TIGTA Semiannual Report to Congress, October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Summary
This Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) Semiannual Report to Congress covers October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020. In the Inspector General's message, J. Russell George states that during the period the Office of Audit completed 18 audits, the Office of Investigations completed 1,257 investigations, and combined audit and investigative efforts resulted in monetary benefits totaling more than $2.25 billion. The message states that TIGTA will review the actions the IRS is taking on COVID-19 and that the Office of Investigations works with the IRS to prevent and detect scams involving COVID-19 stimulus payments. An audit of the Integrated Submission and Remittance Processing (ISRP) Active Directory found 15 physical security violations and more than 16,000 policy violations; IRS management agreed with all of TIGTA's recommendations.
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Tr e a s u r y I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l f o r Ta x A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
Semiannual Report to Congress
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration
(TIGTA)
TIGTA’s Vision
Maintain a highly skilled, proactive, and diverse Inspector General
organization dedicated to working in a collaborative environment with
key stakeholders to foster and promote fair tax administration.
TIGTA’s Mission
Provide quality, professional audit, investigative, and inspection
and evaluation services that promote integrity, economy, and
efficiency in the administration of the Nation’s tax system.
TIGTA’s Core Values
Integrity – Maintain the highest professional standards of
integrity, personal responsibility, independence, objectivity, and
operational excellence in pursuit of TIGTA’s mission.
Organizational Innovation – Pursue innovative practices in organizational structure,
operational programs and processes, audit, investigative, and inspection and
evaluation methodologies, and the application of advanced information technology.
Communication – Achieve effective organizational approaches and
solutions by encouraging open, honest, and respectful communication
among TIGTA’s executives, employees, offices, and functions, as
well as between TIGTA and its external stakeholders.
Value Employees – Respect the dignity, contributions, and work-life balance of our
employees, and recognize diversity as fundamental to the strength of our organization.
Commitment to Collaboration – Establish and maintain collaborative and professional
relationships with other Government and non-Government stakeholders.
Trea sur y Insp ec t o r G e n e r a l fo r Ta x A d m in is tr a tio n
Semiannual Report to Congress
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
This Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration’s (TIGTA)
Semiannual Report to Congress (SAR)
is dedicated to the memory of
John F. Zimmerman, Jr.
TIGTA’s SAR Program Coordinator
TIGTA SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
Inspector General’s Message to Congress
I am pleased to present this Semiannual Report to Congress,
summarizing the accomplishments of the Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration (TIGTA) during the period October 1, 2019 through
March 31, 2020. This report summarizes some of TIGTA’s more
noteworthy audits, investigations, and inspections and evaluations
conducted during this reporting period in the pursuit of our steadfast
commitment to providing oversight of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
and protecting the integrity of Federal tax administration.
During this reporting period, TIGTA’s Office of Audit has completed
18 audits, and its Office of Investigations has completed
1,257 investigations. In addition, TIGTA’s combined audit and
investigative efforts have resulted in the recovery, protection, and
identification of monetary benefits totaling more than $2.25 billion.
On July 1, 2019, the Taxpayer First Act of 2019 was signed into law. This legislation aims to expand
and strengthen taxpayer rights and to reform the IRS into a more taxpayer-friendly agency by requiring
it to develop a comprehensive customer service strategy, modernize its technology, and enhance its
cybersecurity systems and programs. One of TIGTA’s main areas of current emphasis, as reflected by
an audit report described in these pages, is oversight of the IRS’s efforts to improve security over
taxpayer data and to protect IRS resources. TIGTA is working with the IRS to identify, investigate, and
combat threats to its cyberinfrastructure, focusing especially on how the IRS ensures that only
authorized taxpayers can access their information on public-facing applications.
Similarly, TIGTA continues to investigate and deter high-profile attacks against online IRS applications,
as part of its responsibility for investigating and deterring tax-related cybercrime and disrupting cyber-
based schemes by illicit actors who seek to steal identifiers and impersonate taxpayers and IRS
employees.
Like other Federal agencies, the IRS is being dramatically impacted by the novel coronavirus disease
(COVID-19). TIGTA will review the actions IRS is taking to protect the health and safety of its
employees and the taxpaying public. TIGTA will also assess the impact of the extension of deadlines
for payments of taxes and the IRS’s ability to provide customer service, conduct examinations, and
collect revenue. TIGTA’s Office of Investigations continues to work with the IRS to prevent and detect
any scams involving the COVID-19 stimulus payments made under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act of 2020. As always, we stand ready to continue to perform our responsibility of
serving the American people by protecting the integrity of Federal tax administration.
Sincerely,
J. Russell George
Inspector General
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 3
Table of Contents
Inspector General’s Message to Congress ........................................................................ 3
TIGTA’s Profile ..................................................................................................................... 6
Statutory Mandate ........................................................................................................ 6
Organizational Structure ............................................................................................... 7
Authorities..................................................................................................................... 7
Promote the Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness of Tax Administration ................. 8
Security Over Taxpayer Data and Protection of IRS Resources ................................... 8
Implementing Tax Law Changes................................................................................... 12
Supporting an Enhanced Taxpayer Experience ............................................................ 13
Improving Tax Reporting and Payment Compliance ..................................................... 15
Protect the Integrity of Tax Administration ........................................................................ 18
The Performance Model ............................................................................................... 18
Performance Area: Employee Integrity ........................................................................ 18
Identity Theft and Insider Threats............................................................................. 19
Employee Integrity ................................................................................................... 20
Employee Integrity Projects ..................................................................................... 21
Performance Area: Employee and Infrastructure Security............................................ 21
Performance Area: External Attempts to Corrupt Tax Administration ........................... 23
Corrupt Interference ................................................................................................. 23
Scams and Schemes ............................................................................................... 26
Impersonation Scams .............................................................................................. 26
Tax Preparer Outreach ............................................................................................ 30
Advancing Oversight of America’s Tax System ................................................................ 32
Audit Statistical Reports ..................................................................................................... 34
Reports With Questioned Costs .................................................................................... 34
Reports With Recommendations That Funds be Put to Better Use ............................... 35
Reports With Additional Quantifiable Impact on Tax Administration .............................. 36
Investigations Statistical Reports ....................................................................................... 38
Significant Investigative Achievements ......................................................................... 38
Status of Closed Criminal Investigations ....................................................................... 39
Criminal Dispositions .................................................................................................... 39
Administrative Dispositions on Closed Investigations .................................................... 39
Summary of Investigative Reports and Criminal Referrals ............................................ 40
Interference .................................................................................................................. 40
Instances of Whistleblower Retaliation.......................................................................... 40
Closed Investigations Involving Internal Revenue Service Senior
Government Employees ........................................................................................... 40
Inspections and Evaluations Statistical Reports ............................................................... 42
Reports With Significant Unimplemented Corrective Actions ........................................ 42
4 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Ap p e n d i c e s
Appendix I – Statistical Reports – Other ...................................................................... 44
Reports With Significant Unimplemented Corrective Actions ........................................ 44
Other Statistical Reports ............................................................................................... 57
Appendix II – Audit Products .......................................................................................... 58
Appendix III – TIGTA’s Statutory Reporting Requirements ...................................... 60
Appendix IV – Section 1203 Standards......................................................................... 63
Appendix V – Inspector General Peer Review Activity.............................................. 64
Appendix VI – Data Tables Provided by the Internal Revenue Service.................. 65
Internal Revenue Service Memorandum ....................................................................... 65
Report of Employee Misconduct Summary by Disposition Groups................................ 66
Report of Employee Misconduct National Summary ..................................................... 67
Summary of Substantiated I.R.C. § 1203 Inquiries Recorded in ALERTS ..................... . 68
Glossary of Acronyms ..................................................................................................... 69
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 5
TIGTA’s Profile
T
he Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration (TIGTA) provides audit,
investigative, and inspection and Statutory Mandate
evaluation services that promote economy,
efficiency, and integrity in the administration • Protect against IRS
of the Internal Revenue laws. TIGTA also employee improprieties and
provides independent oversight of matters external attempts to corrupt
of the Department of the Treasury or threaten IRS employees.
(Department or Treasury Department) • Provide policy direction and
involving activities of the Internal Revenue conduct, supervise, and
Service (IRS), the IRS Oversight Board, coordinate audits and
and the IRS Office of Chief Counsel. investigations related to IRS
Although TIGTA is placed organizationally programs and operations.
within the Treasury Department and reports • Review existing and
to the Secretary of the Treasury and to proposed legislation and
Congress, it functions independently from regulations related to IRS
all other offices and bureaus within the programs and operations,
Department. and make recommendations
concerning the impact of
TIGTA oversees all aspects of activity such legislation or
regulations.
related to the Federal tax system as
administered by the IRS. TIGTA protects • Promote economy and
the public’s confidence in the tax system efficiency in the
by identifying and recommending administration of tax laws.
strategies for addressing the IRS’s • Prevent and detect waste,
management challenges and implementing fraud, and abuse in IRS
the priorities of the Treasury Department. programs and operations.
• Inform the Secretary of the
TIGTA’s organizational structure (see Treasury and Congress of
following page) is comprised of the Office problems and deficiencies
identified and of the
of the Inspector General and six functional
progress made in resolving
offices: the Office of Investigations; the them.
Office of Audit; the Office of Inspections
and Evaluations; the Office of Mission
Support; the Office of Information
Technology; and the Office of Chief Counsel.
6 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Organizational Structure
Inspector General
Principal Deputy
Inspector General
Deputy
Deputy Deputy Inspector Deputy Chief Chief
Inspector Inspector General for Inspector Information Counsel
General for General for Inspections General for Officer
Investigations Audit and Mission
Evaluations Support
Authorities
TIGTA has all of the authorities granted under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as
amended (Inspector General Act). 1 In addition to the standard authorities granted to
Inspectors General, TIGTA has access to tax information in the performance of its tax
administration responsibilities. TIGTA also reports potential criminal violations directly to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) when TIGTA deems that it is appropriate to do so. TIGTA
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner or IRS Commissioner) have
established policies and procedures delineating responsibilities to investigate potential
criminal offenses under the Internal Revenue laws. In addition, the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98)2 amended the Inspector General
Act to give TIGTA the statutory authority to carry firearms, execute search and arrest
warrants, serve subpoenas and summonses, and make arrests as set forth in Internal
Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Section (§) 7608(b)(2).
1 5 U.S.C. app. (2012 & Supp. IV 2017).
2 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C. app.,
16 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 23 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C. (2012)).
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 7
Promote the Economy, Efficiency, and
Effectiveness of Tax Administration
T
IGTA’s Office of Audit strives to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of
tax administration. TIGTA provides recommendations to improve IRS systems and
operations and to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of taxpayers. TIGTA’s
comprehensive and independent performance and financial audits of the IRS’s programs
and operations primarily address statutorily mandated reviews and high-risk challenges the
IRS faces.
The IRS’s implementation of audit recommendations results in:
• Cost savings;
• Increased or protected revenue;
• Protection of taxpayers’ rights and entitlements; and
• More efficient use of resources.
Each year, TIGTA identifies and addresses the IRS’s major management and performance
challenges. The Office of Audit places audit emphasis on statutory coverage required by
RRA 98 and other laws, as well as areas of concern to Congress, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the IRS Commissioner, and other key stakeholders.
Audit Emphasis Areas for October 2019 Through March 2020
• Security Over Taxpayer Data and Protection of IRS Resources
• Implementing Tax Law Changes
• Supporting an Enhanced Taxpayer Experience
• Improving Tax Reporting and Payment Compliance
The following summaries highlight significant audits completed in each area of emphasis
during this six-month reporting period:
Security Over Taxpayer Data and Protection of IRS Resources
Active Directory Oversight Needs Improvement
Microsoft® Active Directory is a Windows domain service that blends authentication,
authorization, and directory technologies to create enterprise security boundaries that are
highly scalable. Security weaknesses in the Active Directory could allow unauthorized
access to critical IRS servers, applications, and account management. Without adequately
protecting Active Directory domain controllers, the IRS is unable to ensure that it can
protect sensitive taxpayer information.
8 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
This audit was initiated to review the Active Directory Technical Advisory Board’s
effectiveness in implementing TIGTA’s previous recommendations and to evaluate the
effectiveness and efficiency of the Integrated Submission and Remittance Processing
(ISRP) Active Directory implementation.
TIGTA has previously recommended that the IRS review the scope of the Active Directory
Technical Advisory Board’s defined oversight responsibilities and update the existing
charter to ensure that all individual forest owners (i.e., system owners) are appropriately
represented on the Active Directory Technical Advisory Board. The IRS has implemented
these recommendations.
This review of the ISRP’s implementation of the Active Directory found that computer
rooms containing ISRP domain controllers lacked physical security and environmental
controls. TIGTA identified 15 physical security violations related to Limited Areas, 3
multifactor authentication, fire safety and suppression, and emergency power shutoff.
TIGTA also found that the ISRP Active Directory architecture lacked necessary logical
security controls. For example, the IRS did not previously use credentials while performing
vulnerability scans on ISRP domain controllers. When the IRS performed vulnerability
scans using credentials at TIGTA’s request, it identified a 312 percent increase in
vulnerabilities. The IRS was also using an outdated application to perform security
compliance checks.
Further, the IRS improperly configured ISRP service and business role accounts. As a
result, TIGTA found more than 16,000 policy violations. Finally, the IRS inappropriately
assigned business role accounts to an administrator group, resulting in those accounts
having unnecessary elevated privileges.
TIGTA recommended that the IRS ensure that:
• Computer rooms are immediately updated to comply with agency and Federal
requirements;
• Credentialed scans are regularly completed;
• ISRP domain controllers with critical and high vulnerabilities are properly
remediated;
• Compliance checker applications use up-to-date guidelines;
• All ISRP business role accounts and service accounts comply with agency
requirements; and
• System administrators have only one privileged account with domain administrator
privileges.
TIGTA also recommended that the IRS:
• Physically separate the submission processing equipment from the ISRP domain
controllers;
3 An area in a building where access is limited to authorized personnel only. All who access a Limited Area
must have a verified official business need to enter.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 9
• Prioritize computer room upgrades to ensure access via multifactor authentication;
and
• Establish a process to review monthly vulnerability scan reports for credentialed
scans.
IRS management agreed with all of TIGTA’s recommendations.
Reference No. 2020-20-006
While Progress Is Being Made on Digital Identity Requirements, Completion Dates to
Achieve Compliance With Identity Proofing Standards Have Not Been Established
Advances in technology have provided the IRS an opportunity to be more responsive to the
taxpayer’s need for its services. However, a new set of challenges has emerged because
information about individuals has become more widely available through social media and
breaches of Personally Identifiable Information (PII). As a result, the IRS needs to work
toward improving its public-facing applications to ensure that taxpayers who want access to
IRS online services have verified their identities and can access IRS resources in a secure
manner.
This audit was initiated to evaluate the IRS’s identity proofing capabilities for secure
electronic authentication to online applications. Identity proofing is ensuring that users who
interact with an entity over open networks, i.e., the Internet, are who they claim to be.
In June 2017, the National Institute of Standards and Technology issued updated guidance
on identity proofing in Special Publication 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines. The IRS is
making progress toward compliance with those guidelines on identity proofing by
developing and using a five-step process to determine the required assurance level for
each application and by creating a solution to ensure that the applicant is who they claim to
be within a stated level of confidence.
However, the IRS may not complete its processes on all applications as scheduled, and it
is using compensating controls that include identity proofing and authentication level of
assurances based on superseded guidelines for certain applications that require either
remote or physical presence for identity proofing. While these compensating controls did
not fully meet the requirements, the IRS stated that they are the most secure methods to
remotely identity proof and authenticate taxpayers until its new digital identity platform is
implemented, which is expected to be piloted beginning in June 2020.
The IRS has 63 public-facing applications that taxpayers can access from the Internet. As
of July 2019, eight (13 percent) of these applications have completed all five steps of the
digital identity risk assessment process, while 17 (27 percent) applications have completed
four of the steps. The remaining 38 applications were not expected to complete all five
steps until January 2020. However, TIGTA was concerned as to whether the IRS could
achieve that date given that it took an average of 217 calendar days to complete the eight
applications through step five.
10 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
TIGTA recommended that the IRS:
• Ensure that the remaining public-facing applications complete all five steps in the
digital identity risk assessment process;
• Ensure that all testing for the digital identity solution is completed and all public-
facing applications are migrated to the implemented solution; and
• Coordinate with the Department of the Treasury on legislative proposals or policy
changes needed to obtain additional assistance from States, territories, and Federal
agencies that issue identifications in identity proofing users.
IRS management agreed with two recommendations and partially agreed with the third
recommendation on the identity proofing issue.
Reference No. 2020-20-012
Actions Are Needed to Improve the Safeguarding of Taxpayer Information at
Volunteer Program Sites
The Volunteer Program plays an important role in helping the IRS improve taxpayer service
and increase participation in the tax system. The program provides no-cost Federal tax
return preparation and electronic filing to underserved segments of individual taxpayers,
including low-income to moderate-income, elderly, disabled, and limited English proficient
taxpayers. Because taxpayers who use return preparation services at volunteer sites
disclose their PII, and identity thieves covet this information, the sites must safeguard
taxpayer information.
Security over taxpayer data and protection of resources is a top IRS management
challenge. This audit was initiated to assess the adequacy of, and adherence to, the IRS’s
volunteer site requirements to safeguard and protect sensitive taxpayer information.
TIGTA found that the Stakeholder Partnerships, Education, and Communication (SPEC)
function worked with its partners to heighten awareness of data security at volunteer
sites. However, improvements were needed in some areas to strengthen the data security
processes. For example, the IRS’s partners participating in the Volunteer Program did not
develop a written Information Security Plan (ISP) for each site. In addition, TIGTA’s
unannounced visits to 20 volunteer sites identified multiple security weaknesses at each
site. Finally, TIGTA found that procedures should be improved to reduce the risk of
potential identity theft.
TIGTA recommended that the IRS:
• Issue guidance to its partners requiring them to develop an ISP for each site;
• Require site coordinators to use the security feature included in the tax preparation
software to restrict volunteers’ access to prepared returns;
• Develop procedures to confirm that site coordinators are aware of security
requirements;
• Ensure that site reviews include an assessment of compliance with security controls;
• Update procedures for partners to validate volunteers’ identity, using only
Government-issued identification prior to participating in the Volunteer Program;
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 11
• Reinforce training for SPEC function reviewers and site coordinators on how to
report volunteers who are caught violating the standards of conduct;
• Develop procedures to evaluate security incidents at Volunteer Program sites to
identify affected taxpayers whose information is at risk; and
• Emphasize to all volunteer program sites and partners their responsibilities to
evaluate and report to the IRS all partner-owned and IRS-loaned lost or stolen
computers.
IRS management agreed with all of the recommendations.
Reference No. 2020-40-004
Implementing Tax Law Changes
Many Organizations Are Not Notifying the Internal Revenue Service of Their Intent to
Operate Under Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(4) as Required by Law
On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law the Protecting Americans from Tax
Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), 4 requiring I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organizations to notify the IRS
of their existence within 60 days of their establishment. The PATH Act also includes the
assessment of penalties on late filers and nonfilers and, in some cases, on the officials
responsible for filing the notification. Implementation of the new notification requirement
included the development of new forms and changes to information technology systems as
well as new guidance to help taxpayers comply with the notification requirement.
This audit was initiated to assess the IRS’s efforts to implement the PATH Act provision
imposing a new notification requirement for certain I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) tax-exempt
organizations.
TIGTA found that the IRS has not taken sufficient actions to identify noncompliant
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organizations despite having various sources of information that would
allow it to do so. Once an organization notifies the IRS of its existence, the IRS can use
this information to enforce compliance with the filing requirements for the annual return.
TIGTA identified 9,774 organizations that were potentially required to file a notification
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) but did not. These organizations and their responsible officials
were potentially subject to the assessment of more than $48.4 million and
$47.5 million, respectively, in delinquency penalties. However, many of these
organizations may not have understood or even been aware of the notification requirement
because many of them filed other documents that informed the IRS of their existence.
The IRS recently began assessing delinquency penalties on organizations that file their
notifications untimely; however, it did not assess penalties on organizations that filed
untimely prior to February 2019. TIGTA identified 1,719 organizations that filed untimely
notifications before the IRS started assessing the penalty. These organizations and their
responsible officials were potentially subject to more than $4.8 million and $3.1 million,
4 Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242.
12 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
respectively, in delinquency penalties. However, some of these organizations may have
had reasonable cause for filing untimely notifications and may not be subject to the penalty.
TIGTA recommended that the IRS:
• Determine the feasibility of working with State governments to identify new
organizations required to file a notification with the IRS;
• Conduct research on organizations identified by TIGTA and determine if any
compliance actions are necessary;
• Use available information to enforce compliance with notification requirements;
• Determine if untimely filers had reasonable cause for filing untimely or if assessing
delinquency penalties is warranted; and
• Update notices and procedures to fully implement the law.
IRS management agreed to use available information to enforce compliance and update
notices and procedures. The IRS did not agree to work with State governments, take
actions to bring organizations identified by TIGTA into compliance, or determine the
applicability of penalties for untimely filers.
Notwithstanding the IRS’s disagreement with certain recommendations, TIGTA believes
that the recommended actions would improve the detection of noncompliant activity and
ensure more consistency in how the IRS enforces the law with respect to similarly situated
organizations.
Reference No. 2020-10-001
Supporting an Enhanced Taxpayer Experience
Complexity and Insufficient Oversight of the Free File Program Result in Low
Taxpayer Participation
The Free File Program is a private-public partnership between the IRS and Free File Inc.,
intended to provide online Federal tax preparation and electronic filing to economically
disadvantaged and underserved populations at no cost to the individual or the Government.
This program was first available in Calendar Year (CY) 2003 to help eligible taxpayers find
a reliable tax software product that would not charge a fee.
This audit was initiated in response to concerns raised by Congress and other
stakeholders. These concerns relate to whether the Free File Program is operating as
intended and whether eligible taxpayers attempting to prepare and e-file their returns at no
cost are diverted to tax return preparation services that are not free. The objective was to
assess the IRS’s oversight of the Free File Program.
The complexity, confusion, and lack of taxpayer awareness about the operation and
requirements of the Free File Program are contributing reasons why many eligible
taxpayers do not participate in the program. During Processing Year (PY) 2019, only
2.5 million of the 104 million (2.4 percent) eligible taxpayers obtained a free return filing
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 13
through the program. In contrast, more than 34.5 million taxpayers who met Free File Inc.
members’ Free File Program criteria used the members’ commercial software to file their
tax return.
TIGTA called a statistically valid sample of 200 taxpayers who met the Free File Program
criteria but used a Free File Inc. members’ commercial software and was informed by
87 of the 200 (43 percent) taxpayers sampled that they were charged a fee to prepare and
e-file their Federal tax return. Based on these results, TIGTA estimated that more than 14
million taxpayers met the Free File Program criteria but may have nevertheless paid a fee
to e-file their Federal tax return in the 2019 Filing Season.
Sufficient actions have not been taken to educate taxpayers that the only way to participate
in the Free File Program is through the IRS website. IRS and Free File Inc. management
informed TIGTA that, to participate in the program, taxpayers must access the IRS.gov
Free File web page and select a link on that web page directing them to a Free File Inc.
member’s website. However, this provision is not in the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between the IRS and Free File Inc., and most taxpayers are unaware of this
requirement.
In addition, IRS oversight has been insufficient to ensure that the Free File Program is
operating as intended and in alignment with the MOU. Moreover, taxpayers are not being
made aware of protections in the MOU and are not provided a process for reporting their
concerns.
TIGTA made nine recommendations, among them that the IRS:
• Develop and implement a comprehensive outreach and advertising plan to inform
eligible taxpayers about the Free File Program and how to participate;
• Ensure that management performs quality reviews of MOU adherence testing
conducted by Free File Program analysts on Free File Inc. members’ websites and
software;
• Clearly inform taxpayers of their rights and protections in the Free File Program; and
• Develop a process for taxpayers to provide feedback or concerns on their
experience using Free File.
IRS management agreed with six of TIGTA’s recommendations and partially agreed with
three others. The IRS plans to take incremental steps to implement corrective actions on
these three recommendations, to evaluate these actions, and to determine the next steps.
Reference No. 2020-40-009
14 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Improving Tax Reporting and Payment Compliance
Millions of Dollars in Discrepancies in Tax Withholding Required by the Foreign
Investment in Real Property Tax Act Are Not Being Identified or Addressed
The Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) of 1980 5 imposes an income
tax on foreign persons selling U.S. real property interests. Buyers are required to withhold
a percentage of the anticipated taxes due on the amount realized from the sale. The
withholding requirement serves as an incentive for foreign sellers to file the appropriate
U.S. tax return (i.e., Form 1040NR, U.S. Nonresident Alien Income Tax Return, or Form
1120-F, U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign Corporation) to report income from the sale
and claim a credit for the withheld funds.
During PY 2017, buyers reported more than $1.6 billion in FIRPTA withholding. The
objective of this review was to assess the IRS’s efforts to verify the accuracy of withholding
credits reported on Forms 1040NR and Forms 1120-F.
Reconciliation processes did not effectively identify and address FIRPTA reporting and
payment noncompliance. TIGTA identified 2,988 buyers with discrepancies of more than
$688 million between the withholding reported on Forms 8288-A, Statement of Withholding
on Dispositions by Foreign Persons of U.S. Real Property Interests, filed during PY 2017,
and the withholding assessed to the buyer’s tax account. Extensive data inaccuracies in
the FIRPTA database, incorrect and unclear guidelines, and employee errors contributed to
these discrepancies.
In addition, some FIRPTA withholding assessments were incorrect because the IRS does
not have sufficient procedures to ensure that Withholding Certificates are properly applied
when determining the amount of withholding that should be assessed to buyers’ tax
accounts. TIGTA identified 3,184 Forms 8288, U.S. Withholding Tax Return for
Dispositions by Foreign Persons of U.S. Real Property Interests, for which the IRS did not
assess more than $264 million in FIRPTA withholding tax.
The IRS also has not established processes to use Form 1099-S, Proceeds From Real
Estate Transactions, to identify buyers that do not report and pay FIRPTA withholdings.
TIGTA’s analysis of Forms 1099-S for Tax Year (TY) 2017 identified approximately
$22 million in FIRPTA withholding that was not reported and paid to the IRS. Finally,
employee errors resulted in 1,835 foreign individuals potentially receiving more than
$60 million in additional FIRPTA withholding credits than they were entitled to receive.
TIGTA made 12 recommendations to the IRS to improve the processing of Forms 8288 and
Forms 8288-A and the verification of withholding credits claimed by foreign sellers. In
addition, TIGTA recommended that the IRS initiate actions to address the accuracy of
information in the FIRPTA database.
IRS management agreed with all of TIGTA’s recommendations and plans to take
appropriate corrective actions, including implementing a strategy to improve the quality of
5 Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599, 2682-2691 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 861, 897, and 6039C).
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 15
data entered into the FIRPTA database, providing additional training to tax examiners, and
improving internal guidance.
Reference No. 2020-40-014
The Growth of the Marijuana Industry Warrants Increased Tax Compliance Efforts
and Additional Guidance
Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I controlled substance under the Controlled
Substances Act. 6 Businesses in this industry have limited banking access and are subject
to I.R.C. § 280E, which prohibits the deduction of expenses incurred in trafficking Schedule
I controlled substances. The IRS risks diminished taxpayer compliance when marijuana
businesses fail to report all income, regardless of source, as required under
I.R.C. § 61, and deduct expenses not allowed under I.R.C. § 280E.
This audit was initiated to evaluate the IRS’s examination and education approach to
certain cash-based industries with an emphasis on legal marijuana operations.
TIGTA reviewed statistical random samples of marijuana businesses in three States and
determined that 140 of 237 (59 percent) tax return filings for TY 2016 had likely
I.R.C.§ 280E adjustments that, when projected over the population, totaled $48.5 million in
unassessed taxes for TY 2016, or $242.6 million when the results are forecast over five
years.
TIGTA also estimated the tax impact to comply with I.R.C. § 280E for the same sampled
marijuana business taxpayers. When projected over the population, TIGTA estimated a
$95 million Federal income tax impact to these taxpayers from the application of
I.R.C. § 280E on their TY 2016, or $475.1 million when forecast over five years.
In addition, TIGTA selected a statistically random sample of 90 marijuana businesses that
filed State returns for TY 2016 in Washington State, to determine whether these taxpayers
were reporting all of their income in compliance with I.R.C. § 61. TIGTA found that
23 of 90 (26 percent) returns likely had I.R.C. § 61 adjustments involving either
underreported income or nonfiling of tax returns. When projected over the population for
Washington State, the IRS missed the opportunity to address $3.9 million of potential
assessments for TY 2016, or $19.3 million when forecast over five years.
The IRS also lacked guidance to provide to taxpayers and tax professionals in the
marijuana industry. Such guidance would improve awareness of tax filing requirements for
taxpayers in this industry, such as the correct application of I.R.C. §§ 280E and 471(c),
which would reduce the burden of tracking inventory for certain small businesses.
TIGTA made several recommendations, including that the IRS:
• Develop a comprehensive compliance approach for the marijuana industry, including
a method to identify businesses in this industry and track examination results;
6 Controlled Substances Act § 202, 21 U.S.C. § 812.
16 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
• Develop and publicize guidance specific to the marijuana industry, such as guidance
on the application of I.R.C. § 471(c) in conjunction with I.R.C. § 280E;
• Leverage publically available information at the State level and expand the use of
existing Federal/State agreements to identify nonfilers and unreported income in the
marijuana industry; and
• Increase educational outreach towards unbanked taxpayers making cash deposits
regarding the unbanked relief policies available.
IRS management agreed with all of the recommendations, with the exception of the
recommendation to develop and provide guidance on I.R.C. § 471(c), citing other priorities.
However, the IRS added that once the 2019-2020 Priority Guidance Plan is resolved,
developing guidance to ensure coordination between I.R.C. §§ 280E and 471(c) will be
considered.
Reference No. 2020-30-017
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 17
Protect the Integrity of Tax Administration
T
IGTA is statutorily mandated to protect the integrity of Federal tax administration.
TIGTA accomplishes this mission through the investigative work conducted by the
Office of Investigations (OI). Through its investigative programs, OI protects the
integrity of the IRS and its ability to collect revenue owed to the Federal Government by
investigating violations of criminal and civil law that adversely impact Federal tax
administration, as well as administrative misconduct by IRS employees, both of which
undermine the integrity of the Nation’s voluntary tax system.
The Performance Model
The Office of Investigations accomplishes its mission through the hard work of its
employees, whose efforts are guided by a performance model that focuses on three
primary areas of investigative responsibility:
• Employee integrity;
• Employee and infrastructure security; and
• External attempts to corrupt tax administration.
These performance measures align OI’s investigative activities with the strategic goals of
the organization and protect the integrity of Federal tax administration.
IRS employee misconduct undermines the IRS’s ability to deliver taxpayer services, to
enforce tax laws effectively, and to collect taxes owed to the Federal Government. External
threats against the IRS impede its ability to fairly, efficiently, and safely carry out its role as
the Nation’s revenue collector. Individuals who attempt to corrupt or otherwise interfere
with the IRS through various schemes and frauds adversely impact the IRS’s ability to
collect revenue.
TIGTA investigates these serious offenses and refers them to IRS management when they
involve IRS employee misconduct. When appropriate, TIGTA also refers its investigations
to the DOJ or to State authorities for prosecution.
Performance Area: Employee Integrity
In order for the country’s tax system to operate successfully, taxpayers must have
confidence in the fair and impartial administration of Federal tax laws and regulations. IRS
employee misconduct can erode the public’s trust and impede the IRS’s ability to effectively
enforce tax laws.
Employee misconduct can take many forms, such as: the misuse of IRS resources or
authority; theft; fraud; extortion; taxpayer abuse; unauthorized access to, and disclosure of,
tax returns or return information; and identity theft.
18 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
During this reporting period, employee
integrity investigations accounted for
45 percent of OI’s work. OI conducted
459 employee misconduct investigations that
were referred to the IRS for action.
The IRS took action on 419 and closed
40 investigations without action. 7
Identity Theft and Insider Threats
It is particularly troubling when IRS employees, who are entrusted with the sensitive
personal and financial information of taxpayers, misuse their positions to commit identity
theft and other fraud. This breach of trust negatively impacts our Nation’s voluntary tax
system and erodes confidence in the IRS. TIGTA proactively reviews the activities of those
IRS employees who access taxpayer accounts for any indication of unauthorized accesses
that may be part of a fraud scheme.
The following case represents OI’s efforts to investigate identity theft committed by IRS
employees during this six-month reporting period:8
IRS Employee Indicted For Access Device Fraud and Aggravated Identity Theft
On November 26, 2019, in the Eastern District of Virginia, Kwashie Senam Zilevu was
indicted on charges of access device fraud and aggravated identity theft. Zilevu was
previously charged via criminal complaint with access device fraud on October 2, 2019, and
subsequently arrested by TIGTA special agents on October 3, 2019.
According to the court documents, Zilevu was employed as an Information Technology
Specialist with the IRS. Zilevu also owned several businesses, including MacroTele, LLC,
which he claimed sold telephone calling cards that he created. Between January 2016 and
March 2018, Zilevu knowingly, and without authorization, used the names, addresses,
dates of birth, and Social Security Numbers (SSN) of at least three victims to obtain
fraudulent credit cards. Once Zilevu obtained the credit cards in the victims’ names, he
used them to make several thousand dollars’ worth of purchases at retail stores and other
companies. An American Express® (AmEx®) application was submitted using a victim’s PII,
and approximately $49,000 was charged to the AmEx card. Among these purchases were
an airline ticket for travel from Washington, D.C., to Miami, Florida, and a hotel reservation
for Zilevu.
Another credit card application was submitted to U.S. Bank and Trust using PII of a second
victim. Bank statements revealed that a total of $10,273.39 in completed transactions and
$2,651.62 in attempted transactions were made using this card, including an airline ticket
from Dulles, Virginia, to Montego Bay, Jamaica, for Zilevu. Another credit card application
was submitted to U.S. Bank and Trust using a third victim’s PII. A total of $9,641.69 in
7 These data may pertain to investigations referred administratively in prior reporting periods and do not
necessarily relate to the total number of misconduct investigations that were referred to the IRS for action
during this reporting period.
8 The facts in the summarized case narrative come from court documents of the jurisdiction named.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 19
fraudulent charges were made using this card. A review of Zilevu’s IRS e-mail account
revealed that Zilevu had received an e-mail message from PayPal® congratulating the third
victim for setting up his or her account and instructing the victim to click a link in order to
confirm the accuracy of his or her e-mail address. Zilevu had received a subsequent e-mail
message from PayPal to his IRS e-mail account, advising the third victim that he or she
was officially a PayPal member. When interviewed, each of the victims confirmed that the
fraudulent credit cards had been taken out in their names, and that Zilevu did not have
permission or authority to use their information to apply for the cards.
This investigation was worked jointly by special agents from TIGTA and the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service. If convicted, Zilevu could face a fine and up to 15 years’ imprisonment.
Employee Integrity
The following case represents OI’s efforts to address employee integrity during this
six-month reporting period: 9
IRS Employee Sentenced for the Unauthorized Disclosure of Suspicious Activity
Reports
On January 15, 2020, in the Northern District of California, IRS employee John C. Fry was
sentenced for the unauthorized disclosure of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR). Fry
previously pled guilty to the offense in August 2019.
According to the court documents, Fry was an investigative analyst for IRS Criminal
Investigation (IRS-CI) in San Francisco, California, and had worked for the IRS since 2008.
In this position, he had access to various law enforcement databases, including the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and Palantir, which is an analytic
software application used by IRS-CI. FinCEN manages the collection and maintenance of
SARs, which financial institutions are required to generate under the Bank Secrecy Act to
report potentially suspicious financial transactions. The disclosure of a SAR or its contents
is unlawful, and employees or agents of Government authorities are prohibited from
disclosing a SAR, or any information that would reveal even the existence of a SAR, except
as necessary to fulfill official duties.
Fry admitted that on May 4, 2018, he logged on to the Palantir database from his work
computer and downloaded five SARs related to Michael Cohen and his company, Essential
Consultants. Fry then called Michael Avenatti, an attorney based in Newport Beach,
California, twice from his personal cell phone. During those conversations, Fry verbally
provided information contained in the five SARs to Avenatti. Fry also used one of his
personal e-mail accounts to e-mail screenshots of the SARs to Avenatti. Fry admitted that
on May 7, 2018, he logged on to the FinCEN database from his work computer and
conducted additional searches related to Cohen and Essential Consultants. He then called
Avenatti from his personal cell phone and verbally provided information contained in the
searches. Fry admitted that he had no official reason, in his capacity as an IRS
9 The facts in the summarized case narrative come from court documents of the jurisdiction named.
20 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
investigative analyst, to disclose SAR records related to Cohen or the various companies
listed in the SARs.
On May 8, 2018, Avenatti circulated a dossier on his public Twitter account releasing the
confidential banking information related to Cohen and Essential Consultants. On
May 8, 2018, The Washington Post published an article that discussed in detail claims
about Cohen’s banking history made public in Avenatti’s dossier. On May 12, 2018, Fry
placed an outgoing call to a number later identified as being associated with a reporter. On
May 16, 2018, The New Yorker published an article written by this reporter titled, “Missing
Files Motivated the Leak of Michael Cohen’s Financial Records.” The article reported that
the source, identified only as a law enforcement officer, grew alarmed after being unable to
find two important SARs regarding Cohen’s financial activity. In fact, access to the two
SARs in question had been restricted, and they were not available to all FinCEN users.
Fry was sentenced to five years’ probation, including six months of electronic monitoring,
for the unauthorized disclosure of SARs. Fry was also ordered to pay a fine in the amount
of $5,000.
Employee Integrity Projects
As part of its employee integrity focus, TIGTA also conducts proactive investigative initiatives to
detect misconduct in the administration of IRS programs. During this reporting period, TIGTA
initiated 24 proactive projects to detect systemic weaknesses or potential IRS program
vulnerabilities. TIGTA’s most successful integrity project involves the detection of IRS
employees who abuse their access to taxpayer information to commit identity theft and other
crimes.
Performance Area: Employee and Infrastructure Security
Collecting taxes is a critical function of the Federal Government. Threats and assaults
directed at IRS employees, facilities, and infrastructure impede the effective and safe
administration of the Federal tax system and the IRS’s ability to collect tax revenue. In
addition to traditional direct threat vectors, TIGTA also actively pursues, investigates, and
mitigates emerging threats to the IRS’s ability to conduct Federal tax administration in
cyberspace.
All reports of threats, assaults, and forcible interference against IRS employees in the
course of performing their official duties are referred to OI.
Contact with the IRS can be stressful and emotional for taxpayers. While the majority of
taxpayer contacts are routine, some may become confrontational and even violent.
TIGTA’s special agents are statutorily mandated to provide physical security, known as
“armed escorts,” to IRS employees who have face-to-face contact with taxpayers who may
pose a danger to the employee, and to ensure that IRS employees have a secure
environment in which to perform their critical tax administration functions. During this
six-month reporting period, OI provided 15 armed escorts for IRS employees.
The Office of Investigations undertakes investigative initiatives to identify individuals who
could commit violence against, or otherwise pose a threat to, IRS employees, facilities, or
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 21
infrastructure. It also provides intelligence to IRS officials to assist them in making
proactive operational decisions about potential violence or other activities that could pose a
threat to IRS systems, operations, and employees. The investigative information sharing
between OI and the IRS’s Office of Employee Protection (OEP) to identify “potentially
dangerous” taxpayers is one example of TIGTA’s commitment to protecting IRS
employees. Taxpayers who meet OEP criteria are designated as potentially dangerous.
Five years after this designation has been
made, TIGTA conducts a follow-up
assessment of the taxpayer so that OEP can
determine if the taxpayer still poses a potential
danger to IRS employees.
During this six-month reporting period,
employee and infrastructure security
investigations accounted for 46 percent of OI’s
work.
The following case represents OI’s efforts to ensure the safety of IRS employees during the
reporting period: 10
Massachusetts Man Arrested for Threatening to Bomb the IRS
On November 4, 2019, in the District of Massachusetts, Shawn Richardson was arrested in
connection with making a telephonic threat to injure by means of an explosive. He was
previously charged with the offense on October 30, 2019.
According to the criminal complaint, on October 29, 2019, Richardson called the IRS to
inquire about a tax question and his call was routed to the IRS Brookhaven Service Center
in Holtsville, New York. During the call, Richardson became extremely agitated due to his
financial situation and made various violent threats towards the IRS, its employees, and law
enforcement. He specifically stated that he would bomb the IRS office. He stated, “I have
not made it yet, I have to go to Home Depot and get some nitro and get a few other things.
And then deposit it myself and then blow myself up with the bomb because it doesn’t really
matter.”
Richardson then called TIGTA. During the phone call, Richardson quickly became enraged
regarding his financial situation and blamed the Government for ruining his life. Richardson
acknowledged that he made the threatening phone call to the IRS that morning and
reiterated that he did not currently have a bomb, but that he would make one and blow up
the IRS. Richardson stated the IRS needed to be destroyed, as it was ruining people’s
lives, and that he would destroy it.
At his residence, in a conversation with agents, Richardson stated that the IRS was ruining
his life and that he would do whatever he could to destroy the IRS and the U.S.
Government. Richardson stated that the only way to achieve this would be through violent
means. When informed that threatening the IRS was a crime, Richardson replied that he
would continue to seek retribution through violence, as his only option.
10 The facts in the summarized case narrative come from court documents of the jurisdiction named.
22 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
On November 4, 2019, Richardson made his initial appearance and was remanded into the
custody of the U.S. Marshals Service. If convicted, Richardson could face a maximum
statutory sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.
Performance Area: External Attempts to Corrupt Tax Administration
TIGTA also investigates external attempts to corrupt or impede tax administration.
Individuals may interfere with the IRS’s ability to collect revenue for the United States in
many ways. For instance, they may impersonate IRS employees or misuse IRS seals and
symbols; file false or frivolous documents against IRS employees; use fraudulent IRS
documentation to perpetrate criminal activity; offer bribes to IRS employees to influence
their tax cases; commit fraud in contracts awarded by the IRS to contractors; or commit
cybercrimes.
Cybercrime
Attacks against online IRS applications can cause wide-ranging negative implications. This
was clearly demonstrated in recent years through high-profile attacks against the IRS
eAuthentication web portal and the IRS Data Retrieval Tool within the Department of
Education Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) website. Those attacks
caused both of those applications to be taken off line. The unavailability of these resources
impacted taxpayers’ ability to file timely annual tax returns and, in the case of the latter,
negatively impacted the spring college enrollment process nationwide.
These attempts to corrupt or otherwise
interfere with tax administration not only
inhibit the IRS’s ability to collect revenue,
but also undermine the public’s confidence
in fair and effective tax administration.
During this reporting period, investigations
into attempts to corrupt or impede tax
administration accounted for 9 percent of
OI’s work.
Corrupt Interference
The following cases represent OI’s efforts to address and deter external attempts to corrupt
tax administration during this six-month period: 11
Man Sentenced in Scheme to Defraud the Internal Revenue Service
On October 2, 2019, in the Western District of New York, Emmanuel Guobadia was
sentenced in a scheme he devised to defraud the IRS. Guobadia had previously been
11 The facts in the summarized case narratives come from court documents of the respective jurisdictions
named and other publically available documents.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 23
indicted in April 2016 and was found guilty in June 2019 on four counts of wire fraud and
four counts of aggravated identity theft.
According to the court documents, between about May 2012 and July 2012, Guobadia
electronically filed fraudulent Federal income tax returns using the names and SSNs of
others and claimed tax refunds to which he was not entitled. As part of the scheme,
628 fraudulent tax returns claiming a total of $1,252,524 in fraudulent tax refunds were filed
with the IRS for TY 2011. Of those attempted refund claims, the IRS electronically
deposited $178,658 in tax refunds into bank accounts owned by an individual, as directed
on the returns.
On four occasions, Guobadia also directed an individual, who was located in New York, to
wire transfer fraudulently obtained funds into his bank account located in the State of
Georgia.
In October 2013, Guobadia was arrested, and several laptop computers were seized.
Search warrants obtained for the contents of the computers resulted in the identification of
approximately 2,000 unique names with associated PII, bank account information, and
electronic return originator (ERO) passwords. When a tax return is filed online through an
ERO, the return preparer must provide a unique password for that return.
Guobadia was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised
release. Guobadia was also ordered to pay $414,439 in restitution to the IRS.
Man Sentenced for Accessing IRS System and Obtaining Taxpayer Information
On January 13, 2020, in the Northern District of West Virginia, Clinton Jean-Pierre of
Miami, Florida, was sentenced for aggravated identity theft and accessing a computer and
obtaining information from the IRS eAuthentication online taxpayer system. Jean-Pierre
was charged with the offenses in July 2019 and pled guilty in August 2019.
According to a DOJ press release, Jean-Pierre admitted to fraudulently accessing the IRS
eAuthentication online taxpayer system in December 2017. Jean-Pierre admitted that in
order to pass IRS security protocols, he had fraudulently “ported” an unknowing person’s
cellular telephone number to his own phone in order to obtain the security code necessary
to create an unauthorized taxpayer account. Jean-Pierre further admitted that, once in the
IRS eAuthentication system, he gained access to a taxpayer’s tax return information, which
included the taxpayer’s PII.
Jean-Pierre was sentenced to a mandatory 24 months’ imprisonment for aggravated
identity theft and 46 months’ imprisonment for computer fraud, to be served consecutively,
for a total of 70 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. In
addition, Jean-Pierre was ordered to pay a special assessment fee of $200.
Coconspirators Sentenced in Scheme Using Stolen Tax Refund Checks
On November 26, 2019, in the Western District of Missouri, Frances Wright was sentenced
for her role in a scheme involving the theft of U.S. Treasury tax refund checks. On January
24 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
22, 2020, in the Western District of Missouri, Dante Chestnut was sentenced for his role in
the same scheme. Wright and Chestnut had previously pled guilty in July 2019.
According to the court documents, eight individuals were charged in a scheme involving the
theft of U.S. Treasury tax refund checks. Branden Belvin, Mistie Smith, Chestnut,
Susannah Lesaisaea, Cassandra Franklin, Sharieff Sylvester, Joseph Hooks, and Wright
were indicted on May 2, 2018, for conspiracy, bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft.
Belvin and Smith, both residents of California, obtained approximately 99 U.S. Treasury tax
refund checks that had been stolen from the U.S. Postal Service mail stream. Belvin and
Smith recruited the coconspirators to participate in the scheme by negotiating the stolen
checks. They created or obtained fraudulent identification documents, such as driver’s
licenses, in order to deposit the stolen refund checks.
Between March 2016 and May 2016, the coconspirators traveled through Arizona,
Colorado, Kansas, and Missouri negotiating the stolen refund checks at various branches
of Academy Bank. The coconspirators used false identification documents in order to open
bank accounts in the names depicted on the checks. They then deposited the checks into
the newly created accounts and subsequently withdrew the majority of the money.
In April 2016, Denver, Colorado, police officers responded to an incident involving Belvin
and Smith at a hotel. Officers recovered an envelope containing 19 counterfeit California
driver’s licenses. The names on the counterfeit driver’s licenses matched the names of
victims whose tax refund checks had been stolen and cashed, but most of the licenses
pictured the same six individuals, coconspirators Chestnut, Sylvester, Franklin, Lesaisaea,
Wright, and another individual. The scheme resulted in the fraudulent negotiation of
approximately 99 checks representing a total financial loss of approximately $447,517. The
aggregate amount of stolen checks presented by Wright totaled $24,970.
Wright was sentenced to five years’ probation for committing bank fraud and ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $24,970. Chestnut was sentenced to 62 months’ imprisonment
followed by three years’ supervised release. Chestnut was also ordered to pay
$441,056.27 in restitution and a special assessment fee of $300.
Individuals Sentenced for Attempting to Obtain the President’s Tax Returns
On December 16, 2019, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Justin Hiemstra and
codefendant Andrew Harris were sentenced after pleading guilty to two counts arising from
using someone else’s username to access a school computer and attempting to obtain the
tax returns of President Donald Trump without permission.
Hiemstra and codefendant Andrew Harris were charged with the offenses on
July 17, 2019, and pled guilty on August 6, 2019.
According to the court documents, Hiemstra and Harris, two students at Haverford College,
located in Haverford, Pennsylvania, went to the school’s computer lab and attempted to
obtain President Trump’s tax returns via the FAFSA website. Hiemstra and Harris opened
a false FAFSA application in the name of a member of the Trump family and found that
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 25
someone else had already obtained a Federal Student Aid ID (FSA-ID) for President Trump
and an identification password. In general, before beginning an individual’s first FAFSA
application, the individual registers with the Office of Federal Student Aid. Once registered,
the individual obtains a unique identifier, known as a FSA-ID, which is essentially the
equivalent of a username. Once the individual has activated the FSA-ID, the individual can
complete the first FAFSA application, and any subsequent applications through the FAFSA
website.
In order to reset the identification password, Hiemstra and Harris were required to answer
challenge questions that the other person had originally created when first setting up the
FSA-ID and password. They were able to do so and reset the password. Using President
Trump’s personal identifiers, including his SSN and date of birth, Hiemstra and Harris
unsuccessfully attempted to import President Trump’s Federal tax information into the false
FAFSA application that they had initiated in the name of a Trump family member.
When questioned by law enforcement, Hiemstra stated that credentials from two other
Haverford College students were used to access the two computers that he and Harris
used.
Hiemstra and codefendant Harris were each sentenced to two years’ probation on each
count and 200 hours of community service.
Scams and Schemes
Individuals may corrupt tax administration by impersonating IRS employees in an effort to
obtain PII from unsuspecting taxpayers or to steal their money. Such impersonators may
claim to be IRS employees on the telephone or may misuse IRS logos, seals, or symbols
to create official-looking letters and e-mails. They often tell their victims that they owe
money to the IRS and must pay through a preloaded debit card, wire transfer, or gift card
from Apple iTunes®, Walmart®, or Target®. Sometimes they trick taxpayers into providing
their PII, which the impersonator then uses to commit identity theft.
TIGTA aggressively investigates these criminal activities to ensure that taxpayers
maintain confidence in the integrity of Federal tax administration.
Impersonation Scams
For more than 10 years, the IRS has compiled an annual list of commonly encountered
scams, called the “Dirty Dozen” list of tax scams. Many of these scams peak during the
filing season, as people prepare their returns or utilize the services of paid preparers.
Between October 2013 and March 2020, TIGTA logged more than 2.5 million
contacts from taxpayers who reported that they had received telephone calls from
individuals who claimed to be IRS employees.
The impersonators told the victims that they owed additional tax and that if they did not
immediately pay, they would be arrested or face other adverse consequences.
26 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
As of March 31, 2020, 15,848 victims have reported to TIGTA that they have lost more
than $80 million, collectively, to the scam’s perpetrators.
.
“As we are in the midst of the tax filing season, it is critical that all taxpayers remember to be wary of
unsolicited telephone calls and e-mails from individuals claiming to be IRS and Treasury employees. Despite
excellent progress we have made in our investigation of this matter, the callers are aggressive and relentless.
Once they have your attention, they will say anything to con you out of your hard-earned cash. TIGTA has
worked over the last seven years to pursue those perpetrating this fraud, and we ask you to remain vigilant
and report any calls you receive to our website.”
J. Russell George
Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration
March 5, 2020
Because of their complexity, scams such as these are not typically resolved quickly. This
wide-ranging scam has claimed victims in every State. The top five States by number of
victims who have suffered financial losses are, listed from highest number of victims to
lowest, California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 27
Financial Losses by State
Source: TIGTA’s Office of Investigations
In addition to its investigative efforts, TIGTA has taken numerous other steps to
proactively combat the IRS impersonation scam and protect taxpayers from being
victimized. Specifically, OI created a three-pronged Advise and Disrupt strategy. The
first part of this strategy involves analyzing the telephone numbers reported to TIGTA. If
a number is confirmed to be part of the scam, OI identifies the telephone carrier and
requests that the carrier deactivate the number.
The second part of the strategy is to post scam-related telephone numbers on the Internet,
which allows potential victims to determine if the call they receive is a part of the scam.
The final part of the strategy is to deploy a TIGTA auto-dialer to call the impersonators
with a pre-recorded message ordering them to cease and desist their criminal activity, a
procedure which also occupies the impersonators’ time and telephone lines.
The following cases are representative of OI’s efforts to investigate IRS impersonation
scams during this six-month reporting period: 12
12 The facts in the summarized case narratives come from court documents of the jurisdictions named and
other publically available documents.
28 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Indian National Pleads Guilty to Charges in Connection With Operating India-Based
Call Centers That Scammed U.S. Victims Out of Millions of Dollars
On January 9, 2020, in the Southern District of Texas, Hitesh Madhubhai Patel, also known
as Hitesh Hinglaj, pled guilty to wire fraud conspiracy and conspiracy in connection with his
operation of a multimillion-dollar India-based call center scam which targeted U.S. victims.
According to the court documents, Patel was identified as an operator of the India-based
call center HGlobal. From about 2013 until about October 2016, Patel and his
coconspirators participated in a complex scheme to defraud U.S. victims by misleading
them into sending money in connection with several different scams. In one of the scams,
the coconspirators impersonated IRS officers to defraud U.S. residents by misleading them
into believing that they owed money to the IRS, and that they would be arrested and fined if
they did not pay the alleged back taxes immediately.
As part of the scheme, Patel corresponded by e-mail with his coconspirators to send credit
card numbers, telephone scam scripts, deposit slips, payment information, call center
operations information, and bank account information. The scripts included IRS
impersonation, payday loan fraud, U.S. Government grant fraud, and debt collection fraud.
Patel admitted that a reasonably foreseeable loss of more than $25 million but less than
$65 million was attributable to him.
Patel was prosecuted in the United States after being extradited from Singapore in
April 2019. Authorities in Singapore had apprehended Patel at the request of the United
States.
Patel faces a maximum statutory penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment for the wire fraud
conspiracy and five years for conspiracy. Both counts carry the possibility of a fine of up to
$250,000, or twice the gross gain or loss from the offense. Sentencing in this matter is
scheduled for April 3, 2020.
Man Pleads Guilty in Connection With an International Impersonation Scheme
Targeting U.S. Victims
On December 12, 2019, in the Eastern District of New York, Armughanul Asar pled guilty to
one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with an impersonation and
Internet retail scheme directed at thousands of individuals across the United States.
According to the court documents, telemarketing call centers in India placed calls to U.S.
victims seeking to defraud them of money by various fraudulent scenarios. Among these
was a scam wherein callers contacted the victims and falsely claimed to be agents of U.S.
Government agencies, including the IRS. The callers falsely claimed that they were
contacting the victims to inform them that they owed the U.S. Government a specified
amount of money, and if the victims did not immediately remit payment to the individuals or
entities identified by the callers, they would be arrested.
Between January 2018 and September 2018, Asar and others opened bank accounts in
the names of various inactive and shell corporations for the purpose of receiving fraud
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 29
proceeds. Shortly after receiving the wire transfer payments that the victims sent, the
defendants and others withdrew, and directed shell company owners to withdraw, the
fraudulently obtained victims’ funds and then distributed the money via cashier’s checks
and wire transfers to other bank accounts. The defendant, together with others, received
approximately $2.3 million from the victims as a result of the fraud scheme.
Asar could face criminal forfeiture and a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment.
Sentencing in this matter is scheduled for July 7, 2020.
Tax Preparer Outreach
In addition to promoting employee integrity, TIGTA is also committed to tax preparers’
education on integrity. Tax preparers play an important role to ensure the integrity of tax
administration because of their frequent contact with the IRS and their influence on tax
compliance or noncompliance. Tax preparers can either assist in the enforcement of tax
administration to ensure that taxpayers comply with Internal Revenue laws, or they can
impede it.
During this semiannual reporting period, TIGTA special agents provided
17 integrity presentations to tax preparers at various locations nationwide. The
presentations detailed TIGTA’s role in protecting the integrity of Federal tax
administration; the differences between the respective jurisdictions of TIGTA and the IRS;
how to identify various forms of preparer misconduct; and common IRS impersonation
scams.
The following cases represent OI’s efforts to protect tax administration from unscrupulous
tax preparers during this six-month reporting period: 13
Florida Tax Preparer Sentenced in Scheme Involving Wire Fraud
On December 5, 2019, in the Southern District of Florida, Fort Lauderdale tax preparer
Deborah Thomas was sentenced after previously pleading guilty to three counts of wire
fraud in connection with a scheme to misappropriate her clients’ money, which had been
intended to satisfy taxes owed to the IRS. Thomas was indicted for the offenses in May
2019 and pled guilty in August 2019.
According to the indictment, from April 2015 through May 2018, Thomas worked as a tax
preparer at a public accounting firm. In an effort to unjustly enrich herself, she registered
Global Business Concepts, LLC (operating as U.S. Treasures). She subsequently opened
a bank account in the name of that business, in which she deposited fraudulently obtained
checks.
Thomas instructed some of her clients who owed money to the IRS to write checks payable
to “U.S. Treasury.” She then had the checks stamped or altered, making it difficult to see
the last letters of the payee. Thomas instructed other clients, whose primary language was
not English, to make checks payable to “U.S. Treasures” or “U.S. Treasure.” Thomas did
13 The facts in the summarized case narratives come from court documents of the jurisdictions named.
30 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
not give those client checks to the IRS, but instead deposited them into her U.S. Treasures
account through automated teller machines in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Images of the
deposited checks were then transmitted via wire communication to servers located in
Richardson, Texas, allowing them to be credited to Thomas’s own business bank account.
The fraudulent proceeds obtained by Thomas totaled more than $654,779.
Thomas was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised
release. Thomas was further ordered to pay more than $5.1 million in restitution and a
special assessment fee of $300.
Business Owner Sentenced for Aiding and Assisting in the Preparation of Materially
False Income Tax Returns and Obstructing the Due Administration of the IRS
On February 14, 2020, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Myles Hannigan was
sentenced for obstructing the due administration of the IRS and aiding and assisting in the
preparation of materially false income tax returns. Hannigan was charged for the offenses
in July 2019.
According to the court documents, Hannigan owned and operated Payroll Professionals,
Incorporated (PPI), located in Media, Pennsylvania. PPI is a third-party payroll processor
that assists its clients by handling certain payroll services, including issuing payroll checks
for its taxpayers/clients and forwarding tax payments to the Federal, State, and local
authorities.
On over 100 of the Forms 941, Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return, that Hannigan
prepared and filed for taxpayers/clients for TYs 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, he
followed a practice of falsely overstating deposits that he made to pay taxes owed by his
taxpayers/clients to the IRS. Specifically, on Form 941, Line 11, Hannigan reported
depositing more money to pay tax debt than he actually sent to the IRS, causing victims
collectively to underpay the IRS approximately $3,270,566.89 for those tax
years. Additionally, Hannigan concealed from his taxpayers/clients that their taxes had not
been paid by preparing and presenting bogus documents to some PPI clients to falsely
report that their taxes were paid to the IRS. Hannigan impeded the efforts of the IRS to
contact his taxpayers/clients about tax delinquencies by re-routing IRS notices from his
clients’ business address to PPI’s business address.
Hannigan was sentenced to 52 months’ imprisonment followed by one year of supervised
release. He was further ordered to pay $3,270,566.89 in restitution and a special
assessment of $1,800.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 31
Advancing Oversight of
America’s Tax System
T
IGTA’s Office of Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) identifies opportunities for
improvement in IRS and TIGTA programs by performing inspections and evaluations that
report timely, useful, and reliable information to decisionmakers and stakeholders.
This function has two primary product lines: inspections and evaluations.
Inspections are intended to:
• Provide factual and analytical information;
• Monitor compliance;
• Measure performance;
• Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of programs and operations;
• Share best practices; and
• Inquire into allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.
Evaluations are intended to:
• Provide in-depth reviews of specific management issues, policies, or programs;
• Address Governmentwide or multi-agency issues; and
• Develop recommendations to streamline operations, enhance data quality, and
minimize inefficient and ineffective procedures.
The following report highlights one of I&E’s most significant activities during this six-month
reporting period:
The IRS Has Effectively Expanded Options for Taxpayers to Pay With Cash, but
Participation Remains Low
The IRS looks for new ways to partner with external stakeholders and deliver services that
are both convenient for taxpayers and cost-effective for the agency. In March 2016, the
IRS introduced a new payment option that allows taxpayers to pay taxes with cash at non-
IRS facilities. Through an external partnership established by the IRS, individual and
business taxpayers can make a payment at more than 9,200 retail stores in 44 States.
There is no cost to the IRS to provide this option, but taxpayers are charged a fee of $3.99
per payment.
TIGTA employees made cash payments at participating retailers and found that for the
locations visited, the payment option was user-friendly and efficient. The online application
is straightforward and requires information readily available to the taxpayer, such as an
address and date of birth. TIGTA simulated the taxpayer experience by making
19 payments at 18 locations among three participating retailers. Correspondence needed
to make each payment was provided to the taxpayer in a timely manner, and all payments
posted to online tax accounts timely.
32 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
However, very few tax payments have been made with cash at participating retail stores.
For example, less than 700 payments were made annually in the three years after the
service was implemented.
Although the number of taxpayers that would prefer to use this service is unknown, TIGTA
found a number of reasons that could contribute to the low participation. First, the payment
process requires taxpayers to scan a barcode at a participating retail store within seven
calendar days of issuance. If not scanned within these seven days, the barcode expires
and a new barcode needs to be issued before a payment can be made. In CY 2018, more
than 80 percent of the barcodes issued by the IRS expired. Second, the IRS does not
routinely advertise or promote this payment option. Therefore, many taxpayers are likely
unaware that this option exists. Lastly, while the external partnership increased the number
of locations where taxpayers can pay with cash, geographic coverage could be improved.
For example, Mississippi has the highest percentage of unbanked households, but has no
participating retailer that accepts cash for tax payments.
TIGTA recommended that the IRS consider:
• Extending or eliminating the barcode expiration time frame to reduce taxpayer
burden;
• Conducting public outreach to increase taxpayer awareness of the payment option
and update internal guidance; and
• Working with the external partners to add retailers in underserved areas.
IRS management agreed with two of these recommendations and disagreed with the third,
stating there is not enough evidence to suggest that taxpayers are harmed under the
current barcode expiration policy.
Reference No. 2019-IE-R003
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 33
Audit Statistical Reports
Reports With Questioned Costs
TIGTA issued no audit reports with questioned costs during this semiannual reporting period.
The phrase “questioned costs” means costs that are questioned because of:
• An alleged violation of a provision of a law, regulation, contract, or other requirement
governing the expenditure of funds;
• A finding, at the time of the audit, that such cost is not supported by adequate
documentation (an unsupported cost); or
• A finding that expenditure of funds for the intended purpose is unnecessary or
unreasonable.
The phrase “disallowed cost” means a questioned cost that management, in a management
decision, has sustained or agreed should not be charged to the Government.
34 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Reports With Recommendations That
Funds Be Put to Better Use
TIGTA issued three audit reports during this semiannual reporting period with the
recommendation that funds be put to better use. 14 The phrase “recommendation that funds
be put to better use” means funds could be used more efficiently if management took
actions to implement and complete the recommendation, including:
• Reductions in outlays;
• Deobligations of funds from programs or operations;
• Costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to
operations;
• Avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in pre-award reviews of contract
agreements;
• Prevention of erroneous payment of refundable credits, e.g., Earned Income Tax
Credit; or
• Any other savings that are specifically identified.
The phrase “management decision” means the evaluation by management of the findings
and recommendations included in an audit report, and the issuance of a final decision
concerning its response to such findings and recommendations, including actions deemed
necessary.
Reports With Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use
Amount
Report Category Number
(in thousands)
1. Reports with no management decision at the beginning of the
reporting period 0 $0
2. Reports issued during the reporting period 3 $372,966
3. Subtotals (Item 1 plus Item 2) 3 $372,966
4. Reports for which a management decision was made during the
reporting period
a. Value of recommendations to which management agreed
i. Based on proposed management action 3 $372,966
ii. Based on proposed legislative action 0 $0
b. Value of recommendations to which management did not agree 0 $0
5. Reports with no management decision at the end of the
reporting period (Item 3 minus Item 4) 0 $0
6. Reports with no management decision within six months of
issuance 0 $0
14 See Appendix II for identification of audit reports involved.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 35
Reports With Additional Quantifiable
Impact on Tax Administration
In addition to questioned costs and funds put to better use, the Office of Audit has identified
measures that demonstrate the value of audit recommendations to tax administration and
business operations. These issues are of interest to executives at the IRS and the
Department of the Treasury, Members of Congress, and the taxpaying public, and are
expressed in quantifiable terms to provide further insight into the value and potential impact
of the Office of Audit’s products and services. Including this information also promotes
adherence to the intent and spirit of the Government Performance and Results Act.
Definitions of these additional measures are:
Increased Revenue: Assessment or collection of additional taxes.
Revenue Protection: Ensuring the accuracy of the total tax, penalties, and interest paid to
the Federal Government.
Reduction of Burden on Taxpayers: Decreases by individuals or businesses in the need
for, frequency of, or time spent on communication, record keeping, preparation, or costs to
comply with tax laws, regulations, and IRS policies and procedures.
Taxpayer Rights and Entitlements at Risk: The protection of due process (rights) granted
to taxpayers by law, regulation, or IRS policies and procedures. These rights most
commonly arise when filing tax returns, paying delinquent taxes, and examining the
accuracy of tax liabilities. The acceptance of claims for and issuance of refunds
(entitlements) are also included in this category, such as when taxpayers legitimately assert
that they overpaid their taxes.
Taxpayer Privacy and Security: Protection of taxpayer financial and account information
(privacy). Processes and programs that provide protection of tax administration, account
information, and organizational assets (security).
Inefficient Use of Resources: Value of efficiencies gained from recommendations to
reduce cost while maintaining or improving the effectiveness of specific programs;
resources saved would be available for other IRS programs. Also, the value of internal
control weaknesses that resulted in an unrecoverable expenditure of funds with no tangible
or useful benefit in return.
Reliability of Management Information: Ensuring the accuracy, validity, relevance, and
integrity of data, including the sources of data and the applications and processing
thereof, used by the organization to plan, monitor, and report on its financial and
operational activities. This measure will often be expressed as an absolute value, i.e.,
without regard to whether a number is positive or negative, of overstatements or
understatements of amounts recorded on the organization’s documents or systems.
36 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Protection of Resources: Safeguarding human and capital assets, used by or in the
custody of the organization, from accidental or malicious injury, theft, destruction, loss,
misuse, overpayment, or degradation.
The number of taxpayer accounts and dollar values shown in the following chart
were derived from analyses of historical data, and are thus considered potential
barometers of the impact of audit recommendations. Actual results will vary
depending on the timing and extent of management’s implementation of the
corresponding corrective actions, and the number of accounts or subsequent
business activities affected as of the dates of implementation. Also, a report may
have issues that affect more than one outcome measure category.
Reports With Additional Quantifiable Impact on Tax Administration
Number of
Number of Dollar Value
Outcome Measure Category Taxpayer
Reports 15 (in thousands)
Accounts
Increased Revenue 3 552,909 $840,087
Revenue Protection 3 15,926 $824,841
Reduction of Burden on Taxpayers 2 6,792 $475,132
Taxpayer Rights and Entitlements
at Risk 3 14,804,837 $214,273
Taxpayer Privacy and Security 1 0 $0
Inefficient Use of Resources 1 0 $1,096
Reliability of Management
Information 3 2,644 $0
Protection of Resources 1 0 $0
Management did not agree with the outcome measures in the following reports:
• Increased Revenue: Reference Numbers 2020-44-007 and 2020-30-017;
• Revenue Protection: Reference Number 2020-40-014;
• Taxpayer Burden: Reference Number 2020-30-017; and
• Taxpayer Rights and Entitlements: Reference Number 2020-40-014.
The following reports contained quantifiable impacts other than the number of taxpayer
accounts and dollar value:
• Protection of Resources: Reference Number 2020-20-006;
• Taxpayer Privacy and Security: Reference Number 2020-20-012; and
• Reliability of Information: Reference Numbers 2020-10-003 and 2020-10-016.
15 See Appendix II for identification of audit reports involved.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 37
Investigations Statistical Reports 16
Significant Investigative Achievements
(October 1, 2019— March 31, 2020)
Complaints/Allegations Received by TIGTA
Complaints Against IRS Employees 1,994
Complaints Against Non-Employees 1,447
Total Complaints/Allegations 3,441
Status of Complaints/Allegations Received by TIGTA
Investigations Initiated 891
In Process Within TIGTA 17 288
Referred to IRS for Action 562
Referred to IRS for Information Only 995
Referred to a Non-IRS Entity 18 0
Closed With No Referral 346
Closed Associated With Prior Investigation 127
Closed With All Actions Completed 232
Total Complaints 3,441
Investigations Opened and Closed
Total Investigations Opened 1,283
Total Investigations Closed 1,257
Financial Accomplishments
Embezzlement/Theft Funds Recovered $775,347
Contract Fraud and Overpayments Recovered 0
Court Ordered Fines, Penalties, and Restitution $22,963,137
Out-of-Court Settlements 0
Potentially Compromised by Bribery 0
Tax Liability of Taxpayers Who Threaten and/or Assault IRS Employees $1,317,847
IRS Assets and Resources Protected Against Malicious Loss $9,686
Total Financial Accomplishments $25,066,017
16 Includes the reporting requirements under the Inspector General Empowerment Act (IGEA) of 2016,
Pub. L. No. 114-317, 130 Stat. 1595.
17 Complaints for which final determination had not been made at the end of the reporting period.
18 A non-IRS entity includes other law enforcement entities or Federal agencies.
38 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Status of Closed Criminal Investigations
Criminal Referral Employee Non-Employee Total
Referred – Accepted for Prosecution 9 73 82
Referred – Declined for Prosecution 169 152 321
Referred – Pending Prosecutorial Decision 11 31 42
Total Criminal Referrals 19 189 256 445
No Referral 279 446 725
Criminal Dispositions 20
Criminal Disposition Employee Non-Employee Total
Guilty 12 34 46
Nolo Contendere (no contest) 0 0 0
Pretrial Diversion 1 0 1
Deferred Prosecution 21 0 0 0
Not Guilty 0 0 0
Dismissed 4 1 5
Total Criminal Dispositions 17 35 52
Administrative Dispositions on Closed Investigations 22
Administrative Disposition Total
Removed / Terminated 26
Suspended / Reduction in Grade 50
Resigned / Retired / Separated Prior to Adjudication 103
Oral or Written Reprimand / Admonishment 75
Clearance Letter / Closed, No Action Taken 77
Alternative Discipline / Letter With Cautionary Statement / Other 115
Non-Employee Actions 23 409
Total Administrative Dispositions 855
19 Criminal referrals include both Federal and State dispositions.
20 Final criminal dispositions during the reporting period. These data may pertain to investigations referred
criminally in prior reporting periods and do not necessarily relate to the investigations referred criminally in the
Status of Closed Criminal Investigations table above.
21 Generally in a deferred prosecution, the defendant accepts responsibility for his/her actions and complies
with certain conditions imposed by the court. Upon the defendant’s completion of the conditions, the court
dismisses the case. If the defendant fails to fully comply, the court reinstates prosecution of the charge.
22 Final administrative dispositions during the reporting period. These data may pertain to investigations
referred administratively in prior reporting periods and do not necessarily relate to the investigations closed in
the Investigations Opened and Closed table.
23 Administrative actions taken by the IRS against non-IRS employees (e.g., contractors).
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 39
Summary of Investigative Reports and Criminal Referrals
Criminal Referral Breakdown
(October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020)
Number of Investigative Reports Issued 403
Referred to DOJ for Criminal Prosecution 390
Referred to State/Local Prosecuting Authorities 13
Number of Indictments and Criminal Informations 63
Indictments 53
Criminal Informations 10
The above statistical table was generated as a result of a query of TIGTA OI’s case
tracking system, Criminal Results Management System.
Interference
During the reporting period, there were no attempts by the IRS to interfere with the
independence of TIGTA. Additionally, the IRS did not resist, object to oversight activities,
or significantly delay access to information.
Instances of Whistleblower Retaliation
During the reporting period, there were two investigations regarding whistleblower
retaliation, which were unfounded.
Closed 24 Investigations Involving IRS Senior Government Employees 25
If Declined,
Detailed Description of the Facts and Circumstances of the Criminal Date
Disposition: Date of
Investigation: Status: Referred:
Declination:
A senior Government employee was reported to have been arrested Closed without Action No referral
N/A N/A
for assault. Letter made
Closed without Action
A senior Government employee was reported to have been arrested No referral
Letter with Cautionary N/A N/A
for driving while intoxicated. made
Statement
A senior Government employee was alleged to have retaliated No referral
Clearance Letter N/A N/A
against a whistleblower for reporting employee misconduct. made
A senior Government employee was alleged to have been involved Separated During
Declined 07/10/19 01/17/20
in credit card fraud. Investigation
A senior Government employee was alleged to have created a Closed without Action No referral
N/A N/A
hostile work environment. Letter made
A senior Government employee was alleged to have been negligent
No referral
in safeguarding the employee’s Government laptop and PII from Oral/Written Counseling N/A N/A
made
theft.
24 When TIGTA refers an IRS employee investigation to the IRS, the investigation remains open until all
actions are completed, including any penalty imposed upon the employee by the IRS. TIGTA closes an
employee investigation after receiving notice from the IRS of the administrative action taken in response to
that investigation.
25 For this report, a “senior Government employee” refers to an officer or employee in the Executive branch
who occupies a position classified at or above GS–15 of the General Schedule. 5 U.S.C. app § 5(f)(7).
40 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
If Declined,
Detailed Description of the Facts and Circumstances of the Criminal Date
Disposition: Date of
Investigation: Status: Referred:
Declination:
A senior Government employee was alleged to have misused the
Closed without Action
employee’s position to intimidate contractors and influence the N/A N/A N/A
Letter
performance of a contract.
A senior Government employee was alleged to have made
Other N/A N/A N/A
threatening statements to a subordinate employee.
A senior Government employee was alleged to have solicited a Separated During
N/A N/A N/A
prostitute while on official travel. Investigation
A senior Government employee was alleged to have retaliated
Clearance Letter N/A N/A N/A
against a whistleblower.
A senior Government employee was alleged to have made an
Admonished/Reprimand N/A N/A N/A
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive financial information.
A senior Government employee was alleged to have hired an
Clearance Letter N/A N/A N/A
individual with whom the employee had a personal relationship.
A senior Government employee was alleged to have fraudulently
Oral/Written Counseling Declined 06/13/19 06/13/19
received public transportation subsidy benefits.
Closed without Action
A senior Government employee was alleged to have sexually
Letter with Cautionary N/A N/A N/A
harassed the employee’s subordinates.
Statement
A senior Government employee was alleged to have suspended an
employee in retaliation for the employee’s reporting misconduct of Clearance Letter N/A N/A N/A
another employee.
A senior Government employee was reported for associations with
Other N/A N/A N/A
disreputable persons.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 41
Inspections and Evaluations Statistical
Reports
Reports With Significant Unimplemented Corrective Actions26
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires identification of significant
recommendations described in previous semiannual reports for which corrective actions have
not been completed. The following list is based on information from Department of the
Treasury’s Joint Audit Management Enterprise System (JAMES).
Projected
Reference Issued Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Completion
Number (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
Date
2018-IE-R002 February Additional Actions Are Needed to Make the Worker Misclassification Initiative With the
2018 Department of Labor a Success
09/15/20 F-1, R-1: The Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, should evaluate
whether provisions of the MOU require amendment, revision, or termination and ensure that
the duties and responsibilities of the IRS, as outlined in the MOU, are executed as required.
2018-IE-R005 August Controls Over Pocket Commissions Must Be Improved
2018
05/15/20 F-1, R-3: Subsequent to the establishment of a complete and accurate record of non-
enforcement commissions in Personal Identity Verification Data Synchronization (PDS), the
Chief, Facilities Management and Security Services, should reinstate the requirement for an
annual reconciliation to account for issued commissions to ensure that PDS records remain
complete and accurate.
2019-IE-R002 November Although Virtual Face-to-Face Service Shows Promise, Few Taxpayers Use It
2018
06/15/20 F-1, R-1: The Commissioner, Wage and Investment (W&I) Division, and the National
Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) should formally develop and document a vision and specific goals
for their Virtual Service Delivery (VSD) programs and develop performance measures to
monitor and evaluate the performance of the individual programs.
2019-IE-R002 November Although Virtual Face-to-Face Service Shows Promise, Few Taxpayers Use It
2018
06/15/20 F-2, R-2: The Commissioner, W&I Division, and the NTA should both conduct public
awareness activities to increase taxpayers' knowledge of the VSD program.
26 The Office of Inspections and Evaluations has previously designated one report with unimplemented
recommendations as “Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU).” The SBU report concerns the physical security of
IRS facilities or subject matter that might create a risk of circumvention of the law if publicly released. There
are no potential cost savings associated with any unimplemented recommendations from the report.
42 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Appendix I
Statistical Reports – Other
Reports With Significant
Unimplemented Corrective Actions
The Inspector General Act, as amended, requires the identification of any outstanding
unimplemented recommendations, including the aggregate potential cost savings of those
recommendations described in previous semiannual reports for which corrective actions have
not been completed. The following list is based on information obtained from the Department
of the Treasury’s JAMES. 27,28
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2007-10-068 May 2007 INEFFICIENCIES IN PROCESSING OPERATIONS ASSISTANCE REQUESTS
CAUSED TAXPAYERS UNNECESSARY DELAYS
12/15/20 F-3, R-1: Revise Form 12412, Operations Assistance Request, to allow requests to
be closed as completed or as misrouted only if they had been sent to the wrong
operations liaison.
2008-20-176 September THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICS NEEDS TO
2008 ADDRESS COMPUTER SECURITY WEAKNESSES
09/30/20 F-1, R-5: Ensure that audit and accountability controls are sufficient by requiring
audit logs to be maintained a minimum of six years and to be periodically reviewed by
the security officer.
2011-20-111 September CONTINUED CENTRALIZATION OF THE WINDOWS ENVIRONMENT WOULD
2011 IMPROVE ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY EFFICIENCIES
06/15/20 F-2, R-1: Ensure that standards and processes are developed and implemented
enterprise-wide to prevent servers and workstations from being connected to the
network without the proper authorization and required compliance documentation.
06/15/20 F-2, R-2: Ensure that scanning tools, such as the Business DNA software, are
utilized to locate unauthorized servers, workstations, and domains on the IRS
network, and adequate procedures are developed and implemented to ensure they
are removed.
27
This summary data does not include reports that are specifically prohibited from disclosure by any provision
of law, such as 26 U.S.C. § 6103, protecting tax returns and return information, or that are specifically
required by Executive Order to be protected from disclosure in the interest of national defense or national
security or in the conduct of foreign affairs.
28
The Office of Audit has previously designated two reports with unimplemented recommendations as
“Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU).” These SBU reports include subject matter that might create a risk of
circumvention of the law if publicly released. There are no potential cost savings associated with any
unimplemented recommendations from these reports.
44 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2012-20-112 September AN ENTERPRISE APPROACH IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS THE SECURITY RISK
2012 OF UNPATCHED COMPUTERS
06/15/20 F-1, R-1: Ensure that the IRS completes the deployment of an automated asset
discovery tool (or tools if needed) and builds an accurate and complete inventory of
information technology assets (including hardware and software) that reside on the
IRS network.
2012-20-122 September CUSTOMER ACCOUNT DATA ENGINE 2 (CADE 2): SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
2012 AND TESTING PROCESSES NEED IMPROVEMENTS
04/15/21 F-3, R-2: Ensure all database issues identified are resolved or an action plan is
developed with specific corrective actions and time periods.
2014-40-084 September A SERVICE-WIDE STRATEGY IS NEEDED TO INCREASE BUSINESS TAX
2014 RETURN ELECTRONIC FILING
12/15/20 F-2, R-1: Develop a less burdensome electronic signature process for businesses e-filing
employment tax returns using the Modernized e-File system.
2014-23-072 September AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN
2014 SECURITY AND TESTING CONTROLS FOR THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
INFORMATION RETURNS PROJECT
04/15/21 F-1, R-1: Ensure that processes and procedures are developed to provide direction
on how to review and mitigate weaknesses.
2016-40-028 March 2016 REVISING TAX DEBT IDENTIFICATION PROGRAMMING AND CORRECTING
PROCEDURAL ERRORS COULD IMPROVE THE TAX REFUND OFFSET
PROGRAM
On Hold29 F-1, R-1: Revise identification processes to include sole proprietor information from
Form SS-4, Application for Employer Identification Number, to identify individual tax
refunds to offset to business tax debt.
On Hold F-2, R-4: Revise computer programming to ensure that credit elects are offset to any
associated tax debt on the Non-Master File.
3/15/23 F-3, R-1: Revise computer programming to use the Limited Liability Companies
(LLC) indicator on the business tax account to ensure that individual tax refunds are
not offset to the associated LLC's business tax debt.
2017-30-010 October EMPLOYEES SOMETIMES DID NOT ADHERE TO E-MAIL POLICIES WHICH
2016 INCREASED THE RISK OF IMPROPER DISCLOSURE OF TAXPAYER
INFORMATION
10/15/20 F-3, R-1: Update the Enterprise Electronic Fax (EEFax) system to allow encrypted
messages to be sent to the EEFax system server.
2017-40-037 May 2017 IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT TAX ACCOUNTS ON THE
AUTOMATED NON-MASTER FILE ARE ACCURATELY PROCESSED
On Hold F-1, R-1: Correct Automated Non-Master File (ANMF) programming to compute and
assess the Failure to File penalty on Form 1040NR, U.S. Nonresident Alien Income
Tax Return, accounts in which the Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) is an
Employer Identification Number (EIN).
On Hold F-1, R-2: Correct ANMF programming to use the correct date when computing the
Failure to File penalty. In addition, programming should be corrected to ensure that
the proper penalty rate is used to compute the penalty amount.
Potential Increased Revenue: $354,153
29
Except for one report, recommendations designated as “On Hold” were agreed to by the IRS, but action
was deferred pending the availability of funds. The recommendation for report 2017-40-085 was agreed to by
the IRS, but was placed “On Hold” because the IRS is awaiting input from another agency.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 45
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2017-20-024 June 2017 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN
ENTERPRISE-WIDE DISASTER RECOVERY PLANNING AND TESTING
07/15/20 F-2, R-1: Reach consensus regarding the maximum tolerable downtime or recovery
time objective for each mission essential function.
2017-40-038 July 2017 CASE SELECTION PROCESSES RESULT IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN
POTENTIAL EMPLOYER UNDERREPORTED TAX NOT BEING ADDRESSED
On Hold F-3, R-1: Establish a systemic process to match data fields to perfect unpostable
Forms W-3, Transmittal of Wage and Tax Statements.
2017-30-048 August ADDITIONAL CONTROLS ARE NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE THAT
2017 NONRESIDENT ALIEN INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY OWNERS COMPLY WITH TAX
LAWS
On Hold F-1, R-1: Request that a revision be made to Form 1040NR to enable nonresident
aliens to make an election under I.R.C. § 871(d) and revise processing procedures to
ensure that the IRS records the election.
2017-40-085 September FURTHER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF EMPLOYMENT
2017 TAX FRAUD TO BUSINESSES THAT USE THE SERVICES OF PROFESSIONAL
EMPLOYER ORGANIZATIONS
On Hold F-3, R-1: Establish processes and procedures to reduce unnecessary resources
expended notifying employers of an address change when programming incorrectly
identifies an address change resulting from minor formatting revisions.
2017-20-062 September THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL
2017 REQUIREMENTS FOR SOFTWARE ASSET MANAGEMENT
09/15/20 F-1, R-1: Establish executive governance for Software Asset Management within the
IRS which acts as a centralized group to ensure that effective and knowledgeable
decisions are being made timely by authorized personnel.
2017-30-084 September IMPROVEMENT IS NEEDED IN COMPLIANCE EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY
2017 UNSUPPORTED CLAIMS FOR FOREIGN TAX CREDITS
06/15/20 F-4, R-1: Evaluate the Functional Specification Packages to identify programming
changes needed to calculate the amount of the Foreign Tax Credit limitation and
account for mixed-component returns.
2018-40-010 January PROCESSES NEED TO BE IMPROVED TO IDENTIFY INCOMPLETE AND
2018 FRAUDULENT APPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION
NUMBERS
On Hold F-3, R-1: Modify the Real-Time System (RTS) consistency and validity checks to
identify all duplicate uses of supporting documents.
On Hold F-3, R-2: Ensure that programming changes are made to require mandatory review
when the RTS alerts tax examiners that an applicant is using duplicate supporting
documents as has previously been used to obtain an Individual Taxpayer
Identification Number (ITIN).
05/15/20 F-3, R-5: Review the 44,532 ITINs TIGTA identified and the 10,924 ITINs TIGTA
identified that were issued to individuals who used duplicate supporting documents to
determine the validity of the ITINs and take the actions necessary to revoke those
ITINs that are determined to be invalid.
05/15/20 F-4, R-1: Review the 8,110 ITINs identified with a revoked status in the RTS but still
valid on the Individual Master File and take necessary action to change the ITINs to
invalid.
46 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2018-40-013 February ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF FRAUDULENT USE OF
2018 EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS AND TO IMPROVE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE APPLICATION PROCESS
On Hold F-3, R-1: Perform an assessment to determine how an additional field could be
added to the Business Master File so that both the decedent SSN and a responsible
party TIN can be captured for estates and trusts.
On Hold F-3, R-2: Revise internal procedures, application instructions, etc., to require that
estate and trust applicants applying on paper provide a responsible party.
On Hold F-3, R-5: Develop programming to reject estate applications if the decedent TIN is
not that of a deceased individual.
2018-40-031 April 2018 PROACTIVE PROCESSES TO IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE POTENTIAL MISUSE
OF ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS ARE NEEDED
On Hold F-1, R-1: Ensure that expanded authentication requirements are implemented
without further delays to reduce the risk of misuse of the system.
2018-20-029 May 2018 SECURITY OVER HIGH VALUE ASSETS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED
10/15/21 F-1, R-1: Implement the Office of Management and Budget Cybersecurity Strategy
and Implementation Plan actions to identify and document current system hardware
components for all IRS High Value Assets.
2018-40-035 May 2018 PROGRAMMING ERRORS AND DEFICIENCIES IN TAX EXAMINER SCREENING
RESULTED IN SOME HEALTH COVERAGE TAX CREDIT CLAIMS BEING
ERRONEOUSLY PROCESSED
05/15/20 F-2, R-4: Implement Error Resolution Unit screening procedures to identify
individuals who filed a Form W-2, indicating that they obtained a new job.
2018-20-034 June 2018 ACTIVE DIRECTORY OVERSIGHT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT AND CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION COMPUTER ROOMS LACK MINIMUM SECURITY CONTROLS
On Hold F-2, R-1: Complete a cost analysis to: 1) determine the efficacy of relocating
Criminal Investigation (CI) assets in each of the field offices to existing IRS computer
rooms versus upgrading the CI computer rooms to ensure that assets are protected
in accordance with Federal and Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) security
requirements, and 2) implement the most cost effective solution.
2018-30-042 July 2018 THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE LACKS A COORDINATED STRATEGY TO
ADDRESS UNREGULATED RETURN PREPARER MISCONDUCT
10/15/20 F-1, R-1: Develop a preparer misconduct strategy that encourages programs with the
authority to address preparer misconduct to coordinate with one another to establish
program goals and track progress towards those goals.
09/15/20 F-1, R-2: Establish goals that support the Service-wide Return Preparer Strategy
being developed by the Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement and
monitor progress towards those goals.
2018-40-062 August IMPROVED PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED TO PREVENT THE FRAUDULENT USE
2018 OF THIRD-PARTY AUTHORIZATION FORMS TO OBTAIN TAXPAYER
INFORMATION
06/15/20 F-4, R-2: Correspond with representatives and designees assigned multiple
Centralized Authorization File (CAF) numbers to inform them that they are permitted
to have one CAF number per location. The correspondence should request a
response from each representative and designee specifying the CAF number that the
IRS should retain. Excess numbers should then be removed from the CAF.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 47
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2018-20-063 September IMPROVED CONTROLS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT CORRECTIVE
2018 ACTIONS FOR REPORTED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY WEAKNESSES ARE
DOCUMENTED AND FULLY IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO CLOSURE
07/15/20 F-1, R-1: Ensure that complete descriptions of the specific actions taken to close
proposed corrective actions are documented in Form 13872, Planned Corrective
Action Status Update.
07/15/20 F-1, R-2: Ensure that sufficient supporting documentation is uploaded to the JAMES
to support proposed corrective action closure.
07/15/20 F-1, R-3: Ensure that the IRM and instructions for Form 13872 are updated so that
both the manager responsible for implementing the proposed corrective action and
the executive responsible for the proposed corrective action are required to approve
Form 13872 supporting the proposed corrective action’s closure.
2018-20-066 September CONTROLS CONTINUE TO NEED IMPROVEMENT TO ENSURE THAT ALL
2018 PLANNED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SECURITY WEAKNESSES ARE FULLY
IMPLEMENTED AND SUPPORTED
07/15/20 F-1, R-3: Update the IRM to broaden the Audit Coordination and Outreach,
Assessment and Reporting offices auditing to include reviewing management's
corrective actions to ensure that the proposed corrective actions are fully and
appropriately implemented.
07/15/20 F-2, R-3: Update the retention period in the IRM for maintaining documentation with
the JAMES Audit Coordinators to align with the Department of the Treasury's
retention period for maintaining supporting documentation in the JAMES.
2018-30-072 September IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN THE WITHHOLDING COMPLIANCE
2018 PROGRAM
08/15/20 F-2, R-2: Work with Federal Government agencies that are not complying with the
lock-in letters to advise them of the requirement to change withholding based on the
letters they receive.
Potential Increased Revenue: $1,154,182,935
On Hold F-3, R-2: Analyze the current selection criteria used by the Withholding Compliance
System to determine if the taxpayers identified for systemic lock-in letter issuance are
the best use of limited resources. This would include potentially identifying taxpayers
with multiple years of under withholding and the percentage of inventory that includes
nonfilers.
2018-30-074 September FORMS, INSTRUCTIONS, PUBLICATIONS, AND PROCEDURES NEED TO BE
2018 IMPROVED FOR SOME NONRESIDENT ALIENS ELIGIBLE FOR
TREATY- BASED INCOME EXEMPTIONS
09/15/20 F-1, R-1: Consider updating the appropriate forms, instructions, and publications to
clarify how nonresident aliens who do not file a Form 8233, Exemption From
Withholding on Compensation for Independence (and Certain Dependent) Personal
Services of a Nonresident Alien, with their employer are still able to claim the treaty
exemption.
2018-30-077 September IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SS-8 PROGRAM ARE NEEDED TO HELP WORKERS
2018 AND IMPROVE EMPLOYMENT TAX COMPLIANCE
06/15/20 F-1, R-1: Create guidance and training for the responsible functions to ensure the
accurate processing and determinations of worker classification requests, including
gig economy worker classification requests.
06/15/20 F-3, R-1: Evaluate the process used in making worker classification determinations
and opinions in the SS-8 Program and make necessary changes to improve
processing.
2019-10-002 October TAXPAYERS GENERALLY COMPLY WITH ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
2018 FOR 401(K) PLANS; HOWEVER, ADDITIONAL EFFORTS COULD FURTHER
IMPROVE COMPLIANCE
10/15/20 F-1, R-2: Take actions to bring taxpayers who contribute more than the annual limit
to multiple 401(k) plans into compliance with the law.
Potential Increased Revenue: $203,627,585
48 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2019-10-009 October THE TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE CENTRALIZED CASE INTAKE
2018 PROGRAM NEEDS IMPROVEMENT TO PROVIDE BETTER CUSTOMER
SERVICE
06/15/20 F-1, R-1: Develop and implement a staffing plan that will reduce the call wait times
that taxpayers experience during peak call volume periods.
06/15/20 F-1, R-2: Develop and implement a process to prevent callers from being
disconnected from the Centralized Case Intake (CCI) program at the end of the day.
07/15/20 F-1, R-4: Update IRM 13.3 and provide up-to-date guidance to W&I Division contact
representatives who staff the National Taxpayer Advocate toll-free line pertaining to
current procedures for the CCI program.
07/15/20 F-1, R-6: Develop and measure progress toward specific and quantifiable program
goals for the CCI program that measure benefits to taxpayers, the TAS, and the IRS,
such as increased customer satisfaction, reduced direct case time or other measures
of program impact.
2019-20-008 December THE SOLARIS TO LINUX MIGRATION PROJECT WAS DELAYED AND NEEDS
2018 IMPROVED GOVERNANCE
03/15/21 F-1, R-2: Ensure that procurement of hardware, service, and support includes a well-
developed plan, process for utilization, and reasonable timelines.
2019-40-013 December RESULTS OF THE 2018 FILING SEASON
2018
On Hold F-3, R-1: Expand the Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN) opt-
in program to allow ITIN holders who are not automatically issued an IP PIN the
option to obtain an IP PIN. The IRS should notify these individuals of the option to
obtain an IP PIN and provide instructions on how to do so.
2019-40-014 December PROCESSES ARE NEEDED TO IDENTIFY SMALL BUSINESSES
2018 ERRONEOUSLY CLAIMING THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT PAYROLL TAX
OFFSET
11/15/20 F-1, R-1: Review the 81 businesses that TIGTA identified that did not meet the
eligibility requirements for claiming the Research Credit and recover any erroneously
claimed Research Credits.
11/15/20 F-1, R-2: Review the businesses that TIGTA identified and recover any erroneously
claimed Research Credits.
2019-30-016 February EXPANSION OF THE GIG ECONOMY WARRANTS FOCUS ON IMPROVING
2019 SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX COMPLIANCE
04/15/20 F-1, R-1: Develop a strategic plan to address tax administration for the gig economy,
including the assessment and collection of self-employment tax, and consider
developing initiatives such as pilots or soft notice programs geared towards gig
economy workers with repeated noncompliance.
05/15/20 F-2, R-3: Consider programming changes in the Automated Underreporter system to
automatically populate the self-employment tax window (including situations in which
taxpayers have negative numbers on their return) for electronically filed returns as
well as add additional prompts and reminders concerning Form 1040 line 21 and the
need to fill out the income identity code.
2019-40-026 March 2019 MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN POTENTIALLY ERRONEOUS EXCESS SOCIAL
SECURITY TAX CREDIT CLAIMS ARE NOT ADDRESSED
8/15/20 F-1, R-1: Develop processes and procedures to ensure that tax examiners
accurately review Excess Social Security Tax Credit claims.
Potential Funds Put to Better Use: $68,006,288
10/15/20 F-3, R-1: Establish a process to send and measure the success associated with soft
notices that alert individuals to potential errors on their tax return related to Excess
Social Security Tax Credit claims.
Potential Increased Revenue: $28,327,843
10/15/20 F-3, R-2: Evaluate current resources expended on the issuance of soft notices to
ensure that notices are sent to those taxpayers with the highest tax assessment
potential to maximize the use of limited resources.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 49
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2019-20-017 April 2019 ELECTRONIC AUTHENTICATION SECURITY CONTROLS HAVE IMPROVED,
BUT CONTINUED PROGRESS IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF
PUBLIC-FACING APPLICATIONS
02/15/23 F-1, R-1: Ensure that public-facing legacy applications are complying with NIST SP
800-63-3 and that an implementation plan includes specific timelines for
accomplishing full compliance of legacy applications.
2019-44-027 April 2019 TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT: ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS
On Hold F-1, R-1: Revise the TY 2019 Form 1040, Schedule 1, to add the date of divorce or
separation agreements and create controls to prevent taxpayers from claiming the
alimony deduction that originated after January 1, 2019.
2019-34-033 May 2019 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT DEEMED
REPATRIATION TAX PRESENTED SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES
On Hold F-2, R-1: Take steps to ensure that I.R.C. § 965 payments are recorded with the
correct designated payment code.
2019-30-036 May 2019 FEW ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTIES ARE PROPOSED IN LARGE
BUSINESS EXAMINATIONS, AND THEY ARE GENERALLY NOT SUSTAINED ON
APPEAL
05/15/20 F-2, R-2: Revise IRM 4.46 guidelines to: 1) clearly indicate which examiners are
ultimately responsible for penalty development and documentation, and 2) provide
more specificity on the requirements of supervisory involvement in penalty
development when proposing and not proposing penalties.
05/15/20 F-2, R-3: Ensure that quality review systems are adequate and can accurately
determine whether examiners are properly considering civil penalties, adequately
supporting penalty decisions, consistently involving management, and obtaining
required approvals.
06/15/20 F-3, R-1: Evaluate the procedure for closing, shipping, and storing paper
examination case files and take corrective action to improve the process.
2019-40-039 May 2019 SOME REFUNDABLE CREDITS ARE STILL NOT CLASSIFIED AND REPORTED
CORRECTLY AS A HIGH RISK FOR IMPROPER PAYMENTS BY THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE
09/15/20 F-1, R-1: Implement a process to systemically identify and evaluate tax returns filed
by individuals who have nonwork SSNs to prevent erroneous refunds of Earned
Income Tax Credits and Additional Child Tax Credits.
2019-20-031 June 2019 SOFTWARE VERSION CONTROL MANAGEMENT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
05/15/20 F-1, R-1: Create an enterprise-wide, integrated structure to centralize commercial
off-the-shelf software version tracking, currency, and management to include
documenting roles and responsibilities.
07/15/20 F-1, R-2: Update policies and procedure to manage mainframe, server, and
workstation software assets using industry best practices, including identifying,
prioritizing, and removing outdated software when newer versions are installed.
10/15/20 F-1, R-3: Create and execute a plan to periodically monitor and compare software
running on the enterprise against the Enterprise Architecture Enterprise Standards
Profile (ESP) Product Catalog for accuracy.
10/15/20 F-1, R-4: Remove unauthorized software or update the ESP Product Catalog to
reflect the correct information, if warranted.
10/15/20 F-1, R-5: Document and approve risk acceptance to continue using older versions of
software (i.e., sunset, archived/retired).
50 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2019-40-042 July 2019 ACTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN TAKEN TO IMPROVE AMENDED TAX RETURN
REVIEW PROCEDURES TO REDUCE ERRONEOUS AND FRAUDULENT
REFUNDS
10/15/20 F-1, R-2: Implement adequate processes and procedures to identify and correct
employee errors to reduce erroneous refunds issued.
On Hold F-1, R-3: Complete a business case and request funding for expansion of e-filing to
amended returns in the 2020 Filing Season in an effort to reduce unnecessary
processing costs and erroneous refunds resulting from amended returns.
Potential Funds Put to Better Use: $79,413,315
10/15/20 F-2, R-1: Update tax examiner and Customer Service Representative review
guidelines to incorporate additional verification steps to be taken similar to those
systemically performed when verifying a refundable claim on an original tax return.
10/15/20 F-3, R-1: Modify the Form 1040X. Once modified, update processing procedures to
verify accuracy, and if accurate continue processing the amended return.
On Hold F-3, R-3: Establish processes to evaluate amended tax returns.
2019-40-043 July 2019 UNMET NEEDS FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT RESULT IN
INEFFICIENCIES AND HIGHER TAX ADMINISTRATION COSTS
08/15/20 F-1, R-2: Revise the information technology service request process to require the
Business Operating Divisions to submit key requests via the Work Request
Management System. Develop procedures to notate and retain the reason the
requests were denied during precoordination.
08/15/20 F-2, R-4: Establish a process to track estimated and actual resources needed to
complete each work request by system or application.
2019-40-044 August BILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF POTENTIALLY ERRONEOUS CARRYFORWARD
2019 CLAIMS ARE STILL NOT BEING ADDRESSED
10/15/21 F-1, R-1: Ensure that criteria is added to the Research Credit selection risk tool to
identify high-risk carryforward Research Credit discrepancy claims on returns
selected for examination and determine if the carryforward claims taken by the
taxpayers are accurate.
12/15/21 F-1, R-2: Identify and examine returns with discrepancies of General Business Credit
carryforward claims.
05/15/20 F-2, R-1: Develop a strategy to evaluate possible revisions to tax forms to capture
carryforward claim information similar to what is currently required for the corporate
Foreign Tax Credit.
2019-30-047 August CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SHOULD INCREASE ITS ROLE IN ENFORCEMENT
2019 EFFORTS AGAINST IDENTITY THEFT
10/15/20 F-1, R-1: Develop a process for transferring taxpayer-initiated cases to Scheme
Tracking and Referral System (STARS) for scheme development and Criminal
Investigation consideration.
05/15/20 F-2, R-2: Finalize and disseminate to employees guidance on routing identity theft
referrals to Criminal Investigation.
2019-40-048 August ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE ALIMONY REPORTING
2019 DISCREPANCIES ON INCOME TAX RETURNS
On Hold F-2, R-1: Include the validation of the alimony recipient TIN as part of the IRS’s tax
return processing systemic TIN validation process.
On Hold F-2, R-2: Modify Error Resolution System programming to send both e-filed and
paper tax returns that contain an invalid recipient TIN to the Error Resolution function
for review and correspondence with the taxpayer.
Potential Increased Revenue: $525,500
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 51
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2019-20-049 August THE FIRST PHASE OF THE DATA LOSS PREVENTION SOLUTION IS WORKING
2019 AS INTENDED, BUT THE REMAINING PHASES CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE
DELAYS
06/15/21 F-1, R-1: Deploy the Data-at-Rest and Data-in-Use components of the Data Loss
Prevention (DLP) solution.
10/15/21 F-1, R-2: Ensure that project documents are prepared and maintained as required for
effective project management, which should help ensure the successful delivery of
the final two components of the DLP solution.
2019-20-052 August INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RISKS ARE IDENTIFIED, ASSESSED, AND
2019 REPORTED, BUT MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION AND OVERSIGHT NEED
IMPROVEMENT
06/15/20 F-1, R-1: Require all Information Technology organization functions (except the
Cybersecurity function) to record information technology risks in the Item Tracking
Reporting and Control (ITRAC) system.
06/15/20 F-1, R-2: Require detailed descriptions of the risk mitigation plans, mitigation
activities, and closure rationale be captured and closure documentation be uploaded
into the ITRAC system for the Information Technology organization function and
program risks, as applicable.
06/15/20 F-1, R-3: Require periodic review of the risk descriptions and documentation
uploaded into the ITRAC system to ensure that the information is appropriate,
current, complete, and accurate.
2019-20-046 September THE BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE PROGRAM’S SECURITY CONTROLS NEED
2019 IMPROVEMENT
10/15/21 F-3, R-1: Ensure the retention of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) program
application audit logs for the appropriate period and periodic review of the application
audit logs by an independent source.
10/15/21 F-4, R-1: Update BYOD program procedures and guidelines to include: 1) providing
malware prevention training to users; 2) updating the documentation for device
operating system and technical baseline configurations; 3) maintaining and reviewing
application audit logs, specifically time frames for each; 4) clarifying the Computer
Security Incident Response Center reporting procedures for a lost or stolen device; 5)
informing the BYOD program when a device is lost or stolen so that the application
data are remotely wiped; and 6) tracking the manual and systemic application data
wipes by the BYOD program on a periodic basis.
11/15/20 F-5, R-1: Ensure that BYOD program participants complete the security risk
awareness training annually and that the authorizing official certifies employee
training compliance.
2019-20-055 September CONTROLS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED TO ENSURE TIMELY RESOLUTION
2019 OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INCIDENT TICKETS
02/15/21 F-1, R-1: Update incident management performance goals and renegotiate specific
levels of service to better reflect current resource allocations.
04/15/21 F-2, R-1: Update incident management performance metrics to better align with
overall program objectives and expanded use in daily operations.
09/15/21 F-3, R-1: Ensure that all incident assessments and actions performed are
documented in incident tickets to provide a complete historical record of all activities.
2019-30-059 September FISCAL YEAR 2019 STATUTORY REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE OF COLLECTION
2019 ACTIVITIES ON JOINT RETURNS
10/15/20 F-1, R-2: Require I.R.C. § 6103(e)(7) and (e)(8) training for all employees with
taxpayer contact regarding balance due or collection issues to remind them of the
requirements to disclose tax return and collection activity on jointly filed returns when
requested from individuals who are no longer married or no longer reside in the same
household.
52 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2019-20-060 September E-MAIL RECORDS MANAGEMENT IS GENERALLY IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
2019 MANAGING GOVERNMENT RECORDS DIRECTIVE
09/15/20 F-1, R-1: Develop clear and detailed enterprise-wide definitions for software
development and infrastructure projects.
09/15/20 F-1, R-2: Ensure that the appropriate Enterprise Life Cycle criteria and methodology
are consistently applied.
2019-20-061 September FIREWALL ADMINISTRATION NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
2019
11/15/20 F-1, R-1: Conduct annual reviews of all firewall rulesets in accordance with agency
policies and procedures.
09/15/20 F-1, R-2: Assign expiration dates not to exceed 365 days to firewall policies.
11/15/20 F-1, R-3: Conduct periodic firewall administrator account audits in accordance with
agency policies and procedures.
08/15/20 F-2, R-2: Ensure that IRS Firewall Support personnel responsible for managing the
firewall systems obtain write access to key data fields to improve the efficiency and
accuracy of firewall inventory key data fields.
2019-20-062 September SOME COMPONENTS OF THE PRIVACY PROGRAM ARE EFFECTIVE;
2019 HOWEVER, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED
07/15/21 F-2, R-1: Implement a fully integrated information security continuous monitoring
process that includes privacy risks.
08/15/20 F-4, R-1: Ensure that the Privacy, Governmental Liaison, and Disclosure (PGLD)
office coordinates with the business operating divisions to ensure that all employees
take the annual privacy awareness training as required.
11/15/20 F-4, R-2: Ensure that the PGLD office updates and maintains Privacy Impact
Assessment Management System (PIAMS) training courses to capture PIAMS
enhancements.
11/15/20 F-4, R-3: Ensure that the PGLD office makes completion of PIAMS training courses
mandatory for preparers of rejected Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessments.
2019-30-067 September THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE SHOULD REVISE THE APPROACH USED
2019 TO IDENTIFY FOREIGN CORPORATIONS THAT DO NOT FILE REQUIRED U.S.
INCOME TAX RETURNS
06/15/20 F-1, R-1: Assess the success of the campaign based on the 22 examinations
referrals from the first 50 soft letters issued and consider whether limited examination
resources warrant campaign continuation or whether a significant change in the
methods to identify nonfilers is warranted.
2019-30-068 September IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PASSPORT PROVISIONS OF THE FAST ACT WAS
2019 GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE IS
WORKING ON OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR PASSPORT REVOCATIONS
05/15/20 F-2, R-1: Continue developing objective criteria based on the IRS’s traditional
approach to enforcement which takes into consideration an individual taxpayer’s facts
and circumstances when selecting cases to refer to the State Department for
passport revocation.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 53
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2019-30-069 September BILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF NONFILER EMPLOYMENT TAXES WENT
2019 UNASSESSED IN THE AUTOMATED 6020(b) PROGRAM DUE PRIMARILY TO
RESOURCE LIMITATIONS
11/15/20 F-1, R-1: Consider allocating additional resources to the Automated 6020(b)
(A6020(b)) program, beginning with the five Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) planned for
in FY 2020, in conjunction with the Small Business/Self Employed Division’s Nonfiler
Strategic Plan and in consultation with the Nonfiler Executive Steering Committee.
11/15/20 F-2, R-1: Consider revising the A6020(b) systemic case selection criteria to remove
the upper dollar threshold limit, revise the case assignment routing order, and update
the prioritization to focus on the highest dollar cases.
Potential Increased Revenue: $16,704,598,855
11/15/20 F-2, R-2: Consider revising the A6020(b) manual case selection criteria to remove
the upper dollar threshold limit.
11/15/20 F-2, R-3: Consider transferring the highest dollar standalone Taxpayer Delinquent
Investigation (TDI) inventory from the Automated Collection System (ACS), the
Collection queue, and Field Collection to be worked by the planned five FTEs in the
A6020(b) program and continue to transfer higher dollar standalone TDI inventory
manually to the A6020(b) program until the systemic criteria are revised.
2019-30-070 September FISCAL YEAR 2019 STATUTORY REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL
2019 GUIDELINES WHEN ISSUING LEVIES
10/15/20 F-1, R-2: Ensure that corrective programming is implemented so that Collection Due
Process (CDP) notices are issued for Federal contractor levies that are full paid after
the levy issuance.
05/15/20 F-1, R-4: Analyze the causes of delays between the time a CDP hearing request is
received at the campus and the input of the CDP hearing transaction code to the
Integrated Data Retrieval System, and create an action plan to minimize those
delays.
01/15/21 F-2, R-1: Determine the cause and take the appropriate corrective action(s) to
ensure that the ACS does not issue levies on taxpayers without a CDP notice.
03/15/21 F-3, R-1: Ensure that corrective programming changes are implemented to
effectively prevent employees from incorrectly identifying disqualified employment tax
levies.
2019-40-071 September STRENGTHENED VALIDATION CONTROLS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT
2019 AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED FILING AND INPUT OF FRAUDULENT
INFORMATION RETURNS
10/15/21 F-1, R-1: Ensure that the required Digital Identity Risk Assessment is completed for
the Filing Information Returns Electronically (FIRE) system and an implementation
plan for identity proofing the FIRE system’s users is developed.
06/15/20 F-2, R-1: Conduct outreach to affected industry groups to ensure that payers submit
accurate information returns. Based on this outreach, determine if publications and
materials need to be updated to provide better guidance on information filing
practices.
02/15/21 F-2, R-2: Evaluate potential business rules and filters that could be implemented to
identify questionable information return submissions.
04/15/21 F-2, R-3: Develop processes to ensure that entities confirmed as suspicious, and
that received the account lock, are not allowed access to the FIRE system and to
prevent paper returns from posting to the Information Returns Master File.
54 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2019-30-072 September MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN POTENTIALLY ERRONEOUS QUALIFIED PLUG-IN
2019 ELECTRIC DRIVE MOTOR VEHICLE CREDITS CONTINUE TO BE CLAIMED
USING INELIGIBLE VEHICLES
11/15/20 F-1, R-1: Use Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) provided by taxpayers on their
tax returns and readily available third party VIN information to identify taxpayers who
are claiming the credit for nonqualifying vehicles, using the same VIN to obtain the
credit more than once, using invalid VINs, and using VINs associated to previously
leased vehicles.
02/15/21 F-1, R-2: Develop a compliance program to address the taxpayers who appear to
have erroneously received the Plug-In Credit by using a VIN associated to a
nonqualifying vehicle, using the same VIN more than once, using an invalid VIN,
using VINs associated with previously leased vehicles, or claiming a credit above
allowable thresholds (including the 68 taxpayers that TIGTA identified).
Potential Increased Revenue: $82,761,403
11/15/20 F-2, R-1: Update Examiner Lead Sheets to provide guidance to examiners to review
the Plug-In Credit along with information on VIN characteristics, including available
resources to check and determine the validity of a VIN.
2019-40-074 September ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO FURTHER REDUCE UNDELIVERABLE
2019 MAIL
On Hold F-1, R-1: Develop Service-wide processes and procedures to ensure that all
operating divisions suppress the issuance of nonstatutory notices to taxpayers that
have an undelivered mail indicator on their account; suppress the issuance of
correspondence when a taxpayer’s address of record is an IRS campus; and
research and update taxpayer addresses for which the U.S. Postal Service returns
undeliverable mail with a yellow label that provides a more current address.
On Hold F-2, R-1: Install and use hygiene software to perfect taxpayer addresses on the ITIN
RTS.
2019-30-075 September FISCAL YEAR 2019 REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL GUIDELINES
2019 WHEN CONDUCTING SEIZURES OF TAXPAYERS’ PROPERTY
05/15/20 F-1, R-2: Update the IRM to provide guidance to revenue officers and the Property
Appraisal and Liquidation Specialists employees on the appropriate practice of
accepting keys prior to seizure, including what is required to properly secure the keys
when they are accepted.
2019-30-076 September FISCAL YEAR 2019 STATUTORY REVIEW OF RESTRICTIONS ON DIRECTLY
2019 CONTACTING TAXPAYERS
10/15/20 F-1, R-2: Reemphasize the importance of examiners following established guidelines
and procedures on taxpayer representation rights, including enclosure of Publication
1 in correspondence and discussing rights during the initial taxpayer interview
process.
10/15/20 F-1, R-3: Develop procedures for case advocates so that they consistently document
how taxpayer rights should be discussed, whether via related publications such as
Publication 1 or through other means, and to confirm a taxpayer’s understanding of
their rights.
10/15/20 F-2, R-1: Update guidance for employees that clarifies the applicability of
I.R.C. §§ 7521(b)(2) and (c), and 6304(a)(2), develop training materials, specific to
their casework, to emphasize the importance of protecting taxpayers’ rights to
representation, and designate to whom group managers should report cases with
potential violations.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 55
Projected
Reference Completion Report Title and Recommendation Summary
Number Issued Date (F = Finding No., R = Recommendation No.)
2019-30-078 September THE USE OF SCHEDULE K-1 DATA TO ADDRESS TAXPAYER
2019 NONCOMPLIANCE CAN BE IMPROVED
11/15/20 F-1, R-1: Conduct periodic outreach to encourage submission of reliable Schedule K-
1 data to the IRS.
07/15/20 F-1, R-2: Conduct a review to determine the process changes needed to increase
the consistency of Schedule K-1 penalty application, especially for missing or
inaccurate e-filed Schedules K-1.
11/15/21 F-1, R-3: Establish a process to use more e-filed Schedule K-1 data for
noncompliance identification and determine the feasibility of transcribing more data
from paper Schedule K-1.
11/15/20 F-2, R-2: Update flow-through form instructions to explain how a flow-through entity
should address reporting a deceased recipient and the steps a flow-through entity
could take to ensure that accurate recipient information is entered on Schedules
K-1 when ownership changes from a deceased recipient.
11/15/20 F-3, R-1: Conduct periodic outreach to reinforce how Schedule K-1 amounts should
be reported on tax returns to prevent underreporter discrepancies.
On Hold F-3, R-3: Ensure that the computer problem that caused amended Schedules K-1
not to be marked as amended on the Information Returns Master File has been
corrected.
On Hold F-3, R-4: Establish a process to record Schedules K-1 as amended when submitted
with an amended flow-through return regardless of whether the Schedule K-1 itself is
marked as amended.
2019-40-079 September EXCISE TAX REGISTRATIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS TIMELY OR ACCURATELY
2019 PROCESSED
10/15/20 F-1, R-1: Develop processes and procedures to ensure that compliance reviews are
conducted within the required 60 days and Letter 3681 is mailed within the five days
of case assignment.
06/15/20 F-1, R-2: Develop processes and procedures to ensure that tax accounts of currently
approved businesses and newly approved businesses include the required Form 637
indicator.
06/15/20 F-1, R-3: Develop processes and procedures to ensure that Letter 3696 is sent when
required or case files are notated as to the reason why a letter is not being sent.
2019-10-080 September PROCESSES DO NOT ADEQUATELY REDUCE THE RISK THAT OUTSIDE
2019 EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES WILL CONFLICT WITH EMPLOYEES’ OFFICIAL
DUTIES
06/15/20 F-1, R-1: Review the 2,196 employees who hold IRS positions that have
responsibility for tax matters and the 167 employees who are potentially engaged in
prohibited activity, who earned income in TY 2016 but did not have an approved
outside employment request, and ensure that appropriate action is taken to address
any prohibited activities or conflicts of interest.
05/15/20 F-1, R-3: Evaluate whether a legislative proposal is needed to amend I.R.C. § 6103
to enable the IRS to use tax data to perform analyses and identify employees
engaged in outside employment activities that involve potentially prohibited activities.
09/15/20 F-2, R-3: Revise internal outside employment guidelines to require employees to
resubmit their outside employment requests at least annually and modify the Outside
Employment System (OES) to allow for the systemic closure of all requests for which
a renewal was not timely received.
09/15/21 F-2, R-4: Create a plan for housing the OES or create a new database to ensure that
outside employment requests are tracked after the Totally Automated Personnel
System is shut down.
2019-10-081 September PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES FOR REHIRING EMPLOYEES WITH PRIOR
2019 CONDUCT OR PERFORMANCE ISSUES WERE IMPLEMENTED BUT NOT
ALWAYS FOLLOWED
01/15/21 F-1, R-1: Update the IRM to require Employment Talent and Security staff to review
all ALERTS issues in the hiring tool, not just those within the past six years.
56 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Other Statistical Reports
The Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016 requires Inspectors General to address the
following issues for the Offices of Audit and Inspections and Evaluations: 30
Issue Result for TIGTA
Interference/Access to Information
Report any attempt to interfere with the independence of As of March 31, 2020, there was no attempt to
TIGTA, including: budget constraints designed to limit the interfere with the independence of TIGTA or any
capabilities of TIGTA; and incidents of resistance or objection instances of restricted or significantly delayed
to oversight activities of TIGTA. access to information.
Report restricted or significantly delayed access to
information, including the justification of the establishment for
such action.
Disputed Recommendations
Provide information on significant management decisions in As of March 31, 2020, there was no instance in
response to recommendations with which the Inspector which significant recommendations were disputed.
General disagrees.
Revised Management Decisions
Provide a description and explanation of the reasons for any As of March 31, 2020, there was no significant
significant revised management decisions made during the revised management decision.
reporting period.
Reports Issued in the Prior Reporting Period With No
Management Response As of March 31, 2020, there was no prior report for
Provide a summary of each report issued before the which management’s response was not received
beginning of the current reporting period for which no within 60 days of issuance.
management response was received within 60 days of the
report issuance date.
Disclosure
Provide detailed descriptions of the circumstances of each As of March 31, 2020, there was no report that had
inspection, evaluation, and audit that was closed by the been closed and were not disclosed to the public.
agency and was not disclosed to the public.
Review of Legislation and Regulations
Review existing and proposed legislation and regulations, TIGTA’s Office of Chief Counsel reviewed 225
and make recommendations concerning the impact of such proposed regulations and legislative requests
legislation or regulations. during this reporting period.
30 Results listed are for this reporting period only.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 57
Appendix II
Audit Products
October 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020
Audit Products
Reference
Number Report Title Outcome Measure(s)
October 2019
No Reports
Issued
November 2019
Employee Conduct Issues Are Not Considered When
2020-10-002
Prioritizing Overdue Background Reinvestigations
Fiscal Year 2019 Digital Accountability and Transparency Reliability of Information: 440
2020-10-003
Act Reporting Compliance data elements impacted
Actions Are Needed to Improve the Safeguarding of
2020-40-004
Taxpayer Information at Volunteer Program Sites
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure That Consistent
2020-40-005 Suitability Checks Are Performed for Participation in
Internal Revenue Service Programs
December 2019
No Reports
Issued
January 2020
Many Organizations Are Not Notifying the Internal Revenue
2020-10-001 Service of Their Intent to Operate Under Internal Revenue
Code Section 501(c)(4) As Required by Law
Funds Put to Better Use:
$915,921; Increased
Revenue: $43,491,953
impacting 52,834 taxpayer
accounts; Revenue
Protection: $2,126,388
2020-44-007 Results of the 2019 Filing Season impacting 3,874 taxpayer
accounts; Taxpayer Burden:
1,427 taxpayer accounts
impacted; Taxpayer Rights
and Entitlements:
$51,171,393 impacting
476,291 taxpayer accounts
Review of the Internal Revenue Service’s Purchase Card
2020-10-011
Violations Report and the Status of Recommendations
February 2020
Taxpayer Rights and
Complexity and Insufficient Oversight of the Free File
2020-40-009 Entitlements: 14,326,938
Program Result in Low Taxpayer Participation
taxpayer accounts impacted
Protection of Resources: Six
2020-20-006 Active Directory Oversight Needs Improvement IRS computer rooms
impacted
58 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Funds Put to Better Use:
$371,958,300; Increased
Revenue: $534,674,880
Authorities Provided by the Internal Revenue Code Are Not impacting 494,555 taxpayer
2020-40-008 Effectively Used to Address Erroneous Refundable Credit accounts; Revenue
and Withholding Credit Claims Protection: $10,045,989
impacting 7,132 taxpayer
accounts; Inefficient Use of
Resources: $1,096,007
March 2020
Bond Promoter Misconduct Procedures Should Be Reliability of Information:
2020-10-016
Improved 184 bond examinations
Revenue Protection:
$812,669,048 impacting
4,920 taxpayer accounts;
Millions of Dollars in Discrepancies in Tax Withholding Taxpayer Rights and
2020-40-014 Required by the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Entitlements: $163,101,850
Act Are Not Being Identified or Addressed impacting 1,608 taxpayer
accounts; Reliability of
Information: 2,644 taxpayer
accounts impacted
The Enterprise Cloud Program Developed a Strategy, but
2020-20-010 Work Remains to Achieve Cloud-Based Modernization
Goals
A Strategy Is Needed to Address Hiring Shortages As
2020-40-019
Efforts Continue to Close Tax Processing Centers
The Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Project
2020-20-013 Effectiveness Would Be Improved by Better Performance
Metrics and Tools Data
While Progress Is Being Made on Digital Identity Taxpayer Privacy and
Requirements, Completion Dates to Achieve Compliance Security 31
2020-20-012
With Identity Proofing Standards Have Not Been
Established
Actions Can Be Taken to Proactively Reduce Unpostable Funds Put to Better Use:
2020-40-020
Transactions $91,900
Increased Revenue:
$261,920,110 impacting
The Growth of the Marijuana Industry Warrants Increased 5,520 taxpayer accounts;
2020-30-017
Tax Compliance Efforts and Additional Guidance Taxpayer Burden:
$475,131,755 impacting
5,365 taxpayer accounts
31 Taxpayer information is redacted because TIGTA has determined that it is tax return information related to
taxpayer privacy.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 59
Appendix III
TIGTA’s Statutory Reporting Requirements
The following table reflects the FY 2020 statutory reviews.
Reference to
Explanation of the Provision Comments/TIGTA Audit Status
Statutory Coverage
Enforcement Statistics Requires TIGTA to evaluate the Fieldwork currently in process.
IRS’s compliance with restrictions
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A) under RRA 98 § 1204 on the use of
enforcement statistics to evaluate IRS
employees.
Restrictions on Directly Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s Fieldwork currently in process.
Contacting Taxpayers compliance with restrictions under
I.R.C. § 7521 on directly contacting
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(ii) taxpayers who have indicated they
prefer their representatives be
contacted.
Filing of a Notice of Lien Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s Fieldwork currently in process.
compliance with required procedures
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) under I.R.C. § 6320(a) upon the filing
of a notice of lien.
Extensions of the Statute of Requires TIGTA to include information Fieldwork currently in process.
Limitations for Assessment of regarding extensions of the statute of
Tax limitations for assessment of tax under
I.R.C. § 6501 and the provision of
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(C) notice to taxpayers regarding the right
I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4)(B) to refuse or limit the extension of
particular issues or a particular period
of time.
Levies Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s Fieldwork currently in process.
compliance with required procedures
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iv) under I.R.C. § 6330 regarding levies.
Collection Due Process Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s Fieldwork currently in process.
compliance with required procedures
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv) under I.R.C. §§ 6320 and 6330
regarding taxpayers’ rights to appeal
lien or levy actions.
Seizures Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s Fieldwork currently in process.
compliance with required procedures
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iv) under I.R.C. §§ 6330 through 6344
when conducting seizures.
Taxpayer Designations – Illegal An evaluation of the IRS’s Fieldwork currently in process.
Tax Protester Designation and compliance with restrictions under
Similar Designations RRA 98 § 3707 on designation of
taxpayers.
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(v)
60 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Reference to
Explanation of the Provision Comments/TIGTA Audit Status
Statutory Coverage
Disclosure of Collection Activity Requires TIGTA to review and certify Fieldwork currently in process.
With Respect to Joint Returns whether the IRS is complying with
I.R.C. § 6103(e)(8), which requires the
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(B) (TIGTA IRS to disclose information to an
requirement) individual filing a joint return on
I.R.C. § 6103(e)(8) (IRS collection activity involving the other
requirement) individual filing the return.
Taxpayer Complaints Requires TIGTA to include in each Statistical results on the number of received
Semiannual Report to Congress the are shown on page 38.
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(2)(A) number of taxpayer complaints
received and the number of employee
misconduct and taxpayer abuse
allegations received by the IRS or
TIGTA from taxpayers, IRS
employees, and other sources.
Administrative or Civil Actions Requires TIGTA to include information Fieldwork currently in process.
With Respect to the Tax regarding any administrative or civil
Collection Practices Act of 1996 actions with respect to violation of the
fair debt collection provision of
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(G) I.R.C. § 6304, including a summary of
I.R.C. § 6304 such actions and any resulting
RRA 98 § 3466 judgments or awards granted.
Denials of Requests for Requires TIGTA to include information Fieldwork currently in process.
Information regarding improper denial of requests
for information from the IRS, based on
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(F) a statistically valid sample of the total
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(3)(A) number of determinations made by the
IRS to deny written requests to
disclose information to taxpayers on
the basis of I.R.C. § 6103 or 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7).
Adequacy and Security of the Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s Security Reviews:
Technology of the IRS adequacy and security of its Ref. No. 2020-20-006; Feb. 2020
technology. Ref. No. 2020-20-013; Mar. 2020
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(D) Ref. No. 2020-20-012; Mar. 2020
Information Technology Reviews:
Ref. No. 2020-20-010; Mar. 2020
Government Charge Card Abuse Requires TIGTA to report on the IRS Ref. No. 2020-10-011; Jan. 2020
Prevention Act of 2012 progress in implementing purchase TIGTA’s review of the IRS’s purchase card
and travel card audit program found that controls are generally
Pub. L. No. 112-194, 126 Stat. 1445 recommendations. effective, and the number of purchase card
violations identified by the IRS Credit Card
Services Branch were minimal and generally
for nominal amounts.
Improper Payments Elimination Requires TIGTA to assess the IRS’s Fieldwork currently in process.
and Recovery Act of 2010 compliance with improper payment
(IPERA) requirements.
31 U.S.C. § 3321
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 61
Reference to
Explanation of the Provision Comments/TIGTA Audit Status
Statutory Coverage
Digital Accountability and Requires TIGTA to assess the Ref. No. 2020-10-003; Nov. 2019
Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA completeness, timeliness, quality, and The IRS submitted its FY 2019 first quarter
Act) accuracy of data that the IRS submits spending data by March 2019, as required,
to comply with the DATA Act. for publication on USAspending.gov. Based
Pub. L. No. 113-101, 128 Stat. 1124 on a standardized methodology used across
Offices of Inspectors General, the IRS
received the highest of three possible ratings
for overall data quality. However, TIGTA
determined that the quality of the spending
data, specifically the award (procurement)
attribute data, continues to need
improvement.
62 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Appendix IV
Section 1203 Standards
In general, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall terminate any IRS employee if
there is a final administrative or judicial determination that, in the performance of official
duties, such employee committed any misconduct violations outlined below. Such
termination shall be a removal for cause on charges of misconduct.
Misconduct violations include:
• Willfully failing to obtain the required approval signatures on documents authorizing
the seizure of a taxpayer’s home, personal belongings, or business assets;
• Providing a false statement under oath with respect to a material matter involving a
taxpayer or taxpayer representative;
• Violating, with respect to a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or other employee of
the IRS, any right under the Constitution of the United States, or any civil right
established under Title VI or VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;
Age Discrimination Act of 1975; § 501 or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; or
Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990;
• Falsifying or destroying documents to conceal mistakes made by any employee with
respect to a matter involving a taxpayer or taxpayer representative;
• Committing assault or battery on a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or another
employee of the IRS, but only if there is a criminal conviction or a final judgment by a
court in a civil case with respect to the assault or battery;
• Violating the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, the Department of the
Treasury regulations, or policies of the IRS (including the IRM) for the purpose of
retaliating against or harassing a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or other
employee of the IRS;
• Willfully misusing provisions of I.R.C. § 6103 for the purpose of concealing
information from a congressional inquiry;
• Willfully failing to file any return of tax required under the I.R.C. on or before the date
prescribed therefore (including any extensions), unless such failure is due to
reasonable cause and not to willful neglect;
• Willfully understating Federal tax liability, unless such understatement is due to
reasonable cause and not to willful neglect; and
• Threatening to audit a taxpayer for the purpose of extracting personal gain or
benefit.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue may mitigate the penalty of removal for the
misconduct violations outlined above. The exercise of this authority shall be at the sole
discretion of the Commissioner and may not be delegated to any other officer. The
Commissioner, in his or her sole discretion, may establish a procedure that will be used to
decide whether an individual should be referred to the Commissioner for determination.
Any mitigation determination by the Commissioner in these matters may not be appealed in
any administrative or judicial proceeding.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 63
Appendix V
Inspector General Peer Review Activity
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
This appendix implements § 989C of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act. 32
Peer Reviews Conducted of TIGTA by Another Office of Inspector General
There was no review conducted of TIGTA by another Office of Inspector General
during the reporting period.
Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews of TIGTA
There is no outstanding recommendation from peer reviews of TIGTA.
Peer Reviews Conducted by TIGTA
There was no review of another Office of Inspector General conducted by TIGTA during
the reporting period.
Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews Conducted by TIGTA
There is no outstanding recommendation from peer reviews conducted by TIGTA.
32 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)(codified at 5 U.S.C. app §5(a)(14)-(16)).
64 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Appendix VI
Data Tables Provided by the
Internal Revenue Service
The memorandum copied below is the IRS’s transmittal to TIGTA. The tables that follow the
memorandum contain information that the IRS provided to TIGTA and consist of IRS employee
misconduct reports from the IRS Automated Labor and Employee Relations Tracking System
(ALERTS) for the period of October 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020. Also, data concerning
substantiated RRA 98 §1203 allegations for the same period are included. IRS management
conducted inquiries into the cases reflected in these tables.
The Tables That Follow Are Provided by the IRS.
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 65
Report of Employee Misconduct
Summary by Disposition Groups
Period Covering October 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020
Disposition TIGTA Report Administrative Employee Tax Employee Character Totals
of Case Compliance Investigation
Investigation Case
REMOVAL (PROBATION PERIOD COMPLETE) 24 35 24 ─ 83
REMOVAL AT OPM DIRECTION ─ ─ ─
7 7
PROBATION/SEPARATION 3 113 0 ─ 118
SEPARATION OF TEMP 3 7 ─ 1 11
RESIGNATION, RETIREMENT, ETC. (SF50 NOTED) 13 25 16 1 55
RESIGNATION, RETIREMENT, ETC. (SF50 NOT
NOTED) 19 54 44 2 119
SUSPENSION, 14 DAYS OR LESS 41 73 135 2 251
SUSPENSION, MORE THAN 14 DAYS ─ 47
10 15 22
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION ─ ─ 4
1 3
REPRIMAND 31 119 154 10 314
ADMONISHMENT 20 115 240 4 379
WRITTEN COUNSELING 36 138 193 11 378
ORAL COUNSELING ─ ─
14 11 25
A D: IN LIEU OF REPRIMAND 1 4 6 ─ 11
A D: IN LIEU OF SUSPENSION ─
5 13 26 44
CLEARANCE LETTER ─
37 87 11 135
CWA CAUTIONARY LTR 83 170 132 42 427
CWA LETTER 41 81 32 10 164
TERMINATION FOR ABANDONMENT OF POSITION ─ 5 ─ ─ 5
CASE SUSPENDED PENDING EMPLOYEE RTD
─ ─ 0 ─ 1
PROSECUTION PENDING FOR TIGTA'S ROI
─ ─ ─ ─ ─
─ ─ ─ ─ ─
CLOSED
─ 1 ─ ─ 1
FORWARDED TO TIGTA
TOTAL 368 1,072 1,049 90 2,579
Source: Automated Labor and Employee Relations Tracking System (ALERTS)
Note: Columns containing numbers of two or less and protected by I.R.C. § 6103 are notated with a zero
and are not reflected in the column and row totals.
Extract Date: April 1, 2020
66 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Report of Employee Misconduct
National Summary
Period Covering October 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020
Cases Closed
Conduct
Inventory Open Cases Ending
Cases Non-
Case Type Inventory Conduct Merged Inventory
Received Conduct
Issues with Other
Issues
Cases
ADMINISTRATIVE 598 1,656 1,371 40 46 797
CASE
EMPLOYEE
CHARACTER 82 188 106 4 ─ 160
INVESTIGATION
EMPLOYEE TAX
COMPLIANCE 1,805 424 1,131 43 ─ 1,055
CASE
TIGTA REPORT
OF 547 480 471 10 ─ 546
INVESTIGATION
Total 3,032 2,748 3,079 97 46 2,558
Source: ALERTS
Administrative Case - Any matter involving an employee in which management conducted an
inquiry into alleged misconduct.
Background Investigations - Any matter involving an NBIC investigation into an
employee's background that is referred to management for appropriate action.
Employee Tax Compliance Case - Any conduct matter that is identified by the Employee
Tax Compliance program which becomes a matter of official interest.
TIGTA Investigations - Any matter involving an employee in which TIGTA conducted an
investigation into alleged misconduct and referred a Report of Investigation (ROI) to IRS for
appropriate action.
Extract Date: April 1, 2020
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 67
Summary of Substantiated I.R.C. § 1203
Inquiries Recorded in ALERTS
Period Covering October 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020
Removed In
§ 1203 Resigned/ Probation Penalty
Removals On Other Personnel Total
Violation Retired Separation Mitigated
Grounds Process
1203(b)(2):
FALSE STTMNT ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 1
UNDER OATH
1203(b)(4):
CONCEALED 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 1
WORK ERROR
1203(b)(8):
WILLFUL
UNTIMELY
8 7 ─ 4 8 104 131
RETURN
1203(b)(9):
WILLFUL
UNDERSTATED
13 7 ─ 0 5 105 131
TAX
Total 22 14 ─ 5 13 210 264
Source: ALERTS
Note: Columns containing numbers of two or less and protected by I.R.C. § 6103 are annotated
with a zero and are not reflected in the column and row totals.
The cases reported as "Removals" and "Penalty Mitigated" do not reflect the results of any third
party appeal.
Extract Date: April 1, 2020
68 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
Glossary of Acronyms
ACS Automated Collection System
ALERTS Automated Labor and Employee Relations Tracking System
ANMF Automated Non-Master File
BYOD Bring Your Own Device
CAF Centralized Authorization File
CCI Centralized Case Intake
CDP Collection Due Process
DATA Act Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014
DLP Data Loss Prevention
DOJ Department of Justice
EEFax Enterprise Electronic Fax
EIN Employer Identification Number
ERO Electronic Return Originator
ESP Enterprise Standards Profile
FAFSA Free Application for Federal Student Aid
FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
FIRE Filing Information Returns Electronically
FIRPTA Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act
FMSS Facilities Management and Security Services
FSA-ID Federal Student Aid ID
FTE Full-Time Equivalents
I&E Office of Inspections and Evaluations
I.R.C. Internal Revenue Code
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 69
IP PIN Identity Protection Personal Identification Number
IPERA Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010
IRM Internal Revenue Manual
IRS Internal Revenue Service
IRS-CI IRS Criminal Investigation
ISP Information Security Plan
ISRP Integrated Submission and Remittance Processing
ITIN Individual Taxpayer Identification Number
ITRAC Item Tracking Reporting and Control
JAMES Joint Audit Management Enterprise System
LLC Limited Liability Company
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
OEP Office of Employee Protection
OES Outside Employment System
OI Office of Investigations
PATH Act Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015
PGLD Privacy, Governmental Liaison, and Disclosure
PIAMS Privacy Impact Assessment Management System
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PPI Payroll Professionals, Incorporated
PTIN Preparer Tax Identification Numbers
PY Processing Year
RRA 98 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
70 October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020
RTS Real-Time System
SAR Suspicious Activity Reports
SBU Sensitive But Unclassified
SPEC Stakeholder Partnerships, Education, and Communication
SSN Social Security Number
STARS Scheme Tracking and Referral System
TAS Taxpayer Advocate Service
TDI Taxpayer Delinquent Investigation
TIGTA Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
TIN Taxpayer Identification Number
TY Tax Year
UD Undelivered
UTS Universal Tax Services
VIN Vehicle Identification Number
VSD Virtual Service Delivery
October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020 71
Call our toll-free hotline
to report waste, fraud or abuse:
1- 800-366 - 4484
By Web:
www.tigta.gov
Or Write:
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
P.O. Box 589
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044-0589
Information you provide is confidential and you may remain anonymous
Department of the Treasury
Office of the Inspector General for Tax Administration
1401 H Street, NW., Suite 469
Washington, DC 20005
This report and complete copies of TIGTA audit reports
are available online at: w w w.tigta.gov
File and source
- File
- REPORT_TIGTA_Semiannual-Report-to-Congress_mar2020.pdf
- Size
- 6,662,297 bytes
- SHA-256
- 7ffbdf0908f4db480dde4d267e7e16448aec60efe797c64d6e54c63d04bd907d
- Original
- No public link identified.