United States v. Rico Tomas Garcia — Order on Motion to Exclude (D. Colo., Document 283)

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An Order on Motion to Exclude in United States v. Rico Tomas Garcia, No. 24-cr-00106-NYW-1, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, dated February 27, 2026 and filed as Document 283. It rules on the Government's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony [Doc. 267] directed at a global supply chain expert the defense intends to call, and grants it in part and denies it in part. The order records that Mr. Garcia is charged with nine counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and six counts of money laundering, and that an eight-day jury trial is set to begin March 2, 2026. The Court declines to exclude the testimony as untimely, sorts the challenged opinions into four categories, and excludes opinions on the reasonableness of Mr. Garcia's actions or his intent. The signature block names United States District Judge Nina Y. Wang.

Summary drafted by a model from the text of the original file linked on this page and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Cite this document

“United States v. Rico Tomas Garcia — Order on Motion to Exclude (D. Colo., Document 283).” Original at ecf.cod.uscourts.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/order-on-motion-to-exclude-usa-v-garcia-dkt-283-d-colo-621f3cff74/, SHA-256 14171b3aec082d3390297f1703ac1ca33ed8a7eca04d29f30a6215a4c818eab5.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang

Criminal Action No. 24-cr-00106-NYW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

1. RICO TOMAS GARCIA,

Defendant.

ORDER ON MOTION TO EXCLUDE

This matter is before the Court on the Government’s Motion to Exclude Expert

Testimony (the “Motion” or “Motion to Exclude”). [Doc. 267]. Defendant Rico Tomas

Garcia (“Defendant” or “Mr. Garcia”) opposes the Motion. [Doc. 272]. For the following

reasons, the Motion to Exclude is respectfully GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Garcia is charged with nine counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343

and six counts of money laundering, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1957(a) and 2 [Doc. 1]. The Court assumes the Parties’ familiarity with the

allegations underlying the charges and does not repeat them here.

Mr. Garcia is set for an eight-day jury trial beginning March 2, 2026. [Doc. 232 at

5]. He intends to call Rosemary Coates (“Ms. Coates”), “a global supply chain

management expert and consultant,” as an expert witness at trial. [Doc. 267-1 at 3]. On
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February 16, 2026, the Government moved to exclude Ms. Coates’s testimony. See [Doc.

267 at 1, 15]. Defendant responded in opposition on February 20, 2025. [Doc. 272].

LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the
proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. “In essence, Rule 702 permits a court to admit expert testimony that

is ‘both reliable and relevant.’” Sanderson v. Wyo. Highway Patrol, 976 F.3d 1164, 1172

(10th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1122 (10th Cir.

2006)). The party proffering expert testimony has the burden to show its admissibility by

a preponderance of the evidence. Squires ex rel. Squires v. Goodwin, 829 F. Supp. 2d

1041, 1048 (D. Colo. 2011).

Trial courts are charged with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to ensure

that expert testimony is reliable and relevant. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526

U.S. 137, 147–52 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588–89

(1993). To fulfill that function, the court first analyzes whether the proffered expert is

qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to render their opinions.

Fed. R. Evid. 702; Bill Barrett Corp. v. YMC Royalty Co., 918 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.

2019). If the expert is qualified, the court must determine whether the expert’s opinions

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are reliable by evaluating the underlying reasoning and methodology. Bill Barrett Corp.,

918 F.3d at 770. The court must also decide whether the expert’s opinions are “applicable

to a particular set of facts,” i.e., are relevant to the case at hand. Dodge v. Cotter Corp.,

328 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003). “Relevant expert testimony must logically advance

a material aspect of the case, . . . and be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it

will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.” United States v. Garcia, 635 F.3d 472, 476

(10th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). The relevance inquiry “encompasses Rule 702’s

requirement that the evidence help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue.” Sanderson, 976 F.3d at 1172 (cleaned up).

Even if an expert witness’s testimony is reliable and relevant, the testimony may

be excluded under Rule 403 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger

of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the

jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R.

Evid. 403. Evidence need not be “probatively essential” to survive a Rule 403 challenge.

United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1213 (10th Cir. 2011). “To the contrary, [the] law

favors admission of all relevant evidence not otherwise proscribed; thus, exclusion under

this rule is ‘an extraordinary remedy [that] should be used sparingly.’” Id. (emphasis

omitted) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 192 F.3d 946, 949 (10th Cir. 1999)). “The

district court has considerable discretion in performing the Rule 403 balancing test.”

United States v. Silva, 889 F.3d 704, 712 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted).

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ANALYSIS

I. Timeliness

The deadline for rebuttal expert witness disclosures 1 was December 12, 2025, and

the deadline for filing motions challenging rebuttal experts was December 19, 2025. See

[Doc. 122; Doc. 232 at 5]. The Government’s Motion to Exclude was filed on February

16, 2026, nearly two months after the deadline to file such motions. See [Doc. 267]. The

Motion to Exclude does not seek leave to file out of time or address timeliness at all. See

[id.]. The Motion to Exclude also represents that Mr. Garcia disclosed Ms. Coates as an

expert on February 9, 2026, several weeks after the deadline for affirmative expert

disclosures. See [id. at 1]. The Court therefore ordered Defendant to address the

untimeliness of his disclosure in his response to the Motion to Exclude. See [Doc. 268].

Mr. Garcia acknowledges that his rebuttal expert disclosure was untimely. [Doc.

272 at 12]. He argues that exclusion of Ms. Coates on untimeliness grounds is not

appropriate due to the timing of the Government’s affirmative expert disclosure, the timing

of counsel’s entry onto the case, and because the Government has not been prejudiced

by the belated disclosure. [Id.]. Defendant notes that “[t]he government’s expert

disclosures to the defense were similarly late and were provided to the defense on

January 16, 2026” and requests that “[i]f the Court strikes the defense’s expert as

untimely, . . . the Court also strike all of the government’s expert witnesses as untimely

as well.” [Id. at 15].

When contemplating discovery sanctions in a criminal case, courts consider

“(1) the reason for the delay in disclosing the witness; (2) whether the delay prejudiced

1 Defendant classifies Ms. Coates as a rebuttal expert. See [Doc. 272 at 12].

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the other party; and (3) the feasibility of curing any prejudice with a continuance.” United

States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1243–44 (10th Cir. 2001). “The preferred sanction is a

continuance,” and it “would be a rare case where, absent bad faith, a district court should

exclude evidence rather than continue the proceedings.” United States v. Golyansky,

291 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002).

The Court is not persuaded that counsel’s entry into the case on September 4,

2025, [Doc. 228], months before the expert disclosure deadlines, provides an adequate

explanation for Defendant’s failure to comply with the expert disclosure deadlines. No

matter when counsel enters an appearance in the case, counsel is expected to come up

to speed with the case and comply with the Court’s existing orders; and in this case in

particular, the order setting the expert disclosure and Rule 702 motions deadlines was

plain on the Court’s docket, see [Doc. 122], and referenced in a written order entered

after counsel’s appearance, see [Doc. 232 at 5]. But the Court is also mindful that the

Government’s expert disclosures were also late, 2 such that defense counsel could not

have complied with the rebuttal expert deadline set by the Court. And given that the

Government fails to address the timeliness of its Motion or expert disclosures at all, see

[Doc. 267], and was late in its own disclosures, the Court can only assume that the

2 Defense counsel represents that Government counsel communicated that “[i]t is unclear

what our current expert disclosure date is, but previous orders were 21 days before trial
so I imagine the same applies to our current trial date.” [Doc. 272 at 14]. If either Party
was uncertain about the expert disclosure and/or Rule 702 motions deadlines, the Parties
should have filed a motion for clarification.

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Government has not been prejudiced by Defendant’s belated disclosure. The Court

declines to exclude Ms. Coates’s testimony on untimeliness grounds. 3

II. The Motion to Exclude

The Government moves to exclude Ms. Coates’s testimony in its entirety, arguing

that (1) she is not qualified to offer many of her opinions; (2) her methodology in forming

her opinions is not reliable; (3) her opinions are not helpful to the jury; and (4) many of

her opinions constitute impermissible legal conclusions couched as expert opinions.

[Doc. 267 at 4]. The Government has provided a chart that sets out each opinion it

challenges and its objections to each opinion. See [Doc. 267-2]. The Court has sua

sponte categorized Ms. Coates’s opinions into four separate categories:

• Statements of fact that are not opinions;

• Statements or opinions that parrot out-of-court statements;

• Opinions or statements concerning the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects; and

• Opinions about the reasonableness of Mr. Garcia’s actions or Mr. Garcia’s intent.

The Court addresses each category in turn.

A. Statements of Fact, Not Opinions

Many of the “opinions” challenged by the Government are more appropriately

categorized as statements of fact:

• The now-defunct Botani-Labs purchased and sold raw botanical materials
and other plant-derived products, including cannabis products. In 2020,
Botani-Labs supplied wholesale herbal supplements, vegan products, and
botanical extractions to the consumer market. [Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 17].

3 Neither Party has requested a continuance. Because the trial is set to begin in less than
one week, and given the ends-of-justice continuances granted in this case already, the
Court finds that a continuance of the trial would not be in the interest of justice.

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• Mr. Garcia had a prior relationship with IPF Sourcing, and . . . Garcia was
asked to supply 1.33 million 16-oz bottles of hand sanitizer to IPF. The
need was urgent. [Id. at ¶ 18 (footnote omitted)]. 4

• International Product Fulfillment (IPF Sourcing) is a full-service sourcing
company that helps its customers source PPE, safety workwear, and
protective equipment worldwide. Sourcing Agents, such as IPF, act as
outsourced purchasing departments for organizations that do not have in-
house capabilities or global reach. [Id. at ¶ 19 (footnote omitted)].

• In April 2020, following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, IPF Sourcing
was tasked with sourcing 9 million 16-ounce bottles of hand sanitizer in
exchange for approximately $37.8 million. IPF Sourcing agreed to deliver
tranches of hand sanitizer to its customer[s], starting May 4, 2020, and
ending June 8, 2020. IPF Sourcing secured funding for the deal from SZY.
[Id. at ¶ 20].

• IPF Sourcing subsequently engaged Rico Garcia to assist with locating
production capacity for some of the 9 million bottles of hand sanitizer. It
appears that IPF Sourcing placed several contracts for hand sanitizer,
including the one with Mr. Garcia for 1.33 million bottles. [Id. at ¶ 21].

• Payments made to suppliers and sourcing agents like Mr. Garcia, for very
large purchases, are typically paid in two segments – half at the placement
of the order and half on delivery and acceptance of the goods. This was
generally the case with the agreement between Mr. Garcia and IPF
Sourcing. However, the agreement between Mr. Garcia and IPF Sourcing
required the second payment “prior to” delivery of the good. Mr. Garcia was
paid the first half of the fees in advance of production. [Id. at ¶ 28].

Although the Government’s Motion suggests that it takes the position that these

assertions are “opinions,” the Court finds them more appropriately classified as

statements of fact. “Both Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702 distinguish between

expert and lay testimony, not between expert and lay witnesses. Indeed, it is possible for

4 Ms. Coates states that “as a result” of Mr. Garcia’s prior relationship with IPF Sourcing,

Mr. Garcia “was asked to supply” the hand sanitizer. [Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 18]. But unless
Ms. Coates can establish a foundation and demonstrate her personal knowledge of why
IPF Sourcing contracted with Mr. Garcia, she may not opine about why IPF Sourcing
selected Mr. Garcia. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. As discussed in more detail below, Ms.
Coates may not simply offer Mr. Garcia’s out-of-court statements reframed as a factual
assumption or an expert opinion.

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the same witness to provide both lay and expert testimony in a single case.” United States

v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 2002) (footnotes omitted). “[W]itnesses need

not testify as experts simply because they are experts—the nature and object of their

testimony determines whether the procedural protections of Rule 702 apply.” Id.

When an expert witness testifies as a fact or lay witness, the admissibility of the

witness’s testimony “is not determined by Rule 702,” Cox v. Wilson, No. 15-cv-00128-

WJM-NYW, 2016 WL 11260309, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2016); Cavitat Med. Techs., Inc.

v. Aetna, Inc., No. 04-cv-01849-MSK-MEH, 2006 WL 6219350, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 13,

2006) (“The admissibility of assumptions and factual testimony are not determined by

Fed. R. Evid. 702.”), and the testimony is not properly challenged through a Rule 702

motion. As such, the Court declines to outright preclude Ms. Coates from making the

above statements of fact in her testimony, as these statements may provide necessary

context to the actual opinions she intends to offer, so long as proper foundation is laid.

See Cox, 2016 WL 11260309, at *3 (declining to exclude statements of factual

assumption, but excluding one factual statement that “include[d] impermissible weighing

of the evidence”).

To the extent that Ms. Coates’s factual propositions rely upon hearsay that may be

appropriately confronted, such as information from IPF Sourcing’s website, it appears that

such statements may be admissible, subject to any other contemporaneous objections. 5

However, to the extent that Ms. Coates relies solely on hearsay statements of Mr. Garcia,

she will not be permitted to restate that hearsay as discussed in detail below. And for

5 Ms. Coates’s report cites ipfsourcing.com in support of her statement that “International

Product Fulfillment (IPF Sourcing) is a full-service sourcing company that helps its
customers source PPE, safety workwear, and protective equipment worldwide.” See
[Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 19 & n.2].

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many other statements listed above, it is unclear where Ms. Coates derives the factual

basis for her statement, as the statements lack specific source attributions. See, e.g.,

[Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 17]. The Court will address these additional statements outside the

province of the jury before Ms. Coates testifies, and her factual testimony will also be

subject to contemporaneous objections at trial, including but not limited to objections

under Rule 401, Rule 402, Rule 403, and Rule 602.

However, with respect to the last listed opinion—which involves a discussion of the

contract between Mr. Garcia and IPF Sourcing—the Court will not permit Ms. Coates to

offer opinions interpreting the contract. See [Doc. 272 at 13 (Defendant indicating that

Ms. Coates “will be testifying about the interpretation of the contract at issue in this

case”)]. Generally speaking, “contract interpretation is not a proper subject for expert

testimony.” Bethel v. Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 3d 1260,

1267 (D. Colo. 2022). Even if Ms. Coates had any sort of legal or specialized training

regarding contract interpretation—which she does not, see [Doc. 267-1]; see also [Doc.

267 at 4 (the Government arguing that “it is unclear exactly what education, training, and

experience Ms. Coates has with interpreting contractual terms”)]—Defendant does not

explain why expert testimony interpreting the contract is required in this case or would be

helpful to the jury, see [Doc. 272]. For instance, he does not argue that the contract uses

any particular term of art or other technical term that the jury could not understand without

the assistance of expert testimony. Cf. United States v. Higgins, No. 3:18-cr-00186-TMR-

MRM, 2022 WL 36511, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2022) (suggesting that it would be

appropriate for an expert witness to “clarify or define terms of art, science, or trade”

(quotation omitted)), aff’d, No. 22-3538, 2023 WL 6536752 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2023); United

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States v. Shetty, No. 2:23-cr-00084-TL, 2024 WL 5088339, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12,

2024) (“[B]arring testimony about specific terms of art, experts are not permitted to testify

as to their own version of contractual interpretation.” (collecting cases)). And finally,

opinions focused on the proper interpretation of the contract may confuse the jury and

suggest that Defendant’s compliance with (or breach of) the contract is at issue in this

case, when it is not. See United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 108–10 (3d Cir. 2023) (in

fraud case, affirming district court’s exclusion of contract interpretation testimony under

Rule 403). Accordingly, while Ms. Coates may testify, based on her experience, about

standard payment practices or the factual contents of the contract between Mr. Garcia

and IPF Sourcing, she may not offer opinions interpreting the contract. The Motion to

Exclude is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part with respect to these statements,

subject to other objections at trial.

B. Statements or Opinions that Parrot Out-of-Court Statements

Some of Ms. Coates’s statements appear to simply parrot out-of-court statements

made by Mr. Garcia about his actions or intentions. The following opinions fall into this

category:

• Rico Garcia, owner of Botani-Labs, had been investigating the
manufacturing and distribution of PPE, liquid, and gel hand sanitizers before
being contacted by IPF. [Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 18 (footnote omitted)].

• [Supply-chain issues are] what Mr. Garcia experienced as he tried to tap
into his own network of bottlers to source hand sanitizer. [Id. at ¶ 24]. 6

• In April/May, 2020, Mr. Garcia expected to sign a contract with Riveria
Bottling and traveled to their facility in Southern California to confirm
production. In the following weeks, Riveria Bottling notified Mr. Garcia of

6 Only a portion of the opinion set forth in Paragraph 24 fits within this category. The
remainder of this opinion is discussed below in Section II.C.

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shortages in bottles, tops, and ingredients, and their inability to supply the
hand sanitizer. [Id. at ¶ 25 (footnote omitted)]. 7

• After Riveria Bottling notified Mr. Garcia that they were unable to perform,
Mr. Garcia tried to source the hand sanitizer from China, where most of this
product had been produced in the past. [Id. at ¶ 26 (footnote omitted)]. 8

• Mr. Garcia continued to try to find sources for bottled hand sanitizer
throughout the spring and summer of 2020. [Id. at ¶ 27]. 9

The Government argues, inter alia, that these opinions are unreliable, unhelpful, not

relevant, and subject to exclusion under Rule 403. [Doc. 267-2 at 1, 3–4]. Specifically,

and relevant here, the Government argues that these opinions are impermissible

“vouching” opinions that “merely . . . attempt to vouch for the truthfulness of defendant’s

recitation of the facts.” [Doc. 267 at 12]. It also asserts that this testimony merely “parrots”

Mr. Garcia’s unsworn hearsay statements, so these opinions are not based on reliable

facts or data. [Id. at 9–10]. Defendant responds that “Ms. Coates is using her training

and experience to reach an independent judgment regarding the opinions she reaches in

her testimony. Her discussion of out-of-court statements by Mr. Garcia is only incidental

to the independent judgments that Ms. Coates is proffering.” [Doc. 272 at 8].

“If an expert simply parrots another individual’s out-of-court statement, rather than

conveying an independent judgment that only incidentally discloses the statement to

assist the jury in evaluating the expert’s opinion, then the expert is, in effect, disclosing

that out-of-court statement for its substantive truth.” United States v. Pablo, 696 F.3d

7 The Government challenges only a portion of the opinion set out in Paragraph 25.

Compare [Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 25], with [Doc. 267-2 at 3].
8 The Government only challenges a portion of the opinion set out in Paragraph 26.

Compare [Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 26], with [Doc. 267-2 at 3–4].
9 Only a portion of the opinion set forth in Paragraph 27 falls within this category. The
remainder of this opinion is discussed below in Section II.D.

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1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012). In that circumstance, “the expert thereby becomes little

more than a backdoor conduit for an otherwise inadmissible statement.” Id. Therefore,

“[a]n expert whose testimony is ‘simply a summarizing of out-of-court statements of

others’ is likely inadmissible.” United States v. Correa, No. 20-cr-00148-CMA, 2024 WL

4135732, at *12 (D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2024) (quoting United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d

1451, 1457 (10th Cir. 1985)). But experts may “recite inadmissible hearsay so long as

the statements qualify as information ‘of the type reasonably relied on by all experts in

that particular field,’ the expert relied upon that information, and ‘the expert exercised

“independent judgment” in assessing and using the hearsay (and other sources) to reach

an expert opinion.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 703); see also United States v. Mejia, 545

F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2008) (an expert may not “simply transmit . . . hearsay to the jury”

but must instead “form [her] own opinions by applying [her] extensive experience and a

reliable methodology to the inadmissible materials” (quotation omitted)).

Here, there is nothing in Ms. Coates’s report demonstrating that she used her

“training and experience” to form opinions about Mr. Garcia’s efforts or expectations

during the spring of 2020, as Defendant suggests. Nor is there any indication that these

opinions derived from Ms. Coates’s “independent judgment” or that hearsay statements

are of the type reasonably relied on by all experts in Ms. Coates’s field. Correa, 2024 WL

4135732, at *12. Instead, the only source Ms. Coates cites for (two of) these opinions is

a “Statement of Rico Tomas Garcia taken by Juba Law Office, Feb 6, 2026.” [Doc. 267-

1 at 6 n.1; id. at 7 n.4]; see also [Doc. 267-3]. This unsworn, out-of-court statement,

apparently provided the month before trial, does not provide a reliable basis for Ms.

Coates’s opinions. Cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 651 F. App’x 44, 46 (2d Cir. 2016)

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(affirming district court’s decision precluding expert from testifying that he relied on the

defendant’s unsworn hearsay statements to form his opinions because the defendant

“was an interested witness” with “a clear motive to lie”). These opinions are inadmissible

under Rule 702 and Rule 801, and the Motion to Exclude is GRANTED with respect to

these opinions. See United States v. Smith, 806 F. Supp. 3d 382, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)

(“This backdoor means of putting [the defendant’s] view of events before the jury without

subjecting him to cross examination is . . . improper under Rule 801.”); United States v.

Ray, 583 F. Supp. 3d 518, 540–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (excluding expert testimony that was

“a regurgitation of the defense uttered through the mouth of an expert”).

C. Statements Concerning the COVID-19 Pandemic and its Effects

Some of Ms. Coates’s statements discuss general background information about

the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as more specific opinions detailing certain economic

consequences of the pandemic. Five opinions fall into this category, which the Court has

labeled alphabetically for ease of reference:

• Opinion A: COVID-19 was a “black swan” event – defined as an
unpredictable and highly unusual event that is beyond what is normally
expected of a situation and has potentially severe consequences. Black
swan events are characterized by their extreme rarity and severe impact.
[Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 22 (footnote omitted)].

• Opinion B: Demand for PPE of all types, including hand sanitizer, was
skyrocketing in the Spring of 2020, and these products were in short supply
around the world. No vaccines were available yet, and thousands of people
were dying daily. To protect ourselves from the virus, we were instructed
by health care professionals to wash our hands often and use hand sanitizer
to stop the spread of COVID-19. With the extraordinary demand for hand
sanitizer and other PPE, during the Spring of 2020, it wasn’t long before this
spike in demand significantly outstripped supply. [Id. at ¶ 23].

• Opinion C: In my experience during this time - roughly April–July, 2020 -
worldwide factories, including in the U.S., were at capacity because of
extraordinary demand. Raw ingredients, bottles, and bottle pumps were

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scarce. Orders were delayed, and parts were difficult to procure.
Production capacity was constrained or halted by the pandemic. Factories
all over the world were closed for several weeks. [Id. at ¶ 24].

• Opinion D: During the pandemic, there was an enormous opportunity for
profit if products could be procured to meet the extreme demand. Price
increases on PPE and hand sanitizer skyrocketed by 300%–400%. In my
experience, profit margins on PPE and hand sanitizer could be as high as
70–80% during the spring and summer of 2020, especially for products
sourced in China. [Id. at ¶ 29 (footnote omitted)].

• Opinion E: No one could have predicted the unusual circumstances of this
“black swan” event and the global supply chain issues brought on by the
COVID-19 pandemic. The extraordinary volumes of PPE and hand
sanitizer demanded could not be fulfilled by existing factories that were
already at capacity, and because of severe shortages of bottles, caps, and
ingredients. [Id. at ¶ 31].

The Government argues that these opinions should be excluded because they

(1) are not relevant; (2) would not be helpful to the jury; and (3) are excludable under Rule

403. [Doc. 267-2 at 2–3, 5–6]. However, the Government does not appear to challenge

the reliability of these opinions expressly in its Motion; rather, it asserts that “Ms. Coates’

opinions that discuss specific facts and opinions outside of general pandemic supply

chain issues are not sufficiently reliable.” [Doc. 267 at 5 (emphasis added)]; see also [id.

at 5–9 (raising arguments not specifically directed at these opinions)]. As for relevance,

it argues that testimony about supply chain disruptions is not relevant because “[t]his case

is not about the inability to obtain hand sanitizer; it is about the scheme to defraud and

the material misrepresentation that were [sic] made by the defendant.” [Id. at 13]. It also

asserts that “most of Ms. Coates’ testimony regarding the difficulties in obtaining personal

protective equipment during the pandemic is readily understood by a lay person and will

waste time.” [Id. at 15].

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Mr. Garcia responds that these opinions are relevant because they “provide[]

context to facts already in the record or go[] beyond the common knowledge of the jurors.”

[Doc. 272 at 9 (quotation omitted)]. He asserts that although the jurors “could reference

their experience from the supply chain disruptions during COVID-19,” it is “unlikely that

these individuals could testify as to the root causes of the disruption, the ‘downstream’

implications of the disruption, and, specifically, the effect of the disruptions on supplies

(especially PPE) coming from China as these experiences were not universal or common

to the average individual.” [Id.].

With respect to Opinions A and B, the Court agrees with the Government and

concludes that the opinions are neither helpful to the jury nor relevant to the specific

issues in this case. The COVID-19 pandemic was an all-consuming worldwide event

experienced by every juror who will be seated in this case, and the jurors can understand

the magnitude and everyday consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic “without

specialized knowledge.” Garcia, 635 F.3d at 477. Stated differently, jurors do not need

to be told or reminded that demand for PPE or hand sanitizer surged in the spring of 2020

or that hundreds or thousands of people died each day; they all lived through it. See id.

at 476–77 (in deciding whether testimony will assist the trier of fact, courts should consider

whether the testimony “is within the juror’s common knowledge and experience”

(quotation omitted)). And Defendant does not explain why Ms. Coates’s opinion

describing the pandemic as a “black swan” event would assist the trier of fact or is relevant

to this case. Because the opinions do not have “any tendency to make a fact [of

consequence in this action] more or less probable than it would be without” the opinions,

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Fed. R. Evid. 401(a), the opinions are not relevant and would not assist the jury in deciding

this case. The Motion to Exclude is GRANTED as to these opinions.

The Court also agrees with the Government with respect to Opinion D, wherein

Ms. Coates discusses the surge in profit margins for PPE and hand sanitizer during the

pandemic. See [Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 29]. Mr. Garcia does not explain why this opinion is

relevant to this case, see [Doc. 272], and the Court cannot conclude that it is. Moreover,

whatever minimal relevance this opinion has, the Court finds that its probative value is

substantially outweighed by potential confusion of the issues, as it may cause the jury to

focus on matters that are immaterial to the charges in this case. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Accordingly, the Motion to Exclude is GRANTED with respect to this opinion.

As for Opinions C and E, the Court agrees with Defendant. While the general

experience of supply shortages is well within the common knowledge of jurors, jurors may

not know specifics about the scarcity of ingredients or equipment, production capacity

and delays, or the magnitude of the supply shortages. Moreover, to the extent that the

Government argues that this testimony is irrelevant because “[t]his case is not about the

inability to obtain hand sanitizer,” [Doc. 267 at 13], the Court agrees with the

Government’s description of the case but respectfully disagrees with its argument about

relevance. To prove Mr. Garcia guilty of wire fraud, the Government must prove that Mr.

Garcia “acted with specific intent to defraud.” Tenth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury

Instruction § 2.57. Global supply-chain issues could bear on Mr. Garcia’s inability to

procure hand sanitizer, which could bear on whether he had intent to defraud. And finally,

because this information is not within the common knowledge or experience of all jurors,

and because the Court finds that the opinions could be relevant to Mr. Garcia’s intent to

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defraud, the Court is not persuaded by the Government’s argument about wasting time.

The Motion to Exclude is therefore DENIED with respect to these opinions.

D. Opinions about Mr. Garcia’s Reasonableness or Intent

Finally, Ms. Coates offers several opinions asserting that Mr. Garcia made

reasonable efforts to source hand sanitizer in the spring of 2020. The following opinions

fit into this category:

• Based on the statement of Mr. Garcia and my own experience with sourcing
products during this time, it is my opinion that Mr. Garcia was making a
reasonable effort to fulfill his obligations with IPF Sourcing for the 1.33
million bottles of hand sanitizer. [Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 27].

• In my opinion, Mr. Garcia could have considered the down payment
provided by IPF for the sourcing of hand sanitizer as part of his profit, given
that profit margins were extraordinary during this period. He expected to fill
the order for 1.33 million bottles of hand sanitizer, at which time he would
be paid the balance owed to him by IPF Sourcing. [Id. at ¶ 30].

• In my opinion, Mr. Garcia made a reasonable effort to source hand sanitizer
in the U.S. and in China during 2020, and perform as expected in his
agreement with IPF Sourcing. However, the COVID-19 pandemic caused
shortages of factory capacity, bottles, caps, and ingredients, and as a result,
Mr. Garcia was unable to find a source to produce hand sanitizer. This was
a situation outside of Mr. Garcia’s control. [Id. at ¶ 32].

• In my opinion, Mr. Garcia could reasonably assume that the down payment
by IPF Sourcing included his expected profit margin for sourcing and
reselling of hand sanitizer, had he been able to locate a factory and
materials for production. [Id. at ¶ 33].

The Government argues that these opinions should be excluded because (1) Ms. Coates

is not qualified to offer them; (2) they are unreliable; (3) they are not helpful; (4) they

impermissibly opine on Mr. Garcia’s state of mind, in violation of Rule 704; and (5) their

probative value is substantially outweighed by an unnamed consideration listed in Rule

403. [Doc. 267-2 at 4–7; Doc. 267 at 3–4]. Defendant disagrees, arguing that Ms. Coates

is qualified to testify about these matters and her testimony is reliable and relevant. [Doc.

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272 at 4]. He also asserts that Rule 704 is inapplicable to these opinions and that

exclusion is not warranted under Rule 403. [Id. at 5–6, 12].

The Court finds several bases to exclude these opinions. First, at least some of

these opinions rely on Mr. Garcia’s unsworn, out-of-court statements concerning his

efforts to procure hand sanitizer. See [Doc. 267-1 at ¶ 27 (“Based on the statement of

Mr. Garcia . . .”); id. at ¶ 30 (“[Mr. Garcia] expected to fill the order for 1.33 million bottles

of hand sanitizer . . . .”); id. at ¶ 32 (“Mr. Garcia was unable to find a source to produce

hand sanitizer.”)]; see also [Doc. 267-3 (Mr. Garcia’s statement, described as a “summary

of Mr. Garcia’s attempts to perform his contractual duties and the obstacles he faced that

frustrated his ability to perform”)]. Ms. Coates’s report does not demonstrate that she

formed her opinions “by applying [her] . . . experience and a reliable methodology to the

inadmissible materials,” Mejia, 545 F.3d at 197 (quotation omitted), nor do her opinions

reflect any “independent judgment,” Pablo, 696 F.3d at 1288. Rather, Ms. Coates asserts

Mr. Garcia’s out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter asserted. These opinions

are excludable under Rule 801 and Rule 702. Smith, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 414; Pablo, 696

F.3d at 1288.

Second, an expert relying solely or primarily on her experience in forming her

opinions “‘must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that

experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied

to the facts.’” United States v. Medina-Copete, 757 F.3d 1092, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). The

Government argues that Ms. Coates’s opinions “are unreliable because there is no

reasoning or basis in her report establishing the three factors required in Medina-Copete.”

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[Doc. 267 at 6]. Defendant responds that Ms. Coates’s report satisfies the Medina-

Copete requirements because (1) she states that her opinions are based on the factual

background of the case, the evidence she reviewed, and her personal experience

“sourcing PPE products during the COVID-19 pandemic,” (2) she “explains that the

‘methods and processes’ used to develop her opinions are based upon her experiences,

both through personal experience and secondary research,” and (3) she “explains that

when reviewing relevant materials and information in this matter she analyzed their

contents in the context of, not only her over forty years’ worth of education and

experience, but also in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its disruption of global

supply chains (and related business operations).” [Doc. 272 at 7].

Defendant’s argument does not actually address the Medina-Copete factors or

respond to the Government’s argument. First, Ms. Coates does not meaningfully explain

how her experience “working and consulting in global supply chain management” or

“sourcing PPE products during the COVID-19 pandemic” led her to form her conclusions

about the “reasonableness” of Defendant’s efforts in sourcing hand sanitizer or her

opinion about how Mr. Garcia “could have” viewed IPF Sourcing’s initial payment.

Second, Ms. Coates does not, in any way, explain how her experience is a sufficient basis

for her opinions. And third, Ms. Coates does not tie her experience in any way to the

facts of this case. See [Doc. 267-1]. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that these opinions

are sufficiently reliable.

Third, the Court agrees with the Government that the opinions implicate Rule 704,

which provides that “[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion

about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that

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constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the

trier of fact alone.” Fed. R. Evid. 704. This Rule “proscribes . . . expert opinions in a

criminal case that are about a particular person (‘the defendant’) and a particular ultimate

issue (whether the defendant has ‘a mental state or condition’ that is ‘an element of the

crime charged or of a defense’).” Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526, 534 (2024).

Mr. Garcia argues that “[f]or Ms. Coates’s report or testimony to be improper under

Fed. R. Evid 704(b), she would have to testify that Mr. Garcia did not intend to defraud

any of the other parties involved in the agreement. Ms. Coates provided no such

testimony.” [Doc. 272 at 5]. The Court respectfully disagrees with this position. While

“[e]xperts may testify to ‘facts or opinions from which the jury could conclude or infer the

defendant had the requisite mental state,’” experts “may not give testimony that, if

believed, ‘necessarily dictates the final conclusion’ that the defendant “possessed [or did

not possess] the requisite mens rea.’” United States v. Becknell, 601 F. App’x 709, 714

(10th Cir. 2015) (first quoting United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir.1992),

and then quoting United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000)). Ms.

Coates’s statements are not framed as simple facts or opinions from which the jury could

infer Defendant’s mental state; rather, her statements that Mr. Garcia “expected to fill the

order,” tried to “fulfill his obligations with IPF Sourcing for the 1.33 million bottles of hand

sanitizer,” and “made a reasonable effort to . . . perform as expected in his agreement

with IPF Sourcing,” [Doc. 267-1 at ¶¶ 27, 30, 32], necessarily dictate a conclusion that

Mr. Garcia did not intend to defraud IPF Sourcing. Indeed, if such opinions do not dictate

such a conclusion, it is unclear to the Court why these opinions would be relevant to this

case at all.

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The jury is capable of deciding whether, based on the evidence of Mr. Garcia’s

actions, Mr. Garcia intended to defraud IPF Sourcing. And if “expert testimony is offered

on an issue that a jury is capable of assessing for itself, it is plainly within the trial court’s

discretion to rule that testimony inadmissible because it would not even marginally assist

the trier of fact.” Sanderson, 976 F.3d at 1173 (quotation omitted).

Fourth, and finally, the Court finds that the probative value of this evidence is

substantially outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. Fed.

R. Evid. 403. Offering opinions about whether Mr. Garcia acted “reasonably”—an

objective standard—runs the substantial risk of confusing the jurors about its obligation

to determine whether Mr. Garcia had subjective intent to defraud. For all of these

reasons, the Motion to Exclude is GRANTED with respect to these opinions.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) The Government’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony [Doc. 267] is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

DATED: February 27, 2026 BY THE COURT:

_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge

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