Recent Decision to Compress Census Timeframes Poses Additional Risks to an Accurate Count (GAO-20-671R)

Summary

A GAO report to congressional requesters, GAO-20-671R, dated August 2020, the fourth in a series of updates on the Census Bureau's 2020 Census activities and operations. It describes how the Bureau resumed operations after pausing them in response to the COVID-19 national emergency and the operational and public safety challenges it faces. It notes that, as part of decisions to suspend, extend and delay operations and extend data collection until October 31, the Department of Commerce requested statutory relief on the dates for delivering census data for apportionment and redistricting. Its title states that a recent decision to compress census timeframes poses additional risks to an accurate count.

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A Report to Congressional Requesters August 2020

2020 Census

Highlights of GAO-20-671R. Recent Decision to Compress Census Timeframes Poses
Additional Risks to an Accurate Count

The 2020 Decennial Census is This correspondence is the fourth in a series of updates reporting on the Census
underway after pausing operations Bureau’s (Bureau) 2020 Census activities and operations. This update includes
in response to the COVID-19 information from GAO’s ongoing work on the status of 2020 Census operations
national emergency. As the Bureau and challenges, including those raised by COVID-19.
resumes its operations, it faces a
new set of operational and public As part of a series of decisions to suspend, extend, and delay certain operations
safety challenges as a result of and extend data collection activities until October 31, the Department of
COVID-19. These delays, the Commerce requested statutory relief on the required dates for delivering census
resulting compressed timeframes, data to the President and states for apportioning seats in the House of
implementation of untested Representatives and redistricting for elections. While legislation providing this
procedures, and additional relief was introduced in Congress, the legislation has not been enacted into law.
challenges such as COVID-19 could On August 3, the Bureau announced it would accelerate completion of its data
adversely impact downstream collection and data processing operations to deliver the apportionment counts by
operations, escalate census costs the statutory deadline of December 31, 2020. To do so, the Bureau announced it
and undermine the overall quality of would end all data collection operations by September 30, reducing the amount
the count.
of time the Bureau has to complete its nonresponse follow-up (NRFU) operation.
In recent years, GAO has identified GAO and the Bureau have previously identified late design changes as a risk to a
challenges to the Bureau’s ability to complete and accurate count.
conduct a cost-effective count of the
nation, including new innovations, As of August 10, the Bureau had received responses from 63.4 percent of
acquisition and development of IT households and plans to hire up to approximately 435,000 enumerators to follow-
systems, and other challenges. In up with the approximately 56.4 million nonresponding households.
2017, these challenges led GAO to
place the 2020 Census on its High- Areas for Continued Bureau Attention to Help Ensure a Complete and
Risk list. Accurate Census
Over the past decade, GAO has COVID-19 has forced the Bureau to change how it will conduct its operations. As
made 112 recommendations specific it implements those operations and anticipates completing them within the new
to the 2020 Census. To date, the compressed timeframes, the Bureau must monitor a number of areas to help
Bureau has implemented 90 and ensure a complete and accurate census, including:
GAO has closed 1 recommendation
as not implemented. As of August • Hiring a sufficient NRFU workforce. The Bureau began hiring for NRFU on
2020, 21 of the recommendations July 14, and as of August 18, the Bureau hired 309,391 enumerators, but is
had not been fully implemented. experiencing higher attrition than expected. To complete the operation by
September 30, the Bureau plans to maximize the number of hours worked by
staff each week and continue recruiting, hiring, and training replacement
GAO was asked to provide regular enumerators.
updates on the 2020 Census. This
• Ensuring the safety of Census workers and the public. The Bureau is
report examines the cost and
taking social distancing steps to protect census enumerators and the public
progress of key 2020 Census
operations critical to a cost-effective and to increase the likelihood that households will participate in door-to-door
enumeration, and early warnings interviews- see figure.
that may require Census Bureau or Safety Protocols for the 2020 Census in Response to COVID-19
congressional attention.
The Bureau provided technical
comments that were incorporated as
appropriate.

View GAO-20-671R. For more information,
contact J. Christopher Mihm at (202) 512-6806 • Maintaining the public’s awareness of the 2020 Census. The Bureau has
or by email at mihmj@gao.gov and Nick expanded its communications campaign with new advertisements promoting
Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or by email at online self-response and promoting cooperation with in-person interviews. To
marinosn@gao.gov.
United States Government Accountability Office
reach new audiences, it will advertise in 33 additional languages with an
expanded list of media vendors for a total of 45 languages in addition to
English.
• Safely planning for an in-person outreach strategy to encourage
responses. While the Bureau initially moved to a virtual outreach strategy in
light of COVID-19, partnership specialists resumed in-person efforts in early
June 2020. The Bureau also modified its Mobile Questionnaire Assistance
initiative, intended to offer in-person assistance at large community events in
low-response areas, by placing staff outside locations such as grocery stores
and pharmacies.
• Limiting in-person contact for Group Quarters. To reduce in-person
contact to enumerate group facilities—such as prisons and nursing homes—
staff are calling these facilities to ask them to submit their responses
electronically or by mail.
• Counting persons experiencing homelessness. In consultation with
stakeholders, the Bureau decided to count persons experiencing
homelessness in late September to better mirror the weather conditions of
the original planned operation in late March and early April.
• Counting college students while colleges are closed. To count college
students at the correct address, the Bureau requested records from colleges
and universities for students living in university-owned housing and those
living off campus. According to the Bureau, as of August 19, colleges and
universities with housing facilities have already submitted their administrative
records for students living in 81.3 percent of those facilities (approximately
33,000 facilities).
• Monitoring ongoing risks to information technology (IT) systems
implementation. The Bureau is utilizing 52 IT systems to conduct the 2020
Census. It will be important that the Bureau continue to assess the risks to
the implementation of these systems. For example, it is critical for the Bureau
to continually monitor performance of the IT systems supporting NRFU and
quickly address any system defects or other issues, if they arise.
• Adequately protecting mobile devices. The Bureau will need to protect up
to about 435,000 mobile devices provided to enumerators to collect
personally identifiable information (PII) from households that did not self-
respond to the survey.
• Managing disinformation and misinformation. The Bureau has reviewed
the performance from previous operations in the 2020 Census and adapted
the policies and practices for ongoing and future operations to improve event
response.
• Ensuring timely and quality processing of census responses. After 2020
Census data collection, the Bureau must conduct its response processing
operation, which removes duplicate responses, ensures complete
information is collected, and formats the data files used to produce census
results. The Bureau’s August announcement that it intends to deliver the
apportionment counts to the President by December 31, 2020, increases the
risks associated with conducting the response processing operation. The
Bureau must complete remaining IT system and operational testing
expeditiously in order to ensure that its systems are ready to fully support this
operation under compressed timeframes.
• Evaluating the impact of census delays on data quality and coverage.
Delays to data collection operations, public reluctance to participate in door-
to-door interviews, and compressed timeframes for data collection and
processing response data may affect the accuracy, completeness, and
quality of the count. The Bureau has stood up internal working groups in an
effort to address some of these issues.

ii
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548

August 27, 2020

Congressional Requesters

2020 Census: Recent Decision to Compress Census Timeframes Poses Additional Risks
to an Accurate Count
In March 2020, the Census Bureau (Bureau) was forced to pause its operations as a result of
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) national emergency. In May 2020, the Bureau
began to resume select operations while facing a new set of operational and public safety
challenges resulting from COVID-19. In addition, the Department of Commerce (Commerce)
had requested that Congress extend its statutory reporting dates by 4 months. While legislation
providing this relief has been introduced in Congress, the legislation has not been enacted into
law. 1
On August 3, the Bureau announced it would accelerate completion of its data collection and
data processing operations to deliver the apportionment counts by the statutory deadline of
December 31, 2020. The Bureau stated that it is also adapting its plans to comply with the
President’s memorandum to exclude foreign nationals unlawfully residing in the United States
from the apportionment count. 2
We have previously reported that late design changes can introduce new risks and the Bureau
identified this as a risk in August of 2015. 3 Delays, the resulting compressed timeframes,
implementation of untested procedures, and continuing challenges such as COVID-19 could
escalate census costs and undermine the overall quality of the count. We will continue to
monitor the operational implications of these changes in our future updates on the 2020
Census.
You asked us to provide regular updates on the implementation of the 2020 Census. For these
updates, we review the cost and progress of key 2020 Census operations critical to a cost-
effective enumeration and early warnings that may require Bureau or congressional attention.
For this correspondence—the fourth in a series of products—we focused on the status of 2020
Census operations since our last report in June 2020, including the Bureau’s response to
challenges raised by COVID-19 and additional areas requiring continued management
attention. 4

1One bill, The Heroes Act, has passed the House of Representatives. The Heroes Act, H.R. 6800, 116th Cong.

(2020). See also Fair and Accurate Census Act, H.R. 7034, S. 4048, 116th Cong. (2020).
2Excluding Illegal Aliens From the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,679 (July 23,

2020).
3GAO, 2020 Census: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Risk, GAO-19-399 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2019)

4For the prior reports in this series, see GAO, 2020 Census: COVID-19 Presents Delays and Risks to Census Count,

GAO-20-551R (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2020); 2020 Census: Initial Enumeration Underway but Readiness for

Page 1 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
To describe the status of the Bureau's execution of key operations for the 2020 Census and
describe major trends and early warning signs, we reviewed Bureau-provided data on cost and
progress of key operations and compared those data with Bureau plans and Bureau-determined
target dates and metrics. We determined those data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
our reporting objectives by interviewing Bureau staff about the information technology (IT)
systems used. We interviewed Bureau officials to gather additional information on the status
and progress of these key operations.
In addition, to obtain a ground-level perspective on the conduct of key field activities, we
surveyed the Bureau’s entire population of 248 area census office (ACO) managers at various
points during the production of the 2020 Census, including late February to early March, early
April, late May, and late June to early July. The response rates were 71, 75, 76, and 72 percent,
respectively. We also reviewed open-ended responses provided by the ACO managers as part
of this survey.
In addition, we included information from our ongoing work related to the Bureau’s IT system
implementation and cybersecurity activities for the 2020 Census. We collected and reviewed
documentation on the status of systems testing and implementation and for addressing
cybersecurity risks, such as executive-level system status reports and dashboards. We also
interviewed relevant agency officials about systems testing and implementation.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2020 to August 2020 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained
provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
Past Work on the 2020 Census
In 2017, we designated the 2020 Census as a high-risk area and added it to our 2017 High-Risk
list. 5 The 2020 Census remains on the list, as new innovations, and acquisition and
development of IT systems for the 2020 Census, along with other challenges we have identified
in recent years—such as the reliability of the cost estimate— raise serious concerns about the
Bureau’s ability to conduct a cost-effective enumeration. 6 Over the past decade, we have made
112 recommendations specific to the 2020 Census to help address these risks and other
concerns. Commerce has generally agreed with these recommendations and has taken action
and made progress to address them. To date, the Bureau has implemented 90 of our
recommendations and we have closed one recommendation that Commerce did not implement.
However, as of August 2020, 21 of the recommendations have not been fully implemented and
10 of these are designated as priority recommendations. 7

Upcoming Operations is Mixed, GAO-20-368R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2020); and 2020 Census: Status Update
on Early Operations, GAO-20-111R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2019).
5GAO’s high-risk program identifies government operations with vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and

mismanagement, or in need of transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
6GAO, High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas. GAO-19-

157SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2019) and High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial
Efforts Needed on Others. GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2017).
7Priority recommendations are those that GAO believes warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or

agencies. They are highlighted because, upon implementation, they may significantly improve government

Page 2 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
The Bureau Exceeded Its Target for Self-Response
The Bureau’s self-response operation will end on September 30 instead of on October 31 as the
Bureau previously planned. As of August 10, 2020 the Bureau has received responses from
63.4 percent of households (approximately 93.6 million housing units), exceeding its goal of
60.5 percent. 8 This is an important achievement because high self-response rates reduce the
number of households requiring in-person visits from a census worker as part of the Bureau’s
Nonresponse Follow-up (NRFU) operation. The majority of self-responses have been received
via the Bureau’s internet self-response option, which was new for the 2020 Census (see figure
1).
Figure 1: Percentages of Households Self-Responding by Mode Compared to Census Bureau
Projections

While the national response rate is important, the decennial census is a local endeavor, and
self-response rates vary widely across states and counties. For example, while Minnesota had a
self-response rate of 72.7 percent as of August 13, Alaska had a 50.3 percent self-response
rate. Additionally, as of August 13, 16 counties in South Dakota, Arizona, Utah, Texas, Puerto
Rico, Nevada, Colorado, New York, New Mexico and Alaska had a self-response rate of less
than 20 percent. On July 27, the Bureau announced it would begin emailing all households for
which it has contact information in areas where the response rate is less than 50 percent.

operations; for example, by realizing large dollar savings; eliminating mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or making
progress toward addressing a high-risk or fragmentation, overlap, or duplication issue.
8The Bureau includes households that submitted a response as part of the Update Leave operation in its calculation

of self-response.

Page 3 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
The Bureau Resumed Operations, but Data Collection Efforts Will Now End One Month Earlier
Than Planned
In March and April of 2020, the Bureau made several announcements to suspend, extend, and
delay certain operations until June 1 and extend data collection activities until October 31. On
April 13, Commerce also asked Congress to act to change required dates for (1) delivering data
to apportion seats in the House of Representatives among states to the President, and (2)
delivering data for redistricting for elections to states by approximately 120 days to account for
the delays to data collection operations. However, on August 3 the Bureau announced that it
would plan to deliver the apportionment data to the President by the statutorily mandated
deadline of December 31, 2020.
To deliver the apportionment data by this date, the Bureau announced it would end all data
collection operations by September 30 (see figure 2). This change affects NRFU, the Bureau’s
largest operation, during which the Bureau will send enumerators to approximately 56.4 million
households that have not yet responded to the 2020 Census.

Page 4 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
Figure 2: Changes to Census Operations Due to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

aThe Bureau resumed its Update Leave operation in select locations on May 6, 2020. This decision was made based

on an assessment of local conditions.
bThe Bureau resumed its NRFU operation in select locations beginning on July 16 prior to the official start of the

operation on August 9. This decision was made based on an assessment of local conditions.

As of June 11, 2020 the Bureau had resumed operations at all 248 ACOs. The Bureau was able
to resume select operations, including Update Leave, at some ACOs starting on May 6 and
made subsequent announcements each week that it would resume operations at additional
ACOs. The Bureau decided which areas would be able to support operations by considering (1)
whether the state had begun phased reopening, (2) whether data on federally established
health criteria supported the decision to restart, and (3) whether the Bureau could meet the
safety needs of its employees and the public.

Page 5 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
The Bureau completed its Update Leave operation, which hand delivers questionnaires to more
than 6.8 million households that do not receive mail delivered to the door, on August 11. Census
workers took additional precautions such as wearing government issued personal protective
equipment (PPE) while working, and collecting necessary household data by observation when
delivering a questionnaire, instead of knocking on doors to speak with residents.
In mid-June, the Bureau announced it would also use a phased approach for beginning NRFU.
Six ACOs—one in each census region—began the operation in mid-July, and another six
started 1 week later. 9 The Bureau began the operation by July 30 with a third group of 35 ACOs.
As of August 6, 200 ACOs had begun NRFU, and all remaining ACOs began NRFU by August
9. 10
Completing NRFU by September 30 means the Bureau must complete its workload with 31
fewer days than previously planned. Bureau officials told us they are taking steps to ensure that
the workload will be completed, primarily by increasing the amount of hours worked in the field
each week. To do this, the Bureau said it is continuing to recruit, hire, and train enumerators
and is asking those already working to work for a greater number of hours each week. Bureau
officials also said they are planning to implement a pay-incentive program that would reward
enumerators for high productivity and working increased hours. We have requested details on
the Bureau’s revised planning for its operations.
Responses to our early July survey of ACO managers showed an increase in satisfaction
regarding the timeliness and clarity of Bureau communication about its pandemic plan when
compared to responses from our early April survey. We previously reported that responses to
our early April survey underscored the need for the Bureau to ensure open lines of
communications for ACO managers to ask questions and get timely responses. 11 From mid-
April to early July, reported satisfaction among responding ACO managers increased for
communication timeliness (from 35 to 48 percent) and clarity (from 42 to 53 percent).
The Bureau Has Taken Steps to Ensure Worker Safety
According to the Bureau, it has taken a number of steps to ensure worker safety, including
ordering sufficient PPE for all field and office staff and increasing the number of laptops
available to enable additional telework for office staff. The Bureau also told us it has ordered
and is distributing more than 3.2 million masks, 14 million gloves, and 3.3 million individually
sized bottles of hand sanitizer.
In our early July survey, satisfaction among responding ACO managers was fairly high
regarding PPE for staff conducting Update Leave (75 percent), the largest field operation being
conducted at the time. Additionally, the majority of responding managers reported satisfaction
with PPE adequacy for their office and field workers more generally (52 and 51 percent,
respectively). However, more than 30 survey comments in early July reflected concerns about
ACOs not receiving gloves, and other PPE being slow to arrive.

9The initial six ACOs began NRFU on July 16 and included Gardiner, ME; New Orleans, LA; Oklahoma County, OK;

Boise, ID; Beckley, WV; and Kansas City, MO. The additional six ACOs began NRFU on July 23 and included
Hartford, CT; State College, PA; Evansville, IN; Wichita, KS; Tacoma, WA; and Crystal City, VA.
10According to Bureau officials, the ACOs chosen for initial NRFU operations were chosen considering (1) re-opening

trends in the cities where ACOs were located, (2) whether the state met federal guidance for re-opening and (3)
operational readiness including local availability of PPE, staff, and devices for enumerators, such as census laptops
and tablets. The Bureau also selected varied locations to test different work conditions, such as potential internet
connectivity challenges, to allow them to make any necessary adjustments before the remaining ACOs began NRFU.
11GAO-20-551R

Page 6 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
The Bureau has also changed its onboarding process and the content of its trainings to protect
workers. According to Bureau officials, site operators at its fingerprinting locations are required
to wear masks and gloves and selected applicants are required to wear masks. 12 Additionally,
Bureau officials told us the fingerprint equipment is sanitized between each fingerprinting
appointment. To train staff on social distancing protocols for the enumeration, the Bureau added
an additional module to its trainings for all field staff that covers safety procedures.
ACO managers who responded to our survey reported higher satisfaction in early July than in
early April with their ACO’s ability to safely manage employees and operations during the
pandemic (increasing from 55 to 69 percent of respondents on average across three questions
on this topic). Despite this increase in confidence, responding managers expressed concerns
regarding worker safety in open-ended comments in the survey.
For example, in early July managers expressed concerns with adequately and safely
fingerprinting large numbers of staff—necessary to fulfill the census mission—under conditions
of social distancing. Managers’ comments also reflected that training sites have become
unavailable or difficult to secure because of the pandemic. Additionally managers noted that to
keep their staff properly socially distanced in the office, they have had to stagger their
employees’ shifts.
Some managers expressed concerns about not having enough space to have the necessary
number of staff in the office while adhering to social distance guidelines. Bureau officials told us
that some of their office operations and the work at their Paper Data Capture Centers are
difficult to complete while maintaining social distancing. In these situations, Bureau officials told
us that they had provided PPE for office workers to wear.
Areas for Continued Bureau Attention to Help Ensure a Complete and Accurate Census
COVID-19 has forced the Bureau to change how it will operate. As the Bureau implements
those changes and anticipates completing them within the new compressed timeframes, the
Bureau must monitor a number of areas to help ensure a complete and accurate census,
including:
• Hiring a sufficient Nonresponse Follow-up workforce. The Bureau plans to hire up to
435,000 enumerators to conduct NRFU. The Bureau began hiring for NRFU on July 14, and
as of August 18, had hired 309,391 NRFU enumerators. The Bureau plans to hire additional
enumerators in areas with low self-response, such as tribal nations, to ensure they receive
contact early and often if needed during NRFU. Bureau officials told us they are managing
local hiring needs for NRFU to ensure there are sufficient applicants with the necessary
skills in the hiring pool.
In our early-July survey of ACO managers, the majority of respondents reported satisfaction
with the aspects of field-worker hiring we asked about, with the exception of background
check procedures where satisfaction continued to be low (42 percent of responding
managers). The majority of respondents expressed satisfaction with aspects including
Bureau procedures to support field worker recruitment and hiring, positions authorized and
filled, quality of individuals recruited and hired, language skills of applicants to meet area
needs, and geographic distribution of applicants to meet area needs (with satisfaction rates
in these areas ranging from 52 to 72 percent).

12The Bureau considers applicants “selected” when they have accepted a job offer. After being selected, individuals

must complete fingerprinting and a background check.

Page 7 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
However, according to officials, the Bureau is experiencing a greater attrition rate than it
anticipated. The Bureau expected 10 percent of enumerators that started training would not
show up for work in the field. However, as of August 18, approximately 35 percent of
employees that started training did not show up for field work.
To combat attrition, Bureau officials told us they plan to continue recruiting, hiring, and
onboarding enumerators, and that they plan to schedule additional training sessions for
replacement enumerators. Additionally, as mentioned previously, Bureau officials told us
they plan to provide pay-incentives to enumerators who maximize productivity and the
number of hours worked. We will continue to monitor attrition rates as operations continue.
• Ensuring the safety of census workers and the public. The Bureau is taking social
distancing steps to increase the likelihood that households will participate in door-to-door
interviews as part of NRFU (see figure 3).
Figure 3: Safety Protocols for the 2020 Census in Response to COVID-19

The Bureau developed a training module to instruct enumerators on these new safety
protocols. The training includes content on (1) conducting interviews outside, whenever
possible, at a distance of 6 feet from the respondent and (2) avoiding physical contact such
as shaking hands and never allowing respondents to use or see the screen of Bureau-
issued devices.

Page 8 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
The module also covers the basics of COVID-19, including recognizing common symptoms,
and provides instructions for properly wearing and cleaning facemasks. Additionally, the
module notes that enumerators should follow local guidelines regarding use of face
coverings. However, according to Bureau officials, as of July 2020 staff are required to wear
face coverings while working with fellow employees and while conducting all field operations
with the public.
• Maintaining the public’s awareness of the 2020 Census. In June 2020, the Bureau
announced that its communications campaign would include new advertisements
encouraging online self-response and promoting cooperation when census takers arrive to
conduct an interview. It also aims to reach new audiences with advertisements in 33
additional languages and an expanded list of media vendors for a total of 45 languages in
addition to English. New advertisements also feature census staff wearing PPE while in the
field to address public safety concerns (see figure 4).

Figure 4: Example of Census Bureau Advertisement Showing Use of Personal Protective
Equipment

• Safely planning for an in-person outreach strategy to encourage responses. Many of
the Bureau’s efforts to reach hard to count populations, such as minorities, short-term
renters, and small children, rely on in-person face-to-face interactions with trusted
organizations and leaders in the community. While the Bureau initially moved to a virtual
outreach strategy in response to COVID-19, it announced on June 12 that partnership
specialists had resumed in-person efforts and begun attending in-person events across the
country where it was safe to do so. According to the Bureau, these decisions were made in
coordination with guidance from local health authorities.
According to Bureau officials, partners indicated that virtual engagement was insufficient to
reach all members of hard-to-count populations. The Bureau requires all partnership staff

Page 9 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
engaging with the public to adhere to social distancing and document all their outreach
activities for purposes of contact tracing.
In July 2020 the Bureau announced that its Mobile Questionnaire Assistance (MQA)
initiative, which was initially intended to provide staff at community events in locations with
low self-response to help people complete questionnaires and answer questions, would start
with modifications on July 13. The Bureau planned for MQA staff to resume offering in-
person assistance in select areas based on current health conditions and in accordance with
local PPE and social distancing guidelines.
The new plan positioned staff in locations such as grocery store and pharmacy entrances
rather than at large community events. To avoid sharing devices, MQA staff will now
interview respondents to fill out a census form rather than helping individuals respond to the
census on Bureau-issued tablets.
• Limiting in-person contact for Group Quarters. The Group Quarters (GQ) operation
counts individuals living or staying in group housing such as prisons and nursing homes.
According to Bureau officials, they had completed approximately 83 percent of GQ
enumeration as of mid-August 2020. Officials stated that to reduce in-person contact for the
GQ operation they encouraged GQ facilities to use the e-Response option and electronically
transfer data about their residents to the Bureau.
Bureau officials told us they are providing additional support to GQ facilities to ensure the
success of these submissions. For example, GQs can contact ACOs for assistance with
submitting their data and ACOs have assigned staff to contact facility administrators who
appear to not have completed their submission.
In April, the Bureau deployed a second enumeration method, Paper Listing, in which the
facility management provides the ACO a nonelectronic listing of its residents. The Bureau
asked facilities that had opted to provide a paper listing of residents to mail their listings to
their ACOs. However, Bureau officials told us that not all facilities are mailing back the paper
listings and that ACOs will need to pick up paper listings from facilities as needed.
To meet the needs of GQ facilities that were unable to complete enumeration through e-
Response or Paper Listing, Bureau officials told us they began in-person enumeration of
facilities on July 1. The Bureau released safety guidelines for census workers to follow in
those instances when a GQ facility requests in-person enumeration. 13 In addition to the
general safety protocols noted above, this safety guidance includes calling ahead to confirm
appointments with the GQ facility contact and avoiding contact with frequently touched
surfaces of public places—elevator buttons, door handles, tables, handrails—as well as
hand sanitizing after touching these surfaces.
• Counting persons experiencing homelessness. On June 12, 2020, the Bureau
announced that it will conduct the Service Based Enumeration (SBE) and Targeted Non
Sheltered Outdoor Location (TNSOL) operations to count persons experiencing
homelessness between September 22 and 24. To conduct these operations, the Bureau
sends census takers to count people at various locations including shelters, soup kitchens,
and locations previously identified by the Bureau where people are known to sleep outdoors.
In coordination with local stakeholders, the Bureau told us it chose these dates because the
climate in late September best mirrors the weather of late March and early April—when the

13These in-person enumeration methods include distributing and picking up questionnaires; swearing in and training

facility staff on how to conduct enumeration; picking up a paper listing of census response data; and conducting in-
person interviews.

Page 10 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
operations were originally planned to take place. The climate also affects where these
populations may be located. For example, Bureau officials told us that during the summer,
persons experiencing homelessness are less likely to use shelters or other services. This
affects the count because the SBE operation uses these services to reach persons
experiencing homelessness.
While this decision to enumerate the SBE population in September was made, in part, to
improve data quality, it means that these individuals will be counted where they are on the
day of the operation in September rather than on April 1, the reference date used for all
other census operations. 14 According to the Bureau, it may be difficult for persons
experiencing homelessness to recall, months later, where they were staying on April 1.
According to the Bureau, counting persons experiencing homelessness in September
instead of April should not significantly affect the overall census count, and therefore
apportionment data, because these two operations count a relatively small number of
people—about 500,000 individuals in the 2010 Census.
• Counting college students while colleges are closed. The Bureau’s plans for
enumerating college students were significantly affected by COVID-19 as many colleges
and universities ceased in-person instruction in spring 2020. According to the Bureau’s
residence rules, college students should be counted where they live and stay most of the
time—at their college or university. 15 Students who live in on-campus housing are included
in the enumeration of group quarter facilities. There are approximately 40,000 college and
university housing facilities counted as part of this operation.
According to the Bureau, as of August 19, colleges and universities with housing facilities
have already submitted their administrative records for students living in 81.3 percent of
those facilities (approximately 33,000 facilities). The Bureau planned to conduct NRFU
earlier in areas around universities—before the end of the spring semester—to ensure an
accurate count of those students living off-campus but was unable to do so.
In June 2020, in consultation with stakeholders, Bureau officials identified numerous
problems with students completing census forms or being accurately counted as a result of
COVID-19. These problems include students not setting up their mail to forward and
therefore not receiving census notices, and foreign students’ inability to complete their forms
from a foreign IP address. 16
To ensure that college students are counted at the correct address and to avoid duplicate
responses if the student’s family also counts them at home, the Bureau developed print and
media materials for use in partnership and communications efforts, including a web page for
2020 graduates, emphasizing the importance of counting college students (see figure 5).

14Bureau officials told us that when the SBE and TNSOL operations were originally scheduled for 3 days on and

around April 1, they were able to consider April 1 as the reference date for the data collected. However, they do not
always ask individuals where they were on the reference date. For example, during the TNSOL operation,
enumerators are instructed to count individuals without waking them up to ask questions.
15United States Census Bureau, Residence Criteria and Residence Situations for the 2020 Census of the United

States, accessed July 22, 2020, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/programs-surveys/decennial/2020-
census/2020-Census-Residence-Criteria.pdf.
16College students who are foreign citizens living in the United States while attending college in the United States are

to be counted at the on- or off-campus residence where they live and stay most of the time.

Page 11 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
Figure 5: Census Bureau Advertisement to Motivate College Student Self-Response

Additionally, Bureau officials told us that the Director of the Census Bureau sent a letter on
June 15, 2020, to the presidents of more than 1,300 4-year colleges and universities located
in towns and cities with large student populations. 17 The letter asked colleges and
universities to provide housing-unit roster information, which includes the addresses of
where students lived off-campus. Bureau staff also began calling school officials, and at a
minimum will request students’ full names, dates of birth, and local and alternative
addresses.
As of August 14 Bureau staff have reached out to 1,377 colleges with mixed success—706
said they would provide administrative data, 510 said they would not, and the Bureau has
received files from 509 colleges. Bureau officials said that they will request the data again
from colleges that initially declined to provide them, and noted that these student data may
also be captured through students’ parents or through other outreach to students, such as
through social media.
• Monitoring ongoing risks to IT systems implementation. Due to the ongoing impacts of
the COVID-19 pandemic on the Bureau’s 2020 Census operations schedule, as well as the
recent start of NRFU, it will be important that the Bureau continue to monitor risks to its IT
systems implementation. To conduct the 2020 Census, the Bureau is utilizing 52 IT systems
and plans to deploy them across 16 operational deliveries. 18 As of July 2020, the Bureau

17Bureau officials told us they used a list of 2,873 four year schools located within the United States and Puerto Rico

and removed any that were online only, out of business or permanently closed, commuter schools, or required all
students to live on campus.
18The Bureau plans to deploy the 52 systems being used in the 2020 Census multiple times across 16 operational

deliveries, which includes operations such as self-response and NRFU. That is, the Bureau may deploy a system for
one operation in the 2020 Census (such as self-response), and again for a subsequent operation (such as NRFU). As
such, additional development and testing may occur each time a system is deployed.

Page 12 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
had made progress in executing work against its IT development and testing schedule by
deploying the systems for 10 of the 16 operational deliveries. 19
However, the Bureau is continuing to monitor several risks, including those associated with
NRFU, as well as the impact of COVID-19-related schedule changes to the implementation
of IT. Among the ongoing risk areas are those related to NRFU system performance and IT
contractor support.
 NRFU system performance—As one of the most complex 2020 Census operations,
NRFU involves the interaction of 23 systems to support a series of new technical
innovations. These innovations include, for example, the planned use of mobile
devices by up to about 435,000 enumerators to conduct follow-up work, as well as
technology to optimize the assignment of their work. According to Bureau
documentation, these technical innovations are expected to reduce the cost of the
NRFU operation; however, they also introduce new risks if they do not perform as
intended.
The Bureau has taken steps to reduce NRFU system performance risks, including
conducting system, integration, and operational testing, over the past several years.
In addition, in June 2020, the Bureau reported that it had completed an analysis of
the potential impacts to NRFU systems resulting from the COVID-19 operational
delays. As a result, the Bureau stated that it increased NRFU system storage and
performance capabilities in anticipation of a revised NRFU training and operations
schedule.
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Bureau’s phased approach to beginning NRFU
at a subset of ACOs in July 2020 was intended to, among other things, help identify
and address system performance issues before the remaining ACOs begin NRFU in
August 2020. In this regard, as of July 2020, the Bureau had identified several NRFU
systems issues. For example, on July 14, 2020, the Bureau identified an issue with
the software used to deliver and manage NRFU mobile device applications, which
affected its ability to conduct NRFU enumerator training at six ACOs.
Specifically, the Bureau determined that the design of the NRFU software was not
properly optimized and did not perform as expected, resulting in enumerators that
were receiving training being temporarily unable to log in to their NRFU devices.
Bureau officials stated that the Bureau had implemented a temporary solution in mid-
July 2020 so that enumerators could complete their training and, by early August
2020, had completed a permanent solution for this issue.
However, due to the complexity of NRFU, significant risks remain regarding how the
systems will perform. For example, if any aspect of the technical innovations—
including the systems that support those innovations—do not perform as expected,
the Bureau may incur significant costs to troubleshoot and resolve systems issues
that arise. In addition, if NRFU systems do not perform as expected, the Bureau may
miss scheduled milestones for completing the operation.

19As of July 2020, the Bureau had deployed the systems for the following 10 operational deliveries: early operations

preparation; address canvassing; peak recruiting and hiring; integrated partnership and communications; count
review/remote Alaska; GQ advanced contact; self-response; update enumerate/update leave; GQ enumeration; and
NRFU. The systems for the remaining six operational deliveries that had not yet been deployed were: response
processing; data products/dissemination; providing data for redistricting; island area census; and post-enumeration
survey.

Page 13 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
The Bureau’s August 2020 announcement that it was increasing the speed of data
collection further increases the risks with NRFU system performance. As mentioned
earlier, the Bureau is planning to maximize employee work hours in order to
accelerate data collection and complete NRFU by September 30, 2020—31 days
earlier than previously planned.
This compressed schedule could have implications on NRFU system performance if,
for example, more enumerators than previously planned are working concurrently
using their mobile devices in certain areas of the United States. Therefore, it is
critical for the Bureau to continually monitor NRFU systems, and quickly respond to
address any system defects or other issues, if they arise.
 IT contractor support—The Bureau is relying extensively on contractors to implement
the IT systems needed to conduct the 2020 Census. We have previously reported
that it was important for the Bureau to continue to assess the effect of COVID-19
related schedule changes on its contractor support. 20 This includes, for example,
monitoring the availability of contractor staff needed to perform system testing and
provide IT support for both ongoing and upcoming census operations.
It will also be important for the Bureau to continue to monitor contractor support for
its IT hardware and software components. In May 2020, the Bureau completed an
analysis of the 2020 Census hardware and software components that, due to
COVID-19 delays, were expected to no longer be sustainable through the completion
of 2020 Census operations. For example, these IT hardware and software
components would have limited or no contractor support and need to be upgraded to
a new version or replaced to remain operational.
The Bureau has made progress in addressing this issue by, for example, upgrading
the component or negotiating IT contractor support through the completion of the
2020 Census operations. Nevertheless, additional work remains. For example,
according to Bureau documentation, the agency is monitoring a risk related to losing
contractor support for a critical 2020 Census software component.
This component provides IT server management capabilities for census operations,
including the Post-Enumeration Survey (PES). 21 If not addressed, the Bureau may
lack support to continue operation of the software component, including being able to
address any system issues, obtain security updates, or address any other security
issues or questions as they emerge.
• Adequately protecting mobile devices. The 2020 Census will be the first decennial in
which the Bureau will provide mobile devices to enumerators to collect personally
identifiable information from households that did not self-respond to the survey. As
described above, the Bureau plans to use a contractor to provide mobile devices up to about
435,000 enumerators. The contractor will be responsible for, among other things, the
provisioning, shipping, storing, and decommissioning of the devices.
Many threats to mobile devices are similar to those for traditional computing devices;
however, the threats and attacks to mobile devices can be facilitated by vulnerabilities in
their design and configuration, as well as the ways consumers use them. As we previously

20GAO-20-551R.

21The Bureau conducts a PES to collect person and housing unit information (independent from the 2020 Census

operations) from a sample of housing units to provide estimates of census coverage.

Page 14 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
reported, common vulnerabilities include a failure to enable password protection and
operating systems that are not kept up to date with the latest security patches. 22 In addition,
because of their small size and use outside of an office setting, mobile devices are easier to
misplace or steal, leaving sensitive information at risk of unauthorized use or theft.
According to the Bureau’s Decennial Information Security Manager, the Bureau utilizes
several security measures to protect mobile devices from malicious behavior. These security
measures include, among others, multi-factor authentication, encryption, and procedures to
remotely wipe devices that are exhibiting suspicious or malicious activity. 23 We have
ongoing work monitoring the Bureau’s implementation of mobile device security controls.
• Managing disinformation and misinformation. The Bureau continues to track, categorize,
and respond to disinformation and misinformation that may be shared over traditional or
social media. 24 For example, in May 2020, in response to questions by the public, the
Bureau issued a statement on its website to clarify that individuals may be contacted by
representatives of the Bureau to inquire about their responses to the 2020 Census and other
household surveys. 25
According to Bureau officials in the Trust and Safety team, they have reviewed the
performance from previous operations in the 2020 Census and adapted the policies and
practices for ongoing and future operations. For example, the Bureau used lessons learned
from the Address Canvassing operation and applied them to future operations, such as
Update Leave and NRFU. Specifically, the Bureau has not only monitored the threats of
misinformation and disinformation to those operations, but has identified, monitored, and
responded to potential physical threats to the safety of Bureau employees such as 2020
Census enumerators.
Additionally, according to a Trust and Safety Team official, the Bureau adapted policies and
procedures, to include escalating reports from employees in the field to the Trust and Safety
team for situational awareness, and coordinating responses with security teams and
stakeholders. According to this official, the Bureau worked with subject matter experts and
reviewed internal practices to improve event response.
• Protecting the privacy of respondent data. The Bureau continues to report progress in
implementing a disclosure avoidance technique, known as differential privacy, to its publicly-
released statistical products to protect the confidentiality of its respondents and their data. 26

22GAO, Information Technology: Better Management of Interdependencies between Programs Supporting 2020

Census Is Needed, GAO-16-623 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 2016).
23Multifactor authentication—the use of more than one of the combinations of the following factors: something you

know (e.g., a password), something you have (e.g., an identification badge), or something you are (e.g., a fingerprint
or other biometric)—is a stronger form of authentication than single-factor authentication. Encryption of data can be
used to help protect the integrity and confidentiality of data and computer programs by rendering data unintelligible to
unauthorized users and by protecting the integrity of transmitted (in transit) or stored (at rest) data.
24Disinformation is manufactured information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the intent to cause

harm. Misinformation is false information shared without the intent to mislead.
25https://2020census.gov/en/news-events/rumors.html.

26Differential privacy is a disclosure avoidance technique aimed at limiting statistical disclosure and controlling privacy

risk. According to the Bureau, differential privacy provides a way for the Bureau to quantify the level of acceptable
privacy risk and mitigate the risk that individuals can be reidentified using the Bureau’s data. Reidentification can
occur when public data are linked to other external data sources. According to the Bureau, using differential privacy
means that publicly available data will include some statistical noise, or data inaccuracies, to protect the privacy of

Page 15 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
Specifically, the Bureau has changed the disclosure avoidance approach it plans to use for
its redistricting and demographic and housing data products, based on feedback it received
from data users and the public. For example, at the end of May 2020, the Bureau published
a set of summary metrics based on use cases and stakeholder feedback. These metrics are
intended to allow data users to track the Bureau’s progress in refining its disclosure
avoidance system, especially as it relates to data accuracy.
The Bureau still has work left to be done before final decisions regarding its implementation
of differential privacy can be made. For example, Bureau officials reported that they plan to
hold training sessions on differential privacy this summer for the data stewardship executive
policy committee—the committee in charge of making privacy policy decisions for the
Bureau. Additionally, as of July 2020, the Bureau plans to continue collecting feedback from
data users through January 2021.
According to Bureau officials, the data stewardship executive committee is expected to
make final decisions about the implementation of differential privacy for the 2020 Census in
early 2021. We have ongoing work monitoring the Bureau’s progress as it works to
implement differential privacy for the 2020 Census.
• Ensuring timely and quality processing of census responses. It will also be important
that the Bureau monitor the risks associated with the ability of its systems to perform census
response processing under compressed time frames. Before the Bureau is able to deliver
data from the 2020 Census, it must conduct its response processing operation, which
removes duplicate responses, ensures that complete information is collected, and formats
data files used to produce census results.
However, the Bureau is behind schedule in completing integration testing of the 12 systems
needed to conduct the response processing operation. Specifically, the Bureau did not
complete system integration testing by mid-June 2020 as originally planned, and now
expects to complete this testing by the beginning of October 2020—approximately 3.5
months later than planned. The Bureau is also concurrently conducting operational testing,
which is intended to ensure that all components are ready to conduct the operation, and will
need to complete this testing before the response processing operation begins.
The Bureau’s August 2020 announcement that it intends to deliver the apportionment counts
to the President by December 31, 2020, further increases the risks associated with
conducting the response processing operation. More specifically, the Bureau now expects to
begin response processing in October 2020, instead of January 2021, as previously planned
after the Bureau had requested a statutory change to its required deadlines. As a result,
there will be less time available to complete the remaining system integration testing and
operational testing needed before the response processing operation begins.
As of early August 2020, Bureau officials stated that they were in the process of assessing
the impact of the announcement on the remaining IT testing work. In addition, according to
the Bureau’s announcement, it is planning other efforts intended to improve the efficiency of
its response processing operation, including increasing the number of staff and prioritizing
delivery of the apportionment counts in order to meet the required deadline.
Going forward, it will be important that the Bureau complete all remaining system and
operational testing for the response processing operation as expeditiously as possible to
better ensure that its systems are ready to complete this operation under compressed

individuals. Differential privacy provides algorithms that allow policy makers to decide the trade-off between data
accuracy and privacy.

Page 16 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
timeframes. If the Bureau does not complete all required testing, it may face an increased
number of system defects or other issues after it deploys the response processing
operation, which could affect the quality and accuracy of the census count.
• Evaluating the impact of delays and operational changes on data quality and
coverage. Delays to census data collection operations as a result of COVID-19, the
resulting compressed time frames, and public health concerns may affect the quality of the
data collected as part of the 2020 Census in several ways:
 Accuracy of Data Collected— As a result of the delays to data collection operations,
some individuals will answer the census later in 2020 than originally planned. Larger
gaps of time between Census Day, April 1, and completing the census form may
make it more difficult for respondents to recall who was living in their respective
households on April 1, affecting the quality of the data collected and overall accuracy
of the count. For example, NRFU enumerators began visiting households that did not
respond online, by mail, or by phone in mid-July rather than mid-May. The Bureau’s
Data Quality Documentation Team will document how data challenges such as recall
bias, births and deaths since April 1, individuals who have moved, and individuals
who live in different parts of the country at different times of the year affect
respondents’ ability to submit an accurate response.
 Completeness of Data Collected— In the COVID-19 environment, the public may be
less likely to cooperate with the door-to-door interviews used to reach nonresponding
households during NRFU, and less responsive to other in-person interactions used
to engage with hard-to-count populations, which may result in a less complete count.
Though the Bureau resumed in-person partnership and MQA activities in June and
July of 2020, a shorter NRFU operation gives these efforts less time to motivate
response among hard-to-count populations. Additionally, less responsiveness to in-
person interviews may also affect one of the Bureau’s tools for assessing data
quality, the PES, which will survey individuals using multiple methods, including
using door-to-door visits. 27
In an effort to improve completeness, one team reporting to the Bureau’s 2020 Data
Quality Executive Governance Group is expanding existing efforts to evaluate
coverage of children and the college-age population. Another team is considering
use of administrative data, such as data on births in January-March 2020 as a
benchmark against which the Bureau can compare data gathered as part of
evaluation efforts.
 Data Quality—The decision to deliver apportionment data by December 31 despite
delays to certain data collection operations means the Bureau will have less time to
conduct its post data collection activities, which improve the completeness and
accuracy of census data. These activities were designed to take 153 days, but will
have to be completed in 92 days. During response processing, the Bureau checks
for duplicate, inconsistent, and incomplete responses and uses administrative
records to supplement response data.
Bureau officials said that to meet the statutory date, they will prioritize tasks needed
to produce apportionment counts rather than simultaneously preparing redistricting

27The Bureau has modified its procedures for collecting information as part of its PES survey to reduce personal

contact because of COVID-19. Originally, staff were instructed to contact a household member (or a proxy or by
observation as a last resort) at each housing unit selected. Now staff are allowed to collect information by observation
first before attempting to interview by telephone or by a personal visit. 85 Fed. Reg. 41,947 (July 13, 2020).

Page 17 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
data, which requires greater precision. Additionally, they will examine each activity
and determine which ones, if removed, would have the smallest effect on the
accuracy of the census count.
Post data collection activities will also be affected by the President’s memorandum
directing the Bureau to take action consistent with applicable law to exclude foreign
nationals unlawfully residing in the United States from apportionment data.
Information on citizenship was not collected as part of the 2020 Census and the
Bureau will need to use alternative sources of information to fulfill the request in the
President’s memo. We will continue to monitor any operational impacts resulting
from this memorandum.

Agency Comments

We provided a copy of this draft report to the Department of Commerce. The Census Bureau
provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
- - - - -
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, the
Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, the Director of the Census Bureau, and interested
congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website
at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact J. Christopher Mihm at
202-512-6806 or by email at mihmj@gao.gov or Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or by email at
marinosn@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this
report are listed in enclosure I.

J. Christopher Mihm
Managing Director, Strategic Issues

Nick Marinos
Director, Information Technology and Cybersecurity

Enclosure (1)

Page 18 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
List of Requesters

The Honorable Ron Johnson
Chairman
The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney
Chairwoman
The Honorable James Comer
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Chairman
The Honorable Chip Roy
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly
Chairman
The Honorable Jody Hice
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Government Operations
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable Karen Bass
House of Representatives

The Honorable Joaquin Castro
House of Representatives

The Honorable Judy Chu
House of Representatives

The Honorable Steven Horsford
House of Representatives

The Honorable Jim Jordan
House of Representatives

Page 19 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
Enclosure I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts: J. Christopher Mihm, (202) 512-6806 or mihmj@gao.gov
Nick Marinos, (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao.gov
Staff Acknowledgments: In addition to the contacts named above, Alexandra Edwards, Jon
Ticehurst, Kate Sharkey, (Assistant Directors), Kerstin Meyer, Andrea Starosciak (Analysts-in-
Charge), Shawn Ward, Paulina Maqueda Escamilla, Andrew Avery, Michael Bechetti, Christina
Bixby, Anna Blasco, Alan Daigle, Rebecca Eyler, Sam Gaffigan, Lisa Hardman, Amalia
Konstas, Christopher Martone, Carlton Maynard, Melissa Melvin, Ty Mitchell, Lisa Pearson,
Emmy Rhine Paule, Emmet Ryan, Josephine Soddano, Andrew Stavisky, Farrah Stone, Peter
Verchinski, and Tim Wexler made significant contributions to this report.

(104396)

Page 20 GAO-20-671R 2020 Census
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