Pandemic Darlings The pandemic economy, in original documents
Home Source documents Order Granting Joint Motion to Continue — No. 1:24-cr-00212 (Dkt. 65, D. Colo.)

Order Granting Joint Motion to Continue — No. 1:24-cr-00212 (Dkt. 65, D. Colo.)

Summary

Order Granting Joint Motion to Continue, Document 65 filed November 3, 2025 in United States v. Joshua Lybolt and Magdalena Lybolt, Criminal Action No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD in the District of Colorado. The defendants, indicted June 27, 2024 on multiple counts relating to wire fraud, jointly moved on October 21, 2025 (Doc. 64) to continue the trial then set for December 1, 2025 by ninety days and to exclude the delay under the Speedy Trial Act; the Government did not oppose, and four prior continuances had been granted (Docs. 25, 41, 55, 61). Daniel D. Domenico, United States District Judge, finds the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial, and grants the motion. The pretrial motions deadline moves to January 20, 2026, with responses due January 27, 2026.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Cite this document

“Order Granting Joint Motion to Continue — No. 1:24-cr-00212 (Dkt. 65, D. Colo.).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/order-granting-joint-motion-to-continue-no-1-24-cr-00212-dkt-65-d-colo-1308a53dc7/, SHA-256 a97fae24a653287b34a212e96be57dd1b9d2be53d0c6c64b5f570ff5d0a64ae8.

Full text

Case No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD      Document 65     filed 11/03/25   USDC Colorado      pg 1
                                        of 6




                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
                          Judge Daniel D. Domenico

      Criminal Action No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD

      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

              Plaintiff,
      v.

      (1) JOSHUA LYBOLT; and
      (2) MAGDALENA LYBOLT,

              Defendants.


              ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO CONTINUE


           The defendants jointly move to continue the trial date in this case by
      ninety days, and to exclude that period of delay when computing the
      time within which their trial must commence under the Speedy Trial
      Act. Doc. 64. For the following reasons, I find that the requested contin-
      uance is warranted, and that the ends of justice served by granting the
      continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants
      in a speedy trial. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion is granted.

                             PROCEDURAL HISTORY

           On June 27, 2024, the defendants were indicted on multiple counts
      relating to wire fraud. Doc. 1. On July 11, the defendants had their ini-
      tial appearances in this Court and pleaded not guilty at their arraign-
      ments, Docs. 7, 11, making September 19, 2024 the initial deadline for
      their trial to commence under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
      § 3161(c)(1), (h)(6). The defendants have filed four prior motions for con-
      tinuances of their trial date and exclusions of Speedy Trial Act time,
      which were granted. Docs. 25, 41, 55, 61. Trial is currently set for


                                          -1-
Case No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD     Document 65     filed 11/03/25   USDC Colorado      pg 2
                                       of 6




      December 1, 2025. Doc. 56. On October 21, 2025, the defendants filed
      the joint motion to continue currently before me. Doc. 64. The Govern-
      ment does not oppose the requested continuance. Id. ¶ 7.

                                APPLICABLE LAW

         When evaluating a request to continue a trial, I consider the follow-
      ing factors: (1) the diligence of the party requesting the continuance;
      (2) the likelihood that the continuance, if granted, would accomplish the
      purpose underlying the party’s expressed need for the continuance;
      (3) the inconvenience to the opposing party, its witnesses, and the Court
      resulting from the continuance; and (4) the need asserted for the contin-
      uance and the harm that the party requesting it might suffer if the con-
      tinuance is denied. United States v. West, 828 F.2d 1468, 1470 (10th
      Cir. 1987). No single factor is determinative, and the weight given to any
      one factor may vary depending on the extent of the showing on the oth-
      ers. Id. However, “by far the most important factor to consider” is the
      requesting party’s need for a continuance and the prejudice resulting
      from its denial. Id. at 1471.

         When a request for continuance implicates Speedy Trial Act require-
      ments, I may exclude from the statutory time period within which the
      defendant’s trial must commence “[a]ny period of delay resulting from a
      continuance granted . . . on the basis of [my] findings that the ends of
      justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
      public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In
      order to exclude the period resulting from such a continuance, I must
      set forth in the record my reasons for finding that the ends of justice
      served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interests of the




                                         -2-
Case No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD       Document 65      filed 11/03/25   USDC Colorado   pg 3
                                         of 6




      public and the defendant in a speedy trial, considering the following fac-
      tors:
              (i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
              proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
              proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.

              (ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to
              the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or
              the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is un-
              reasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial pro-
              ceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits estab-
              lished by this section.

              ....

              (iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a
              case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so com-
              plex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant
              reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably
              deny the defendant or the Government continuity of coun-
              sel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney
              for the Government the reasonable time necessary for ef-
              fective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due
              diligence.

      18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)-(B); see also United States v. Toombs, 574
      F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2009).

                                     DISCUSSION

         The defendants request a continuance because they need additional
      time to continue plea negotiations with the Government. Doc. 64 ¶¶ 2, 6.
      The defendants report that Mr. Lybolt is “in the final stages of plea ne-
      gotiations,” and his negotiations “directly impact Ms. Lybolt and her on-
      going negotiations with the government, which are directly related to
      the negotiations involving her husband.” Id. ¶ 2. Additionally, Ms. Ly-
      bolt’s counsel needs more time to confer with her regarding the case due
      to her current hospitalization. Id. ¶ 3.




                                           -3-
Case No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD     Document 65      filed 11/03/25   USDC Colorado       pg 4
                                       of 6




         I find that the West factors weigh in favor of granting the requested
      continuance. Nothing in the record suggests that the defense has not
      been diligent in conducting necessary pretrial tasks and engaging in
      plea negotiations. It also appears likely that the continuance, if granted,
      would accomplish the stated purpose of giving counsel the reasonable
      time necessary to complete their plea negotiations, and for Ms. Lybolt’s
      counsel to assess her ability to participate in the case and assist with
      her defense. The Government does not oppose the requested continu-
      ance, and the continuance will not cause any significant inconvenience
      to the Court. And the defendants might be significantly prejudiced if the
      continuance is denied, as they may be unable to effectively prepare their
      defense without additional time.

         I further find that the Speedy Trial Act factors weigh in favor of a
      finding that the ends of justice served by granting the requested contin-
      uance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a
      speedy trial. It is in the defendants’ best interest to have sufficient time
      to engage in fully informed plea negotiations with the Government.
      Without the requested continuance, defense counsel will be unable to
      effectively advise their clients regarding their options or prepare the
      case for trial if necessary. A limited ends-of-justice continuance will not
      subvert the public’s or the defendants’ interests in the prompt prosecu-
      tion of this case.

                                   CONCLUSION

         Based on the relevant record considered as a whole, I FIND that:
         Failure to grant a continuance of trial beyond the time prescribed by
      18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) would likely result in a miscarriage of justice,
      within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i);
         Even taking into account the exercise of due diligence, failure to
      grant the requested continuance would deny counsel for the defendants


                                         -4-
Case No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD      Document 65     filed 11/03/25   USDC Colorado      pg 5
                                        of 6




      the reasonable time necessary for effective pretrial and trial preparation
      within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv);
          The ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance out-
      weigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial
      within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A); and
          Ninety days should be excluded from the computation of the Speedy
      Trial Act time.

          For the foregoing reasons,1 it is ORDERED that:
          The defendants’ Joint Unopposed Motion for an Ends of Justice Con-
      tinuance of Trial and Related Dates, Doc. 64, is GRANTED;
          Ninety days, from November 16, 2025 to February 14, 2026, will be
      excluded from the computation of the Speedy Trial Act time for both de-
      fendants;
          The seven-day jury trial set for December 1, 2025 is VACATED and
      RESET to commence at 9:00 a.m. on March 2, 2026 in Courtroom
      A1002 of the Alfred A. Arraj United States Courthouse, 901 19th Street,
      Denver, CO 80294. Counsel and pro se parties must be present
      at 8:30 a.m. on the first day of trial;
          The Trial Preparation Conference set for November 18, 2025 is
      VACATED and RESET to 1:30 p.m. on February 24, 2026 in Court-
      room A1002; and
          The pretrial motions deadline is extended to January 20, 2026, re-
      sponses to those motions must be filed no later than January 27, 2026,
      and no replies are permitted without prior leave of the Court. The dead-
      lines for disclosing and challenging expert witnesses, filing any notice of
      disposition, filing and responding to motions in limine, filing proposed



      1  As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C), I have not predicated my
      ruling on congestion of the Court’s calendar or lack of diligent prepara-
      tion by the Government’s counsel.


                                          -5-
Case No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD     Document 65      filed 11/03/25   USDC Colorado       pg 6
                                       of 6




      jury instructions and verdict forms, filing trial briefs, filing witness and
      exhibit lists, and filing proposed voir dire questions remain as stated in
      the Order Setting Trial Date and Related Deadlines, Doc. 15, and are
      now tied to the new trial and Trial Preparation Conference dates.

      DATED: November 3, 2025                     BY THE COURT:



                                                  Daniel D. Domenico
                                                  United States District Judge




                                         -6-


File and source

File
65.pdf
Size
113,021 bytes
SHA-256
a97fae24a653287b34a212e96be57dd1b9d2be53d0c6c64b5f570ff5d0a64ae8
Our copy
65.pdf
Original
No public link identified.
Back to top