United States v. Nikenson Jean Mathurin — Memorandum Opinion (D.N.J., Document 89)

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A Memorandum Opinion by District Judge Shipp in United States of America v. Nikenson Jean Mathurin, Criminal No. 24-432 (MAS), Document 89, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, filed August 28, 2026. The court denies the defendant's Motion for a New Trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a). The opinion recounts a July 2, 2024 indictment charging three counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and one count of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, a jury trial from May 18, 2026 through May 21, 2026, and a conviction on all counts. It states that the defendant argued the Summary Charts were inaccurate and that a witness's attribution testimony required expert qualification, and the court rejects both arguments.

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Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document 89 _ Filed 08/28/26 Page 1 of 9 PagelD: 1736

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Criminal No. 24-432 (MAS)
Vv. MEMORANDUM OPINION

NIKENSON JEAN MATHURIN.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Nikenson Jean Mathurin’s (“Defendant”)
Motion for a New Trial (the “Motion’”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a).
(ECF No. 78.) The United States of America (the “Government”) opposed (ECF No. 82), and
Defendant replied (ECF No. 84). The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and
decides the matter without oral argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1, which is applicable to
criminal cases under Local Civil Rule 1.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the
Motion.

I, PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 2, 2024, a federal grand jury returned a four-count Indictment charging Defendant
with three counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and one count of money laundering
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. (Indictment, ECF No. 16.) The Indictment charged Defendant
with a scheme to defraud a financial institution and the Small Business Administration (the “SBA’”’)
to obtain millions of dollars of federal COVID-19 emergency relief money by means of materially
false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and with laundering the proceeds.

(id. 99 2, 4(b), 7.)
Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document 89 _ Filed 08/28/26 Page 2 of 9 PagelD: 1737

Defendant was subsequently tried before a jury over four days from May 18, 2026, through
May 21, 2026. (Minute Entries, ECF Nos. 60, 61, 65, 67.) The Government’s evidence at trial
consisted of testimony from six witnesses, including summary witness Special Agent Michael
Pohar (“Pohar’”) of the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (“IRS-CI”), as well as.
voluminous records, including loan applications, bank records, tax forms, email correspondence,
subscriber records, and summary charts. (See generally Trial Tr., ECF Nos. 63, 64, 66, 68.) The
Government’s theory of the case was that Defendant submitted fraudulent COVID-19 relief
applications under the Paycheck Protection Program (the “PPP”) and the Economic Injury Disaster
Loan Program (the “EIDL”) for entities that Defendant controlled, including Innovation Partners
Plus and Opulence Motor Group, and that he caused the loan proceeds to be wired to accounts that
he controlled. (Trial Tr. 19:3-21:4, 416:13-24, 430:19-22.)

During Pohar’s testimony, the Government introduced Exhibit 800, Summary Charts
(“Summary Charts”), which were prepared based on various investigative records and were
admitted without objection. (/d. at 162:1-10; Summary Charts, Gov’t’s Ex. 800.) Page ten of the
Summary Charts included IP addresses which were said to have been captured on the loan
submissions, juxtaposed with the IP addresses said to have been associated with Defendant’s
iPhone. (Summary Charts 10; Trial Tr. 160:8-162:4, 284:12-288:6.)

At the close of evidence, Defense Counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, (Trial Tr. 377:24-378:23.) The Court subsequently denied
that motion. (May Order, ECF No. 75.) Following the trial and deliberations, a jury convicted

Defendant on all counts. (Trial Tr. 486:24-488:11; Verdict, ECF No. 72.) Defendant filed the
Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document 89 _ Filed 08/28/26 Page 3 of 9 PagelD: 1738

instant Motion pro se! on July 6, 2026. (Def.’s Moving Br., ECF No. 78.) The Government opposed
(Gov’t’s Opp’n Br., ECF No 82), and Defendant replied (Def.’s Reply Br., ECF No. 84).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a), the Court may vacate any judgment and
grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Evidence is not viewed
favorably to one side or the other—instead the Court “exercises its own judgment.” United States
v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Quiles, 618 F.3d 383, 390
(3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (‘A determination of whether it should grant a new trial is left to
the discretion of a district court.”).

A district court “can order a new trial only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a
miscarriage of justice has occurred—that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.” United
States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A new trial is required when evidentiary errors “so infected the jury’s deliberations that
they had a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149,
156 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v.
Amirnazmi, 648 F. Supp. 2d 718, 719 (E.D. Pa. 2009), (explaining that a new trial will be granted
“only if a defendant proves[:] (1) that error occurred at trial[;] and (2) that error had a substantial
influence on the verdict” (citation omitted)), aff'd, 645 F.3d 564 (3d Cir. 2011). “[M]otions for a
new trial based on the weight of the evidence are not favored.” United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d

176, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Govt of VI. v Derricks, 810 F.2d 50, 55 Gd Cir. 1987)).

' Defendant was represented by counsel at trial. After trial, Defendant requested to proceed pro se.
(See Text Order, ECF 80.) The Court, accordingly, conducted a Faretta hearing (Faretta Hr’g
Minute Entry, ECF No. 83), before granting Defendant’s request to proceed pro se (id.).

3
Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document 89 _ Filed 08/28/26 Page 4 of 9 PagelD: 1739

Moreover, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motions are “granted sparingly and only in
exceptional cases.” Si/veus, 542 F.3d at 1005 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because: (1) the Summary Charts did not
fairly represent the underlying records “at the decisive point”; and (2) Pohar’s attribution opinion
was specialized-knowledge testimony without the qualification, disclosure, or reliability screening
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require. (Def.’s Moving Br. 13-22.)

A. The Summary Charts were Accurate and Properly Admitted

Defendant first contends that page ten of the Summary Charts had material errors. (Def.’s
Moving Br. 13-14.) Specifically, Defendant argues that the DocuSign signing event related to one
of the loan applications which was attributable to Defendant’s iPhone on page ten of the Summary
Charts and a separate loan-agreement reflected in Exhibit 112-B both bore the exact same time
stamp. (/d.)

As a threshold matter, Defendant’s arguments about the Summary Charts are waived
“because he did not object to the admissibility ... of the evidence” at trial. United States v. Copper,
No, 24-88, 2025 WL 2109348, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2025); United States v. Sharif, No. 23-630,
2024 WL 4202676, at *2 (D.N.J. Sep. 16, 2024) (denying defendant’s hearsay arguments on a
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion where, among other things, defendant “did not raise
any objection to the potential evidence at issue during trial”). Given Defendant’s pro se status,
however, the Court considers his arguments on the merits.

Here, the Court finds that the Summary Charts accurately summarized the relevant
evidence for the jury and that, to the extent there was a mistake on the time stamp, it does not

warrant a new trial. First, the Summary Charts were proper summary evidence. Pursuant to Federal
Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document 89 _ Filed 08/28/26 Page 5 of 9 PagelD: 1740

Rule of Evidence 1006, a party “may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of
voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.”
Cartee-Haring v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., No. 20-1995, 2024 WL 3633684, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 23,
2024) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 1006). “The proponent must make the originals or duplicates
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. And
the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.” Jd. Here, Defendant had an
opportunity to review the Summary Charts and underlying evidence in advance of trial, the
underlying evidence was admitted by stipulation, and the Summary Charts were admitted without
objection. (Gov’t’s Exs. 700, 701; Def.’s Moving Br. 10 (explaining that the Summary Charts were
“admitted without objection’”).)

Second, Pohar specifically testified that he was called to summarize voluminous evidence
efficiently for the jury and explained his review of the records in developing the Summary Charts.
(Trial Tr. 160:4-162:4.) Third, the Court gave clear instructions to the jury regarding the Summary
Charts. (See id. at 419:18-21 (“If the charts and summaries do not correctly reflect the evidence in
the case, you should disregard them and determine the facts from the underlying evidence.”).)

Fourth, the Summary Charts showed that Defendant’s iPhone was connected to the same
IP addresses as captured in the submission of the loan documents. (See generally Summary
Charts.) Moreover, during cross examination of Pohar and in summation, Defense Counsel
challenged the accuracy and significance of the IP addresses and the Summary Charts and
advanced the same arguments Defendant reiterates now in his Motion. (See Trial Tr. 303:2-304:7
(Defense Counsel cross-examining Pohar about the DocuSign timestamp and the EIDL application

submission bearing the same timestamp), 452:12-457:11 (arguing that the Government did not
Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document 89 _ Filed 08/28/26 Page 6 of 9 PagelD: 1741

meet its burden in showing the veracity of the IP address evidence submitted).) The jury disagreed,
and Defendant’s arguments go to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.

Fifth, the Summary Charts were just some of evidence against Defendant that the jury
considered. For example, some of the other facts in evidence connecting Defendant to the
submission of the fraudulent applications include: (1) Defendant’s personal identifying
information listed on the loan applications, including his name, address, phone number, and email
address (Trial Tr. 170:9-22, 181:3-182:14, 237:11-239:19); (2) Defendant’s passport card was
submitted with loan applications (id. at 184:20-185:1, 221:14-22); (3) communications to lenders
were sent from email addresses and phone numbers that Defendant controlled (id at
197:16-201:10; 224:16-227:6; Gov’t’s Exs. 100-A, 100-C, 100-D, 100-H, 100-1, 100-J, 100-K,
100-L); (4) Defendant controlled all of the companies that submitted the fraudulent applications
(Trial Tr. 172:21-173:22); (5) Defendant controlled all of the bank accounts that received the
proceeds from the loan applications (id at 179:13-180:11; 204:13-206:10; 216:18-217:19;
230:7-231:13; 248:7-18); and (6) DocuSign signatures on the applications captured email
addresses subscribed to Defendant (id. at 201:19-202:12; 215:6-216:16; 227:11-228:2),

The Court, accordingly, finds that even if there was an error on page ten of the Summary
Charts, this is not an exceptional case, and the interest of justice does not require a new trial based
on the Summary Charts evidence. The Court, therefore, finds that Defendant is not entitled to a

new trial based on the introduction and use of the Summary Charts at trial.
Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document 89 _ Filed 08/28/26 Page 7 of 9 PagelD: 1742

B. Pohar’s Testimony was not Improper Expert Opinion under Federal Rule? of
Evidence 702

Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Pohar’s testimony was
improper opinion evidence that required special knowledge and was admitted without the
qualifications, disclosure, or reliability screening that the Rules require. (Def.’s Moving Br. 15-22.)
Again, as a threshold matter, Defendant’s arguments about Pohar’s testimony are waived “because
he did not object to the admissibility . . . of [Pohar’s testimony]” at trial. Copper, 2025 WL
2109348, at *9; Sharif, 2024 WL 4202676, at *2 (denying defendant’s hearsay arguments where,
among other things, defendant “did not raise any objection to the potential evidence at issue during
trial”). Given Defendant’s pro se status, however, the Court considers his arguments on the merits.

Rule 701 provides that if a witness does not testify as an expert, opinion testimony must
be: “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. The Third Circuit
has explained that it “will not reverse a district court’s decision to admit lay opinion testimony
unless no reasonable person would adopt [its] view” because “the modern trend is away from .
skepticism of lay opinion evidence and toward greater admissibility.” United States v. Brown, 754
F. App’x 86, 88 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation modified).

Here, the Court finds that Pohar’s testimony was proper lay opinion testimony pursuant to
Rule 701. It was rationally based upon his review of the records and his experience conducting
fraud investigations and was helpful to the jury in understanding the evidence. See United States

v, Wadley, No. 19-2931, 2022 WL 1011693, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2022) (affirming district court

* All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document 89 _ Filed 08/28/26 Page 8 of 9 PagelD: 1743

and finding that an FBI special agent’s opinion testimony regarding summary charts of drug weight
calculations was “not the exclusive . . . province of an expert”); United States v. Georgiou, 777
F.3d 125, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that lay witness testimony, which included “comparisons
of stock quantities and prices” and “provided factual information and summaries of voluminous
trading records that [the witness] had personally reviewed,” did not “require prohibited scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge” (citation modified)); United States v. Bush, 741 F.
App’x 110, 119 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that agent had personal knowledge to provide testimony
under Rule 701 due to, among other things, his review of the evidence); see also United States v.
Sponaugle, No. 22-2851, 2024 WL 4144069, at *4 (3d Cir. Sep. 11, 2024) (“{W]hen a lay witness
has particularized knowledge by virtue of her experience, she may testify—even if the subject
matter is specialized or technical—because the testimony is based upon the layperson’s personal
knowledge rather than on specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” (quoting United
States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 301 Gd Cir. 2016))), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1456 (2025).

Defendant’s argument that Pohar’s testimony fell outside of Rule 701’s ambit because he
was assigned to the case two months before trial specifically as a summary witness is also
unavailing. (See Def.’s Moving Br. 10, 16, 21.) Pohar testified that he personally reviewed the
evidence. (Trial Tr. 160:6-161:3, 269:7-8, 359:6-361:8.) Lay opinion testimony, moreover, “may
incorporate reports or documents prepared by others where the witness still possessfes] the
requisite personal knowledge or foundation to render his lay opinion admissible under [Rule 701].”
United States v. Holovacko, No. 16-349, 2017 WL 3184175, at *3 (D.N.J. July 26, 2017) (internal
quotations and citation omitted), aff'd, 781 F. App’x 100, 103 (d Cir. 2019).

Defendant’s argument that Pohar reached the ultimate conclusion when he testified that

Defendant’s “iPhone was used because they were connected at the same time” also fails because
Case 3:24-cr-00432-MAS Document 89 _ Filed 08/28/26 Page 9 of 9 PagelD: 1744

that testimony was elicited by Defense Counsel on cross-examination. (Def.’s Moving Br. 10, 21;
Trial Tr. 287:4-288:24); see Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 144 (holding that the “District Court also did
not abuse its discretion in allowing [the summary witness’s] remaining testimony on re-direct
because [defense] counsel first elicited [the] opinion on cross-examination”’).

The Court, accordingly, finds that Pohar’s testimony was proper lay witness testimony
pursuant to Rule 701, this is not an exceptional case, and the interest of justice does not require a
new trial based on such testimony.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion. An Order consistent

with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.

United States District Judge

th
DATED: August 28, 2026


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