United States v. Barrett Purvis — Order (M.D. Fla., Document 109)

Summary

An order of United States District Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell in United States v. Barrett Purvis, Case No. 8:23-cr-110-CEH-AAS, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, filed August 6, 2024 as Document 109. It denies the defendant's Motion for New Trial (Doc. 100) and Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 29 (Doc. 101), filed after a jury found the defendant guilty on May 1, 2024 of wire fraud and illegal monetary transactions. The order recounts the indictment's allegation that the defendant, president of Big Man Promotions, Inc., used most or all of a $499,000 EIDL loan for unauthorized purposes. The court finds the evidence, including text messages to a casino employee about gambling debts, sufficient for the verdict and holds that the deliberate ignorance instruction was properly given.

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“United States v. Barrett Purvis — Order (M.D. Fla., Document 109).” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/order-no-8-23-cr-00110-dkt-109-m-d-fla-98fed621b9/, SHA-256 07d9f2df899b3752330bddf02ab683aa73db82e2a2c73e41089c5a30e2212b9a.

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Case 8:23-cr-00110-CEH-AAS Document 109 Filed 08/06/24 Page 1 of 12 PageID 565

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CASE NO: 8:23-cr-110-CEH-AAS

BARRETT PURVIS

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Barrett Purvis’s Motion for

New Trial (Doc. 100) and his Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant

to Rule 29 (Doc. 101), both filed on May 8, 2024. In the motions, Defendant renews

his request for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) and requests a new

trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. 1 The Court, having considered the briefing and being

fully advised in the premises, will deny both motions.

BACKGROUND 2

On March 30, 2023, a federal grand jury in the Middle District of Florida

returned an indictment that charged Defendant with Wire Fraud (Count One) and

Illegal Monetary Transactions, also referred to as Money Laundering (Count Two).

Doc. 1.

1
Defendant’s Motion for New Trial cites Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59, which
concerns “Matters Before a Magistrate Judge.” Doc. 100. However, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29 deals with motions for judgment of acquittal.
2
The parties do not provide record citations to court testimony or evidentiary exhibits.
Accordingly, the Court relies on the parties’ recitation of the facts in their briefs, to the extent
it is not objected to, and the Court’s own recollection.
Case 8:23-cr-00110-CEH-AAS Document 109 Filed 08/06/24 Page 2 of 12 PageID 566

The underlying background facts were as follows. See Doc. 1. Defendant, a

Middle District of Florida resident, was president of a company called Big Man

Promotions, Inc., that provided marketing services to auto dealerships, as testified to

at trial. Id.

The conduct alleged in the indictment occurred in April and May of 2021. Id. ¶

9. Significantly, in connection with the COVID-19 Pandemic, the President of the

United States signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security

(“CARES”) Act. Id. at 1–2. As part of this Act, the Small Business Administration

expanded the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) program to provide loan

assistance to small businesses and other eligible entities, to pay certain qualifying

expenses that could have been paid had the pandemic not occurred. Id.

According to the Indictment, Defendant fraudulently prepared and submitted a

false application to the EIDL program, ultimately using most or all of the $499,000

EIDL loan for unauthorized purposes – namely, his own personal enrichment. Id. at

3–4.

On April 29, 2024, a jury trial began on both counts. Doc. 81. The next day,

after each side presented opening statements, the Government called several witnesses

to the stand as part of its case-in-chief, including an attorney from the SBA EIDL

servicing center, a car dealership employee who worked with Mr. Purvis, and the IRS

case agent who investigated this matter. See Doc. 84.

After the Government rested, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal as

to both Counts. Id. As detailed below, the Court denied this motion. Defendant next

2
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presented his case, calling witnesses and taking the stand himself. Doc. 87. After the

conclusion of evidence, Defendant made a renewed oral motion for Judgment of

Acquittal pursuant to Rule 29. Docs. 87, 88. Again, the Court denied this motion.

Doc. 89.

Closing arguments were presented to the jury on May 1, 2024. The jurors

deliberated the same day and found Defendant guilty as to all counts. Docs. 87, 93.

On May 8, 2024, Purvis filed the instant motions (Docs. 100, 101), and the

Government responded (Doc. 105).

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 29

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 provides the framework for judgment of

acquittal based on a lack of sufficient evidence. Under Rule 29(a), “[a]fter the

government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the

defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the

evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” After a jury verdict, under Rule 29(c),

a defendant “may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within

14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.”

In deciding a Rule 29 motion, a district court must “determine whether, viewing

all evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and drawing all reasonable

inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury's verdict, a reasonable trier of fact

could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States

v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 833 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. O'Keefe, 825 F.2d

3
Case 8:23-cr-00110-CEH-AAS Document 109 Filed 08/06/24 Page 4 of 12 PageID 568

314, 319 (11th Cir. 1987)). To challenge a jury’s guilty verdict based on insufficiency

of the evidence, it must be established that “no reasonable jury could have found

Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence presented.” United States

v. Ruiz, 253 F.3d 634, 639 (11th Cir. 2001).

B. Rule 33

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) provides that “[u]pon the defendant’s

motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of

justice so requires.” The Eleventh Circuit has described this as a “broad standard.”

United States v. Vicaria, 12 F.3d 195, 198 (11th Cir. 1994). Additionally, “[t]he decision

to grant or deny the new trial motion is within [the] sound discretion of the trial court

and will not be overturned on appeal unless the ruling is so clearly erroneous as to

constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245,

1252 (11th Cir. 1990)).

In ruling on the merits of a Rule 33 challenge, the Court “may weigh the

evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Martinez, 763

F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 1985). However, it is not appropriate for the Court to

“reweigh the evidence and set aside the verdict simply because it feels some other result

would be more reasonable.” Id. at 1312–13. Instead, to warrant a new trial, the

“evidence must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a

miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.” Id. at 1313.

4
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C. Relevant Offenses and Elements

To prove a defendant guilty of wire fraud, the Government must establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant knowingly devised or participated

in a scheme to defraud someone by using false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,

or promises; (2) the false pretenses, representations, or promises were about a material

fact; (3) the defendant acted with the intent to defraud; and (4) the defendant

transmitted or caused to be transmitted by wire some communication in interstate

commerce to help carry out the scheme to defraud. Doc. 90 at 10–11; Pattern Crim.

Jury Instr. 11th Cir. O51.

To prove a defendant guilty of illegal monetary transactions, or money

laundering, the Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the

Defendant knowingly engaged or attempted to engage in a monetary transaction; (2)

the Defendant knew the transaction involved property or funds that were the proceeds

of some criminal activity; (3) the property had a value of more than $10,000; (4) the

property was in fact proceeds of wire fraud; and (5) the transaction took place in the

United States. Doc. 90 at 12–13 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1957); See Pattern Crim. Jury Instr.

11th Circ. O74.6.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for New Trial

Defendant moves for a new trial on two grounds. First, he argues that the

Government failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that he had an intent to

defraud. Doc. 100 at 2. To the contrary, he argues that he began paying the SBA loan

5
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back before he was obligated to do so, and that the loan proceeds were used to “pay

down both business and personal debt, debts that tended to overlap considering

[Defendant’s] woeful accounting practices and the nature of his marketing efforts.” Id.

Secondly, Defendant argues that the Court erred in giving a deliberate

ignorance instruction to the jury over his objection. Id. He argues that the Government

submitted no evidence proving that he “took any action to indicate a deliberate

ignorance” as to the loan requirements, and that he had a friend complete the loan

application for him out of convenience and a lack of familiarity with computers. Id. at

3. Moreover, Defendant argues that neither of the Government’s witnesses could

define the term working capital or the “meaning of the use of the funds not primarily

being for personal use,” which was part of the loan agreement. Id. Defendant

concludes by arguing that because there was no evidence he deliberately avoided

learning information, and the loan terms were unclear, the instruction was prejudicial

to his defense and violated his right to a fair trial. Id. at 3–4.

The Government responds that the “interest of justice” does not require a new

trial based on either argument. Doc. 105 at 2–5. First, it argues that the evidence at

trial proved that Defendant never intended to use any of the EIDL funds for business-

related expenses. Id. at 3. Instead, it argues, text messages explicitly showed that he

intended to repay gambling debts and pay off his girlfriend’s credit card debt, which

had no legitimate ties to his business. Id.

Next, the Government argues that the deliberate ignorance instruction was

properly given, and that the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the use of this

6
Case 8:23-cr-00110-CEH-AAS Document 109 Filed 08/06/24 Page 7 of 12 PageID 571

instruction in fraud cases such as this one. Id. at 4 (citing United States v. Willner, 795

F.3d 1297, 1315-1316 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Cooper, 132 F.3d 1400, 1405

(11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Murray, 154 F. App'x 740, 743-744 (11th Cir. 2005)

(unpublished).

Specifically, the Government argues that the evidence at trial proved Defendant

made no attempt to read the EIDL application or learn what the EIDL funds could

and could not be used for. Doc. 105 at 5. It asserts that while Defendant admitted to

signing the loan application, he denied reading it in detail, instead saying that he took

steps to quickly sign the application and therefore remain ignorant of the requirements

and rules of the EIDL program. Id.

A district court may “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest

of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). “The decision to grant or deny a new

trial motion based on the weight of the evidence is within the sound discretion of the

trial court.” United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 1985). While the

Court has broad discretion, it may not reweigh the evidence because some other result

would be more reasonable. Id. at 1312–13.

The interest of justice does not require a new trial in this case. First, sufficient

evidence and testimony was introduced to allow a jury to conclude that Defendant

intended to cause injury or loss, and neither the fact that he began paying the loan back

early nor his poor accounting practices necessitate a new trial in the interest of justice.

As the Government argues, text messages Defendant sent to a casino employee were

introduced into evidence showing his intentions of using the loan to pay off gambling

7
Case 8:23-cr-00110-CEH-AAS Document 109 Filed 08/06/24 Page 8 of 12 PageID 572

debts. See Doc. 94-32 at 1–3. This is in addition to evidence of other ostensibly personal

expenses Defendant used the loan for, including his girlfriend’s credit card debt. See

Doc. 94-1.

Defendant’s argument that the jury could not find that he intended to cause

injury or loss, despite this evidence, is unpersuasive. Nor do the arguments that he

began paying back the loan prior to the repayment date or the conclusory argument

that the funds were used to pay down overlapping business and personal debts swing

the pendulum in his favor. Here, sufficient evidence was introduced allowing a jury to

find that Defendant intended to cause injury or loss, see United States v. Takhalov, 827

F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2016). The interest of justice does not require a new trial,

and Defendant’s motion for new trial on this basis is due to be denied.

Defendant’s second argument, that a new trial is warranted because the Court

wrongly gave a deliberate ignorance instruction, fares no better. Instead, as the

Government correctly argues, the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed use of this instruction

in fraud cases with similar circumstances, and other courts in the district have given

the instruction as well. 3 There was sufficient evidence and testimony at trial to show

that Defendant, by having someone else fill out the loan application and signing it

without reading it, was deliberately ignorant of the terms and conditions of the EIDL

3
See, e.g., United States v. Chun, Case No. 8:20-cr-120-WFJ-JSS, Doc. 214 at 20; United States
v. Daniels, Case No. 8:21-cr-287-VMC, Doc. 141 at 18; United States v. Martin, Case No. 8:17-
cr-301-SCB-AAS, Doc. 123 at 24; United States v. Ali, 8:23-cr-24-CEH-SPF, Doc. 123 at 15.

8
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loan. Thus, the deliberate ignorance instruction was properly given, and Defendant’s

motion for a new trial on this ground is due to be denied.

B. Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Defendant’s oral motions for judgment of acquittal, made at two points during

the course of trial, were denied by the Court. Docs. 86, 89. In both motions,

Defenndant contended that the Government produced insufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to find him guilty on any count.

As to the first motion, argued on April 30 after the Government rested its case,

the Court found that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Government, the jury could find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The

Court noted that sufficient circumstantial evidence had been introduced to allow the

jury to find that Defendant acted with intent to defraud, and that evidence or testimony

to satisfy all four elements of wire fraud had been introduced. As to the money

laundering charge, the Court similarly found that there was sufficient evidence to

sustain a conviction on that count as well, and therefore denied Defendant’s motion.

The following day, after the defense had rested, Defendant renewed his motion

for judgment of acquittal and made argument. After the Government responded, the

Court again denied the motion, finding that there was evidence from which the jury

could find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt considering the elements of

the charged offenses.

Now, with the benefit of having reviewed the Parties’ briefing and the evidence

presented at trial, the Court concludes, again, that the evidence was sufficient for a

9
Case 8:23-cr-00110-CEH-AAS Document 109 Filed 08/06/24 Page 10 of 12 PageID 574

reasonable jury to find Defendant guilty of wire fraud (Count One) and money

laundering (Count Two).

Defendant’s renewed motion offers no new arguments. Instead, Defendant

simply rehashes his previous arguments. However, review of the transcripts and

exhibits indicates that the Court’s previous understanding of the evidence was correct.

Because Defendant offers no basis for the Court to reconsider its previous ruling, and

for the reasons detailed below, the Court will deny the Renewed Motion for Judgment

of Acquittal. See United States v. Atkins, No. 8:18-CR-483-CEH-JSS, 2019 WL 6728263,

at *6 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2019) (citing United States v. Mulherin, 529 F. Supp. 916, 923

(S.D. Ga. 1981), aff’d, 710 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1983)).

As to Count One, Defendant again argues that insufficient evidence was

produced at trial to prove that he intended to cause injury or loss. Doc. 101 at 2. He

also argues that he began paying the loan back before he was obligated to, did not enter

incorrect information into the loan application himself, and did not know the scope of

permissible use of the funds. Id. Finally, Defendant argues that the language in the

documents introduced at trial were confusing and misleading and did not apprise him

of what “working capital” meant or how the funds could be properly utilized. On that

basis, Defendant requests that his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal be

granted.

To the contrary, the Court credits the Government’s summary of the evidence

at trial and agrees with its argument that sufficient evidence was presented to allow the

jury to find defendant guilty. First, the Government argues evidence was submitted

10
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regarding Defendant’s loan application as well as how he spent the proceeds. Doc. 105

at 2. It notes that evidence was also presented on the nature of Defendant’s marketing

business and apparent gambling addiction. Id. Overall, the Government argues that

the evidence was more than sufficient for a jury to find that: (1) Defendant fraudulently

applied for EIDL funds under the pretense that he would spend the money on business

expenses; (2) that he spent the funds almost exclusively on his personal lifestyle and

gambling addiction; and (3) that at the time he applied for the funds, Defendant had

already committed much of the funds to a casino he was indebted to. Id.

After reviewing the pleadings and evidence to the extent it is cited by either side,

the Court finds that “a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1296

(11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The testimony and evidence

described above was sufficient to enable a rational jury to find, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that Defendant was guilty of wire fraud.

Defendant provides no specific argument as to the money laundering count in

his motion. Thus, to the extent his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal was

meant to address this count as well, the Court will deny it. The testimony and evidence

presented at trial was sufficient to allow a jury to find Defendant guilty as to both

counts.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motion for New Trial (Doc. 100) is DENIED.

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Case 8:23-cr-00110-CEH-AAS Document 109 Filed 08/06/24 Page 12 of 12 PageID 576

2. Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to

Rule 29 (Doc. 101) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on August 6, 2024.

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

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