United States v. Erin V. Mazzei — Order Denying Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (D. Haw., Document 148)
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An order by United States District Judge J. Michael Seabright, dated May 1, 2026 and filed as Document 148 in United States v. Erin V. Mazzei, Cr. No. 22-00045 JMS-02, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, denying Mazzei's pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and a certificate of appealability. It recounts that Mazzei and her husband and co-defendant, Christopher Mazzei, were indicted on May 26, 2022 on wire fraud and money laundering counts, that she pleaded guilty to counts 1 and 3 on August 28, 2024, and that on January 9, 2025 she was sentenced to 27 months, three years of supervised release and restitution of $1,418,174.70. The court finds many claims barred by the plea agreement's collateral-attack waiver and the rest without basis, and directs the Clerk to close Civ. No. 26-00026 JMS-KJM.
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“United States v. Erin V. Mazzei — Order Denying Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (D. Haw., Document 148).”
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Case 1:22-cr-00045-JMS Document 148 Filed 05/01/26 Page 1 of 52 PageID.1713
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CR. NO. 22-00045 JMS-02
(CIV. NO. 26-00026 JMS-KJM)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION
v. UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO
VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR
ERIN V. MAZZEI, (02) CORRECT SENTENCE BY A
PERSON IN FEDERAL
Defendant-Petitioner. CUSTODY, ECF NO. 124; AND
(2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILTY
ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE,
SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL
CUSTODY, ECF NO. 124; AND (2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court is pro se Defendant-Petitioner Erin V. Mazzei’s
(“Defendant”) Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (“§ 2255 Motion”). ECF No. 124.1 For
the reasons discussed below, the court DENIES the § 2255 Motion and DENIES a
Certificate of Appealability.
1
All ECF citations in this Order are to the docket in the underlying criminal case, Cr.
No. 22-00045 JMS.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings
This background section sets forth only the facts necessary to
understand the general history of this case and place the § 2255 Motion into proper
context. As necessary, the court will address more specific facts as they relate to
particular claims raised in the § 2255 Motion.
Defendant and her husband, Christopher Mazzei, were charged in a
May 26, 2022 Indictment with: (1) conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C § 1349 (count 1); (2) wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (count
2); (3) conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)
(count 3); and (4) money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (count 4).
ECF No. 1.
On August 28, 2024, Defendant entered a plea of guilty, pursuant to a
plea agreement, to counts 1 and 3 of the Indictment. ECF Nos. 77, 79. In return
for entering a plea of guilty, the United States agreed to dismiss counts 2 and 4
after sentencing and not to file additional charges against Defendant relating to:
(1) the submission of false statements to several mortgage lenders; and (2) identity
theft. ECF No. 79 at PageID.296–297. Defendant was sentenced on January 9,
2025, to a total term of incarceration of 27 months, a term of supervised release of
three years, and restitution in the amount of $1,418,174.70 (less amounts
2
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previously paid). See ECF Nos. 106, 112. In addition, the court ordered forfeiture
of real property located in Kapolei, Hawaii, real property located in Arroyo
Grande, California, and over $625,000 in United States currency. ECF No. 105
(forfeiture order).
Defendant’s plea agreement contains a waiver of her right “to
challenge her conviction or sentence or the manner in which it was determined in
any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28,
United States Code, Section 2255.” ECF No. 79 at PageID.312. This waiver
contains two exceptions: (1) if the court imposed a sentence above the guideline
range as determined by the court, then Defendant retained the right to collaterally
attack “the portion of her sentence greater than specified in that guideline range”;
and (2) a claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.2 Defendant signed
the plea agreement under the heading “AGREED.” Id. at PageID.325. And during
her August 28, 2024 change of plea hearing, Defendant confirmed that she read the
plea agreement, discussed it with counsel, and understood its terms. ECF No. 114
at PageID.1038–1039.
2
Defendant’s 27-month sentence fell within the guideline range as determined by the
court. With a guideline offense level 17 and criminal history category I, the advisory guideline
range was 24 to 30 months. See ECF No. 110 at PageID.996 and ECF No. 115 at PageID.1100–
1101.
3
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Defendant has been represented by several counsel throughout this
proceeding. First, Federal Public Defender Salina Kanai represented Defendant
both pre- and post-indictment. She was appointed to represent Defendant on July
26, 2021. See ECF No. 4 in Misc. No. 21-00299 LEK-KJM. On August 24, 2022,
after Kanai’s motion to withdraw was granted,3 Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”)
attorney John Schum was appointed to represent Defendant. See ECF Nos. 15, 19,
20. On February 8, 2023, CJA counsel Matthew Mannisto was appointed to
represent Defendant, after Schum’s withdrawal. ECF No. 30. CJA counsel
Randall Hironaka was then appointed to represent Defendant on February 22,
2023. ECF No. 33. On September 19, 2023, Andrew Marcantel, an attorney in
private practice from Chandler, Arizona, entered an appearance on behalf of
Defendant. ECF No. 50. On March 6, 2024, Marcantel withdrew as counsel and
John Schum re-entered an appearance on behalf of Defendant, now as retained
counsel. See ECF Nos. 65, 66. Schum represented Defendant at both her change
of plea and sentencing hearings.
Defendant now makes a litany of arguments, many of which are
barred, and others of which are without basis in fact or law.
3
Kanai thus represented Defendant both pre-indictment (from July 26, 2021 until May
26, 2022) and post-indictment (from May 26, 2022 until August 24, 2022).
4
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B. Procedural Background
Defendant filed her § 2255 Motion on January 23, 2026. ECF No.
124. The United States filed its response on March 20, 2026, ECF No. 143, and
Defendant filed a reply on April 1, 2026. ECF No. 146.4
III. SECTION 2255 LEGAL STANDARDS
The court’s review is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), which
provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess
of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
A court may deny a § 2255 motion if “it plainly appears from the
motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving
party is not entitled to relief.” R. 4(b) Governing § 2255 Proceedings in the U.S.
Dist. Cts. A court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the allegations are
“palpably incredible” or “patently frivolous or false” or if the issues can be
4
Defendant’s husband and co-defendant, Christopher Mazzei, also filed a § 2255 Motion
on January 23, 2026, raising many of the same arguments that Defendant does. Because the two
motions raise many of the same issues, this Order often parallels the Order on Christopher
Mazzei’s § 2255 Motion.
5
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conclusively decided based on the evidence in the record. Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a
“district court has discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 claim
where the files and records conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to
relief”). Conclusory statements in a § 2255 motion are insufficient to require a
hearing. United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted). Instead, to require a hearing, a petitioner must allege specific facts that,
if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. See United States v. Rodrigues, 347
F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155,
1159 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Several limitations to raising a collateral attack apply to Defendant’s
§ 2255 Motion. These include restrictions precluding a collateral attack based on:
(1) a plea of guilty; (2) a plea agreement waiver (other than a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel); (3) procedural default; and (4) a claim relating to a
forfeiture or restitution order. Further, if “a petitioner does not allege lack of
jurisdiction or constitutional error, an error of law will not provide a basis for
habeas relief unless that error resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or in a
proceeding inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.”
6
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Hamilton v. United States, 67 F.3d 761, 763–64 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted); United States v. Addonzio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979).
First, as to a plea of guilty, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267
(1973), explained:
[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events
which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court
that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is
charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.
Thus, “when the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has
become final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding [in a collateral
attack], the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both
counseled and voluntary.” United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). This
general rule does not apply “where on the face of the record the court had no
power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.” Id.; see also United States
v. Chavez-Diaz, 949 F.3d 1202, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the
exception “allows for constitutionally-based appeals—despite an unconditional
guilty plea—where the appeal, if successful, would mean that the government
cannot prosecute the defendant at all”). This exception exists where a defendant
challenges the government’s jurisdiction to prosecute her for the charges to which
she pled guilty. See United States v. Garcia-Valenzuela, 232 F.3d 1003, 1006–07
7
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(9th Cir. 2000). Such challenges include claims of vindictive prosecution,
violation of the double jeopardy clause, challenges to the constitutionality of the
statutes underlying the indictment, and claims that the indictment fails to state an
offense. Id. at 1005–06; see also Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 178 (2018).
And there is a limitation on raising these claims—they must “be proved by relying
on the face of the indictment and on the record as it existed when the trial judge
accepted the guilty plea.” Garcia-Valenzuela, 232 F.3d at 1006 n.2; see also
Broce, 488 U.S. at 575–76. In an ineffective assistance of counsel context,
although “freestanding constitutional claims are unavailable to habeas petitioners
who plead guilty, claims of pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel are
cognizable on federal habeas review when the action, or inaction, of counsel
prevents petitioner from making an informed choice whether to plead.” Mahrt v.
Beard, 849 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017).
Second, a waiver of appellate and/or § 2255 rights “is enforced if
(1) the language of the waiver encompasses [the defendant’s] right to appeal [or
bring a collateral attack] on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly
and voluntarily made.” United States v. Rodriguez, 49 F.4th 1205, 1212 (9th Cir.
2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).5 “To discern whether a waiver is
5
A waiver of the right to appeal is subject to the same analysis as a waiver of the right to
bring a collateral attack. Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at 1211–12 & n.3.
8
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knowing and voluntary, we must ask ‘what the defendant reasonably understood to
be the terms of the agreement when he pleaded guilty.’” United States v. Medina-
Carrasco, 815 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. De la
Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993)). The court assesses the knowing and
voluntary nature of a waiver “by assessing the knowing and voluntary nature of the
plea agreement as a whole.” Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at 1212. “A plea agreement is
made knowingly if the defendant understands the terms and, to a certain extent, the
consequences of the agreement. A plea agreement is made voluntarily if the
defendant is not induced by promises or threats to enter the agreement.” Id.
(footnote, internal citation, and quotation marks omitted). In other words, as to
Defendant, the § 2255 waiver is enforceable other than to claims of involuntariness
of the waiver itself or a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United
States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pruitt, 32
F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (determining that a defendant may waive the right to
file a § 2255 motion to challenge the length of her sentence); Wondra v. United
States, 2024 WL 4665670, at *3 (D. Idaho Nov. 4, 2024) (“A defendant may waive
his statutory right to file a § 2255 motion challenging his sentence, and that waiver
is enforceable.”); see also United States v. Johnson, 67 F.3d 200, 203 (9th Cir.
1995) (explaining that a defendant who does not “foresee the specific issue that he
now seeks to appeal does not place that issue outside the scope of his waiver”);
9
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United States v. Goodall, 21 F.4th 555, 562 (9th Cir. 2021) (“When a defendant
waives his appellate rights, he knows that he is giving up all appeals, no matter
what unforeseen events may happen.”).
Third, a § 2255 defendant procedurally defaults claims that could
have been raised on direct appeal but were not. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, 622 (1998). Procedural default can be overcome if a defendant demonstrates
either cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence. Id. Cause “must be
something external to the [movant], something that cannot fairly be attributed to
him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) (emphasis omitted);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Thus, a plea agreement appeal
waiver provision does not constitute cause. Garcia-Santos v. United States, 273
F.3d 506, 508 (2d Cir. 2001); Norris v. United States, 2024 WL 4311671, at *8
(S.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2024). A defendant who pled guilty is prejudiced if there is a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, she would not have pled guilty.
United States v. Werle, 35 F.4th 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2022). Exceptions to the
cause and prejudice requirement include (1) claims that could not be presented
without further factual development, and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. United States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1149 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007).
And last, a § 2255 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to collaterally
attack a restitution or forfeiture order:
10
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28 U.S.C. § 2255 is available to prisoners claiming the
right to be released from custody. Claims for other[]
types of relief, such as relief from a restitution order,
cannot be brought in a § 2255 motion, whether or not the
motion also contains cognizable claims for release from
custody.
United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Finze,
428 F. App’x 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying Thiele to bar a § 2255 challenge
to a forfeiture order); United States v. Kealoha, 2023 WL 3505328, at *4 (D. Haw.
May 17, 2023); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Because the court concludes that the § 2255 Motion can be decided
conclusively based on the existing record, the court will not hold an evidentiary
hearing. Further, the court decides the § 2255 Motion without a hearing pursuant
to Criminal Local Rule 12.2(a)(1).
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendant raises a myriad of grounds in her § 2255 Motion. The
court begins with Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and then
addresses Defendant’s remaining claims.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
1. Legal Standard
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of
counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including sentencing. See
United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 1997). To prevail on an
11
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687–88, 694 (1984). That is, the petitioner must show not only that there was a
deficiency, but that the deficiency was prejudicial. Id. at 692; see also Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (“An ineffective assistance claim has two
components: A petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,
and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.”). “[I]t is unnecessary to consider
the prejudice prong of Strickland if the petitioner cannot even establish
incompetence under the first prong.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737
(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Counsel “is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation
are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690–91. Conclusory allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel made with no factual or legal explanation fall well
12
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short of stating a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See
Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74 (“[P]resentation of conclusory allegations unsupported
by specifics is subject to summary dismissal . . . .”). Further, “[s]tatements made
by a defendant during a guilty plea hearing carry a strong presumption of veracity
in subsequent proceedings attacking the plea.” United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d
1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008); Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73–74 (“[T]he representations
of the defendant [at a plea hearing] . . . constitute a formidable barrier in any
subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a
strong presumption of verity.”); see also United States v. Morrison, 113 F.3d 1020,
1021 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Any attempt to contradict the factual basis of a valid plea
must fail.”); United States v. Yamashiro, 788 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2015)
(finding that the district court did not err in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea where the defendant’s under-oath statements during a change-of-plea hearing
contradicted her contention that the plea was not voluntary and knowing). Absent
a showing of extraordinary circumstances, a defendant cannot overcome the
presumption of veracity that attaches to under-oath statements. Muth v. Fondren,
676 F.3d 815, 821–822 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing cases); see also, e.g., Favela-
Astorga v. United States, 2024 WL 4416977, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2024);
Chipman v. United States, 2023 WL 2184633, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2023).
13
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2. Allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Against Kanai
As set forth above, Kanai represented Defendant both pre-indictment
(from July 26, 2021 until May 26, 2022) and post-indictment (from May 26, 2022
until August 24, 2022). Defendant claims that for the pre-indictment period, Kanai
told her “just wait to hear from the prosecutor.” ECF No. 124 at PageID.1311.
This passive approach, per Defendant, resulted in no “actual work” being done,
and thus Kanai was deficient in her pre-indictment representation. Id.
Defendant’s argument fails as a legal matter—an attorney cannot
provide ineffective assistance of counsel pre-indictment. See United States v.
Olson, 988 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2021) (stating that Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel does not attach prior to the time that a defendant is
formally charged). And Defendant makes no claim that Kanai was ineffective
during the three-month period when Kanai represented her post-indictment.
Further, Defendant fails to argue, let alone prove, any prejudice from
Kanai’s alleged shortcomings (whether pre-indictment or post-indictment). See
Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at 1213 (explaining that to prove prejudice a defendant must
demonstrate that absent deficient performance by counsel, she would “either have
gone to trial or received a better plea bargain”) (citations omitted). And finally,
Defendant has not shown that Kanai’s representation prevented her “from making
an informed choice whether to plead.” Mahrt, 849 F.3d at 1170. In short,
14
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Defendant’s conclusory statements are insufficient to meet her burden.
Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74 (“[P]resentation of conclusory allegations unsupported
by specifics is subject to summary dismissal . . . .”).
3. Allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Against Schum
Liberally construed, Defendant claims that Schum provided
ineffective assistant of counsel because he: (i) failed to “mount any defense, object
to, demand recusal, or otherwise attempt to mitigate” based on Schum informing
Defendant that the court was “upset, acting on emotion and not as an impartial
mediator”; (ii) retired from the practice of law after the sentencing hearing, which
“calls into question the effectiveness of the defense that Schum mounted”;
(iii) failed to disclose a potential conflict of interest based on a close relationship
between Schum and the assigned Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”);
(iv) threatened “to quit right before sentencing hearing”; (v) failed to argue actual
loss versus intended loss under the sentencing guidelines; (vi) failed to present
“crucial evidence,” including “evidence that banks were not fully knowledgeable
of the guidelines of the PPP program, banks that were now being incentivized to
turn in those that had received PPP loans, and legitimate business evidence of the
Ohana Project”; (vii) failed to argue improper venue; (viii) failed to argue a Brady
15
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v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) violation6; (ix) failed to point out misstatements
made by the prosecutor during sentencing; (x) failed to question the court’s
comments regarding restitution and forfeiture at sentencing; (xi) failed to object to
a plea agreement that prohibited “ALL downward departures”; (xii) failed to object
when a DOJ investigator posed as a court official and called to verify a character
letter provided to the court; and (xiii) failed to object when the AUSA threatened
to prosecute Defendant’s mother-in-law. See ECF No. 124 at PageID.1299–1302,
1311–1314.7 In her reply, Defendant also argues that: (xiv) her plea of guilty was
involuntary based on Schum’s claim that he “would not be part of [Defendant’s]
pleading guilty, if she truly believed she was innocent.” See ECF No. 143-2 at
PageID.1623–1624 and ECF No. 146.
The court addresses each claim in turn.
6
Under Brady, “the prosecution has an obligation, imposed by the Due Process Clause,
to produce evidence favorable to an accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment. Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1022 (9th Cir. 2019) (brackets, internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
7
Defendant also claims the Sixth Amendment was violated because a “personal injury
attorney” handled her criminal case. ECF No. 124 at PageID.1303. But Schum, during the
change of plea and sentencing hearings, was privately retained by Defendant, not appointed by
the court. And Kanai, as the federal public defender for the District of Hawaii, does not practice
personal injury law. Finally, to the extent Defendant is referring to other CJA counsel, they are
experienced criminal defense attorneys. This claim is both conclusory and not based in fact.
16
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i. Failing to mount a defense based on the court being “upset”
Defendant claims that even though Schum told her that the court was
“upset, acting on emotion and not an impartial mediator,” he “did not mount any
defense, object to, demand recusal, or otherwise attempt to mitigate the effect that
this had on the case.” ECF No. 124 at PageID.1311. This allegation fails for
several reasons.
First, some background—at the time the Mazzeis entered their pleas of
guilty, they had two minor children, ages 10 and 12. ECF No. 114 at PageID.1089.
Given this fact, at the conclusion of the change of plea hearing the court informed
counsel and Defendants that the court would consider staggered sentences. The
court asked the parties to discuss this possibility—but the court also stated that it
would be more open to staggered sentences if one of the defendants began to serve
his or her sentence before the sentencing date. Id. at PageID.1089–1094.
Although the parties failed to follow this advice, they still requested staggered
sentences at the sentencing hearing. ECF No. 115 at PageID.1152. The court
agreed to a staggered sentence, but made clear that Defendant (who selected to
serve her sentence before her husband) would have to self-surrender two weeks
after sentencing. Id. at PageID.1154. Defendant then said, in addition to the
children, there was an issue regarding their house. Id. The court responded that
“you’ve had plenty of time to worry about your house. I don’t want to hear it. I
17
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don’t care. I care about your children.” Id. This is the sole time that the court
showed irritation with Defendant, which was based on the fact that Defendant was
asking for even more time to self-surrender even though the court stated that it
would be more open to staggered sentences if one defendant began serving their
sentence before the sentencing hearing. Schum, in his declaration, summarizes his
conversation with Defendant after sentencing:
After sentencing, Ms. Mazzei wanted me to go back into
court and ask Judge Seabright to allow her to self-
surrender to the place where she would be serving her
sentence. I explained that the location she would be
serving her sentence might not be known by her report
date. If the place she was designated had been
determined before her report date, I explained how she
could ask her probation officer to make the request and
that Judge Seabright would likely allow it.
She demanded that I go back into court and try and
convince Judge Seabright to allow her to remain out
longer so that she did not have to report to FDC
Honolulu. I told her that I did not believe Judge
Seabright was really happy with us right now. I
explained how Judge Seabright expected that either her
or her husband would turn themselves in shortly after the
change of plea as part of his willingness to consider
staggered sentences. The fact that neither of them
surrendered early and that they were now asking to self-
surrender in six to seven weeks after being sentenced did
not likely sit well him [sic]. I explained how he was
compassionate enough not to have one of them taken into
custody immediately following sentencing so that they
had time to prepare their young children for what
was happening. In my opinion, I did not believe Judge
Seabright would change his mind and I refused to go
back into Court to make the request.
18
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ECF No. 143-2 at PageID.1627–1628.
Schum’s recitation is correct—the court was not happy that the parties
had ignored its request during the change-of-plea hearing, and then at sentencing
Defendant requested additional time to self-surrender. But Schum was neither
deficient, nor did this event cause Defendant any prejudice. Schum was not
deficient in failing to ask the court to reconsider its decision post-sentencing, and
there could be no prejudice as the events that occurred after the court imposed
sentence. This claim is meritless.
ii. Retirement from the practice of law
Defendant claims that Schum’s retirement from the practice of law
after her sentencing “calls into question the effectiveness of the defense that
Schum mounted.” ECF No. 124 at PageID.1311. But whether Schum provided
effective assistance of counsel is not measured against the date of his retirement
from the practice of law; it is measured against the record in this case. This claim
is both conclusory and simply lacks any merit.
iii. Failing to disclose a relationship with the AUSA
Defendant states that she has obtained “information after the case”
that Schum and the assigned AUSA were close friends, that this relationship was
never disclosed, and that this raises a potential conflict of interest. Id. Schum
denies this claim, explaining that other than court matters, he has had no
19
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“interaction with” the AUSA. ECF No. 143-2 at PageID.1627. But even if Schum
and the AUSA were friends, Defendant fails to point out a conflict of interest as a
result of the friendship. See Boadway v. Ludwick, 2011 WL 5107599, at *9 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 27, 2011) (“[I]t is not unusual for opposing attorneys to have friendly
relationships outside of the courtroom, particularly in a small legal community.
Without more, such a friendship does not state a colorable claim of a conflict of
interest on the part of defense counsel.”); United States v. Welch, 2015 WL
4924887, at *14 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2015) (“Lawyers in a community like Baltimore
often know their legal adversaries and conduct themselves professionally. Ms.
Welch is grasping at straws.”); Howard v. United States, 2007 WL 1810709, at *16
(D. Me. June 21, 2007), report and recommendation adopted (July 23, 2007) (“[I]t
quite simply is not unusual that attorneys on opposing sides of the courtroom share
friendly, non-professional relationships. Without more, this banter does not raise a
tenable claim of a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel.”).
Further, a defendant alleging an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim based on a conflict of interest “must show 1) that counsel actively
represented conflicting interests, and 2) that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer’s performance.” Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir.
20
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1988); see also United States v. Christakis, 238 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001).8
Defendant has made neither of these showings
iv. Threatening to quit before sentencing
Without any further explanation, Defendant states that Schum
“threatened to quit right before sentencing hearing.” ECF No. 124 at
PageID.1299. 9 Defendant does not explain how this threat resulted in deficient
performance, or how she was prejudiced by it. Further, as is obvious, Schum did
represent Defendant through the sentencing hearing. Thus, this claim fails.
v. Failing to argue “actual loss” versus “intended loss” under the
guidelines
Defendant claims that under “the standard set forth in [United States]
v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022), the court should have calculated the
sentence using actual loss” under the sentencing guidelines. Id. at PageID.1313.
Although not clear, Defendant appears to claim that the court applied an intended
8
To prove an adverse effect, a showing of actual prejudice is not required. Instead, a
defendant must show that some effect on counsel’s handling of particular aspects of the case was
likely. Christakis, 238 F.3d at 1170.
9
In Schum’s declaration submitted by the government in opposition to the § 2255
Motion, Schum denies that he threatened to “quit” prior to sentencing. ECF No. 143-2 at
PageID.1626. Instead, he states that if Defendant maintained that she was innocent at the
sentencing hearing (after having admitted illegal conduct during the change of plea), he “would
not be part of perpetrating a fraud on the court. I would be willing to take the case to trial, but I
would not allow her to compromise my ethical obligations . . . .” Id.
21
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loss amount, but Schum should have argued for an application of actual loss.
Defendant is mistaken.
First, some additional background—Defendant’s fraudulent conduct
involved Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans under the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act. Defendant stipulated in her plea agreement to
certain facts, including that she and her husband conspired to obtain PPP funds by
submitting false and fraudulent loan applications and supporting documentation,
while concealing the fact that they submitted multiple PPP loan applications.
Further, as a “result of the scheme, [Defendant] and Christopher Mazzei obtained
approximately $1,365,000.00 in PPP funds to which they were not entitled, which
they used to pay for personal expenses and an unallowable new business venture.”
ECF No. 79 at PageID.301. Specifically, Defendant and her husband’s PPP fraud
resulted in the payment to them of: $92,500 from “Bank 1;” $562,500 from “Bank
2”; and $710,332 from “Bank 3.” Id. at PageID.302–306.
In determining the loss, the presentence investigation report
determined that Defendant fraudulently obtained a total of $1,365,332 in PPP
loans. ECF No. 98 at PageID.756, 762. Under guideline § 2B1.1, the report
applied a base offense level 7 and a 14-level increase based on the loss of
22
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$1,365,332.10 Id. at PageID.763. At sentencing, Schum did object to the total loss
amount, and the court determined that $1,365,332 was the loss amount that applied
to Defendant. ECF No. 115 at PageID.1100.
Thus, Defendant’s argument is premised on a mistaken view—that the
court calculated intended loss, not actual loss, in determining total loss. In fact, the
loss was premised on the amount of fraudulently obtained funds from three
separate banks. That represents actual, not intended, loss. And the § 2255 Motion
does not claim that Schum could have presented evidence to offset the loss
amount, such as money returned before Defendant’s offense was detected. See
Guideline § 2B1.1, application note 3(D) (stating that loss shall be reduced by
money returned “to the victim before the offense was detected”). 11 In short,
Schum was not deficient in failing to argue actual loss at sentencing.
vi. Failing to present “crucial” evidence
Defendant claims that Schum failed to present “crucial” evidence,
including that “banks were not fully knowledgeable of the guidelines of the PPP
program” and banks “were now being incentivized to turn in those that had
10
The 14-level increase was based on a loss of between $500,000 and $1,500,000 under
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).
11
United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022), which held that the pre-2024
Guidelines requires a calculation based only on actual loss, is simply irrelevant. Even if Banks
applied in the Ninth Circuit, see United States v. Hackett, 123 F.4th 1005 (9th Cir. 2024), the
court used the calculation—actual loss—approved by Banks.
23
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received PPP loans.” ECF No. 124 at PageID.1311. This argument fails—whether
the banks were “not fully knowledgeable” about the PPP program, or whether they
have been “incentivized” to report PPP fraud, is simply irrelevant to the issues
before the court. As a result, Schum was not deficient in failing to raise these
matters; and even if he was, there could be no prejudice.
vii. Failing to argue improper venue
Defendant claims that counsel (whether Schum or perhaps Kanai as
well) was ineffective for failing to challenge venue in the District of Hawaii. Id. at
PageID.1313. Because venue was proper in the District of Hawaii as to both
counts 1 and 3 of the Indictment, this claim necessarily fails.
A criminal defendant “has a constitutional right to be tried in a district
where the crime was committed.” United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1119
(9th Cir. 2012). And Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 provides that
“[u]nless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute
an offense in a district where the offense was committed.” Venue must be proper
as to each count in an indictment. United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 349 (9th
Cir. 2002).
To decide whether venue is proper the court “must initially identify
the conduct constituting the offense (the nature of the crime) and then discern the
location of the commission of the criminal acts.” United States v. Rodriguez–
24
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Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 (1999). To determine the “nature of the crime,” the
court looks to the “essential conduct element[s]” of the offense. Id. at 280.
Unless otherwise provided by law, “any offense against the United
States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than
one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such
offense was begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). And it is
“well settled that venue on a conspiracy charge is proper where . . . any overt act
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred.” United States v. Gonzalez,
683 F.3d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778
F.3d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 2015).
Count 1 charged Defendant with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349. 12 ECF No. 1 at PageID.6–16. Specifically,
that count charges that by email Christopher Mazzei submitted a fraudulent
application and records to the Bank of Hawaii,13 which is a bank based and
headquartered in Hawaii, in support of a loan application seeking over $710,000 in
PPP funds. Id. at PageID.13. Given these facts, there was no factual or legal basis
for counsel to have challenged venue as to count 1 in the District of Hawaii. See
12
There is no specific venue statute covering wire fraud or conspiracy to commit wire
fraud.
13
The Indictment refers to “Bank 3” as “based” and “headquartered” in the State of
Hawaii,” and the presentence report specifically identified “Bank 3” as the Bank of Hawaii. See
ECF No. 1 at PageID.5, 13 and ECF No. 98 at PageID.755–756.
25
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Pace, 314 F.3d at 349) (stating that venue is established in a wire fraud case “in
those locations where the wire transmission at issue originated, passed through, or
was received”); United States v. Meyers, 847 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It
is not necessary that Meyers himself have entered or otherwise committed an overt
act within the district, as long as one of his co-conspirators did.”).
Count 3 charged Defendant with conspiracy to commit money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1957. For this violation, a
specific venue provision applies:
(i) Venue.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a prosecution for
an offense under this section or section 1957 may be
brought in—
(A) any district in which the financial or monetary
transaction is conducted; or
(B) any district where a prosecution for the underlying
specified unlawful activity could be brought, if the
defendant participated in the transfer of the proceeds of
the specified unlawful activity from that district to the
district where the financial or monetary transaction is
conducted.
(2) A prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy offense
under this section or section 1957 may be brought in the
district where venue would lie for the completed offense
under paragraph (1), or in any other district where an act
in furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy took place.
(3) For purposes of this section, a transfer of funds from
1 place to another, by wire or any other means, shall
26
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constitute a single, continuing transaction. Any person
who conducts (as that term is defined in subsection
(c)(2)) any portion of the transaction may be charged in
any district in which the transaction takes place.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(1)–(3).
Here, among the financial transactions listed in count 3 was a
$175,000 “[w]ire transfer by ERIN MAZZEI from Bank 5 acct. no. x0096 to
T.G.E.S., an entity based in the District of Hawaii, for down payment on a Koio
Drive condo.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.19.14 Venue is thus proper in the District of
Hawaii as a “district in which the financial or monetary transaction is
conducted.” 15 Again, because there was no factual or legal basis for counsel to
challenge venue in the District of Hawaii, counsel was not deficient.
viii. Failing to argue a Brady violation
Defendant claims that Schum failed to argue that the government
violated its Brady obligation.16 Specifically, she claims that the government
suppressed emails “from the loan originators that explicitly stated that payroll
14
“T.G.E.S.” is Title Guaranty Escrow Services. See ECF No. 99 at PageID.794. It
makes sense that funds were transferred to a Hawaii title and escrow company because, as
alleged in the Indictment, the “Koio Drive condo” is located in Kapolei, Hawaii. See ECF No. 1
at PageID.21 (forfeiture allegation).
15
“[T]he term ‘conducts’ includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating, or
concluding a transaction . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2).
16
Defendant also claims that the prosecution engaged in other forms of prosecutorial
misconduct beyond a Brady violation. Those allegations are discussed separately in this Order.
27
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projections were acceptable for PPP loan applications.” ECF No. 124 at
PageID.1312.
A defendant may raise a pre-plea Brady claim only to challenge the
voluntariness of a guilty plea. United States v. Sanchez, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th
Cir. 1995).17 To prevail, Defendant must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable
probability that but for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant
would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial.” Id. at 1454. The test to
determine whether a defendant would have gone to trial is an objective one that
centers on the likely persuasiveness of the withheld information. Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
First, Defendant’s argument falls under its own weight. If the defense
was aware of the loan originator emails, then there was no Brady violation. See
Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no Brady violation if the
defendant is aware of the essential facts that enable him to take advantage of the
17
In United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002), the Supreme Court concluded that
“the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence
prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.” Ruiz creates some tension with
Sanchez. See, e.g., Parker v. County of Riverside, 78 F.4th 1109, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2023)
(reiterating that “as I have previously noted, [the Ninth Circuit’s] holding that Brady applies
during plea bargaining conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in [Ruiz],” and stating that
“we should revisit this issue with the benefit of Ruiz. . . in an appropriate case”) (R. Nelson, J.
concurring) (citing United States v. Harshman, 2021 WL 3929926, at *2–4 (9th Cir. Sep. 2,
2021) (R. Nelson, J., concurring)). Nevertheless, this Order applies Sanchez as binding
precedent in the Ninth Circuit, under which Defendant’s claim still fails (and so this is not an
“appropriate case” to revisit the tension between Sanchez and Ruiz).
28
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exculpatory evidence). 18 And if Schum was unaware of the emails, then he could
not have been ineffective in failing to argue a Brady violation. Second, in any
event, the alleged emails do not constitute Brady material. Defendant’s conviction
was not based on inaccurate payroll projections—instead, Defendant admitted
under oath at her change of plea hearing to multiple fraudulent statements
unrelated to payroll projections that were made in relation to the PPP loans. See
ECF No. 114 at PageID.1059–1079. 19 Stated differently, the content of the alleged
emails stating that “payroll projections were acceptable for PPP loan applications,”
was not material to Defendant’s guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. And
third, even if the emails were Brady material, and even if Schum should have
argued they were being withheld, Defendant has not shown a reasonable
probability that but for the failure to disclose the Brady material, she would have
refused to enter a guilty plea and would have gone to trial instead.
18
Defendant appears to have been aware of this “Brady” information as early as March
30, 2020. See ECF No. 124 at PageID.1353–1355 (setting forth an email chain from March 29
and 30, 2020 between Christopher Mazzei and South End Capital containing an alleged
exculpatory email) and PageID.1323 (email from Christopher Mazzei to his attorney stating that
several loan originators informed him that he could use payroll projections to apply for a PPP
loan).
19
For example, Defendant admitted that she falsely and fraudulently certified in relation
to the loan from “Bank 1” that she did not have an ownership interest in another business, and
that she would not receive another PPP loan in 2020. ECF No. 114 at PageID.1076. She also
admitted to providing false records to “Bank 1,” including false payroll records and a false IRS
Form 941. Id. at PageID.1077. And Defendant admitted that she engaged in this conduct with
the intent to defraud. Id.
29
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ix. Failing to point out misstatements made by the prosecutor
during sentencing
Defendant further claims that Schum did not argue or correct various
alleged misstatements made by the AUSA during sentencing. ECF No. 124 at
PageID.1312. Specifically, she alleges that the AUSA falsely stated that
the Kapolei condo was purchased solely for a VRBO
vacation home; the claim that the PPP funds were used to
pay off the Arroyo Grande, California home mortgage;
the claim that [Defendant] purchased a billboard to get
the attention of Dawyne “The Rock” Johnson; and the
mischaracterization of the Ohana Project as a “vanity
television project.”20
Id. at PageID.1312. These arguments fail.
During the change of plea hearing, the government provided the
following proffer as to how Defendant and her husband spent the fraudulently-
obtained PPP funds:
And upon receiving the aforementioned PPP loan funds,
Christopher Mazzei and Erin Mazzei moved the funds
into their bank accounts and began spending the funds on
unallowable personal and other expenses. Among the
notable personal expenses made by Christopher Mazzei
and Erin Mazzei were a $39,445 payment for the
mortgage on their home in Arroyo Grande, California;
$175,500 for the purchase of a home in Kapolei, Hawaii;
and $125,877 for the purchase of two vehicles.
20
Elsewhere in the § 2255 Motion, Defendant claims that Schum failed to present
“legitimate business evidence” of the Ohana Project. ECF No. 124 at PageID.1312.
30
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Christopher Mazzei and Erin Mazzei also committed
$793,000 of PPP funds to a third party production
company to develop various film and television projects.
Of this amount, they spent approximately $164,796 to
film a promotional trailer for a television project entitled
Ohana that they planned to produce in the State of
Hawaii.
ECF No. 114 at PageID.1066. When asked by the court if the AUSA’s proffer was
accurate, Defendant stated, “Yes.” Id. at PageID.1066–1067. Defendant thus
admitted under oath that she and her husband used $39,445 of PPP proceeds
towards the mortgage on their home in Arroyo Grande, California. This statement
“carr[ies] a strong presumption of veracity in subsequent proceedings attacking the
plea.” Ross, 511 F.3d at 1236. 21
Further, Defendant admitted that she used $175,500 of PPP funds for
the purchase of a home (condo) in Kapolei, Hawaii. Against this backdrop, at
sentencing the AUSA stated that Defendant and her husband put the Kapolei condo
“on a vacation rental service called VRBO, and they pulled in $41,000 from
renting that condominium in Kapolei, Hawaii.” ECF No. 115 at PageID.1122.
Contrary to Defendant’s claim, the AUSA never stated that the condo was used
“solely” as a vacation rental. ECF No. 124 at PageID.1312. Instead, he set forth
21
To the extent Defendant claims that the AUSA incorrectly stated that PPP funds were
used to “pay off” the mortgage as opposed to simply paying down the mortgage balance, any
such misstatement would be immaterial. And Schum was certainly not deficient in failing to
raise such an inconsequential discrepancy.
31
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facts which Defendant does not challenge—that the condo generated $41,000
through VRBO rentals. 22 And at sentencing, Christopher Mazzei’s counsel
corrected any misimpression that could have been left by the AUSA—he told the
court that “the VRBO rental didn’t begin until after the fraud was discovered.”
ECF No. 115 at PageID.1139. The court accepted that proffer as accurate. Id. In
short, any possible false impression left by the AUSA during sentencing was
corrected.
As set forth above, Defendant also admitted that she and her husband
spent $793,000 on a third-party production company. In his remarks to the court
during sentencing, the AUSA stated that Defendant and her husband “set aside
$793,000 for a Vanity television project called Ohana, spending $164,000 to film a
promotional trailer.” Id. at PageID.1122. Defendant appears to claim that Schum
should have corrected the statement that these funds were spent on a “vanity”
television project. But given that Defendant admitted that she and her husband
used fraudulently obtained PPP funds to support the Ohana project, it was quite
reasonable for Schum to avoid a discussion of the project, and in particular not to
nitpick as to whether it was a “vanity” project.23
22
The AUSA made this comment in response to Defendant’s statement that the condo
was purchased as a “home writing and production office as we started making connections in the
Hawaii film industry.” ECF No. 115 at PageID.1122. In short, the AUSA was pointing out that
the condo was used—at least in part—as a vacation rental at some point in time.
(continued . . )
32
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During sentencing, the AUSA also stated that Christopher Mazzei’s
“support letters include one letter from a production partner that explains that the
Mazzeis hoped to attract the attention and support of a film actor with ties to
Hawaii, Dwayne the Rock Johnson, and that was how they spent the PPP loan
money.” Id. The AUSA then pointed out that the purpose of the PPP was not to
provide funds for new business ventures. Id. at PageID.1123. The reference letter,
written by an individual that worked with Defendant on the Ohana project, states
that Defendant and her husband “sold personal items to finance a billboard near
Dwayne Johnson’s Los Angeles residence, hoping to gain his support.” ECF No.
103-1 at PageID.865; see also ECF No. 104-4 at PageID.918 (showing a
photograph of the billboard, which states in part, “Let’s Keep The Legacy of
Filmmaking in Hawaiʻi Strong. OhanaTheSeries.com”). And in her § 2255
Motion, Defendant claims the billboard was financed by a family friend, ECF No.
124 at PageID.1330. But regardless of the actual source of funds, Defendant
claims that Schum should have made clear that PPP funds were not used to
purchase the billboard advertisement.
23
To be clear, the court believed at sentencing, and believes now, that Defendant and her
husband put funds into the Ohana project hoping that it would succeed and provide them with
income. The court was never of the view that the Ohana project itself was illegitimate or illegal.
But there is no dispute that funds used on the Ohana project were fraudulently obtained. And
whether it was a “vanity” project has always been irrelevant to the court.
33
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A defense counsel need not address every issue raised by a defendant
during sentencing. Strategic choices must be made, and those are “virtually
unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Here, Defendant admitted under
oath that she used a large part of the fraudulently obtained PPP funds to support the
Ohana project. It would make little sense for Schum to provide an accounting as to
how much of the Ohana project was funded by illegal proceeds versus legal ones.
What was material to the court was that Defendant obtained PPP funds through
fraud, and then spent those proceeds, in part, on a television project—what specific
funds went to a particular part of that project is simply not relevant. Instead, it was
well within the professional range of reasonableness for Schum to focus at
sentencing (as he did) on more significant mitigating factors, such as Defendant’s
history, her community support, and her minor children. See ECF No. 115 at
PageID.1135–1136. Given these facts, there was no reason for Schum to highlight
Defendant’s involvement in the Ohana project. And, in any event, there was
certainly no prejudice in failing to do so. That is, even assuming that Schum
should have raised these various arguments at sentencing, Defendant has failed to
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, she would have received a lesser sentence.
34
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x. Failing to question the court’s comments regarding
restitution and forfeiture at sentencing
Liberally construed, Defendant argues that Schum was ineffective at
the sentencing by failing to object to a “flawed restitution and forfeiture” order,
and that Schum failed to question the court’s “allusions to how recovered funds
should work in relation to restitution, giving the impression that [Defendant] would
not pay twice for the same amount.” ECF No. 124 at PageID.1308, 1313.
The plea agreement, however, is very clear—Defendant would be
required to pay full restitution and forfeiture. See ECF No. 79 at PageID.298–299,
315–320. The court highlighted this fact during the change of plea hearing,
informing Defendant: “So, in addition to forfeiture, there would be a restitution
order.” ECF No. 114 at PageID.1035. Further, there is no double recovery if both
restitution and forfeiture are ordered. “The two payments represent different types
of funds: punitive and compensatory. They are different in nature, kind, and
purpose.” United States v. Davis, 706 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013). Given the
requirement in the plea agreement for Defendant to pay both forfeiture and
restitution, there was no reason for Schum to correct any misimpression that the
court may have left with Defendant herself at the time of sentencing. Further, even
if Schum should have explained the restitution and forfeiture obligation to
35
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Defendant more clearly during sentencing, the failure to do so could not have
prejudiced Defendant. 24
xi. Failing to object to a plea agreement that prohibited any
downward departure
Defendant states that the AUSA “tendered a plea deal that prohibited
ALL downward departures,” and that Schum failed to object to this “misconduct.”
ECF No. 124 at PageID.1300. Defendant is mistaken as to the nature of the plea
agreement.
Under the plea agreement, Defendant was not permitted to “seek a
variance or departure from the advisory guideline range as determined by the Court
at the time of sentencing and therefore will argue for a sentence within the
calculated advisory guideline range . . . .” ECF No. 79 at PageID.309. The plea
agreement also made clear that this provision “is not binding on the Court.” Id. In
other words, Defendant’s claim that the plea agreement prohibited any downward
variance is simply incorrect. The court had discretion to sentence below the
guideline range, within the guideline range, or above the guideline range.
24
Defendant also claims that “[a]ssets were seized a year before being charged, violating
DOJ guidelines that state assets must be returned or charged filed within 90 days after seizer
[sic].” ECF No. 124 at PageID.1303. Although unclear, Defendant may be referencing a 90-day
period for the government to file a complaint if an individual makes a claim to seized property
under 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A). Here, Defendant does not provide evidence (or even allege) that
she filed a claim, and thus the 90-day period is inapplicable. See Snitko v. United States, 90
F.4th 1250, 1258 n.5 (9th Cir. 2024) (explaining application of § 983(a)(3)(A)).
36
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Further, Defendant provides no argument or evidence as to why the
inclusion of this provision in the plea agreement constituted “prosecutorial
misconduct.” Defendant was aware of this provision, discussed it with Schum, and
agreed to it. ECF No. 114 at PageID.1038–1039; ECF No. 143-2 at PageID.1625.
Because there was no prosecutorial misconduct, Schum could not have been
deficient in failing to raise the issue with the court.
xii. Failing to object when a DOJ investigator posed as a court
official
Defendant claims that “a DOJ agent called character witness PJ
Haarmsa the day before sentencing posing as a court official to ‘verify’ his
character letter, but in reality, it was a DOJ investigator, which undermines the
integrity of the investigation.” ECF No. 124 at PageID.1312. In support of this
claim Defendant attaches a text communication in which Haarmsa states that “the
court just called me asking if my letter was legit.” Id. at PageID.1350. When
Haarmsa was asked for the phone number of the person who called, he provided a
number starting with a 310 area code, and then wrote “Lynn the agent.” Id. Given
this communication, it appears that Haarmsa may have confused the difference
between a court official and law enforcement. Regardless, Haarmsa identified the
caller as an “agent,” a person clearly not attempting to falsely claim affiliation with
the court.
37
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Further, even if these events happened, Defendant has failed to show
that she was prejudiced by this in any way. Had Schum made the court aware of
this issue, it would not have been relevant to the court’s consideration of the
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors or the ultimate sentence. Any such failure by
Schum did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
xiii. Failing to object when the AUSA threatened to prosecute
Defendant’s mother-in-law
Defendant next claims the AUSA “used a tactic of threatening charges
against [her] mother-in-law if [she] didn’t sign the plea deal.” Id. at PageID.1312.
She provides no evidence that Schum relayed such a threat to her, or even that
Schum was aware of such a threat. More importantly, Defendant confirmed under
oath that nobody threatened her or anyone else or forced her in any way to enter a
plea of guilty. ECF No. 114 at PageID.1028. Instead, she stated that she was
pleading guilty of her own free will because she was guilty. Id. at 1028–1029.
Defendant also confirmed under oath that, other than the written plea agreement,
there was no other agreement between Defendant and the United States (such as a
non-prosecution agreement as to Defendant’s mother-in-law). Id. at PageID.1039.
In other words, although Defendant now claims that threats were made, she stated
otherwise while under oath. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73–74 (“[T]he
representations of the defendant [at a plea hearing] . . . constitute a formidable
barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open
38
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court carry a strong presumption of verity.”). And Defendant has not presented a
compelling explanation for the contradiction or demonstrated extraordinary
circumstances to permit this claim to go forward. See Muth, 676 F.3d at 821–822
(“[A] motion that can succeed only if the defendant committed perjury at the plea
proceedings may be rejected out of hand unless the defendant has a compelling
explanation for the contradiction.”) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 414 F3d
825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005)).
xiv. Failing to provide proper advice regarding plea options
In her reply brief, for the first time, Defendant argues that Schum was
ineffective by restricting “her ability to pursue alternative courses of action by
conditioning representation of her on an admission of guilt.” ECF No. 146 at
PageID.1652. This argument was not raised in her § 2255 Motion, but instead is
made in response to a Schum declaration provided by the government in
opposition to the § 2255 Motion. In that declaration, Schum states that he
explained Defendant’s choice: proceed to trial or take a plea deal being offered by
the government. ECF No. 143-2 at PageID.1623. Schum then explains:
After considering my advice, Ms. Mazzei explained that
her primary concern was spending the least amount of
time incarcerated. She asserted that although she
believed she did nothing wrong, she was willing to take
the deal in order to limit her confinement. I told her that
I could not ethically assist her with this course of action.
For me to represent her in a guilty plea, there must be
factual basis for her plea. In order for the court to
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establish that the plea was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent, she would need to tell the court that she was
guilty of the offenses and explain how her actions and
intentions amounted to the commission of the crimes to
which she was pleading. I told her that I would not be
part of her pleading guilty, if she truly believed she was
innocent.
Id. at PageID.1623–1624. Schum explains that Defendant then informed him that
she would accept the plea deal, and she confirmed that she was pleading guilty
because she was guilty. Id. at PageID.1624. Schum states that prior to sentencing,
I again reiterated to Ms. Mazzei that if during the
sentencing she insisted on her innocence and was only
taking a plea agreement to get a reduced sentence, I
would not be part of perpetrating a fraud on the court. I
would be willing to take the case to trial, but I would not
allow her to compromise my ethical obligations or let her
confess to crimes she did not commit.
Id. at PageId.1626.
Against this background, Defendant’s reply makes two arguments not
raised in her § 2255 Motion. First, she argues that Schum’s condition on her plea
of guilty—that he could not ethically assist her in entering a guilty plea if she
falsely admitted guilt—removed her ability to proceed to trial. ECF No. 146 at
PageID.1651 (stating that Schum’s position caused Defendant to “forfeit[ ] her
right to trial”), 1652 (stating that Schum’s position “eliminated” her option of
going to trial), 1659 (stating that Schum’s position removed the option of
“proceeding to trial with counsel”), 1661 (stating that the “loss of trial itself
40
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constitutes prejudice” under Strickland). Second—and perhaps inconsistent with
the first argument—Defendant claims that Schum’s condition of her plea of guilty
took away the option of pleading guilty while maintaining innocence. Id. at
PageID.1657–1658.
Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief in a § 2255
proceeding are waived. 25 See United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1039 n.7 (9th
Cir. 2010) (declining to consider arguments raised for the first time in a § 2255
reply brief); Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 930 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Arguments raised for the first time in [habeas] petitioner’s reply brief are deemed
waived.”); United States v. Jones, 2025 WL 849231, at *4 n.4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24,
2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 842721 (D. Ariz. Mar. 18,
2025) (same); United States v. Masuisui, 2024 WL 778297, at *4, n.10 (D. Haw.
Feb. 26, 2024), reconsideration denied, 2024 WL 1719943 (D. Haw. Apr. 22,
2024) (same). But, regardless, Defendant’s argument also fails on the merits.
25
Defendant’s reply brief states that her § 2255 Motion sets forth facts, such as “counsel
informed Defendant he would not continue representation unless she admitted guilt despite her
prior assertion that she had ‘done nothing wrong.’” ECF No. 146 at PageID. 1654. The § 2255
Motion makes no such argument. Although the § 2255 Motion refers to a “coercive” plea
agreement, that argument centers on the plea agreement terms and an alleged threat to prosecute
Defendant’s mother-in-law, not on Schum’s refusal to participate in a plea of guilty if Defendant
maintained her innocence. See ECF No. 124 at PageID.1312, 1329, 1359. In short, the
arguments Defendant makes in her reply brief were not raised in the § 2255 Motion.
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Defendant’s claim that Schum’s advice somehow eliminated or
removed her ability to proceed to trial is simply inaccurate. 26 At no point does
Schum’s declaration state or imply that Schum would not represent Defendant at
trial if she maintained her innocence. The opposite is true—Schum told Defendant
that if she maintained her innocence, he would take the case to trial but not
participate in a plea of guilty. See ECF No. 143-2 at PageID.1623 (“I explained
her choices were to force the government to prove her guilt (and we could put on a
defense if she desired) or she could take the deal being offered, which I also fully
explained to her.”). Schum’s advice centered on whether he could participate in a
plea of guilty if Defendant maintained her innocence, not whether he would
represent her at trial. Defendant’s claim otherwise is not based on fact and is
rejected as wholly unsupported by the record.
As to Defendant’s second argument, she states that Schum “refused to
participate in the course of action Defendant initially sought—accepting the plea
while maintaining that she had done nothing wrong—thereby making the available
options turn on counsel’s imposed condition rather than Defendant’s independent
choice.” ECF No. 146 at PageID.1657–1658. But even if the court assumes that
26
In her reply, Defendant does not present any new facts, but instead only makes
argument based on Schum’s declaration. In doing so, Defendant relies on and accepts the factual
recitations in Schum’s declaration as true—that is, there is no factual dispute as to the accuracy
of Schum’s declaration as it relates to his advice regarding Defendant’s options to enter a plea or
proceed to trial.
42
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Schum was deficient in his advice regarding plea options, Defendant fails on the
prejudice prong. 27
Liberally construed, Defendant may be arguing that Schum should
have sought a plea of nolo contendere or a plea pursuant to North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 28 In applying Strickland in the context of plea
bargains, “a defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have
been different with competent advice.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163
27
Because the court finds a lack of prejudice, the court need not determine whether
Schum’s advice was deficient. In particular, the court need not address whether Schum’s
advice—that he would not be part of Defendant’s plea of guilty if Defendant truly believed she
was innocent—fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157, 171 (1986) (finding the counsel’s refusal to participate in client’s suggested perjury
“falls well within accepted standards of professional conduct and the range of reasonable
professional conduct acceptable under Strickland”); see also Hawaii Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.3 (made applicable in this court by Criminal Local Rule 83.3 and stating that a lawyer
shall not knowingly “fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client”). The court also need not determine
whether the failure to provide a defendant with the possible option of a nolo contendere plea or a
plea under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness. See Carr v. United States, 2009 WL 1867672, at *8 (N.D. W.Va. June 29, 2009)
(“The Court has not found a case that holds that an attorney must inform or advise a client to
consider entering an Alford plea.”).
28
A defendant pleading nolo contendere “takes no position on guilt or innocence,
whereas a defendant entering an Alford plea takes the position that he is not guilty.” United
States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir, 2009). “An Alford plea is simply
shorthand for a guilty plea accompanied by a protestation of innocence.” Id. Further, while a
plea of guilty—including an Alford plea—requires a factual basis, a nolo contendere plea does
not. Id. at 681–82. And in determining whether a factual basis exists, the court may rely on
anything that appears in the record. Id. at 682. The court has broad discretion to accept or reject
a nolo contendere plea after determining whether the plea is in the public interest. Id. Whether a
district court can reject an Alford plea appears to be in question in the Ninth Circuit. See id. at
682–83; see also United States v. Neal, 473 F. App’x 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that a
conflict exists in the Ninth Circuit as to whether district courts have discretion to reject an Alford
plea).
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(2012). To prevail on this claim Defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable
probability” that, had she been properly advised of her ability to enter an Alford or
nolo contendere plea, she would not have entered the plea as she did, but instead
would have entered an Alford or nolo contendere plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985); United States v. Silveira, 997 F.3d 911, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2021).
Stated differently, Defendant must demonstrate that absent Schum’s incompetence,
she would have “rationally” rejected the plea she entered, and would have either
gone to trial or “received a better plea bargain” instead.29 Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at
1213. This test, requiring a “reasonable probability” or evidence that a defendant
would “rationally” reject a plea offer, is an objective one. See United States v.
Singh, 95 F.4th 1028, 1033 (6th Cir. 2024) (stating that the “reasonable
probability” standard creates an objective, not subjective, inquiry); Christian v.
Ballard, 792 F.3d 427, 452 (4th Cir. 2015) (“When evaluating objective
reasonableness under the prejudice prong of Strickland, the challenger’s subjective
preferences . . . are not dispositive; what matters is whether proceeding to trial
would have been objectively reasonable in light of all of the facts.”) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Dominguez, 998 F.3d 1094,
29
Because Defendant pled guilty with an admission of guilt, she cannot be claiming that
she would have gone to trial if she had known of the possibility of an Alford plea or a plea of
nolo contendere. Instead, Defendant is arguing that she wanted to enter a plea of guilty without
any admission of guilt.
44
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1111 (10th Cir. 2021) (“Consistent with the proposition that a defendant’s say-so is
not enough, we have indicated that this prejudice inquiry is largely an objective
one.”).
Here, applying the objective standard, Defendant fails to demonstrate
a “reasonable probability” that, had she been advised of her ability to enter an
Alford or nolo contendere plea, she would have rejected the plea agreement she
entered and instead would have entered a nolo contendere or Alford plea.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.
Defendant’s guideline level almost certainly would have been higher
had she entered a nolo contendere or Alford plea. By pleading guilty and accepting
responsibility for her illegal conduct, Defendant received a 3-level reduction in her
guideline level. See Presentence Report ¶¶ 53–54, ECF No. 98 at PageID.763. 30 If
Defendant maintained her innocence, this 3-level reduction likely would not have
been applied with either a nolo contendere or an Alford plea. “[W]hile a reduction
for acceptance of responsibility under a nolo contendere or Alford plea is not
automatically barred by the nature of the plea, such a plea is, as a general
proposition, inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility and is a relevant
30
Including that 3-level reduction, Defendant had a total offense level 17, criminal
history category I, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 24 to 30 months. ECF No. 110 at
PageID.996. Had she not received the 3-level acceptance of responsibility reduction, a total
offense level 20, criminal history category I, would have resulted in an advisory guideline range
of 33 to 41 months.
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factor to consider when determining the sentence.” United States v. Gordon, 979
F. Supp. 337, 342 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 1, 1997); see also United States v. Haverstat,
22 F.3d 790, 799 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court’s finding that defendant
who pled nolo contendere and who minimized his criminal conduct was not
entitled to a guideline acceptance of responsibility reduction); United States v.
Harris, 751 F.3d 123, 126–27 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that although a nolo
contendere plea does not automatically preclude a district court from granting a
reduction for acceptance, the district court did not err in denying such a reduction
based on the facts of the case); United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176, 181 (5th Cir.
1994) (affirming denial of acceptance of responsibility in Alford plea where the
district court did not believe the defendant’s “weak story”).
Here, even if Defendant can show that she would have entered a nolo
contendere or Alford plea, and that the court would have accepted it, she cannot
show that such a plea would have resulted in the same or a lesser sentence. No
reasonable person would trade a guideline range of 24 to 30 months for a range of
33 to 41 months. Stated differently, Defendant fails to demonstrate a “reasonable
probability” that, had she been properly advised of her ability to enter an Alford or
nolo contendere plea, she would have rejected the plea agreement that she
ultimately accepted and instead would have entered an Alford or nolo contendere
plea. See Silveira, 997 F.3d at 916 (finding that, where a defendant would likely
46
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have faced a longer sentence by proceeding to trial rather than accepting a plea
deal, and given the strength of the government’s evidence, it was not plausible that
the defendant would have decided to proceed to trial”). Defendant fails on the
prejudice prong.
* * *
Defendant has failed to show that Schum provided ineffective
assistance of counsel. The court now addresses the remaining claims in
Defendant’s § 2255 Motion.
B. The Remainder of Defendant’s Claims
1. The Plea Agreement Waiver Is Valid
Before discussing the specific claims that remain, the court must
determine whether Defendant’s plea agreement waiver of her § 2255 rights was
knowing and voluntary. Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at 1212. It was both.
The language of the plea agreement itself is clear: Defendant waived
her right “to challenge her conviction or sentence or the manner in which it was
determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought
under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255.” ECF No. 79 at PageID.312.
This broad waiver contained one exception applicable here: a claim based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. During Defendant’s change of plea hearing,
the court explained the waiver in detail, and she confirmed that she understood
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both the nature and scope of the waiver. ECF No. 114 at PageID.1042–1044.
Further, after a full colloquy, Defendant confirmed that she understood the terms
of the plea agreement and its consequences. Id. at PageID.1037–1039. And, other
than the terms of the plea agreement itself, Defendant was not “induced by
promises or threats” to enter the agreement. Id. at PageID.1025.31 In short,
Defendant’s waiver of the right to bring a collateral attack, other than based on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, was knowing and voluntary.
2. Barred Claims Not Premised on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Applying the well-established principles set forth above, the following
claims are barred: (1) by the collateral attack waiver in the plea agreement (“plea
agreement waiver”); (2) because Defendant entered a plea of guilty (“guilty plea
limitation”); (3) because of procedural default; 32 and/or (4) because the claims are
not cognizable under § 2255. Many of the claims are barred for multiple reasons.33
31
Specifically, during the August 28, 2024 change of plea hearing, the court asked
Defendant whether “anyone made any promise or assurance to you of any kind . . . in an effort to
get you to enter a plea of guilty other than what’s in the plea agreement itself?” She answered
“No.” The court then asked Defendant, “Has anyone threatened you or anyone else, or forced
you in any way to plead guilty?” Again, Defendant answered “No.” And finally, the court asked
if Defendant was “pleading guilty of your own free will because you are guilty?” Defendant
responded: “Yes.” ECF No. 114 at PageID.1028–1029. And to the extent Defendant claims
that the plea was otherwise “coercive,” ECF No. 124 at PageID.1313, these under-oath
statements at the change of plea hearing fully undermine this claim.
32
For each claim subject to procedural default, Defendant has failed to show cause and
actual prejudice. Likewise, she has not demonstrated actual innocence.
(continued . . )
48
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(1) Prosecutorial misconduct claims relating to events that predate
Defendant’s plea of guilty: (a) the suppression of emails from loan originators; (b)
a threat to prosecute Defendant’s mother-in-law; and (c) the AUSA “tendered a
plea deal the prohibited ALL downward departures,” ECF No. 124 at
PageID.1300—these claims are barred by the plea agreement waiver, the guilty
plea limitation, and/or procedural default.34
(2) Prosecutorial misconduct claims relating to events that postdate
Defendant’s plea of guilty: (a) a DOJ investigator posing as a court official and
calling a character witness to verify the witness’s letter; (b) the AUSA used
“forfeited funds to bid at foreclosure auction for personal gain (now under FBI
investigation for these misconducts);35 and (c) the AUSA made false statements at
33
Many of these claims are also meritless, for the same reasons set forth in the
discussion of ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, many of these claims are conclusory or
simply incorrect. This section of the Order, however, need not address the merits of many of
Defendant’s barred claims.
34
A valid § 2255 waiver covers pre-plea claims of prosecutorial misconduct. See United
States v. Lee, 2017 WL 411205, at *2, 4 (D. Haw. Jan. 30, 2017); United States v. Demasi, 2025
WL 2051601, at *3 (6th Cir. July 22, 2025); United States v. Davis, 2016 WL 6471012, at *12
(D. Idaho Nov. 1, 2016); United States v. Porter, 2022 WL 17852017, at *8–9 (W.D. Penn. Dec.
22, 2022).
35
Defendant has presented no evidence that the AUSA was involved in bidding at a
foreclosure auction on Defendant’s previous residence. Instead, she claims that “DOJ agents
were present and actively bidding” on the home. ECF No. 124 at PageID.1329. Christopher
Mazzei’s § 2255 Motion makes the same argument and relies on a letter from Jeremy Engle
addressed to President Trump containing double hearsay: “the bidder notified me that
government agents were present” and bidding at the auction. ECF No. 123 at PageID.1273.
Regardless, Defendant has not alleged that the government was involved in the wrongful
foreclosure of her house, so she could show no prejudice.
49
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the sentencing hearing,” id.—these claims are barred by the plea agreement waiver
and/or procedural default.
(3) Claims of error in relation to the imposition of restitution and
forfeiture: Defendant suggests that the court erred in ordering both restitution and
forfeiture, id. at PageID.1313—a § 2255 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to
collaterally attack a restitution or forfeiture order, and, in any event, would be
barred by the plea agreement waiver and/or procedural default.
(4) Claim that Defendant’s sentence was too harsh: Defendant claims
that although the court recognized her early restitution payments, the court
nonetheless “felt the need to sentence [Defendant] harshly,” and the Trump
administration has stated that most PPP cases should “be handled civilly, not
criminally” id. at PageID.1314—this claim is barred by the plea agreement waiver
and/or procedural default.
* * *
In sum, Defendant has failed to show that she is entitled to any relief,
whether viewing her claims individually or in total. Further, no evidentiary
hearing is necessary as the issues raised can be conclusively decided based on the
evidence in the record.
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V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
In denying the § 2255 Motion, the court must also address whether
Defendant should be granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”). See R. 11(a)
Governing § 2255 Proceedings in the U.S. Dist. Cts. (providing that “[t]he district
court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order
adverse to the applicant”). A COA may issue only if the petitioner “has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2).
“The standard for a certificate of appealability is lenient.” Hayward v.
Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), overruled on other grounds
by Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011). The petitioner is required to
demonstrate only “that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s
resolution or that the issues are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (holding that a certificate of appealability
should issue only if a prisoner shows, among other things, “that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling”). The standard “requires something more than the absence of frivolity, but
something less than a merits determination.” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 553 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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The court carefully reviewed Defendant’s assertions and gave her
every benefit by liberally construing them. Based on the above analysis and
considering all the allegations in the § 2255 Motion and the reply, the court finds
that reasonable jurists could not find the court’s rulings debatable. Accordingly, a
COA is DENIED.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Defendant’s § 2255
Motion and DENIES a Certificate of Appealability. The Clerk of Court is directed
to close the civil case file, Civ. No. 26-00026 JMS-KJM.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, May 1, 2026.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
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