Order — No. 0:21-cv-01301 (Dkt. 18, D. Minn.)
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An order in Brenizer et al. v. The County of Sherburne et al., Civil No. 21-1301 (DSD/TNL), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, filed August 31, 2021 as Doc. 18 (10 pages) and signed by Judge David S. Doty. Four inmates of the Sherburne County Jail sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over their treatment and conditions of confinement. The court sustains their objection (ECF No. 14) to the magistrate judge's order requiring a further $998.00 in filing fees or in forma pauperis applications, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) applies only when at least one prisoner plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. Section 1914(a) then requires one filing fee per case, and their payment of $402 satisfies it.
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“Order — No. 0:21-cv-01301 (Dkt. 18, D. Minn.).”
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CASE 0:21-cv-01301-DSD-TNL Doc. 18 Filed 08/31/21 Page 1 of 10
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
CIVIL NO. 21-1301(DSD/TNL)
Kyle-William Brenizer, Travis R.
Fairbanks, Johnnie L. Haynes,
and Montez T. Lee, All Inmates
of the Sherburne County Jail,
Plaintiffs,
v. ORDER
The County of Sherburne, Joel
Brott, Sherburne Co. Sheriff
(In his individual and official
capacities); Donald Starry,
Sherburne Co. Chief Deputy Sheriff
(In his individual and official
capacities); Pat Carr, Sherburne
Co. Jail Commander (In his individual
and official capacities); Brian Frank,
Sherburne Co. Jail Administrator (In
his individual and official capacities);
Dave Isias, Assistant Sherburne Co.
Jail Administrator (In his individual
and official capacities); Chris
Bloom, Sherburne Co. Jail Captain
(In his individual and official
capacities); Tom Zerwas, Sherburne
Co. Jail Captain (In his individual
and official capacities); Steve Doran,
Sherburne Co. Chief Deputy Sheriff
(In his individual and official capacities);
and Mark Frittle, Sherburne Co. Jail
Programs Coordinator (In his individual
and official capacities),
Defendants.
This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ objection to
the August 5, 2021, order of Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung. In
his order, the magistrate judge required plaintiffs to pay
CASE 0:21-cv-01301-DSD-TNL Doc. 18 Filed 08/31/21 Page 2 of 10
additional filing fees or petition to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP). The magistrate judge stated that failure to do so would
result in dismissal for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b). Based on a careful review of the file,
record, and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, the
court now overturns the order.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Kyle-William Brenizer, Travis R. Fairbanks,
Johnnie L. Haynes, and Monte T. Lee brought this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, challenging their treatment and conditions of
confinement in the Sherburne County Jail. Initially, three of the
four defendants filed applications to proceed IFP. In his June
2021 order, the magistrate judge instructed the remaining
plaintiff, Travis Fairbanks, to submit an IFP application. See
ECF No. 6. Further, the magistrate judge instructed the other
three plaintiffs to submit additional information to complete
their IFP applications. 1
Plaintiffs then paid $402 as a filing fee, sought to withdraw
their previously filed IFP applications, and asked the court to
“rescind or vacate as moot” the June 24, 2021, order. ECF No. 8.
1The magistrate judge required plaintiffs to submit
information to establish deposits to, and balances of, their jail
trust account. The court needs that information to calculate their
initial partial filing fee, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
2
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In response, the magistrate judge determined that plaintiffs
failed to pay the full civil filing fee. ECF No. 10, at 2. The
magistrate judge found that each prisoner in a case with multiple
prisoner litigants must pay the filing fee regardless of whether
any prisoners proceed IFP. Id. Therefore, the magistrate judge
determined that each plaintiff must pay a $350.00 statutory filing
fee, for a total of $1,400.00. Id.
Considering their payment of $402.00, the magistrate judge
ordered plaintiffs to pay the remaining $998.00. Id.
Alternatively, plaintiffs could choose not to withdraw their IFP
applications and instead provide the additional information needed
to process the applications. Id. at 3. If plaintiffs failed to
pay the remaining fees or provide the necessary IFP documentation,
the magistrate judge stated that he would recommend dismissal of
the action for failure to prosecute. Id. at 2.
Plaintiffs object to the order, arguing that no further filing
fee is owed. Plaintiffs assert that when no prisoner proceeds
IFP, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), which requires each plaintiff to
separately pay the filing fee, does not apply. Plaintiffs argue
instead that 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) applies and only requires payment
of a single standard filing fee.
3
CASE 0:21-cv-01301-DSD-TNL Doc. 18 Filed 08/31/21 Page 4 of 10
DISCUSSION
The district court will modify or set aside a magistrate
judge’s order on a nondispositive issue only if it is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(a). This is an “extremely
deferential” standard. Reko v. Creative Promotions, Inc., 70 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1007 (D. Minn. 1999). “A finding is clearly
erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Chakales
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 79 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1995)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “A decision is
contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant
statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Knutson v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Minn., 254 F.R.D. 553, 556 (D. Minn. 2008)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
I. Prisoner Plaintiff Actions
Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA) to address the large number of prisoner complaints filed in
federal court. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007). For
example, “[i]n 2005, nearly 10 percent of all civil cases filed in
federal courts nationwide were prisoner complaints challenging
prison conditions or claiming civil rights violations.” Id. at 203
(citations omitted). By implementing a series of reforms, the
4
CASE 0:21-cv-01301-DSD-TNL Doc. 18 Filed 08/31/21 Page 5 of 10
PLRA sought to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of
prisoner suits.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002).
One reform addressed the common practice of prisoner-
plaintiffs claiming indigency, applying to proceed in forma
pauperis, and seeking waiver of the filing fee required to initiate
an action. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d
Cir. 2001). This resulted in a “large number of meritless” claims
because prisoners proceeding IFP were “not subject to the same
economic disincentives to filing meritless cases that face other
civil litigants.” Id. (citations omitted). In response, the PLRA
modified “the scheme by which courts ... process requests for
pauper status.” In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131 (6th Cir. 1997). Instead of a complete waiver, “the only
issue [under the PLRA] is whether the inmate pays the entire fee
at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under
an installment plan.” Id.
The PLRA interacts with numerous aspects of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and courts continue to determine the precise
contours of their combined effect. One issue courts have
considered is whether prisoner plaintiffs can participate in joint
litigation. See Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 854-55 (7th
Cir. 2004) (outlining the rationale for rejecting joint prisoner
litigation). Further, courts that permit joint prisoner
5
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litigation have wrestled with the proper approach to assigning
filing fees among those plaintiffs.
II. Relevant Filing Fee Provisions
Section 1914(a) requires “the parties instituting any civil
action, suit or proceeding ... to pay a filing fee of $350.” 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a). This provision is generally interpreted to
require, even in cases with multiple plaintiffs, payment of a
single filing fee. Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 855-56. Section 1915
provides that “if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an
appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay
the full amount of a filing fee.” 18 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Most
courts that have analyzed the requirements of § 1915 have concluded
that, unlike § 1914, it requires each plaintiff to separately pay
the full filing fee. See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 155-56
(3d Cir. 2009); Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 855-56.
Under that framework, § 1914 serves as the general rule for
filing fees, and § 1915(b)(1) modifies the rule in certain
circumstances. Here, the court must consider whether the general
rule or the exception applies to plaintiffs in this case. This
question requires the court to interpret § 1915(b)(1) to determine
its proper application.
III. Interpreting § 1915(b)(1)
In a case involving statutory interpretation, we start with
the plain meaning of the text. Negonsott v. Samuels, 506 U.S. 99,
6
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104 (1993). Section 1915(b)(1) provides that “if a prisoner brings
a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner
shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” On its
face, § 1915(b)(1) applies only when a prisoner proceeds IFP. It
states that the full filing fee is due “if a prisoner brings a
civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis,” indicating
that its requirements do not apply if a prisoner does not file
IFP. 18 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thus, the plain meaning indicates
that § 1915(b)(1) only applies to cases in which at least one
prisoner proceeds IFP and that the general rule in § 1914(a)
applies if there are no IFP prisoner plaintiffs.
In addition to the plain meaning, § 1915(b)(1)’s title
supports the finding that it applies only to prisoners proceeding
IFP. “‘[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section’ are
‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning
of a statute.” Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998)
(quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-
29 (1947)). Section 1914, titled “District court; filing and
miscellaneous fees; rules of court,” lays out the filing fees for
“parties instituting any civil action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1914. Section
1915 follows and is titled “Proceedings in forma pauperis.” Thus,
the section’s title indicates that its provisions apply only when
plaintiffs proceed IFP.
7
CASE 0:21-cv-01301-DSD-TNL Doc. 18 Filed 08/31/21 Page 8 of 10
Finally, other courts have interpreted the scope of
§ 1915(b)(1) similarly. In Hardwick v. Phelps, the court denied
a motion seeking to “require plaintiff to pay a filing fee pursuant
to the PLRA” based on its finding that “[b]ecause the filing fee
was prepaid, plaintiff does not proceed under the filing fee
requirements of the PLRA.” 137 F. Supp. 3d 626, 628 (D. Del.
2015). In its explanation, the court clarified that it was “aware
that § 1915(b)(1) requires that indigent prisoners filing civil
actions pay the full amount of a filing fee” but that “plaintiff
did not seek a finding of indigence, and the filing fee in the ...
case was not assessed under the requisites of § 1915(b)(1).” Id.
at n.2.
This court has applied similar reasoning. In Jackson v. Mike-
Lopez, the court addressed a multi-plaintiff prisoner suit in which
some plaintiffs sought IFP status and some did not. No. 17-cv-
4278, 2018 WL 614737 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2018). After a non-IFP
plaintiff submitted the full filing fee, the court permitted the
action to go forward, finding that the payment satisfied the
requirements of § 1914(a). Id. at *2. The court went on to
dismiss the other plaintiffs’ IFP applications “[b]ecause the non-
IFP filing fee for the action ha[d] been paid in full.” Id.
Therefore, under its plain meaning, surrounding context, and
case law, § 1915(b)(1) only applies when at least one prisoner
plaintiff proceeds IFP. Otherwise, the general requirements of
8
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§ 1914 apply. Here, all plaintiffs withdrew their IFP applications
and proceeded by paying the full filing fee. Under these
circumstances, plaintiffs are subject to the general requirements
of § 1914.
IV. Applying § 1914 to Plaintiffs
Section 1914(a) states that “the parties instituting any
civil action, suit or proceeding ... [are required] to pay a filing
fee of $350.” 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Notably, the phrasing in
§ 1914 – “the clerk ... shall require the parties ... to pay” –
differs from the phrasing in § 1915(b)(1) – “the prisoner shall be
required to pay ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
The difference suggests that § 1914 requires only one filing fee.
Further, courts have generally interpreted § 1914 to mean that the
fee “is per case rather than per litigant.” See Boriboune, 391
F.3d at 855.
Therefore, plaintiffs’ withdrawal of their IFP applications
and payment of $402 satisfies their filing fee obligation. As a
result, the court must set aside the order.
9
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
plaintiff’s objection [ECF No. 14] to the magistrate judge’s order
is sustained.
Dated: August 31, 2021
s/David S. Doty
David S. Doty, Judge
United States District Court
10
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