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Case 1:25-cv-02990-ER Document 102 Filed 06/02/25 Page 1 of 19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 1:25-cv-02990 (ER)(BCM)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 1:25-cv-02990-ER Document 102 Filed 06/02/25 Page 2 of 19
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. ii
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 2
I. AS DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED, THIS
COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE STATES’ CLAIMS ........... 2
II. THE COURT’S PRIOR RULINGS ARE LAW OF THE CASE ............. 5
III. DEFENDANTS’ JUSTIFICATIONS ARE NOT REASONABLE .......... 8
IV. THE COURT SHOULD COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO PROCESS
PAYMENT REQUESTS WITHOUT DELAY TO ENSURE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT’S PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS........................................................................................ 10
V. GIVEN DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS IN THIS CASE AND
POSSIBLE CHANGE IN THE LAW, THE COURT SHOULD
ORDER A NOMINAL BOND ................................................................ 11
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 11
i
Case 1:25-cv-02990-ER Document 102 Filed 06/02/25 Page 3 of 19
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Bowen v. Massachusetts,
487 U.S. 879 (1988) ............................................................................................................... 3-5
Cmty. Legal Servs. in East Palo Alto v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,
No. 25-2808, 2025 WL 1393876 (9th Cir. May 14, 2025) .................................................... 4-5
Dep’t of Educ. v. California,
604 U.S. ___, 2025 WL 1008354 (April 4, 2025) ................................................................. 4-5
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
70 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1994).........................................................................................................6
United States v. Quintieri,
306 F.3d 1217 (2d Cir. 2002).....................................................................................................5
Federal Regulations
2 C.F.R.
§ 200.344................................................................................................................................5, 8
Rules
Local Civ. R. 6.3 ..............................................................................................................................6
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 ...........................................................................................................................11
ii
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INTRODUCTION 1
As a threshold matter, the Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ purely equitable claims.
In opposing Plaintiffs’ first PI motion, Defendants plainly concluded that the Tucker Act is
inapplicable because Plaintiffs do not assert a claim for money damages and thus Defendants did
not contest this Court’s jurisdiction. Having lost on the merits on the first motion, Defendants now
assert the opposite position and suddenly challenge the Court’s jurisdiction. But Defendants were
correct the first time. And their new position on the Tucker Act is not justified by Plaintiffs’ request
that the Court order ED to “process” ES funding requests without delay. Their contention that
“process” means the same as “pay” is nonsensical.
On the merits, the Court should reject most of Defendants’ arguments under the law of the
case doctrine. The May 11 Rescission Letter is a final agency action under the APA for the same
reasons that the Court held the March 28 Rescission Letter was a final agency action. The Court
has already held that rescinding ED’s prior extension approvals will cause Plaintiffs irreparable
harm. Defendants’ pandemic-is-over justification for ED’s abrupt change in position on the
extension approvals is just as unreasonable now as the Court held it to be on the first PI motion.
And as the Court held before, Defendants fail to account for Plaintiffs’ reliance on ED’s prior
extension approvals; they simply declare such reliance to be invalid. Finally, Defendants’ second
attempt to terminate Plaintiffs’ liquidation periods is contrary to law for the same reasons that the
Court previously held the March 28 rescission was contrary to law.
1
The defined terms used in this reply are the same as those used in Plaintiffs’ opening brief (ECF
No. 85) (“Opening Br.”).
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Defendants’ second attempt to rescind ED’s prior extension approvals is not saved by the
additional “justifications” included in the May 11 Rescission Letter. None provides a reasoned
explanation for ED’s abrupt change in position, nor do they matter in any event since the rescission
is still contrary to law in violation of the APA regardless of any purported justification Defendants
offer. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have again established a high likelihood of success on the merits of
their APA claims.
Finally, in addition to enjoining Defendants from enforcing the May 11 Rescission Letter,
the Court should direct ED to process Plaintiffs’ ES funding requests “without delay” and to report
to the Court on when all current outstanding requests will be processed. This directive is necessary
to prevent ED from thwarting the Court’s injunction by burdening Plaintiffs’ SEAs with boilerplate
demands for additional information that effectively seek to revisit the bases for ED’s prior
extension approvals, as ED has been doing since the Court issued its May 6 preliminary injunction
order (“May 6 Order”).
ARGUMENT
I. AS DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED, THIS COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE STATES’ CLAIMS
In response to Plaintiffs’ first PI motion, Defendants concluded that the Tucker Act does
not apply because Plaintiffs do not seek money damages—despite Plaintiffs anticipating in their
opening brief that Defendants might rely on the Tucker Act as a defense, see ECF No. 11 at Point
I.A. Defendants’ conclusion is clearly correct; this case, at its core, is about Plaintiffs’ need to
enjoin Defendants’ unlawful termination of their liquidation periods, but for which Plaintiffs
would not require relief from this Court of any kind. Thus, Defendants’ brief opposing Plaintiffs’
first PI motion never once mentioned the Tucker Act or suggested that the Court lacks jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs’ claims. See ECF No. 63.
2
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Having lost that motion on the merits, Defendants now trot out the Tucker Act, employing
sophistry to try to explain why the Tucker Act applies now but did not before; they assert that
Plaintiffs have changed the nature of the relief they seek by including in their proposed PI Order a
request that the Court order ED to “pay money to the States under the grants.” Opp. at 9. Not true.
Plaintiffs seek preliminary relief directing ED merely to “process” Plaintiffs’ liquidation requests
without delay, not “pay” them. ECF No. 87. The words “pay” and “process” mean different things,
and an order directing ED to “process” requests may or may not result in payment, depending on
whether the requests meet the requirements for payment under ED’s ministerial review criteria
applicable to timely payment requests. Indeed, Defendants recognize this distinction between
“pay” and “process,” arguing the Court should not “direct the Department to make specific
payments because the Department is continuing to review submissions” and should be allowed “to
continue that process.” Opp. at 15 (emphasis added). The core relief Plaintiffs seek here remains
enjoining implementation of that unlawful action.
Because Plaintiffs’ claims, including the request for an order directing ED merely to
“process” ES funding requests without delay, are not for money damages, this case fits squarely
within the general rule that district courts have jurisdiction over challenges to final agency action
under §702 of the APA, including when a remedial order may result in the disbursement of funds,
as Defendants correctly concluded when opposing Plaintiffs’ first PI motion. See Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 (1988).
Defendants also assert that seeking “to enjoin the Department from implementing the
directives in the May 11 letter” “amount[s] to [a] claim[] for the payment of money, purportedly
pursuant to grant agreements.” Opp. at 11. Their position directly conflicts with their prior correct
conclusion on Plaintiffs’ first PI motion that seeking to enjoin ED from implementing the
3
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directives in the March 28 Rescission Letter was not a claim for the payment of money triggering
the Tucker Act. Both letters rescind ED’s prior extension approvals and terminate Plaintiffs’
liquidation periods. For the reasons articulated in Plaintiffs’ brief in support of their first PI motion,
and as Defendants have already implicitly conceded by omitting any Tucker Act argument in their
opposition, such relief is not a claim for money damages that would fall within the scope of the
Tucker Act under Bowen. ECF No. 11 (Point I.A.). Rather, it is a claim “to hold unlawful and set
aside agency action,” which this Court, as the “reviewing court,” has “jurisdiction under §702 [of
the APA] to review” to grant Plaintiffs “the complete relief authorized by §706 [of the APA].”
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 911.
Defendants’ newly minted effort to distinguish Bowen, Opp. at 13-14, is also without merit.
As in Bowen, this case involves a decision by an agency head that categorically rescinds a previous
agency determination across an entire grant program. Such a decision “represents an ongoing
policy that has significant prospective effect,” see Bowen, 487 U.S. at 889 (cleaned up), and
“reviewing the Secretary’s interpretation of federal law” in that context is precisely the task that
Bowen deemed appropriate for APA review. Id. at 909–10.
Defendants’ reliance on the Supreme Court’s motion order granting a stay in Dep’t of Educ.
v. California, 604 U.S. ___, 2025 WL 1008354 (April 4, 2025), is unavailing. Opp. at 11-12. That
order—which pre-dated Defendants’ opposition to the first PI motion by nearly 3 weeks—was
issued “with barebones briefing, no argument, and scarce time for reflection,” 2025 WL 1008354
at *2 (Kagan, dissenting), and did not overrule Bowen; indeed, the majority cites to Bowen as
controlling law, id. at *1 (per curiam).
Here, Bowen controls because the “rights and remedies are statutorily or constitutionally
based” rather than “contractually based.” Cmty. Legal Servs. in East Palo Alto v. United States
4
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Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 25-2808, 2025 WL 1393876, at *2 (9th Cir. May 14, 2025)
(cleaned up). As Defendants acknowledge, the rights and remedies at issue are statutorily based
on ED’s congressional mandate under CRRSA and ARP, and regulatory authority under 2 C.F.R.
§200.344(c), with Defendants invoking ED’s inherent authority under the regulatory framework
to reconsider the prior extension approvals. See ECF No. 1-1, at 1 & n.1 (citing Ivy Sports Med.,
LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). This case is thus an administrative law case,
not a contract case, and does not turn on the particular terms and conditions of ED’s grant awards.
See East Palo Alto, 2025 WL 1393876, at *2 (holding Tucker Act inapplicable where “plaintiffs
seek to enforce compliance with statutes and regulations, not any government contract”).
Furthermore, unlike in California, Defendants’ actions prevent Plaintiffs from submitting
timely payment requests for awarded ES funds, requiring them to cut programs and lay off staff
because they do not have the “financial wherewithal” to keep these programs running or all of their
employees on the payroll. 2 California, 2025 WL 1008354, at *1. As the Court held in Bowen,
“[t]he fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to another is not a sufficient
reason to characterize the relief as ‘money damages.’” Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893.
II. THE COURT’S PRIOR RULINGS ARE LAW OF THE CASE
Defendants all but ignore the Court’s May 6 rulings and fail to present any “cogent” or
“compelling” reason why the Court should depart from those prior rulings that are now law of the
case. United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir. 2002). As discussed below, the
2
See, Coughlin-NY ¶¶50-57, 52, 59; Slaga-AZ ¶¶19-28; Wright-MD ¶¶10 & 12; Perkins-Cohen-
MD ¶¶12–15; Rice-MI ¶¶22-25; Seaton-IL ¶¶18, 25; Stewart-DC ¶11; Chasse Johndro-ME ¶36;
Rowe-PA ¶30; Wetherell-OR ¶25; Ehling-NJ ¶20; Marten-DE ¶13.
5
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Court’s prior rulings defeat most of Defendants’ arguments under the law of the case doctrine
without the need for further analysis.
Final Agency Action. Defendants argue that the rescission is not final agency action
subject to review under the APA because it provides a “process for seeking project-specific
extension” and therefore “does not determine whether any particular project’s liquidation deadline
may be extended.” Opp. at 19. The Court rejected this same argument on the first PI motion,
holding that the rescission was “final” agency action despite the “new process that has been set up
for these funds.” Id. at 44:10-17. 3
Irreparable Harm. Defendants argue “Plaintiffs have failed to show irreparable harm”
because “the States may follow the project-specific process” subject to the right of an appeal. Opp.
at 16-17. This is the same argument they raised before, contending that “the ability to obtain a
further extension of the liquidation period” through the project specific extension process prevents
the harm “from being irreparable.” Tr. at 34:17-25:15. The Court rejected this argument, holding
that absent an injunction preventing Defendants from terminating Plaintiffs’ liquidation periods,
“[P]laintiffs have established irreparable harm” based on “any number of declarations that have
been submitted that talk about the disruption that has been caused by” ED’s change in position,
Tr. 45:15-21, 46:6-7.
3
In a single sentence, Defendants ask the Court to “reconsider” its prior ruling on finality, Opp. at
19, but this request is both procedurally improper and substantively without merit. Reconsideration
must be requested by a formal motion filed within 14 days of entry of the order being challenged.
Local Civ. R. 6.3. And Defendants have not satisfied the “strict” test for reconsideration, which
requires the moving party to “point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked.”
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1994). Defendants do neither. instead,
they simply point to the “the project-specific extension process” the Court already considered.
Opp. at 19.
6
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Equities/Public Interest. Defendants maintain that the balance of equities and public
interest weigh in their favor because through the project-specific extension process ED is seeking
to ensure “that the funds requested by the States are being utilized for their intended purposes.”
Opp. at 18. The Court rejected this argument, holding that “the public interest and the balance of
hardships here weigh clearly in favor of the [P]laintiffs” because their SEAs “have had to disrupt
the provision of educational services to schoolchildren” and “have had to halt infrastructure
projects midstream because of the Department of Education's determination,” Tr. at 46:6–11.
Pandemic Is Over. In the May 11 Rescission Letter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
liquidation periods should be terminated as of May 25, 2025, because the pandemic “concluded
more than two years ago.” May 11 Rescission Letter at 2. Defendants offered this same
justification in the March 28 Rescission Letter, but the Court held it “was not a reasonable
explanation” because the ES funds were intended to support “programs going forward after the
pandemic emergency was deemed to have ended” to mitigate the “loss of educational attainment
that schoolchildren had suffered as a result of remote learning and other difficulties attendant to
the COVID-19 pandemic.” Tr. at 44:21-45:17.
Contrary to Law. Defendants argue the May 11 Rescission Letter is not contrary to law
because “there is nothing in the statutes Congress passed that precludes [ED] from rescinding a
prior extension and evaluating further extension requests on a project-specific basis.” Opp. at 22.
The Court previously rejected this argument, holding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in
proving Defendants had acted contrary to law in rescinding ED’s prior extension approvals
because “Congress intended that [the ES] funds remain available” and that ED “be liberal and
flexible in making sure that these programs continued to be funded” and “not impose unreasonable
obstacles in the way of state agencies looking to continue to fund those programs.” Tr. at 45:9-14.
7
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Defendants’ Harm. Defendants argue they “will suffer irreparable harm” if the Court
issues the requested PI because ED “will be compelled to disburse funds that it will be unable to
recover” through a process it has “attempted . . . to supersede.” Opp. at 16-17. The Court rejected
this argument on the first PI motion, finding there was no evidence in the record “suggest[ing] the
government would be irreparably harmed” by disbursing “funds that have been appropriated for
particular uses” by Congress. Tr. at 45:22-25.
* * *
But even if the Court did not apply law of the case and were to revisit these rulings, the
operative facts and law have not changed and therefore the results should be the same. The
reasoning employed by the Court on Plaintiffs’ first PI motion applies with equal force on this
motion. See Tr. at 43:25-46:15.
III. DEFENDANTS’ JUSTIFICATIONS ARE NOT REASONABLE
Defendants fail to establish in their opposition that any of the remaining justifications listed
in the May 11 Rescission Letter are reasonable.
First, Defendants contend that it is reasonable to rescind ED’s prior extension approvals,
terminate Plaintiffs’ liquidation periods, and require Plaintiffs to utilize the new project-specific
process “to ensure that ongoing projects are consistent with the objectives of the appropriations
statutes.” Opp. at 21. But this is not a reasonable basis to rescind extensions that ED previously
approved under 2 C.F.R. §200.344 because that regulation authorizes ED to extend liquidation
periods based on whether grant recipients demonstrate additional time is needed to implement
projects already approved when the grants were awarded, not to revisit the objectives or prior
approvals of those projects. And Defendants concede that the projects which the May 11
Rescission Letter contends “Congress did not intend” to fund (ECF No. 84-1 at 2) “might arguably
be permitted under” ARP. Opp. at 21. It is patently unreasonable for ED to justify rescinding the
8
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prior extension approvals to impose on Plaintiffs a new project-specific extension process to reject
projects Congress intended ES funds to support.
Second, Defendants fail to explain how the NAEP scores provide a reasonable justification
for rescinding ED’s prior approvals. As a matter of common sense, tests administered in the first
quarter of 2024 do not shed any light on the efficacy of programs designed under contracts entered
into between April and September of 2024 and started in the 2024-2025 academic year. And
logically, test scores suggesting students are continuing to struggle to catch up cannot possibly
justify cutting projects that provide additional instruction time.
Third, Defendants unconvincingly attempt to walk back their admission during argument
on May 6 that there was “no reason to believe” ED failed to conduct a careful review when
approving the prior extension requests, Tr. at 27:7-10, suggesting this statement was somehow
qualified because it was “based on the record,” Opp. at 21. But the evidence Defendants rely on to
support the assertion in the May 11 Rescission Letter that ED’s prior review was not careful are
the “original extension letters” they contend “included no explanation for the extensions.” May 11
Rescission Letter at 4. That is the same evidence that was in the record when Defendants, through
their counsel, represented to the Court there was “no reason to believe” ED failed to conduct a
careful review. See, e.g., Pierson Decl.-CA, Ex. A (ECF No. 14-1); Marten Decl.-DE, Ex. 1 (ECF
No. 16-1); Couglin Decl.-NY, Ex. A (ECF No. 26-1). If the approval letters provided no reason
for Defendants to believe on May 6 that ED’s review was not careful, they similarly provide no
reason to believe otherwise today. 4
4
Defendants’ suggestion that the extensions were not the product of a careful review because they
were “extreme” falls flat. Opp. at 21. Defendants cannot dispute that the 14-month extensions fit
within the guidelines for extension applications on the ED website. ECF No. 85 at 14 n.7.
9
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Fourth, Defendants disingenuously point to “the recent pace of the States’ draw-down
requests” received since May 6 as justifying the termination of Plaintiffs’ liquidation periods. Opp.
at 22. Defendants ignore the obvious explanation for the uptick: the backlog of payment requests
that piled up between ED’s termination of Plaintiffs’ liquidation periods on March 28 and the
Court’s PI Order restoring the liquidation periods on May 6.
IV. THE COURT SHOULD COMPEL DEFENDANTS TO PROCESS PAYMENT
REQUESTS WITHOUT DELAY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
COURT’S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
As Plaintiffs demonstrated in their opening brief, Defendants have largely ignored this
Court’s May 6 Order. See Opening Br. at 18–19. For example, the New York State Education
Department submitted a drawdown request for approximately $11.5 million on March 28, 2025,
prior to the retroactive deadline imposed by the March 28 Rescission Letter. ECF No. 89-1. ED
did not respond to that drawdown request until May 13, 2025—a week after the Court issued its
May 6 Order—and then only to request additional information. Id.; see also ECF No. 89 at ¶ 5.
Other of Plaintiffs’ SEAs have experienced similar delays:
• On May 7, 2025, the California Department of Education (“CDE”) submitted a
drawdown request for approximately $3.8 million. On May 16, 2025, ED requested
additional documentation, which CDE promptly supplied the same day. On May
20, 2025, ED requested invoices again. Thompson Reply Aff. Ex. A.
• On May 22, 2025, the Minnesota Department of Education submitted a drawdown
request for approximately $225,000 but has yet to receive any response from ED
other than an automatic email stating that the email will be processed in the order
in which it was received. Thompson Reply Aff. Ex. B.
• On May 8, 2025, the D.C. Office of the State Superintendent of Education
submitted a drawdown request for approximately $14.8 million, and a week later
received a response from ED that additional documentation was required.
Thompson Reply Aff. Ex. C.
Defendants’ own declarant demonstrates clearly how slowly Defendants have been moving
in response to Plaintiffs’ drawdown requests: of the approximately $428 million in drawdown
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requests ED reports to have received since May 6, it has only processed approximately $16.7
million, or about 4%. ECF No. 101-1. And Defendants do not even include requests, like New
York’s, that have been pending since prior to the March 28 termination. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
request that the Court direct Defendants to process Plaintiffs’ drawdown requests without delay.
V. GIVEN DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS IN THIS CASE AND POSSIBLE CHANGE
IN THE LAW, THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NOMINAL BOND
Defendants have largely ignored this Court’s rulings and the May 6 Order, and given that
conduct and a potential legislative change targeting Rule 65 injunctions, Plaintiffs seek a nominal
bond in order to ensure the Court will be able to compel compliance by Defendants in the future.
On May 22, 2025, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1, the 2025 budget reconciliation bill.
Tucked into Title VII of the bill is a provision that, if enacted into law, would retroactively bar
federal courts from enforcing through contempt a party’s failure to comply with a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order “if no security was given when the injunction or order
was issued.” H.R. 1 §70302. 5 A bond is inappropriate under current law, but given Defendants’
past conduct, Plaintiffs ask that the Court enter a nominal bond of $1,000 in an abundance of
caution. Plaintiffs’ revised proposed preliminary injunction order reflecting this change is attached
as Exhibit 1 to this reply.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter their Revised Proposed
Preliminary Injunction Order, along with granting such other relief as the Court deems necessary
and appropriate to maintain the status quo pending resolution of this action.
5
Available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1/text.
11
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Dated: New York, New York
June 2, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
LETITIA JAMES KRISTIN K. MAYES
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA
By: /s Andrew Amer By: /s/ Alexa Salas
Andrew Amer Alexa Salas*
Special Counsel Assistant Attorney General
Molly Thomas-Jensen Lauren Watford*
Special Counsel Assistant Attorney General
Rabia Muqaddam 2005 North Central Avenue
Special Counsel for Federal Initiatives Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Stephen C. Thompson (602) 542-3333
Special Counsel Alexa.Salas@azag.gov
28 Liberty Street Lauren.Watford@azag.gov
New York, NY 10005 ACL@azag.gov
(212) 416-6127
andrew.amer@ag.ny.gov Counsel for the State of Arizona
Counsel for the State of New York
KATHLEEN JENNINGS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
ROB BONTA DELAWARE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA
By: /s/ Vanessa L. Kassab
By: /s/ Maureen C. Onyeagbako Ian Liston
Maureen C. Onyeagbako* Director of Impact Litigation
Supervising Deputy Attorney General Vanessa L. Kassab
José Pablo Galán de la Cruz* Deputy Attorney General
Deputy Attorney General Delaware Department of Justice
Cheryl L. Feiner** 820 N. French Street
Senior Assistant Attorney General Wilmington, DE 19801
California Attorney General’s Office (302) 683-8899
1300 I Street, Ste. 125 vanessa.kassab@delaware.gov
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Counsel for the State of Delaware
Telephone: (916) 210-7324
Email: Maureen.Onyeagbako@doj.ca.gov
Pablo.Galan@doj.ca.gov
Cheryl.Feiner@doj.ca.gov
Counsel for Plaintiff State of California
12
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BRIAN L. SCHWALB ANNE E. LOPEZ
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
COLUMBIA HAWAIʻI
By: /s/ Andrew Mendrala By: /s/ Kalikoʻonālani D. Fernandes
Andrew Mendrala* David D. Day*
Assistant Attorney General Special Assistant to the Attorney General
Public Advocacy Division Kalikoʻonālani D. Fernandes*
Office of the Attorney General for the Solicitor General
District of Columbia 425 Queen Street
400 Sixth Street, NW Washington, DC Honolulu, HI 96813
20001 (808) 586-1360
(202) 724-9726 kaliko.d.fernandes@hawaii.gov
Andrew.Mendrala@dc.gov
Counsel for the State of Hawaiʻi
Counsel for the District of Columbia
KWAME RAOUL
AARON M. FREY ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
MAINE
By: /s/ Elena S. Meth
By:/s/ Sarah A. Forster Cara Hendrickson*
Sarah A. Forster* Assistant Chief Deputy Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General Elena S. Meth*
Office of the Attorney General Assistant Attorney General
6 State House Station Office of the Illinois Attorney General
Augusta, ME 04333-0006 115 S. LaSalle St.
Tel.: 207-626-8800 Chicago, IL 60603
Fax: 207-287-3145 (773) 835-0182
Sarah.Forster@maine.gov Cara.Hendrickson@ilag.gov
Elena.Meth@ilag.gov
Counsel for the State of Maine
Counsel for the State of Illinois
13
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ANTHONY G. BROWN ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS
MARYLAND
By: /s/ David C. Kravitz
By: /s/ Keith M. Jamieson David C. Kravitz**
Elliott Schoen* State Solicitor
Principal Counsel Katherine Dirks
Assistant Attorney General Chief State Trial Counsel
Alan J. Dunklow* Office of the Attorney General
Deputy Principal Counsel One Ashburton Place, 20th Floor
Assistant Attorney General Boston, MA 02108
Maryland State Department of Education (617) 963-2427
Keith M. Jamieson* david.kravitz@mass.gov
Assistant Attorney General
Federal Accountability Unit Counsel for the
Office of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts
200 Saint Paul Place
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(410) 576-6960 KEITH ELLISON
kjamieson@oag.state.md.us ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA
Counsel for the State of Maryland By: /s/ Liz Kramer
Liz Kramer*
Solicitor General
DANA NESSEL 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN St. Paul, Minnesota, 55101
(651) 757-1010
By: /s/ Neil Giovanatti Liz.Kramer@ag.state.mn.us
Neil Giovanatti
BreAnna Listermann* Counsel for the State of Minnesota
Assistant Attorneys General
Michigan Department of Attorney General
525 W. Ottawa AARON D. FORD
Lansing, MI 48909 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEVADA
(517) 335-7603
GiovanattiN@michigan.gov By: /s/ Heidi Parry Stern
ListermannB@michigan.gov Heidi Parry Stern (Bar. No. 8873)
Solicitor General
Counsel for the People of the State of Office of the Nevada Attorney General
Michigan 1 State of Nevada Way, Ste. 100
Las Vegas, NV 89119
HStern@ag.nv.gov
Counsel for the State of Nevada
14
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MATTHEW J. PLATKIN RAÚL TORREZ
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW
MEXICO
/s/ Lauren E. Van Driesen
Lauren E. Van Driesen
Jessica L. Palmer /s/ Anjana Samant
Justine Longa** Anjana Samant**
Deputy Attorneys General Deputy Counsel
Office of the Attorney General New Mexico Department of Justice
124 Halsey Street, 5th Floor 408 Galisteo Street
Newark, NJ 07101 Santa Fe, NM 87501
(609) 696-5279
Lauren.VanDriesen@law.njoag.gov asamant@nmdoj.gov
Jessica.Palmer@law.njoag.gov (505) 270-4332
Justine.Longa@law.njoag.gov
Counsel for the State of New Mexico
Counsel for the State of New Jersey
JENNIFER C. SELBER
DAN RAYFIELD General Counsel
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF Michael J. Fischer
OREGON Executive Deputy General Counsel
By: /s/ Sara Van Loh
Sara Van Loh OSB #044398* By:/s/ Thomas P. Howell
Senior Assistant Attorney General Thomas P. Howell*
100 SW Market Street Deputy General Counsel
Portland, Oregon 97201 Governor’s Office of General Counsel
Tel (971) 673-1880 30 N. 3rd Street, Suite 200
Fax (971) 673-5000 Harrisburg, PA 17101
Sara.VanLoh@doj.oregon.gov (717) 460-6786
thowell@pa.gov
Attorneys for the State of Oregon
Counsel for Governor Josh Shapiro,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
* Admitted Pro Hac Vice
** Pending Pro Hac Vice applications filed/to
be filed
15
Case 1:25-cv-02990-ER Document 102 Filed 06/02/25 Page 19 of 19
RULE 7.1 CERTIFICATION
I certify that, excluding the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, signature
block, and this certification, the foregoing Reply Memorandum of Law contains 3,482 words,
calculated using Microsoft Word, which complies with Rule 7.1(c) of the Local Rules of the
United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.
Dated: New York, New York
June 2, 2025
LETITIA JAMES
Attorney General of the State of New York
By: /s Andrew Amer
Andrew Amer
Special Counsel
28 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10005
(212) 416-6127
andrew.amer@ag.ny.gov