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Reply to Document, Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation et al. v. Mnuchin, No. 1:20-cv-01002 (D.D.C.), Doc. 64 (May 19, 2020)

Summary

In the Chehalis Reservation, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and Ute Tribe cases against Steven Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury, the Alaska Native Village Corporation Association, Inc. and the Association of ANCSA Regional Corporation Presidents/CEO's, Inc. filed this reply in support of their motion to intervene. The reply states that the Court already granted their intervention in the two consolidated cases and asks the Court to grant it in Case No. 1:20-cv-1070-APM. It argues that the Ute Tribe mischaracterizes their standing arguments, that the Court's preliminary injunction findings do not resolve the merits, and that permissive intervention is appropriate. It states that the members' relief funds under Title V of the CARES Act are being withheld.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Cite this document

“Reply to Document, Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation et al. v. Mnuchin, No. 1:20-cv-01002 (D.D.C.), Doc. 64 (May 19, 2020).” Original at storage.courtlistener.com. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/reply-to-document-confederated-tribes-of-the-chehalis-reservation-et-a-81a09d092c/, SHA-256 d4deb333e113398ef7cc0d3839612c2f8e287becfcf97952a67cc94c6b66888c.

Full text

       Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 1 of 13



                    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE
CHEHALIS RESERVATION, et al.,

                    Plaintiffs,

      v.                                      Case No. 1:20-cv-1002-APM

STEVEN MNUCHIN, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the Treasury,

                    Defendant.

CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE et al.,

                    Plaintiffs,

      v.
                                              Case No. 1:20-cv-1059-APM
STEVEN MNUCHIN, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the Treasury,

                    Defendant.

UTE TRIBE OF THE UINTAH AND OURAY
RESERVATION,

                    Plaintiff,

      v.                                      Case No. 1:20-cv-1070-APM
STEVEN MNUCHIN, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the Treasury,

                    Defendant.


     REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGE CORPORATION
 ASSOCIATION, INC. AND ASSOCIATION OF ANCSA REGIONAL CORPORATION
            PRESIDENTS/CEO’S, INC. MOTION TO INTERVENE
         Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 2 of 13



                                       INTRODUCTION

       Proposed Intervenor-Defendants, the Alaska Native Village Corporation Association, Inc.

(“ANVCA”) and Association of ANCSA Regional Corporation Presidents/CEO’s, Inc. (“ARA”)

(collectively, the “ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants”) hereby submit this reply in support

of their motion to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. There is no credible basis

to deny the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants intervention in this case. The Court has

already granted their intervention in the two consolidated cases, Nos. 1:20-cv-01002-APM and

1:20-cv-01059-APM. See Minute Order (May 13, 2020). Furthermore, the Court has not only

recognized that the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants have an interest in this case, but

also that they have an interest in moving swiftly given the significant injuries their members are

suffering now. See (Conf. Hr’g Tr. at 7:20-25) (“Now, I think the ANCs would take the view that

no matter what the amount is, the schedule ought to move quickly, because whether it’s a small

amount or a large amount, that amount is being withheld until this matter gets to a final judgment

or there’s an appeal and the Court of Appeals says otherwise.”).

       Rather than confront the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ arguments regarding

Article III standing and permissive intervention head on, Plaintiff Ute Tribe of the Uintah and

Ouray Reservation mischaracterizes those arguments and misapprehends relevant legal concepts

in its opposition. In particular, the Ute Tribe appears to argue that ANC Association Intervenor-

Defendants lack standing because the Court has already resolved the merits against them. But if

that were true, there would be no point in entertaining cross-motions for summary judgment. In

reality, the Court has merely offered its preliminary view of the law, and the ANC Association

Intervenor-Defendants’ members are being injured with each passing day that coronavirus relief

funds continue to be withheld. In essence, the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ standing
         Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 3 of 13



to intervene is self-evident, and nothing in the Ute Tribe’s opposition credibly suggests

otherwise.

       Elsewhere in its opposition, the Ute Tribe goes so far as asserting that because of its

sovereign immunity, no one belongs in this case other than the Plaintiffs and the Secretary of the

Treasury. This unsupported view of sovereign immunity would render Rule 24 a nullity in any

case brought by a sovereign entity. Not surprisingly, the Ute Tribe cites no authority to justify

doing away with Rule 24 in such circumstances. Finally, in opposing intervention as of right, the

Ute Tribe effectively converts the minimal burden of showing inadequate representation into a

presumption against intervention that can only be overcome by showing some sort of special

circumstances. There is no support in this Circuit’s precedents for this overly restrictive view of

the inadequate representation requirement.

       Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court should grant ANC

Association Intervenor-Defendants’ motion to intervene in Case No. 1:20-cv-1070-APM, as it

already has in the other two consolidated cases.




                                                   2
           Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 4 of 13



                                         ARGUMENT

I.     The ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants Have Standing to Intervene. 1

       The Ute Tribe does not contest two of the three elements for establishing associational

standing. See ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants Mot. to Intervene at 15-17. Its opposition

focuses only on the first element, whether “at least one member would have Article III standing

in his or her own right.” Cigar Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 323 F.R.D. 54, 64

(D.D.C. 2017). The Ute Tribe’s standing arguments fail because they rest on a

mischaracterization of the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ motion and a misreading of

the law.

       The Ute Tribe claims the motions to intervene are based “primarily on claims that they

have ‘638 contracts’ to survey land that they own.” Ute Tribe Opp. at 2. But the ANC

Association Intervenor-Defendants’ motion does not even mention 638 contracts in explaining

that the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants have standing to intervene because the standing

of their members, like with the Ute Tribe itself, is self-evident. See ANC Association Intervenor-

Defendants’ Mot. to Intervene at 14-15. The Ute Tribe seeks to nullify the Secretary of

Treasury’s determination that the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ members are eligible

for relief funds under Title V of the CARES Act. The economic harm that would result from



1
  Notably, in opposing the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ motion to intervene as of
right under Rule 24(a), the Ute Tribe does not dispute any of the ANC Association Intervenor-
Defendants’ arguments explaining why they have legally protectable interests that would be
impaired by the disposition of this case. See ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ Mot. to
Intervene at 7-11. That the Ute Tribe effectively concedes the ANC Association Intervenor-
Defendants meet the interests prongs under Rule 24(a) shows that its challenge to the ANC
Association Intervenor-Defendants’ standing is meritless. Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’'t
of the Interior, 584 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The standing inquiry is repetitive in the
case of intervention as of right because an intervenor who satisfies Rule 24(a) will also have
Article III standing.”) (citing Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir.
2003)).

                                                3
          Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 5 of 13



such nullification is sufficient to establish injury-in-fact for each of the ANCs that comprise the

ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants. See id. (quoting Crossroads Grassroots Policy

Strategies v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 788 F.3d 312, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2015), for its holding that

“[o]ur cases have generally found a sufficient injury in fact where a party benefits from agency

action, the action is then challenged in court, and then an unfavorable decision would remove the

party’s benefit”). Contrary to the Ute Tribe’s inexplicable allegation (at 2), there is no need for

the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants to “now switch to an assertion that they have

standing because they have money at stake in this case, based upon their interpretation of Title V

of the CARES Act.” This has been the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ argument all

along.

         Tellingly, the Ute Tribe does not even acknowledge the holding in Crossroads on which

the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ standing argument is based. Instead, it argues that

this case presents an “unusual fact scenario” because the “Court has reviewed [the proposed

intervenors’] claim of interest already.” Ute Tribe Opp. at 2. To state the obvious, the Ute Tribe

fundamentally misapprehends the nature of the Court’s findings on likelihood of success on the

merits during the preliminary injunction stage. The initial review conducted for a preliminary

injunction hardly amounts to a final decision on the merits of a claim, as this Court itself has

indicated. See (May 7 Tr. at 18:25-19:11) (“I haven’t prejudged the issue. . . Frankly, it doesn’t

make any sense to move directly to summary judgment briefing until I make a decision on the

intervention.”).

         Apart from its erroneous understanding of the legal effect of the Court’s findings during

the preliminary injunction stage, the Ute Tribe’s assertion that the ANC Association Intervenor-

Defendants lack standing because they already lost on the merits would wrongly collapse the



                                                  4
         Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 6 of 13



standing inquiry into the merits. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,

135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2015) (“[S]tanding ‘often turns on the nature and source of the claim

asserted,’ but it ‘in no way depends on the merits’ of the claim.”); Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. E.P.A.,

693 F.3d 169, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[W]e must find Article III standing before addressing the

merits of a case[.]”). Indeed, “[w]hether a plaintiff has a legally protected interest that supports

standing does not require that he show he will succeed on the merits; if it did, every merits loss

would amount to a lack of standing.” Estate of Boyland v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 913

F.3d 117, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

       Finally, the Ute Tribe’s reliance on Cobell v. Jewell falls flat, as Cobell and the cases

cited therein are inapposite. In each of those cases, the prospective intervenors’ interests in

reimbursements were “too conjectural” and “would crystalize only if the Court resolved a

threshold legal interpretation in a specific way.” Cobell v. Jewell, 2016 WL 10704595 at *1

(D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2016). Here, in sharp contrast, the Secretary has already determined that the

ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ members are eligible for relief funds under Title V of

the CARES Act, and those members are suffering injury each day that those funds are withheld

by operation of this Court’s preliminary injunction ruling. 2 Alaska Natives live in some of the

most impoverished regions in the country; some communities still do not have running water or

toilets. See Decl. of Michele Christiansen (ECF No. 45-17) ¶ 3; Decl. of Patrick McCarty ¶ 3

(ECF No. 45-18). And many Alaska Natives are either not enrolled to a federally recognized

tribe or live outside of their enrolled village. See Decl. of Aaron M. Schutt (ECF No. 45-1) ¶ 12;


2
  Indeed, as confirmed by government counsel at the May 8, 2020 preliminary injunction hearing
in Agua Caliente , No. 1:20-cv-01136-APM, the Secretary has announced that each ANC will, at
minimum, receive $100,000. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Coronavirus Relief Fund Allocations
to Tribal Governments (May 5, 2020), at 3, available at
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Coronavirus-Relief-Fund-Tribal-Allocation-
Methodology.pdf.

                                                  5
         Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 7 of 13



Decl. of Sophie Minich (ECF No. 45-6) ¶ 6) see Decl. of Sheri Buretta (ECF No. 45-5) ¶ 3. As

such, they do not receive health care or social services from such entities. See Schutt Decl. (ECF

No. 45-1) ¶ 13); Minich Decl. (ECF No., 45-6) ¶ 6-7.

       In Alaska, a considerable number of Alaska Natives rely on ANCs to provide numerous

social services and community support more traditionally provided in the lower 48 states by

tribes, including assistance with housing, food, and health care. See, e.g., Decl. of Clifford Blair

(ECF No. 45-10) ¶¶ 3-4; Minich Decl. (ECF No. 45-6) ¶¶ 7-13; Decl. of Nancy Andrew (ECF

No. 45-8) ¶ 3; Decl. of Richard Glenn (ECF No. 45-3) ¶ 5. Without access to the coronavirus

relief funds under Title V of the CARES Act, many of the ANC Association Intervenor-

Defendants’ members will be severely limited in their ability to provide these services, which are

desperately needed by their members in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g.,

Christiansen Decl. (ECF No., 45-17) ¶¶ 3-8 & 11; Decl. of Robert Mills (ECF No. 45-19) ¶ 7;

Glenn Decl. (ECF No. 45-3) ¶¶ 4-9 & 12; Buretta Decl. (ECF No. 45-5) ¶ 5; Decl. of Wayne

Westlake (ECF No. 45-7) ¶ 5; Blair Decl. (ECF No. 45-10) ¶ 6. Fisheries in many Alaska

villages also stand to be negatively impacted, leaving the local populations that depend on them

for subsistence in need of assistance, which again will be lacking if their ANCs do not receive

Title V funds. See, e.g., Barlow Decl. (ECF No. 45-15) ¶ 3; Herndon Decl. (ECF No. 45-12) ¶ 5.

       As their declarations illustrate, the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ members’

interests in coronavirus relief funding have already crystallized and the injuries they are suffering

are not conjectural in the least. The Court’s preliminary injunction has necessarily worked to

enhance those injuries because it prevents the immediate disbursement of much-needed relief for

many Alaska Natives.

II.    Permissive Intervention is Appropriate.



                                                  6
         Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 8 of 13



        The Court has already allowed the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants to intervene

in the two consolidated cases. There can be no serious doubt that the ANC Association

Intervenor-Defendants satisfy the requirements for permissive intervention, and each of the Ute

Tribe’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.

        At the outset, the Ute Tribe completely ignores the ANC Association Intervenor-

Defendants’ argument regarding the Court’s independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction.

See ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ Mot. to Intervene at 17 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367

and Butte County, Cal. v. Hogen, No. 08-519, 2008 WL 2410407, at *2 (D.D.C. June 16, 2008)

(discussing federal supplemental jurisdiction statute)). Jurisdiction exists by virtue of the ANC

Association Intervenor-Defendants defending against the APA claim brought by plaintiffs, and

Butte County confirms that this satisfies the requirement that there be an independent ground for

subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Ute Tribe’s claim that each proposed intervenor provided

only a “cursory and conclusory sentence that this Court has jurisdiction over their ‘defenses’ or

their ‘defenses and arguments’” to establish that the Court has an independent ground for subject

matter jurisdiction is inapt.

        The Ute Tribe’s argument boils down to the notion that it has alleged that only the

Secretary has violated a statute and that the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants have not

shown that they could be subject to a claim that they (or any of their members) are violating a

federal statute. The D.C. Circuit, however, has “eschewed strict readings of the phrase ‘claim or

defense,’ allowing intervention even in ‘situations where the existence of any nominate claim or

defense is difficult to find.’” EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir.

1998). Consequently, courts in this Circuit routinely allow entities to intervene, both as of right

and permissively, to help defend governmental action despite the lack of any claim that the



                                                  7
         Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 9 of 13



proposed intervenors are themselves violating a statute. See, e.g., Washington All. of Tech.

Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2019) (allowing

business organizations to intervene and defend a challenge to Department of Homeland

Security’s authority to implement certain employment regulations); Safari Club Int’l v. Jewell,

No. CV 14-0670 (ABJ), 2015 WL 13651265, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2015) (allowing

conservation groups to intervene and defend regulatory action taken by Fish and Wildlife

Service); Associated Dog Clubs of N.Y. State v. Vilsack, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2014)

(allowing Humane Society to intervene and defend a challenge to Department of Agriculture rule

regarding animal licensing requirements).

        The Ute Tribe’s sovereign immunity argument likewise misses the mark entirely. No

counterclaim has been raised by any of the proposed intervenors, so any case addressing whether

sovereign immunity shields a plaintiff from an intervenor’s counterclaims is irrelevant. More to

the point, the Ute Tribe cites nothing to support its peculiar assertion that it has only chosen to

waive that immunity to litigate against the Secretary alone. To agree with the Ute Tribe would

require this Court to find that sovereign immunity somehow precludes any entities from

intervening under Rule 24 altogether in any case brought by a sovereign entity. There is no such

restriction either in Rule 24 or case law interpreting it, and this Court should reject the Ute

Tribe’s attempts to rewrite the rule to its liking.

        Finally, granting the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants permissive intervention

would not unduly delay or prejudice the Ute Tribe. Unsurprisingly, the Ute Tribe never actually

states that the burden of responding to one additional brief on the merits—on the very timeline it

previously asked this Court for, see Joint Status Report 3-4, ECF No. 44—would unduly delay or

prejudice this case. It would not. For one thing, the Court has already directed all proposed



                                                      8
        Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 10 of 13



intervenors to file a single motion for summary judgment. Minute Order (May 13, 2020). And, in

any event, Center For Biological Diversity v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,

274 F.R.D. 305, 305 (D.D.C. 2011), on which the Ute Tribe relies to try to show that the ANC

Association Intervenor-Defendants’ participation in this case would not be helpful, does not help

the Ute Tribe. There, the putative intervenor sought to introduce matters that were not even at

issue in the case. Id. at 312. Here, by contrast, the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants seek

to defend and bolster the Secretary’s interpretation of the CARES Act. The ANC Association

Intervenor-Defendants do not seek to introduce issues outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ complaints,

and nothing in the Ute Tribe’s opposition suggests otherwise. And although the Ute Tribe baldly

asserts (at 9) that the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants would not add anything to the

case, the fact that the Ute Tribe invites the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’

participation as amicus as an alternative to intervention just confirms that the ANC Association

Intervenor-Defendants would aid the Court’s understanding in this case. See Ute Tribe Opp. at 9;

see also ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ Mot. to Intervene at 13 (explaining how the

ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants’ participation would provide this Court with an

important perspective in this dispute).

III.   The ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants Meet the Requirements for
       Intervention as of Right.

       As noted above, the only requirement for intervention as of right that the Ute Tribe

disputes is whether the Secretary would adequately represent the ANC Association Intervenor-

Defendants’ interests in this case. The Ute Tribe’s arguments depend on the false premise that

there is a “same ultimate objectives” presumption of adequate representation in this case that can

only be overcome by a showing of “special circumstances.” Ute Tribe Opp. at 10-11. The Ute

Tribe does not cite any authority from this Circuit recognizing that there is a “same ultimate


                                                 9
        Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 11 of 13



objectives” presumption in a case such as this where the proposed intervenors seek to defend a

federal governmental action. Far from a presumption of adequate representation, the D.C. Circuit

“ha[s] often concluded that governmental entities do not adequately represent the interests of

aspiring intervenors.” Fund for Animals Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see

also Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 321. This Court recognized as much, having noted that “our Circuit

law is clear that . . . the private interests of private parties is a distinct interest that the government

may not adequately be able to represent.” Conf. Hr’g Tr. 23:5-13. 3

        Despite attempting to persuade this Court to recognize a “same ultimate objectives”

presumption, the Ute Tribe inexplicably highlights a D.C. Circuit decision that directly refutes its

claim that the Secretary adequately represents the ANC-Intervenor Defendants’ interests based

on the fact that they have the same ultimate objective in this case, i.e., an order affirming the

Secretary’s legal interpretation. Ute Tribe Opp. at 13 (attempting to distinguish Crossroads, 788

F.3d at 321). In Crossroads, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of intervention,

where the denial was premised solely on a finding that “the [Federal Election] Commission could

adequately represent Crossroads’ interests because their interests were aligned in defending the

legality of the dismissal order.” Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 321. The D.C. Circuit criticized the

district court for “treating general alignment as dispositive” and underscored that “the district

court went against the weight of authority in this Circuit.” Id.

        As Crossroads and the cases discussed therein illustrate, the Ute Tribe seeks to turn the

inadequate representation prong on its head. Courts in the D.C. Circuit and elsewhere have

3
  Indeed, among other things, the participation of the ANCs in this case will better inform the
Court on matters the Secretary to date has not been in a position to articulate. Compare Mem.
and Op. (ECF 36) (discussing the Secretary’s inability to identify a 638 contract) (ECF 36) with
Mallott Decl. (ECF 45-2) ¶ 7 (noting existence of 638 contract); Hegna Decl. (ECF 45-4) ¶ 4
(same); Buretta Decl. (ECF 45-5) ¶ 11 (same); Westlake Decl. (ECF 45-7) ¶ 15 (same); Minich
Decl. (ECF 45-6) ¶¶ 6-10 (same); Schubert Decl. (ECF 45-23) ¶ 10 (same).

                                                    10
        Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 12 of 13



commonly found that the federal Government’s interest generally is too broad to support a finding

of adequate representation. For example, in Trbovich, there was a statute expressly obligating the

defendant agency to serve the interests of the putative intervenor, and even that was not enough to

show adequate representation. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538-39

(1972). The Supreme Court held that “even if the Secretary is performing his duties, broadly

conceived, as well as can be expected,” the proposed intervenor “may have a valid complaint

about the performance of his lawyer,” i.e., the Secretary, with respect to protecting proposed-

intervenor’s narrower interests. Id. at 539. Numerous other courts have found inadequate

representation on behalf of the government due to potential differences in litigation strategy or

points of emphasis. See, e.g., Safari Club, 2015 WL 13651265, at *5 (“While both defendants

and movants support the Zimbabwe determination, their differing views on the role of sport-

hunting in protecting wildlife may cause their interest to diverge during the course of this

litigation such that defendants will not adequately represent movants’ interests.”); Connecticut v.

United States Dep’t of the Interior, 344 F. Supp. 3d 279, 305 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The fact that

MGM and Federal Defendants presently agree on a litigation posture does not mean that Federal

Defendants necessarily will adequately represent MGM’s interests throughout this action, as

Federal Defendants remain free to change their strategy during the course of litigation.”)

(internal brackets omitted).

       Finally, contrary to what the Ute Tribe appears to allege (at 12), there is no requirement

that a proposed intervenor demonstrate an intent to raise claims or arguments that would not

otherwise be raised, nor is there any requirement to show “collusion, nonfeasance, or adversity of

interest.” There is no requirement for the ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants to make any of

these showings to demonstrate that the existing parties in this case do not adequately represent



                                                 11
        Case 1:20-cv-01002-APM Document 64 Filed 05/19/20 Page 13 of 13



their interests. The ANC Association Intervenor-Defendants have clearly made the showings

necessary to satisfy the inadequate representation prong of the test for intervention as of right.

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the ANC Association Intervenor-

Defendants intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), or

alternatively, permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B).


                                                       /s/ DRAFT
                                                       Daniel W. Wolff (D.C. Bar #486733)
                                                       David Y. Chung (D.C. Bar #500420)
                                                       Kirsten L. Nathanson (D.C. Bar #463992)
                                                       CROWELL & MORING LLP
                                                       1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
                                                       Washington, D.C. 20004
                                                       Tel: (202) 624-2500
                                                       dwolff@crowell.com
                                                       dchung@crowell.com
                                                       knathanson@crowell.com

                                                       Christine V. Williams
                                                       J. Harrison Powell, II
                                                       OUTLOOK LAW, LLC
                                                       1016 West 6th Avenue, Suite 306
                                                       Anchorage, Alaska 99501
                                                       (907) 258-2200
                                                       christinewilliams@outlooklaw.com
                                                       harrisonpowell@outlooklaw.com

                                                       Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-
                                                       Defendants Alaska Native Village
                                                       Corporation Association, Inc. and
                                                       Association of ANCSA Regional
                                                       Corporation Presidents/CEO’s, Inc.




                                                  12


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