Order Granting Joint Motion to Continue — No. 1:24-cr-00212 (Dkt. 63, D. Colo.)
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Order Granting Joint Motion to Continue, Document 63 filed July 10, 2025 in United States v. Joshua Lybolt and Magdalena Lybolt, Criminal Action No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD in the District of Colorado. The defendants, indicted June 27, 2024 on multiple counts relating to wire fraud, jointly moved on July 9, 2025 (Doc. 61) to continue the trial then set for September 8, 2025 by ninety days and to exclude the delay under the Speedy Trial Act; the Government did not oppose, and three prior continuances had been granted (Docs. 25, 41, 55). Daniel D. Domenico, United States District Judge, finds the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial, and grants the motion. The pretrial motions deadline moves to October 21, 2025, with responses due October 28, 2025.
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“Order Granting Joint Motion to Continue — No. 1:24-cr-00212 (Dkt. 63, D. Colo.).”
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Case No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD Document 63 filed 07/10/25 USDC Colorado pg 1
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Daniel D. Domenico
Criminal Action No. 1:24-cr-00212-DDD
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
(1) JOSHUA LYBOLT; and
(2) MAGDALENA LYBOLT,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO CONTINUE
The defendants jointly move to continue the trial date in this case by
ninety days, and to exclude that period of delay when computing the
time within which their trial must commence under the Speedy Trial
Act. Doc. 61. For the following reasons, I find that the requested contin-
uance is warranted, and that the ends of justice served by granting the
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants
in a speedy trial. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion is granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 27, 2024, the defendants were indicted on multiple counts
relating to wire fraud. Doc. 1. On July 11, the defendants had their ini-
tial appearances in this Court and pleaded not guilty at their arraign-
ments, Docs. 7, 11, making September 19, 2024 the initial deadline for
their trial to commence under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(c)(1), (h)(6). The defendants have filed three prior motions for
continuances of their trial date and exclusions of Speedy Trial Act time,
which were granted. Docs. 25, 41, 55. Trial is currently set for
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September 8, 2025. Doc. 56. On July 9, 2025, the defendants filed the
joint motion to continue currently before me. Doc. 61. The Government
does not oppose the requested continuance. Id. ¶ 7.
APPLICABLE LAW
When evaluating a request to continue a trial, I consider the follow-
ing factors: (1) the diligence of the party requesting the continuance;
(2) the likelihood that the continuance, if granted, would accomplish the
purpose underlying the party’s expressed need for the continuance;
(3) the inconvenience to the opposing party, its witnesses, and the Court
resulting from the continuance; and (4) the need asserted for the contin-
uance and the harm that the party requesting it might suffer if the con-
tinuance is denied. United States v. West, 828 F.2d 1468, 1470 (10th
Cir. 1987). No single factor is determinative, and the weight given to any
one factor may vary depending on the extent of the showing on the oth-
ers. Id. However, “by far the most important factor to consider” is the
requesting party’s need for a continuance and the prejudice resulting
from its denial. Id. at 1471.
When a request for continuance implicates Speedy Trial Act require-
ments, I may exclude from the statutory time period within which the
defendant’s trial must commence “[a]ny period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted . . . on the basis of [my] findings that the ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In
order to exclude the period resulting from such a continuance, I must
set forth in the record my reasons for finding that the ends of justice
served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interests of the
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public and the defendant in a speedy trial, considering the following fac-
tors:
(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to
the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or
the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is un-
reasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial pro-
ceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits estab-
lished by this section.
....
(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a
case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so com-
plex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant
reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably
deny the defendant or the Government continuity of coun-
sel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney
for the Government the reasonable time necessary for ef-
fective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due
diligence.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)-(B); see also United States v. Toombs, 574
F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
The defendants request a continuance because they need additional
time to continue plea negotiations with the Government, and Ms. Ly-
bolt’s expert witnesses need additional time to review discovery and pre-
pare their expert reports. Doc. 61 ¶¶ 2, 4.
I find that the West factors weigh in favor of granting the requested
continuance. Nothing in the record suggests that the defense has not
been diligent in conducting expert investigation and other necessary
pretrial tasks. It also appears likely that the continuance, if granted,
would accomplish the stated purpose of giving counsel the reasonable
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time necessary to conduct all necessary investigation and engage in
meaningful plea negotiations. The Government does not oppose the re-
quested continuance, and the continuance will not cause any significant
inconvenience to the Court. And the defendants might be significantly
prejudiced if the continuance is denied, as they may be unable to effec-
tively prepare their defense without additional time.
I further find that the Speedy Trial Act factors weigh in favor of a
finding that the ends of justice served by granting the requested contin-
uance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a
speedy trial. It is in the defendants’ best interest to have sufficient time
to complete necessary investigation, have informed discussions with
their counsel, and explore resolution of the case short of trial. Without
the requested continuance, defense counsel will be unable to effectively
engage in fully informed plea discussions with the Government or pre-
pare the case for trial if necessary. A limited ends-of-justice continuance
will not subvert the public’s or the defendants’ interests in the prompt
prosecution of this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the relevant record considered as a whole, I FIND that:
Failure to grant a continuance of trial beyond the time prescribed by
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) would likely result in a miscarriage of justice,
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i);
Even taking into account the exercise of due diligence, failure to
grant the requested continuance would deny counsel for the defendants
the reasonable time necessary for effective pretrial and trial preparation
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv);
The ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance out-
weigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A); and
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Ninety days should be excluded from the computation of the Speedy
Trial Act time.
For the foregoing reasons,1 it is ORDERED that:
The defendants’ Joint Unopposed Motion for an Ends of Justice Con-
tinuance of Trial and Related Dates, Doc. 61, is GRANTED;
Ninety days, from August 18, 2025 to November 16, 2025, will be ex-
cluded from the computation of the Speedy Trial Act time for both de-
fendants;
The seven-day jury trial set for September 8, 2025 is VACATED and
RESET to commence at 9:00 a.m. on December 1, 2025 in Courtroom
A1002 of the Alfred A. Arraj United States Courthouse, 901 19th Street,
Denver, CO 80294. Counsel and pro se parties must be present
at 8:30 a.m. on the first day of trial;
The Trial Preparation Conference set for September 4, 2025 is
VACATED and RESET to 1:30 p.m. on November 18, 2025 in
Courtroom A1002; and
The pretrial motions deadline is extended to October 21, 2025, re-
sponses to those motions must be filed no later than October 28, 2025,
and no replies are permitted without prior leave of the Court. The dead-
lines for disclosing and challenging expert witnesses, filing any notice of
disposition, filing and responding to motions in limine, filing proposed
jury instructions and verdict forms, filing trial briefs, filing witness and
exhibit lists, and filing proposed voir dire questions remain as stated in
1 As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C), I have not predicated my
ruling on congestion of the Court’s calendar or lack of diligent prepara-
tion by the Government’s counsel.
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the Order Setting Trial Date and Related Deadlines, Doc. 15, and are
now tied to the new trial and Trial Preparation Conference dates.
DATED: July 10, 2025 BY THE COURT:
Daniel D. Domenico
United States District Judge
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