Order Denying Construed Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 59(e) — No. 1:22-cr-00187 (Dkt. 290, D. Colo.)

Summary

Order Denying Construed Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Document 290 filed August 21, 2026 in United States v. Shambrica Washington, Criminal Case No. 22-cr-187-WJM in the District of Colorado. On March 31, 2026 the court had denied Washington's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 281); her response to that order (ECF No. 284) was construed as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and the Government responded (ECF No. 289). Washington argued the court should not have denied a certificate of appealability she never requested, and realleged that her co-defendant, the Government and her defense counsel colluded against her. William J. Martínez, Senior United States District Judge, finds that Habeas Rule 11(a) required a ruling on a certificate of appealability, that the collusion claims rehash arguments already rejected, and denies the motion.

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Case No. 1:22-cr-00187-WJM        Document 290       filed 08/21/26    USDC Colorado       pg 1
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                       IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
                               Judge William J. Martínez

 Criminal Case No. 22-cr-187-WJM

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff,

 v.

 1.     SHAMBRICA WASHINGTON,

        Defendant.


               ORDER DENYING CONSTRUED MOTION TO ALTER OR
             AMEND THE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FED R. CIV. P. 59(e)


        On March 31, 2026, the Court issued a 28-page Order denying Defendant

 Shambrica Washington’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence under 28

 U.S.C. § 2255 (the “Prior Order”). (ECF No. 281.) Now before the Court is

 Washington’s “Response to Order Denying 28 U.S.C. 2255,” (ECF No. 284), which the

 Court has construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R.

 Civ. P. 59(e), (ECF No. 286) (the “Construed Motion”). The Government filed a

 response. (ECF No. 289.) Washington did not file a reply.

        For the reasons explained below, the Construed Motion is denied.

                                   I. LEGAL STANDARD

        Relief under Rule 59(e) “is appropriate only where the court has misapprehended

 the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law.” Barber ex rel. Barber v. Colo. Dep’t

 of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Thus, the movant must show “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new
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 evidence previously unavailable, [or] (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent

 manifest injustice.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir.

 2000). A Rule 59(e) motion “is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or

 advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.” Id.; see also Exxon

 Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 475 n.5 (2008) (“Rule 59(e) . . . may not be used

 to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments . . . that could have been raised prior to

 entry of judgment”).

                                         II. ANALYSIS

        Washington’s arguments in the Construed Motion can be broadly sorted into two

 categories. First, she suggests the Court erred in denying a certificate of appealability

 (“COA”). Second, she realleges that her co-defendant, the Government, and her

 defense counsel all colluded against her in various ways. As further explained below,

 neither argument warrants relief under Rule 59(e).

 A.     Certificate of Appealability

        In the Construed Motion, Washington suggests it was improper for the Court to

 deny a COA when she “never requested a COA nor . . . filed a Notice of Appeal.” (ECF

 No. 284 at 2.) However, the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings (“Habeas

 Rules”) dictate that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability

 when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Habeas Rule 11(a) (emphasis

 added). In other words, the Court’s issuance or denial of a COA was not contingent on

 Washington’s express request for a COA nor her filing of a notice of appeal.

        Washington next contends the fact that “a substantial showing of a constitutional

 right was not presented . . . is not a ground to deny a COA and if so then the judge did


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 not elaborate on which issues or claims that did not present a ‘substantial showing.’”

 (ECF No. 284 at 1–2.) To the extent Washington asserts the Court applied the wrong

 legal standard in considering whether a COA should issue, her argument is simply

 incorrect. The Court concluded in the Prior Order that “no certificate of appealability will

 issue because Washington has not made a substantial showing that jurists of reason

 would find it debatable whether the Motion states a valid claim of the denial of a

 constitutional right.” (ECF No. 281 at 28.) As Washington appears to recognize, (see

 ECF No. 284 at 2), this is the precise standard district courts are to apply in considering

 whether a COA should issue. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003)

 (“[Section] 2253(c) permits the issuance of a COA only where a petitioner has made a

 ‘substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’ . . . Under the controlling

 standard, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for

 that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or

 that the issues presented where adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

 further.”) (cleaned up). Moreover, in ruling that “no certificate of appealability will issue,”

 the Prior Order made clear that Washington had not made the requisite showing as to

 any claim. (ECF No. 281 at 28.)

        Lastly, Washington asserts “a question of first impression likely warrants an

 issuance of a COA.” (ECF No. 284 at 2.) To the extent Washington is thereby

 suggesting her § 2255 motion raised “a question of first impression,” she does not

 identify that issue, much less explain how it presents a novel legal question.

        Thus, each of Washington’s arguments regarding the Court’s denial of a COA fail

 to establish any ground warranting relief under Rule 59(e).


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 B.     Unsubstantiated Allegations of a Conspiracy

        In the remainder of the Construed Motion, Washington alleges various ways her

 ex-husband and co-defendant, Jean Damus; the Government; and her own defense

 attorney conspired to incriminate and prosecute her. (See generally ECF No. 284 at 3–

 5.) The Court has already fulsomely considered these unsubstantiated allegations and

 rejected them as a basis for habeas relief in the Prior Order. Washington does not

 explain any manner in which “the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s

 position, or the controlling law” in the Construed Motion. Nelson v. City of Albuquerque,

 921 F.3d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 2019). Nor does she “present newly discovered evidence”

 warranting reconsideration. Comm. for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517,

 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). Rather, she simply rehashes the same allegations the Court has

 previously considered and rejected. Washington may disagree with the Court’s

 assessment of her accusations of collusion, but that is no grounds for relief under Rule

 59(e). Cf. Massey v. Computershare Ltd., 2024 WL 4680632, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 5,

 2024) (noting fact that litigant “broadly disagrees with the Court’s judgment and the

 reasoning upon which it rests . . . is far from being a proper basis for a Rule 59(e)

 motion”).

                                     III. CONCLUSION

        For the reasons stated above, Defendant Shambrica Washington’s Construed

 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (ECF No. 284)

 is DENIED.




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       Dated this 21st day of August, 2026.

                                                  BY THE COURT:



                                                  ______________________
                                                  William J. Martínez
                                                  Senior United States District Judge




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