Opinion and Order Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Granting Request for Evidentiary Hearing (Ecf Nos. 114, 117) — No. 2:23-cr-20296 (Dkt. 127, E.D. Mich.)
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An opinion and order by Judge Jonathan J.C. Grey denying in part defendant Christina Anasi's motion to withdraw her guilty plea and granting her request for an evidentiary hearing (ECF Nos. 114, 117), filed August 21, 2026 as ECF No. 127 in United States v. Anasi, Case No. 23-cr-20296-3, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (20 pages). Anasi moved on June 19, 2026 to withdraw a plea entered on August 20, 2024 in a case arising from Paycheck Protection Program loan applications. The court denies the motion to the extent it argues ineffective assistance of counsel based on Padilla, grants an evidentiary hearing on another defense issue, and sets the hearing for November 16, 2026 at 1:00 p.m., with materials due by September 21, 2026.
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“Opinion and Order Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Granting Request for Evidentiary Hearing (Ecf Nos. 114, 117) — No. 2:23-cr-20296 (Dkt. 127, E.D. Mich.).”
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Case 2:23-cr-20296-JJCG-APP ECF No. 127, PageID.1165 Filed 08/21/26 Page 1 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 23-cr-20296-3
v.
Hon. Jonathan J.C. Grey
CHRISTINA ANASI,
Defendant.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND GRANTING
REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING (ECF Nos. 114, 117)
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 19, 2026, Defendant Christina Anasi, a noncitizen, moved
to withdraw her guilty plea entered on August 20, 2024. 1 (ECF Nos. 114,
117.) Moreover, Anasi requests, “to the extent the Court finds it
necessary to rule on this motion, that the Court conduct an evidentiary
hearing to resolve factual disputes raised herein.” (ECF No. 117,
PageID.989.) The motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 119, 125.)
1 ECF No. 117 is the sealed version of the motion. This opinion cites to ECF No. 117,
but simply refers to “the motion” throughout the order.
Case 2:23-cr-20296-JJCG-APP ECF No. 127, PageID.1166 Filed 08/21/26 Page 2 of 20
On August 5, 2026, the Court held a hearing on the motion. For the
reasons below, the Court GRANTS Anasi’s request for an evidentiary
hearing to resolve factual disputes raised on the motion and DENIES IN
PART her motion to withdraw guilty plea.
II. BACKGROUND
On June 1, 2023, Anasi was arrested and appeared on a criminal
complaint charging her with conspiracy to commit an offense against the
United States; conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud;
substantive wire fraud; substantive bank fraud; money laundering; and
false statements in connection with a bank loan. (ECF No. 1.) The charges
arose out of allegedly fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”)
loan applications. (ECF No. 117, PageID.994.) Anasi claims that her role
in the conspiracy was minimal relative to her co-defendants, Samer
Kammo and Rita Shaba, and “[i]f anything, her involvement was
limited to sending emails, verifying information, and preparing
documents at the direction of others.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) On
August 26, 2025, both of Anasi’s co-defendants entered guilty pleas before
this Court, and both have been sentenced. Sentencing in Anasi’s case has
not yet occurred.
2
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Anasi contends the following. On March 22, 2024, AUSA Andrew
Yahkind sent a formal Rule 11 plea offer to her prior defense counsel
Efstathios “Steve” T. Kiousis. (See ECF No. 117-1, PageID.1027.) The
offer called for Anasi to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit
wire fraud and bank fraud and acknowledged a loss of $1.5 million to $3.5
million and an enhancement for sophisticated means. (Id.) The
government anticipated a guideline range of 37 to 46 months’
imprisonment
. (Id.) The AUSA warned that if Ms. Anasi
proceeded to trial and was convicted, her guideline range could be 102 to
127 months, with a 24-month mandatory minimum for aggravated
identity theft. (Id.)
Anasi contends that Kiousis’ “advice was centered around a single
objective: securing Ms. Anasi’s guilty plea as quickly as possible,
” (ECF No. 117, PageID.995.)
Anasi alleges that Kiousis repeatedly told her that she had “no choice”
and “no options” but to plead guilty, that she would “go down for 20 years
3
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or more” if she went to trial,
. (Id.) She maintains that at no
point during his representation did Kiousis tell her that her conviction
renders her mandatorily deportable with no discretionary relief
available—he only told her that she may be deported. (Id. at PageID.990,
995.) She alleges he also failed to review any discovery materials with
her. (Id.) As such, she did not know what evidence the government
possessed against her, her possible defenses, e, or available alternative
courses of action . (Id. at PageID.995–996.) Put simply, she argues that
her guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily.
On December 1, 2025, Anasi’s new attorney, Wade Fink, appeared
in this matter, substituting Kiousis. (ECF No. 69.) The parties stipulated
to adjourn Anasi’s sentencing from January 7, 2026 to April 16, 2026 so
that Fink could “review and analyze any potential motions to be filed
and/or to prepare for sentencing.” (ECF No. 81, PageID.505.) Finally, on
June 19, 2026, Anasi filed her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. (ECF
No. 114.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) provides that “[a]
defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty” before sentencing if she “can
show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” “[T]he aim of
th[is] rule is to allow a hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and
confused mind to be undone, not to allow a defendant ‘to make a tactical
decision to enter a plea, wait several weeks, and then obtain a
withdrawal if he believes that he made a bad choice in pleading guilty.’”
United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (citation omitted).
B. Evidentiary Hearing
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court “must hold an
evidentiary hearing” when the movant presents “a factual narrative . . .
that is neither contradicted by the record nor inherently incredible.” Pola
v. United States, 778 F.3d 525, 532–533 (6th Cir. 2015). Moreover,
“[w]hen the decision . . . turns on credibility issues, then ‘resolution on
the basis of affidavits can rarely be conclusive.’” Id. at 535.
IV. ANALYSIS
Anasi bases her “fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal” on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. She argues
5
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that Kiousis’ performance was deficient because he: (1) failed to advise
Anasi that a plea will result in deportation (the “Padilla issue”); and (2)
failed to review discovery with Anasi, discuss possible defenses, analyze
strengths and weaknesses of the evidence, or attempt to negotiate a more
favorable resolution (the “defense issue”). The Court takes each in turn.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Padilla Issue
i. Strickland Prong One: Deficient Performance
Anasi first argues that she received constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky and Strickland v.
Washington. A defendant arguing ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and
(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). To demonstrate deficiency, Anasi “must show that [her] attorney's
performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” O’Neal
v. Bagley, 743 F.3d 1010, 1019 (6th Cir. 2013). To demonstrate prejudice,
Anasi must show “a reasonable probability” that “but for such conduct
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Williams v.
Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 800 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, the Supreme Court
6
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in Padilla held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims “can extend
to an attorney’s sufficiently poor advice regarding the immigration
consequences of criminal pleas.” Maiyo v. United States, 576 F. App’x 567,
570 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010)).
In Padilla v. Kentucky, a noncitizen faced deportation after
pleading guilty to drug-distribution charges. 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010).
The noncitizen filed a motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that his
attorney was ineffective because “not only [did he] fail[] to advise him of
th[e] consequence [of deportation] prior to his entering the plea, but also
told him that he did not have to worry about immigration status since he
had been in the country so long.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The noncitizen alleged that he would have insisted on
going to trial if he had not received incorrect advice from his attorney. Id.
The Supreme Court in Padilla only addressed the first Strickland
prong (i.e., constitutional deficiency) and held that “[w]hen the law is not
succinct and straightforward . . . , a criminal defense attorney need do no
more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Id. at 369. “But when
the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty
7
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to give correct advice is equally clear.” Id.
Anasi maintains that because the relevant immigration statute is
unambiguous and mandates Anasi’s deportation,2 Kiousis’ warning that
Anasi may be deportable is constitutionally deficient. The Court
disagrees and finds that Kiousis satisfied the standard under Padilla.
While Anasi argues that Padilla requires counsel to “deliver an
affirmative warning that the plea will result in deportation” when the
immigration statute is “succinct, clear, and explicit” (ECF No. 117,
PageID.1003 (emphasis added)), the Supreme Court in Padilla was not
so unequivocal. In context, the Court stressed that “the terms of the
relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining
the removal consequence for [the noncitizen’s] conviction[,]” but
“[i]nstead, [the noncitizen’s] counsel provided him false assurance that
his conviction would not result in removal from this country.” Id. at 368.
2 Specifically, Anasi states the following:
Conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349,
where the loss exceeds $10,000, is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). The stipulated loss is $1.5 to $3.5 million. See ECF
No. 40 at PageID.242. Thus, deportation is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). No form of discretionary relief is available. 8 U.S.C. §§
1229b(a)(3), 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1229c(b)(1)(C).
(ECF No. 117, PageID.1004.)
8
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“This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of
[the noncitizen’s] plea could easily be determined from reading the
removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his
counsel’s advice was incorrect.” Id. at 368–369.
The facts here differ significantly from Padilla. Kiousis advised
Anasi of potential deportation and never gave patently incorrect or false
assurances. In an unpublished case with similar facts, the Sixth Circuit
held that the advice provided by the noncitizen’s attorney was not
deficient and satisfied Padilla. In Maiyo v. United States, the noncitizen’s
attorney informed him that deportation was only a “possibility” following
his guilty plea. 576 F. App’x 567, 568–569 (6th Cir. 2014). The noncitizen
alleged an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, contending that the
crime to which he pleaded guilty was a deportable defense such that his
deportation was not merely a “possibility” but much more certain. Id.
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit in Maiyo held that the noncitizen’s
attorney did not provide ineffective assistance because “[n]othing his
attorney said or did not say ran afoul of the requirement of Padilla that
an attorney advise a client ‘whether his plea carries a risk of
deportation’”—both the attorney and the colloquy demonstrates that the
9
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noncitizen “‘was on notice that ‘his plea carrie[d] a risk of deportation.’”
Id. at 570 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374). See also Thauberger v.
United States, No. 3:14-CR-00111-GNS-CHL, 2019 WL 5692653, at *4
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2019) (citing Maiyo in an aggravated felony prosecution
and holding that “as long as counsel advises the client that pleading
guilty carries a risk of deportation, not that deportation is ‘assured,’
counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient.”). So too here. 3
Anasi argues that the Court cannot rely heavily on Maiyo because
it is unpublished and predates Lee v. Unites States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017).
However, Lee did not address the question of deficiency because the
government conceded that the noncitizen’s counsel had performed
deficiently. 582 U.S. at 364. The only issue Lee addressed was whether
the noncitizen was prejudiced by the attorney’s erroneous advice. Id.
Anasi also argues that in Maiyo, unlike here, there is a curative
statement because the district court told the defendant at his plea
colloquy that his conviction “will subject you to deportation from the
3 The government spends a portion of their brief explaining other avenues for
immigration relief Anasi may qualify for to support their argument that Kiousis’
advice was accurate. (See ECF No. 119, PageID.1064–1066.) Anasi responds that
these avenues for relief fail. (ECF No. 125, PageID.1142–1143.) Because the Court
finds that Kiousis satisfied the Padilla standard regardless, as discussed above, the
Court need not and does not address this argument.
10
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United States.” 576 F. App’x at 570. However, Anasi places too much
weight on this statement because the district court immediately
backtracked after receiving further information that the noncitizen may
qualify for other avenues for relief and asked, “do you understand that
deportation is a possibility in your case[?]” Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Anasi did not satisfy the first
Strickland prong, and her ineffective assistance of counsel claim based
on Padilla fails.
ii. Strickland Prong Two: Prejudice
Even if Kiousis’ conduct was constitutionally deficient, Anasi fails
to show that the deficient performance prejudiced her. Anasi correctly
notes that under Strickland, she must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, she would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial—or, alternatively, that
she would have bargained for a plea to a non-removable offense. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Rodriguez-Penton v. United States, 905 F.3d
481, 488 (6th Cir. 2018). While Anasi argues that both pathways support
a finding of prejudice, the government contends otherwise.
Regarding the first inquiry—whether there is a reasonable
11
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probability that, but for Kiousis’ deficient performance, she would have
insisted on going to trial—Anasi must demonstrate that going to trial
“‘would have been rational’” under the circumstances of her case, which
is an objective inquiry. United States v. Singh, 95 F.4th 1028, 1033 (6th
Cir. 2024) (quoting Lee, 582 U.S. at 370). Next, Anasi “must point to
evidence contemporaneous with [her] plea showing it’s reasonably likely
[s]he would have taken that route.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Lee,
582 U.S. at 369). “Only in ‘unusual circumstances’ will a defendant who
conceded guilt at the plea stage be able to meet this ‘high bar.’” Id. at
1033–1034 (quoting Lee, 582 U.S. at 368–369).
In analyzing the prejudice prong, Singh is instructive. In Singh, the
Sixth Circuit held that the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim fails because he could not demonstrate a reasonable probability
that, but for his counsel’s advice, he would have proceeded to trial. Id. at
1034. There, the defendant did not cite any evidence contemporaneous
with his plea to support his assertions that he was “greatly concerned”
about his citizenship. Id. Further, “the contemporaneous evidence cut[]
against” the defendant where:
In the written plea agreement, [the defendant] stated his
decision to plead guilty was in ‘no way conditioned upon or
12
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affected by the advice he has been given regarding any
potential immigration consequences’ . . . [and] confirmed: his
decision to plead was ‘wholly independent of the immigration
consequences of a conviction.’ . . . And when the district court
told [the defendant] the plea could affect his citizenship, [the
defendant] expressed no reservations, twice confirmed that he
understood, and pled guilty anyway. Cf. Lee, 582 U.S. at 369.
Id. “In the face of this evidence, [the defendant] can’t demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s advice, he would have
proceeded to trial.” Id.
Similarly, the contemporaneous evidence here cuts against Anasi.
As the government notes, Anasi specifically “underst[ood] that . . . her
conviction . . . may require her to be removed from the United States” and
nevertheless “affirm[ed] that [she] chooses to plead guilty regardless of
any immigration or other consequences from her conviction.” (ECF No.
40, PageID.240–241.) Moreover, at the plea hearing, the government’s
counsel expanded on the court’s warning that there might be immigration
consequences to Anasi and specifically noted that she is “not a U.S.
citizen” and he “[w]ant[ed] the record to be clear that she may very well
be removed. She may be denied citizenship in the future and she may be
denied admission into the United States in the future.” (ECF No. 90,
PageID.640.) After these warnings, Anasi pleaded guilty. Under these
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circumstances, the Court finds that Anasi failed to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for Kiousis’ advice, she would have
proceeded to trial.
Anasi also argues that Kiousis prejudiced her in another way: but
for his advice, she would have bargained for a plea to a non-removable
offense. See Rodriguez-Penton, 905 F.3d at 488; see also Singh, 95 F.4th
at 1034. “Under our precedent, defendants can show prejudice by
establishing that, but for counsel’s advice, it’s reasonably probable they
would’ve rejected the government’s plea offer and successfully negotiated
a better one.” Singh, 95 F.4th at 1034 (citations omitted). “But this too is
a difficult standard to meet. At a minimum, a defendant must show,
based on contemporaneous evidence, that it’s reasonably probable he
would’ve rejected the plea offer, the government would’ve offered a better
one, he would’ve accepted that offer, and the trial court would’ve
approved the deal.” Id. (citations omitted). Defendants can also
demonstrate prejudice by “‘identifying cases indicating a willingness by
the government to permit defendants charged with the same or a
substantially similar crime to plead guilty to a non-removable offense.’”
Rodriguez-Penton, 905 F.3d at 488 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-
14
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Vega, 797 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 2015)).
Anasi does not point to any facts that show she could have
negotiated a better plea deal. She argues, instead, that “she would have
given the government an ultimatum: try me or give me a deal that won’t
result in removal.” (ECF No. 117, PageID.1009–1010.) However, there is
no indication or contemporaneous evidence that the government would
have offered or agreed to a better deal, or that a better deal was offered
in similar cases—this is entirely conclusory. (Id.) In fact, Kiousis stated
that “it is unlikely to get the amount down under $10,000 given the
amounts at issue in this case,” and Anasi does not rebut that point. (Id.;
see also ECF No. 119, PageID.1070–1071.) Nor does Anasi identify any
plea agreements to non-removable offenses that were reached by other
defendants charged with a similar crime. See Rodriguez-Penton, 905 F.3d
at 488. For these reasons, the Court finds that Anasi is not entitled to
withdraw her guilty plea on the Padilla issue.
iii. Evidentiary Hearing
The Court further finds that an evidentiary hearing is not
warranted on the Padilla issue because the Court makes its finding on
the undisputed record before it, as presented by Anasi, and the decision
15
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does not turn on credibility issues.
2. Defense Issue
Additionally, Anasi identifies a second deficiency in Kiousis’
performance: that Kiousis did not: (1) review any discovery with Anasi,
(2) discuss possible defenses, (3) analyze strengths and weaknesses of the
evidence and whether it was strong enough to warrant the plea, (4)
discuss whether it was worth proceeding to trial, or (5) attempt to
negotiate a more favorable resolution. (ECF No. 117, PageID.1005.) She
argues that her guilty plea could not be a “voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action” if she has not been
informed what those courses of action are or what their consequences will
be. (Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).) The
government fails to address this argument in its response brief.
On the record before it, the Court cannot determine whether
Kiousis’ performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard on
this second alleged deficiency or whether Anasi was prejudiced.
Moreover, any ruling on the defense issue turns on credibility. Thus, the
Court orders an evidentiary hearing as to the defense issue.4
4 Anasi also argues that the Bashara factors, set out in United States v. Bashara, 27
F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1994), independently establish a fair and just reason for
16
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B. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
The course also finds that the communications between Anasi and
Kiousis are waived to the extent necessary to litigate her ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
“The attorney-client privilege protects certain communications
between an attorney and client from disclosure without the client’s
permission.” United States v. Ketzner, No. 20-20346, 2023 WL 174943, at
*1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 12, 2023). It “applies at all stages of all actions, cases,
and proceedings.” In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 452 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 1101(c)). But “attorney-client privilege
cannot be used as a sword and a shield at the same time.” United States
v. Lossia, No. 04-80422, 2008 WL 192274, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2008)
(Pepe, M.J.) (citing In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987); Clark
v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)).
A movant who raises an ineffective-assistance claim, or otherwise
raises issues regarding their counsel’s performance, impliedly waives the
attorney-client privilege. In re Lott, 424 F.3d at 452–453. “The privilege
is waived to the extent necessary to litigate [the movant’s] ineffective
withdrawal. The Court refrains from addressing this argument until after the
evidentiary hearing.
17
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assistance of counsel claims.” Lossia, 2008 WL 192274, at *1.
Anasi’s communication with Kiousis is the central issue in her
motion. She claims that he: never reviewed discovery with her;
repeatedly told her she had no choice but to plead guilty;
; and failed to convey the
significance of the plea hearing itself. (ECF No. 117, PageID.990.) “As
litigation of [Anasi’s] claims necessarily requires examination of
protected communications, [s]he must waive the attorney-client
privilege.” Lossia, 2008 WL 192274, at *1 (citation omitted). Moreover,
the government cannot properly address Anasi’s claims without
obtaining relevant communications. Id. The Court therefore finds that
Anasi has implicitly waived attorney-client privilege by asserting
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in her motion, and Anasi did not
object at the motion hearing.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES IN PART AND
GRANTS IN PART Anasi’s motion to withdraw guilty plea and for
evidentiary hearing. (ECF Nos. 114, 117.)
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court DENIES Anasi’s
motion to the extent it argues ineffective assistance of counsel based on
Padilla.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court GRANTS Anasi’s
request for an evidentiary hearing related to the defense issue above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the government is permitted to
obtain relevant communications between Anasi and Kiousis related to
her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the defense issue, but
only to the extent necessary to litigate those claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Anasi is permitted to obtain
relevant communications between Kiousis and the government
pertaining to plea negotiations.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall produce
relevant materials on or before September 21, 2026.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the evidentiary hearing shall
take place on November 16, 2026 at 1:00 p.m.
SO ORDERED.
Date: August 21, 2026 s/Jonathan J.C. Grey
Jonathan J.C. Grey
United States District Judge
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Certificate of Service
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF
System to their respective email or First-Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on August 21, 2026.
s/ S. Osorio
Sandra Osorio
Case Manager
20
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