Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Suppress — No. 4:21-cr-00066 (Dkt. 201, S.D. Tex.)

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Opinion and order of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas by Judge Charles Eskridge, United States v. LaDonna Wiggins, case 4:21-cr-00066, Document 201, entered August 18, 2023, denying a motion to suppress. Wiggins is charged with six counts of wire fraud under 18 USC § 1343 and five counts of money laundering under 18 USC § 1957, relating to Paycheck Protection Program loan applications for The Concession Stand, Wiggins & Graham Enterprise LLC and Pink Lady Line and later transfers of the funds. Her motion (Dkt 164) sought to suppress evidence seized under a search warrant at her home, including bank documents, laptops, an iPad and a video camera. After a suppression hearing on May 16, 2023, the court makes findings of fact and denies the motion.

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“Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Suppress — No. 4:21-cr-00066 (Dkt. 201, S.D. Tex.).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/opinion-and-order-denying-motion-to-suppress-no-4-21-cr-00066-dkt-201-ed0799228a/, SHA-256 67cad548a96391e0d213762f92a1583323f20e00aca45f4cf2326710a333562d.

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Case 4:21-cr-00066 Document 201 Filed on 08/18/23 in TXSD Page 1 of 13
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
August 18, 2023
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF § CRIMINAL ACTION NO
AMERICA, § 4:21-CR-00066
§
§
vs. § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
§
§
LADONNA WIGGINS, §
Defendant. §

OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Defendant LaDonna Wiggins is charged by the United
States with six counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 USC
§ 1343 and five counts of money laundering in violation of
18 USC § 1957. The charges relate to applications for
Paycheck Protection Program loans for The Concession
Stand, Wiggins & Graham Enterprise LLC, and Pink Lady
Line, along with later transfers of the disbursed funds.
Dkt 68 at 6–8.
Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at
Wiggins’ home and seized such evidence as bank
documents, laptops, an iPad, and a video camera. See
Dkts 164-1, 164-2 & 164-3. Pending is a motion by Wiggins
to suppress “any and all evidence obtained through, or
derived from, the execution of” that warrant. Dkt 164.
The motion is denied.
1. Findings of fact
A suppression hearing was held on May 16, 2023, with
testimony heard from one witness. Dkt 191. The parties
submitted briefing and supporting documents in advance.
See Dkts 164, 181 & 184. Unless stated otherwise, the
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following facts are found to be credible and true based upon
the testimony and evidence.
The evidence reviewed includes the application for a
search warrant and the attached affidavit for Wiggins’
residence at 17918 Bandera Ridge Lane, Cypress, Texas
77433. Also reviewed are an inventory of all items seized,
information regarding the subject home, and photographs
of the home taken during the search. See Dkts 181-2
(application for search warrant and attached affidavit),
164-1 (warrant and attachments) & 164-3 (inventory of all
items seized).
The warrant application and supporting affidavit were
approved on February 8, 2021, with the search following
the next day. Dkt 181-2 at 22, 37–38; see also Dkt 164-1.
Photographs of the home depict a single-family multi-
bedroom residence with one front door and a driveway
leading to a garage. Inside the home, a foyer opens up into
a living room, with a single staircase leading upstairs to a
second floor. Government Exhibits 4–6.
Agents executing the warrant first met Wiggins’ son at
the front door. He claimed that no one else was home. But
Wiggins’ cousin, Coadie Barnett Jr, and his girlfriend were
found asleep in a bedroom during a protective sweep of the
second floor. Barnett and his girlfriend were taken outside
and put in hand restraints until the completion of the
protective sweep and then permitted to leave. Dkt 164-2
at 1–2 (attached to briefing, not offered into evidence).
Wiggins returned to the residence during the search,
and law enforcement walked through the house with her.
Ibid. Evidence was seized from three bedrooms, an office,
the kitchen, a vehicle, and a front room. No evidence was
seized from the bedroom where Barnett and his girlfriend
were found. Dkt 164-3.
The warrant affidavit asserted that there was probable
cause to believe that Wiggins had engaged in a conspiracy
to facilitate a criminal enterprise, with evidence of the
violations at her residence. Dkt 181-2 at ¶ 49. Certain
areas of the home, and access to and control of them, are

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pertinent to the present inquiry. The warrant described the
property as “a 5,255 square foot white two-story brick
structure” with “five bedrooms and 4.5 bathrooms.” It
further specified that “the search is to include the confines
of property, to include outbuildings, rooms, attics, storage
areas including safes and all other parts therein,” as well
as vehicles. Photographs of the home were also included.
Dkt 164-1 at 2–3. The affidavit also specifically noted that
“several people share the PREMISES as a residence” and
disclosed the possibility that “the PREMISES will contain
storage media that are predominately used, and perhaps
owned, by persons who are not suspected of a crime.”
Dkt 181-2 at ¶ 40.
Barnett testified as a witness for the defense. Dkt 191.
He testified that he has lived at Wiggins’ home since 2020.
He explained that he has an informal, oral rental
agreement for an upstairs bedroom under which he pays
$450 per month in cash. He neither pays for separate
utilities nor reimburses Wiggins based on his own usage.
Upon inquiry, Barnett testified that Wiggins could ask him
to leave at any time. He also confirmed that there is only
one doorbell to the home, with no separate entrance or door
for his use. Instead, he has his own key to enter the home,
and he goes through the common area downstairs to get to
his bedroom upstairs.
Photographs of Barnett’s room show a bed, a
nightstand and dresser, and a small walk-in closet.
Defense Exhibits 2.1–2.5. Upon inquiry, Barnett stated
that he didn’t purchase the furniture or bedding for his
room. He further testified that no one is allowed to enter
the room without his permission, but also specified that his
room has no separate key and only locks from the inside.
He also stated that, for the TV in his room, he has a Roku
streaming account for which he pays monthly under his
own name.
Barnett additionally testified that he (i) shares a
bathroom with Wiggins’ daughter; (ii) has no appliances or
method of cooking in his room and so shares the kitchen
and laundry room with other family members living there;

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and (iii) takes his trash to a main (not separate) trash bin
and receives mail at the home (not his own) mailbox.
Upon inquiry, Barnett testified that nothing from his
room was seized, nor was anything of his seized elsewhere.
He also confirmed that he didn’t tell law enforcement he
was a tenant, that Wiggins was his landlord, or that the
room where he was found was his rental unit. He explained
that he only discussed with the officers his familial
relationship with Wiggins and his occupation, and he
answered inquiries about certain items in his closet.
No testimony or evidence otherwise establishes that
anyone informed the officers that the second-floor bedroom
where Barnett and his girlfriend were found was a rented
room. Likewise, none of the reports from the officers make
reference to Barnett being a tenant of Wiggins. See
Dkt 164-2 (attached to briefing, not offered into evidence).
2. Legal standard
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
This textually “contains no provision expressly
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands.” United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906 (1984).
But the Supreme Court long ago established the
exclusionary rule, which provides that “evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a
criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search
and seizure.” United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 347
(1974), citing Weeks v United States, 232 US 383 (1914),
and Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961). This “operates as ‘a

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judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.’” Leon, 468 US at 906, quoting Calandra,
414 US at 348. And “evidence obtained by state officers
during a search which, if conducted by federal officers,
would have violated the defendant's immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment is inadmissible over the defendant's timely
objection in a federal criminal trial.” Elkins v United
States, 364 US 206, 223 (1960).
A defendant seeking to suppress seized evidence
generally “has the burden of proving, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the evidence in question was obtained
in violation of her constitutional rights.” United States v
Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F3d 428, 432 (5th Cir 2001). But if
“the government searches or seizes a defendant without a
warrant, the government bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the search or seizure
was constitutional.” Ibid.
3. Analysis
Wiggins argues that the evidence should be suppressed
because the search warrant failed to specify that one of the
bedrooms was a separate rental unit, thus invalidating the
warrant. She alternatively argues that the search was
unreasonable because it exceeded the scope of the warrant.
Dkt 164 at 12–14.
The Government disagrees on both points. It also
contends that Wiggins lacks standing to complain about
any search related to Barnett’s room—from which no
evidence was seized, regardless. Dkt 181.
The standing issue will be addressed first and is
dispositive. For completeness of review on any later appeal,
the contentions on the merits will also be addressed.
a. Standing
The Supreme Court long ago observed, “Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some
other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously

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asserted.” Alderman v United States, 394 US 165, 174
(1969). The Fifth Circuit thus holds that, to justify
suppression of evidence, the defendant “must show not only
that the police committed an unreasonable search or
seizure, but also that the search or seizure infringed a
Fourth Amendment interest of the defendant himself.”
United States v Beaudion, 979 F3d 1092, 1097 (5th Cir
2020), quoting Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 140 (1978)
(cleaned up). In other words, the defendant “must show
that ‘his own Fourth Amendment rights [were] infringed
by the search [or] seizure which he seeks to challenge.’”
Ibid, quoting Byrd v United States, 138 S Ct 1518, 1526
(2018) (emphasis original).
A defendant can establish the requisite personalized
interest in two ways. One objects to “the physical intrusion
of a constitutionally protected area in which he has a
property interest,” and the other objects to “government
action that violates a reasonable expectation of privacy . . .
in the place searched.” Ibid (citations and quotation marks
removed). The inquiry is specific as to both defendant and
place under either approach, meaning that “it requires that
a particular defendant (the suppression movant) have a
property or privacy interest in a particular place (the area
searched).” Ibid (emphasis original).
Wiggins argues that the warrant failed to specify the
rental unit and lacked a separate search warrant for the
rented room. Dkt 164 at 12. The Government responds that
she lacks standing to raise such contention, arguing that
“it would be Barnett’s (and potentially his girlfriend’s)
Fourth Amendment rights that were violated, not
Wiggins.” Dkt 181 at 2, 5. Wiggins replies that she has a
property interest in the rental unit because she is the “sole
owner of the residence,” and so she can challenge the
search under the Fourth Amendment. Dkt 184 at 5.
Wiggins doesn’t assert that she personally had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental unit. The
dispute thus boils down to whether Wiggins, as landlord,
had a property interest in the rental-unit bedroom. Prior
decisions where landlords asserted Fourth Amendment

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challenges demonstrate that she lacks standing to
challenge the search of the subject bedroom.
For example, the Fifth Circuit confronted such an
assertion by a landlord in Enclave Arlington Associates Ltd
Partnership v City of Arlington, Texas, 401 Fed Appx 936
(5th Cir 2010). The case concerned residents who lived at
an apartment complex next to the Dallas Cowboys football
stadium. They began to experience significant delays
during events at the stadium because they had to place a
“hang tag” in their car and speak to a police officer in order
to enter and exit the complex. The partnership that owned
the complex sued the city, arguing that the city had
engaged in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment due to this denial of access to and from the
complex during events. Id at 937. The Fifth Circuit held
that the landlord didn’t have standing to assert a Fourth
Amendment claim on behalf of the tenants because the
potentially infringed rights were the personal rights of the
tenants, not the landlord. Id at 938–939.
Likewise, “it has long been settled that a landlord’s
mere ownership interest does not create a privacy interest
in property he rents out to others.” Shaw v City of Fostoria,
2009 WL 3682330, *1 (ND Ohio), citing Chapman v United
States, 365 S Ct 610 (1961). True, Wiggins owns the entire
home. But she leases and gives rights to the upstairs
bedroom to Barnett. No evidence suggests that Barnett and
Wiggins entered into a lease that specified Wiggins
maintained any possessory interest in the room at the time
of the warrant’s execution. On this record, it is Barnett who
had “the exclusive right of possession” pertinent to the
suppression inquiry. United States v Colby, 2007 WL
9718271 at * 4 (WD Tex), citing State National Bank of El
Paso v United States, 509 F2d 832, 835 (5th Cir 1975).
A number of district court decisions are in accord with
holding that Wiggins lacks a sufficient property interest
that would allow her to assert Fourth Amendment claims
based on the search of a leased-out room. For example, see
Dearmore v City of Garland, 400 F Supp 2d 894, 899–900
(ND Tex 2005) (finding lack of Fourth Amendment

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standing regarding commercial property because “property
owner has no expectation of privacy if the property is
leased”); Colby, 2007 WL 9718271, *3–4 (landlord who
owned duplex found to lack standing despite possessory
interest in apartments as owner, concluding that “common-
law property rights do not necessarily translate into
protected privacy rights”); Smith v Lanier, 779 F Supp 2d
79, 89–90 (DDC 2011), affirmed, 726 F3d 166 (DC Cir 2013)
(owner of entire single-family residence who rented out
apartments within lacked standing to assert Fourth
Amendment violation as to search of one apartment).
The motion by Wiggins to suppress the evidence seized
from her residence will be denied for lack of standing to
complain about any search related to Barnett’s room. He is
instead the only person who could bring a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the search of his rental unit. And
any such argument by him would be nonsensical where the
record establishes that nothing of his was seized—either
from in his room or anywhere else in the home.
b. Reasonableness
The challenge by Wiggins would fail on the merits even
assuming that she had standing.
i. Specificity of warrant
The express terms of the Fourth Amendment dictate
that a proper warrant is one “particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” The Fifth Circuit observes that this “demands that
the place to be searched and the items to be seized be
described with sufficient particularity so as to leave
‘nothing . . . to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant.’” United States v Allen, 625 F3d 830, 835 (5th Cir
2010). This doesn’t mean that a warrant can’t be broad
enough to include an entire house, but rather, that the
house must be particularly described. For as the Fifth
Circuit explains, “Reasonable specificity is required, not
‘elaborate detail.’” United States v Triplett, 684 F3d 500,
504 (5th Cir 2012); cf Groh v Ramirez, 540 US 551, 558
(2004) (warrant found lacking where stating “that the

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items consisted of a ‘single dwelling residence . . . blue in
color’”).
The subject warrant and its attachments specified
Wiggins’ home by address, along with description of its
appearance, photographs, and details that “the search is to
include the confines of the property, to include
outbuildings, rooms, attics, storage areas including safes
and all other parts therein.” Dkt 164-1 at 3. It then further
described and listed the items to be seized over six pages.
Id at 4–10. Simply put, detail in the warrant was
abundant, and no officer was left with unbounded
discretion.
Wiggins focuses on the fact that the warrant didn’t
specify that one of the bedrooms of the residence was a
separate rental unit. She asserts that courts have “held
that where a residence contains separate rental units, the
warrant must specify the unit(s) to be searched.” Dkt 164
at 12. For this proposition, she cites United States v
Cannon, 264 F3d 875 (9th Cir 2001), and United States v
Greathouse, 297 F Supp 2d 1264 (D Or 2003). Properly
understood, neither case supports her contention.
Cannon involved a warrant that authorized the search
of a “single family dwelling.” There were two structures
within the fence that surrounded the house, but the agent
believed the rear building to be a garage when applying for
the warrant. It turned out that the garage had been
converted into a self-contained unit twenty years prior and
had three separate entrances. When the officers entered
that building, they realized it was a place where someone
lived due to the presence of appliances and its own
bathroom. 264 F3d at 878. On these facts, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that it was a separate dwelling for which a
separate warrant was required. Id at 879.
Far from stating a blanket rule regarding warrants
that happen to address what turns out to be multiple units
in a single residence or property, Cannon stands simply for
the proposition that if there are indicia that a building
apart from the main house is a separate residence, a
separate search warrant is needed. And so, for example,

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even in that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a storage
room in the rear building did not require a separate search
warrant because it fell within the curtilage of the house—
thus being included within the scope of the warrant. Ibid.
Greathouse involved a warrant to search a residence
within which several unrelated persons lived together. One
of the residents advised the officers upon arrival that the
defendant was a renter and lived in the back bedroom on
the first floor. On that bedroom door, the defendant had a
sign stating, “Do Not Enter.” The court concluded that the
defendant had taken steps to preserve the area as private
and that his expectation of privacy was reasonable. This
meant that once the officers learned the above information,
they “should have known there were separate residences
within the house and should have stopped and obtained a
second warrant for the defendant’s bedroom.” 297 F Supp
2d at 1273–75. But again, far from stating any blanket rule
with respect to warrants, Greathouse stands only for the
proposition that when officers learn that a renter lives
within a particular room, they should get a separate
warrant.
At the suppression hearing, Wiggins argued that the
officers—either when obtaining the warrant or executing
it—should have known that Barnett was renting a room
from Wiggins. But she failed to adduce any evidence
showing any indicia by which surveilling or executing
officers could have come to the realization that there was a
separate residence or rental unit within the larger home.
No public records establish this living arrangement.
Nothing about its entrance, mail, trash, kitchen,
bathrooms, common areas, living arrangements, utilities,
or any other aspect suggested separateness of units within.
And importantly, no one—neither Barnett, nor his
girlfriend, nor Wiggins’ son, nor even Wiggins herself—
informed the officers that Barnett was a tenant or that his
room was a separate rental unit.
The precepts of neither Cannon nor Greathouse
required a separate warrant here. To the contrary, the
Government cites a number of cases clearly establishing

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that there was no such need. See Dkt 181 at 8–10, citing,
among others, United States v Ferreras, 192 F3d 5, 10–11
(1st Cir 1999) (specifying relevant factors pertinent to
openness of access and indications of separateness or
independent living); United States v Hoston, 2016 WL
4147642 at *8 (EDNC) (applying similar factors); United
States v Kyles, 40 F3d 519, 524 (2d Cir 1994) (bedroom in
multi-occupant residence isn’t separate residential unit
where not having own doorbell, mailbox, or independent
outside access).
The warrant stated abundant detail supporting a
search of the entire house. It was appropriately specific
under the circumstances.
ii. Scope of search
The Fourth Amendment requires that if “the scope of
the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly
issued warrant . . . the subsequent seizure is unconstitu-
tional without more.” Horton v California, 496 US 128, 140
(1990). “As a general rule only items described in a search
warrant may be seized.” Creamer v Porter, 754 F2d 1311,
1318 (5th Cir 1985).
Wiggins contends that the search was unreasonable
because it exceeded the scope of the warrant due to the
search of Barnett’s rental unit. Dkt 164 at 13. To the
contrary, the search hewed closely to the warrant. It
specifically authorized the search of the “confines of the
property,” including “outbuildings, rooms, attics, storage
area including safes and all other parts therein.” Dkt 164-1
at 3. It also authorized the seizure of “evidence,
instrumentalities, and records” relating to suspected
violations by Wiggins, such as bank records,
memorandums, debit and credit access devices, cell phones,
computers, hard disc drives, thumb drives and electronic
copies of wire transfers. Id at 4–8.
No greater specificity was required. And the scope of
the search was in express compliance with the warrant.
Indeed, the described type of items are exactly what were
seized. See Defense Exhibit 3. It is thus notable that

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Wiggins doesn’t even object that any particular piece of
evidence was seized outside the scope of the warrant.
The search and the seizure were both reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
c. Good faith
The Government contends in the alternative that even
if the search was somehow unconstitutional, the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule would overcome any
need for suppression. See Dkt 181 at 12. This, too, is
correct.
The Fifth Circuit holds the good-faith exception to
pertain where “the official action was pursued in complete
good faith” because “the deterrence rationale loses much of
its force.” United States v Pope, 467 F3d 912, 916 (5th Cir
2006) (cleaned up). This confines inquiry “to the objectively
ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained
officer would have known that the search was illegal
despite the magistrate’s authorization.” Ibid. Suppression
will be granted only “in those unusual cases in which
exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary
rule.” Ibid.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized four situations that
might indicate the presence of bad faith and call for
application of the exclusionary rule, even with a warrant:
o The magistrate or judge issuing the warrant
was misled by information known by the
affiant to be false or made in reckless disregard
of the truth;
o The magistrate or judge issuing the warrant
wholly abandoned the judicial role;
o The supporting affidavit was so lacking any
indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence unreasonable; and
o The warrant is so facially deficient—for
example, utterly failing to particularize places
to search and items to seize—that the
executing officers couldn’t reasonably presume
it valid.

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United States v Ganzer, 922 F3d 579, 588 (5th Cir 2019).
None of these are remotely applicable here. The
Supreme Court mandates that constitutionality of a search
is judged in this respect “in light of the information
available to [the officers] at the time they acted.” Maryland
v Garrison, 480 US 79, 85 (1987) (upholding search of
second apartment believed in good faith to be covered by
warrant). Nothing here indicates that any of the involved
officers knew that Barnett’s room was a separate rental
unit, or that anyone on premises even advised them of this
fact—including Barnett himself. Instead, all indications
are that they believed in good faith that the warrant
allowably covered the search of the entire home.
There wasn’t a problem with the specificity of the
warrant or the execution of the search. But even assuming
there were, the good-faith exception to the warrant
requirement would require denial of the suppression
motion by Wiggins.
4. Conclusion
Defendant LaDonna Wiggins lacks standing to bring a
Fourth Amendment claim for the search of Barnett’s rental
unit. But even if she had standing, the warrant was
appropriately specific, the search was reasonable, and the
good-faith exception would pertain regardless.
The motion to suppress the evidence seized at the
Bandera Ridge Lane home is DENIED. Dkt 164.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on August 18, 2023, at Houston, Texas.

__________________________
Hon. Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge

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