Order Granting Second Unopposed Motion to Exclude Time from the Requirements of the Speedy Trial Act — No. 1:24-cr-00113 (Dkt. 98, D. Colo.)

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Order Granting Second Unopposed Motion to Exclude Time from the Requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, Document 98 filed March 10, 2025 in United States v. Carie L. Hallford, Criminal Action No. 24-cr-00113-NYW in the District of Colorado. Hallford's motion (Doc. 94), filed March 6, 2025, asked the court to exclude 180 days from the Speedy Trial Act calculation; the parties put the current expiry of the clock at April 4, 2025. Under the ends-of-justice factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B) as read in United States v. Hill, 197 F.3d 436, Nina Y. Wang, United States District Judge, grants the motion. The ten-day jury trial is reset for September 8, 2025 with a Trial Preparation Conference on September 5, 2025 at 10:00 a.m.; pretrial motions are due July 18, 2025 and responses July 25, 2025, with the other deadlines in Doc. 24 unchanged.

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Case No. 1:24-cr-00113-NYW       Document 98     filed 03/10/25    USDC Colorado      pg 1
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                      IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
                                Judge Nina Y. Wang

Criminal Action No. 24-cr-00113-NYW

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff,

v.

2.       CARIE L. HALLFORD,

        Defendant.


     ORDER GRANTING SECOND UNOPPOSED MOTION TO EXCLUDE TIME FROM
               THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT


        This matter is before the Court on the Second Unopposed Motion to Exclude

Time from the Requirements of the Speedy Trial Act (the “Motion”) filed on March 6,

2025 by Defendant Carie L. Hallford (“Ms. Hallford”). [Doc. 94]. Ms. Hallford asks this

Court for an order excluding 180 days from the Speedy Trial Act calculation. [Id. at 1].

        The Motion is filed under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (the “Speedy Trial Act” or

the “Act”), which is “designed to protect a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a

speedy trial and to serve the public interest in ensuring prompt criminal proceedings.”

United States v. Hill, 197 F.3d 436, 440 (10th Cir. 1999). The Act “requires that a

criminal defendant’s trial commence within 70 days after his indictment or initial

appearance, whichever is later.” Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Certain periods

of delay are excluded and do not count toward the 70-day limit.           See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(1)–(8). The Speedy Trial Act provides, in pertinent part:
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       The following periods of delay shall be excluded . . . in computing the time
       within which the trial of any such offense must commence:

       ...

       Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge . . .
       at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the
       attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the
       basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action
       outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). This is frequently referred to as an “ends of justice continuance.”

       In order for a continuance to qualify as an excludable “ends of justice”

continuance under § 3161(h)(7)(A), certain prerequisites must be satisfied. See Hill,

197 F.3d at 441.       First, the Court must consider the following factors listed in

§ 3161(h)(7)(B):

       (i)     Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding
               would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding
               impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
       (ii)    Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number
               of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of
               novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect
               adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself
               within the time limits established by [the Act].
       (iii)   Whether, in a case in which arrest precedes indictment, delay in the
               filing of the indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a
               time such that it is unreasonable to expect return and filing of the
               indictment within the period specified in section 3161(b), or
               because the facts upon which the grand jury must base its
               determination are unusual or complex.
       (iv)    Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which,
               taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within
               clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain
               counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the
               Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the
               defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time
               necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise
               of due diligence.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B).


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       After considering these factors, the Court must then set forth, “in the record of the

case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by

the granting of such continuance will outweigh the best interests of the public and the

defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Although the Court’s findings “may be

entered on the record after the fact, they may not be made after the fact.” Hill, 197 F.3d

at 441 (quoting United States v. Dorian, 882 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1989)).

“Instead, ‘[t]he balancing must occur contemporaneously with the granting of the

continuance because Congress intended that the decision to grant an ends-of-justice

continuance be prospective, not retroactive.’” Id. (quoting Dorian, 882 F.2d at 1516).

       On April 10, 2024, an Indictment was filed charging Ms. Hallford and her co-

Defendant, John M. Hallford (“Mr. Hallford,” and with Ms. Hallford, “Defendants”), with

ten counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 2; two counts of conspiracy to

commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349; and three counts of aiding and abetting wire

fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 2. See [Doc. 1]. On September 12, 2024, Ms.

Hallford filed a Notice of Disposition, [Doc. 41], and the Court held a Change of Plea

Hearing on October 24, 2024, [Doc. 48], at which time Ms. Hallford entered into a plea

agreement with the Government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), [Doc. 49].             However, Ms.

Hallford withdrew from the plea agreement on March 4, 2025 after the Court informed

her that it was rejecting the Parties’ plea agreement to the extent it bound the Court to a

certain sentencing range. See [Doc. 84]. The Court then reset Ms. Hallford’s trial date.

[Doc. 87].

       Ms. Hallford now requests that approximately 180 days be excluded from the

Speedy Trial Act calculation. See [Doc. 94 at 1]. Her counsel represents that, given the



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prior progression of this case, he has spent the vast majority of his time negotiating with

the Government, meeting with his client, and preparing plea and sentencing materials.

[Id. at ¶ 11]. Now that Ms. Hallford has withdrawn her plea, counsel will need to re-

review discovery materials and prepare pretrial motions with the new perspective of her

co-Defendant’s guilty plea.    [Id.].   Counsel asserts that, absent a continuance, Ms.

Hallford will be denied the time necessary to effectively prepare for trial, and a

miscarriage of justice will result. [Id. at ¶¶ 11–12]. The Government does not oppose

the requested continuance. [Id. at ¶ 9].

       Based on the relevant record considered as a whole, including the necessary

shift from preparing for sentencing to preparing for trial, the Court finds that it would be

unreasonable to expect adequate preparation, despite due diligence, for pretrial or trial

proceedings within the time initially allowed under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). The Court has

considered the required factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)–(iv). As required by

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C), the Court has not predicated its ruling on congestion of the

Court’s calendar or lack of diligent preparation by counsel.

       Accordingly, the Court FINDS that:

       (1)    Failure to grant a continuance of trial beyond the time prescribed by 18
              U.S.C. § 3161(c) would likely result in a miscarriage of justice, within the
              meaning of 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(B)(i);

       (2)    Even considering due diligence, failure to grant the Motion would deny
              counsel for Defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective pretrial
              and trial preparation within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1361(h)(7)(B)(iv);
              and

       (3)    Therefore, the ends of justice served by granting the Motion outweigh the
              best interests of the public and Defendant in a speedy trial within the
              meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

       Therefore, it is ORDERED that:



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      (1)    The Second Unopposed Motion to Exclude Time from the Requirements

             of the Speedy Trial Act [Doc. 94] is GRANTED;

      (2)    The 70-day clock, exclusive of tolled time, shall accordingly be

             extended by 180 days, from April 4, 2025 1 to October 1, 2025;

      (3)    The current trial and Trial Preparation Conference dates are VACATED.

             The ten-day jury trial is RESET for September 8, 2025.          The Trial

             Preparation Conference is RESET for September 5, 2025 at 10:00 a.m.;

      (4)    All pretrial motions shall be filed on or before July 18, 2025, and

             responses to these motions shall be filed by July 25, 2025. If counsel

             believe an evidentiary hearing on motions is necessary, they shall confer

             and email Chambers at Wang_Chambers@cod.uscourts.gov no later than

             two business days after the motion is filed to set such a hearing; and

      (5)    The remaining deadlines set forth in the Court’s Order Setting Trial Dates

             and Deadlines [Doc. 24] remain SET.




DATED: March 10, 2025                         BY THE COURT:


                                              _________________________
                                              Nina Y. Wang
                                              United States District Judge




1 Ms. Hallford states that it is the Parties’ position that the Speedy Trial Act clock
currently expires on April 4, 2025. [Doc. 94 at ¶ 4]. The Court adopts the Parties’
calculation without re-calculating the date independently.


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