programs . . . 46
High-Priority Unimplemented
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Labor Racketeering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Summary of Reports with Unimplemented
Recommendations with Cost Savings / Funds
Departmental Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Put to Better Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Single Audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Reports with Unimplemented
Recommendations for Management
Employee Integrity Investigations . . . . . . 59 Improvement or Disallowed Costs Owed . . . 94
Investigative Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
OIG Whistleblower Activities . . . . . . . . . . 63
Peer Review Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

OIG Congressional Testimony . . . . . . . . . 67 OIG Hotline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Reporting Requirements Under
the Following Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Audit Statistics

15 25 $269,192,840 $20,772,490
Audits and Recommendations for Questioned Costs Funds Put to
Other Reports Issued Corrective Action Better Use

$
OIG Unimplemented Recommendations
OIG recommendations not fully implemented as of September 30, 2025

BLS 2

EBSA 7

ETA 55

MSHA 34

OASAM 19

OCFO 17

OLMS 3

OSEC 1

OSHA 17

WHD 1

0 10 20 30 40 50 60
6 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Investigative Statistics
Investigative Results Labor Racketeering 117/169
Program Fraud
300

196
169

117
92
67
117 investigative
cases opened and
2
169 cases closed
r r s s ry ts
s d
se ose
s d
se ene fo tion fo tion e nt i on to en
a a d u d c t t u
C Cl C Op rre ec rre l A ict
m
nv
ic a rm
e fe ros e fe ivi d o St eba
R P R /C I n C D
s es ses min
d
Ca Ca A

Monetary Accomplishments

$
Types include: $666,912

Recoveries
Cost-Efficiencies
Restitutions
Fines/Penalties
Forfeitures
Civil Monetary Actions
$670,908,897
$671,575,809
Total Labor Racketeering
Program Fraud

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–August 31, 2025 7
Top Management and Performance Challenges

Top Management and Performance Challenges
As required by the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) identifies
the most serious management and performance challenges facing the Department of Labor (DOL or
Department) in its annual Top Management and Performance Challenges (TMPC) report. In this report,
the OIG summarizes the challenges, significant DOL progress to date, and what remains to be done.
The TMPC can be found in its entirety at https://www.oig.dol.gov/topchallenges.htm.

Reducing Unemployment Insurance Protecting Retirement, Health, and
Improper Payments Other Benefit Plans for Workers,
Retirees, and Their Families

Protecting the Safety and Health Providing a Safe, Secure, and
of Workers Healthy Learning Environment at
Job Corps Centers

Managing Medical Benefits in the
Enhancing Grant Management to Office of Workers’ Compensation
Maximize Workforce Outcomes Programs

Maintaining the Integrity of Foreign Managing and Securing Data and
Labor Certification Programs Information Systems

8 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree
Benefit Programs

Unemployment Insurance Programs

Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

Unemployment Insurance Programs
Enacted more than 80 years ago as a federal-state partnership, the unemployment insurance
(UI) program is the Department’s largest income-maintenance program. This multi-billion-dollar
program provides unemployment benefits to eligible workers who become unemployed through
no fault of their own. Within the UI program umbrella are other programs such as State UI,
Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees, and Unemployment Compensation for
Ex-Servicemembers. The UI program is generally administered by states with oversight from
DOL’s Employment and Training Administration.

The UI program has experienced some of the highest improper payment rates across the federal
government, generally exceeding 10 percent for the last two decades.

COVID-19: RECOVERY OF MILLIONS IN PANDEMIC-RELATED UI
OVERPAYMENTS IMPROPERLY WAIVED, INCLUDING FRAUD

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

On March 27, 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
Act with the intent of providing expanded UI benefits to workers who were unable to work as a direct
result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Act, as amended, granted state workforce agencies (SWA or
state) authority to waive the recovery of certain nonfraudulent UI overpayments. As of June 30, 2023,
47 states reported waiving the recovery of $10.9 billion (22 percent) of $49.6 billion in established
nonfraudulent UI overpayments.

The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) was responsible for oversight of CARES Act UI
programs. Based on concerns that states may have unintentionally waived the recovery of ineligible
overpayments, including fraud, we performed an audit to answer the following question:

Did ETA’s guidance and oversight ensure states only waived the recovery of eligible
overpayments?

To answer this question, we performed in-depth testing on two of the states that reported the highest
dollar amount of waived overpayment recoveries. We surveyed the other 51 SWAs.

What OIG Found

We found ETA’s guidance and oversight did not ensure states only waived the recovery of eligible
overpayments for the three key pandemic-related UI programs from March 27, 2020, to

10 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

June 30, 2023. First, ETA did not detect that Michigan and Massachusetts improperly waived
the recovery of overpayments that did not meet federal requirements, including those resulting
from fraud. As a result, the federal government and taxpayers incurred a financial loss estimated
to exceed $240 million. We based this on the following:

To waive recovery of a non-fraud overpayment, the CARES Act, and its amendments required states
to determine: (1) the overpayment was not the claimant’s fault and (2) repayment would be contrary
to equity and good conscience. However, Michigan and Massachusetts did not always comply
with these requirements. Michigan waived recovery of an estimated 71,656 overpayments that
were the claimants’ fault and 17,833 that were confirmed to be fraudulent. Massachusetts waived
recovery of 250 overpayments that did not meet federal waiver requirements, including 14 that were
likely fraudulent. Data availability issues prevented the projection of Massachusetts’ results. The
deficiencies noted occurred because ETA’s oversight of waivers primarily consisted of monitoring
reviews that were not sufficient to detect the risk of improper decisions by states, which involved the
creation and application of state laws to determine claimants’ waiver eligibility.

Second, the $10.9 billion in UI overpayment recoveries that 47 SWAs reported to ETA as waived was
likely significantly understated. For instance, Massachusetts was unable to report dollar amounts
waived for one pandemic-related program due to system field limitations. Other states reported
challenges were due to outdated information technology systems, limited resources, and increased
workloads. Without accurate reporting on recoveries waived for pandemic-related UI program
overpayments—as required by ETA—the Department and the public are unaware of the total amount
of this federally funded debt that was forgiven by states. ETA also needs this information to make the
most informed policy decisions about guidance for future emergencies.

What OIG Recommended

We made five recommendations to ETA including the need for more frequent reviews, working with
Michigan on the confirmed fraud cases, remedying at least $240 million in questioned costs, and
working with states to obtain missing waiver information. ETA agreed with our recommendations in a
response to the Draft Report provided in November 2025. Once cleared, we will post ETA’s response
and our analysis to our website.

Read the Full Report

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/19-25-009-03-315.pdf,
Report No. 19-25-009-03-315 (September 25, 2025).

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 11
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

COVID-19: ETA NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT OF STATES’
EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY UI FRAUD USING SUSPICIOUS EMAIL
ACCOUNTS

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

As of September 2022, the OIG had reported a cumulative $45.6 billion paid in four high-risk areas
of UI fraud the OIG had identified; claimants using suspicious email accounts—$16.3 billion—was
the third largest area. The OIG shared its data and methodology for identifying those claimants with
ETA. ETA is responsible for providing states with UI program direction and oversight; the states are
responsible for ensuring UI payments go only to eligible claimants and for making determinations of
fraud.

Based on the OIG’s concerns regarding UI benefits paid in each of the high-risk areas, the OIG began
a series of four audits; this is the third in the series. Specifically, for claimants using suspicious email
accounts, we contracted with Regis & Associates, P.C. (Regis) to answer the following question:

To what extent have ETA and SWAs addressed potentially fraudulent CARES Act UI claims
filed using suspicious email accounts?

What OIG Found

Regis found the 10 SWAs selected for testing confirmed some claimants filed fraudulent UI claims
using suspicious email accounts. However, ETA took limited action to ensure states properly
addressed the potentially fraudulent UI claims. While ETA transmitted claimant data associated with
potentially fraudulent UI claims to the 53 SWAs and Guam, including instructions and requirements
on investigations and due process, ETA did not perform the following oversight actions:

• monitor nor require states to report the results of research or investigations of potentially
fraudulent UI claims, which would have assisted ETA in identifying high-risk areas for UI fraud;
• ensure the National Association of State Workforce Agencies’ (NASWA) Integrity Data Hub (IDH)
effectively provided states with useful information to assist in identifying UI fraud; or
• ensure states consistently established and reported fraudulent overpayments distributed to
imposter claimants or identify systemic weaknesses that resulted in states reporting zero
fraudulent overpayments when UI fraud risk was at its height during the pandemic.

12 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

flagged by the IDH rather than by the outcomes of states’ fraud investigations, and (3) did not detect
states’ information technology systems or staffing were insufficient to establish or report fraudulent
overpayments.

Without knowledge of the states’ investigative results, ETA’s ability to assess UI program
performance, identify high-risk areas, and provide states with additional tools and guidance to prevent
fraudulent overpayments was impaired. In addition, without ETA establishing an outcome-based
metric for IDH cross-matches, ETA was unable to determine the IDH’s effectiveness in assisting
states with identifying fraud.

The OIG selected 168 claimants that filed potentially fraudulent UI claims across 10 SWAs for
Regis to test. Regis determined $591,045 in UI benefits were paid, and the states confirmed $83,376
(14 percent) was fraudulent.

What OIG Recommended

Regis did not make any new recommendations in this report. To address the issues identified in
this report and improve ETA’s oversight of states’ efforts to identify fraudulent UI claims, Regis
made three recommendations to ETA in the first report of this series, with which ETA generally
agreed. That report, including ETA’s responses to the recommendations, is available at:
https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/19-25-004-03-315.pdf.

Read the Full Report

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/19-25-007-03-315.pdf,
Report No. 19-25-007-03-315 (September 16, 2025).

ETA DID NOT ENSURE ARPA GRANTS DEMONSTRATED
IMPROVEMENTS IN ACCESS TO UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA) provided DOL $1 billion in funding to prevent and
detect fraud, promote equitable access, and ensure timely payment of UI benefits. Subsequently,
ETA awarded $219 million in first-of-their-kind grants to 45 states and the District of Columbia
(states) to promote equitable access to UI programs. The Department terminated all active ARPA
grants to states on May 22, 2025. However, because our audit focused on grant implementation and

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 13
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

performance measurement, our results are not isolated to these grants and can help inform ETA’s
grant governance practices agencywide.

Based on prior OIG audits, we were concerned about ETA’s ability to deploy this grant funding.
Therefore, we performed an audit to determine:

To what extent did ETA administer these grants in accordance with ARPA and DOL’s
objectives for UI access, and are grant recipients on target to achieve performance
outcomes?

What OIG Found

While ETA designed these grants in accordance with ARPA and DOL goals and objectives, we
found ETA did not ensure the grants demonstrated improvements in access to UI benefits nor were
they awarded in a way that would maximize impact of the funding. This was inconsistent with ETA
guidance and federal law on government performance and results. Specifically, ETA awarded more
than $20.7 million in ARPA funding for 16 projects that failed to provide evidence of the existence of
a UI access issue in their state’s grant application. We identified those monies as funds for better
use. This occurred because ETA did not establish effective criteria for reviewing grant applications.
Consequently, a risk exists that completed and ongoing state projects may demonstrate limited to no
impact on improving access to UI benefits.

In addition, ETA did not ensure states reported complete and accurate outcome metrics and status
updates in quarterly progress reports. Of 10 sampled states with closed-out grants, 3 did not achieve
all expected outcomes; we are claiming a total of more than $2.8 million as questioned costs and
recommend recovery. Further, based on the latest quarterly progress reports reviewed, two sampled
states that had active grants (still within their period of performance) were either not on target to
achieve all project goals or their status was unknown. These problems occurred because ETA did
not effectively monitor grant reporting and performance. Incomplete reporting of outcome metrics
and inaccurate status updates can hinder ETA’s ability to perform real-time monitoring, provide timely
interventions, and demonstrate the grants achieved their goals.

Finally, ETA’s grant rollout was inefficient and the design was duplicative of another program.
Specifically, ETA announced these grants and subsequently announced another ARPA grant
opportunity—Tiger Team grants. Both programs had similar goals and required separate assessments
of the same UI environment to inform grant activities. However, ETA did not coordinate the two
opportunities in a way that would maximize the impact of the grant funding. This prevented synergies
between the two programs where Tiger Team recommendations could have informed grant projects,
mitigated duplication of efforts, and increased project effectiveness.

14 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

What OIG Recommended

We made four recommendations to ETA to improve grant governance in the areas of awarding,
monitoring, and planning as well as funds recovery. Specifically, we recommended ETA: establish a
policy requiring evaluation criteria to ensure grant applications include appropriate evidence; develop
additional guidance and staff training to improve monitoring; review and recover $2.8 million in
questioned costs; and develop guidance for the planning of new discretionary grant programs. ETA
agreed with and provided corrective action information in response to all four recommendations.

Read the Full Report

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/19-25-006-03-315.pdf,
Report No. 19-25-006-03-315 (August 28, 2025).

COVID-19: ETA NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT OF STATES’
EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY UI FRAUD USING DECEASED PERSONS’
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

As of September 2022, the OIG had reported a cumulative $45.6 billion paid in four high-risk areas
of UI fraud the OIG had identified; claimants using deceased persons’ Social Security numbers
(SSN)—$139.5 million—was the second largest area. The OIG shared its data and methodology for
identifying those claimants with ETA. ETA is responsible for providing states with UI program direction
and oversight; the states are responsible for ensuring UI payments go only to eligible claimants and
for making determinations of fraud.

Based on the OIG’s concerns regarding UI benefits paid in each of the high-risk areas, the OIG began
a series of four audits; this is the second in the series. Specifically, for claimants using deceased
persons’ SSNs, we contracted with Key & Associates, P.C. (Key) to answer the following question:

To what extent have ETA and SWAs addressed potentially fraudulent CARES Act UI claims
filed using the SSNs of deceased persons?

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 15
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

What OIG Found

Key found the 10 SWAs selected for testing confirmed some claimants filed fraudulent UI claims
using deceased persons’ SSNs. However, ETA took limited action to ensure states properly
addressed the potentially fraudulent UI claims filed using deceased persons’ SSNs. While ETA
transmitted claimant data associated with potentially fraudulent UI claims to the 53 SWAs and
Guam, including instructions and requirements on investigations and due process, ETA did not
perform the following oversight actions:

• monitor nor require states to report the results of research or investigations of potentially
fraudulent UI claims, which would have assisted ETA in identifying high-risk areas for UI fraud;
• ensure the NASWA's IDH effectively provided states with useful information to assist in
identifying UI fraud; or
• identify systemic weaknesses that resulted in states reporting zero fraudulent overpayments
when UI fraud risk was at its height during the pandemic.

These deficiencies occurred because ETA considered its oversight responsibilities to be limited.
Specifically, ETA: (1) did not consider monitoring the results of states’ research and investigations as
part of its responsibilities, (2) measured IDH effectiveness by the number of claims submitted to and
flagged by the IDH rather than by the outcomes of states’ fraud investigations, and (3) did not detect
states’ information technology systems or staffing were insufficient to report fraudulent overpayments.

The OIG selected 185 claimants that filed potentially fraudulent UI claims across 10 SWAs for
Key to test. Key determined $586,782 in UI benefits were paid, and the states confirmed $302,686
(52 percent) was fraudulent.

What OIG Recommended

Key did not make any new recommendations in this report. To address the issues identified in
this report and improve ETA’s oversight of states’ efforts to identify fraudulent UI claims, Regis &
Associates, PC, an OIG contractor, made two recommendations (numbers 1 and 3) to ETA in the first
report of this series, with which ETA generally agreed. That report, including ETA’s responses to the
recommendations, is available at: https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/19-25-004-03-315.pdf.

16 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

Read the Full Report

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/19-25-005-03-315.pdf,
Report No. 19-25-005-03-315 (August 15, 2025).

COVID-19: ETA NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT OF STATES’
EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY MULTISTATE UI FRAUD

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

As of September 2022, the OIG had reported a cumulative $45.6 billion paid in four high-risk areas
of UI fraud the OIG had identified; multistate claimants— $29 billion—was the largest area. The OIG
shared its data and methodology for identifying those claimants with ETA. ETA is responsible for
providing states with UI program direction and oversight; the states are responsible for ensuring UI
payments go only to eligible claimants and for making determinations of fraud.

Based on the OIG’s concerns regarding UI benefits paid in each of the high-risk areas, the OIG began
a series of four audits; this is the first in the series. Specifically, for multistate claimants, we contracted
with Regis to answer the following question:

To what extent have ETA and SWAs addressed potentially fraudulent CARES Act UI claims
filed by multistate claimants?

What OIG Found

Regis found 7 of the 10 SWAs selected for testing confirmed some multistate claimants filed
fraudulent UI claims. However, ETA took limited action to ensure states properly addressed the
potentially fraudulent UI claims filed by multistate claimants. While ETA transmitted claimant data
associated with potentially fraudulent UI claims to the 53 SWAs and Guam, including instructions and
requirements on investigations and due process, ETA did not perform the following oversight actions:

• monitor nor require states to report the results of research or investigations of potentially
fraudulent UI claims, which would have assisted ETA in identifying high-risk areas for UI fraud;
• ensure the NASWA's IDH effectively provided states with useful information to assist in
identifying UI fraud; or
• ensure states consistently established and reported fraudulent overpayments distributed to
imposter claimants or identify systemic weaknesses that resulted in states reporting zero
fraudulent overpayments when UI fraud risk was at its height during the pandemic.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 17
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

These deficiencies occurred because ETA considered its oversight responsibilities to be limited.
Specifically, ETA: (1) did not consider monitoring the results of states’ research and investigations as
part of its responsibilities; (2) measured IDH effectiveness by the number of claims submitted to and
flagged by the IDH rather than by the outcomes of states’ fraud investigations; and (3) did not detect
states’ information technology systems or staffing were insufficient to establish or report fraudulent
overpayments.

The OIG selected 181 multistate claimants that filed potentially fraudulent UI claims across 10 SWAs for
Regis to test. Regis determined $1.6 million in UI benefits were paid, and the states confirmed $404,288
was fraudulent. The fraudulent overpayments confirmed by the states represented 25 percent of the UI
benefits paid to the claimants tested.

What OIG Recommended

Regis made three recommendations to ETA to improve its oversight of states’ efforts to identify
fraudulent UI claims filed by multistate claimants. ETA generally agreed with the recommendations.

Read the Full Report

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/19-25-004-03-315.pdf,
Report No. 19-25-004-03-315 (August 4, 2025).

ETA AND STATE WORKFORCE AGENCIES NEED TO DO MORE TO
RECOVER PANDEMIC UI PROGRAM IMPROPER PAYMENTS

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

The economic emergency resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic led to new UI programs created
under the CARES Act. The CARES Act and subsequent Continued Assistance for Unemployed
Workers Act of 2020 (Continued Assistance Act) and ARPA provided payments under three key
pandemic-related UI programs that were implemented by SWAs. ETA provided guidance and
monitored SWAs’ administration of the programs.

18 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

Based on audits of previous emergency UI program implementation, we were concerned about
SWAs’ ability to effectively recover pandemic UI program improper payments. We contracted with
the independent, certified public accounting firm Regis to conduct an audit to answer the following
question:

Did ETA ensure that SWAs had adequate controls to recover UI improper payments under
the CARES Act, Continued Assistance Act, and ARPA?

Regis’ audit procedures included assessing ETA’s oversight, performing in-depth testing for 10 SWAs,
and surveying 43 other SWAs regarding activity under the CARES Act, Continued Assistance Act,
and ARPA.

What OIG Found

Regis concluded ETA and SWAs need to do more to recover improper payments from federally-funded
temporary pandemic UI programs. For the period from April 1, 2020, through September 30, 2022,
the 10 audited SWAs reported a total of $10.4 billion in overpayments for the programs reviewed,
$676.3 million of which was attributed to fraud. Regis found the overpayment recovery rates for the
selected SWAs were far below ETA’s core performance measure for regular UI paid from state
trust funds.

Further, Regis determined the 10 audited SWAs waived approximately $601.6 million more in
overpayments than they recovered. This highlights the need for SWAs to do more to recover
overpayments, as well as prevent improper payments caused by SWAs’ lack of adequate controls.

The 10 audited SWAs—along with the other SWAs across the U.S.—established significantly
less overpayments for recovery than what was estimated by Regis using the ETA published UI
overpayment rates. Regis estimated that, for the audited SWAs, approximately $23.5 billion of
potential overpayments were not established; thus, they were not pursued for collection. Additionally,
Regis identified SWAs did not consistently use the recovery methods mandated by law, nor the
methods strongly recommended by ETA. Regis also noted SWAs’ ability to recover CARES Act
UI program overpayments may be limited by states’ finality laws. ETA deferred to states to apply
their finality laws to limit when a state may reconsider a prior decision or determination made on a
CARES Act funded UI claim. We are concerned this change in policy may hinder the recovery of
overpayments and detection of fraud. Improper payment recovery activities are crucial for maintaining
the integrity of the unemployment benefits system and public trust in these programs.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 19
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

What OIG Recommended

Regis made four recommendations to ETA to improve improper payments recovery. These
recommendations included: (1) developing lessons learned and providing SWAs with resources to
address the root causes of CARES Act-related overpayments, (2) requiring SWAs to maximize all
recovery methods, and (3) continuing to work with Congress to lift restrictions and develop incentives
to recover federally-funded UI overpayments. ETA agreed with all of the OIG’s recommendations to
improve improper payment recoveries.

Read the Full Report

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/19-25-003-03-315.pdf,
Report No. 19-25-003-03-315 (April 1, 2025).

Bank Contractor Sentenced in Unemployment Insurance Fraud Conspiracy

On April 3, 2025, Jaysha Victorian pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud for
her role in the UI fraud scheme. On July 22, 2025, Victorian was sentenced to 18 months in prison
and ordered to pay more than $8.5 million in restitution for her role in a fraudulent UI scheme that
defrauded the California Employment Development Department (CA EDD) and a financial institution.

From late 2020 to early 2021, Victorian, who was employed as a contractor for a national financial
institution, handled a variety of administrative banking tasks, including those involving pre-paid debit
cards for California’s UI system. She used her access to the bank’s internal systems to credit pre-paid
debit cards with fraudulently obtained UI benefits from the CA EDD. The pre-paid cards were distributed
to other co-conspirators, who later withdrew the stolen funds at ATMs and other locations.

In total, Victorian credited at least 187 cards with nearly $8.6 million in fraudulent proceeds. Of that
amount, more than $7.6 million was either withdrawn or spent before the cards could be frozen by
the financial institution. She admitted to using some of the fraudulently obtained funds and receiving
approximately $300,000 for her role in the scheme.

This is a joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security-Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG). United States v. Jaysha Victorian (S.D. Texas)

Michigan Man Pled Guilty for Role in Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme

On April 23, 2025, Terrance Calhoun, Jr. pled guilty to aggravated identity theft, wire fraud, conspiracy
to commit wire fraud, and possession of 15 or more unauthorized access devices for his role in a
$4 million identity theft and UI fraud scheme.
20 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

According to his plea agreement, Calhoun Jr. and co-conspirators used stolen personal identifiable
information (PII) to file hundreds of fraudulent UI claims with the Michigan, Arizona, and Maryland
SWAs in the names of identity theft victims without the victims’ knowledge or consent. As a result of
the scheme, hundreds of debit cards, which were loaded with more than $4 million in UI benefits,
were mailed to addresses controlled by the conspirators. To access the stolen funds, the defendants
made $1.6 million in purchases and cash withdrawals using UI debit cards.

This is a joint investigation with the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation
(IRS-CI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the United States Secret Service, the United
States Postal Service (USPS)-OIG, and the Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (MUIA).
United States v. Terrance Calhoun Jr. et al. (E.D. Michigan)

Maryland Co-Conspirators Convicted and Sentenced for $3.5 Million Unemployment
Insurance Fraud Conspiracy, Firearms, and Drug Trafficking Crimes

On July 21, 2025, Zakria Hussain pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated
identity theft, for his role in a $3.5 million pandemic-related UI fraud scheme. On August 7, 2025,
Lawrence Harris pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft for his
role in the scheme. He also pled guilty to possession of a machine gun, possession with intent to
distribute a controlled substance, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime. On September 8, 2025, Ahmed Hussain was sentenced to 102 months in prison for his role in
the scheme as well as for firearm and drug offenses. He was also ordered to pay more than $557,000
in restitution for the UI fraud.

Between approximately January 2021 and September 2023, the Hussains and Harris conspired
with other co-defendants, including former contractors who provided services directly to the Maryland
Department of Labor (MD DOL). The contractors were issued laptop computers that allowed
remote access to MD DOL systems, such as the UI claims system. The Hussains, Harris, and their
co-conspirators used the laptops to access non-public UI data and databases maintained by MD
DOL to change information on existing UI claims, including email addresses, account passwords, and
payment methods. Using the PII of identity theft victims, they also made numerous false statements
and misrepresentations on UI applications. This enabled them to obtain the highest amount of
available UI benefits that would be paid via debit cards that they controlled. The co-conspirators
uploaded and approved documents required by MD DOL to support UI claims, removed fraud holds
on UI claims, and certified weeks of unemployment for payment in the MD DOL system.

On November 16, 2022, while law enforcement executed a search warrant at his home, Harris threw
a firearm and a bag of marijuana out the window from his bedroom. Law enforcement then searched
the residence and discovered three additional firearms, including one that functioned as a machine
gun. Law enforcement also recovered approximately 37 pounds of marijuana that Harris intended to

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 21
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

distribute. On the same date, law enforcement also executed a residential search warrant at Ahmed
Hussain’s home where they found that he possessed a stolen handgun, as well as 60 pounds of
marijuana, drug distribution baggies, and 229 rounds of ammunition. Ahmed Hussain had been
previously convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year imprisonment, so he was
prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition.

This is a joint investigation with the FBI as part of the Maryland COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Strike
Force. United States v. Zakria Hussain; United States v. Lawrence Nathaniel Harris; United States v.
Ahmed Hussain (D. Maryland)

Maryland Defendants Convicted and Sentenced for Roles in $3.2 Million
Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme

On April 24, 2025, Tiia Woods was sentenced to 74 months in prison and ordered to pay more than
$3.2 million in restitution for her role in leading a pandemic-related, UI fraud scheme executed to
defraud the MD DOL. Additionally, on August 11, 2025, Tyshawna Davis pled guilty to conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft for her role in the UI fraud scheme.

From approximately May 2020 to May 2021, Woods, Davis and their co-conspirators submitted
fraudulent UI applications to MD DOL that contained addresses, employment status, work
histories, occupations, and benefit eligibility of unsuspecting identity theft victims. Using electronic
communications, the co-conspirators fraudulently applied for UI benefits, modified UI claims within the
MD DOL online system, and checked the status of claims. Once MD DOL disbursed UI benefits via
pre-paid debit cards, the defendants used various financial transactions, including ATM withdrawals
and point-of-sale transactions, to obtain the stolen funds. Woods and Davis also provided instructions
to their co-conspirators via text message in furtherance of the conspiracy, which included directions
on how to obtain UI benefits, expedite a UI claim, and how much of the fraudulent proceeds that each
would keep for themselves.

Woods, Davis and their co-conspirators submitted at least 150 fraudulent UI claim applications,
resulting in a loss of more than $3.2 million.

This is a joint investigation with the FBI as part of the Maryland COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Strike
Force. United States v. Tiia Woods et al. (D. Maryland)

California Woman Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison for Unemployment
Insurance Fraud

On August 7, 2025, Tabitha Markle was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months in prison and ordered to
pay more than $2.59 million in restitution for her involvement in a scheme to defraud the UI benefit
program during the COVID-19 pandemic.

22 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

Between April 2020 and January 2021, Markle defrauded the CA EDD and the U.S. government of
UI benefits. Markle collected PII, including names, dates of birth, SSNs and other information. She
then used that information to submit more than 150 fraudulent applications for UI benefits to CA EDD
from her residence. The applications represented that the beneficiaries were self-employed when,
in fact, they were not. Markle created fictional jobs for claimants, such as manicurist, construction
painter, hair stylist/barber, personal attendant, music technician, and landscaper. Markle also filed UI
applications for many inmates at state prisons and county jails whom she knew were unable to work
due to their incarcerated status, and thus were ineligible for benefits.

In furtherance of the scheme, Markle and her associates caused UI debit cards to be mailed to
addresses she listed in the fraudulent applications. She then used the cards, which were issued in the
names of the supposed beneficiaries, to withdraw cash from ATMs throughout California. Markle and
her associates often appeared in ATM surveillance photos taking out large amounts of cash from the
cards. She and her criminal associates fraudulently obtained more than $2.59 million.

This was a joint investigation with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-OIG and the CA EDD.
United States v. Tabitha Markle (N.D. California)

Brooklyn Man Sentenced to 60 Months in Prison for $1.75 Million COVID-19
Pandemic Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme

On May 21, 2025, Bryan Abraham was sentenced to 60 months in prison for aggravated identity theft
and conspiracy to commit access device fraud. He was also ordered to forfeit more than $575,000
and to pay restitution in the same amount.

From June 2020 to April 2021, Abraham and his co-conspirators defrauded the New York State
Department of Labor of more than $1.75 million in UI benefits. He and his co-conspirators used
encrypted applications to purchase stolen PII. They then fraudulently applied for UI benefits in
the names of approximately 250 identity theft victims without their knowledge or consent. Abraham
was personally responsible for the submission of at least 78 fraudulent UI claims. He and his
co-conspirators flaunted their ill-gotten gains on social media with images of stacks of cash, designer
clothing, jewelry, and luxury cars. They also discussed the logistics of the scheme using encrypted
applications, including where to purchase stolen PII and how to withdraw stolen funds.

This is a joint investigation with the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) and the New
York Police Department. United States v. Bryan Abraham et al. (E.D. New York)

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 23
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

Florida Man Sentenced to 54 Months in Prison for Role in Multi-State
Unemployment Insurance Fraud Conspiracy

On May 22, 2025, Ben Espinal was sentenced to 54 months in prison and ordered to pay
restitution of more than $1.2 million for his role in a scheme to defraud the CA EDD of COVID-19
pandemic-related UI benefits.

From August 2020 to August 2022, Espinal and his co-conspirators submitted fraudulent UI claims to
CA EDD by using compromised PII. The defendants then facilitated the submission of UI claims to CA
EDD via an identity verification company by creating counterfeit driver licenses with victims’ PII and
photographs of conspirators. To access the stolen funds, they used multiple rental vehicles to make
cash withdrawals at ATMs throughout Florida and Maryland. The scheme resulted in the theft of more
than $1.2 million in UI benefits from the CA EDD.

This is a joint investigation with the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) as part of the Southern
District of Florida Miami COVID-19 Strike Force. United States v. Ben Felix Espinal (S.D. Florida)

California Couple Sentenced to More Than 12 Years in Prison for Unemployment
Insurance Fraud

On August 7, 2025, Deshawn Campbell and Rochelle Pasley were sentenced to 87 months and
65 months, respectively, and ordered to pay joint and several restitution of more than $1.15 million
for their involvement in an UI fraud scheme aimed at the state of California.

Between June 2020 and December 2020, Campbell and Pasley filed fraudulent UI claims with the
CA EDD seeking Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits under the CARES Act. During
the conspiracy, the defendants utilized the PII of other individuals and used the PII to submit dozens
of fraudulent claims. The claims falsely represented, among other things, that the claimants had
recently lost employment or were unable to find employment due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These
claims were fraudulent as the claimants were not California residents, had not lost their jobs due to
the pandemic, and were otherwise ineligible for UI benefits.

In furtherance of the scheme, both Campbell and Pasley used mailing addresses that were under
their control or under the control of their family and friends. CA EDD approved more than 50 of the
fraudulent claims and authorized a financial institution to mail out CA EDD debit cards containing
benefits. Both Campbell and Pasley then obtained these debit cards to withdraw the funds at ATMs
throughout California and to make direct purchases—all for their personal benefit. The scheme
resulted in CA EDD paying out more than $1 million.

This is a joint investigation with the USPIS and the CA EDD. United States v. Deshawn Campbell et
al. (E.D. California)

24 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

Multiple Defendants Sentenced for Roles in $1.1 Million Unemployment
Insurance Fraud Scheme

On April 24, 2025, Evelyn Taylor, Laron Taylor, Latrice Taylor, and Raschell Taylor were sentenced to
18 months, 54 months, 27 months, and 24 months in prison, respectively, and ordered to pay more
than $567,000 in restitution. Also, on June 5, 2025, Bianka Logie was sentenced to 30 months in
prison and ordered to pay over $1.1 million in restitution. The defendants participated in a scheme in
which they created nonexistent businesses and subsequently claimed more than $1.1 million in UI
benefits for purported employees of the fake businesses.

From February 2013 to July 2016, the defendants, along with their co-conspirators, defrauded the
CA EDD. They registered fake companies with CA EDD and submitted fraudulent UI claims in their
own names and the names of others, including identities that were stolen. To access the funds, the
defendants used the CA EDD-issued debit cards to make cash withdrawals at ATMs.

This was a joint investigation with the CA EDD-Investigation Division, the USPIS, and the U.S.
Marshals Service. United States v. Catrina Gipson et al. (C.D. California)

Former Amtrak Employee Sentenced to More Than 2 Years in Federal Prison for
COVID-19 Fraud

On July 17, 2025, Lizette Lathon, a former Amtrak employee, was sentenced to 25 months in federal
prison for conspiring with her husband to steal nearly $1 million in pandemic-related UI benefits and
for fraudulently obtaining more than $63,000 in sickness benefits while she worked at the passenger
railroad company. She was also ordered to pay more than $1 million in restitution.

From March 2020 through March 2021, Lathon submitted fraudulent applications with the CA EDD
for UI benefits by using names, SSNs, and dates of birth that she obtained from former clients of
her tax-preparation businesses without their permission. On the applications, she falsely asserted
inflated income for the named claimants—many of whom had never lived in California—to receive the
maximum benefit amount.

As a result of the fraudulent claims, CA EDD authorized a financial institution to issue debit cards in
the names of Lathon’s former clients. The cards were mailed to addresses that she and her family
controlled. Lathon and her husband then used the debit cards to make cash withdrawals at ATMs and
to make purchases at retail stores.

During the conspiracy, Lathon and her husband caused at least 44 fraudulent UI claims to be filed,
resulting in losses to CA EDD and the U.S. Treasury of more than $998,000.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 25
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

Lathon, who was employed at Amtrak from 2000 to 2021, also schemed to defraud the Railroad
Retirement Board (RRB) of sickness benefit payments by filing forged and false claims that she was
being treated by a medical professional for pain and anxiety. Through this scheme, which lasted from
September 2014 to January 2020, Lathon fraudulently obtained approximately $63,000 in sickness
benefit payments.

This was a joint investigation with the Amtrak-OIG, the RRB-OIG, the DOL-Employee Benefits
Security Administration (DOL-EBSA), the CA EDD, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, HSI, and the USPIS. United States v. Lizette Lathon (C.D. California)

Georgia Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for CARES Act Unemployment Fraud

On May 13, 2025, Brandon Carter was sentenced to 78 months in prison for his role in submitting
fraudulent UI claims to the Alabama Department of Labor (AL DOL). On July 29, 2025, Carter was
ordered to pay restitution of more than $818,000 for his role in the scheme.

From approximately March 2020 through September 2020, Carter and his co-conspirators submitted
numerous fraudulent UI claims to AL DOL. He falsely claimed Alabama residency, used multiple
aliases, and submitted fictitious names, dates of birth, SSNs, and other fraudulent information to
support the claims. Carter and his co-conspirators filed claims from hotels, using virtual private
networks to mask their identities. As a result, AL DOL disbursed UI benefits via direct deposits into
bank accounts controlled by the defendants. In addition, debit cards containing UI benefits were
mailed to addresses the conspirators controlled, including an abandoned apartment complex where
Carter and his co-conspirators set up mailboxes to receive the UI debit cards. In total, the scheme
caused a loss of more than $800,000 to the UI program.

This was a joint investigation with the AL DOL, the USPIS, the USSS, Social Security Administration-
Office of Inspector General (SSA-OIG), the Alabama Department of Transportation, and the Alabama
State Bureau of Investigations. United States v. Brandon Cody Carter (M.D. Alabama)

Former State of California Employee and Ex-Boyfriend Sentenced for
Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme

On May 9, 2025, Phyllis Stitt, a former CA EDD employee, and her ex-boyfriend, Kenneth Riley, were both
sentenced to 20 months in prison for their involvement in an UI fraud scheme. Stitt was ordered to pay
approximately $768,000 in restitution, and Riley was ordered to pay more than $611,000 in restitution.

Stitt and Riley had been in a romantic relationship while Stitt was employed by the CA EDD as an
employment program representative. Her job duties included determining claimant eligibility for UI
benefits and performing claim processing activities.

26 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

From March 2020 to September 2021, Stitt acquired the names, dates of birth, SSNs, and other PII of
identity theft victims while working at CA EDD. She then filed fraudulent claims for UI benefits using
the stolen PII without the victims’ knowledge or consent. Stitt also backdated the fraudulent claims to
maximize the amount of UI benefits paid. She then certified the fraudulent claims that included the
victims’ employment history, driver’s license information, and employment status. Many of the victims
were ineligible to receive these benefits because they were actively employed or deceased.

As a result, Stitt and Riley received debit cards, which were loaded with UI benefits, that were mailed
to addresses they controlled. To access the stolen funds, Riley and others made cash withdrawals,
bank transfers, and retail purchases.

This was a joint investigation with the FBI and the CA EDD-Investigation Division. United States v.
Phillis Hope Stitt et al. (C.D. California)

Virginia Man Sentenced to 70 Months in Prison for Using Stolen Identities to
Defraud Pandemic-Related Unemployment Insurance Program

On April 16, 2025, Dewaynald Gibbs was sentenced to 70 months in prison and ordered to pay more
than $650,000 in restitution for his role in a pandemic-related UI fraud scheme.

From approximately July 2020 to April 2021, Gibbs submitted fraudulent UI applications to the Virginia
Employment Commission (VEC) to obtain hundreds of thousands of dollars in UI benefits by using
the stolen personal identifiable information of other individuals, including identity theft victims. The
fraudulent UI claims were discovered after a review identified multiple applications sharing certain
similarities. Many of the UI claims had the same name for the former employer, mailing addresses
associated with Gibbs, and the same telephone number. As a result of Gibbs’ fraud, the VEC mailed
debit cards to addresses that he controlled, enabling him and others to use the debit cards for their
personal financial gain.

Gibbs filed dozens of fraudulent UI claims that resulted in VEC approving approximately $659,000 in
UI benefits.

This was a joint investigation with the DHS-OIG. United States v. Dwaynald Gibbs (E.D. Virginia)

Texas Woman Sentenced for Filing Fraudulent Applications for Multiple
Government Disaster and Pandemic Relief Programs

On May 1, 2025, Cora Chantail Custard was sentenced to 57 months in prison and ordered to pay
more than $620,000 in restitution for her role in a conspiracy to defraud a variety of CARES Act
programs.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 27
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

From March 2020 to March 2021, Custard submitted more than 100 fraudulent pandemic-related UI
claims in Michigan, Illinois and several other states. At least 20 of those claims resulted in payouts
totaling nearly $200,000.

Custard used social media to promote her efforts in furtherance of the fraud scheme. She used
Facebook to advertise services to file fraudulent disaster relief claims. Her posts repeatedly described
the scheme to obtain between $6,000 and $8,000 for an application within days of filing. Custard also
submitted more than 100 fraudulent Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) applications, 36 of which
resulted in advance payments of about $345,000. Additionally, she filed at least 30 fraudulent Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) disaster benefit applications related to two hurricanes
in 2020. At least 16 of those fraudulent applications resulted in the disbursement of approximately
$75,000.

This is a joint investigation with the DHS-OIG, the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration, the SSA-OIG, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA)-OIG, and the IRS-CI.
United States v. Cora Chantail Custard (S.D. Texas)

Indianapolis Man Sentenced to Prison for Stealing Pandemic Relief Funds

On August 1, 2025, Johnson Omodusonu pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit access
device fraud and one count of access device fraud. On the same day, Omodusonu was sentenced
to 24 months in prison and ordered to pay approximately $520,000 in restitution for his role in a
COVID-19 pandemic-relief fraud scheme.

From approximately August 2020 to October 2020, Omodusonu and his co-conspirators acquired
more than 165 UI debit cards that were periodically loaded with UI benefits. None of the debt cards
belonged to the conspiracy members as they were all issued in the names of identity theft victims. To
obtain the debit cards, other conspiracy members, who were located outside the United States, used
stolen PII to file numerous false UI claims with various SWAs.

Omodusonu and his co-conspirators subsequently used the debit cards to make more than 525
cash withdrawals at various ATMs in and around Indianapolis, Indiana, stealing more than $520,000
in benefits. They took a portion of the proceeds for their personal benefit and then delivered the
remaining cash to other co-conspirators.

This investigation is joint with the FBI and the USPIS. United States v. Johnson Omodusonu
(S.D. Indiana)

28 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

New York Man Sentenced to More Than 2 Years in Prison for Money Laundering
Connected to Stolen Federal Funds

On April 1, 2025, Xing Zheng was sentenced to 28 months in prison for his role in a conspiracy to
launder approximately $2.98 million in fraud proceeds, including more than $426,000 in stolen Social
Security retirement funds and COVID-19 pandemic-related UI benefits from six SWAs. Zheng was
also ordered to pay approximately $426,000 in restitution to the SSA and the various SWAs, as well
as to forfeit $745,000.

In May 2020, Zheng and a co-conspirator agreed to launder fraud proceeds from various fraud
schemes. In furtherance of the conspiracy, a co-conspirator filed fraudulent applications for PUA
benefits and with the SSA Retirement Insurance Benefit program by using the stolen identities and
PII of eligible retirees and other individuals. The fraudulently obtained funds were then transferred
to bank accounts controlled by the conspirators. Zheng purchased approximately 1,565 debit and
gift cards valued at approximately $2.98 million with the proceeds, which he then laundered and
exchanged for cryptocurrency. In total, he retained approximately 25 percent of the value of the debit
and gift cards.

This investigation is joint with the SSA-OIG and the FBI. United States v. Xing Zheng
(E.D. Pennsylvania)

Maryland Defendants Convicted and Sentenced for Involvement in Pandemic
Unemployment Insurance Benefits Scheme

On April 3, 2025, and July 1, 2025, respectively, Michael Cooley, Jr. and Alonzo Brown were
sentenced after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft
for their participation in a scheme to fraudulently obtain pandemic-related UI benefits. Cooley was
sentenced to 87 months in prison and Brown was sentenced to 45 months in prison. Both defendants
were ordered to pay restitution of more than $310,000.

Additionally, on April 22, 2025, co-defendant, Isiah Lewis, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire
fraud and aggravated identity theft for his role in the UI fraud scheme.

From approximately June 2020 to March 2021, Cooley, Brown, and Lewis conspired to devise and
execute a scheme to defraud multiple state workforce agencies, including the MD DOL and the CA
EDD, of more than $800,000 in UI benefits. As a result, the defendants successfully obtained more
than $300,000 in stolen funds. Cooley and his co-defendants used the PII of more than 60 individuals,
including identity theft victims, to file fraudulent UI applications with MD DOL and CA EDD. The
conspirators used anonymous email addresses in an attempt to obscure their identities and avoid

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 29
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

detection. Debit cards, which were loaded with UI benefit funds, were sent to addresses that were
controlled by the defendants. Cooley and his co-defendants flew to California to retrieve some of the
debit cards to make cash withdrawals and purchase luxury items.

This is a joint investigation with the IRS-CI as part of the Maryland COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement
Strike Force. United States v. Michael Cooley Jr. et al. (D. Maryland)

Three Louisiana Residents Sentenced in Pandemic Relief and Health Care
Fraud Scheme

On August 20, 2025, Devin Tyrone Stampley, Jr., Kevan Andre Hills, and Asia Deshan Guess were
sentenced to 104 months in prison, 96 months, and 24 months, respectively, and ordered to pay joint
and several restitution of more than $87,000. Further, Stampley Jr. was ordered to pay approximately
$10,000 in additional separate restitution.

On May 8, 2025, Kevan Andre Hills, Devin Tyrone Stampley Jr., and Asia Deshan Guess pled guilty
to obtaining funds from federal pandemic assistance programs by submitting fraudulent applications.
They also pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud for their roles in schemes
to obtain controlled substances from pharmacies by using fraudulent prescriptions and the stolen
identities of medical professionals. Hills and Stampley pled guilty to one count of aggravated identity
theft and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Stampley pled guilty to one count of burglary
of a pharmacy. Guess pled guilty to one count of theft of government funds.

Guess fraudulently applied for more than $125,000 in PUA benefits. She submitted fraudulent
claims for UI benefits to the Louisiana Workforce Commission, the Maine Department of Labor, and
numerous other SWAs. Guess falsified application details, such as her employment history and
residency, in an effort to appear eligible for PUA funds and other benefits. In total, she fraudulently
obtained more than $15,000 in UI benefits.

Hills, Stampley, and Guess submitted fraudulent prescriptions for controlled substances to Medicaid.
Without the providers’ knowledge, they used Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) registration
numbers and other identifying information of several physicians and other medical providers to
submit fraudulent prescriptions. To unlawfully obtain controlled substances for resale, Stampley also
burglarized a pharmacy in Louisiana.

Further, the defendants submitted and assisted others to submit numerous fraudulent applications
for nearly $300,000 in funds from the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and the EIDL Program.
Hills, Stampley, and their co-conspirators submitted fraudulent bank statements, tax forms, and other
documents in support of the fraudulent PPP applications. In total, they defrauded the programs of at
least $87,000 by posing as small business owners and residents in need of assistance.

30 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

This is a joint investigation with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)-OIG and
the DEA. United States v. Hills et al. (M.D. Louisiana)

Previously Convicted Maryland Felon Sentenced to More Than 26 Years in Prison
for Drug and Firearm Offenses, Wire Fraud, and Aggravated Identity Theft

On April 9, 2025, Ryan Dales was sentenced to 26 years in prison for unlawful possession of a
firearm as a felon, possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug trafficking crime, as well as wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft for his role in multi-faceted
fraud schemes, including filing fraudulent pandemic-related UI claims with the MD DOL.

In December 2024, a federal jury in Baltimore found Dales guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm
as a felon, possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug trafficking crime. Additionally, Dales faced a second trial on wire fraud and aggravated identity
theft charges, but on January 10, 2025, Dales pled guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft.

From December 2020 to September 2022, Dales was serving a federal sentence for bank fraud,
conspiracy, and aggravated identity theft. While living in a halfway house on supervised release,
he attempted to defraud the MD DOL, the SBA, and various businesses and financial institutions of
more than $25,000 in pandemic relief funds. Dales submitted fraudulent claims for UI benefits, and
he attempted to fraudulently obtain an $8,000 Economic Injury Disaster Loan from the SBA. He also
received more than $95,000 from the sale of high-end riding lawn mowers, which he purchased from
various outdoor equipment retailers by securing lines of credit using the PII of identity theft victims.

On January 20, 2023, Dales was arrested, and law enforcement executed a federal search warrant
at his luxury apartment. They located and seized various items used in connection with selling drugs,
including loaded firearms and rounds of ammunition. In addition, law enforcement seized dangerous
controlled substances, fentanyl packaged for street-level distribution, drug paraphernalia, and cell
phones. They also seized items connected with Dales’ fraud and identity theft schemes, including
computers, an embosser and ID card printer, security holograms, gift cards, a card printer and card
reader, and blank PVC cards. It was also revealed that he obtained the PII of identity theft victims on
the dark web.

This was a joint investigation with the FBI. United States v. Ryan E. Dales (D. Maryland)

Baltimore Woman Pled Guilty to Role in $3.2 Million Unemployment Insurance
Fraud Scheme

On August 11, 2025, Tyshawna Davis pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated
identity theft for her role in a pandemic-related UI fraud scheme that defrauded the MD DOL.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 31
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

From approximately May 2020 to May 2021, Davis and her co-conspirators submitted fraudulent UI
applications to MD DOL that contained addresses, employment status, work histories, occupations,
and benefit eligibility of unsuspecting identity theft victims. Davis directed certain co-conspirators
to obtain the PII of identity theft victims, which Davis and her co-conspirators then used in the
submission of fraudulent UI claims to MD DOL. Davis also created an email account that she and her
co-conspirators used as the common contact email address on more than 150 fraudulent UI claims.

An Internet Protocol address associated with Davis was used more than 1,500 times to log into the UI
claim system of MD DOL. During these logins, she accessed UI claims involving at least 60 different
individuals who were identity theft victims.

Once MD DOL disbursed the UI benefits via the pre-paid debit cards, Davis made ATM withdrawals
to obtain the stolen funds. Through text messages to her co-conspirators, she provided instructions
about how fraudulent proceeds would be divided among themselves.

Davis and her co-conspirators submitted at least 150 fraudulent UI claim applications, resulting in a
loss of more than $3.2 million.

This is a joint investigation with the FBI as part of the Maryland COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Strike
Force. United States v. Tyshawna Davis et al. (D. Maryland)

Three Former State of Michigan Employees Pled Guilty for Role in
Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme

Three former MUIA employees pled guilty for their involvement in an UI fraud scheme. Each former
employee pled to the following:

• September 24, 2025 - Jennae Reed pled guilty to conspiracy to commit federal program bribery
scheme.
• August 28, 2025 - Janine Rayford pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit federal
program bribery and one count of aggravated identity theft.
• May 8, 2025 - Timeka Johnson pled guilty to aggravated identity theft and conspiracy to commit
wire fraud.

As part of the fraud conspiracy, Reed, Johnson and Rayford accessed MUIA UI claim information
without authorization and dismissed and improperly closed fraud prevention triggers and information
requests used to help verify the legitimacy of UI claims. In furtherance of the scheme, Johnson
and Rayford uploaded false and fraudulent documentation to support fraudulent UI claims, falsely
certifying UI claimants as being eligible for assistance. The unauthorized actions of Reed, Johnson,
and Rayford caused the issuance of improper payments of UI benefits to be made.

32 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

As a result of the conspiracy, more than $2.86 million in UI assistance funding was issued to
third-party claimants. Additionally, Reed and Rayford also obtained at least $34,000 and $50,000,
respectively, in bribe payments in exchange for actions related to the fraudulent UI claims.

This is a joint investigation with the FBI, the DHS-OIG, the MUIA, and the USPIS. United States v.
Timeka Johnson et al. (E.D. Michigan)

Two Defendants Pled Guilty to Fraud Scheme Involving Data Stolen from
Hospital Patients

On July 28, 2025, and August 6, 2025, Charlene Marte and Wilkens Estrella, respectively, pled guilty
to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud in a scheme to fraudulently obtain pandemic relief
funds from the IRS and the New York State Department of Labor (NYSDOL). The scheme resulted in
almost $1 million in actual losses. Estrella also pled guilty to violating the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act through the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information.

From at least 2020 to 2022, Estrella and Marte misused the names, SSNs, and other PII belonging to
hundreds of individuals to fraudulently obtain approximately $1.6 million in COVID-19 stimulus checks
and tax refunds from the IRS, and UI benefits from NYSDOL. They also arranged for these and
other funds to be loaded onto hundreds of debit cards that they opened in other individual’s names
obtained using stolen data. They then had the debit cards mailed to homes associated with them or
their family members. Estrella, a former clerk at a New York hospital, accessed and stole data of at
least 4,005 hospital patients for use in the fraud scheme.

This is a joint investigation with the FBI and the IRS. United States v. Wilkens Estrella and Charlene
Marte (S.D. New York)

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 33
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) administers four major workers’
compensation programs: Federal Employees’ Compensation, Energy Employees Occupational
Illness Compensation (Energy), Coal Mine Workers’ Compensation (Black Lung Benefits), and
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation.

The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) program is the largest of the programs and
provides workers’ compensation coverage to millions of federal, postal, and other employees
for work-related injuries and illnesses. Benefits include wage replacement, payment for medical
care, vocational rehabilitation, and survivor benefits.

OWCP HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ADDRESS THE BACKLOG OF WAR
HAZARDS CLAIMS

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

Since the early 1940s, the U.S. government has ensured workers’ compensation for contracted
workers overseas who suffer injuries, disabilities, deaths, or detentions. War Hazards Compensation
Act claims are funded through the Employees’ Compensation Fund and congressional appropriations.
In 2024, $700 million in funding under special benefits was appropriated for War Hazards.

By mitigating financial risks associated with work in dangerous environments, War Hazards
Compensation Act claims encourage companies to participate in government contracts, ensuring
availability of essential services and support in conflict zones. Based on inquiries the OIG received
regarding concerns about a backlog of claims, we conducted a performance audit to determine:

Has the OWCP ensured efficiency and thoroughness in processing War Hazards
Compensation Act claims, addressed any backlog of unprocessed or unpaid claims, and
implemented a secure process for collecting and safeguarding associated claims data?

To make this determination, we analyzed OWCP War Hazards Compensation Act claims data from
January 2014 through October 2024, interviewed OWCP War Hazards Compensation Act claims
officials and OWCP management, and reviewed related regulations and policy documents.

34 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

What OIG Found

We found OWCP had a thorough method for processing and paying War Hazards Compensation
Act claims, including a valid and secure approach to collecting and safeguarding associated claims
data. Moreover, OWCP is implementing new processes to improve efficiency and security of case and
claims submission by the insurance carriers.

In addition, we determined a backlog did exist; however, it did not result from any process failure
but was instead due to an increased volume of claims that resulted from expanded eligibility. OWCP
had taken steps to swiftly increase its output for processing and paying claims, including allocating
additional staff, which has helped address the backlog.

OWCP is also developing and implementing additional strategies—such as sampling enhancements,
draft decision documents, and consolidated claims—to improve War Hazards case management,
streamline processing times and reduce the backlog, helping prevent future issues. OIG analysis
determined OWCP’s process and its planned improvements, including the continuation of additional
staffing resources, will allow OWCP to continue to address the backlog. As of October 2024, OWCP
has approved and paid more cases in 2024 so far than in all of 2023 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Number of War Hazards Cases (Approved and Paid), 2023 and 2024*

6,000

5,000
5136
3,000

2,000 2401
1,000

0
2023 2024

*Numbers for 2024 are from January 1 through October 17. Source: OWCP Weekly War Hazards Report,
October 17, 2024

Read the Full Report

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/23-25-003-04-432.pdf,
Report No. 23-25-003-04-432 (May 12, 2025).

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 35
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs

Walgreens Agrees to Pay Up to $350 Million for Illegally Filling Unlawful Opioid
Prescriptions and Submitting False Claims to the Federal Government
On April 21, 2025, Walgreens Boots Alliance and various subsidiaries (“Walgreens”), agreed to a
$300 million settlement to resolve allegations that the national pharmacy chain filled millions of invalid
prescriptions for opioids and other controlled substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act
and then sought payment from Medicare and other federal health care programs, including workers
compensation programs administered by the DOL, for many of those prescriptions. As part of the
settlement, Walgreens will owe the U.S. government an additional $50 million if the company is sold,
merged, or transferred prior to 2032.

On April 18, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice filed an amended civil complaint to its initial
complaint, alleging that Walgreens knowingly filled millions of prescriptions for controlled substances
that lacked a legitimate medical purpose, were not valid, and were not issued in the usual course
of professional practice. The complaint further alleged that Walgreens pharmacists filled the
prescriptions despite clear “red flags” indicating the prescriptions were highly likely to be invalid.

This was a joint investigation with the DEA, the HHS-OIG, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service,
the Defense Health Agency, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the VA-OIG, and the FBI.
United States v. Walgreen Co. et al. (N.D. Illinois)

Houston Doctor to Pay More Than $2 Million to Settle Allegations of Fraudulent
Billing of Federal Programs
On August 11, 2025, Ajay Aggarwal, an anesthesiologist and pain medicine doctor, agreed to pay
more than $2 million to resolve allegations that he submitted false claims to federally funded health
care programs, including DOL’s OWCP.

Aggarwal, a sole proprietorship, and PRWCSWTX LLC, are entities that Aggarwal used to conduct his
medical practice. From November 2021 to March 2023, Aggarwal billed for the surgical implantation
of neurostimulator electrodes. These procedures, which are invasive and typically require the use of
an operating room, were primarily submitted for reimbursement to OWCP and Medicare. Due to the
complex nature of these surgical interventions, federally funded health care programs usually reimburse
providers thousands of dollars per procedure.

According to the allegations, Aggarwal submitted inaccurate billing for these high-cost treatments.
Patients allegedly received devices used for electro-acupuncture that only involved inserting
monofilament wire into patients’ ears and taping the neurostimulator behind the ear. These device
placements took place in Aggarwal’s clinic, as opposed to a hospital or surgical center, and no incision
was made on a patient.

This is a joint civil investigation with the USPS-OIG, the OPM-OIG, the VA-OIG, and the HHS-OIG.
(S.D. Texas)

36 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker Safety, Health,
and Workplace Rights

Mine Safety
and Health Administration

Wage and Hour Programs
Worker Safety, Health, and Workplace Rights

Mine Safety and Health Administration
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) develops and enforces safety and health
standards and regulations for all U.S. mines. Its mission is to prevent death, illness, and
injury for miners by conducting inspections, investigating accidents, and requiring operators
to correct hazardous conditions. MSHA also provides training and compliance assistance to
ensure safe working environments for more than 327,000 men and women working in the
nation’s mines.

Kentucky Man Pled Guilty to Conspiring to Cover Up Coal Mine Fire in Illinois

On August 28, 2025, Timothy Brandon Parsons pled guilty to conspiring to defraud DOL’s MSHA in
relation to an underground fire that occurred in the MC#1 Mine in Franklin County, Illinois, in August
2021.

On August 12, 2021, Parsons was the mine manager when an underground fire was ignited by a
torch used to cut collapsed steel beams. Rather than implementing the approved Mine Emergency
Evacuation and Firefighting Plan, Parsons and conspirators agreed that they would not evacuate
miners or notify MSHA. Despite gas detectors indicating the dangerous presence of carbon
monoxide, the miners continued to work during firefighting efforts from August 12-13.

On August 13, 2021, Parsons tried to conceal the existence of the fire by evacuating the mine under
the false pretense that a coal carrying belt was broken. Later, MSHA received an anonymous tip
about the fire and ordered that the mine be evacuated after inspectors confirmed the fire’s existence.
Despite the evacuation order and without MSHA’s permission, the conspirators twice re-entered
the mine to assess the fire and manipulate underground conditions so MSHA would allow mining to
resume. Conspiracy members did not wear the devices designed to track the underground location of
miners, and they made false entries in records.

This is a joint investigation with the FBI. United States v. Timothy Brandon Parsons (S.D. Illinois)

38 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker Safety, Health, and Workplace Rights

Wage and Hour Programs
The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) enforces federal minimum wage, overtime pay,
recordkeeping, and child labor requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). WHD
also enforces the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the wage garnishment provisions
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the Labor Value Content requirements of the United
States-Mexico-Canada Implementation Act, and a number of employment standards and
worker protections as provided in several immigration-related statutes.

Additionally, WHD administers and enforces the prevailing wage requirements of the
Davis-Bacon and Related Acts, the Service Contract Act, and other statutes applicable to
federal contracts for construction and for the provision of goods and services.

ADVISORY REPORT: REVIEW OF WHD EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHILD
LABOR LAW VIOLATION CHALLENGES

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

Based on national concern associated with rising child labor law1 violations, we conducted a review to
answer the following question:

How has WHD addressed challenges in enforcing child labor laws?

Additionally, ongoing child labor law violation issues were highlighted in several recent news articles.

What OIG Found

We learned WHD is leveraging its limited resources to enforce child labor laws through a multi-faceted
approach that uses available tools and resources, as follows:

1 The FLSA sets wage, hours worked, and safety requirements for minors (individuals under age 18) working in
jobs covered by the statute. The rules vary depending upon the particular age of the minor and the particular job
involved. As a general rule, the FLSA sets the minimum age for employment at 16 years old but authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to permit minors between the ages of 14 and 16 to work a limited number of hours in certain
occupations.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 39
Worker Safety, Health, and Workplace Rights

• sharing information with federal, state, and local entities in the form of a strategic enforcement
initiative, a task force, and partnerships;
• targeting resources toward child labor investigations; and
• holding companies accountable for violating the law through the use of monetary penalties and
other mechanisms.

However, we determined WHD encountered several challenges in enforcing child labor laws,
including resource constraints, communication barriers, and confusion caused by differences in
state and federal child labor laws. This is problematic considering, during our review period from
FY 2019 to FY 2023, WHD saw an increase from 3,073 to 5,766 (88 percent) in the number of minors
employed in violation of child labor laws. Further, during the same time period, WHD investigations
revealed an increase from 3,748 to 7,624 (103 percent) in the number of child labor law violations
(see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Child Labor Law Violations by Fiscal Year
9,000
8,000
7,000 7,624
103% Increase
6,000
5,000
4,859
4,000 4,181
3,748 3,524
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Fiscal Year

Child Labor Violations Percentage Change of
Child Labor Violations

Source: Compiled by the OIG using case data provided by WHD

We identified that resource constraints have impacted WHD’s ability to investigate child labor law
violators and hold them accountable for exploiting working minors. Furthermore, communication
barriers between WHD investigators and employees of businesses under investigation have affected
WHD’s ability to enforce child labor laws. These communication barriers limit WHD’s ability to educate
working minors on their rights and protections to keep them safe. Additionally, differences in state and
federal child labor laws have created confusion among employers about their responsibilities, which
also impacts WHD’s enforcement efforts. Specifically, we learned that state actions to strengthen or
weaken child labor law protections have led to misunderstandings among employers. Finally, the OIG
is concerned with the handling of instances of possible labor trafficking of minors when encountered
by WHD investigators in the field.

40 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Worker Safety, Health, and Workplace Rights

What OIG Recommended

We made no recommendations in this advisory report. The OIG’s recently announced audit work2 will
analyze child labor law violations in greater detail by targeting areas of high risk and concern for further
review and analysis. The information from this advisory report will inform the focus of that audit work.

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/17-25-001-15-001.pdf,
Report No. 17-25-001-15-001 (September 30, 2025).

Six Former Cult Members Sentenced for Lengthy Forced Labor Conspiracy to
Compel Labor of Minors

On August 7, 2025, six former high-ranking members of the United Nation of Islam (UNOI) were
sentenced for their involvement in a forced labor and forced labor conspiracy scheme. Kaaba Majeed
was sentenced to 10 years in prison; James Staton and Randolph Rodney Hadley were sentenced to
5 years in prison; Daniel Aubrey Jenkins and Dana Peach were sentenced to 4 years in prison, and
Yunus Rassoul was sentenced to 5 years probation. Rassoul subsequently entered into a restitution
and appeal agreement to pay $150,000 to the victims.

From October 2000 through November 2012, the defendants conspired to enforce rules requiring
UNOI members to perform unpaid labor—using beatings, threats, punishments, isolation, and
coercion to compel the labor of over a dozen victims, including minors as young as eight years old.
Victims worked without pay for up to 16 hours a day in UNOI-owned and operated businesses in
Kansas, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Georgia, and other states. The defendants also forced the
victims to perform unpaid childcare and domestic service in the defendants’ homes. While the victims
were housed in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions with limited food and water, the defendants
lived comfortably.

During a September 2024 trial, it was proven that the defendants made false promises of education,
life skills training, and job training to induce parents to send their children to Kansas. After isolating
the victims from their families and making them fully dependent on UNOI, the defendants required the
victims to attend UNOI’s unlicensed and unaccredited school. They also restricted and monitored the
victims’ communications with others, including regarding the whereabouts of the victims.

This is a joint investigation with the FBI. United States v. Kaaba Majeed et al. (D. Kansas)

2 Wage and Hour Division’s Efforts to Protect Child Laborers, Project No. 09-P25-001-15-001 (July 31, 2025),
available at: https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/oaprojects/Engagement%20Letter_WHD%20Child%20Labor%20
Violations_073125.pdf

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 41
Employment and
Training Programs

Workforce Development Programs

Foreign Labor Certification Programs
Employment and Training Programs

Workforce Development Programs
The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) administers federal workforce development
programs, including those authorized by the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).
These programs help job seekers access employment, education, training, and support services
to succeed in the labor market and to match employers with the skilled workers they need
to compete in the global economy. Additionally, WIOA also helps employers hire and retain
skilled workers, ensuring that American workers are equipped with the necessary skills and
opportunities and are prioritized for employment over foreign workers.

COVID-19: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to Improve
Oversight of Grants Awarded in New York

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

ETA awards grants to states, local governments, and other entities to provide individuals with
significant barriers to employment the opportunity to enter into high-quality jobs and careers, as well
as to help employers hire and retain skilled workers.

ETA awarded approximately $16 billion to grant recipients in all 50 states, the District of Columbia,
and U.S. territories from October 2018 through September 2021. During this time, the COVID-19
pandemic created many challenges for ETA job training programs across the nation, such as the
suspension of in-person services and the transition to providing services remotely, which impacted its
ability to provide services to the public.

For this audit, we focused on the State of New York because it was allotted the third highest amount
of statutory employment and training grant funds associated with the Workforce Innovation and
Opportunity Act to answer the following question:

Did ETA grant recipients and subrecipients utilize grant funds for the intended purposes
during the COVID-19 pandemic?

To answer this question, we analyzed grant recipient and subrecipient funding data and WIOA
eligibility requirements for select grants issued prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic. In
addition, we reviewed federal, state, and grant recipients’ guidance and policies and procedures, as
well as supporting documentation for grant recipients and subrecipients. We also interviewed ETA,
state, and grant recipients’ and subrecipients’ staff.

44 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Employment and Training Programs

What OIG Found

ETA’s grant recipients and their subrecipients received WIOA grant funds to provide career, training,
and supportive services. However, we found ETA did not ensure grant recipients and subrecipients
utilized grant funds for the intended purposes during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in grant
recipients and their subrecipients not: (1) accurately reporting enrollment levels and serving only
eligible participants, (2) awarding contracts in compliance with federal regulations, (3) maintaining
proper documentation to support claimed costs, and (4) avoiding conflicts of interest in executing
grant terms.

These issues occurred partly because of incorrect reporting, missing or insufficient documentation,
and the lack of an established conflict of interest policy. As a result, ETA cannot provide reasonable
assurance that the more than $740 million awarded in New York was used in the best interest of
the award programs. Furthermore, in our review of statutory and discretionary grant funds awarded
before and during the pandemic, we identified a total of $25,391,220 in questioned costs associated
with contractual services as well as payroll and non-payroll costs.

Reported outcomes for the statutory and discretionary grant programs may have created a false
sense of success, as the programs might not have served the intended population or reached those
truly in need.

What OIG Recommended

We made six recommendations to ETA to improve grant verification and monitoring capabilities,
increase technical assistance to funding recipients, and remedy the questioned costs identified during
this audit. ETA provided a response to the August 2025 draft report in November 2025. Once cleared,
we will post this response, along with our related analysis, to our webpage.

Read the Full Report

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/19-25-008-03-391.pdf,
Report No. 19-25-008-03-391 (September 26, 2025).

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 45
Employment and Training Programs

Foreign Labor Certification Programs
ETA administers a number of foreign labor certification (FLC) programs that allow U.S. employers
to employ foreign workers to meet domestic worker shortages, including: PERM, CW-1, H-1B,
H-2A, and H-2B. The PERM program allows an employer to hire foreign nationals to work in
the United States on a permanent basis while the CW-1, H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B programs are
for temporary employment in the United States. ETA ensures the admission of foreign workers
into the United States on a PERM, CW-1, H-2A, or H-2B visa will not adversely affect job
opportunities, wages, and working conditions of U.S. workers. The Department’s Wage and
Hour Division (WHD) has been delegated enforcement authority to ensure employers in H-1B,
H-2A, and H-2B programs are in compliance with labor certification requirements. The OIG also
investigates labor trafficking cases that involve fraud against FLC programs.

Mexican Nationals Admit Roles in Smuggling and Labor Trafficking Scheme

On April 11, 2025, and May 19, 2025, Maria Del Carmen Sanchez Potrero and Apolinar Francisco
Paredes Espinoza were sentenced, respectively, for their involvement in a scheme to smuggle
undocumented workers into the United States, harbor them at Connecticut residences, force
them to work, and threaten to harm them if they failed to pay exorbitant fees, interest and living
expenses. Sanchez, Paredes, and a third co-defendant, Porfiria Maribel Ramos Sanchez, forced the
undocumented individuals to work in circumvention of DOL’s H-2B visa program. Sanchez and Parades
were sentenced to 51 months and 40 months in prison, respectively. Sanchez and Paredes were also
ordered to pay restitution of more than $574,000, jointly and severally, with Ramos.

The defendants arranged to enter the United States with undocumented workers for fees of between
$15,000 and $20,000 per victim. In most cases, the workers were required to provide a property deed
as collateral before leaving Mexico. After the undocumented workers arrived in Connecticut, they were
told they owed $30,000 plus interest. They were also forced to pay Ramos, Sanchez, and Paredes for
their rent, food, gas, and utilities. The defendants created false identity documents for the workers and
helped them to find employment. In addition to their jobs, some of the workers were required to perform
housework and yardwork without compensation or a debt reduction. To date, the investigation has
identified 18 trafficked undocumented workers.

This was a joint investigation with the FBI, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, the ICE, and the Hartford Police Department. United States v. Maria Del
Carmen Sanchez-Potrero; United States v. Apolinar Francisco Paredes-Espinoza; United States v.
Porfiria Maribel Ramos Sanchez (D. Connecticut)

46 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Labor
Racketeering
Labor Racketeering

Labor Racketeering
Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, the OIG is responsible for investigating
labor racketeering and the influence of organized criminal enterprises involving unions, employee
benefit plans, and labor-management relations.

Labor racketeering refers to the infiltration, exploitation, or control of a union, employee benefit
plan, employer entity, or workforce, carried out through illegal, violent, or fraudulent means. OIG
labor racketeering investigations focus largely on individuals and organized criminal enterprises
engaged in embezzlement, extortion, violence against union members or employers, and other
related criminal activities.

Our investigations continue to identify fraudulent payments from employers to union
representatives in order to gain favorable labor agreements for the employer. Our investigations
have also identified complex financial and investment schemes used to defraud union affiliated
benefit plans, resulting in millions of dollars in losses to plan participants.

Former Union Official and Two Business Executives Pled Guilty to Their Roles in
Schemes to Provide and Receive Prohibited Labor Payments and/or Kickbacks

On April 2, 2025, Ricky Dallas O’Quinn and his wife, Mabel O’Quinn, each pled guilty to one count
of conspiracy to provide and receive prohibited labor payments in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Additionally, on July 23, 2025, Robert L. Rubin pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the
federal Anti-Kickback Statute.

From approximately 2010 to 2023, Ricky O’Quinn served as both an officer and employee of the
International Union, Security, Police and Fire Professionals of America (SPFPA), a labor union
representing protective security officers at federal worksites. SPFPA executed collective bargaining
agreements with multiple employers covering the security industry in several states. Mabel O’Quinn
was the founder, incorporator, and an initial director of a company that provided protective security
officers at federal workplaces in numerous states. While Mabel O’Quinn served as the Chief
Executive Officer and President of the company, Ricky O’Quinn was involved in the finance, budget,
and operations of the company since its inception in a clandestine role. Both defendants hid Ricky
O’Quinn’s involvement in operating their company.

The O’Quinns worked with the President of Company-1, which also provides protective security
officers at federal workplaces in numerous states. The defendants conspired with Company 1’s

48 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Labor Racketeering

President to obtain government contracts by exploiting the status of their company as a small, woman
service-disabled owned business. In exchange for getting the O’Quinns lucrative sub-contracts
totaling tens of millions of dollars, Company-1’s President and his family received 40 percent of the
ownership and/or profits of the O’Quinn’s company.

From 2010 to 2020, Rubin served as the Vice President of Business Development for Company-1.
Rubin held hidden interests in subcontractors to Company-1. In exchange for this hidden interest in
the subcontractors’ proceeds, Rubin assisted in obtaining and performing lucrative subcontracts on
behalf of Company-1. One subcontractor in question, and its affiliated entities, were awarded more
than $100 million in contract proceeds.

United States v. Ricky O’Quinn; United States v. Mabel O’Quinn; United States v. Robert Louis Rubin
(E.D. Virginia)

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 49
Departmental
Management

Departmental Management

Single Audits
Departmental Management

Departmental Management
The OIG performs oversight work involving the Department’s operations, financial management,
and IT services.

SERVICE AUDITORS’ REPORT ON THE INTEGRATED FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’
COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 2024, THROUGH
JUNE 30, 2025

The OIG contracted with the independent certified public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) to
perform an examination of the Integrated Federal Employees’ Compensation System (iFECS)
transaction processing for application and general controls for the period October 1, 2024, through
June 30, 2025. The examination was to determine if iFECS application and general controls, as
described in the report, were fairly presented, suitably designed, and effectively operating. The
controls and control objectives included in the description are those that the management of
OWCP’s Division of Federal Employees’ Compensation and the Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Administration and Management (OASAM) believe are likely to be internal controls for financial
reporting relevant to user entities of the FECA Special Fund and iFECS throughout the period.

KPMG examined the suitability of the design and operating effectiveness of the controls and control
objectives. KPMG concluded that, except for two matters described in the Basis for Qualified Opinion,
the iFECS application and general controls, as described in the report, were suitably designed
and operating with sufficient effectiveness to provide reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that
the control objectives were achieved for the audit period. Those two matters are summarized as
follows: during the period, OWCP and OASAM did not consistently conduct reviews (1) for continuing
eligibility or (2) related to review and approval of claim compensation payments. In both cases, this
meant that the controls were not operating effectively to achieve their respective control objectives, to
provide related reasonable assurance.

This report, No. 22-25-008-04-431 (September 12, 2025), contains sensitive information and will not
be released publicly.

52 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Departmental Management

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR DID NOT MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE PAYMENT INTEGRITY
INFORMATION ACT FOR FY 2024

Why OIG Conducted the Audit

The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) requires federal agencies to identify programs
susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate the improper payments for those programs,
and report on actions to reduce the improper payments in those programs.

What OIG Did

The OIG contracted with KPMG to conduct a performance audit related to DOL’s compliance with
PIIA, as defined in 31 U.S.C. § 3351(2), for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2024. KPMG’s
objective to evaluate DOL’s compliance with PIIA included determining whether DOL met six PIIA
compliance requirements in relation to the Federal State Unemployment Insurance (FSUI), FECA,
and pandemic programs.

What OIG Found

KPMG concluded DOL met five of the six requirements for compliance with PIIA for the FSUI
program, five of the six requirements for the FECA program, and none of the six requirements for
the pandemic programs: Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC), Pandemic
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC) and PUA.

KPMG found DOL was not in compliance with requirement 6 of PIIA for the FSUI program. DOL
reported a combined improper and unknown payment rate of 15.95 percent for the FSUI program,
which exceeded the 10 percent threshold established by the PIIA. Despite DOL’s efforts to reduce
the improper and unknown payment rate, certain program features continue to hinder states’ ability to
further reduce the rate. In addition, DOL lacks access to necessary data and information, resulting in
improper payments—with many being outside of DOL’s control.

KPMG also determined DOL was not in compliance with requirement 5 of PIIA for the FECA program
because DOL did not publish an FY 2025 FECA improper and unknown payment rate reduction target
in the FY 2024 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) payment integrity data call. This occurred
because DOL’s review procedures lacked the precision necessary to identify discrepancies between
its responses in the data call and statutory requirements.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 53
Departmental Management

KPMG found DOL was not in compliance with any of the six requirements for the FPUC, PEUC, and
PUA programs. DOL management indicated that, because the programs were expired, no further
benefits were eligible after September 2021, and, as such, no reporting is required for the expired
program. However, the FPUC, PEUC, and PUA programs continued to have gross residual outlays for
eligible claims of approximately $250.5 million, $68.5 million, and $121.4 million, respectively, for the
FY 2024 reporting period. Therefore, the pandemic programs should be reportable for FY 2024 due to
the improper and unknown payment estimates exceeding the statutory threshold per PIIA.

In addition, KPMG noted during its review of the improper payment information reported through
the FY 2024 OMB payment integrity data call that DOL management did not identify or correct
the differences within DOL’s risk assessment supporting schedules. Specifically, DOL’s risk
assessment supporting schedules contained discrepancies and inconsistencies with the information
reported on PaymentAccuracy.gov. Moreover, the FSUI program improper payment reporting on
PaymentAccuracy.gov and in its FY 2024 dataset contained discrepancies with the OMB payment
integrity data call. The errors occurred because DOL’s review procedures were not designed at a
level of precision to identify errors within the supporting schedules for its OMB payment integrity data
call reporting and published information on PaymentAccuracy.gov.

What OIG Recommended

KPMG made three recommendations to DOL management to ensure accurate data call responses,
maintain focus on technical assistance, and improve pandemic reporting. DOL management agreed,
in part, with two of our three recommendations. However, DOL management did not concur with
two findings and their related recommendation. KPMG reviewed management’s response; however,
management’s comments did not result in any changes to the findings or recommendation.

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/22-25-007-13-001.pdf,
Report No. 22-25-007-13-001 (May 27, 2025).

54 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Departmental Management

LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT
SPECIAL FUND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND INDEPENDENT
AUDITORS’ REPORT

The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Special Fund (Longshore Special Fund)
provides medical benefits, compensation for lost wages, and rehabilitation services for job-related
injuries and diseases sustained by private-sector workers in certain maritime and related employment.
The Longshore Special Fund also extends benefits to dependents if any injury results in the worker’s
death. The OIG contracted with public accounting firm KPMG to audit the financial statements of the
Longshore Special Fund as of September 30, 2024. KPMG issued an unmodified opinion, meaning
the financial statements presented fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Longshore
Special Fund, and its net costs, changes in net position, and budgetary resources for the years then
ended in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.

As part of its audit, KPMG also considered the Longshore Special Fund’s internal control over
financial reporting, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the
Longshore Special Fund’s internal control over financial reporting nor to identify all deficiencies that
might be material weaknesses or significant deficiencies. During its audit, KPMG did not identify any
deficiencies in internal control that it considered to be material weaknesses.

As part of obtaining reasonable assurance, KPMG also performed certain tests of the Longshore
Special Fund’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations and its test results disclosed no
instances of noncompliance or other matters required to be reported under government auditing
standards.

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/22-25-005-04-432.pdf,
Report No. 22-25-005-04-432 (April 28, 2025).

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 55
Departmental Management

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT
SPECIAL FUND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND INDEPENDENT
AUDITORS’ REPORT

The District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1928 Special Fund (DCCA Special Fund)
provides medical benefits, compensation for lost wages, and rehabilitation services for job-related
injuries, diseases, or death of certain private-sector workers in the District of Columbia. The DCCA
Special Fund also extends benefits to dependents if any injury resulted in the employee’s death.
The OIG contracted with public accounting firm KMPG to audit the financial statements of the DCCA
Special Fund as of September 30, 2024. KPMG issued an unmodified opinion, meaning the financial
statements presented fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the DCCA Special Fund,
and its net costs, changes in net position, and budgetary resources for the years then ended in
accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.

As part of its audit, KPMG also considered the DCCA Special Fund’s internal control over financial
reporting, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the DCCA Special
Fund’s internal control over financial reporting nor to identify all deficiencies that might be material
weaknesses or significant deficiencies. During its audit, KPMG did not identify any deficiencies in
internal control that it considered to be material weaknesses.

As part of obtaining reasonable assurance, KPMG also performed certain tests of the DCCA Special
Fund’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and its test results disclosed no instances of
noncompliance or other matters required to be reported under government auditing standards.

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/22-25-006-04-432.pdf,
Report No. 22-25-006-04-432 (April 28, 2025).
.

56 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Departmental Management

Single Audits
A single audit provides an organization-wide examination of an entity expending federal
assistance funds received for its operations. The audit is typically conducted annually by an
independent certified public accountant, and its objective is to provide assurance to the U.S.
government regarding the management and use of funds by recipients such as states, schools,
universities, and nonprofits.

Quality Control Review of Single Audits
Under OMB Uniform Guidance,3 cognizant federal agencies ensure the implementation of single audit
requirements. A nonfederal entity expending more than $50 million a year in federal awards has a
cognizant agency for audit.4 DOL is currently cognizant for 12 entities.

The OIG periodically performs Quality Control Reviews (QCR) of single audits of entities over which
DOL has cognizance. During this reporting period, we conducted two QCRs: (1) Quality Control
Review for the Single Audit of the State of New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions for the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024, and (2) Quality Control Review for the Single Audit of Eckerd
Connects for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024.

QUALITY CONTROL REVIEW FOR THE SINGLE AUDIT OF THE STATE OF NEW
MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 2024
We performed a QCR of the independent certified public accounting firm Jaramillo Accounting Group
LLC’s single audit of the State of New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions for the fiscal year
ended June 30, 2024. Our QCR covered unemployment insurance and the WIOA cluster, which
totaled about $236 million of DOL funds. We determined Jamarillo Accounting Group LLC’s audit work
on the single audit was acceptable and met the requirements of OMB Uniform Guidance, generally
accepted government auditing standards, and generally accepted auditing standards. Our report did
not contain any recommendations.

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/24-25-002-50-598.pdf,
Report No. 24-25-002-50-598 (April 2, 2025).

3 Uniform Guidance refers to 2 C.F.R. Part 200, OMB’s “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and
Audit Requirements for Federal Awards.”
4 According to Uniform Guidance, the designated cognizant agency for audit must be the federal awarding agency
that provides the predominant amount of funding directly to a nonfederal entity unless OMB designates a specific
cognizant agency for audit. Cognizant agencies for audit are the federal agencies designated to carry out the
responsibilities described in Uniform Guidance § 200.513(a).
Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 57
Departmental Management

QUALITY CONTROL REVIEW FOR THE SINGLE AUDIT OF ECKERD
CONNECTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2024

We performed a QCR of the independent certified public accounting firm CBIZ CPAs P.C.’s single
audit of Eckerd Connects for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2024. Our QCR covered the WIOA
cluster and Reentry Employment Opportunities, which totaled about $32 million of DOL funds.
We determined CBIZ CPAs P.C.’s audit work on the single audit was acceptable and met the
requirements of OMB Uniform Guidance, generally accepted government auditing standards, and
generally accepted auditing standards. Our report did not contain any recommendations.

For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2025/24-25-003-50-598.pdf,
Report No. 24-25-003-50-598 (June 3, 2025).

58 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Employee Integrity
Investigations
Employee Integrity Investigations

Employee Integrity Investigations
The OIG is responsible for investigating possible misconduct or criminal activities involving DOL
employees or individuals providing services to the Department.

Former Bureau of Labor Statistics Economist Sentenced after Pleading Guilty to
Making False Statements

On July 17, 2025, Matthew Hong, a former economist with DOL’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
was sentenced to 36 months of supervised release and ordered to pay restitution of more than
$13,300 to BLS for making false statements. This was in connection with sick leave compensation
that he received from his federal government employer when he was not sick but instead was working
remotely for a private company.

Hong worked as a BLS economist from April 2020 until July 2023. He worked in a role that provided
him with access to certain Principal Federal Economic Indicators (PFEI), such as employment and
unemployment data prior to its public disclosure. This information was subject to strict security
procedures and safeguards due to the PFEI’s sensitivity and ability to affect financial markets if
prematurely disclosed.

In June 2022, while still employed at BLS and working remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
Hong began full-time employment as a senior associate at a global financial institution in New York.

Between June 2022 and July 2023, Hong made dozens of entries in BLS’s time-and-attendance
system that falsely represented he was sick. Hong sought sick leave compensation, despite the fact
that he was not sick, but instead was working for a private financial institution. Based on these false
statements, Hong received more than $13,300 in sick leave compensation from BLS.

United States v. Matthew Hong (D. District of Columbia)

Administrative Investigation Summaries

• The OIG conducted an internal investigation into allegations that a senior DOL management
official had changed information on official documents related to an ongoing OIG audit. The
investigation determined that although the information was altered from what was in the original
document, the information was only condensed and the substance of the information submitted
was not changed. No further action was warranted.

60 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Employee Integrity Investigations

• The OIG conducted an internal investigation into allegations that a senior DOL employee —
whose duties include oversight of harassment allegations and reasonable accommodation
requests—had been found to have violated Title VII by sharing medical information while still
being allowed to perform these duties. The OIG’s investigation determined that the employee
had never been the subject of any Title VII investigation, nor had they ever been found to have
illegally shared confidential medical information. No further action was taken.

• The OIG conducted an internal investigation into allegations that a senior DOL management
official had engaged in prohibited personnel practices when they pressured the supervisor at a
field office to select one employee over another for a management position at the field office.
The investigation confirmed that the senior management official did contact the supervisor and
pressure them to select one specific person who had scored lower in an interview than the other
candidates. The investigation was referred to DOL in January 2025. On September 5, 2025, DOL
indicated that the senior management official had entered into a settlement with the Department
and agreed to retire through the Deferred Resignation Program on December 31, 2025.

• The OIG conducted an internal investigation into allegations that a senior DOL management
official had engaged in prohibited personnel practices and an ethics violation. The senior DOL
official allegedly hired a former personal attorney, to whom they allegedly owed a large sum
in legal fees, to fill a position in their office in return for lowering the overall amount owed.
The investigation determined that the senior DOL official did hire their former attorney to fill
a position; however, the position was a Presidentially mandated position, and the employee
was hired pursuant to all applicable Office of Personnel and DOL guidelines. In addition, the
investigation determined that the senior DOL management official did not owe money to the
attorney directly, but instead owed money to a State Court for payment of litigation expenses. No
further action was taken.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 61
OIG Whistleblower
Activities
OIG Whistleblower Activities

OIG Whistleblower Activities
Whistleblower Protection Coordinator

DOL employees, contractors, subcontractors, and grantees perform an important service by
reporting evidence of wrongdoing, including misconduct, fraud, waste, and abuse, in DOL programs.
Whistleblowers should never be subjected to, or threatened with, retaliation for having engaged
in a protected communication or protected activity. The OIG plays a vital role in ensuring that
DOL employees and employees of DOL grantees and contractors are informed of their rights and
protections against retaliation for “blowing the whistle.” This work is done by the OIG Whistleblower
Protection Coordinator Program, housed in the OIG’s Office of Legal Services.

Pursuant to Section 2 of the Whistleblower Protection Coordination Act of 2018 (S.1869, June
25, 2018), every Inspector General’s office is required to designate a Whistleblower Protection
Coordinator. According to Section 2, the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator:

1. educates agency employees about prohibitions against retaliation for protected disclosures;

2. educates agency employees who have made or are contemplating making a protected disclosure
about their rights and the remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures, including the
means by which employees may seek review of any allegation of reprisal, as well as about the
roles of the OIG, the Office of Special Counsel, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and any
other relevant entities; and

3. provides general information about the timeliness of such cases, the availability of any alternative
dispute mechanisms, and avenues for potential relief. Within the OIG, a Supervisory Associate
Counsel to the Inspector General has been designated to serve as the Whistleblower Protection
Coordinator.

Pursuant to this designation, the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator has:

• provided input into training that is required to be completed by all DOL employees, entitled
“Prohibited Personnel Practices, Whistleblower Protection”;

• provided input into training that is required to be completed by all DOL supervisors and
managers entitled “Responding to Whistleblower Retaliation Complaints/Overview of Prohibited
Personnel Practices – Annual Training.”

• developed training for new employees titled “Whistleblower Rights and Protections for DOL

64 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
OIG Whistleblower Activities

Employees” that is included in all DOL employees’ New Employee Orientation and regularly
provides this training live to Solicitor’s Office’s Honors Attorneys;

• updated the DOL-OIG public-facing website titled “Whistleblower Protection Coordinator,” which
is available to all DOL and OIG employees, to provide information on whistleblower protections
and options for DOL employees and employees of DOL contractors and grantees;

• established a dedicated e-mail address—OIGWhistleblower@oig.dol.gov—to receive and
respond to whistleblower-related inquiries from DOL employees and employees of DOL
contractors and grantees;

• monitored whistleblower retaliation complaints received by the OIG, as well as whistleblower
retaliation investigations conducted by the OIG; and

• conducted training for various agencies within DOL upon request.

Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations

The OIG can initiate its own investigations into allegations of improper or illegal retaliation brought by
DOL employees or, on a discretionary basis, refer such allegations to the Office of Special Counsel
for review and investigation.

Further, pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 4712, the OIG is required, with some exceptions, to investigate
whistleblower retaliation allegations made by employees of DOL contractors or grantees.

Table 1: Whistleblower Investigations, April 1, 2025 – September 30, 2025

Investigation Type Number
Pending DOL employee complaint investigations 1
Reports related to DOL employee whistleblower retaliation complaints sent to the
0
appropriate agencies within the Department
Grantee/contractor employee complaints closed after preliminary inquiry 1
Pending grantee/contractor employee complaint investigations 8
Reports pending with DOL 2
Decision issued by the DOL Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management in
2
grantee/contractor employee complaints

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 65
OIG Congressional
Testimony
OIG Congressional Testimony

OIG Congressional Testimony
During this semiannual reporting period, the OIG provided a statement for the record for one
congressional hearing. The full text of our testimony is available on our website at
https://www.oig.dol.gov/testimony.htm.

May 6, 2025 – House Committee on Education and the Workforce: Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections

The OIG provided a statement for the record on “FECA Reform and Oversight: Prioritizing Workers,
Protecting Taxpayer Dollars.”

68 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices
Appendices

Reporting Requirements Under
the Following Acts
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended
REPORTING REQUIREMENT PAGE

Recommendations on existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to the None to
Section 4(a)(2)
programs and operations of DOL report

Description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration
Section 5(a)(1) of programs and operations of the establishment and associated reports and All
recommendations for corrective action made by the Office

Identification of each recommendation made before the reporting period, for which
Section 5(a)(2) corrective action has not been completed, including the potential costs savings associated All
with the recommendation

Section 5(a)(3) Summary of significant investigations closed during the reporting period 20-49

Identification of the total number of convictions during the reporting period resulting from
Section 5(a)(4) 99
investigations

Information regarding each audit, inspection, or evaluation report issued during the
reporting period, including—
(A) a listing of each audit, inspection, or evaluation;
Section 5(a)(5) (B) if applicable, the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a separate category for 74
the dollar value of unsupported costs) and the dollar value of recommendations that funds
be put to better use, including whether a management decision had been made by the end
of the reporting period

Information regarding any management decision made during the reporting period with
Section 5(a)(6) 79
respect to any audit, inspection, or evaluation issued during a previous reporting period

Information from the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act Section 804(b) —
None to
Section 5(a)(7) instances in which an agency has not met intermediate target dates in a remediation plan,
report
and the reasons

Peer review reporting:
Section 5(a)(8) (A) results of any peer review conducted by another OIG, or 101
(B) a statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted

None to
Section 5(a)(9) Outstanding peer review recommendations
report

70 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Section 5(a) Peer reviews conducted by the OIG and recommendations outstanding or not fully None to
(10) implemented report

Statistical tables on investigative findings showing total number of:
(A) reports issued;
Section 5(a) (B) persons referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for prosecution;
99
(11) (C) persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities; and
(D) indictments and criminal informations that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting
authorities

Section 5(a)
Metrics used for developing the data for the statistical tables 99
(12)

Summary of investigations of senior government employees where allegations of
Section 5(a)
misconduct were substantiated, including the facts, circumstances, status, and disposition 60
(13)
of the matter

Description of whistleblower retaliation cases including information about the official found
Section 5(a)
to have engaged in retaliation and what, if any, consequences that establishment imposed 64
(14)
to hold that official accountable

Information related to interference by the establishment, including—
(A) a detailed description of any attempt by the establishment to interfere with the
independence of the Office, including—
Section 5(a) (i) with budget constraints designed to limit the capabilities of the Office; and
None to
(15) and (ii) incidents where the establishment has resisted or objected to oversight activities of the
report
Section 6(c)(2) Office or restricted or significantly delayed access to information,
including the justification of the establishment for such action; and
(B) a summary of each report made to the head of the establishment under section 6(c)(2)
during the reporting period

(A) Descriptions of inspections, evaluations, audits, and investigations that are closed and
Section 5(a) were not disclosed to the public; and None to
(16) (B) Descriptions of investigations conducted by the office involving a senior government report
employee that are closed and were not disclosed to the public

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010

REPORTING REQUIREMENT PAGE

Section
Peer review reporting 101
989(C)

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 71
Appendices

Funds Recommended for Better Use
Number Dollar Value
Funds Put to a Better Use Agreed to by DOL5
of Reports ($ millions)

For which no management decision had been made as of the commencement of the
2 $1,3926
reporting period

Issued during the reporting period 1 $21
Subtotal 3 $1,413
For which a management decision was made during the reporting period:
• Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management 1 $100
• Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to by management 0 $0

For which no management decision had been made as of the end of the reporting period 2 $1,313

Number Dollar Value
Funds Put to a Better Use Implemented by DOL
of Reports ($ millions)

For which final action had not been taken as of the commencement of the reporting period 4 $73,6867

For which management or appeal decisions were made during the reporting period 1 $100

Subtotal 5 $73,786

For which management decision was made during the reporting period:

• Dollar value of recommendations that were actually completed

• Dollar value of recommendations that management has subsequently concluded should not or
0 $0
could not be implemented or completed

For which no final action had been taken by the end of the reporting period 5 $73,786

5 The term “recommendation that funds be put to better use” means a recommendation by the OIG that funds
could be used more efficiently or achieve greater program effectiveness if management took actions to implement
and complete the recommendation. This term is defined by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and
includes, among other things, reductions in future outlays; deobligation of funds from programs or operations;
costs not incurred in the future by implementing recommended improvements related to the operations of the
establishment, a contractor, or a grantee; and any other savings specifically identified, including reverting funds to
Treasury to be used for other purposes.
6 Beginning balance shown differs from the ending balance in the last SAR because of rounding.
7 Beginning balance shown differs from the ending balance in the last SAR because of rounding.

72 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Questioned Costs
Questioned
Number
Resolution Activity: Questioned Costs8 Costs
of Reports
($ millions)
For which no management decision had been made as of the commencement of the reporting
1 $105
period (as adjusted)
Issued during the reporting period 3 $269
Subtotal 4 $374
For which a management decision was made during the reporting period:
• Dollar value of disallowed costs
• Dollar value of costs not disallowed 0 $0
For which no management decision had been made as of the end of the reporting period 4 $374
For which no management decision had been made within six months of issuance 1 $105

Disallowed
Number
Closure Activity: Disallowed Costs9 Costs
of Reports
($ millions)
For which final action had not been taken as of the commencement of the reporting period
5 $303
(as adjusted)
For which management or appeal decisions were made during the reporting period 0 $0
Subtotal 5 $303
For which final action was taken during the reporting period:
• Dollar value of disallowed costs that were recovered 0 $0
• Dollar value of disallowed costs that were written off 2 $8
• Dollar value of disallowed costs that entered appeal status 0 $0
For which no final action had been taken by the end of the reporting period 3 $295

8 As defined by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, questioned costs include alleged violations of law,
regulations, contracts, grants, or agreements; costs not supported by adequate documentation; or the expenditure of
funds for an intended purpose that was unnecessary or unreasonable.
9 Disallowed costs are costs that the OIG questioned during an audit as unsupported or unallowable and that the
grant/contracting officer has determined the auditee should repay. The Department is responsible for collecting the
debts established. The amount collected may be less than the amount disallowed, and monies recovered usually
cannot be used to fund other program operations and are returned to Treasury.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 73
Appendices

Final Audit Reports Issued

Management Decision Made by

Number of Recommendations Funds Put To Better Use ($)
Questioned Costs ($)
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued

End of Reporting Period10

Employment and Training Administration

ETA and State Workforce Agencies Need to Do More to
Recover Pandemic UI Program Improper Payments; 4 $0 $0 Yes
Report No. 19-25-003-03-315; 04/01/25

COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of States'
Efforts to Identify Multistate UI Fraud; 3 $0 $0 No
Report No.19-25-004-03-315; 08/04/25

COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of States'
No
Efforts to Identify UI Fraud Using Deceased Persons' Social
0 $0 $0 Response
Security Numbers;
Required
Report No. 19-25-005-03-315; 08/15/25

ETA Did Not Ensure ARPA Grants Demonstrated
Improvements in Access to Unemployment Benefits; 4 $2,827,736 $20,772,490 No
Report No.19-25-006-03-315; 08/28/25

COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of States' No
Efforts to Identify UI Fraud Using Suspicious Email Accounts; 0 $0 $0 Response
Report No. 19-25-007-03-315; 09/16/25 Required

COVID-19: Recovery of Millions in Pandemic-Related
Unemployment Insurance Overpayments Improperly Waived,
5 $240,973,884 $0 No
Including Fraud;
Report No. 19-25-009-03-315; 09/25/25

COVID-19: The Employment and Training Administration
Needs to Improve Oversight of Grants Awarded In New York; 6 $25,391,220 $0 No
Report No. 19-25-008-03-391; 09/26/25

Total (7 Reports)

10 The management decisions documented in this table refer to decisions made from April 1, 2025, to September
30, 2025. Management decisions noted in the Funds Put to a Better Use and Questioned Cost tables include
information from both current and prior semiannual reporting periods.

74 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Office of the Chief Financial Officer

The U.S. Department of Labor Did Not Meet the
Requirements for Compliance with the Payment Integrity
3 $0 $0 Yes
Information Act for FY 2024;
Report No. 22-25-007-13-001; 5/27/25

Total (1 Report)

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs

Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Special
No
Fund Financial Statements and Independent Auditors' Report
0 $0 $0 Response
September 30, 2024 and 2023;
Required
Report No. 22-25-005-04-432; 04/28/25

District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act Special
No
Fund Financial Statements and Independent Auditor's Report
0 $0 $0 Response
September 30, 2024 and 2023;
Required
Report No. 22-25-006-04-432; 04/28/25

OWCP Has Taken Steps to Address the Backlog of War No
Hazards Claims; 0 $0 $0 Response
Report No. 23-25-003-04-432; 05/12/25 Required

Service Auditors’ Report on the Integrated Federal
Employees’ Compensation System; Service Auditors’
Report on Optum Workers’ Compensation and Auto
No
No-Fault’s Retail Pharmacy Network Services System; and
0 $0 $0 Response
Service Auditors’ Report on the Acentra Health LLC’s U.S.
Required
Department of Labor Workers’ Compensation Medical Billing
Program System;
Report No. 22-25-008-04-431; 09/12/25

Total (4 Reports)

Wage and Hour Division

Advisory Report: Review of WHD Efforts to Address Child No
Labor Law Violation Challenges; 0 $0 $0 Response
Report No. 17-25-001-15-001; 09/30/25 Required

Total (1 Report)

Final Audit Total (13 Reports) 25 $269,192,840 $20,772,490

continued on next page

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 75
Appendices

Other Reports
Management Decision
Number of
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued Made by End of
Recommendations
Reporting Period

Employment and Training Programs

Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act

Quality Control Review for the Single Audit of the State of
New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions for the Fiscal Year
0 No Response Required
Ended June 30, 2024;
Report No. 24-25-002-50-598; 04/02/25

Quality Control Review for the Single Audit of Eckerd Connects for the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024; 0 No Response Required
Report No. 24-25-003-50-598; 06/03/25

Total (2 Reports)

Other Reports Total (2 Reports) 0

76 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Unresolved Audit Reports Over 6 Months Old

Number of Unresolved
Questioned
Agency Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued

Recommendations
Costs ($)

Agency Management Decision or Grant/Contracting Officer’s Final Determination Did Not Resolve;
OIG Negotiating with Agency

EBSA Faced Challenges Enforcing Compliance with Mental Health Parity
EBSA Laws and Requirements; 5 $0
Report No. 09-25-001-12-001; 02/19/25
Unemployment Insurance Overpayments Related to Work Search
ETA Underscore the Need for More Consistent State Requirements; 1 $0
Report No. 04-21-001-03-315; 09/29/21
Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Data Analytics Capability to
ETA Improve Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program; 2 $0
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23
COVID-19: ETA Needs a Plan to Reconcile and Return to the U.S. Treasury
Nearly $5 Billion Unused by States for a Temporary Unemployment
ETA 1 $105,100,000
Insurance Program;
Report No. 19-23-015-03-315; 09/28/23
ETA Did Not Ensure States Sufficiently Implemented the Mixed Earners
ETA Unemployment Compensation Program; 1 $0
Report No. 19-24-005-03-315; 09/11/24
COVID-19: ETA Could Have Done More to Ensure States Had Sufficient
ETA Staffing to Delivery Timely Pandemic Unemployment Benefits; 1 $0
Report No. 19-25-002-03-315; 11/22/24
MSHA Needs to Provide Better Oversight of Emergency Response Plans;
MSHA 2 $0
Report No. 05-17-002-06-001; 03/31/17
COVID-19: MSHA Did Not Complete or Accurately Report Mandatory
MSHA Inspections; 7 $0
Report No. 19-24-001-06-001; 10/17/23
Alert Memorandum: Urgent Concerns for Miner Safety and Health in At Least
Three U.S. Territories: MSHA Has Never Conducted Mandatory Inspections
MSHA 1 $0
and Conducted Inappropriate Oversight of Mines in the Pacific Territories;
Report No: 05-25-002-06-001; 11/12/24
Without an IT Modernization Framework, DOL Is Vulnerable to Inadequate
Resource Prioritization for Ensuring Security and Availability of DOL
OASAM 2 $0
Systems;
Report No. 23-24-002-07-725; 11/17/23

continued on next page

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 77
Appendices

DOL Implemented Its Wireless Network Securely, Though Security Gaps
OASAM Exist in Testing, Updating, Patching, and Continuous Review; 2 $0
Report No. 23-24-003-07-720; 09/11/2411
FY 2024 FISMA DOL Information Security Report: Continued Improvement of
OASAM Information System Security Program; 2 $0
Report No. 23-25-002-07-725; 12/10/24
DOL’s IT Governance Lacked the Framework Necessary to Support the
OSEC Overall Mission; 1 $0
Report No. 23-21-002-01-001; 09/30/21
COVID-19: OSHA Needs to Do More to Address High Injury Rates of
OSHA Warehouse Workers; 3 $0
Report No. 19-23-013-10-105; 09/27/23

Total Nonmonetary Recommendations and Questioned Costs 31 $105,100,000

Number of Funds Recommended for
Agency Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued

Better Use ($)
Recommendations

Agency Management Decision or Grant/Contracting Officer’s Final Determination Did Not Resolve;
OIG Negotiating with Agency

Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Data Analytics Capability to
ETA Improve Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program; 1 $1,292,205,723
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23

Total Funds Recommended for Better Use 1 $1,292,205,723

Total Audit Exceptions and Questioned Costs 31 $105,100,000

Total Funds Recommended for Better Use 1 $1,292,205,723

Total Audit Exceptions, Questioned Costs, and Funds Recommended for Better Use 32 $1,397,305,723

11 This report contains sensitive information, and content was not posted for public viewing.

78 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Management Decision Made During this
Reporting Period on Audits, Inspections,
or Evaluations Issued During a Previous
Reporting Period: Final Audit Reports Issued

Number of Recommendations
Management Decision Made

Funds Put to Better Use ($)
Questioned Costs ($)
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued

on Previously Issued Audits

Employment and Training Administration

Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Training Administration Needs
to Respond to the Risk of States’s Untimely Disposal of CARES Act
1 $0 $0 Yes
Unemployment Insurance Data and Supporting Records;
Report No. 50-25-001-03-315; 10/17/2412

ETA Needs to Improve Oversight of Disaster Dislocated Worker Grants;
8 $926,513 $0 Yes
Report No. 02-25-001-03-391; 10/24/24

COVID-19: ETA Could Have Done More to Ensure States Had Sufficient
Staffing to Deliver Timely Pandemic Unemployment Benefits; 4 $0 $0 Yes
Report No. 19-25-002-03-315; 11/22/24

Job Corps Needs to Revise How It Measures and Reports on Its Activities
Supporting the President’s National Drug Control Strategy; 3 $0 $0 Yes
Report No. 03-25-001-03-370; 11/22/24

COVID-19: Data Sharing Project Finds Billions Paid to Same Likely
Fraudsters Under Both the Unemployment Insurance and Economic Injury
2 $0 $0 Yes
Disaster Loan Programs;
Report No. 19-25-001-03-315; 12/05/24

12 This report was omitted in the FY 25 Spring SAR but is being accounted for during this SAR Period. The report
contains sensitive information, and content was not posted for public viewing.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 79
Appendices

ETA Can Improve Its Management of the H-2A Program;
4 $0 $0 Yes
Report No. 06-25-001-03-321; 02/25/25

Total (6 Reports)

Employee Benefits Security Administration

EBSA Faced Challenges Enforcing Compliance with Mental Health Parity Laws
5 $0 $0 Yes
and Requirements; Report No. 09-25-001-12-001; 02/19/25

Total (1 Report)

Mine Safety and Health Administration

Alert Memorandum: Urgent Concerns for Miner Safety and Health in At Least
Three U.S. Territories: MSHA Has Never Conducted Mandatory Inspections
11 $0 $0 Yes
and Conducted Inappropriate Oversight of Mine in the Pacific Territories;
Report No. 05-25-002-06-001; 11/12/24

Total (1 Report)

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management

FY 2024 FISMA DOL Information Security Report: Continued Improvement of
Information System Security Program; 7 $0 $0 Yes
Report No. 23-25-002-07-725; 12/10/24

U.S. Department of Labor’s Purchase and Travel Card Risk Assessed as Very
No Response
Low and Low, Respectively; 0 $0 $0
Required
Report No. 22-25-004-50-598; 03/25/25

Total (2 Reports)

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy

DOL Continues to Make Progress Toward Compliance with the Geospatial Data
3 $0 $0 Yes
Act of 2018; Report No. 23-25-001-01-001; 10/03/24

Total (1 Report)

80 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Office of the Chief Financial Officer

FY 2024 Independent Auditors’ Report on DOL’s Consolidated Financial
Statements; 3 $0 $0 Yes
Report No. 22-25-002-13-001; 11/14/24

Management Advisory Comments Identified in an Audit of the Consolidated
Financial Statements for the Year Ended September 30, 2024; 12 $0 $0 Yes
Report No. 22-25-003-13-001; 12/18/24

Total (2 Reports)

Office of the Secretary

Management Alert Memorandum: The Majority of DOL Nondisclosure
Agreements Do Not Include Required Anti-Gag Language; 3 $0 $0 Yes
Report No. 09-25-0001-MA-01-001; 01/14/25

Total (1 Report)

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs

Special Report Relating to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act Special
No Response
Benefit Fund September 30, 2024; 0 $0 $0
Required
Report No. 22-25-001-04-431; 10/31/24

Total (1 Report)

Final Audit Total (15 Reports) 66 $926,513 $0

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 81
Appendices

Management Decision Made During this
Reporting Period on Audits, Inspections,
or Evaluations Issued During a Previous
Reporting Period: Other Reports

Management Decision
Number of
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued Made by End of
Recommendations
Reporting Period

Employment and Training Programs

Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act

Quality Control Review of the Single Audit of the Commonwealth of
No Response
Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources for the Fiscal 0
Required
Year Ended June 30, 2022; Report No. 24-25-001-50-598; 01/17/25

Total (1 Report)

Other Reports Total (1 Report) 0

82 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Corrective Actions Taken by the Department
During this reporting period, we took final action to close recommendations within reports
based on corrective action taken by the Department. The following is a summary of the most
significant actions.

MSHA Can Improve How Violations Are Issued, Terminated, Modified, and
Vacated; Report No. 05-21-002-06-001; 03/31/21

MSHA inspects mines to ensure they are safe for miners. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (Mine
Act) gives MSHA the authority to issue notices, safeguards, citations, and orders (“violations” is the
blanket term used by MSHA) to mine operators who do not comply with the health and safety standards
or the Mine Act. Our audit found thousands of violations written by MSHA inspectors did not comply with
the Mine Act and MSHA Citation and Order Writing Handbook requirements. Errors make violations
subject to court challenges and inaccurate penalty assessments and can jeopardize miner safety.

In response to our audit, MSHA revised its handbook to clarify situations when multiple safeguards can
be issued for a single mine. The updated handbook also requires supervisors to review safeguards for
accuracy. In addition, MSHA provided training to its enforcement personnel to help ensure consistent
application of its policies for issuing safeguards.

ETA Needs to Improve Oversight of Disaster Dislocated Worker Grants;
02-25-001-03-391; 10/24/24

Under Public Law 116-20, ETA was provided with $50 million for the dislocated workers assistance
National Reserve to address the consequences of multiple natural disasters in 2018 and 2019. Our
audit found ETA needs to improve its oversight of the Disaster Dislocated Worker Grants (DWG)
program. Specifically, DWG recipients generally did not coordinate with FEMA, and ETA’s failure to
facilitate this coordination may have decreased the effectiveness and timeliness of DWG disaster
recovery assistance. Additionally, a two-week work stoppage at a subrecipient impacted disaster
recovery efforts due to a 41-day grant modification approval process, which was not in compliance
with the Office of Management and Budget’s 30-day requirement.

In response to our audit, ETA entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
Department of Homeland Security/FEMA in December 2024. This MOU formally establishes a
framework for interagency collaboration, outlining the ways in which they will cooperate to carry out
their respective responsibilities to provide disaster information to the public during disaster recovery
efforts and ensure the DWG activities are better aligned with FEMA’s disaster response operations.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 83
Appendices

Moreover, ETA updated DWG program guidance to implement a new funding approach of awarding
DWG in full. This change eliminates the need for incremental funding in most cases and therefore
grant recipients no longer need to modify grant agreements to request funding.

Alert Memorandum: Urgent Concerns for Miner Safety and Health in at Least
Three U.S. Territories: MSHA Has Never Conducted Mandatory Inspections
and Conducted Inappropriate Oversight of Mines in the Pacific Territories;
Report No. 05-25-002-06-001; 11/12/24

In April 2024, the OIG received a referral from the Office of Special Counsel alleging MSHA had
failed to conduct required inspections of mines in the Pacific Territories and MSHA officials had
falsely designated mines in these areas as “abandoned” despite evidence of ongoing and active
operations. Our analysis found that MSHA: (1) failed to sufficiently identify its own jurisdiction;
(2) never conducted mandatory mine inspections in at least three U.S. territories where mining
occurred; and (3) engaged in inappropriate and misleading actions, such as changing mine
statuses rather than transparently reporting any issues that have led to the lack of mandatory
inspections performed. These three issues resulted in miners in the Pacific Territories, and
potentially in other locations, being unnecessarily exposed to unsafe and unhealthy conditions.

In response to our audit, MSHA confirmed that it holds jurisdiction, under the Mine Act, in the
Pacific Territories: American Samoa, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands. Accordingly, MSHA updated its jurisdictional statement on the agency’s website to reflect
this determination. MSHA also determined that the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of
the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau, and the U.S. Minor Outlying Islands do not fall under
the jurisdiction of the Mine Act, and as such, MSHA does not have the legal authority to conduct
enforcement activities in these locations.

COVID-19: Data Sharing Project Finds Billions Paid to Same Likely Fraudsters
Under Both the Unemployment Insurance and Economic Injury Disaster Loan
Programs; Report Number 19-25-001-03-315; 12/05/24

The unemployment insurance (UI) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) programs provide
eligible people and businesses with needed relief in the face of crises. However, both programs are
at risk of ineligible individuals attempting to obtain benefits. In 2020, soon after Congress expanded
both programs in response to the adverse economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, both
DOL-OIG and SBA-OIG, respectively began reporting on heightened risks of fraud and found similar
fraud indicators.

Our audit found data sharing and matching between ETA and SBA could mitigate the risk of
fraudulent UI benefit payments and SBA disbursements. During the pandemic, no data sharing

84 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

mechanism on potential fraud for UI and COVID EIDLs existed between ETA and SBA. If data sharing
and matching had existed, the agencies could have conducted a higher level of review by matching
applicants across both programs to mitigate fraudulent payments.

In response to our audit, ETA engaged with the Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service, FEMA, and
SBA to discuss their data sharing authorities and compliance requirements. The discussions resulted
in shared data elements that could be used for cross-matching program data and/or sharing potential
and confirmed fraud data in the relevant programs. As a result of the discussions, ETA identified data
elements that could support effective cross-matching of shared data elements.

COVID-19: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to Improve
Oversight of Grants Awarded in New York; 19-25-008-03-391; 09/26/25

From October 2018 to September 2021, ETA awarded approximately $16 billion to grant recipients
in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories. Of this amount, ETA awarded 77
employment and training grants totaling over $740 million to New York. During this time, the
COVID-19 pandemic created many challenges for ETA job training programs across the nation, such
as no access for in-person services and the transition to providing services remotely, which impacted
its ability to provide services to the public. Our audit found ETA did not ensure New York State grant
recipients and subrecipients utilized grant funds for the intended purposes during the COVID-19
pandemic, resulting in grant recipients and their subrecipients, among other things, not avoiding
conflicts of interest in executing the terms of the grant.

In response to our audit fieldwork, ETA took proactive corrective actions even before the audit
report was finalized by issuing its first conflict-of-interest policy. Previously, ETA had not established
a conflict-of-interest policy to mitigate the risk of grant recipients and its employees operating in a
manner that could call into question the impartiality of their actions, judgment, or decision-making. In
May 2024, ETA updated its standard grant terms and conditions template for ETA grants to require
that all grant recipients and subrecipients of federal assistance maintain a written policy addressing
conflicts-of-interest, including organizational conflicts of interest. ETA now requires the recipients’
policies to outline the process the grant recipient or subrecipient will follow to identify, avoid, remove,
and remedy conflicts of interest.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 85
Appendices

Unimplemented Recommendations
During this reporting period, we encountered one instance of an audit or evaluation provided to
the Department for comment that was not responded to within 60 days. In addition, agencies
have provided management decisions in response to all audits and evaluations issued before the
commencement of this reporting period.

From October 1, 2014, through March 31, 2025, the OIG made 1,209 audit recommendations,
of which 156 have not been fully implemented. These 156 recommendations include 118
recommendations resulting from audits issued since the end of FY 2022, and, in many cases, the
corrective action plans are in place.

RECOMMENDATIONS MADE PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 2025,
NOT YET IMPLEMENTED
Unimplemented Recommendations
Total Number of
Fiscal Year
Recommendations Made
Total Number Monetary Impact ($)

2014 128 1 $0

2015 163 0 $0

2016 100 0 $0

2017 112 6 $0

2018 98 1 $0

2019 84 6 $0

2020 105 4 $0

2021 133 20 $39,155,643,774

2022 67 7 $29,581,490,253

2023 93 34 $6,611,643,281

2024 60 27 $129,565,581

202513 6614 50 $0

Total 1,209 156 $75,478,342,889

13 FY 2025 shows data for the first half of the fiscal year (October 1, 2024, to March 31, 2025).
14 Number of recommendations includes 1 recommendation for a report that was not included in the FY 2025
Spring SAR – Volume 93.

86 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

High-Priority Unimplemented Recommendations
The following table summarizes the unimplemented recommendations the OIG considers to be
the highest priorities for the Department.

Report Title; Report Number;
Unimplemented Recommendation(s)
Date Issued
Employment and Training Programs

COVID-19: More Can Be Done to Mitigate Risk to Issue guidance directing states to provide access to state UI claimant data to
Unemployment Compensation Under the CARES prevent and detect fraud.
Act;
Report No. 19-20-008-03-315; 08/07/20

Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Establish effective controls, in collaboration with SWAs, to mitigate fraud and
Training Administration (ETA) Needs to Ensure other improper payments to ineligible claimants, including the areas identified
State Workforce Agencies (SWA) Implement in the memorandum: UI benefits paid to multistate claimants, claimants who
Effective Unemployment Insurance Program used the Social Security numbers of deceased individuals, potentially ineligible
Fraud Controls for High Risk Areas; federal inmates, and claimants with suspicious email accounts. Effective
Report No. 19-21-002-03-315; 02/22/21 controls will help prevent similar or greater amounts of fraud and allow those
funds to be put to better use;
Work with Congress to establish legislation requiring SWAs to cross-match
high-risk areas, including the four areas identified in the memorandum.

COVID-19: States Struggled to Implement Continue to work with states to develop, operate, and maintain a modular
CARES Act Unemployment Insurance Programs; set of technological capabilities to modernize the delivery of UI benefits that
Report No. 19-21-004-03-315; 05/28/21 is sufficient to manage and process sudden spikes in claims volume during
emergencies or high unemployment.

Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Amend 20 C.F.R. 603.5 and 603.6(a) through the rulemaking process
Training Administration Needs to Issue Guidance to reinforce that UI information must be provided to DOL-OIG for all IG
to Ensure State Workforce Agencies Provide engagements authorized under the IG Act, including audits, evaluations, and
Requested Unemployment Insurance Data to the investigations.
Office of Inspector General;
Report No. 19-21-005-03-315; 06/16/21

Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent Implement immediate measures to ensure SWAs are required to provide
Unemployment Insurance Payments in High-Risk ongoing access to the OIG by amending its current guidance to require
Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion; disclosures to the OIG for audits and investigations as necessary, mandatory,
Report No. 19-22-005-03-315; 9/21/22 and without time limitation for the proper oversight of the UI program;
Expedite OIG-related amendments to 20 C.F.R. § 603.6(a) to make ongoing
disclosures of UI information to DOL-OIG mandatory by expressly adding the
U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General (including its agents and
contractors) to the list of required disclosures that are necessary for the proper
oversight of the UI program without distinction as to purpose (e.g., audits
versus investigations);
Expedite OIG-related amendments to 20 C.F.R. § 603.5(i) to expressly make
disclosures of UI information to federal officials for oversight, audits, and
investigations of federal programs mandatory.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 87
Appendices

COVID-19: ETA and States Did Not Protect Use data collected from monitoring and BAM reports to identify the areas of
Pandemic-Related UI Funds from Improper highest improper payments including fraud and create a plan to prevent similar
Payments Including Fraud or from Payment issues in future temporary UI benefit programs;
Delays; Work with NASWA to update the IDH Participant Agreement to require state to
Report No. 19-22-006-03-315; 09/30/22 submit the results of their UI fraud investigations;
Work with NASWA to ensure the IDH cross matches are effective at preventing
the types of fraud that were detected during the pandemic and regularly update
using the results of state fraud investigations.

ETA Did Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Specify within its policy the information states must include in their
Emergency Administrative Grants; documentation to support compliance with the requirements to receive grant
Report No. 19-23-006-03-315; 07/27/23 funds prior to disbursement of the funds;
Remedy the $136,353,568 in questioned costs.

COVID-19: Unemployment Relief for Obtain evidence from the states that ensures all EURGENO refunds and
Governmental Entities and Nonprofit credits to which reimbursing employers are entitled have been provided;
Organizations Should Have Been Better Work with states to reconcile remaining balances;
Managed; Determine the proper disposition of excess funds and take necessary actions,
Report No. 19-23-010-03-315; 09/21/23 including the recovery of questioned costs.

Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Obtain direct access to unemployment insurance claims data from all state
Data Analytics Capability to Improve Oversight of workforce agencies;
the Unemployment Insurance Program; Create an integrity program that incorporates a data analytics capability and
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23 regularly monitors state unemployment insurance claims data to detect and
prevent improper payments, including fraudulent payments, and to identify
trends and emerging issues that could negatively impact the unemployment
insurance program.

COVID-19: ETA Needs a Plan to Reconcile Work with Oregon, Louisiana, Delaware, and Mississippi to ensure the appropriate
and Return to the U.S. Treasury Nearly return of approximately $105.1 million in TFFF reimbursements for first-week
$5 Billion Unused by States for a Temporary regular UI compensation paid that were associated with ineligible weeks;
Unemployment Insurance Program; Establish a deadline by which states are required to perform a timely
Report No. 19-23-015-03-315; 09/28/23 review of past drawdowns and provide evidence that drawdowns were for
reimbursement of eligible first-week regular UI compensation paid by the state
for claim weeks that fell within the TFFF program period;
Ensure that any state drawdowns of the remaining almost $5 billion in TFFF
funds are only for the reimbursement of first-week regular UI compensation
paid by the state that fall within the TFFF program period (March 27, 2020,
through September 6, 2021);
Establish written procedures and deadlines for the timely return of funding for
TFFF and future similar programs and consult with OMB and Treasury officials to
execute the proper return of unused funds that remain within states’ accounts.

88 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

COVID-19: ETA’s Oversight of Short-Time Establish policies and procedures for monitoring, using lessons learned from
Compensation Did Not Detect $129.6 Million in the Short-Time Compensation (STC) program during the pandemic, that
Questioned Costs; ensure states meet requirements for similar future temporary unemployment
Report No. 19-24-003-03-315; 06/26/24 insurance programs that provide federal reimbursements to states;
Review states’ compliance with STC eligibility requirements and require all
states with STC agreements to return federal funds used for reimbursements
of STC benefit payments for weeks of unemployment beginning before
March 27, 2020, and ending after September 6, 2021, as well as for
reimbursements that exceeded benefits paid;
Monitor states administering unemployment insurance programs subsidized
with federal funds, including temporary programs such as STC, to ensure
compliance with the 3-year records retention requirements established in the
Code of Federal Regulations (2 C.F.R. § 200.334).

ETA Did Not Ensure States Sufficiently Perform an assessment of previous emergency UI programs and the pandemic-
Implemented The Mixed Earners related UI programs to determine an appropriate historically-based time limit for
Unemployment Compensation Program; states’ acceptance of emergency program benefit claims after the expiration of
Report No. 19-24-005-03-315; 09/11/24 the UI programs’ eligibility periods and consider making a legislative proposal to
Congress to use the determined time limit on future emergency programs.

COVID-19: ETA Could Have Done More to Capture lessons learned from the pandemic and use the information to develop
Ensure States Had Sufficient Staffing to Deliver performance standards for prompt payment of UI benefits under temporary UI
Timely Pandemic Unemployment Benefits; programs;
Report No. 19-25-002-03-315; 11/22/24 Establish policy that requires officials to issue guidance timely for ETA regional
offices to monitor and measure the effectiveness of states’ use of staffing to
support the implementation of temporary UI programs;
Establish policy that requires states to develop corrective action plans to address
staffing related concerns negatively impacting permanent and temporary UI
programs, as identified by regional offices during monitoring reviews;
Establish policy that requires ETA officials to develop a business case analysis
and supporting justification before suspending UI program integrity functions for
states to manage workload surges during emergency events.

COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Evaluate fraud risk mitigation strategies and actions on a quarterly basis
Oversight of States’ Efforts to Identify to determine their effectiveness and document the results accordingly, in
Multistate UI Fraud; compliance with the processes set forth in ETA’s UI Integrity Strategic Plan;
Report No. 19-25-004-03-315; 08/04/25 Issue guidance to states to address the issue of inconsistent reporting
of overpayments involving identity fraud; Identify the states that have not
complied with ETA 227 reporting requirements for FPUC and PEUC and ETA
902P reporting requirements for PUA and work with the states to ensure
fraudulent overpayments for the CARES Act UI programs are reported before
the commencement of DOL’s Fiscal Year 2025 financial statement audit.

ETA Did Not Ensure ARPA Grants Establish a policy that requires evaluation criteria or standards to be used to
Demonstrated Improvements in Access to ensure grant applications include evidence of a specific issue prior to awarding
Unemployment Benefits; a grant intended to address said issue; Develop additional guidance and
Report No. 19-25-006-03-315; 08/28/25 staff training to improve monitoring of grant recipients, including a focus on
reviewing progress reports to ensure reporting complies with requirements and
grant recipients are on target to achieve grant goals as identified in the grant
agreement.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 89
Appendices

Worker Safety

MSHA Needs to Provide Better Oversight of Clarify mine operators’ responsibilities for local coordination under the
Emergency Response Plans; Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act, including
Report No. 05-17-002-06-001; 03/31/17 coordination and communication between the operator, mine rescue teams, and
local emergency response personnel, and familiarizing local rescue personnel
with surface functions that may be required in the course of mine rescue work.

MSHA Needs to Improve Efforts to Protect Coal Enhance its sampling program to increase the frequency of inspector samples
Miners from Respirable Crystalline Silica; where needed (e.g., by implementing a risk-based approach).
Report No. 05-21-001-06-001; 11/12/20

Alert Memorandum: Urgent Concerns for Revise MSHA’s implementation plan for when it will begin inspecting mines
Miner Safety and Health in At Least Three within American Samoa, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
U.S. Territories: MSHA Has Never Conducted Mariana Islands and begin implementing the plan. The revised plan should
Mandatory Inspections and Conducted address: (1) when enforcement of the Mine Act and MSHA regulations will
Inappropriate Oversight of Mines in the Pacific begin; (2) how inspections will occur in future years (e.g., travel from a specific
Territories; MSHA district or setting up a field office nearby); (3) whether additional training
Report Number: 05-25-002-06-001; 11/12/24 will occur and how (e.g., in-person, virtual, hybrid, via grants, et cetera); and (4)
how funding will be obtained to conduct required MSHA activities in FY 2025.

COVID-19: OSHA’S Enforcement Activities Did As part of OSHA’s rulemaking on infectious diseases, require employers to
Not Sufficiently Protect Workers from Pandemic notify all employees of all known positive cases of infectious diseases at the
Health Hazards; worksite;
Report No. 19-23-001-10-105; 10/31/22 Develop and implement a tracking tool to ensure OSHA receives and reviews
all items Compliance Safety and Health Officers (CSHO) request during
inspections to ensure alleged hazards have been mitigated.

OSHA Needs to Better Address Complaints and Modify the Field Operations Manual to include a policy for mandatory
Referrals for Increased Worker Safety; interviews of complainants and witnesses or document the rationale for lack
Report No. 02-23-001-10-105; 03/06/23 thereof and provide training to CSHOs on the updated requirements.

COVID-19: OSHA Needs to do More to Address Develop specific, measurable inspection goals for the Site-Specific Targeting
High Injury Rates of Warehouse Workers; program, including a baseline for the number of inspections in each Site-Specific
Report No. 19-23-013-10-105; 09/27/23 Targeting category, and periodically monitor progress toward those goals;
Develop a more effective enforcement strategy to improve employer Form
300A compliance;
Assess Form 300A data categories and gather more specific supporting
information about injuries to better identify the count and type of injuries
reported, such as musculoskeletal disorders;
Develop specific measurable inspection goals for the warehousing National
Emphasis Program, including a baseline for the number of inspections to
complete and periodically monitor progress toward those goals. Ensure the
goals contain metrics that demonstrate the outcomes of the program.

90 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Employee Benefits

EBSA Did Not Have the Ability to Protect Reduce or eliminate exemption thresholds for small plans.
the Estimated 79 Million Plan Participants in
Self-Insured Health Plans from Improper Denials
of Health Claims;
Report No. 05-17-001-12-121; 11/18/16

OLMS Can Do More to Protect Workers’ Rights Outline requirements needed to strengthen enforcement authority to align
to Unionize Through Enforcing Persuader Activity with the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959’s intentions
Disclosure; to protect workers’ rights and interests to unionize by recommending
Report No. 09-24-002-16-001; 05/03/24 rule changes or legislative changes to increase employer and consultant
compliance.

Departmental Management

DOL Needs to Do More to Secure Employees’ Establish and implement procedures to ensure E2 Solutions (E2) account
Personally Identifiable Information in the Travel management practices enforce DOL’s security policies; Establish and
Management System; implement procedures to ensure E2 is managed in compliance with contractual
Report No. 23-20-003-13-001; 09/10/20 security requirements and DOL computer security policies for contracted
information systems.

DOL’s IT Governance Lacked the Framework Ensure the Chief Information Officer is a lead member with voting rights of
Necessary to Support the Overall Mission; DOL’s executive strategy and management boards and committees, including
Report No. 23-21-002-01-001; 09/30/21 but not limited to the Management Review Board, Enterprise Shared Services
Governance Board, COVID-19 Coordination team, and Enterprise Risk
Management Council.

FY 2022 FISMA DOL Information Security Update DOL entity-wide and system-level security policies, procedures, and
Report: DOL’s Information Security Program Not plans to comply with National Institute of Standards and Technology Special
Remaining Current with Security Requirements; Publication 800-53, Revision 5;
Report No. 23-23-001-07-725; 02/10/23 Implement data loss prevention tools and alerts based on the results of
agencies’ data exfiltration tests.

Management Alert Memorandum: The Majority of Send an updated memorandum to all DOL agency heads reminding them of
DOL Nondisclosure Agreements Do Not Include the requirement to include the anti-gag provision in all nondisclosure forms,
Required Anti-Gag Language; agreements, and related documents;
Report No. 09-25-0001-MA-01; 01/14/25 Send an email to all DOL employees providing the required anti-gag language
and informing all DOL employees that such language should be read as
incorporated into any nondisclosure agreement (an agreement requiring an
employee not to disclose certain governmental information) they may have
signed since November 27, 2012, that did not include the required language;
Revise all existing nondisclosure agreement forms or templates to include the
required anti-gag language.

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 91
Appendices

Summary of Reports with Unimplemented
Recommendations with Cost Savings / Funds
Put to Better Use

Funds Put to Better Use
Number of

Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued Unimplemented

Recommendations ($)

Employment and Training Administration

Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) Needs to Ensure
State Workforce Agencies (SWA) Implement Effective Unemployment Insurance Program
Fraud Controls for High-Risk Areas; Report No. 19-21-002-03-315; 02/22/21

Establish effective controls, in collaboration with SWAs, to mitigate fraud and other
1 $5,409,966,198
improper payments to ineligible claimants, including the areas identified in the
memorandum: UI benefits paid to multistate claimants, claimants who used the Social
Security numbers of deceased individuals, potentially ineligible federal inmates, and
claimants with suspicious email accounts. Effective controls will help prevent similar or
greater amounts of fraud and allow those funds to be put to better use.
COVID-19: States Struggled to Implement CARES Act Unemployment Insurance
Programs; Report No. 19-21-004-03-315; 05/28/21

Continue to work with states to develop, operate, and maintain a modular set of 1 $33,745,677,576
technological capabilities to modernize the delivery of UI benefits that is sufficient to
manage and process sudden spikes in claims volume during emergencies or high
unemployment.
Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Payments in
High-Risk Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion; Report No. 19-22-005-03-315; 09/21/22

Expedite OIG-related amendments to 20 C.F.R. § 603.6(a) to make ongoing disclosures
1 $29,581,490,253
of UI information to DOL-OIG mandatory by expressly adding the U.S. Department
of Labor, Office of Inspector General (including its agents and contractors) to the list
of required disclosures that are necessary for the proper oversight of the UI program
without distinction as to purpose (e.g., audits versus investigations).
Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Data Analytics Capability to Improve
Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program;
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23
1 $1,292,205,723
Establish effective controls, in collaboration with State Workforce Agencies, to mitigate
fraud and other improper payments to ineligible claimants in high-risk age categories.

92 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

COVID-19: ETA Needs a Plan to Reconcile and Return to the U.S. Treasury Nearly
$5 Billion Unused by States for a Temporary Unemployment Insurance Program;
Report No. 19-23-015-03-315; 09/28/23
1 $4,948,811,006
Establish written procedures and deadlines for the timely return of funding for TFFF and
future similar programs and consult with OMB and Treasury officials to execute the proper
return of unused funds that remain within states’ accounts.15

COVID-19: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to Improve Oversight of
Grants Awarded in New Jersey; Report No. 19-23-016-03-391; 09/28/23
1 $100,098,923
Develop and implement risk tolerance for the amount of participants being served under the
WIOA Adult, Youth, and Dislocated Workers program.

Total 6 $75,078,249,679

15 To date, ETA has completed the reconciliation process in accordance with Unemployment Insurance Program
Letter No. 20-20, Change 1, for 52 states and territories, and facilitated the return of $4,475,268,3494. ETA has
reserved $265 million in the Uninvested Federal Unemployment Account for states’ unpaid TFFF expenditures.
We will close this recommendation once ETA provides documentation to support that the $265 million reserved
for states’ unpaid TFFF expenditures has been reconciled and unused funds that
remained within states’ accounts have been properly returned. continued on next page

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 93
Appendices

Reports with Unimplemented
Recommendations for Management
Improvement or Disallowed Costs Owed
The following table lists all OIG reports issued prior to this semiannual reporting period with
recommendations that have not yet been fully implemented (as of March 31, 2025). For identification
of each recommendation made before March 31, 2025, visit our online Recommendation Dashboard.

Number of Unimplemented or

Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued Unimplemented Disallowed Costs

Recommendations Owed

Bureau of Labor Statistics

BLS Could Do More to Identify Data Limitations and Increase Transparency;
2 $0
Report No. 17-24-001-11-001;10/26/23

Employee Benefits Security Administration

Limited-Scope Audits Provide Inadequate Protections to Retirement
Plan Participants; 1 $0
Report No. 05-14-005-12-121; 09/30/14

EBSA Did Not Have the Ability to Protect the Estimated 79 Million Plan
Participants in Self-Insured Health Plans from Improper Denials of
1 $0
Health Claims;
Report No. 05-17-001-12-121; 11/18/16

EBSA Faced Challenges Enforcing Compliance with Mental Health Parity Laws
and Requirements; 5 $0
Report No. 09-25-001-12-001; 02/19/25

Employment and Training Administration

COVID-19: More Can Be Done to Mitigate Risk to Unemployment
Compensation Under the CARES Act; 1 $0
Report No. 19-20-008-03-315; 08/07/20

Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) Needs
to Ensure State Workforce Agencies (SWA) Implement Effective Unemployment
1 $0
Insurance Program Fraud Controls for High-Risk Areas;
Report No. 19-21-002-03-315; 02/22/21

COVID-19: States Struggled to Implement CARES Act Unemployment
Insurance Programs; 1 $0
Report No. 19-21-004-03-315; 05/28/21

94 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to
Issue Guidance to Ensure State Workforce Agencies Provide Requested
3 $0
Unemployment Insurance Data to the Office of Inspector General;
Report No. 19-21-005-03-315; 06/16/21

Unemployment Insurance Overpayments Related to Work Search Underscore
the Need for More Consistent State Requirements; 3 $0
Report No. 04-21-001-03-315; 09/29/21

Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Payments
in High-Risk Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion; 2 $0
Report No. 19-22-005-03-315; 09/21/22

COVID-19: ETA and States Did Not Protect Pandemic Related UI Funds from
Improper Payments, Including Fraud or from Payment Delays; 3 $0
Report No. 19-22-006-03-315; 09/30/22

ETA Did Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Emergency Administrative Grants;
2 $136,353,568
Report No. 19-23-006-03-315; 07/27/23

COVID-19: Unemployment Relief for Governmental Entities and Nonprofit
Organizations Should Have Been Better Managed; 3 $29,074,061
Report No. 19-23-010-03-315; 09/21/23

COVID-19: ETA Can Improve Its Oversight to Ensure Integrity over
CARES Act UI Programs; 1 $0
Report No. 19-23-011-03-315; 09/22/23

Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Data Analytics Capability to
Improve Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program; 2 $0
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23

COVID-19: Pandemic Unemployment Assistance for Non-Traditional Claimants
Weakened by Billions in Overpayments, Including Fraud; 1 $0
Report No. 19-23-014-03-315; 09/27/23

COVID-19: ETA Needs a Plan to Reconcile and Return to the U.S. Treasury
Nearly $5 Billion Unused by States for a Temporary Unemployment Insurance
6 $105,100,000
Program;
Report No. 19-23-015-03-315; 09/28/23

COVID-19: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to Improve
Oversight of Grants Awarded in New Jersey; 1 $0
Report No. 19-23-016-03-391; 09/28/23

COVID-19: ETA’s Oversight of Short-Time Compensation Did Not Detect
$129.6 Million in Questioned Costs; 3 $129,565,581
Report No. 19-24-003-03-315; 06/26/24

ETA Did Not Ensure States Sufficiently Implemented the Mixed Earners
Unemployment Compensation Program; 4 $0
Report No. 19-24-005-03-315; 09/11/24

continued on next page

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 95
Appendices

Job Corps Needs to Revise How it Measures and Reports on its Activities
Supporting the President’s National Drug Control Strtegy; 3 $0
Report No. 03-25-001-03-370; 11/22/24

COVID-19: ETA Could Have Done More to Ensure States Had Sufficient Staffing
to Delivery Timely Pandemic Unemployment Benefits; 4 $0
Report No. 19-25-002-03-315; 11/22/24

COVID-19: Data Sharing Project Finds Billions Paid to Same Likely
Fraudsters Under Both the Unemployment Insurance and Economic Injury
1 $0
Disaster Loan Programs;
Report No. 19-25-001-03-315; 12/05/24

ETA Can Improve Its Management of the H-2A Program;
4 $0
Report No. 06-25-001-03-321; 02/25/25

Mine Safety and Health Administration

MSHA Needs to Provide Better Oversight of Emergency Response Plans;
5 $0
Report No. 05-17-002-06-001; 03/31/17

MSHA Can Improve Its Pre-Assessment Conferencing Program;
6 $0
Report No. 05-19-001-06-001; 09/23/19

MSHA Needs to Improve Efforts to Protect Coal Miners from Respirable
Crystalline Silica; 1 $0
Report No. 05-21-001-06-001; 11/12/20

MSHA Can Improve How Violations Are Issued, Terminated, Modified,
and Vacated; 5 $0
Report No. 05-21-002-06-001; 03/31/21

COVID-19: MSHA Did Not Complete or Accurately Report Mandatory
Inspections; 9 $0
Report No. 19-24-001-06-001; 10/17/23

Alert Memorandum: Urgent Concerns for Miner Safety and Health in At Least
Three U.S. Territories: MSHA Has Never Conducted Mandatory Inspections and
8 $0
Conducted Inappropriate Oversight of Mines in the Pacific Territories;
Report No: 05-25-002-06-001; 11/12/24

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management

FY 2021 FISMA DOL Information Security Report: Information Security
Continuous Monitoring Controls Remain Deficient; 1 $0
Report No. 23-22-001-07-725; 01/28/22

FY 2022 FISMA DOL Information Security Report: DOL’s Information Security
Program Not Remaining Current with Security Requirements; 2 $0
Report No. 23-23-001-07-725; 02/10/23

Without an IT Modernization Framework, DOL Is Vulnerable to Inadequate
Resource Prioritization for Ensuring Security and Availability of DOL Systems; 2 $0
Report No. 23-24-002-07-725; 11/17/23

96 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

DOL Implemented Its Wireless Network Securely, Though Security Gaps Exist in
Testing, Updating, Patching, and Continuous Review; 4 $0
Report No. 23-24-003-07-720; 09/11/24

DOL Continues to Make Progress Toward Compliance with the
Geospatial Data Act of 2018; 3 $0
Report No. 23-25-001-01-001; 10/03/24

FY 2024 FISMA DOL Information Security Report: Continued Improvement of
Information System Security Program; 4 $0
Report No. 23-25-002-07-725; 12/10/24

Management Alert Memorandum: The Majority of DOL Nondisclosure
Agreements Do Not Include Required Anti-Gag Language; 3 $0
Report No. 09-25-0001-MA-01-001; 01/14/25

Office of the Chief Financial Officer

DOL Needs to Do More to Secure Employees’ Personally Identifiable Information
in the Travel Management System; 2 $0
Report No. 23-20-003-13-001; 09/10/20

FY 2024 Independent Auditors' Report on DOL's Consolidated Financial
Statements; 3 $0
Report No. 22-25-002-13-001; 11/14/24

Management Advisory Comments Identified in an Audit of the Consolidated
Financial Statements, for the Year Ended September 30, 2024; 12 $0
Report No. 22-25-003-13-001; 12/18/24

Office of Labor-Management Standards

OLMS Can Do More to Protect Workers’ Rights to Unionize Through Enforcing
Persuader Activity Disclosure; 3 $0
Report No. 09-24-002-16-001; 05/03/24

Office of the Secretary

DOL’s IT Governance Lacked the Framework Necessary to Support the
Overall Mission; 1 $0
Report No. 23-21-002-01-001; 09/30/21

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OSHA Needs to Improve the Guidance for Its Fatality and Severe Injury
Reporting Program to Better Protect Workers; 1 $0
Report No. 02-18-203-10-105; 09/13/18

Review of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Referral to and
Reclamation of Debt from the U.S. Department of the Treasury; 1 $0
Report No. 22-20-006-10-001; 03/16/20

OSHA’s Diminished Enforcement Left More Workers at Risk for Exposure to
2 $0
Silica; Report No. 02-21-003-10-105; 09/29/21

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 97
Appendices

COVID-19: OSHA’s Enforcement Activities Did Not Sufficiently Protect Workers
4 $0
from Pandemic Health Hazards; Report No. 19-23-001-10-105; 10/31/22

OSHA Needs to Better Address Complaints and Referrals for Increased Worker
3 $0
Safety; Report No. 02-23-001-10-105; 03/06/23

COVID-19: OSHA Needs to Do More to Address High Injury Rates of Warehouse
6 $0
Workers; Report No. 19-23-013-10-105; 09/27/23

Wage and Hour Division

COVID-19: The Pandemic Highlighted the Need to Strengthen Wage and Hour
1 $0
Division’s Enforcement Controls; Report No. 19-21-008-15-001; 09/30/21

Totals 150 $400,093,210

98 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Investigative Statistics
Division
Total
Totals
Investigative Reports Issued / Cases Closed (includes investigative reports issued, case closing
169
reports, and matters referred for possible civil and/or administrative action):

Program Fraud 154
Labor Racketeering 15

Cases Opened: 117

Program Fraud 105
Labor Racketeering 12

Cases Referred for Prosecution (each case is measured as a singular statistic and may include more
92
than one person or business entity):

Program Fraud 83
Labor Racketeering 9

Cases Referred for Administrative/Civil Action (each case is measured as a singular statistic and
67
may include more than one person or business entity):

Program Fraud 63
Labor Racketeering 4

Persons Referred to the Department of Justice for Criminal Prosecution (includes the number of
98
individuals and business entities referred for prosecution):

Program Fraud 90
Labor Racketeering 8

Persons Referred to State and Local Prosecuting Authorities for Criminal Prosecution (includes
11
the number of individuals and business entities referred for prosecution):

Program Fraud 7
Labor Racketeering 4

Indictments and Criminal Informations That Resulted from Any Prior Referral to Prosecuting
300
Authorities (includes sealed and unsealed indictments):

Program Fraud 279
Labor Racketeering 21

Indictments (includes sealed and unsealed indictments): 300

Program Fraud 279
Labor Racketeering 21

Convictions: 196

Program Fraud 178
Labor Racketeering 18

Statutory Debarments: 2

Program Fraud 0
Labor Racketeering 2

continued on next page

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 99
Appendices

Recoveries, Cost-Efficiencies, Restitutions, Fines/Penalties,
$671,575,809.22
Forfeitures, and Civil Monetary Actions:

Program Fraud $670,908,896.95
Labor Racketeering $666,912.27

Recoveries (the dollar amount/value of an agency’s action to recover or to reprogram
$521,640,580.11
funds or to make other adjustments in response to OIG investigations):

Cost-Efficiencies (the one-time or per annum dollar amount/value of management’s
commitment, in response to OIG investigations, to utilize the government’s resources $3,200,454.96
more efficiently):

Restitutions/Forfeitures (the dollar amount/value of restitutions and forfeitures
$141,784,029.50
resulting from OIG criminal investigations):

Fines/Penalties (the dollar amount/value of fines, assessments, seizures, investigative/
0.00
court costs, and other penalties resulting from OIG criminal investigations):

Civil Monetary Actions (the dollar amount/value of forfeitures, settlements, damages,
$4,950,744.65
judgments, court costs, and other penalties resulting from OIG criminal investigations):

Total $671,575,809.22

100 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

Peer Review Reporting
The following meets the requirement of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended that the
Inspectors General include their peer review results as an appendix to each semiannual report.

Peer Review of the Office of Personnel Management Office Inspector General
Audit Organization

DOL-OIG conducted a peer review of the Office of Personnel Management Office of Inspector
General audit organization’s system of quality control for the period ending March 31, 2024.
The peer review report issued on September 4, 2024, resulted in an opinion that the system of
quality control was suitably designed and complied with to provide the DOL-OIG with reasonable
assurance of performing and reporting conformity with applicable professional standards and
applicable legal and regulatory requirements in all material respects.

Peer Review of DOL-OIG Inspection and Evaluation Function

The Federal Housing Finance Agency OIG conducted an external peer review to assess the
extent to which the DOL-OIG met seven standards in the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency’s (CIGIE) Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (Blue Book),
issued January 2012. The peer review report, issued on April 25, 2023, concluded that the
DOL-OIG’s policies and procedures and the three reviewed reports were consistent with and
complied with the covered Blue Book standards for the period ended September 30, 2022. The
report contained no recommendations.

Peer Review of DOL-OIG Audit Function

The Small Business Administration OIG conducted a peer review of the system of quality control
for DOL-OIG’s audit function for the 3-year period ending September 30, 2024. The peer review
report, which was issued on June 18, 2025, resulted in an opinion that the system of quality
control for the DOL-OIG audit organization was suitably designed and provided reasonable
assurance of DOL-OIG’s audits conforming to professional standards. The peer review did not
find any reportable findings, and DOL-OIG received an external peer review rating of “pass.”

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 101
Appendices

Peer Review of DOL-OIG Investigative Function

The Department of Defense OIG conducted a peer review of internal safeguards and management
procedures for DOL-OIG’s investigative operations for the period ending December 31, 2024.
The peer review report, which was issued on July 18, 2025, resulted in an opinion that the system
of internal safeguards and management procedures for the investigative function of DOL-OIG in
effect for the period ending December 31, 2024, complies with the quality standards established
by CIGIE and the applicable Attorney General Guidelines.

Peer Review of DHS-OIG Investigative Function

The OIG conducted a peer review of internal safeguards and management procedures for
DHS-OIG’s investigative operations for the period ending March 2025. The peer review report,
which was issued on July 3, 2025, resulted in an opinion that the system of internal safeguards
and management procedures for the investigative function of DHS-OIG were in compliance with
the quality standards established by CIGIE and the applicable Attorney General Guidelines.

102 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

OIG Hotline
The OIG Hotline provides a communication link between the OIG and persons who want to report
alleged violations of laws, rules, and regulations; mismanagement; waste of funds; abuse of
authority; or danger to public health and safety. During the reporting period April 1, 2025, through
September 30, 2025, a total of 1,640 complaints were opened in the OIG Hotline’s complaint
management system.

Complaints Received (complaints opened by method reported): Totals

Telephone 0

E-mail/Internet 1,537

Mail 103

Fax 0

Walk-In 0

Total 1,640

Contacts Received (complaints opened by source): Totals

Complaints from Individuals or Non-Governmental Organizations 1,092

Complaints/Inquiries from Congress 2

Referrals from GAO 9

Complaints from Other DOL Agencies 1

Complaints from Other (non-DOL) Government Agencies 536

Total 1,640

Disposition of Complaints Reviewed and Processed: Totals

Referred to OIG Components for Further Review and/or Action 143

Referred to DOL Program Management for Further Review and/or Action 186

Referred to Non-DOL Agencies/Organizations 72

No Referral Required/Informational Contact 607

Total 1,008

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 103
Appendices

Acronyms and Abbreviations
ARPA American Rescue Plan Act ETA Employment and Training IRS Internal Revenue Service
of 2021 Administration
Key Key & Associates, P.C.
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics FBI Federal Bureau of
Investigation KPMG KPMG LLP
CARES Act
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and FECA Federal Employees’ MEUC Mixed Earners
Economic Security Act Compensation Act Unemployment
Compensation
CIGIE Council of the Inspectors FEMA Federal Emergency
General on Integrity and Management Agency MOU Memorandum of
Efficiency Understanding
FISMA Federal Information
Continued Assistance Act Security Management MSHA Mine Safety and Health
Continued Assistance for Administration
Unemployed Workers Act of FLC Foreign Labor Certification
MUIA Michigan Unemployment
2020 FLSA Fair Labor Standards Act Insurance Agency
DCCA Special Fund FPUC Federal Pandemic NASWA
The District of Columbia Unemployment National Association of
Workmen’s Compensation Compensation State Workforce Agencies
Act of 1928 Special Fund
FSUI Federal State OASAM Office of the Assistant
DEA Drug Enforcement Unemployment Insurance Secretary for Administration
Administration and Management
FY Fiscal Year/fiscal year
Department or DOL OIG Office of Inspector General
U.S. Department of Labor H-1B visa program for workers in
specialty occupations OLMS Office of Labor-
DHS U.S. Department of Management Standards
Homeland Security H-2A visa program for agricultural
workers OMB Office of Management
DOJ U.S. Department of Justice and Budget
H-2B visa program for non-
DWG Dislocated Worker Grants agricultural workers OPM Office of Personnel
EBSA Employee Benefits Security Management
HHS U.S. Department of Health
Administration and Human Services OSHA Occupational Safety and
EDD Employment Development Health Administration
HSI Homeland Security
Department Investigations OWCP Office of Workers’
EIDL Economic Injury Disaster Compensation Programs
ICE Immigration and Customs
Loan Enforcement PERM permanent employment
Energy Energy Employees certification program
IDH Integrity Data Hub
Occupational Illness PEUC Pandemic Emergency
Compensation Program iFECS Integrated Employees’ Unemployment
Compensation System Compensation
ERISA Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974

104 Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025
Appendices

PFEI Principal Federal Economic SPFPA International Union, UI unemployment insurance
Indicators Security, Police and Fire
Professionals of America UNOI United Nation of Islam
PII personally identifiable
information SSA Social Security USPIS United States Postal
Administration Inspection Service
PIIA Payment Integrity
Information Act of 2019 SSN Social Security number USPS United States Postal
Service
PUA Pandemic Unemployment SWA State Workforce Agency
Assistance VA U.S. Department of
TFFF Temporary Full Federal Veterans Affairs
PPP Paycheck Protection Funding of the First Week
Program of Compensable Regular VEC Virginia Employment
Unemployment for States Commission
Regis Regis & Associates, P.C. with No Waiting Week
WHD Wage and Hour Division
QCR Quality Control Reviews Treasury WIOA Workforce Innovation and
U.S. Department of the
RRB Railroad Retirement Board Opportunity Act
Treasury
SBA Small Business
Administration

Semiannual Report to Congress | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025 105
Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue, NW
Room S-5506
Washington, DC 20210

To learn more about the Office of Inspector General’s current and planned work,
please visit www.oig.dol.gov.
Office of Inspector General
United States Department of Labor

Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

Contact the Hotline
202.693.6999 or 800.347.3756
Fax: 202.693.7020
www.oig.dol.gov

The OIG Hotline is open to the public and to federal employees
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to receive allegations of fraud, waste,
and abuse concerning Department of Labor programs and operations.

OIG Hotline
U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Inspector General
200 Constitution Avenue, NW
Room S-5506
Washington, DC 20210

File and source

File: SAR_DOL-OIG_vol94_2025-04-01_2025-09-30.pdf
Size: 4,000,254 bytes
SHA-256: f9d0a9eac8cef15b415cc23fbd76b2141446b66205362d1c43c76b60c2c4a0b9
Our copy: SAR_DOL-OIG_vol94_2025-04-01_2025-09-30.pdf
Original: No public link identified.