Order — No. 2:21-cv-01145 (Dkt. 60, D. Ariz.)

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An order in Wayne Clifford v. LexisNexis Risk Data Management LLC, No. CV-21-01145-PHX-DJH, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, filed March 13, 2023 as Document 60 (13 pages), with the signature block of Judge Diane J. Humetewa. The case arises under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the plaintiff disputed the accuracy of a bankruptcy entry in his Equifax credit file that Equifax obtained using the defendant as a public-records vendor. On the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 47; 53), the Court grants the defendant's motion, concluding that it acted reasonably on the plaintiff's Section 1681s-2(b) claim, denies the plaintiff's motion and directs the Clerk to enter judgment.

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“Order — No. 2:21-cv-01145 (Dkt. 60, D. Ariz.).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/order-no-2-21-cv-01145-dkt-60-d-ariz-e1af5a4a0b/, SHA-256 217babf660da89c39e9a698ebdee4e9f9cac721aec860aeb9255d118df19ca92.

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Case 2:21-cv-01145-DJH Document 60 Filed 03/13/23 Page 1 of 13

1 WO
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6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
8
9 Wayne Clifford, No. CV-21-01145-PHX-DJH
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 LexisNexis Risk Data Management LLC,
13 Defendant.
14
15 The parties’ have filed cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 47; 53).1 Both
16 motions are fully briefed.2 Defendant LexisNexis Risk Data Management LLC

17 (“Defendant”) also filed two Motions to file exhibits under seal (Docs. 50; 55). The Court
18 must decide whether Defendant is a “Consumer Reporting Agency” that issues “consumer

19 reports” as defined under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). The Court must also

20 decide whether Defendant conducted a reasonable investigation as to Plaintiff Wayne
21 Clifford’s (“Plaintiff”) dispute about the accuracy of his bankruptcy report.
22 I. Background3

23 This case arises under the FCRA. Plaintiff is a consumer. Defendant collects data

24 about certain public records and delivers that data to its customers for fees. (Doc. 53-2 at

25 1
Both parties requested oral argument on the matter. The Court finds that the issues have
been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. Therefore, the Court
26 will deny the requests for oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (court may decide
motions without oral hearings); LRCiv 7.2(f) (same).
27
2
(See Docs. 54; 57; 58; 59).
28
3
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.
Case 2:21-cv-01145-DJH Document 60 Filed 03/13/23 Page 2 of 13

1 ¶ 2). Defendant does not offer services to consumers. (Id. at ¶ 4). Non-party Equifax4 has
2 a Consumer Bankruptcy Public Record Acquisition Agreement (“Records Agreement”)
3 with Defendant under which Defendant provides public bankruptcy records to Equifax
4 from PACER. (Id. at ¶ 8; 22). Under the Records Agreement, Defendant also receives
5 Single Public Records Collection (“SPRC”) requests from Equifax to re-collect docket
6 information for specific cases. (Id. at ¶ 9).
7 A. Plaintiff’s Petition for Bankruptcy
8 On October 7, 2009, Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy. (Doc. 47-2 at 2). He was
9 discharged on May 18, 2010. (Id. at 5). Ten years later, on May 1, 2020, Plaintiff’s wife
10 filed a police report with the Maricopa County Sheriff’s office stating Jeffrey Benson filed
11 a bankruptcy petition in her and Plaintiff’s name without their knowledge or permission.
12 (Doc. 47-3 at 4–7). Mr. Benson appeared to have filed this petition on March 6, 2019, and
13 listed the last four digits of Plaintiff’s social security number (“SSN”) as 9827. (Id. at 10,
14 15).
15 B. Plaintiff’s Correspondence with Equifax
16 On September 8, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel sent Equifax a letter stating Plaintiff
17 reviewed his credit disclosure and discovered the following inaccurate information in his
18 credit file: “Chapter 7 Bankruptcy with Reference Number: 1902380-DSP-03/19.” (Id. at
19 2). Plaintiff attached the bankruptcy petition and the police report to his letter and noted
20 that the last four digits of the SSN on the petition were different than his SSN. (Id.)
21 C. Equifax’s Correspondence with Defendant
22 On October 1, 2020, Defendant received an SPRC request from Equifax related to
23 Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case. The SPRC request noted under the claims code: “NOT
24 MINE—PROVIDE COMPLETE ID, STATUS, DATES & AMTS.” (Doc. 53-2 at 22).
25 The next day, Defendant responded to the SPRC, which appeared to verify the bankruptcy
26 case number along with other information about the case filing but included a different
27 SSN for Plaintiff ending in 9827. (Id.) The record also shows Defendant received an
28 4
Plaintiff also filed suit against Equifax on November 25, 2020. (Doc. 53-5 at ¶ 2, 5). The
parties later settled. (Id. at 21).

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1 Automated Consumer Dispute Verification (“ACDV”) from Equifax on September 30,
2 2020, that stated Plaintiff “claims true identity fraud—account fraudulently opened initiate
3 investigation.” (Doc. 53-3 at 26).
4 D. Equifax’s Subsequent Correspondence with Plaintiff
5 On October 3, 2020, Equifax sent Plaintiff the results of his reinvestigation, which
6 stated Equifax “verified that this item belongs to you.” (Id. at 32). The “item” referred to
7 the bankruptcy case 1902380—the same case Plaintiff complained about in his letter to
8 Equifax. (Id.) The letter further informed Plaintiff that Equifax obtained the public record
9 using Defendant as a vendor and provided a web address. (Id.) The webpage states, “If
10 you have concerns that a record has been erroneously matched to you and included in your
11 credit report, please contact Equifax to correct the error. [Defendant] does not match
12 bankruptcy information to consumer credit files for Equifax. Equifax performs this
13 matching.” (Doc. 53-4 at 11).
14 E. Plaintiff files Current Suit
15 On July 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff argues Defendant
16 is both a consumer reporting agency (“CRA”) and furnisher under the FCRA. Plaintiff
17 claims Defendant negligently and willfully violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i(a),
18 which impose obligations on CRAs. (Doc. 47 at 2). Plaintiff further claims Defendant
19 negligently and willfully violated Section 1681s-2(b), which imposes obligations on
20 furnishers of information to CRAs. (Id.) Both parties seek summary judgment on all
21 claims.
22 II. Legal Standard
23 A court will grant summary judgment if the movant shows there is no genuine
24 dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
25 Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A factual dispute is
26 genuine when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson
27 v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Here, a court does not weigh evidence
28 to discern the truth of the matter; it only determines whether there is a genuine issue for

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1 trial. Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994). A fact is
2 material when identified as such by substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Only
3 facts that might affect the outcome of a suit under the governing law can preclude an entry
4 of summary judgment. Id.
5 The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying portions of the record,
6 including pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits,
7 that show there is no genuine factual dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once shown, the
8 burden shifts to the non-moving party, which must sufficiently establish the existence of a
9 genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
10 Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86 (1986). The evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed,
11 and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. But
12 if the non-movant identifies “evidence [that] is merely colorable or is not significantly
13 probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249–50 (citations omitted). “A
14 conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is
15 insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” F.T.C. v. Publ’g Clearing House,
16 Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997).
17 III. Discussion
18 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on all counts in the FAC as to liability only.
19 (Doc. 47 at 3). Defendant moves for summary judgment, asserting that, as a matter of law,
20 it is not a CRA and thus it cannot be held liable for obligations under Sections 1681e(b)
21 and 1681i(a) of the FCRA. (Doc. 53). Defendant also moves for summary judgment on
22 Plaintiff’s Section 1681s-2(b) claim, arguing the public bankruptcy record it provided to
23 Equifax did not contain any inaccurate information. (Id.)
24 The Court must first decide whether Defendant is a CRA that is subject to the
25 obligations under Sections 1681e(b) and 1681i(a). The Court must also consider whether
26 Defendant reasonably investigated Plaintiff’s dispute about the accuracy of his bankruptcy
27 record under Section 1681s-2(b). The Court will address each issue in turn.
28 A. Fair Credit Reporting Act

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1 Congress enacted the FCRA to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote a
2 more efficient banking system, and protect consumer privacy. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
3 Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). There are three main entities that are either covered or
4 regulated by the FCRA: consumers, furnishers, and Consumer Reporting Agencies
5 (“CRAs”). See 15 U.S.C §§ 1681a, 1681s-2. The FCRA imposes procedural obligations
6 on CRAs and creates a private right of action for consumers to enforce compliance. Robins
7 v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2017).
8 Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Section 1681e(b) and Section 1681i(a),
9 both of which regulate CRAs. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i(a). Plaintiff also alleges
10 Defendant violated Section 1681s-2(b), which imposes obligations on furnishers of
11 information to CRAs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2. The threshold issue is whether Defendant
12 is a CRA that issues “consumer reports” under the FCRA.
13 B. Defendant is not a Consumer Reporting Agency
14 The FCRA defines a “consumer reporting agency” as:
15 [A]ny person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit
16 basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers
17 for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which
18 uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of
preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
19
20 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
21 The FCRA defines a “consumer report” as:
22 [A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
23 consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
24 characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or
25 collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for . . . credit or insurance to be used
26 primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
27
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
28
To be a CRA, an entity must act “for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports.”

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1 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f); Zabriskie v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 940 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir.
2 2019) (“By its plain meaning, therefore, FCRA applies to an entity that assembles or
3 evaluates consumer information with the intent to provide a consumer report to third
4 parties.”). The definition of a CRA includes four elements: (1) the company works in
5 exchange for compensation; (2) it regularly assembles or evaluates information about
6 consumers; (3) its purpose in doing so is to furnish consumer reports to third parties; and
7 (4) it uses interstate commerce to achieve these aims. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f);
8 McCalmont v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 2014 WL 3571700, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2014); Zabriskie
9 v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1183 (D. Ariz. 2014).
10 Defendant does not appear to dispute the first or fourth elements and the Court
11 accordingly finds those satisfied. Defendant disputes the second and third element, arguing
12 it “assembles information about public records unmatched to specific individuals” and that
13 its customers, such as Equifax, may act as CRAs when they link the public record data to
14 particular consumer files. (Doc. 53 at 17) (emphasis in original). However, Defendant
15 asserts it does not perform “consumer matching—it simply supplies raw data that report
16 preparers may choose to use.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues Defendant gathered bankruptcy
17 information and provided it to Equifax and thus acted as a CRA. (Doc. 47 at 12).
18 The issue is whether, under the second element, the bankruptcy record Defendant
19 assembled was about a consumer. Plaintiff conclusory asserts that Defendant “regularly
20 engages in the practice of assembling consumer credit information . . . on consumers for
21 the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” (Doc. 47 at 11–12). Plaintiff
22 cites an out-of-circuit district court case to support this proposition, stating “one who
23 assembles information does not necessarily change its contents . . . [t]he definition only
24 requires that the assembler gather or group the information.” See McGrath v. Credit
25 Lenders Serv. Agency, Inc., 2022 WL 580566, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2022). The McGrath
26 decision is neither binding nor persuasive. The court there considered whether the
27 defendant engaged in “assembling” and concluded it was “at a loss” to call the defendant’s
28 actions “anything other than the ‘assembling’ of information.” Id. The dispute here is not

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Case 2:21-cv-01145-DJH Document 60 Filed 03/13/23 Page 7 of 13

1 whether Defendant assembled information, indeed Defendant conceded as much, but
2 whether the bankruptcy record assembled was about a consumer.
3 Defendant’s argument thus hinges on whether it provided Equifax data about public
4 records, or about a consumer. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant
5 expected his bankruptcy record to be used for the purposes in § 1681a(d)(1). To be a CRA,
6 Defendant must assemble or evaluate consumer information with “the purpose of
7 furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). As noted, a “consumer
8 report” is any communication by a consumer reporting agency “bearing on a consumer’s
9 credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
10 characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole
11 or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility”
12 for credit, insurance, employment, or other statutorily enumerated reasons. Id. §
13 1681a(d)(1). Defendant contends there are two fundamental characteristics of consumer
14 reports: the reports are about an identified consumer, and the reports are expected or
15 intended to serve as a factor in making certain eligibility decisions. (Doc. 53 at 17).
16 Defendant argues the bankruptcy record it provided to Equifax meets neither of those two
17 criteria. (Id.) The Court agrees with Defendant.
18 It is true that Defendant provides Equifax with bankruptcy records under the
19 Records Agreement. (Doc. 53-2 at ¶ 9). The Records Agreement explicitly states,
20 however, that “Equifax shall be solely responsible for the incorporation, selection, linking
21 and/or matching of Licensed Data to specific consumers and distribution of Licensed Data
22 from any Equifax repository.” (Id. at ¶ 11) (emphasis added). Indeed, the letter Equifax
23 sent to Plaintiff about its reinvestigation directed Plaintiff to a webpage that states
24 “[Defendant] does not match bankruptcy information to consumer credit files for Equifax.
25 Equifax performs this matching.” (Doc. 53-4 at 11).
26 The Court is therefore not persuaded that Defendant acted as a CRA when it
27 confirmed a bankruptcy case existed because Equifax alone performed the consumer
28 matching, not Defendant. See Thacker v. GPS Insight, LLC, 2019 WL 3816720, at *9 (D.

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1 Ariz. Aug. 14, 2019) (“That an entity acts as a consumer reporting agency in one case does
2 not establish that the entity always so acts.”). As Defendant notes, it is unreasonable to
3 suggest any raw data vendor to a CRA itself becomes a CRA by virtue of that CRA
4 matching the data to a specific consumer. See Mix v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 2016
5 WL 5850362, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2016) (noting the Federal Trade Commission’s report
6 that “a business that delivers records, without knowing their content or retaining any
7 information from them, is not acting as a CRA even if the recipient uses the records to
8 evaluate the consumer's eligibility for insurance or another permissible purpose.”).
9 Plaintiff has thus failed to establish an element of his Section 1681e(b) and 1681i(a)
10 claims—that Defendant is a CRA—and summary judgment will be entered in Defendant’s
11 favor as a matter of law on those claims.
12 The Court must still determine whether Defendant violated Section 1681s-2(b) of
13 the FCRA, which imposes obligations on furnishers of information to CRAs.
14 C. Defendant’s Obligations as a Furnisher—Section 1681s-2(b)
15 In addition to holding CRAs accountable, the FCRA imposes duties on the
16 “furnishers” that provide information to those agencies. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2.
17 Subsection (b), which provides a private right of action, imposes a series of duties once a
18 furnisher receives notice from a CRA that a consumer disputes the accuracy of the
19 furnisher’s reporting. See § 1682s–2(b). Upon notification, a furnisher must, among other
20 things, conduct a reasonable investigation and update any information it finds to be
21 inaccurate or incomplete. Id.; Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1157
22 (9th Cir. 2009).
23 Before a court considers the reasonableness of the furnisher’s procedures, a plaintiff
24 must make a prima facie showing of an inaccuracy in the credit report. See Gross v.
25 CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 2022). Once shown, then plaintiff must
26 show that the investigation itself was unreasonable. See id. Information can be inaccurate
27 or incomplete if it is “patently incorrect, or because it is misleading in such a way and to
28 such an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Drew v. Equifax

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1 Info. Servs., LLC, 690 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012).
2 To establish a claim under Section 1681s-2(b), plaintiff must show (1) a credit
3 reporting inaccuracy existed on plaintiff’s credit report; (2) plaintiff notified the consumer
4 reporting agency that plaintiff disputed the reporting as inaccurate; (3) the consumer
5 reporting agency notified the furnisher of the alleged inaccurate information of the dispute;
6 and (4) the furnisher failed to investigate the inaccuracies or further failed to comply with
7 the requirements in 15 U.S.C. 1681s–2(b)(1)(A)–(E). See Cook v. Mountain Am. Fed.
8 Credit Union, 2018 WL 3707922, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 2018) (internal citation omitted).
9 1. Whether Defendant is a Furnisher
10 The first issue is whether Defendant is a furnisher. The FCRA’s implementing
11 regulations define a furnisher as “an entity that furnishes information relating to consumers
12 to one or more consumer reporting agencies for inclusion in a consumer report.” 12 C.F.R.
13 § 1022.41(c). Plaintiff argues Defendant is a furnisher because it supplied information to
14 Equifax about a bankruptcy case allegedly filed by Plaintiff. (Doc. 57 at 9). Defendant
15 claims it is not a furnisher for the same reasons it is not a CRA—namely, it does not supply
16 information about consumers. (Doc. 53 at 12, n. 1). Defendant does not seek summary
17 judgment on that ground, however, and reserves that argument for trial should the Court
18 deny its motion. (Id.)
19 Regardless of the parties’ contentions, Plaintiff’s Section 1681s-2(b) claim still fails
20 as a matter of law because Defendant’s procedures were reasonable. See Gorman, 584
21 F.3d at 1161 (affirming summary judgment because the defendant’s procedures were
22 reasonable); see infra Section III.C(3)(ii).
23 2. Inaccurate Information
24 Here, Defendant asserts summary judgment is appropriate because the bankruptcy
25 report it provided to Equifax was accurate. Defendant thus claims Plaintiff cannot make
26 the prima facie showing necessary to bring a Section 1681s-2(b) claim. The Court
27 disagrees.
28 It is undisputed that Equifax submitted a SPRC request to Defendant after receiving

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1 a letter from Plaintiff asking it to remove the bankruptcy petition because it was the result
2 of identity theft. (Doc. 53-3 at 8). In its SPRC Response, Defendant reported a bankruptcy
3 case existed and that the VSSN ended in 9827. (Doc. 52-2 at 19). Defendant contends it
4 simply reported that a bankruptcy case existed with Plaintiff’s name and address and
5 included “a [SSN] that was apparently not Plaintiff’s actual [SSN].” (Doc. 53 at 11).
6 Defendant says Equifax decided to link that case to Plaintiff despite the SSN discrepancy—
7 “both initially and after [Defendant] pointed out that the number was different from the
8 one Equifax had supplied for Plaintiff.” (Doc. 53 at 11). Regardless of whether Equifax
9 linked the case to Plaintiff, it is undisputed that the SPRC Defendant provided to Equifax
10 contained an incorrect SSN. The law is clear that information that is “patently incorrect”
11 is inaccurate. Plaintiff’s SSN ends in 7375, and the SPRC provided by Defendant listed it
12 as 9827. (Doc. 52-2 at 19; Doc. 53-2 at 22). This is plainly inaccurate. Drew, 690 F.3d at
13 1108.
14 Although the Court finds Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of inaccurate
15 information in Defendant’s SPRC, the Court must still determine whether Plaintiff has
16 shown the investigation itself was unreasonable. See Sanchez v. JPMorgan Chase Bank
17 NA, 2022 WL 17404796, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2022) (“Only once it is determined that a
18 piece of information reported is patently incorrect or materially misleading can a court
19 move on to the next step of determining whether the investigation conducted by a furnisher
20 was reasonable.”).
21 3. Unreasonable Investigation
22 After receiving the ACDV and SPRC requests from Equifax, Defendant was
23 required to conduct a reasonable investigation into the disputed information. See § 1681s–
24 2(b)(1)(A). A reasonable investigation entails an “inquiry likely to turn up information
25 about the underlying facts and positions of the parties, not a cursory or sloppy review of
26 the dispute.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1156. Courts consider several factors in assessing the
27 reasonableness of the investigation, such as (1) the nature, size, complexity and scope of
28 the furnisher’s activities; (2) the furnisher’s relationship to the consumer and the debt; (3)

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1 the level of detail in the dispute notice; and (4) the feasibility of implementing investigatory
2 procedures. See Gross, 33 F.4th at 1253. A key factor is the amount of information that
3 the furnisher received from the CRA regarding the dispute. Id. at 1157.
4 i. Notice of Disputed Information
5 Defendant contends it never received a “notice” from Equifax because the “only
6 item of information that Plaintiff disputed with Equifax was the linking or matching of the
7 Bankruptcy Case to Plaintiff’s credit file.” (Doc. 53 at 14). Defendant claims its Records
8 Agreement, however, confirms that Equifax alone determines the linkage of bankruptcy
9 records to specific individuals. (Id.) Defendant thus argues Equifax’s SPRC request was
10 not a notice that triggered an investigation by Defendant. (Id. at 16).
11 “A furnisher’s obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation under § 1681s–
12 2(b)(1)(A) arises when it receives a notice of dispute from a CRA.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at
13 1157. “Such notice must include ‘all relevant information regarding the dispute that the
14 [CRA] has received from the consumer.’” § 1681i(a)(2)(A). “It is from this notice that the
15 furnisher learns the nature of the consumer’s challenge to the reported debt, and it is the
16 receipt of this notice that gives rise to the furnisher’s obligation to conduct a reasonable
17 investigation.” Id.
18 The Court rejects Defendant’s argument. The record shows Defendant received an
19 ACDV and SPRC from Equifax. The ACDV characterized Plaintiff’s dispute as “claims
20 true identity fraud—account fraudulently opened initiate investigation.” (Doc. 47-4 at 2).
21 The SPRC, under “Customer Supplied Case Information,” states a similar description:
22 “claims code: 01—not mine—provide complete ID, status, dates & AMTS.” (Doc. 53-2
23 at 22). The Court finds these descriptions are sufficient notice to trigger an investigation
24 by Defendant into whether a bankruptcy case existed.
25 ii. Reasonableness of Procedures
26 The next question is whether the furnisher’s procedures were reasonable in light of
27 what it learned about the nature of the dispute from the description in the CRA’s notice of
28 dispute. Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157. Juries’ “unique competence” to weigh questions of

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1 reasonableness limits the circumstances in which summary judgment should be granted on
2 this issue. Id. (quotation omitted). Summary judgment is accordingly warranted “when
3 only one conclusion about the conduct’s reasonableness is possible.” Id. (quotation
4 omitted).
5 Plaintiff claims it is undisputed that Defendant did not investigate Plaintiff’s
6 reported inaccuracy because Defendant admits all it did was respond to Equifax’s SPRC
7 with the erroneous SSN. (Doc. 47 at 10). But the record shows that Defendant responded
8 to Equifax’s ACDV and SPRC by supplying information that showed the bankruptcy case
9 existed. (Doc. 47-4 at 2; Doc. 53-2 at 19, 22). Thus, despite Plaintiff’s contention,
10 Defendant indeed took some steps to investigate based on the limited descriptions in the
11 notices provided by Equifax. Moreover, Equifax’s SPRC request to Defendant did not
12 provide Plaintiff’s dispute letter or any other documents. (Doc. 53-2 at ¶ 24); see Gross,
13 33 F. 4th at 1253 (finding one of the most important factors in assessing reasonableness is
14 the quality and type of information that the furnisher received from the CRA when it was
15 notified of the dispute). The nature of the inquires here suggest a dispute as to the
16 legitimacy of the bankruptcy case, and Defendant reasonably supplied information to
17 Equifax that such a case existed, albeit with a different SSN from Plaintiff’s. Given the
18 scant information contained in the claim descriptions, coupled with no attachments about
19 the dispute, this Court does not find Defendant could have been reasonably expected to
20 undertake an investigation beyond confirming the bankruptcy was on the public docket.
21 See Sanchez, 2022 WL 17404796, at *8 (finding the furnisher’s investigation was
22 reasonable given “the two pieces of information” it received relating to the consumer’s
23 dispute).
24 The Court therefore finds “only one conclusion about the conduct’s reasonableness
25 is possible,” and that conclusion is that Defendant acted reasonably. Gorman, 584 F.3d at
26 1157. Defendant is thus entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Section 1681s-2(b)
27 claim.
28 Accordingly,

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1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that is Defendant LexisNexis Risk Data Management
2 LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53) is granted.
3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Wayne Clifford’s Motion for
4 Summary Judgment (Doc. 47) is denied.
5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant LexisNexis Risk Data Management
6 LLC’s Motions to file exhibits under seal (Docs. 50; 55) are denied as moot.
7 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment
8 accordingly and terminate this action.
9 Dated this 10th day of March, 2023.
10
11
12 Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
13 United States District Judge

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