Pandemic Darlings The pandemic economy, in original documents
Home Source documents Order — No. 1:20-cr-00296 (Dkt. 837, N.D. Ga.)

Order — No. 1:20-cr-00296 (Dkt. 837, N.D. Ga.)

Summary

An order in United States v. Teldrin Foster, Criminal Action No. 1:20-CR-00296-JPB-CMS-20, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, filed January 22, 2024 as Document 837 (9 pages). It overrules the defendant's objections [Doc. 678] to the Magistrate Judge's Final Report and Recommendation dated February 17, 2023 [Doc. 639], adopts that report and denies his motion to suppress [Doc. 493]. The motion challenged a March 11, 2021 search warrant for T-Mobile cell-site information, and the Court finds the affidavit supplied probable cause. The case concerns charges of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, fraud, false statements and money laundering relating to Paycheck Protection Program loan applications.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Cite this document

“Order — No. 1:20-cr-00296 (Dkt. 837, N.D. Ga.).” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/order-no-1-20-cr-00296-dkt-837-n-d-ga-ad45dc5397/, SHA-256 a352115895cb9f657d69e8ee748e2da770576bb67a453ff7dc5b9073ba4aede2.

Full text

       Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS Document 837 Filed 01/22/24 Page 1 of 9




                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
                           ATLANTA DIVISION

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


        v.                                      CRIMINAL ACTION NO.
                                                1:20-CR-00296-JPB-CMS-20
    TELDRIN FOSTER,

              Defendant.

                                       ORDER

       This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s Final Report and

Recommendation dated February 17, 2023 (“R. & R.”) [Doc. 639] and Defendant

Teldrin Foster’s (“Defendant”) Objections to the R. & R. [Doc. 678]. This Court

finds as follows:

                                  BACKGROUND

       Defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud,

substantive counts of fraud, making a false statements and money laundering. See

[Doc. 290]. Defendant’s charges relate to a fraudulent Paycheck Protection

Program (“PPP”)1 loan scheme, involving PPP loan applications submitted by

several businesses. The R. & R. sets forth the facts of this case in detail. See


1
  The PPP was established as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(“CARES”) Act.
        Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS Document 837 Filed 01/22/24 Page 2 of 9




[Doc. 639, pp. 1–5]. The Court incorporates those facts by reference here in

addition to providing a brief summary of the facts most relevant to Defendant’s

objections.

        On March 11, 2021, United States Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard

issued a search warrant for information associated with T-Mobile accounts tied to

seven cell phone numbers (the “Target Cell Phones”), including one used by

Defendant. See [Doc. 493-1]. The warrant authorized the Government to seize

information that constituted “fruits, evidence, and instrumentalities of violations of

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 (Wire Fraud), 1344 ([B]ank [F]raud),

1028A (Aggravated Identify Theft), 1956 and/or 1957 (Money Laundering), and

conspiracy to commit these offenses.” Id. at 39. This warrant is the subject of

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress [Doc. 493] and the corresponding R. & R. [Doc.

639].

        FBI Special Agent Joseph D. Stites submitted an affidavit in support of the

search warrant that Judge Vineyard issued. [Doc. 493-1, pp. 1–34]. Special Agent

Stites’s supporting affidavit contained evidence of Defendant’s involvement in a

fraudulent PPP loan scheme—specifically, Defendant’s fabrication of supporting

documents associated with businesses’ PPP loan applications. Id. at 11. The

affidavit also included facts showing that money was laundered in connection with


                                          2
     Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS Document 837 Filed 01/22/24 Page 3 of 9




the scheme. Id. at 13–18. One method of money laundering discussed in the

affidavit was the use of Rapid Pay Cards, on which loan proceeds were deposited

for business applicants’ purported employees. Id. at 16–17. Special Agent Stites

averred that he had probable cause to believe that the Target Cell Phones “were

carried and utilized by the conspirators who used the Rapid Pay Cards . . . to

launder fraudulently obtained PPP loan proceeds while making the transactions

appear as if they [were] legitimate payroll expenses.” Id. at 18. Additionally,

Special Agent Stites explained that the disclosure of historical cell-site information

from the Target Cell Phones would assist investigating agents in determining who

used the Rapid Pay Cards issued to purported employees. Id. at 27. With respect

to Defendant, the affidavit shows that one Rapid Pay Card, issued in Defendant’s

name, was used to make approximately $8,554.10 in purchases and ATM

withdrawals at various locations in and around Atlanta, Georgia, where Defendant

resides. See id. at 25.

      On June 10, 2022, Defendant moved to suppress the seized “evidence from

T-Mobile related to his cell phone number, including the cell-site data.” [Doc.

493, p. 4]. He argued that the affidavit did not provide probable cause “as it relates

to Mr. Foster’s phone information.” Id. at 2. In an R. & R. dated February 17,

2023, United States Magistrate Judge Catherine M. Salinas recommended denying


                                          3
     Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS Document 837 Filed 01/22/24 Page 4 of 9




Defendant’s Motion. [Doc. 639, p. 10]. Following extensions granted by this

Court, Defendant filed objections to the R. & R. on May 12, 2023. [Doc. 678].

The R. & R. is ripe for review.

                               LEGAL STANDARD

      A district judge has broad discretion to accept, reject or modify a magistrate

judge’s proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447

U.S. 667, 680 (1980). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court reviews any

portion of the R&R that is the subject of a proper objection on a de novo basis and

any non-objected-to portion under a “clearly erroneous” standard. Notably, a party

objecting to a recommendation “must specifically identify those findings objected

to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the

district court.” Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988). Placing

this burden on the objecting party “facilitates the opportunity for district judges to

spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result compatible

with the purposes of the Magistrates Act.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d

1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 409–10

(5th Cir. Unit B 1982)).




                                           4
     Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS Document 837 Filed 01/22/24 Page 5 of 9




                                    ANALYSIS

      As stated above, Defendant filed objections to the R. & R. See [Doc. 678].

Defendant’s objections are discussed in turn below.

           I.   First Objection

      Defendant first objects that the R. & R. failed to address Defendant’s

argument related to the overbreadth of the warrant. [Doc. 678, p. 5]. In his

objections, Defendant argues that “the warrant requested over seven months of

data without justifying why data from such a lengthy amount of time was

necessary or appropriate.” Id. As Defendant acknowledges in his objections, this

argument was not raised in Defendant’s Motion.2 See [Doc. 493]; [Doc. 678, p. 4].

Rather, Defendant raised this additional argument in his Reply. [Doc. 597, pp. 4–

6]; [Doc. 678, p. 4] (“In response to the government’s response. . . Mr. Foster also

argued that the affidavit was overbroad and lacked specificity.”). Because this

argument was not raised in the original motion, the Court declines to consider it.

See, e.g., Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005)

(“As we repeatedly have admonished, ‘[a]rguments raised for the first time in a




2
  Instead, Defendant’s Motion focuses on the alleged lack of probable cause to support
the warrant based on insufficient information connecting Defendant to the use of Rapid
Pay Cards. The timeframe associated with the warrant is not mentioned. See [Doc. 493].

                                          5
     Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS Document 837 Filed 01/22/24 Page 6 of 9




reply brief are not properly before a reviewing court.’”) (citing United States v.

Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 632 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1994)).

          II.   Second Objection

      Defendant next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that there was

sufficient probable cause to issue the search warrant and seize records from

Defendant’s cell phone. This Court finds that there was sufficient information

included in the affidavit to support a finding of probable cause. The Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that

         [p]robable cause exists when under the totality-of-the-
         circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
         evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. In other
         words, probable cause exists where the facts lead a reasonably
         cautious person to believe that the search will uncover evidence
         of a crime.

United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation and

quotations omitted). The affidavit in support of a search warrant, then, must “state

facts sufficient to justify a conclusion that evidence or contraband will probably be

found at the [location] to be searched.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308,

1314 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The task of this Court is “only to

determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the

magistrate judge’s decision to issue the warrant,” rather than conduct a de novo

determination of probable cause. United States v. Bushay, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1335,

                                          6
     Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS Document 837 Filed 01/22/24 Page 7 of 9




1379 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984)).

Indeed, reviewing courts are to accord “great deference” to a magistrate judge’s

determinations of probable cause to issue a search warrant. United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984); Martin, 297 F.3d at 1317.

       Defendant objects that the allegation that Defendant was involved in the

preparation of fraudulent PPP loan applications does not establish probable cause

to believe that his cell site data and related information would contain evidence of

that crime. [Doc. 678, p. 7]. But that is not all that the affidavit showed. Special

Agent Stites’s affidavit contained facts to show: (1) Defendant’s involvement in

the alleged PPP loan fraud scheme, (2) that Rapid Pay Cards were utilized to

launder proceeds of the alleged scheme, (3) that a Rapid Pay Card was issued in

Defendant’s name3, (4) that the Target Cell Phones were carried and used by

conspirators who used Rapid Pay Cards to launder fraudulently obtained PPP funds

and (5) that the disclosure of historical cell-site information from the Target Cell


3
  Defendant argues that there are insufficient allegations in the warrant affidavit to show
that he actually received and used the Rapid Pay Card, “as opposed to being simply one
of the many other individuals whose names and information Darrell Thomas (and others)
used to obtain Rapid Pay Cards.” [Doc. 678, p. 10]. This Court disagrees. The facts in
the affidavit tie Defendant to the alleged scheme. This differentiates him from “the many
other individuals” whose names and information were used without their knowledge and
who were not tied to the alleged scheme. In light of this difference, that a Rapid Pay
Card was issued in Defendant’s name is one more fact in support of probable cause that
he received and used the Rapid Pay Card to access proceeds of fraudulent PPP loans.

                                             7
     Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS Document 837 Filed 01/22/24 Page 8 of 9




Phones would assist investigating agents in determining who used the Rapid Pay

Cards issued to purported employees. [Doc. 493-1, pp. 11, 14–18, 25–27]. Given

these facts, under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit contained “facts

sufficient to justify a conclusion that evidence or contraband will probably be

found at the [location] to be searched.” Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510; Martin, 297 F.3d

at 1314 (citation omitted). Defendant’s objection is OVERRULED.

         III.   Third Objection

             Finally, in providing additional reasoning for her conclusion, the

Magistrate Judge explained in the R. & R.,

         [E]ven if Foster did not use the card, the historical cell site
         information could still be evidence of money laundering and/or
         aggravated identify theft against Darrell Thomas or other
         individuals. It was not necessary for Agent Stites to state a
         probable cause basis to believe that Foster committed any of the
         crimes under investigation. Rather, he had to show only that
         there was probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime—
         not evidence related to a specific criminal—would be found in
         the data and information described in the warrant.

[Doc. 639, pp. 8–9]. Defendant objects to this conclusion of the R. & R. [Doc.

678, p. 15]. However, because the Court has found that probable cause existed to

believe Defendant used a Rapid Pay Card to launder proceeds of the alleged PPP

scheme, the Court need not address Defendant’s objection on this ground.

Defendant’s third objection is OVERRULED.


                                           8
     Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS Document 837 Filed 01/22/24 Page 9 of 9




                                 CONCLUSION

      The Court has carefully reviewed both R. & R. and all objections thereto.

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s factual and legal conclusions are

correct, and therefore Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED in their entirety.

Accordingly, the Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the R. & R. [Doc. 639] as

the order of the Court. For the reasons stated by the Magistrate Judge, Defendant’s

motion [Doc. 493] is DENIED.

      SO ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 2024.




                                         9


File and source

File
837.pdf
Size
155,359 bytes
SHA-256
a352115895cb9f657d69e8ee748e2da770576bb67a453ff7dc5b9073ba4aede2
Our copy
837.pdf
Original
archive.org
Back to top