Full text
December 4, 2024
AFTER ACTION REVIEW OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC:
Recommendations
The Origins of the Coronavirus Pandemic, Including but Not Limited to the
Federal Government’s Funding of Gain-of-Function Research
Recommendations Regarding Investigating the Origins of COVID-19
1. The U.S. Intelligence Community should continue its investigation into the origins of
COVID-19.
a. The U.S. Intelligence Community should continue to pursue the origins of
COVID-19, to include intelligence collection regarding activities at the Wuhan
Institute of Virology and Wuhan Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
specifically regarding activities conducted immediately preceding the COVID-19
pandemic.
b. The U.S. Intelligence Community should continue to pursue the origins of
COVID-19, to include intelligence collection regarding the knowledge and
actions of the government of the People’s Republic of China, including but not
limited to local and provincial governments.
2. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence should declassify, to the extent
allowable by law, information related to COVID-19’s origins. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence must abide by S. 619, the COVID-19 Origin Act of
2023, and declassify “any and all information related to the potential links between the
Wuhan Institute of Virology and the origin of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19)…”
3. The Federal Government should do a holistic review of the origins of COVID-19.
The White House should conduct a thorough and comprehensive internal review of all
documents and information in the custody and control of the following agencies
regarding the origins of COVID-19, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc, and funding of gain-of-
function research:
a. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, to include the U.S. National
Institutes of Health and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
b. U.S. Department of State, to include the U.S. Agency for International
Development;
c. U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
d. U.S. Department of Justice, to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
e. U.S. Department of Defense, to include the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency;
f. U.S. Department of Energy, to include the network of National Laboratories; and
the
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g. U.S. Intelligence Community, to include the Central Intelligence Agency.
Recommendations Regarding Gain-of-Function Research
1. The Federal Government must take steps to pause and subsequently regulate high-
risk pathogen research to increase safety and decrease the risk of an accident.
Evaluate pausing all high-risk pathogen research until new regulations and biosafety and
biosecurity measures can be designed and implemented.
a. Provide further scrutiny to high-risk pathogen research that involves recombinant
or chimeric research, regardless of pathogen host, to include government review
and oversight.
b. Evaluate increasing laboratory and fieldwork biosafety and security standards for
all life sciences research.
c. Evaluate whether the United States needs a single, unified regulatory scheme
governing gain-of-function and dual use research, regardless of funding source.
d. Evaluate removing final approval authority for high-risk pathogen research
proposals from the funding agency and instead empower an independent oversight
entity to review, approve, and oversee such experiments.
e. Impose increased transparency requirements for high-risk pathogen research so
that federal and federally funded entities can no longer withhold critical
information from Congress and the public.
2. Using artificial intelligence or machine learning should be encouraged as a
substitute for traditional high-risk pathogen research. The Federal Government must
encourage the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning in high-risk virology
research and restrict the use of live viral research to only necessary uses to reduce the
likelihood of a laboratory or research related accident or infection.
Recommendations Regarding EcoHealth Alliance, Inc
1. The Federal Government must ensure that no more U.S. taxpayer dollars go to
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc or Dr. Peter Daszak and that they are held accountable. As
of December 4, 2024, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has
preliminarily suspended and proposed for debarment both EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., as an
institution, and Dr. Peter Daszak, as an individual. The U.S, Department of Health and
Human Services must formally debar both EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. and Dr. Peter Daszak
for the maximum time allowable.
2. The Department of Justice must evaluate if Dr. Peter Daszak violated any federal laws,
including but limited to violations of:
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a. 18 U.S.C. 1001;
b. 18 U.S.C. 1621; and
c. 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733.
Recommendations Regarding the Federal Government.
1. The Federal Government must continue to prioritize grant oversight and
compliance efforts. Evaluate the resources allocated to grant oversight and compliance
to ensure adequate government-wide grant enforcement and proper investigations of
grant compliance.
a. Ensure that the annual grant reporting process is timely, transparent, and
streamlined, to include a public repository of all annual reports filed pursuant to
taxpayer funded grants.
b. Evaluate policies to ensure federal funded research can be replicated successfully
and reward researchers whose research is routinely successfully replicated.
c. Include excessive or unanticipated pathogen growth conditions as a term of award
in all high-risk pathogen grants, these terms must include how the grantee should
measure growth, when the grantee should measure growth, and how and when
that growth is to be reported to the funding agency. Any experiments that exhibit
excessive or unanticipated growth must be reported to Congress within 48 hours
of the funding agency receiving the report from the grantee.
d. Update applicable U.S. biosafety and security standards to include a biosafety
level for research with bat-borne coronaviruses.
e. Include applicable U.S. biosafety and biosecurity standards as a term of award in
all high-risk pathogen grants, especially those with a foreign component or
collaborator.
f. Evaluate new terms of award, regulations, or grant conditions to ensure the safety
and humane treatment of laboratory animals in domestic and foreign labs.
g. Require grantees in all high-risk pathogen grants produce all metadata, underlying
data, laboratory notebooks, or other information pertinent to the federal funded
activity within 48 hours at the funding agencies request.
2. Restructure the U.S. National Institutes of Health to provide for great accountability
and transparency. Consider whether the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases should be divided into at least two institutes, one focusing on
infectious disease and one focusing on allergies.
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a. Evaluate whether leadership of the institutes and centers of the U.S. National
Institutes of Health should be subject to term or years of service limits.
3. Increase accountability, security, and transparency in the federal grant peer review
process. Consider granting the Director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health or the
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the funding Institute,
authority to immediately suspend, pending investigation, a grant determined to be a threat
to national security.
a. Incorporate a national security or Office of the Director of National Intelligence
review into the grant making process for grants that involve, in any way, countries
of particular concern or special watch list countries.
b. Provide transparency and accountability to the grant process by assigning one
funding agency official to be accountable for approving federal funding for grants
and making those decisions, and the peer review process more transparent to
Congress and the public.
c. Allow federal funded research peer review process to be more open to include
more researchers and scientists to ensure research is being thoroughly and
impartially reviewed.
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The Efficacy, Effectiveness, and Transparency of the Use of Taxpayer Funds
and Relief Programs to Address the Coronavirus Pandemic, Including Any
Reports of Waste, Fraud, or Abuse
1. Federal Agencies Cannot Rely on “Self-Certification” and Must Implement Modern
Digital Identification Programs: Whether for regular, recurring government benefits or
for the extraordinary benefits that were disbursed during the pandemic, federal agencies
must verify eligibility of applicants through either commercially available or
government-developed identification verification applications. Federal agencies should
implement proper cross-matching of applicant data with available databases immediately
to be effective in the scenario of future emergency relief funds. Update legacy systems
within federal agencies to give them the ability to perform cross-matching for such a
large volume of claims.
2. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Effective Control Measured Should be
Implemented: Require OMB to provide detailed guidance for federal agencies to
develop internal control plans that can be put to immediate use for future emergency
funding and require agencies to report such plans to OMB and Congress. These internal
control plans should be standardized across all agencies and include procedures for
verifying eligibility, monitoring fund usage, and detecting fraud.
3. SBA Should Implement a Fraud-Risk Program: When SBA is engaged in contingency
operations to disburse funds as it was during the pandemic, it needs to assign trained staff
to focus on fraud risk management and oversee improper payments and fraud. This
includes leveraging analytics programs to identify patterns of fraud or abuse across
applications.
4. SBA Must Instruct Lenders on How to Combat Fraud and Require Internal
Controls: During the disbursement of various pandemic relief funds and loans, SBA
assumed lenders had prior internal control measures in place for mitigating waste, fraud,
and abuse in loans. While some lenders may have some controls, not all did. SBA should
develop uniform guidance and minimum levels of internal controls in order for lenders to
be eligible to administer relief loans.
5. Require Sole Proprietors and Contractors to Provide Employer Identification
Numbers (EINs): EINs must be provided when applying for future emergency relief
programs, such as EIDL loans. Do not allow applicants to self-certify the number of
employees at their company to receive additional relief funds based off a falsified SSN or
EIN.
6. Federal Agencies Must Integrate Frad-Risk Assessments Before Disbursing Funds
to Applicants: Federal agencies should not disburse funds to applicants without proper
implementations of fraud risk assessments outlined by the Select Subcommittee, and the
agency’s IGs. Fraud risk assessments should involve identifying, analyzing, and
mitigating potential vulnerabilities in the program's funding process.
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7. Establish Agreements with Other Agencies to Securely Share Data and Streamline
Eligibility Verification: For example, make the U.S. Department of Treasury’s do-not-
pay list available to all agency’s OIGs to verify identities and the eligibility of individuals
and organizations seeking emergency relief funding prior to issuing payments.
8. Amend the Social Security Act to Allow full Death Data to be Shared Between the
Social Security Administration and Treasury. Authorize the SSA to share the Full
Death Master File (DMF) with the Treasury and other federal agencies for program
integrity purposes. Sharing complete death records ensures that federal agencies can
quickly identify and stop payments made to deceased beneficiaries. Ensure timely
updates to federal databases, reducing overpayments and the risk of fraud. Minimize
financial losses due to improper payments, which cost taxpayers billions.
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The Implementation or Effectiveness of Any Federal Law or Regulation
Applied, Enacted, or Under Consideration to Address the Coronavirus
Pandemic and Prepare for Future Pandemics
1. Expand and Improve the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response: Created
after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Office Pandemic Preparedness and Response (OPPR) is a
good start, but only focusses on two of five biodefense strategy objectives. The current National
Biodefense Strategy has five objectives. Those are: (1) enable risk awareness to inform decision
making, (2) ensure capabilities to prevent incidents, (3) ensure preparedness to reduce impacts,
(4) rapidly respond to limit impacts, and (5) facilitate recovery. The OPPR is currently only
responsible for (3) preparedness and (4) response. The OPPR should be renamed the Office of
Biodefense Surveillance, Prevention and Response because “pandemic” is too limited a focus in
a world of biodefense threats. The Office should be responsible for ‘biological hazards’ as
naturally occurring or bioengineered and ‘biological incidents’ as natural or accidental
occurrences, a crime involving a biothreat, and an act of biological terrorism or warfare. More
important, the Office should be expanded to cover all of the National Biodefense Strategy
objectives. As the leading public health officer, the Surgeon General should be consulted and
briefed regularly on the Office’s activities. Finally, the Office should be removed from the
Executive Office of the President to emphasize the apolitical nature of the office and its
responsibilities.
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Notional organizational chart for the Office of Biodefense Surveillance, Prevention, and Response
This office will inform biodefense strategy and policy, assign biodefense roles and responsibilities across
the interagency, direct biodefense activities, and advise on biodefense budgetary matters.
Recommendations Regarding The WHO
2. Reform the WHO as a Condition of Continued U.S. Support: The WHO stood by
while China lied about the severity of the novel COVID-19 virus and obstructed
investigations within China. Honesty is a non-negotiable, especially in a once in a
lifetime global pandemic, and within any public health intuition. If the WHO cannot be
reformed to better manage its membership the U.S. should commence withdrawing
support.
3. Support Taiwan’s Inclusion into the WHO to Replace China’s Membership: The
next Administration should endorse Taiwan’s membership as a consequence for the
manner in which China misled the international community regarding COVID-19. The
United States and other like-minded developed countries must hold China to account, and
excluding China from international bodies, such as the WHO, should be considered as
means to bring China into compliance with shared international norms and practices
between responsible nations.
Recommendations Regarding The Supply Chain and Strategic National Stockpile
4. A U.S. Pandemic Quick Response Team and Supporting Infrastructure Needs to be
in Place Before the Next Pandemic: This is crucial for rapid containment, effective
response, and mitigation of societal and economic impacts. This would be part of a larger
national pandemic response infrastructure that includes enhanced disease surveillance,
dispersed supply stockpiles, rapid development of medical countermeasures, and securing
public trust through effective communication
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5. States Need to Acquire and Maintain Their Own Strategic Stockpiles: Stockpiles
should be designed to address pandemics, natural disasters, chemical/biological threats,
and other emergencies. State stockpiles should supplement the Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS), reducing reliance on federal resources. Ensure stockpiles are
appropriately sized for state populations and potential risks.
6. Better Management of National Stockpile: More and multiple diverse sites – even with
the states acquiring their own products. Use digital inventory systems to track stock
levels, expiration dates, and maintenance schedules. Set up alerts for replenishment needs
and approaching expiration dates. Ensure systems can communicate with federal and
regional databases for seamless coordination. Regularly rotate stock to prevent
expiration, especially for perishable items like medications. Partner with manufacturers
or distributors to maintain "just-in-time" replenishment capabilities.
7. U.S. Must Move Toward a 100 Percent Domestic Production of Vital medical
Supplies and Pharmaceuticals: Provide tax credits, grants, and low-interest loans to
companies investing in domestic production. Offer guaranteed government procurement
contracts to incentivize U.S.-based production. Partner with private companies to develop
next-generation medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. Fund educational initiatives and
apprenticeships in pharmaceutical manufacturing, biomedical engineering, and related
fields. Maintain a strategic reserve of critical materials to buffer against supply
disruptions.
8. U.S. Must Develop a Manufacturing Ready Reserve (MRR): This would be a
forward-thinking strategy to ensure the U.S. can rapidly produce critical medical
supplies, pharmaceuticals, and other essential goods during emergencies. The MRR
would act as a "standby force" of manufacturing capacity, ready to be activated when
needed. Focus areas would include: Medical Supplies: PPE, ventilators, syringes, and
diagnostic tools. Pharmaceuticals: Vaccines, antiviral drugs, antibiotics, and essential
medications. Critical Technologies: Items like microchips and other essential components
used in healthcare devices.
Recommendations Regarding Public Health Mitigation Measures
9. Ensure Proposed Policies, Such as Social Distancing, are Considered Wholistically.
The economic, mental, and social impacts of these policies must be weighed with the
public health considerations.
10. The CDC and Administration must Conduct Gold Standard Scientific Studies
before Suggesting Wide-Spread use of Masks: The government should be more
transparent with their understandings. Let people know if what they are discussing is a
hypothesis. Show if trials eventually prove something to be false
11. Public Health Lockdowns Must Be Designed to Protect the Most Vulnerable While
Preserving the Status Quo For As Much of the Population as Possible: A robust
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discussion of the costs and benefits is critical. We must not ever again attach “zero value”
to the collateral damage that may be caused by interventions such as lockdowns.
12. The Collateral Damage of COVID-19 Lockdowns Should be Robustly Studied:
These studies may help inform cost-benefit analysis during a future pandemic or provide
guidance toward what present problems need to be addressed.
Recommendations Regarding Surveillance and Testing
13. Support Wastewater Surveillance Efforts. During COVID-19, efforts to surveil
wastewater proved to be an effective early-warning tool. The federal government should
consider bolstering these efforts to prepare for a future pandemic.
14. Public-Private Partnerships to Develop Testing Must be Put in Place Now to
Prepare for Future Pandemics: Having agreements, contracts, etc. and infrastructure in
place with industry and academia for testing. Government development of its own kits
did not work. Incorporate lessons learned for failures in developing tests. Office of
Pandemic Preparedness Readiness and Response should have the lead.
15. Clear and Concise Communications: The FDA's evolving guidance on testing types,
usage, and interpretation of results led to some confusion. For instance, there were
changing recommendations about the use of PCR vs. antigen tests, which affected public
understanding and trust in testing. As the understanding of the virus evolved, updating
guidelines and communicating changes promptly would have kept testing strategies
aligned with the latest scientific knowledge.
16. Streamline Testing Processes (from Production to Delivering Results):
a. Reducing Bottlenecks: The testing process often faced delays due to bottlenecks
in sample collection, processing, and reporting. Improving logistics and
increasing the speed of processing and reporting could have accelerated response
times.
b. Decentralization: Enhancing the ability for more decentralized or local testing,
including at pharmacies and clinics, might have alleviated pressure on centralized
testing facilities and made testing more accessible.
c. Prioritize development of at-home testing for future pandemics, especially if
symptoms could be asymptomatic and human-to-human transmission is the means
of spreading the virus.
17. When There is Any Doubt about a New Virus of Concern Emerging in a Foreign
Country, Travel Restrictions Should be Immediately Enacted: It is far easier to undo
the restrictions that may have been unneeded than it is to take a “wait and see” approach
once the unknown virus of concerned has entered our borders and thoroughly spread.
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18. Continue to Build upon and Augment International Partnerships. The CDC and
USAID have established effective programs in less capable nations to conduct overseas
surveillance to provide early detection of diseases of concern.
19. Exercise Closing the Borders and Ports of Entry: The Department of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the CDC and Office of Pandemic Preparedness and
Response, should develop an operational plan (or, if they exist, refine existing plans) to
close the borders and all ports of entry within 24 hours’ notice and routinely exercise the
plan in order to prepare for the next pandemic.
General Recommendations
20. The Constitution Should Never be Put on Hold in Times of Crisis: Free speech is of
vital importance and the federal government should never seek to suppress content it
disagrees with on social media, or elsewhere. The government should never be the arbiter
of truth, especially not when it has a conflict of interest.
21. Doctors Frequently and Responsibly Prescribe Off-Label Treatments and Should
Never be Demonized for Doing so in Exercising Their Sound Medical Judgment:
Doctors were repudiated for prescribing off-label treatment. This was shameful and
should not be repeated. Off-label medications are a critical tool for physicians, both in
times of normalcy and during a pandemic. Stigmatizing this commonplace practice is
counterproductive. For federal health agencies to regain trust, they must avoid
patronizing the American people. The American people want to be educated, not
indoctrinated. In the face of a novel virus for which there is little or no available
treatments, federal policy should seek to support doctors’ efforts to repurpose drugs
which are already known to be very safe.
22. Federal Health Agencies Must Trust the American People with the Whole Truth –
Speaking in “Generalities” and Using Rules of Thumb is Not Good Enough: Full
transparency is necessary for ensuring trust. Federal health agencies must avoid
unnecessarily inflating or exaggerating the power of vaccines or other interventions.
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The Development of Vaccines and Treatments, and the Development and
Implementation of Vaccination Policies for Federal Employees and Members
of the Armed Forces
1. Operation Warp Speed Should Serve as a Blueprint to be Used to Quickly Develop
Vaccines and Therapeutics. The federal government should evaluate whether certain
aspects of Operation Warp Speed can be integrated permanently to more rapidly develop
vaccines and therapeutics for diseases which currently afflict the American people. If this
evaluation necessitates legislation, Congress should pass legislation which facilitates
these goals.
2. The Government should not Promise Approval of a Drug or Treatment Before its
Approval. The White House should not promise a particular regulatory action, such as a
booster recommendation, prior to the regulatory agency making its decision.
3. Greater Congressional Oversight of FDA Decisions. Congress should consider
legislation which requires the FDA Commissioner and CDC Director to notify
Committees of jurisdiction prior to overruling its advisory committees such as VRBPAC
and ACIP.
4. Naturally Acquired Immunity Should not be so Quickly Discarded in the Future
until there is Ample Scientific Data to Support or Refute the Value of Natural
Immunity to a New Virus. Official public health guidelines should acknowledge that
individuals who have recovered from an infection may possess natural immunity, which
can provide protection against reinfection. Public health authorities should adopt a
nuanced perspective, recognizing that while natural immunity exists, it may vary in
strength, duration, and effectiveness across different individuals. Decisions regarding
natural immunity should be grounded in robust, peer-reviewed scientific research, not
assumptions or generalizations.
5. Vaccine Mandates—Particularly at the Federal Level—Should be Avoided,
Especially for Vaccines which do Not Prevent the Spread of a Virus. Vaccine policy
should leave room for individual choice and tailored medical advice from individual’s
doctors. One’s vaccination status should not preclude them from earning a wage or
pursuing a happy and fulling life.
6. Consider Whether Vaccines which are not Eligible for VICP Compensation should
be Eligible for a Vaccine Mandate. Some vaccines, particularly those approved for
emergency use (e.g., COVID-19 vaccines during the pandemic), may not be eligible for
VICP compensation. Mandating such vaccines raises concerns about their safety, as they
have not undergone the same long-term testing as vaccines covered by VICP. Vaccines
not covered by VICP may still be safe and effective, but their long-term safety profile
might not be fully known at the time of mandate. Continuous monitoring and post-market
surveillance are necessary to ensure that any adverse effects are identified early and
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addressed. Mandating vaccines that do not offer VICP protection could lead to legal
challenges, particularly if individuals feel they are being forced to take a vaccine without
adequate recourse in the event of harm. This could also damage public trust in
vaccination programs. If vaccines are not eligible for VICP compensation, it may be
appropriate for Congress to explore alternative mechanisms to provide compensation or
remedy for individuals who suffer serious adverse reactions to mandated vaccines.
7. DOD Should have Considered Testing Servicemembers’ Antibody Levels for a More
Targeted Approach to Vaccination Policy, Rather than Mandating it for All Troops.
The DOD or other entities may consider taking blood samples to test for antibody levels
for more tailored vaccine policy. The DOD has a long history of requiring certain
vaccines, however COVID-19 vaccines were very new and controversial, and the
unintended consequences must be considered when weighing new mandates
8. The System used by Federal Health Agencies for Vaccine Safety Surveillance Must
be Reformed. The federal government should consider establishing a personnel reserve
consisting of appropriate public and private sector experts, which could be activated
during a public health emergency to evaluate reports of adverse events and seek to
establish causality. Rather than maintaining a “separate back-end system” The FDA and
CDC should evaluate the feasibility of publicly publishing all updates and corrections to
VAERS reports.
9. The Federal Government Should Robustly Investigate Reports of Neurological
Issues Associated with COVID-19 vaccines. The federal government should consider
establishing dedicated programs to study these conditions. The federal government must
take neurological issues associated with COVID-19 vaccines seriously, given the
potential concerns and the need to maintain public trust in the vaccination process.
Investigating reports of adverse events, especially neurological side effects, should be
done in a transparent, rigorous, and scientific manner. This is essential not only to ensure
public safety but also to demonstrate the government’s commitment to thorough
monitoring and accountability.
10. HRSA Should Work Rapidly to Establish an Injury Table for COVID-19 Vaccines
and Other Covered Countermeasures: HRSA plays a crucial role in administering the
VICP, which compensates individuals who suffer serious injuries from vaccines and other
covered countermeasures. Given the introduction of COVID-19 vaccines and other
emergency countermeasures (such as therapeutics and diagnostic tools), there is a
pressing need for HRSA to rapidly establish an injury table specific to these vaccines and
countermeasures to ensure timely support and transparency.
11. Establish a Personnel Reserve Consisting of Appropriate Public and Private Sector
Subject Matter Experts: The federal government should consider establishing a
personnel reserve consisting of appropriate public and private sector experts, which could
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be activated during a public health emergency to assist in the adjudication of
compensation claims. This personnel reserve may also be established in conjunction with
a personnel reserve analyzing overall reports of vaccine adverse events.
12. Move COVID-19 Vaccines from CICP to VICP: Congress should also consider
reforming these programs such that any future vaccine which is mass-distributed or
mandated vaccine is covered under VICP rather than CICP.
13. Emergency Use Authorization should Only Be Used for the Most Vulnerable
Americans with the Greatest Risk: EUA process was created to allow for the rapid
deployment of medical interventions—such as vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics—
during public health emergencies, including pandemics. However, there is a growing
concern that EUA should only be applied to the most vulnerable Americans who face the
greatest risk during a health crisis, rather than being broadly extended to all populations.
14. Americans Need to Hear From Trusted Messengers: During the next pandemic or
public health emergency, Americans need to hear more from trusted messengers such as
doctors treating patients, who are also better equipped to provide advice that is tailored to
a particular region or locality’s situation.
15. During a Future Pandemic, the Government Should Craft Response Policies which
Prioritize Maintaining Normalcy in the Healthcare System: During the COVID-19
pandemic, far too many Americans were encouraged or forced to forgo medical treatment
that was deemed to be “elective” or was deprioritized. The Select Subcommittee has
heard personal stories of individuals who died from diseases other than COVID-19
because crucial medical procedures were put on hold.
16. In the Interest of Pandemic Preparedness and General Public Health Resiliency,
Congress and the Executive Should Consider Enacting Legislation or Policies which
Broadly Bolster the Health of the American People: Comorbidities were a critical
determinant of an individual’s risk for COVID-19.
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The Economic Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic and Associated
Government Response on Individuals, Communities, Small Businesses, Health
Care Providers, States, and Local Government Entities
1. Faster Distribution of Aid: Delays in distributing unemployment benefits and stimulus
checks caused financial strain. Implementing a more streamlined system for disbursing
funds quickly, possibly using existing tax infrastructure or direct deposit systems, could
have reduced delays.
2. Targeted Support for Hard-Hit Sectors: Some sectors, like hospitality, retail, and small
businesses, were disproportionately affected. More targeted aid and relief packages
tailored specifically to the needs of these sectors could have preserved more jobs.
3. Enhancing Digital Infrastructure: Many state unemployment systems were
overwhelmed due to outdated technology. Federal investment in modernizing state
unemployment systems before or early in the pandemic could have ensured more
efficient processing of claims.
4. Improved Communication and Guidance: Mixed messages and changing guidelines
created confusion among businesses and workers. Clearer and more consistent
communication from federal and state governments might have helped businesses and
workers make better-informed decisions.
5. Increased Federal Reserve Reporting on Risks of Prolonged Low Interests Rates:
The Federal Reserve could have produced more detailed and frequent reports on financial
stability, focusing on the risks associated with prolonged low interest rates and rising
government debt. These reports should have included analyses of asset price bubbles and
credit risk within the financial system. Furthermore, implementing robust monitoring
systems to track risks across different sectors, including housing, corporate debt, and
financial institutions, could have helped identify vulnerabilities early. The Federal
Reserve should have conducted regular analyses of government debt sustainability,
including assessing the potential impact of rising debt on future interest rates, inflation,
and fiscal policy.
6. The Federal Reserve Must Provide Clear Forward Guidance on How and When it
Plans to Normalize Interest Rates and Unwind Unconventional Monetary Policies:
Communicating a well-defined exit strategy would help manage expectations and reduce
market uncertainty about future policy changes. Being transparent about the potential
risks associated with low interest rates and high government debt would help market
participants and policymakers understand the challenges and prepare for potential
adjustments. This includes publishing detailed analyses of how current policies could
impact future economic conditions.
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The Societal Impact of Decisions to Close Schools, How the Decisions Were
Made and Whether There is Evidence of Widespread Learning Loss or Other
Negative Effects as a Result of These Decisions
1. School Closures should be reviewed under the highest level of scrutiny: In the event
of a declared national health emergency, School closures should be temporary measures
and subject to the highest scrutiny.
2. Comprehensive Analysis Impacts of School Closures: In the context of school
closures, analyzing its effects should not be limited to public health considerations.
Federal public health authorities should consider effects including but not limited to
student academics, mental health, and physical health.
3. Establishment of a Temporary Interagency Task Force: In the event of a declared
national health emergency, the federal government should establish a temporary
interagency task force that identifies and analyzes risks associated with the health
emergency to coordinate and communicate targeted mitigation measures. The Secretary
of Education should appoint a temporary officer to serve as a liaison to the public health
agencies—specifically, HHS and CDC—to a continually review evolving science. While
respecting federalism interests, the interagency task force should be communicating risk
assessment and guidance to state and local stakeholders.
4. Communicating and Consulting on Public Health Guidance: Public health
authorities—specifically the CDC—should be encouraged to consult with stakeholders
related to the practicality of health guidance. However, these agencies should be
discouraged from sharing and accepting feedback from stakeholders that are not based on
science and could harm the public trust of federal health agencies.
5. Transparency in public health guidance. The CDC must be more transparent regarding
published guidance, guideline, reference, or recommendation documents. This must
include acknowledge any non-governmental groups the CDC consulted in the
formulation of the documents.
6. Addressing Pandemic-Era Learning Loss: The federal government should encourage
states to establish programs to identify and assess pandemic-era learning loss and
encourage targeted programs for addressing learning loss.
7. Reducing Chronic Absenteeism: The federal government should collaborate with public
and private stakeholders to identify, assess, and establish programs aiming to reduce the
rate of chronic absenteeism that has occurred since the pandemic.
8. Improving School Infrastructure: Encourage school districts to identify, construct, and
maintain infrastructure, including but not limited to ventilation systems, that could further
impact transmission in school environments.
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Cooperation By the Executive Branch and Others with Congress, the
Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office, and Others in
Connection with Oversight of the Preparedness for and Response to the
Coronavirus Pandemic
Recommendations Regarding the Federal Government
1. The Executive Branch must comply with Congress. The Executive Branch’s standard
operating posture must be to comply with authorized congressional oversight requests
fully, transparently, and timely to the fullest extent allowed by law.
3. The Federal Government must review employees’ record retention practices and
ensure accountability for any violators. Conduct a federal government wide review of
federal employees’ use of personal email for official, government business.
a. Conduct a federal government wide review of federal employees’ deletion and
destruction or potential deleting or destruction of official, government records.
b. Conduct a federal government wide review of agencies compliance with the
Freedom of Information Act to ensure it is consistent with the law and
Congressional intent.
c. The Department of Justice must evaluate if Dr. David Morens violated any federal
laws, including but limited to violations of:
I. 18 U.S.C. 1001;
II. 18 U.S.C. 1621; and
III. 18 U.S.C. 2071.
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