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Opinion — No. 3:15-cr-30023 (Dkt. 51, C.D. Ill.)

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An Opinion, with a number 51 and E-FILED stamp of July 6, 2020 in the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division (Case 3:15-cr-30023-SEM-TSH), United States v. Christopher Jones, by U.S. District Judge Sue E. Myerscough. The defendant pleaded guilty on June 1, 2016 to possession with intent to distribute heroin and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and was sentenced to a combined 150 months, now served at FCI Milan. He moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) citing his health issues and the COVID-19 pandemic, and the government opposed on exhaustion and merits grounds. The court finds he has not established extraordinary and compelling reasons and denies the pro se and amended motions, without prejudice to a later motion.

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“Opinion — No. 3:15-cr-30023 (Dkt. 51, C.D. Ill.).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/opinion-no-3-15-cr-30023-dkt-51-c-d-ill-518e67a999/, SHA-256 21c6b8468dfc90f7b82e02eed6e5b3c6c2e5dd4d85ef140dafae6c02435fb008.

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     3:15-cr-30023-SEM-TSH # 51   Page 1 of 7                                E-FILED
                                                    Monday, 06 July, 2020 10:07:48 AM
                                                        Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

           IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
           FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
                   SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               )
                                        )
                Plaintiff,              )
                                        )
     v.                                 ) Case No. 15-cr-30023
                                        )
CHRISTOPHER JONES,                      )
                                        )
                Defendant.              )

                                OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

     Before the Court is Defendant Christopher Jones’ Amended

Motion for Compassionate Release (d/e 48) requesting a reduction

in his term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

                             I. BACKGROUND

     On June 1, 2016, Defendant Christopher Jones pled guilty to

Count 2 of the Indictment for possession with intent to distribute

heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and Count

3 for carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). On September 30, 2016,

Defendant Jones was sentenced to a combined 150 months’


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imprisonment, consisting of 90 months on Count 2 and 60 months

on Count 3 to run consecutively to Count 2, and a 6-year term of

supervised released. Defendant is currently serving his sentence at

FCI Milan and has a projected release date of November 26, 2025.

     On May 29, 2020, Defendant filed a pro se motion for

compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See

d/e 45. On June 11, 2020, following the appointment of counsel to

represent Defendant, an Amended Motion for Compassionate

Release was filed. See d/e 48. Defendant seeks compassionate

release due to his health issues and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Defendant states that he submitted a request to BOP for

compassionate release, thus satisfying the exhaustion requirement

of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Even if his request does not satisfy the

exhaustion requirement, Defendant argues that the Court should

waive the exhaustion requirement.

     On June 15, 2020, the Government filed a response opposing

Defendant’s motion. See d/e 49. The Government argues that the

Court lacks the authority to grant Defendant’s motion because

Defendant has not exhausted his administrative rights with the

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) or waited 30 days from the time a request


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     3:15-cr-30023-SEM-TSH # 51   Page 3 of 7




to BOP regarding a motion for compassionate release was made.

The Government contends that FCI Milan does not have record of

Defendant filing for a request for a reduction in sentence with the

warden at FCI Milan. The Government also argues that Defendant

has not established extraordinary and compelling reasons to

warrant a reduction.

                            II. ANALYSIS

     As a general matter, the Court is statutorily prohibited from

modifying a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed. See

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, several statutory exceptions exist,

one of which allows the Court to grant a defendant compassionate

release if certain requirements are met. See 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(1)(A).

     Section 603(b)(1) of the First Step Act amended the statutory

language at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See First Step Act of 2018,

Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat 5194. Prior to the First Step Act, the

Court could grant a defendant compassionate release only if the

Director of the BOP filed a motion seeking that relief. With the

enactment of the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) now

allows an inmate to file with the Court a motion for compassionate


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release, but only after exhausting administrative review of a BOP

denial of the inmate’s request for BOP to file a motion or waiting 30

days from when the inmate made his or her request, whichever is

earlier. The statute now provides as follows:

     The court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of
     Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the
     defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to
     appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a
     motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days
     from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the
     defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the
     term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of
     probation or supervised release with or without
     conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of
     the original term of imprisonment), after considering the
     factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they
     are applicable, if it finds that—

     (i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
     reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent
     with applicable policy statements issued by the
     Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

     The Court finds that § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not require the Court

to wait to consider a compassionate release request if there is a

credible claim of serious and imminent harm from this pandemic.

That does not mean the Court will waive the exhaustion

requirements in all cases. The decision must be made on a case-



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by-case basis. In this case, Defendant Jones alleges that he

submitted a request to BOP for compassionate release but was not

let out and remains in custody. See Amended Motion, d/e 48, p. 5.

However, the Government disputes this as BOP alleges it has no

record of receiving said request. See Response, d/e 49. It is

possible that the request may have been lost or BOP has simply not

reviewed the request due to the constraints and limitations created

by the pandemic. Regardless, the Court excuses the requirement to

exhaust Defendant’s administrative remedies or meet the 30 days

requirement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

     Having considered the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a), the Court concludes that Defendant has not established

that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction in

his term of imprisonment. The spread of COVID-19 has presented

extraordinary and unprecedented challenges for the country and

poses a serious issue for prisons. Due to the infectious nature of

the virus, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and

state governments have advised individuals to practice good hygiene

and social distancing and isolation. Social distancing can be

difficult for individuals living or working in a prison.


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     3:15-cr-30023-SEM-TSH # 51   Page 6 of 7




     Defendant is a 26-year-old African American male. Defendant

argues that he suffers from asthma and is obese, which places him

at higher risk of serious illness or death if he contracts COVID-19.

See Amended Motion, d/e 48. However, Defendant’s asthma

appears to be controlled.

     The COVID-19 pandemic does not warrant the release of every

federal prisoner with medical concerns. While the Court is

sympathetic to Defendant’s health conditions, he has not shown

that he would be at a higher risk at FCI Milan than he would be if

released. As of July 6, 2020, there are 11 inmates and 1 staff

member with active confirmed cases of COVID-19 at FCI Milan. See

COVID-19 Cases, Federal Bureau of Prisons,

https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last accessed July 6, 2020).

FCI Milan has 1,323 total inmates. See FCI Milan, Federal Bureau

of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/mil/ (last

accessed July 5, 2020).

     The Court must reconsider the factors in § 3553(a). Since

being incarcerated, Defendant has been disciplined twice for rule

violations. See Response, d/e 49, p. 14. On December 6, 2018, he

was sanctioned for fighting with another person. Id. On May 31,


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2019, he was sanctioned for being absent from assignment. Id.

Based on the history and characteristics of Defendant, the Court

finds that reconsideration of the factors in § 3553(a) concludes that

Defendant is not entitled to compassionate release.

     The Court, taking all the relevant facts into account, finds that

Defendant has not established the existence of extraordinary and

compelling reasons that warrant a reduction in his term of

imprisonment.

                          III. CONCLUSION

     For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Jones’ pro se

motion (d/e 45) and amended motion for compassionate release

(d/e 48) are DENIED. This ruling does not preclude Defendant

from filing another motion for compassionate release in the future if

circumstances change. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of

this Opinion to FCI Milan.

ENTER: July 6, 2020.

                                  s/ Sue E. Myerscough
                                  SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
                                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE




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