Report and Recommendation — No. 1:24-cr-00083 (Dkt. 68, E.D. Mo.)

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A Report and Recommendation, Document 68, filed February 27, 2026 in United States v. Jeffery James Reed, Case No. 1:24 CR 83 SNLJ (ACL), in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Southeastern Division. It addresses the defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 39) seized under a search warrant executed four days after an arson fire that the report says caused more than one million dollars in damage to a neighboring farming operation. The report summarizes his arguments that the affidavit lacked a factual nexus and probable cause, and the government's response (Doc. 47) that the good faith exception applies. It recommends that the Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements (Doc. 39) and the Motion for a Franks Hearing (Doc. 59) be denied, with objections due March 13, 2026.

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“Report and Recommendation — No. 1:24-cr-00083 (Dkt. 68, E.D. Mo.).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/report-and-recommendation-no-1-24-cr-00083-dkt-68-e-d-mo-81b3bbf875/, SHA-256 e6c3f3e0bc6c305fd05127770419ca7ade9723d57224108fb5be3fdf07d1edea.

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Case: 1:24-cr-00083-SNLJ-ACL Doc. #: 68 Filed: 02/27/26 Page: 1 of 38 PageID
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:24 CR 83 SNLJ (ACL)
)
JEFFERY JAMES REED, )
)
Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court 1 on Defendant Jeffery James Reed’s Motion to

Suppress Evidence (Doc. 39) seized from the premises located at 1234 Wayne 419,

Williamsville, Missouri, the location of his residence and farm.

Reed is a farmer in rural Wayne County, Missouri. He was identified as a suspect

in an arson fire that caused more than one million dollars in damage to a neighboring

farming operation. Four days after the fire, a Search Warrant was executed at Reed’s

property and various items were seized by law enforcement.

Reed first claims that the “search warrant affidavit lacked a factual nexus to the

subject premises,” (Doc. 42 at 4) resulting in a lack of probable cause making the Search

Warrant facially invalid, id. at 9. He notes that the Affidavit states the premises is where

“a suspect of an arson investigation” is “located,” but does not indicate 1234 Wayne 419

1
Pretrial matters have been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge under
28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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is “Reed’s residence, belongs to Reed, is farmland, is a farm operated by Reed, or is

otherwise connected to Reed in any manner.” Id. at 5.

Next, Reed argues “the Affidavit is devoid of any information showing the

evidence sought[, including electronic devices] would be found” in his home. Id. at 9-15.

He asserts the Search Warrant lacked probable cause, because there is nothing in the

Affidavit “that directly ties the place to be searched to the objects of the search, or to the

underlying criminal investigation.” Id. at 13. He claims “the Fourth Amendment does

not permit the type of significant inferential leaps as would be required to determine the

Affidavit set forth a ‘substantial basis’ to conclude the objects of the search would be

found at the” listed address. Id.

Finally, Reed alleges “the lack of a nexus to Reed’s residence would have been

apparent to reasonable officers, precluding application of the ‘good faith’ exception and

mandating suppression of the evidence obtained from the search.” Id. at 17.

The Government opposes the Motion arguing that when examining the “totality of

the information in the affidavit there is clearly sufficient probable cause to connect Jeff

Reed to the arson, and to connect the target premises to Reed.” (Doc. 47 at 9.)

Additionally, the Government asserts there was “a sufficient connection between the

arson and the evidence sought to be seized, and a fair probability they would be located at

Reed’s residence.” Id. at 10. Lastly, the Government argues that even if the Search

Warrant was defective in some way, the good faith exception to the warrant requirement

applies because the affiant reasonably relied on the issuing Judge’s determination of

probable cause. Thus, suppression would not be warranted “as any mistake would have

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been on the part of the issuing Court and suppression would do nothing to deter police

misconduct as contemplated by the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 16.

Although the matter was set for an evidentiary hearing and the Government issued

a subpoena for the officer who signed the Search Warrant, no one testified. When the

undersigned asked the Government attorney “how many witnesses do you have…?”

(Doc. 55 at 2.) He announced, “we don’t have any. The motion is basically an attack on

the sufficiency of the search warrant” offered as Government Exhibit #1 and Defendant’s

Exhibits A and B. Id. The Defendant also offered Exhibit C, the inventory for the Search

Warrant. The Government did not oppose admission of Exhibit C. The Government

further stated that even if the Court were to apply the good-faith exception no additional

information was required because although “[t]he law allows the Court to consider

information that was known to the officers but not placed in the Affidavit . . . There’s

simply no additional information that they had that was material to the issue of probable

cause at that point in time.” Id. at 3.

Defense counsel argued that the Affiant’s testimony was necessary to determine

“whether or not the officer was reasonable in relying on the information provided in the...

warrant.” Id. at 5. He asserted that there were a number of omissions in the Affidavit,

including that the Affiant was related to the “victim” by marriage. That said, he

acknowledged that the Defendant had not filed a request for a Franks hearing and had not

subpoenaed any witnesses. Defense counsel anticipated that the Affiant would be

testifying considering the subpoena that was issued.

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The Government responded that the issue before the Court is extremely narrow.

The “question is whether or not there was a substantial basis for the state judge to issue

this Search Warrant based on the totality of the information in the Affidavit . . . we’re

stuck with whatever is in the affidavit, not what other people knew or hypothetically

knew or whether they liked or disliked this defendant…” Id. at 8-9. If the Court

concludes the four corners did not provide the issuing judge with a substantial basis to

find probable cause to issue the warrant, then and only then do we look at the good-faith

exception.” Id. at 9. The Government reiterated that since the Affiant had no additional

material evidence related to the probable cause question, “[t]he question becomes . . .

would a reasonable objective police officer” be able to rely on the issuing judge’s finding

of probable cause. Id.

Considering the developments during the hearing, defense counsel requested leave

to reschedule the hearing to “issue our own subpoena to the detective and get into those

issues and then supplement it with a Franks motion.” Id. at 10. The Government

countered that the Defendant had a year to file a Franks motion. Further stating “there’s

nothing out there that would tend to indicate that any of the information in this Affidavit

was either deliberately false or was made with reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. at 11-

12. The Defendant replied, “we would have explored those issues on the good-faith

exception.” The undersigned took the issue under advisement. Following the hearing,

the Defendant submitted supplemental briefing and a request for leave to file his Motion

to Suppress Evidence Pursuant to Franks v. Delaware. (Doc. 59.) The Franks Motion

will be discussed in Part II.D.

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In consideration of the record before the Court, the undersigned recommends that

the following findings of fact and conclusions of law be adopted and that the Defendant’s

Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion for Frank’s Hearing be denied.

I. Findings of Fact

A fire was intentionally set at the farming operation of “Buff Beef” owned by

Stanley and Mary Buffington on August 22, 2023, resulting in more than one million

dollars in damages. The National Response Team of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms and Explosives (ATF) arrived on-scene the day after the fire to join agents from

three nearby ATF offices to investigate the fire. A news release issued on August 24,

stated that “[t]he fire is being jointly investigated by the ATF, Wayne County Sheriff’s

Office, Missouri State Highway Patrol, and the Missouri Fire Marshals Office.” (Doc.

62-1 at 1.)

Four days after the fire, a Search Warrant was executed at “the premises located at

1234 Wayne 419, Williamsville, Missouri 63967.” (Doc. 39-2 at 4-7.) Although the

“evidence to be searched for” was described as items “that could potentially lead to

further details surrounding this arson investigation…,” the Search Warrant expressed that

the evidence sought pertained to a homicide. Id. at 1. The Affiant did not directly state

that 1234 Wayne 419 was Reed’s home or the location of “Rolling Shoals Farm.” The

Affidavit noted that “Reed owns a farm approximately two nautical miles from the Buff

Beef farm.” Id. at 4.

The Affidavit also relayed that in the past, Buffington and Reed had been friends.

They also enjoyed a barter agreement in which Reed utilized farm equipment belonging

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to Buffington in exchange for Reed’s corn and other agricultural products. Toward the

end of 2022, the pair had a falling out over monies owed between them. In the fall of

2022, Reed sent Buffington an invoice for over $48,000. Buffington indicated he paid

approximately $32,000 to Rolling Shoals Farm. He also sent Reed an invoice for

amounts due that totaled around $92,000. Reed told investigators that the issues between

him and Buffington were over $13,000, which was inconsistent with the documents

received during the investigation.

According to Buffington, Reed also believed that Buffington had flirted with

Reed’s wife. Buffington added that Reed threatened to “kill him if [Buffington] looked

at [Reed’]s wife again.” Id. at 5.

In describing the more than one million dollars of estimated damages caused by

the fire, the Affidavit noted that fire investigators found 30-minute burn time Orion brand

road flares and fuel on “burned, and non-burned machinery, ground, and building parts.”

Id. at 4. Investigators also recovered videos from a Menard’s store in Poplar Bluff that

showed Reed purchasing a total of thirty, 30-minute burn time Orion brand road flares

during trips to the store on July 30 and August 18, 2023. Other items Reed purchased

included: five cigarette lighters, two cans of spray paint, a roll of tape, a pair of 14-inch

chemical gloves, ten hose clamps, 25 feet of discharge hose, one 17-in-1 multi-tool,

safety glasses, landscape fabric, one box cutter knife, and work gloves. Reed paid cash

for all the items.

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The search warrant application-affidavit (the “Affidavit”) outlined the following

information in support of Trooper Wilson’s belief that “evidence related to the crime

currently under investigation is located on the described premises.” (Doc. 39-2 at 7.)

1. On Tuesday, August 22, 2023, the criminal investigative unit of the
Missouri State Highway Patrol was requested to assist with an arson investigation
in Wayne County. The location of the arson was at 36°56'58 North, -90°31'30
West, and is located in Wayne County, Missouri. This is described as an
agricultural business, Buff Beef. During the investigation, it was determined three
large-scale buildings were destroyed by fire. Fire Investigators determined that
each building was a separate point of origin and that the fire had not communi-
cated between the buildings.

2. Thirty-Minute (30) burn time Orion Brand Road flares and fuel were
located on burned, and non-burned machinery, ground, and building parts.
Gasoline containers were located inside portions of the burned buildings.
Approximately fifteen (Estimate only) pieces of farm machinery were destroyed
by fire. Several of these pieces of equipment were not in the buildings that burnt.
The total loss due to the fire exceeds one million dollars.

3. During interviews it was determined the victim, Stanley Buffington,
named one particular person who had a conflict with him; Jeff Reed. Mr. Reed
owns a farm approximately two nautical miles from the Buff Beef farm and the
two were previously friends. In approximately the fall of 2022, the friendship
ended as Mr. Reed accused Mr. Buffington of owing him a substantial amount of
money. Mr. Buffington eventually agreed to pay Mr. Reed a portion of what he
said he owed, but Mr. Reed did not believe it was enough. Mr. Reed had
knowledge and layout information of Mr. Buffington’s farm, buildings, safe, and
equipment. It should be noted: that the safe at Buffington’s farm was opened with
a torch but nothing was believed to be stolen; furthermore, Mr. Buffington
typically keeps fifty to one hundred thousand dollars inside of the safe but had
taken it out. Mr. Reed was one of the few people who had direct knowledge of the
cash amount Mr. Buffington kept inside the safe at the business. Jeff Reed had
also made prior threatening comments about Mr. Buffington flirting with his wife;
making the comment to Mr. Buffington that he would kill him if he looked at his
wife again.

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4. Mr. Buffington also said in the fall of 2022 he, Buff Beef Farm, received
a bill from Mr. Reed, Rolling Shoals Farm Inc., for an amount of over $48,000.00
Mr. Buffington said up to this point he and Mr. Reed had an agreement in place
where Mr. Reed was able to use Mr. Buffington’s equipment and in turn, Mr. Reed
would provide shelled corn, or other agricultural products as a form of payment.
Mr. Buffington said he contacted Mr. Reed and asked him why he was sent a bill
since they had an agreement in place. Mr. Buffington said Mr. Reed said he
wanted the money instead. Mr. Buffington said he paid approximately $32,000.00
to Rolling Shoals. Mr. Buffington said he then had a bill sent to Rolling Shoals for
$92,000.00. Mr. Buffington also said he also paid $32,000.00 to Rolling Shoals
farms.

5. During the course of this investigation investigators were provided
invoices from both Rolling Shoals and Buff Beef Farms. These were provided by
Mary Buffington. The first invoice is dated August 31, 2022, and is from Rolling
Shoals to Stan Buffington for $16,110.67. An invoice dated November 29, 2022,
from Buff Beef to Rolling Shoals Farms. The grand total amount billed to Rolling
Shoals by Buff Beef is $76,622.96. The invoice sent to Rolling Shoals was sent by
registered mail.

6. In an interview with Mr. Reed, he stated the issues between him, and Mr.
Buffington were over $13,000.00. With the documents provided it is apparent Mr.
Reed lied to investigators about the amount of money he owed to Mr. Buffington.
Mr. Reed also said he received a phone call from Jimmy Freeman, who is a farm
hand for Mr. Buffington, on the morning of the fire. Mr. Reed said Mr. Freeman
threatened him during this phone call and a short time later he observed a vehicle
drive up and park, shutting the headlights off, approximately 200-300 yards down
the lane from his residence.

Mr. Reed said it was Mr. Freeman’s vehicle. Mr. Reed said he exited
his home with a rifle and took position in a tree line. He further stated he would
have shot Mr. Freeman if he had entered his property. This observation was
supposed to have taken place a little after 3:00 a.m. When Mr. Freeman was
interviewed, he admitted to making the phone call but said he had not been to or
near Mr. Reed’s house that night or anytime since he did not know where Mr.
Reed lived.

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7. On August 25, 2023, investigators located videos from Menards in Poplar
Bluff Missouri. These videos depict Mr. Reed purchasing three (4) packs of 30-
minute burn-time Orion brand flares, safety glasses, landscape fabric (100-foot
roll), Gerber brand box cutter knife, and Mechanics Wear brand work gloves. These
purchases were made on Sunday, July 30, 2023, and payment was made in cash. A
second video depicts Mr. Reed purchasing six (6) packages of the same flares, five
Bic brand cigarette lighters, two cans of black spray paint, a roll of Gorilla brand
tape, a pair of 14-inch Nitrile brand chemical gloves, a pack of ten (10) hose clamps,
twenty-five foot of discharge hose, and a Gerber brand truss seventeen in one
multitool. These purchases were made on Friday, August 18, 2023, and cash was
used to make these purchases. The total confirmed amount of individual 30-minute
Orion flares which was confirmed Mr. Reed had purchased was thirty (30). During
both visits to Menards, Mr. Reed was driving a dark-colored Dodge Dually truck,
which he parked on the east side of the parking lot, where there are no cameras and
well away from the building. Mr. Reed does however drive past the front of the
store when leaving the parking lot.

(Doc. 39-2 at 4-7.)

Trooper Wilson identified the evidence to be searched for as follows:

(1) computers and other electronic smart devices (Including cellular phones);

(2) any written notes/documentation pertaining to information leading up to or
explaining the arson;

(3) Gorilla Tape

(4) Orion Flares and related packaging

(5) Lighters

(6) Chemical Gloves and Utility Gloves

(7) Vehicle’s which could store vital GPS information

(8) Any clothing that may have potential evidence related to the arson
investigation; including clothing with welding defects, fuel contaminates,
smoke, etc.

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(9) The clothing worn by Mr. Reed at the time he purchased flares and other
materials at Menards in Poplar Bluff, Missouri.

(10) All of these items are evidence in this investigation that could potentially lead
to further details surrounding this arson investigation in that the described
items could incriminate or exclude possible witnesses/suspects.

(Doc. 39-2 at 4-7 (emphasis added).)

At 10:12 p.m., Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney Ginger Koller Joyner

affirmed to Judge Schrum that she reviewed the “Affidavit and Application” and applies

for the requested “search warrant based upon th[e] Affidavit and place my signature upon

this Application.” Id. at 8. In signing the Application, the Prosecutor stated:

knowing that false statements herein are punishable by law and/or being duly
sworn, deposes and states upon information and belief that evidence of a crime
related to the criminal offense/s of arson are currently present on the described
premises. Application for the issuance of this search warrant is hereby made. The
basis of this belief is detailed in the above Affidavit provided by the Affiant and
said information is submitted in conjunction with this Application as a basis upon
which this Court may find the existence of probable cause for the issuance of said
warrant.

Id. (emphasis added.) Trooper Wilson subscribed and swore to the truthfulness of the

Application and Affidavit before Associate Circuit Judge Scotty J. Schrum under oath on

August 25, 2023, at 10:29 p.m.

Judge Schrum authorized the Search Warrant at 10:30 p.m. The Search Warrant

provided a further description of the location to be searched:

The premises include a primary residence, entire land, any and all
outbuildings, shops, barns, or sheds, as well as any automobiles, or utility vehicles
on the premises.
.

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The premises are specifically described as follows: 1234 Wayne 419,
Williamsville, Missouri 63967. It is described as a single-story residence that faces
west. There is an outbuilding located southwest of the property. A driveway leads
from County Road 419 to the east portion of the premises which leads to a large
barn/shop.

Id. As to the evidence to be searched for, the Search Warrant included the same list of

ten items identified in Trooper Wilson’s Affidavit. The list included computer and

electronic devices, plus written notes or documentation “leading up to or explaining the

arson,” as well as vehicle’s which could store vital GPS information. Id. (emphasis

added). Items that could have been used in the arson were listed, including Gorilla tape,

Orion Flares and related packaging, lighters, chemical and utility gloves, plus “[a]ny

clothing that may have potential evidence related to the arson investigation; including

clothing with welding defects, fuel contaminates, smoke, etc.” Id. (emphasis added).

The list also included “clothing worn by Mr. Reed at the time he purchased flares and

other materials at Menards in Poplar Bluff, Missouri.” Id. While listed as “item” 10,

the last sentence explained that “[a]ll of these items are evidence in this investigation

that could potentially lead to further details surrounding this arson investigation in that

the described items could incriminate or exclude possible witnesses/suspects.” Id. at 1-

2 (emphasis added).

Officers arrived at the described premises to execute the Search Warrant the

following day, at 4:00 p.m. The premises were seized at 4:10 p.m., and the search was

completed by 6:08 p.m. The inventory of items seized is below.

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See Doc. 39-2 at 9, Search Warrant Inventory.

Reed requests that all evidence obtained by law enforcement be suppressed.

II. Conclusions of Law

First, Reed argues “the Affidavit failed to connect the target property to Reed (let

alone establish that he lived there) and, therefore, lacked the requisite nexus to support

probable cause.” (Doc. 48 at 2.) He claims that the Government’s assertion that the

Affidavit “points only to Reed as the suspected arsonist” requires the Court to “weigh the

facts pertaining to each person against each other and reach a factual finding as to who

the affiant most likely referred to as ‘a suspect,’ if indeed it was one specific person…”

Id. at 3. Furthermore, Reed argues, “[w]hile the affiant may very well have intended to

mean Reed lived at the premises by stating ‘a suspect’ was ‘located’ there, he did not say

that, and the Court cannot now take the liberty of assuming that critical information.” Id.

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Additionally, Reed claims “the Affidavit here remains devoid of any information

establishing the evidence sought would be found at the target premises, requiring

suppression of the same.” Id. at 4. Lastly, Reed avers the “good faith” exception cannot

save the Search Warrant due to the deficiencies in the Affidavit.

The Government asserts there was “a sufficient connection between the arson and

the evidence sought to be seized, and a fair probability they would be located at Reed’s

residence.” (Doc. 47 at 10.) The Government further contends that if there was a defect

in the Search Warrant, the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applies

because the affiant reasonably relied on the issuing Judge’s determination of probable

cause. Thus, suppression would not be warranted “as any mistake would have been on

the part of the issuing Court and suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct

as contemplated by the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 16.

II.A. Affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the arson and the evidence
sought, and a fair probability they would be found at Reed’s premises.

The standard for reviewing the propriety of the issuance of a warrant under the

Fourth Amendment is clear. “The Fourth Amendment commands that ‘no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.’” United States v.

Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). “The

sufficiency of a search warrant is. . .determined on the basis of the information before the

issuing judicial officer.” United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1986).

“The warrant must be based upon a finding by a neutral and detached judicial officer that

there is probable cause to believe the evidence, instrumentalities or fruits of a crime,

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contraband,. . .may be found in the place to be searched.” Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d

861, 870 (8th Cir. 1998).

Probable cause to issue a warrant exists when an affidavit sets forth sufficient facts

to justify a prudent person in the belief that contraband will be found in a particular place.

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Whether probable cause has been

established involves the practical common-sense evaluation of the totality of the

circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. All that need be shown for probable cause to

search is that there is a “fair probability” that contraband or evidence of a crime will be

found at the location to be searched. Gates, supra. Also, affidavits should not be read in

a hypertechnical manner. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).

The quantum of evidence needed to meet this probable cause standard has been

addressed by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1979).

“[A] court reviewing a challenged warrant—whether at the district or appellate

level—‘must accord considerable deference to the probable cause determination’” of the

issuing judge. United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Walczyk v.

Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 157 (2d Cir. 2007). See also United States v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427,

430 (8th Cir. 2007), citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (same). Such deference derives not

only from the law’s recognition that probable cause is “a fluid concept” that can vary

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with the facts of each case, but also from its “strong preference” for searches conducted

pursuant to a warrant, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 236 (1983), and its related

concern that “[a] grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will

tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer

before acting.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). With this

backdrop, the task of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the “totality of the

circumstances” afforded the issuing judge “a substantial basis” for making the requisite

probable cause determination. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

“In determining whether probable cause exists,” a reviewing court “do[es] not

evaluate each piece of information independently; rather. . .all of the facts [are

considered] for their cumulative meaning.” United States v. Allen, 297 F.3d 790, 794

(8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Allen found the information contained in a challenged

search warrant affidavit connected the target residence to methamphetamine

manufacturing. The information included that an individual consented to a search after

his car was stopped and an officer found items indicating the individual was involved in

manufacturing methamphetamine. The individual agreed to cooperate with law

enforcement. He told officers that he and Allen had spent the evening buying ephedrine

pills and looking for anhydrous ammonia to steal. The informant also stated that Allen

had 20 soda cylinders and 30 lithium batteries in his possession or at his residence. The

Eighth Circuit found these facts “establish probable cause to believe that Allen had

methamphetamine manufacturing equipment and ingredients at his home.” Id.

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It is generally understood that “probable cause to search is demonstrated where

the totality of the circumstances indicates a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence

of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d at 156 (quoting

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). “This required nexus between the items sought and

the ‘particular place’ to be searched protects against the issuance of general warrants,

instruments reviled by the Founders who recalled their use by Crown officials ‘to search

where they pleased.’” Clark, 638 F.3d at 93 (quoting Stanford v. State of Texas, 379

U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (discussing how abusive use of general warrants contributed to

Revolution and, thereafter, to demand for the Fourth Amendment)).

As observed by the First Circuit,

The focus in a warrant application is usually on whether the suspect
committed a crime and whether evidence of the crime is to be found
at his home or business. That hardly makes the address unimportant:
to invade the wrong location is a serious matter. But so long as the
affidavit itself asserts a link between the suspect and the address, it
is easy to understand how both the officer applying for the warrant
and the [judge] might overlook a lack of detail on a point often estab-
lished by the telephone book or the name on a mailbox.

United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Indeed, a

simple Google search 2 of the target address results in a list of various sources identifying

Jeffery Reed as the person connected with the residence. The failure of the Affiant to

2
Seehttps://www.google.com/search?q=1234+wayne+419+williamsville+mo&rlz=1C1GCEA_e
nUS1106US1107&q=1234+wayne&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqBwgAEAAYgAQyBwgAEAAYg
AQyBggBEEUYOTIICAIQABgWGB4yCAgDEAAYFhgeMggIBBAAGBYYHjIICAUQABg
WGB4yCAgGEAAYFhgeMg0IBxAAGIYDGIAEGIoFMg0ICBAAGIYDGIAEGIoFMg0ICRA
AGIYDGIAEGIoF0gEKMTQwMTVqMGoxNagCCLACAfEFGF2PxaFL9sTxBRhdj8WhS_bE
&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 (last visited Feb. 25, 2026).
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directly state that the premises located at 1234 Wayne 419 was in fact Reed’s residence

and farm is more akin to a clerical error. The preferred practice is for the owner or

occupant of property to be included in the property description of a Search Warrant.

The Fourth Amendment requires that a valid search warrant particularly describe

the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

The appropriate test for determining particularity is set out in United States v. Gitcho, 601

F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1979). The description of the place to be searched is sufficient if it is

described with sufficient particularity as to enable the executing officer to locate and

identify the premises with reasonable effort and whether there is any reasonable

probability that another location may be mistakenly searched. Id at 371. The Court should

consider the total circumstances surrounding the case in determining whether a warrant

fails for lack of particularity. United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 346 (8th Cir. 2011)

(emphasis added).

“[T]here must be evidence of a nexus between the contraband and the place to be

searched before a warrant may properly issue.” United States v. Tellez, 217 F.3d 547,

550 (8th Cir. 2000). Reed alleges the primary infirmity of the affidavit relates to the

issuing judge’s inference that there was a “fair probability that contraband or evidence

of a crime [would] be found” at the location specified in the Search Warrant when the

affidavit did not present facts to indicate that location was in fact Reed’s residence and a

place the suspected contraband would likely be found.

One case Reed relies upon in support of this argument is United States v. Rose,

wherein the Sixth Circuit concluded that although the search warrant identified the

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defendant as the subject of the search at a specific address, the attached affidavit did not

include the address. 714 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2013). Those facts are dissimilar to what

occurred in this case. Rose held that the search warrant “tenuously linked the property

to Rose” in that the defendant’s name preceded the address and the physical description

of the address notated that the name “Rose” appeared over the doorbell for apartment

number one. Id. at 366. Nowhere in the affidavit, however, did the affiant provide

Rose’s address. Id. at 364. The Sixth Circuit found that the affidavit did not provide

probable cause for a search of the listed address, because “[t]here is no way to read the

affidavit and to conclude that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis for thinking

that there was a fair probability that evidence of the crimes described in the affidavit

would be found at [the address listed in the search warrant]. Id. at 366. Next, the Sixth

Circuit determined that the good-faith exception applied because exclusion would

demand “a hyper-technical reading of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” That

exception will be discussed in section II.B.

The Eighth Circuit has observed that “[a]s a matter of common sense, it is logical

to infer that someone in possession of valuable contraband would store that contraband

in a safe, accessible location such as his or her residence.” United States v. Carpenter,

341 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2003). Likewise, it is reasonable to infer that clothing a

person wore and items he recently purchased would be found at the person’s home.

Such inferences have “common sense appeal” that is routinely accepted by an issuing

judge, making it “not entirely unreasonable for [an officer] to believe the inference

permissible.” Id. at 672. See also United States v. Mahler, 141 F.3d 811, 813-14 (8th

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Cir. 1998) (where search warrants issued for multiple locations “issuing judge could

reasonably infer that [storage] units were leased by either of the suspects whose drug

activities were outlined in the [remainder] of the affidavits,” including their drug

activities at a shared apartment that was searched, their joint ownership of a van that

was used to transport drugs, and fact the men had leased certain storage units although

the affidavit did not specify who leased each of the three units).

The Government offered the following to show that the description of the place to

be searched was facially sufficient:

In this instance the search warrant itself states clearly and unequivocally
that the location to be searched is “1234 Wayne 419, Williamsville, Missouri
63967. It is described as a single-story residence that faces west. There is an
outbuilding located southwest of the property. A driveway leads from County
Road 419 to the east portion of the premises which leads to a large barn/shop.”
GE # 1 at 1. That description provides sufficient detail that an officer unfamiliar
with the location could locate 1234 Wayne County Road 419, Williamsville
Missouri, 63967, with a reasonable amount of effort. The description is also
specific enough to prevent someone mistaking another location for the target
address.

(Doc. 47 at 5-6.) Regarding the nexus between Reed’s residence and the evidence

sought, the Government added:

The entirety of the facts in the affidavit clearly point to Reed as the
principle suspect in the arson fire. The affidavit states that the “suspect of an
arson investigation”, who based on the information in the affidavit, was
indisputably Jeff Reed, was “located at the premises” that they sought to
search. The rest of the affidavit goes to great lengths to establish the probable
cause to believe that Reed is in fact the arsonist. The victim told officers that
there was “one particular person who had a conflict with him; Jeff Reed.” Reed
had an ongoing financial dispute with the victim, knew that the victim kept a
large amount of cash in the safe, which had been cut open, had threatened the

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victim because he believed the victim had flirted with Reed’s wife, and had
bought a total of 30 Orion road flares, the same type of flares discovered at
the scene of the arson fires, under suspicious circumstances in two separate
incidents. Nothing other than a vivid imagination could lead one to conclude
from the application and affidavit that the investigators were looking at anyone
other than Jeff Reed as the possible arsonist at that point in time.

The affidavit then goes on to state that “Reed owns a farm approximately
two nautical miles” from the scene of the arson. The description of the target
premises in both the affidavit and the warrant as including a “primary residence,
entire land, any and all outbuildings, shops, barns, or sheds” is certainly consistent
with the target address being a farm. The fact that Reed and Buffington had a
barter agreement where Reed used Buffington’s farm equipment also supports the
conclusion that Reed’s premises was a farm, and in reasonably close proximity to
Buffington’s in order to make the use of Buffington’s farm equipment a practical
arraignment between the two men.

Reed’s statement to the investigators that Buffington’s farm hand Jimmy
Freeman had called him the morning of the fire and threatened him, showing up “a
short time later” at Reed’s residence, is consistent with Reed’s farm being in close
proximity to the scene of the arson where Freeman worked. Reed’s admission that
he had “exited his home” at 3:00 am with a rifle to hide in the tree line when he
thought that Freeman had shown up to carry out his threats is also consistent with
Reed residing at the rural property as described in the warrant.

Id. at 7-8.

The Search Warrant sought authority to search for items of evidence “that could

potentially lead to further details surrounding the arson investigation in that the described

items could incriminate or exclude possible witnesses/suspects.” (Doc. 39-2 at 1-2, 7.)

The list of items to be searched for fell into three categories: 1) documentary evidence

whether in paper or electronic form (on computers and cell phones, vehicle GPS devices),

2) items that could have been used to commit the arson including the items Reed

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purchased from Menard’s, or their packaging (i.e., Gorilla tape, Orion Flares and related

packaging, lighters, chemical and utility gloves); and, 3) clothing items that could have

been worn during the arson and when Reed purchased the flares and other materials at

Menards. Id.

Arson was the crime under investigation. The details in the Affidavit suggest

Reed had a financial and personal motive to commit arson at Buff Beef. The Affidavit

discussed the dispute between Reed and Buffington. Reed did not deny that he and

Buffington had a dispute when interviewed by law enforcement. As to the first category

of evidence, common sense suggests that financial records and other documents, whether

in paper or electronic form, may contain information relevant to the investigation.

Similarly, GPS data in vehicles that could have been used during travel to Menards or the

location of the arson would also be relevant. Regarding the second and third categories

of evidence, items that could have been used to commit arson would be pertinent to the

investigation including physical items like the flares, lighters, and gloves, as well as

clothes worn during the purchase of said items or use of the items during the arson.

Further discussion regarding the request to search for computers, other electronic

smart devices, and cellular phones is warranted. Several such items were seized during

the search, including two cell phones, one computer, two laptops, two flash drives, and one

hard drive were seized pursuant to the warrant. Reed argues that the Affidavit fails to

establish that the premises to be searched contain “computers or other electronic devices

belonging to Reed,” and offers no suggestion “that Reed used electronic devices to

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commit the alleged arson or stored information relating to that suspected crime thereon.”

(Doc. 39-1 at 14.)

The Government explained that there was a sufficient connection between the

arson and electronic devices, as well as documentary evidence, and a fair probability

those items would be located at Reed’s residence. The Government’s argument on this

point is set out below.

The warrant sought to locate and seize “computers and other
electronic smart devices (Including cellular phones)” as well as “any written
notes/documentation pertaining to information leading up to or explaining the
arson”. The affidavit discusses the financial dispute between Reed and the
victim which involved a significant amount of money and resulted in the send-
ing of invoices and demands for payment back and forth. People commonly keep
such records in both paper and electronic form, which would reside on computers
and other electronic devices in their homes and places of business.

Evidence of the financial dispute, as well as evidence of Reed’s financial
status generally, relates in part to Reed’s motivation to commit the crime. Reed
was apparently in financial difficulty, as evidenced by his desire to cancel the
barter agreement and get cash instead, Reed believed that Buffington owed him a
large sum of money, knew that the victim kept a large sum of money in the safe at
the farm, and the safe had been blowtorched open but nothing was stolen, as the
money had been removed prior to the fire. Judge Schrum reasonably concluded
that there was probable cause to believe evidence of this nature would be located
both in paper records and electronic media such as computer devices and
electronic memory storage devices at Reed’s.

(Doc. 47 at 10.)

The Affidavit did not include any statements about the Affiant’s training and

experience related to the use of such items by criminals in the commission of crimes.

These days, it is rare for law enforcement officers searching a person or place to not find

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cell phones and electronic devices. It was reasonable for both the issuing judge and

Affiant to infer an individual suspected of committing an arson may possess cell phones

and other electronic devices containing information related to the crime under

investigation, especially where the suspected arsonist and victim were engaged in a

financial dispute. Probable cause does not require conclusive evidence that links a

particular place or item to a crime. United States v. Anderson, 450 F.3d 294, 303 (7th

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “Rather, issuing judges may draw reasonable inferences

about where evidence is likely to be found based on the nature of the evidence and the

offense.” United States v. Zamudio, 909 F.3d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 2018). In other words,

“[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require certainty that a search will uncover the

sought-after evidence; a fair probability is enough.” United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d

940, 946 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2010).

Although several electronic devices were seized pursuant to the Search Warrant, a

search of those devices would have required additional authority. The record is devoid of

information regarding whether the devices were searched. No motions have been filed to

challenge any searches of those devices.

In reviewing the Affidavit, due deference is afforded to the issuing judge’s

probable cause finding by examining the “cumulative meaning” of all the information

presented. As argued by the Government, Reed was the central suspect of the

investigation. The investigation revealed that Reed and Buffington were both farmers

and lived a short distance apart in rural Wayne County. The pair had an ongoing dispute

over money that began approximately one year before the fire. Additionally, Reed

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threatened Buffington’s life due to Buffington flirting with Reed’s wife. While they were

friends, Reed learned that Buffington typically kept between $50,000 to $100,000 in a

safe at Buff Beef. This was something few people knew. Reed was also familiar with

the layout of the buildings, safe, and equipment at the farm. Buffington reported that he

removed the money prior to the fire. The safe was reportedly opened with a torch but

nothing was believed to have been removed from the safe during the arson. Use of a

torch to open the safe is an indication the person who wanted access to the contents did

not have the combination. Reed’s description of his property during his interaction with

one of Buffington’s farmhands the morning of the fire is consistent with the premises

described in the Search Warrant. One of the most significant details supporting probable

cause for a search of Reed’s property is that surveillance footage from the local Menards

showed Reed purchasing a total of thirty Orion flares, like those found throughout the

scene of the arson, within between one and three weeks before the fire was set at Buff

Beef.

At the conclusion of the Affidavit, the Affiant stated “[b]ased on the foregoing, I

have probable cause to believe that evidence related to the crime currently under

investigation is located on the described premises.” (Doc. 39-2 at 7.) The Affidavit

noted that the investigation was related to the arson, and the premises was where “a

suspect” of the investigation was located. Id. at 3. The information within the four

corners of the Affidavit pointed toward Reed being that suspect.

On the facts presented here, the issuing judge had a “substantial basis” for

authorizing the Search Warrant. While minimally stated, there was a factual basis for the

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issuing judge to infer that when the Affiant stated the “crime under investigation involves

a suspect of an arson investigation located at the premises of 1234 Wayne 419,” the

Affiant was referring to Jeffery Reed as the suspect of the investigation and identifying

the premises as Reed’s property. This Court does not condone the Affiant’s failure to

directly state that Reed was connected to the target premises. The best practice would

have been for the Affiant to articulate his basis of knowledge, which would have avoided

this issue.

Considering all the information set forth in the Affidavit, the issuing judge had a

“substantial basis” 1) to infer that Reed had a connection to the premises at 1234 Wayne

419, and 2) to find that there was probable cause to believe the items sought may be

found at the premises.

II.B. Good faith

Alternatively, the undersigned will assume that the infirmities alleged in the

Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, viewed collectively, were not sufficient to

demonstrate a nexus between Reed, the location, and the contraband.

Under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the question of whether an

officer’s reliance on an issued warrant was objectively reasonable is a question of law.

United States v. Carpenter, 341 F.3d 666, 668 (8th Cir. 2003). Reed claims this

exception does not apply because the Affidavit contained “no discussion or factual

connection to the premises” and the lack of nexus “would have been apparent to

reasonable officers precluding application of the ‘good faith’ exception…” (Doc. 39-1 at

17.) Reed also anticipated he would rely on “evidence to be adduced at the forthcoming

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evidentiary hearing.” (Doc. 48 at 4.) Considering the entire record, it is likely Reed

expected to cross-examine the Affiant about the alleged omissions highlighted in his

Supplemental Brief and the Motion for Franks hearing that was filed after the deadline

for filing pretrial motions.

Reed correctly stated that the “good faith” exception does not apply in any of the

following scenarios: (1) where the affiant deliberately or recklessly misled the judge; (2)

where the judge wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) where the warrant affidavit

is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

entirely unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient that no police

officer could reasonably presume it valid. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923

(1984). Under Leon, “evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant that is later found

to be invalid is not suppressed if the executing officers reasonably relied in good faith on

the issuing court’s determination of probable cause and technical sufficiency.” United

States v. Herron, 215 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922).

As to the first scenario, there is no evidence the Affiant deliberately or recklessly

misled the judge. The Affiant summarized important details about the arson under

investigation, the relationship between Reed and Buffington, as well as how Reed had

motive and opportunity to commit the arson. No argument was presented in support of

the second scenario.

Reed’s attack engages the third “good faith” scenario. In assessing whether an

affidavit lacks indicia of probable cause rendering official belief in it unreasonable, a

reviewing court is “bound by the four corners of the affidavit, and [ ] may not consider

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what the officer executing the warrant knew or believed.” Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 367. 3

Reed relies on United States v. Herron, wherein the Government conceded on

appeal that the search warrant for the defendant’s residence was not supported by

probable cause. 215 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2000). In that case, law enforcement used the

same affidavit to apply for Search Warrants to be executed at Herron’s residence and his

brother’s residence, the Buck farm. The Eighth Circuit concluded that although “the

same affidavit can support probable cause at more than one location, here the affidavits

were designed to support a search warrant for the Buck farm and applied to the Herron

residence as an afterthought.” Id. at 815. Herron observed that “the affidavits barely

touch on the Herron residence or Mr. Herron and then only in a way incidental to the

Buck investigation.” Id. at 814. The previous section conducted a detailed analysis of

how the instant Affidavit had a sufficient nexus between Reed and the place to be

searched as well as evidence to be seized. The circumstances in this case are

distinguishable from Herron.

Reed also relies on the Rose case, discussed above. Rose concluded there was an

insufficient nexus between the place to be searched and the suspect, but concluded that

“[f]inding the good-faith exception does not apply in this case because the affidavit failed

to provide the address listed on the warrant would be a hyper-technical reading of the

requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” 714 F.3d 362, 367. Rose and the instant case

3
The Court notes that two of the references relied upon by Reed (Troxel and Chong) as to
the Government’s burden to present evidence do not properly state the holdings of those
cases. See Doc. 58 at 3.
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are similar in that “the failure to link evidence of criminal activity to the address searched

was really a by-product of the fact that the affidavit ‘completely neglect[ed] to indicate

why the affiant believed that [the defendant] himself had any connection with the

[address].’” Id. at 369 (quoting United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 336). It is

true that the instant Affidavit failed to directly state a link between Reed and 1234 Wayne

419, Waynesville, Missouri. That said, the Affiant articulated a belief that evidence

relevant to the arson investigation would be found at the described premises where “a

suspect” of the investigation was located and Reed was the only suspect discussed. There

was considerable information supporting that Reed had motive, opportunity, and

possession of the items used to commit the arson at Buff Beef based on his purchase of

thirty Orion flares within the two weeks prior to the fire. Like the Rose court concluded

rather than raising “fears of police misconduct, this case merely raises concerns about

sloppiness in drafting affidavits within” the agency responsible for drafting it. 714 F.3d

362, 369 (6th Cir. 2013).

The Court in Leon determined that “the exclusionary rule is designed to deter

police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges…,” and that “there exists no

evidence suggesting that judges [ ] are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth

Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme

sanction of exclusion.” United States v. Carpenter, 341 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). The distinction in motivations between neutral and

detached judges compared to law enforcement officers “‘who are engaged in the often

competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’” is important as it led the Supreme Court

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to hold “that the exclusionary rule could be modified to permit the admission of evidence

seized by officers who act in objectively reasonable, good faith reliance upon issued

warrants.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 922).

In Procopio, FBI investigation of a robbery led agents to secure arrest warrants

for two of the suspects along with a search warrant for 79 Intervale, which was believed

to be the residence of one of the suspects, Kiley. 88 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1996). When they

arrived at that location, they learned that Kiley lived in unit 81 Intervale which was on the

third floor of the same building as unit 79. An amended warrant was issued upon

application by an agent who relayed that she had been advised that the correct address for

Kiley was 81 Intervale rather than 79. The district court found the warrant should not have

been issued because nothing in the affidavit established that Kiley lived at 81 Intervale,

however, the good faith exception applied. In its de novo review, the First Circuit

observed that “the only omission was to explain how the agent—who had ample basis for

the contention—knew that ‘81 Intervale’ was ‘Kiley’s address.’” Id. The First Circuit

applied Leon concluding “[w]hether or not this is a defect in the application, it is hardly

blatant, nor is there any suggestion (or basis for a suggestion) of actual bad faith. Id. The

Affiant minimally articulated that the target residence belonged to Reed. While he could

have directly stated the connection, there is no suggestion that his failure to do so was in

actual bad faith. Nor does it provide a basis to preclude application of the good faith

exception.

Reed also complains that the Search Warrant was “facially deficient” as it

authorized officers to search the property for evidence of a “homicide” instead of an

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arson case. (Doc. 39-1 at 17.) The undersigned finds that reference to a homicide

investigation was a clerical error as every other time the investigation is described, the

crime being investigated is described as arson. The Affidavit provided that “[t]he crime

under investigation involves a suspect of an arson investigation…” (Doc. 39-2 at 3.) In

the list of items to be seized, which appears in the Affidavit and the Search Warrant,

number two is related to “explaining the arson,” number eight is “any clothing. . .related

to the arson investigation,” number ten expresses all the items “could potentially lead to

further details surrounding this arson investigation…” Id. at 1, 7. “There was no

ambiguity on the face of the warrant, much less fatal ambiguity that would have made

execution of the warrant objectively unreasonable.” Carpenter, 341 F.3d at 673.

The Affidavit did not contain false or misleading information. The absence of

various pieces of information identified by Reed did not mislead the judge who issued

the Search Warrant. Reed was identified as a suspect of the arson investigation.

Additionally, the items to be searched for were expected to “lead to further details

surrounding the arson investigation in that the described items could incriminate or

exclude possible witnesses/suspects.” (Doc. 39-2 at 7.)

The contents of the Affidavit relayed that Reed was a suspect in the arson

investigation who had motive to harm Buffington based on their falling out, Reed’s

concern Buffington was interested in his wife, and their money dispute, plus Reed’s

recent possession of items that were the same brand as those used in the subject arson.

These facts were thoroughly described in the affidavit satisfying the “not so lacking”

standard necessary for Leon’s good faith exception to be applied. The undersigned

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“cannot say it was entirely unreasonable for [the Affiant] to rely on the issuing [judg]e’s

willingness to infer the requisite nexus. Carpenter, 341 F.3d at 672 at n.3 (citing United

States v. Allen, 297 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 2002).

Based on the foregoing, should the Search Warrant be found to not support the

issuing judge’s probable cause finding, the undersigned alternatively recommends that

the good faith exception be applied.

II.C. Franks challenge

Next, Reed challenges the validity of the Search Warrant under the rationale

of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). To succeed in a Franks challenge based on

omissions of fact, a defendant must “prove first that facts were omitted with the intent to make, or

in reckless disregard of whether they make, the affidavit misleading, and, second, that the affidavit,

if supplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding of probable cause.” Allen,

297 F.3d at 795. (Citation omitted.) Mere negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient to

void a warrant. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.

Reed argues that the Affiant was “married to Mr. Buffington’s daughter. . .and has

at least two children with her” making him a prior son-in-law. (Doc. 60 at 2.) Reed

claims that the Affiant’s participation in the investigation was in violation of MSHP

Rules because his involvement “had a significant potential for a conflict of interest,

created the appearance of a conflict, raised a question of his impartiality” in that he may

have financial interests in assisting Buffington. Id. at 3-4. He claims this omission “had

a significant bearing on the credibility of the facts provided in the Affidavit” supporting

an inference of recklessness “even if the omission was not intentional.” Id. at 4. To

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support this argument, Reed cites a number of cases that examine informant credibility

issues which are inapplicable here as the “informant’s” were not law enforcement

officers. He asserted that if the Affiant had disclosed his familial relationship with Mr.

Buffington, the issuing judge “may have inferred” the Affiant’s information “was biased

and /or the product of improper motivations….” Id. at 6.

Reed attached MSHP Rules of Conduct for Employees Number 26-02-2174 issued

on December 4, 2025, after the offense date in this matter. Assuming similar rules were

in place prior to August 25, 2023, the undersigned is not persuaded there was a violation

of the rules of conduct. The fire at Buff Beef resulted in a multi-agency collaborative

effort to find who was responsible for the crime. Securing a Search Warrant for one of

the primary suspects who recently made a large purchase of the exact brand of flares used

in the fire under investigation was a necessary part of the investigation. Although the

Affiant was a former son-in-law of the victim, the circumstances presented do not raise

questions related to the prohibited conduct cited in the MSHP Rules of Conduct.

Reed also argues that the Affiant further misled the issuing judge by omitting

additional “suspicious circumstances” from the Affidavit, including:

(1) that Mr. Buffington removed the surveillance cameras from his property
shortly before the fire, supposedly for “yearly maintenance”;

(2) the suspicious timing of when Mr. Buffington removed of the cash contents of
his safe prior to the arson—approximately three days beforehand—while the
Affidavit only notes that he “had taken it out”;

(3) that investigators executed a Google Geo-Fence search warrant and determined

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that only one cellular device was present at the Buffington Property during the
suspected commission of the arson—a device that “stays near or at Jimmy
Freeman’s residence”—which is located on the same property;

(4) that Freeman’s son, Eric Freeman, had previously set one of Mr. Buffington’s
barns on fire, and then stole a pistol from him, according to Mr. Buffington
himself; and

(5) that Mr. Buffington’s son, Ryan Buffington, told investigators he knows Reed
well and did not suspect Reed was involved in the arson; “he couldn’t even see
Reed asking or telling anyone to do something like this”, according to the
investigator’s report.

Id. at 6-7. Reed argues that the above information “points toward Mr. Buffington and/or

Mr. Freeman as the perpetrator(s) of the arson” and that including the “information would

preclude a finding of probable cause.” Id. at 7. Finally, “on information and belief”

Reed claims that the Affiant first presented the warrant application to another judge “who

refused to authorize the warrant” in Wayne County resulting in the Affiant presenting it

to a “more distant judge. . .in Iron County.” Id. Notably, Reed failed to present any

affidavits or documentation to support any of the above contentions.

The Government responded that Reed’s Motion to Suppress related “solely to the

sufficiency of the search warrant documents, particularly the Affidavit” and when the

Government simply offered the Search Warrant documents at the hearing Reed objected.

(Doc. 62 at 3.) The Government asserts that the “reason for [objecting] was because

they apparently intended to engage in either a discovery deposition, or just general

impeachment of the affiant.” Id.

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In opposition to the Government’s explanation regarding why there was no need

for testimony, defense counsel stated:

…that's exactly what this hearing would be, to show all of the omissions
that were not in the affidavit that we think are very significant, not the least
of which is upon information and belief, I believe this affiant is actually the
son-in-law of the alleged victim in this case, which would make him the
grandfather of the alleged victim of this crime, which was not – which was
not stated in the affidavit, which I think on itself is a very significant piece of
information and goes to bias and goes to the bias as to how he would come upon
Mr. Reed as a suspect and leaving out these other individuals that are equally
plausible suspects just on the face of things.”

(Hearing Transcript, Doc. 55 at 4-5.)

The Government now argues “[i]t is painfully obvious from counsel’s comments

in this respect that the intended cross examination of the affiant was solely about getting

traction for a defense at trial – finding bias and posturing for an alternate perpetrator

theory – and not about an attack upon the validity of the search warrant affidavit…”

(Doc. 62 at 3.) When the undersigned inquired of defense counsel as to the fact a Franks

hearing had not been requested, defense counsel acknowledged that was true. (Doc. 55 at

6.)

Reed now asks leave file his Motion for Franks Hearing out of time. It appears

the Motion was not filed prior to the hearing so that the alleged omissions could be used

as cross-examination material on the good faith argument. Even so, Reed will be granted

leave to file the Motion out-of-time.

In Franks, the Supreme Court cautioned that, only in certain circumstances, the

Fourth Amendment will entitle a defendant to an evidentiary hearing regarding the

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accuracy of a search warrant affidavit. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. Therefore, a

defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks. “There is

… a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting [a] search warrant.”

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. A defendant’s conclusory allegations of false or omitted

information are insufficient. Id. “

“The ‘substantial preliminary showing’ requirement needed to obtain a Franks

hearing is not lightly met.” United States v. Milton, 153 F.3d 891 at 896. Indeed, in

Franks, the Supreme Court was careful to articulate what it meant by a substantial

preliminary showing:

To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be
more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to
cross-examine. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of
reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied
by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the
warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied
by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise
reliable statement of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence
explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.
The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is
permitted...is only that of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant.

438 U.S. at 171. (emphasis added)

The Government argued that:

…Reed seeks to do precisely what Franks prohibits, namely, to cross exam-
ine the affiant in an effort to find ammunition to use in his defense. A careful
examination of Reed’s claimed basis for his need for a Franks hearing discloses
two classes of alleged omissions, things which were disclosed to the defendant in
discovery more than a year before and recently discovered items which Reed now
claims were “omitted intentionally or recklessly to mislead the magistrate.”

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(Doc. 62 at 5-6.)

To resolve the Motion, the undersigned will assume without finding that the information

was omitted with reckless disregard to whether it made the Affidavit misleading. In making that

finding, the undersigned must next consider whether supplementing the Affidavit with the

information would result in a lack of probable cause. First, the Affiant’s status as the former son-

in-law to Mr. Buffington does not impact the probable cause analysis. The Affiant also failed to

mention that in addition to the MSHP, the ATF, Wayne County Sheriff’s Office, and the

Missouri Fire Marshals Office were collaborating in the investigation. Including the Affiant’s

relationship to Buffington and the involvement of multiple agencies in the investigation does not

negate the probable cause finding.

The parties agree there was a dispute between Buffington and Reed, giving Reed motive to

commit arson at Buff Beef. The Affiant included the fact the surveillance cameras at Buff Beef

had been removed although it was not clear that the removal occurred three days before the fire.

That information does not reduce the probable cause determination.

The three remaining omissions include: 1) results from a geofence search warrant that

showed a single person (one of Buffington’s farmhands) was in the vicinity of the arson during the

time frame of the arson, 2) Mr. Buffington’s son’s opinion that he couldn’t imagine Reed was

responsible for the fire, and 3) fact that the farmhand’s son had previously set one of Mr.

Buffington’s barns on fire and stolen a pistol from him in the past. These are pieces of information

that will surely be discussed at trial, however, the addition of this information would not eliminate

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the probable cause finding.

At bottom, the highlighted omissions do not reduce the strength of the information

supporting the issuing judge’s probable cause finding. In particular, the dispute between

Buffington and Reed as to money and Reed’s wife, Reed’s apparent financial difficulties, and the

video-recordings from Menard’s that show Reed purchased the exact type of flares used in the

fire at Buff Beef. The purchases were on two separate dates within the three weeks preceding the

fire. This information enabled the issuing judge to conclude that Reed had motive and the

opportunity to commit the arson in question.

In summary, the undersigned concludes that supplementing the Affidavit with the

omissions cited does eliminate probable cause. Thus, Reed failed to meet the requirements

under Franks. Reed’s Motion for Franks Hearing should be denied.

II.D. Statements

Reed also requests that statements he made following the execution of the Search

Warrant be suppressed. He did not argue that his statements were involuntary or that

there was a violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-450 (1966), thus those

issues are not considered.

“[T]he exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct

result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and found to be

derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” United States v. Riesselman,

646 F.3d 1072, 1078 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804

(1984)). “[T]he defendant bears the initial burden of establishing the factual nexus

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between the constitutional violation and the challenged evidence.” United States v.

Marasco, 487 F.3d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 2007).

The undersigned concluded that Reed’s property was searched pursuant to a valid

Search Warrant. Because Reed has not shown that the search was unlawful, none of his

statements constitute fruit of the poisonous tree. See United States v. Goodale, 738 F.3d

917, 922 (8th Cir. 2013) (Where search of laptop did not violate Goodale’s constitutional

rights, his statements were not fruit of the poisonous tree.).

Reed’s request for suppression of his statements should be denied.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the Memorandum above,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

Evidence and Statements (Doc. 39) and Motion for a Franks Hearing (Doc. 59) be

denied.

Further, the parties are advised that they have fourteen days, or not later than

March 13, 2026, to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation, unless an

extension of time for good cause is obtained. Failure to file timely objections may result

in a waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356 (8th

Cir. 1990).

/s/ Abbie Crites-Leoni
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: February 27, 2026

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