OIG-CA-22-004: Semiannual Report to Congress, April 1, 2021 – September 30, 2021 (Department of the Treasury)
Summary
The Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress for April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021 (OIG-CA-22-004). It states that the Office of Audit issued 17 products and that Office of Investigations work resulted in 19 indictments and 19 convictions in the period. The OIG lists lessons learned from overseeing the $150 billion Coronavirus Relief Fund for American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 programs, and reports that seven of its agents are assigned part-time to the PRAC Fraud Task Force on Paycheck Protection Program cases. Acting Inspector General Richard Delmar reported six challenges facing the Department, including COVID-19 pandemic relief. As of September 30, 2021, the OIG had 205 full-time staff.
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“OIG-CA-22-004: Semiannual Report to Congress, April 1, 2021 – September 30, 2021 (Department of the Treasury).”
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Semiannual Report to Congress
April 1, 2021 – September 30, 2021
OIG-CA-22-004
Office of Inspector General
Department of the Treasury
Highlights
During this semiannual reporting period, the Office of Audit issued 17 products. Work by
the Office of Investigations resulted in 19 indictments and 19 convictions. Some of our
more significant results for the period are described below:
• We identified the following lessons learned from monitoring and overseeing the
$150 billion Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) for Treasury’s consideration in
implementing and administering American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 programs:
(1) the need for clear and timely guidance, (2) the need for agreements with terms
and conditions, (3) balancing data reporting & transparency and recipient burden,
(4) conducting outreach, and (5) the need for performance measures.
• We issued updates to the CRF Prime Recipient Quarterly GrantSolutions Submissions
Monitoring and Review Procedures Guide pertaining to CRF reporting.
• Seven of our Office of Investigations agents are assigned to the Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee (PRAC) Fraud Task Force on a part-time basis through a
memorandum of understanding with the PRAC. The agents are assigned to the
Paycheck Protection Program cases while continuing to work their existing caseload.
• Our joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security
Investigations, and U.S. Postal Inspection Service revealed that five subjects
conspired to defraud several financial institutions in a scheme using fraudulent debit
card returns resulting in an initial estimated loss of $1.1 million to those institutions.
The U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced the
subjects to 13 months in prison, 13 years of probation, and $1.2 million in criminal
restitution.
• Our joint investigation with the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector
General, the Federal Protective Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
and the Office of Professional Responsibility determined that two subjects stole
iPhones that had been seized by CBP. The subjects were sentenced by the USAO,
District of New Jersey to 82 months of probation and $225,872 in restitution.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 i
Message from the Acting Inspector General
As we approach the 2-year mark of the declaration of the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic, the challenges facing the Department of the Treasury (Treasury
or the Department) continue to rise, making our oversight more important than ever.
Treasury is responsible for leading and implementing economic relief and recovery
programs to address the economic challenges precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic,
and we are auditing multiple aspects of Treasury’s response to the pandemic.
We also continue to work closely with the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and its Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
to ensure transparency and accountability of COVID-19 spending, as well as Diversity,
Equity, and Inclusion (DE&I) in the Department’s programs and operations.
The Treasury OIG team’s conduct of rigorous and valuable oversight of Treasury’s
programs and operations, while carrying out its greatly increased responsibilities in a
fully remote work environment, is particularly impressive. This organization has met
every challenge it has encountered, served as a responsible steward of the public’s
funds, and improved Treasury’s performance of its missions.
Richard K. Delmar
Acting Inspector General
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 ii
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Contents
Highlights .......................................................................................... i
Message from the Acting Inspector General ......................................... ii
Treasury Office of Inspector General Overview ..................................... 1
Management and Performance Challenges ............................................ 5
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products ......................... 7
CARES Act Compliance Monitoring and Oversight........................................................7
Manufacturing .........................................................................................................9
Financial Management ............................................................................................ 10
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations ............................. 13
CARES Act Investigations ....................................................................................... 13
Other Significant Investigations................................................................................ 13
Treasury OIG Accomplishments and Activities .................................... 19
Statistical Summary......................................................................... 21
Summary of Treasury OIG Activities ......................................................................... 21
Metrics Used for Office of Investigations Activities ....................................................21
Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations ........................................................22
Closed Investigations of Senior Government Employees Not Publicly Disclosed .............44
Summary of Instances of Whistleblower Retaliation ...................................................46
Summary of Attempts to Interfere With Treasury OIG Independence, Including Instances
Where Information or Assistance Request was Refused ..............................................46
Listing of Audit Products Issued ............................................................................... 47
Audit Reports Issued With Questioned Costs ............................................................. 49
Audit Reports Issued With Recommendations that Funds Be Put to Better Use ..............50
Reports for Which No Management Comment was Returned Within 60 Days ................51
Reports Issued Over 6 Months for Which No Management Decision Has Been Made......51
Significant Revised Management Decisions ............................................................... 51
Significant Disagreed Management Decisions ............................................................ 51
Peer Reviews ......................................................................................................... 52
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 iv
Contents
Other Reporting Requirements and Requests ...................................... 53
References to the Inspector General Act ............................................ 55
Abbreviations.................................................................................. 57
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 v
Treasury Office of Inspector General Overview
The Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury or the Department) Office of Inspector
General (OIG) was established pursuant to the 1988 amendments to the Inspector
General Act of 1978. Treasury OIG is headed by an Inspector General appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Treasury OIG performs independent, objective reviews of Treasury programs and
operations, except for those of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP), and certain pandemic-related loans, loan guarantees, and other
investments, and keeps the Secretary of the Treasury and Congress fully informed of
problems, deficiencies, and the need for corrective actions. The Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) and the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) perform oversight related to the IRS. A Special Inspector General and GAO
perform oversight related to TARP. The Special Inspector General for Pandemic
Recovery and GAO perform oversight of loans, loan guarantees, and other investments
under the Coronavirus Economic Stabilization Act of 2020.
Treasury OIG also performs independent oversight of programs and operations funded
by the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund (Trust Fund) established within Treasury by
the Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived
Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act of 2012 (RESTORE Act). In addition to
performing oversight of Treasury-related activities, Treasury OIG performs oversight of
programs and operations administered by the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration
Council (Council), established as an independent Federal entity, and the Gulf Coast
Ecosystem Restoration Science, Observation, Monitoring, and Technology Program
(Science Program) administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA). With regard to the Council and the Science Program, Treasury
OIG keeps the appointed Chairperson of the Council, the NOAA Science Program
Administrator, and Congress fully informed of problems, deficiencies, and the need for
corrective actions.
Treasury OIG has four components: (1) Office of Audit; (2) Office of Investigations;
(3) Office of Counsel; and (4) Office of Management. Treasury OIG is headquartered in
Washington, DC. Treasury OIG also has an audit office in Boston, Massachusetts.
The Office of Audit, under the leadership of the Assistant Inspector General for Audit,
performs and supervises financial and performance audits, attestation engagements,
and evaluations. The Assistant Inspector General for Audit also serves as the Special
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 1
Treasury Office of Inspector General Overview
Deputy Inspector General for Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) Program Oversight.
Under the Assistant Inspector General for Audit, there are three deputies. The first
deputy is primarily responsible for financial sector audits to include audits of banking
supervision, manufacturing of currency and coins, resource management,
procurement, alcohol and tobacco excise tax revenue collection activities, SBLF
programs, and the State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) authorized by the
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARP). The second deputy is primarily responsible
for financial management and transparency audits to include financial audits of
Treasury and the Council performed by Treasury OIG staff and contractors; audits of
Government-wide collection, payment, and debt programs and operations; audits of
anti-money laundering/terrorist financing, foreign sanctions, and intelligence programs
and operations; and audits of Emergency Rental Assistance (ERA) and Homeowners
Assistance Fund (HAF) programs authorized by the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2021 (CAA, 2021) and ARP. The third deputy is primarily responsible for
cybersecurity and financial assistance audits to include audits of Treasury and the
Council information systems performed by Treasury OIG staff and contractors;
RESTORE Act programs and operations; the Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) and the Air
Carrier Worker Support programs authorized by the CARES Act (as amended); the
Emergency Capital Investment Program and the Community Development Financial
Institutions Rapid Response Program authorized by the CAA, 2021; and the new State
and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds authorized by ARP.
The Office of Investigations, under the leadership of the Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations, performs investigations and conducts initiatives to detect and
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in programs and operations within Treasury OIG’s
jurisdictional boundaries, and investigates threats against Treasury personnel and
assets in designated circumstances as authorized by the Inspector General Act. The
Office of Investigations also manages the Treasury OIG Hotline to facilitate reporting
of allegations involving these programs and operations.
The Office of Counsel, under the leadership of the Counsel to the Inspector General,
provides legal advice to the Inspector General and all Treasury OIG components. The
office represents Treasury OIG in administrative legal proceedings and provides a
variety of legal services, including (1) processing Freedom of Information Act and
Giglio 1 requests; (2) conducting ethics training; (3) ensuring compliance with financial
disclosure requirements; (4) reviewing proposed legislation and regulations;
(5) reviewing administrative subpoena requests; and (6) preparing for the Inspector
1
Giglio information refers to material that may call into question the character or testimony of a
prosecution witness in a criminal trial.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 2
Treasury Office of Inspector General Overview
General’s signature, cease and desist letters and monetary assessments against
persons and entities misusing the Treasury seal and name. The Office of Counsel also
responds to media and Congressional inquiries and serves as the Whistleblower
Protection Coordinator for Treasury.
The Office of Management, under the leadership of the Assistant Inspector General for
Management, provides administrative services to maintain the Treasury OIG
administrative infrastructure, including facilities, human resources, information
technology, procurement, records management, and security.
Treasury OIG’s fiscal year 2021 appropriation was $41 million, which included up to
$2.8 million of 2-year funding for the RESTORE Act programs. Treasury OIG’s
oversight of SSBCI and SBLF programs was funded on a reimbursable basis. In
addition to the annual fiscal year appropriation, Treasury OIG received additional multi-
year and no-year funding for oversight of pandemic relief programs, which included
$35 million for CRF, $9.5 million for ERA, and $2.6 million for HAF programs. As of
September 30, 2021, Treasury OIG had 205 full-time staff.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 3
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Management and Performance Challenges
The Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 requires that the Department of the Treasury
(Treasury or the Department) Inspector General annually provide information on the
most serious management and performance challenges facing Treasury and the Gulf
Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council (Council). The following is a synopsis of our
annual assessments which are available, in their entirety, on the Treasury Office of
Inspector General (OIG) website.
Treasury
In an October 14, 2021, memorandum to Secretary of the Treasury,
Janet Yellen, Acting Inspector General Richard Delmar reported the following six
challenges facing the Department, of which one was new.
• Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic Relief
• Transition of New Administration (new)
• Cyber Threats
• Anti-Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing and Bank Secrecy Act
Enforcement
• Efforts to Promote Spending Transparency and To Prevent and Detect
Improper Payments
• Information Technology Acquisition and Project Management
Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council
In an October 8, 2021, letter to the Honorable Michael Regan, Administrator of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, as Chairperson of the Council, we
reported three challenges, all of which are repeat challenges.
• Loss of Key Leadership Over Administration of Gulf Coast Restoration
Activities
• Federal Statutory and Regulatory Compliance
• Grant and Interagency Agreement Compliance Monitoring
.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 5
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Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
CARES Act Compliance Monitoring and Oversight
Title VI of the Social Security Act, as amended by Title V of the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), established the Coronavirus Relief
Fund (CRF) for Treasury to make $150 billion in payments to each of the 50 States,
qualifying units of local government, the District of Columbia, U.S. Territories, and
Tribal Governments for necessary expenditures due to the public health emergency
with respect to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, extended the covered period for recipients of CRF payments
to use funds between March 1, 2020 and December 31, 2021. The CARES Act
assigned the Department of the Treasury (Treasury or the Department) Office of
Inspector General (OIG) with responsibility for monitoring and oversight of the receipt,
disbursement, and use of CRF proceeds. 2 To carry out our monitoring responsibilities,
we developed a portal via GrantSolutions, a grants management system under
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, for CRF recipients to report
expenditure data on a quarterly basis. To date, CRF data has been collected up to and
through September 30, 2021. This data is displayed on the Pandemic Response and
Accountability Committee’s website (https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/). During
this reporting period, we also issued updates to the CRF Prime Recipient Quarterly
GrantSolutions Submissions Monitoring and Review Procedures Guide pertaining to
CRF reporting. (OIG-CA-20-029R).
Through our CRF monitoring and oversight work, we identified certain lessons learned
with respect to the implementation and administration of the CRF program for
Treasury management’s consideration in implementing American Rescue Plan Act
(ARP) programs.
American Rescue Plan- Application of Lessons Learned From the
Coronavirus Relief Fund
We identified certain lessons learned that included, (1) the need for clear and
timely guidance, (2) the need for agreements with terms and conditions,
(3) balancing data reporting & transparency and recipient burden, (4) conducting
outreach, and (5) the need for performance measures.
2
CRF was established under Title VI of the Social Security Act, as amended by Title V of Division A of
the CARES Act, P.L. 116-136 (March 27, 2020)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 7
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
Accordingly, we recommended that Treasury management (1) finalize guidance
concurrent with funds distribution in order to facilitate efficient administration of
programs and minimize recipient confusion and misuse of funds; (2) document
its analysis of the applicability of grant requirements under 2 CFR [Uniform
Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for
Federal Awards, 2 CFR Part 200] for each ARP program in its implementation
plan as required by Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Memorandum
M-21-20, Promoting Public Trust in the Federal Government through Effective
Implementation of the American Rescue Plan and Stewardship of the Taxpayer
Resources (March 2021); (3) apply the requirements of 2 CFR to Federal
financial assistance funded through the ARP to the maximum extent authorized
by law; (4) require signed agreements documenting standard terms and
conditions before disbursing ARP funds to recipients; (5) conduct and document
an Information Technology investment analysis as required by OMB’s M-21-20,
OMB Circular No. A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource (July
2016) and Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the
Budget (March 2021) before making the decision to implement the grants
Quality Services Management Offices system, 3 GrantSolutions, Salesforce, or
another solution for the execution of ARP programs; (6) develop performance
metrics to measure the effectiveness of ARP program funding in assisting with
pandemic relief goals; and (7) include recipient reporting requirements in written
agreements to facilitate this process and ensure that needed information is
collected quarterly. Management concurred with our recommendations.
(OIG-CA-21-020)
3
OMB’s M-19-16, Centralized Mission Support Capabilities for the Federal Government (April 26,
2019), describes the process and desired outcomes for shared services and establishes a process for
designating agencies as Quality Services Management Offices (QSMO). An agency QSMO offers
solutions that, over time, will standardize processes, reduce the technology footprint, and reduce
Government-wide operating costs. Once an opportunity for centralization or sharing is identified,
OMB will designate a lead agency as the QSMO to take responsibility for establishing and/or
managing such capabilities.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 8
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
Manufacturing
We conduct audits of Treasury’s coin programs. We issued the following report during
this semiannual period.
Survey of Project Management at the United States Mint
In our survey, we found that it was premature to devote resources to conduct
an audit of project management at the United States Mint (Mint) as Treasury
had not yet established any Program Management Improvement Accountability
Act (PMIAA) 4 guidance for its bureaus and policy offices. PMIAA is intended to
improve the quality and effectiveness of program and project management in
Federal agencies. There is a 5-year implementation plan from fiscal years (FY)
2018 through 2022 to fulfill the requirements of PMIAA across Treasury,
including the development of project management guidance that is scheduled
for the first part of FY 2022. After the issuance and implementation of
Treasury-wide PMIAA guidance, we plan to reexamine the Mint’s project
management controls and processes, including compliance with any applicable
PMIAA guidance. (OIG-CA-21-023)
4
P.L.114-264, PMIAA (December 14, 2016)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 9
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
Financial Management
PIIA
An independent certified public accounting firm, RMA Associates (RMA), under a
contract monitored by our office, performed an audit of Treasury’s compliance with
the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) for FY 2020. In its audit, RMA
also assessed Treasury’s compliance with additional improper payment reporting
requirements set forth in Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments and
Eliminating Waste in Federal Programs, OMB Circular No. A-123, Appendix C,
Requirements for Payment Integrity Improvement, and OMB Circular No. A-136,
Financial Reporting Requirements. Our office performed the audit of the Gulf Coast
Ecosystem Restoration Council’s (Council) compliance with PIIA for FY 2020.
Treasury Compliance with PIIA Fiscal Year 2020
RMA reported that Treasury was not in compliance with PIIA for FY 2020 due
to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) not reporting an improper payment rate of
less than 10 percent for three of its programs identified as susceptible to
significant improper payments: the (1) Earned Income Tax Credit, (2) American
Opportunity Tax Credit, and (3) Additional Child Tax Credit programs. RMA also
reported that Treasury complied with 5 of the 6 PIIA requirements: (1) published
an Agency Financial Report, (2) conducted a risk assessment, (3) published an
improper payment estimate, (4) published corrective action plans, and
(5) published and is meeting reduction targets. In addition, RMA noted that the
Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Fiscal Service) was unable to provide sufficient
documentation to support the quantitative risk assessment performed for the
Treasury fund, Fiscal Service – Interest on the Public Debt. RMA also identified
that Fiscal Service and Mint managements’ responses to some risk assessment
questions in several fund group qualitative risk assessments were inaccurate in
determining the payment types’ susceptibility to significant improper payments.
Accordingly, RMA recommended that (1) Treasury’s Risk and Control Group
(RCG) works with Fiscal Service management to revise its controls over the
review and approval process to verify the quantitative risk assessment includes
sufficient supporting documentation to substantiate Fiscal Service's improper
payment amount derived from its non-statistical sampling methodology, and
that (2) RCG works with Fiscal Service and Mint management to provide
evidence of sufficient review and approval on the program-specific risk
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 10
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
assessments indicating management responses to risk assessment questions are
complete and accurate. Management concurred with RMA’s recommendations.
(OIG-21-028)
Gulf Coast Compliance with PIIA Fiscal Year 2020
We determined that the Council was compliant with all of the applicable
requirements of PIIA for FY 2020. Accordingly, we made no recommendations
in this report. (OIG-21-027)
Attestation Engagements
Independent certified public accounting firms, Sagger & Rosenburg, P.C. (S&R) and
KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contracts monitored by our office, completed the reports
described below in support of the audit of Treasury’s FY 2021 Consolidated Financial
Statements and the financial statement audits of certain other Federal agencies.
Reports on the Processing of Transactions by Treasury Enterprise
Business Solutions
S&R examined Treasury Enterprise Business Solutions’ description of controls
for processing user entities’ human resource transactions in its HRConnect
system, and the suitability of the design and effectiveness of these controls for
the period beginning July 1, 2020 and ending June 30, 2021. S&R found, in all
material respects, the controls were fairly presented in the description of
controls for this system, suitably designed, and controls tested operated
effectively throughout the period. (OIG-21-029)
Reports on the Processing of Transactions by Fiscal Service
KPMG examined the accounting and procurement processing and general
computer controls related to financial management services provided to various
Federal agencies by Fiscal Service’s Administrative Resource Center for the
period beginning July 1, 2020 and ending June 30, 2021. KPMG found, in all
material respects, that the controls were fairly presented in the description of
controls for these activities and suitably designed. KPMG also found that
controls tested operated effectively throughout the period. (OIG-21-030)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 11
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act
The following instances of noncompliance with the Federal Financial Management
Improvement Act of 1996 were reported in connection with the audit of Treasury’s FY
2020 Consolidated Financial Statements.
Type of
C o n d it i on n o n c o m p li a n c e
Treasury continues to have deficiencies in IRS financial management systems. Federal financial
Specifically, Treasury did not consistently design, implement, and operate information management system
system controls and security programs over its financial systems in accordance with the requirements
Federal financial management systems requirements. (first reported in FY 1997)
Treasury has deficiencies in Fiscal Service government-wide cash and Federal debt Federal financial
management information systems. Specifically, Fiscal Service did not consistently design, management system
implement, and operate information system controls and security programs over its cash requirements
and Federal debt systems in accordance with the Federal financial management systems
requirements. (new reporting in FY 2018)
The status of these instances of noncompliance, including progress in implementing
remediation plans, will be evaluated as part of the audit of Treasury’s FY 2021
Consolidated Financial Statements.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 12
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations
CARES Act Investigations
Departmental Offices Employee Forwarded Sensitive CARES Act Tribal
Data to Another Agency Without Encryption or Confidential Warnings
Our investigation, which was initiated upon receipt of information from Congress and
the Department of the Interior Office of Inspector General (OIG), revealed that
unencrypted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) tribal
data was emailed, without confidential warnings to another Government agency,
which contributed to a leak of tribal data. Criminal prosecution was presented and
declined by the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the District of Columbia. Our office
provided a report of investigation to Departmental Offices (DO), Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Management, and to the concerned members of Congress.
Other Significant Investigations
Debit Card Fraud Conspirators Prosecuted
Our joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security
Investigations, and U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) revealed that five subjects
conspired to defraud several financial institutions in a scheme using fraudulent debit
card returns resulting in an initial estimated loss of $1.1 million to those institutions.
The USAO for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced the subjects to 13 months in
prison, 13 years of probation, and $1.2 million in criminal restitution.
Subject Sentenced for Theft of Government Funds and Defrauding a
Financial Institution
A final subject in our joint investigation with Internal Revenue Service-Criminal
Investigation (IRS-CI), and USPIS was sentenced to 26 months in prison, 96 months of
probation, restitution of $283,224, a special assessment of $200, and forfeiture of
$60,619. The subject conspired with others and deposited a stolen Department of the
Treasury (Treasury or the Department) check, in the amount of $993,176, into a bank
account opened in the name of a fictitious business with false identification
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 13
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations
documents, and laundered the funds through various other fraudulent business
accounts. The USAO for the District of Maryland prosecuted the case.
Subject Sentenced for Theft of Government Property
Our joint investigation with the Department of Homeland Security OIG, the Federal
Protective Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office of
Professional Responsibility determined that two subjects stole iPhones that had been
seized by CBP. The subjects were sentenced by the USAO, District of New Jersey to
82 months of probation and $225,872 in restitution.
Subject Sentenced for Theft of Thrift Savings Plan Retirement Account
Funds
Our joint investigation with the Anne Arundel County Police Department revealed that
a subject made a fraudulent $121,000 withdrawal from a victim’s Thrift Savings Plan
retirement account and directed it into the subjects’ own bank account. The subject
was sentenced to 10 months in prison, all but 3 months suspended, 60 months of
probation, and $86,800 in restitution. The Office of the State’s Attorney, Anne
Arundel County, Maryland, prosecuted the case.
Honolulu Subject Sentenced for Impersonating a Treasury Agent
Our investigation revealed that an individual participated in an investment fraud
scheme and pretended to be a Treasury agent to build credibility with the scheme’s
victims. The USAO for the District Court of Hawaii sentenced the individual to
60 months of probation, 150 hours of community service, a $100 special assessment,
and $7,000 in criminal fines.
Cyber Assist with Stolen OCC Laptop Recovered During Prince Georges
County Police Department Search Warrant
Our office, at the request of the Prince Georges County Police Department (PGPD),
conducted a forensic examination of a stolen Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) laptop that PGPD recovered during a search warrant. Our office determined that
information on the laptop was not accessed after it was stolen, and subsequently
returned the laptop to PGPD for retention in their criminal investigation. PGPD will
return the laptop to OCC upon completion of their criminal investigation.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 14
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations
Mismanagement of Loans by Bank Officials
Our joint investigation with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve OIGs substantiated an allegation received by OCC
that bank officials used inaccurate record keeping and diverted loan proceeds to pay
other troubled non-performing loans and unrelated parties. Due to the age of the case
and repaid loans, the USAO, Northern District of Illinois declined prosecution.
Allegations of Circumventing Policies and Practices Related to OCC
Redlining Investigations Were Unsubstantiated
Our investigation, initiated upon receipt of information from members of Congress,
that OCC engaged in a pattern of scuttling investigations related to civil rights and
redlining in violation of its statutory responsibility determined that the allegations were
unsubstantiated. Our office provided a response to the concerned members of
Congress.
Allegation of Fraudulent Billing of Hours by Government Contractor Was
Unsubstantiated
Our office initiated an investigation of an anonymous complaint involving the
fraudulent billing of hours by a government contractor. It was alleged that the
contractor’s employees frequently showed up late for work and took long lunches. Our
investigation determined that the contractor’s employees were not full-time
employees, but part-time and were only paid for the hours they worked.
Cease and Desist Letter Issued for Fraudulent Treasury Website
Our office initiated an investigation after being notified of a fraudulent Treasury
website. Our investigation did not conclusively reveal the positive identity of the
subscriber. Criminal prosecution was presented and declined by the USAO for the
District of Maryland. Treasury sent a Cease and Desist letter to the domain registrant
to take down the domain.
Prosecution of Former Departmental Offices Employee for Removing and
Transmitting Classified Information Declined
Our office initiated an investigation after being notified of an allegation that a former
DO employee removed classified documents from a Sensitive Compartmented
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 15
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations
Information Facility without authorization, and emailed the classified documents to an
individual without a need to know or clearance to access the information over an
unsecured means of communication. The alleged disclosure occurred several months
after DO removed the former employee for misconduct. Criminal prosecution of the
former employee was declined by both the USAOs for the District of Columbia and the
Eastern District of Virginia.
Bureau of the Fiscal Service Defended Against Automated Data Mining of
Its Treasury Check Verification System Web Application by Implementing
CAPTCHA
Our office investigated suspicious activities associated with the Bureau of the Fiscal
Service (Fiscal Service) Treasury Check Verification System (TCVS). TCVS is a public
website used to query Treasury check serial numbers and amounts. Our review of
7.5 million TCVS requests over a 3-week time period found that computer scripted
queries appear to have targeted dollar amounts associated with Economic Impact
Payments. The majority of the requests came from non-U.S. Internet Protocol
addresses. Fiscal Service added an additional security feature called CAPTCHA, which
is a computer test to determine whether or not the requestor is a human, effectively
mitigating the automated data mining of TCVS.
Following is information related to significant investigative activities from prior
semiannual periods.
Final Subjects Sentenced for Conspiracy to Defraud the Government and
Aggravated Identity Theft
As reported in a previous semiannual period, our joint investigation with the IRS-CI
determined a subject in Pennsylvania was involved in a fraud scheme to illicitly procure
and negotiate Treasury checks. The subject, who owned two money service
businesses, was linked to approximately $10 million in potential fraud related to stolen
Treasury checks and a stolen identity refund fraud scheme. The subject pled guilty to
Conspiracy to Defraud the Government in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, and forfeited $2 million. Investigative efforts continued and the
remaining three co-conspirators were located and arrested. The three additional
subjects pled guilty to Conspiracy to Defraud the Government with respect to claims
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 16
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations
and aggravated identity theft in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of
Pennsylvania.
Update: The final three subjects were charged by the USAO in the U.S. District Court
of the Middle District of Pennsylvania, with conspiring to defraud Treasury by
producing multiple fraudulent Federal income tax returns using stolen identities and
receiving over $5 million in fraudulent funds. The subjects were sentenced to 16 years
in prison, 9 years of probation, and $5 million in restitution and civil judgments
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 17
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Treasury OIG Accomplishments and Activities
PRAC Fraud Task Force
Earlier this year, the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) stood up a
Fraud Task Force to serve as a resource for the Inspectors General (IG) community by
merging investigative resources into those areas where the need is the greatest,
currently pandemic loan fraud. Agents from Offices of Inspectors General (OIG) across
the Government are detailed to work on Task Force cases. These agents have
partnered with prosecutors at the Department of Justice’s Fraud Section and at United
States Attorneys’ Offices across the country.
The idea behind the PRAC Fraud Task Force is to harness the expertise of the
oversight community and attack this problem with every tool available: criminal, civil,
forfeitures of money and property, suspension and debarments. The Task Force works
closely with other initiatives to combat pandemic fraud such as the Department of
Justice Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Fraud Enforcement Task Force.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury or the Department) OIG has seven agents who
are assigned to the PRAC Fraud Task Force on a part-time basis. The PRAC has
extended its authority to investigate pandemic-related fraud to Treasury OIG through a
memorandum of understanding. The agents are assigned Paycheck Protection Program
cases while continuing to work their existing Treasury OIG caseload. This initiative
allows Treasury OIG to make a broader contribution to the IG community by assisting
with investigations that might otherwise remain unstaffed.
Treasury OIG Leadership Roles
Treasury OIG professionals serve on various important public and private professional
organizations supporting the Federal audit community. Examples of participation in
these organizations follow:
Deborah Harker, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, serves as the Co-Chair of the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Federal Audit
Executive Council’s Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act) Working
Group Governance Committee. Ms. Harker also represents CIGIE on the Chief Financial
Officers Council, Leveraging Data as a Strategic Asset Working Group. In addition,
Ms. Harker represents Treasury OIG on the National Association of State Auditors,
Comptrollers, and Treasurers COVID-19 Accountability Work Group.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 19
Treasury OIG Accomplishments and Activities
Pauletta Battle, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Financial Management and
Transparency Audits, chairs the Federal Audit Executive Council’s DATA Act Working
Group, which educates Inspectors General and Government financial communities on
the DATA Act oversight process. The Working Group consists of approximately 200
members representing at least 48 OIGs.
Donna Joseph, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Cyber and Financial Assistance
Audits, serves as the National Single Audit Coordinator for Treasury, and is a member
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) National
Governmental Accounting and Auditing Update Conference planning committee.
James Hodge, Audit Director, also serves with Ms. Joseph on the AICPA National
Governmental Accounting and Auditing Update Conference planning committee.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 20
Statistical Summary
Summary of Treasury OIG Activities
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
Number or
OIG Activity Dollar Value
Office of Counsel Activities
Regulation and legislation reviews 29
Instances where information was refused 0
Office of Audit Activities
Reports issued and other products 17
Disputed audit recommendations 0
Significant revised management decisions 0
Management decision in which the Inspector General disagrees 0
Monetary benefits (audit)
Questioned costs $0
Funds put to better use $0
Total monetary benefits $0
Office of Investigations Activities*
Criminal and judicial actions (including joint investigations)
Investigative reports issued 164
Cases referred for prosecution and/or litigation 33
Individuals referred for criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice 36
Individuals referred for criminal prosecution to state and local authorities 2
Cases accepted for prosecution and/or litigation 5
Arrests 1
Indictments/informations 19
Convictions (by trial and plea) 19
*During the reporting period defendants were sentenced to 683 months of prison time, 1,272 months
of probation, 7 months suspended, 108 months of home detention, 19 days of community service and
ordered to pay fines, restitution, and court fees in the amount of $5.1 million, and seizures and
forfeitures in the amount of $500,114.
Metrics Used for Office of Investigations Activities
Department of the Treasury (Treasury or the Department) Office of Inspector General
(OIG) investigative statistics listed above were obtained through reports drawn from
Treasury OIG’s Office of Investigations case management system.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 21
Statistical Summary
Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations
Issued prior to April 1, 2021
The following list of Treasury OIG reports with unimplemented recommendations is
based on information in Treasury’s automated audit recommendation tracking system,
which is maintained by Treasury management officials, and recommendations tracked
by other Federal organizations related to Treasury OIG’s oversight of the Resources
and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Operations, and Revived Economies of the Gulf
Coast States Act of 2012 (RESTORE Act) programs and activities of the Gulf Coast
Ecosystem Restoration Council (Council) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Science, Observation, Monitoring,
and Technology Program.
Treasury OIG is reporting 138 open and unimplemented recommendations for 25
reports issued prior to April 1, 2021, with $2,550 in potential monetary benefits.
Treasury OIG considers all unimplemented recommendations for reports issued over
6 months to be significant.
Treasury Programs and Operations
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2016 OIG-16-059 General Management: Treasury Has Policies 09/16
and Procedures to Safeguard Classified
Information but They Are Not Effectively
Implemented
1. The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis should direct the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security to update the Treasury Security
Manual to include procedures requiring the Office of Security Programs to
follow up and obtain all bureau self-inspection reports. Management agreed
with the recommendation.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 22
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2018 OIG-18-018 Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering: OFAC 11/17
Human Resources Practices Need
Improvement
1. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Director should ensure that
legacy employees' current position descriptions are evaluated to ensure that
the documented promotion potential of these non-supervisory employees is
consistent with OFAC's current promotion practices. Management agreed
with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2018 OIG-18-043 Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering: 04/18
OFAC’s Licensing Program Would Benefit
From System Enhancements
1. The Director of OFAC should develop performance measures specific for the
licensing division. Management agreed with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2018 OIG-18-044 Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering: Audit 04/18
of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis’
Authorities and Actions Related to U.S.
Persons’ Financial Information
1. The Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, as
expeditiously as possible, should ensure that the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis’s (OIA) U.S. Persons Procedures are finalized and submitted for
approval to the Attorney General of the United States.
2. Implement a compliance monitoring program to assess whether intelligence
analysts' activities are conducted in accordance with OIA authorities, and
electronic searches and other queries are performed in a manner that fully
protects the rights of U.S. persons. Management agreed with the
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 23
Statistical Summary
recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2019 OIG-19-007 Information Technology: Department of the 10/18
Treasury Federal Information Security
Modernization Act Fiscal Year 2018
Performance Audit
1. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) management
should establish a current enterprise baseline of software and related
configurations for the TIGTA System.
2. Develop and disseminate to TIGTA personnel a TIGTA System Information
System Contingency Plan that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination, and compliance to
facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy and
associated contingency planning controls. TIGTA should conduct disaster
recovery and business continuity testing for the TIGTA System on the
frequency stipulated by a Business Impact Analysis. Management agreed
with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2019 OIG-19-040 DATA Act: Treasury's Efforts to Increase 07/19
Transparency Into Federal Spending Continue,
But Further Refinement is Needed
1. The Fiscal Assistant Secretary should enhance generic disclaimers on
USAspending.gov and expand the use of limitation statements on pages
with known and potential display issues so that the public has a clear
understanding of known limitations when using the data as displayed and
available for download. Management agreed with the recommendation.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 24
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-002 Information Technology: Department of the 10/19
Treasury Federal Information Security
Modernization Act Fiscal Year 2019
Performance Audit for Collateral National
Security Systems (Sensitive but Unclassified)
1. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified. Management agreed
with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-003 Information Technology: Department of the 10/19
Treasury Federal Information Security
Modernization Act Fiscal Year 2019
Performance Audit
1. The Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) management should assess and
remediate vulnerabilities identified during Security Content Automation
Protocol configuration baseline compliance and vulnerability scanning within
the required timeframes specified in the BEP Minimum Standard Parameters.
2. Departmental Offices (DO) management should develop and implement a
process to ensure that periodic user access reviews are completed for DO
System 2, documented, and all unnecessary access is removed in
accordance with National Institute of Standards and Technology Special
Publication 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations (NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 4) and
Treasury Directive Publication 85-01, Department of the Treasury
Information Technology Security Program (TD P 85-01).
3. Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Fiscal Service) management should protect the
confidentiality and integrity of transmissions by encrypting Fiscal Service
System 2 data in transit as required by NIST 800-53, Rev. 4.
4. United States Mint (Mint) management should establish a quality control
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 25
Statistical Summary
process to ensure that user access to Mint System 1 and other Mint
information systems follow the access management process requiring the
completed background investigations, signed non-disclosure agreements,
signed rules of behavior, and completion of the security awareness training.
5. Mint management should clearly document and formally approve
exemptions to the Mint's access authorization process when a business
justification exists. Management agreed with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-007 DATA Act: Treasury Continues to Make 11/19
Progress in Meeting its DATA Act Reporting
Requirements
1. Treasury's Assistant Secretary for Management (ASM), working as needed
with Treasury's Senior Accountable Official, the Senior Procurement
Executive, reporting entities, the Program Management Office, and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should develop and implement a
method and procedures to submit Treasury Forfeiture Fund financial
assistance award data to the Financial Assistance Broker Submission in
accordance with the reporting submission specifications established by the
Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act) Information Model
Schema. Management agreed with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-022 Financial Management: Management Report 12/19
for the Audit of the Department of the
Treasury's Consolidated Financial Statements
for Fiscal Years 2019 and 2018
1. Fiscal Service management should address the mainframe operating system
vulnerabilities noted in the condition as soon as possible.
2. Develop a tailored mainframe operating system security configuration
baseline that specifies how security configuration options are to be set
based on the selected industry guidance.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 26
Statistical Summary
3. Ensure that the chief information security officer assign specific
responsibility for providing controls over operating system security,
including access permissions to all system datasets and all security-related
option settings.
4. Develop and document controls over changes and monitor update access to
all key system datasets.
5. Develop and document controls and baseline documentation of mainframe
operating system options specified in the configuration files.
6. Establish which techniques are to be used to control update access to key
system datasets and to control read access to sensitive system datasets
(such as the security software database and the page files), whether a
third-party tool is to be used, or tailored change control mechanisms, and
develop procedures and documentation to support their use.
7. Develop procedures to provide assurance that programs installed with the
privileges of the operating system (whether purchased from software
vendors or internally developed) do not introduce security weaknesses.
8. Develop, document, and implement policies, procedures, and controls to
conduct periodic reviews of actual mainframe security software settings
against the security baseline.
9. Develop a mainframe security software risk assessment process using the
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical
Implementation Guide (STIG) as a guideline.
10. Develop a tailored mainframe security software configuration baseline that
specifies how security configuration options should be set based on the
industry guidance. As part of this action, management should develop and
document a baseline specifying for each possible setting in the security
software control file how the option should be set and who is responsible
for approving the setting.
11. Use the mainframe security software configuration baseline to harden the
mainframe environment, including the Payment Authorization Manager and
Payments, Claims, and Enhanced Reconciliations production.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 27
Statistical Summary
12. Remove duplicate and excessive permissions in the mainframe security
software database.
13. Perform an annual comparison of each actual setting in the mainframe
security software control file to each setting specified in the baseline to
verify compliance with the baseline.
14. Develop and document procedures for controlling updates to the mainframe
security software control file.
15. Define and document the segregation of functions and privileges based on
the principle of least privilege for mainframe security software and operating
system.
16. Review and establish access permissions to the mainframe system and
security software based on the principle of least privilege access.
17. Review and re-assess each access permission in the mainframe security
software dataset and resource rules on a periodic basis.
18. Develop procedures and documentation to establish the following for each
dataset permission, resource permission, and mainframe security software
privilege: a. Responsibility for approving access and enforcing compliance
with the principle of least privilege; b. Actual access meets the principle of
least privilege; and c. Any discrepancy from approved access will be
identified and corrected.
19. Develop, document, and implement policies, procedures, and controls for
comprehensive logging and monitoring of events. Procedures and controls
should include an annual re-assessment of whether logging and reporting is
adequate.
20. Review and determine which profiles, applications, databases, and other
processes on the mainframe will be logged and reviewed.
21. Assess all mainframe logs to determine which logs should be evaluated by
the incident management tool.
22. Establish appropriate alerts and event thresholds for those mainframe logs
required to be evaluated by the external tracking tool.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 28
Statistical Summary
23. Develop and implement data and analysis tools and processes for identifying
event trends, patterns, spikes, and exceptions.
24. Identify non-security related purposes for logging and monitoring (including
performance tuning, problem management, capacity planning, and
management of service level agreements); assign responsibility for
addressing and integrating them with security uses of logging and
monitoring.
25. Identify the possible sources of log information; determine how each is to
be used for security monitoring; and develop procedures to ensure that each
type of logging which is necessary for effective security monitoring is
activated.
26. Annually assess the effectiveness of security logging and monitoring,
ensuring that the volume of logged events is limited to just those that are
needed for security, and ensuring that monitoring results include effective
identification and response for any violations and for any significant trends
(such as an increase in the number of password resets for a given group of
users or repetition of the same attempted but failed attempt to access a
productions dataset or resource).
27. Identify, document, and assess the mainframe security controls affecting
the system software to fully describe how mainframe security is provided.
These Fiscal Service management controls should include: a. Specific
assignment of responsibility for maintaining operating security, b. Skill
assessment and remediation for operating system security maintenance,
c. Baseline documents for mainframe configuration files, d. Standard
procedures for review and maintenance of operating system security, and
e. Standard procedures to compare actual configuration settings to baseline
documents.
28. Update mainframe documentation to be consistent with Fiscal Service and
TD P 85-01.
29. Develop procedures and documentation to establish who is responsible and
how effective security is achieved for controls.
30. Implement an oversight process to determine that designated Fiscal Service
personnel review and reevaluate privileges associated with the UNIX
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 29
Statistical Summary
production environment semiannually for privileged accounts.
31. Configure the systems-management software agents to include all UNIX
servers, databases, and users' accounts within the UNIX environment when
generating the users' lists for the semiannual review and recertification
process so that all privileged and non-privileged users' access is reviewed.
32. Update UNIX semiannual account review and recertification procedures to
include quality control steps to validate that systems-management software
is generating complete and accurate account listings for all UNIX servers
and databases privileged and non-privileged user accounts within the UNIX
environment prior to completing the review and recertification process.
33. Finalize policies and procedures to review audit logs of production DB2
servers.
34. Implement an oversight process to ensure that designated Fiscal Service
personnel: a. Review the security logs for the UNIX and DB2 servers hosting
the Payment Information Repository (PIR), Judgment Fund Internet Claim
System (JFICS), and Security Payment System (SPS) applications on a
pre-defined frequency, as indicated in the Fiscal Service Baseline Security
Requirements (BLSR). b. Formally document completion of their reviews and
any escalations to the Information System Security Office, and c. Retain the
audit logs and documentation of their reviews for 18 months, as required by
the BLSR.
35. Periodically review Fiscal Service management's implementation and
operation of the review of the security audit logs for the UNIX and DB2
servers hosting the PIR, JFICS, and SPS applications to determine that
Fiscal Service management completes the reviews on a pre-defined basis,
documents completion of the reviews and escalations, and maintains such
documentation.
36. Establish an effective enforcement process or mechanism to ensure that
(a) UNIX and DB2 events and monitoring controls are followed and (b) Fiscal
Service management has confidence it consistently reviews for potential
unauthorized or inappropriate activity.
37. Update its current PIR security procedures to require that management
obtain current PIR developer access requirement listings from the service
provider and use them when validating the appropriateness of PIR developer
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 30
Statistical Summary
access during the semiannual access reviews and recertification of the PIR
and UNIX environments.
38. Maintain the documentation used to review and recertify the access of the
known PIR service provider developers evidencing that their access to the
UNIX environments is commensurate with their job functions and
responsibilities.
39. Ensure that developers do not have the ability to make changes to the PIR
production environment.
40. Remove users' access once validated by the Federal Program Agency (FPA)
during the SPS annual user access review.
41. Retain evidence of recertification of all users.
42. Oversee the recertification process and ensure that access corrections are
processed once received from the FPA.
43. Review and enhance the manual processes and procedures to ensure that
user access to all resources, as defined for Treasury Web Application
Infrastructure (TWAI) users, is accurately and completely identified and
evaluated during the course of the General Support System 1 (GSS1) and
General Support System 2 (GSS2) TWAI User Privilege Recertification
cycles.
44. Complete the GSS1 TWAI User Access Recertification cycle within the time
intervals set by Fiscal Service BLSR requirements.
45. Remove and disable the two users' access immediately.
46. Implement a quality control process to ensure that PIR application accounts
defined to the PIR production environment that have been inactive for over
120 days are disabled.
47. Review and update the Enterprise Information Technology Infrastructure
System Security Plans (SSP), Attachment A-Security Control Matrix, to be
consistent with the Fiscal Service BLSR and the Chief Information Officer
Publication Information System Security Internal Standard Operating
Procedure 8.3.6.60 UNIX/LINUX Account Management.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 31
Statistical Summary
48. Configure the six UNIX servers to enforce the minimum password as stated
in the Fiscal Service BLSR and ensure that the default password
configuration settings for the production UNIX environments comply with
the minimum requirements specified in the BLSR.
49. Develop and implement a quality control process to ensure that PIR
emergency change approvals are consistently obtained, documented, and
retained by the Change Control Board prior to implementing changes into
the PIR production environment.
50. Develop and implement documentation to assign responsibility for ensuring
adequacy of UNIX and database security and baseline settings.
51. Update existing UNIX and database configuration security baseline
documents to ensure that these documents fully incorporate and enforce
the components of the DISA STIG. Management should document any
deviations from the STIG and note compensating controls that mitigate the
security risk to an acceptable level.
52. Develop, document, and implement policies, procedures, and controls to
conduct periodic reviews of actual UNIX and database settings against the
security configuration baselines.
53. Provide logging and monitoring of security related events to include the
retention of evidence of reviews performed.
54. Develop a baseline of essential security settings and specify that baseline as
the standard to be observed.
55. Implement corrective actions to address all vulnerabilities associated with
the baseline enforcement to include removing the three default user
accounts on UNIX servers. Management agreed with the recommendations.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 32
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-023 BILL AND COIN MANUFACTURING: BEP 12/19
Improved Governance and Oversight over
Note Development and Production But
Challenges Remain
1. The Director of the BEP should finalize the required 5 year update of the
memorandum of understanding with the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Board) to formalize BEP and the Board's responsibilities
and authorities related to notes including activities, procedures, and
obligations related to the annual production, destruction, and research and
development of notes. Management agreed with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-027 Resource Management: Audit of the 02/20
Department of the Treasury Departmental
Offices Executive Pay Adjustments, Bonuses,
and Awards
1. The ASM should ensure that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Human Resources and Chief Human Capital Officer (DASHR/CHCO) and
the Office of Executive Resources (OER) develop, implement, and include
effective internal controls within its policies and standard operating
procedures (SOP) to ensure Treasury's Senior Executive Service (SES) basic
pay rates are in compliance with 5 CFR 534.403(a)(3)(b), Suspension of
certification of performance appraisal system and 5 CFR 534.404 (h)(2),
Setting pay upon transfer.
2. DASHR/CHCO and OER calculate the overpayment amounts for the two DO
SES members whose pay was set higher than allowed by regulation.
3. DASHR/CHCO and OER seek recovery of the overpayment amounts or
exercise the authority to waive any claim in accordance with applicable
Federal regulations and Treasury's Directive 34-01, Waiving Claims Against
Treasury Employees for Erroneous Payments.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 33
Statistical Summary
4. DASHR/CHCO and OER complete Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
data calls in accordance with OPM's applicable instructions and guidance to
ensure all required employees, such as those who have left Treasury, are
properly reported.
5. DASHR/CHCO finalizes and approves Treasury's SES Pay and Awards
policy, and then periodically reviews it for continued relevance,
effectiveness, and transparency in making pay decisions and awarding
bonuses, assesses staffing levels, workforce skills, and respective budgets
to determine whether additional personnel should and can plausibly be
incorporated into future strategic planning to ensure OER can meet its goals
and mission.
6. DASHR/CHCO finalizes and approves Treasury's SES Pay and Awards
policy, and then periodically reviews it for continued relevance,
effectiveness, and transparency in making pay decisions and awarding
bonuses.
7. OER documents the processes and SOP, with appropriate detail, followed in
administering Treasury DO SES member performance ratings, pay
adjustments, and bonuses.
8. OER oversees the process regarding exceptions to the 12-month rule.
9. OER includes information regarding the approval process for waiver requests
for exceptions to the 12-month rule in the instructions provided to bureau
heads and DO policy offices. This information should be consistent with
Federal regulations and Treasury's SES Pay and Awards policy.
10. OER submits Treasury's respective data call report to OPM by the due dates
established by 5 CFR 534.405, Performance awards, and before any
established deadlines per OPM's annual data call memorandum.
Management agreed with the recommendations.
Questioned $2,550
Cost
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 34
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-029 Gulf Coast Restoration: Jefferson Parish's 03/20
Internal Control over Federal Awards
1. & 2. The Fiscal Assistant Secretary should ensure that deficiencies identified in
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana's (Jefferson Parish) controls over Federal awards
are considered as part of the Treasury's oversight of future awards as well
as risk assessments of Jefferson Parish as required by the Uniform
Administrative Requirements, Cost Principals, and Audit Requirements for
Federal Awards (2 CFR Part 200) (Uniform Guidance). This recommendation
is counted as two recommendations because it applies to both findings in
the report. Management agreed with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-030 Bill and Coin Manufacturing: The United 03/20
States Mint Numismatic Order Management
System is Meeting User Needs But
Improvements to Oversight are Needed
1. The Mint Director ensures the Numismatic and Bullion Directorate retains
evidence of its monitoring activities outlined in the contract's Quality
Assurance Surveillance Plan to better document the Mint's oversight of the
contractor's compliance with contract requirements.
2. Perform an assessment regarding the impact of not having language
accessibility for Mint's numismatic program services and considers adding
these services to the Mint's Order Management System.
3. Perform analyses to determine the feasibility and potential impact of
proposed actions to improve numismatic sales, perform additional studies to
enhance future sales, and report the results to stakeholders. Management
agreed with the recommendations.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 35
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-036 Interim Audit Update – Coronavirus Relief 05/20
Fund Recipient Reporting
1. Treasury management should support our office in accomplishing our
monitoring and oversight responsibilities in the following ways: (1) assist in
communications with Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) recipients on matters
that include, but are not limited to, communications of reporting and record
keeping requirements and other audit inquiries, as needed; (2) ensure that
Treasury maintains communication channels with recipients to obtain and
address post payment inquiries regarding specific payments; and
(3) continue to update CRF guidance and disseminate to recipients as
needed. Management agreed with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-040 BILL AND COIN MANUFACTURING: Audit of 06/20
Bureau of Engraving and Printing’s
Implementation of Security Features and
Meaningful Access for the Blind and Visually
Impaired into New Note Design
1. The Director of BEP in collaboration, as necessary, with members of the
United States Currency Program:
Continue to improve the Banknote Development Process and Technology
Development Process guidance, including refining procedures to reflect
lessons learned during its Catalyst note series redesign.
2. Ensure the Advanced Counterfeit Deterrence Steering Committee charter is
updated in a timely manner, and as needed, to ensure roles, responsibilities,
and current practices, such as the attendance of Advanced Counterfeit
Deterrence Steering Committee monthly meetings by appropriate personnel,
are clearly defined and communicated to its members. Management agreed
with the recommendations.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 36
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-042 MANUFACTURING AND REVENUE: Mint 08/20
Controls Over Raw Materials and Coin
Exchange Programs Need Improvement
1. The U.S. Mint Director should conduct regular reviews of the suppliers’
quality systems to ensure that the suppliers are acting in the best interest of
the Mint. This includes regular site visits or periodic reviews of the
suppliers’ quality system documentation.
2. Develop and implement SOPs that are consistent among Mint facilities to
ensure quality assurance processes over sampling, inspection, and testing
of materials for circulating coinage are standardized and documented; and
that materials received meet the specifications required in the contracts and
by U.S. law.
3. Consider sampling and testing the material after blanking in order to assess
the material quality throughout the coil.
4. Verify incoming raw material weights to ensure that the Mint is receiving
the raw materials paid for.
5. Strengthen and finalize SOPs for all coin exchange programs before
accepting any redemptions. This would include using tests and subject
matter experts to authenticate the genuineness of coins redeemed, as well
as working with the Board to develop appropriate interagency procedures to
assure the integrity of the coin redemption process for uncurrent coins.
6. Follow all SOPs, including but not limited to, procedures related to
sampling, inspecting, and testing coins; and appropriately document
redemptions. Additionally, ensure that adequate background investigations
are conducted on bulk redeemers and decisions to allow participation into
the Mutilated Coin Redemption Program are based on relevant data from the
background investigation. The Mint should add criteria, such as obtaining
financial statements for analyses of the potential bulk redeemers and
performing site visits at their premises, as part of the background
investigation process for entry into the program. The Mint should document
how this criteria was met, and if these steps were not performed, the
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 37
Statistical Summary
reasons why.
7. Ensure that all coins returned to the Mint and removed from circulation are
destroyed timely and sufficiently accounted for. Management agreed with
the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Report Title Date Issued
Year Number
2021 OIG-21-009 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: 11/20
Department of the Treasury Federal
Information Security Modernization Act
Fiscal Year 2020 Performance Audit
(Sensitive But Unclassified)
1. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
2. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
3. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
4. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified. Management agreed
with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Report Title Date Issued
Year Number
2021 OIG-21-010 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: 11/20
Department of the Treasury Federal
Information Security Modernization Act
Fiscal Year 2020 Performance Audit for
Collateral National Security Systems
(Sensitive But Unclassified)
1. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
2. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
3. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
4. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 38
Statistical Summary
5. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
6. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
7. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
8. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
9. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified. Management agreed
with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Report Title Date Issued
Year Number
2021 OIG-21-012 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: 12/20
Management Letter for the Audit of the
United States Mint's Financial
Statements for Fiscal Years 2020 and
2019
1. Mint management should re-enforce requirements to control performers to
ensure that new or modified user accounts are approved prior to being
enabled and that documentation supporting the approval is retained.
2. Enforce termination and transfer procedures to remove system access of
terminated or transferred employees and contractors in a timely manner
from the network and applications managed by the Mint or by its service
providers.
3. Implement and enforce procedures that include a timeframe requirement for
notifying service providers, such as the Administrative Resource Center, of
terminated or transferred Mint employees and contractors, so that their
access can be removed from applications hosted or managed by the service
organizations in a timely manner. Management agreed with the
recommendations.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 39
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Report Title Date Issued
Year Number
2021 OIG-21-013 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Audit of the 12/20
Office of D.C. Pensions' Financial
Statements for Fiscal Years 2020 and
2019
1. Office of D.C. Pensions management should fully develop existing policies
and procedures to document a process for reviewing, investigating, and
resolving unusual or suspicious activity identified during the audit log
review, as well as maintaining evidence of such review, investigation, and
resolution. Management agreed with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Report Title Date Issued
Year Number
2021 OIG-21-019 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Audit of the 12/20
Department of the Treasury's
Consolidated Financial Statements for
Fiscal Years 2020 and 2019
1. The ASM and Deputy Chief Financial Officer should ensure that Fiscal
Service implement requisite corrective actions to resolve control deficiencies
over its cash management and debt information systems.
2. Ensure that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) implements corrective
actions to resolve its control deficiencies.
3. Ensure that IRS and Fiscal Service develop and implement remediation plans
outlining actions to be taken to resolve noncompliance with the Federal
financial management system requirements and the resources and
responsible organizational units for such planned actions. Management
agreed with the recommendations.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 40
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Report Title Date Issued
Year Number
2021 OIG-21-020 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: 12/20
Management Letter for the Audit of the
Department of the Treasury's Financial
Statements for Fiscal Years 2020 and
2019
1. DO Information Technology management should ensure that the configured
schedule/frequency of Financial Analysis and Reporting System backups is
implemented in accordance with the minimum backup frequency required by
DO and Treasury policy.
2. Ensure that system-generated logs of backups, including failures, are
retained for the examination period and can be provided upon request.
3. Management should strengthen control procedures to ensure policies,
procedures, and related control activity documentation are timely updated
for continued relevance and effectiveness of key controls based on changes
in legislation, policies, and agreements related to Government Sponsored
Enterprises’ activities.
4. Assist management in mitigating the risk of potential noncompliance with
the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) if (1) results of testing
were not documented or (2) controls were not consistently tested by the
components, management should enforce guidance on how to improve
A-123 documentation and implementation of internal controls. Additionally,
management should perform a more detailed review of the sufficiency of
the component submissions, follow up with all inconsistencies, and have
documentation readily available to substantiate the conclusion that was
reached. Management agreed with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Report Title Date Issued
Year Number
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 41
Statistical Summary
2021 OIG-21-021 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: 02/21
Management Report for the Audit of the
Department of the Treasury's
Consolidated Financial Statements for
Fiscal Years 2020 and 2019
1. Fiscal Service management should complete its periodic review of the PIR
user access within the annual timeframe in accordance with the PIR SSP.
2. Address resource constraints and prioritize efforts to perform reviews within
the annual timeframe in accordance with the PIR SSP.
3. Re-enforce established audit logging policy and procedures.
4. Retain evidence to demonstrate PIR auditable events are reviewed on a
weekly basis as required by the PIR Security Log SOP.
5. Consider resource constraints and prioritize efforts to perform timely audit
logging reviews in accordance with policy and procedures.
6. Review the current population of JFICS accounts and disable application
user access that has been inactive for greater than 120 days.
7. Design and implement a control to automatically disable the JFICS
application user accounts after 120 days of inactivity.
8. Retain evidence to demonstrate that access is disabled in a timely manner in
accordance with the JFICS SSP.
9. Perform a review of the current system environment against the
Configuration Management Database (CMDB) to ensure that all information
system components are inventoried.
10. Perform a risk assessment over the subject matter and determine the
appropriate personnel to be responsible for monitoring and updating the
CMDB.
11. Update policy and procedures related to the above recommendations and
disseminate the documentation to enforce such policy and procedures.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 42
Statistical Summary
12. Conduct a review of the UNIX Mid-Tier production servers to validate that
backups are scheduled for all servers based on the frequency defined in the
Enterprise Information Technology Infrastructure (EITI) SSP for the full fiscal
year.
13. Perform a risk assessment over the subject matter and determine the
appropriate personnel to be responsible for developing a Plan of Action &
Milestones (POA&M) or formal risk acceptance for vulnerabilities identified.
14. Disseminate policy and procedures related to the use of a POA&M or formal
risk acceptance to the appropriate personnel determined above to enforce
the respective vulnerability management requirements.
15. Update the contingency plan at a minimum of every three years or after a
major change, in accordance with BLSR and EITI SSP.
16. Assign responsible points of contact to prioritize efforts to perform updates
to the contingency plan every three years or when there is a significant
change, in accordance with the BLSR and EITI SSP. Management agreed
with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Report Title Date Issued
Year Number
2021 OIG-21-025 Interim Audit Update - Air Carrier and 03/21
Contractor Certifications for Payroll
Support Program
1. As expeditiously as possible, Treasury management should review
payments issued under Payroll Support Program 1 (PSP1) to ensure
awarded amounts are allowable per the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (CARES Act) and Treasury guidance.
2. As expeditiously as possible, Treasury management should remedy the
incorrect amounts awarded under PSP1. Management agreed with the
recommendations.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 43
Statistical Summary
Closed Investigations of Senior Government Employees Not
Publicly Disclosed
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
Treasury OIG closed six investigations involving senior Government employees during
the period that were not publicly disclosed. In four of these investigations, an instance
of misconduct was substantiated against a senior Government employee.
Case Number Allegation/Disposition
UST-20-0074-I At the request of the Integrity Committee of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), Treasury
OIG investigated allegations related to (1) violating Freedom of
Information Act laws, (2) changing administrative rules to
target a single employee, and (3) surreptitiously monitoring
protected employee communications with the Office of Special
Counsel and the Congress by a senior Government official.
Treasury OIG’s investigation determined the allegations were
unsubstantiated due to lack of sufficient evidence. On
January 22, 2021, Treasury OIG submitted its Report of
Investigation to CIGIE for information and appropriate action.
This matter was not referred to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
Unsubstantiated
USM-21-0050-I Treasury OIG initiated an investigation upon notification that
senior Government officials pressured a subordinate to rescind
a hiring selection based on the selectee’s race. The allegation
was unsubstantiated based on conflicting statements, and on
the unanimous approval of the subordinate’s selection by a
hiring panel and the senior officials. On July 22, 2021, a report
was provided to DOJ, but this matter was not referred to DOJ.
Unsubstantiated
OCC-20-0012-I Treasury OIG initiated an investigation upon notification a
senior Government official from the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) released confidential supervisory
information during a presentation at a financial services forum.
Prosecution of the employee was declined by the U.S.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 44
Statistical Summary
Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the District of Columbia. On
May 24, 2021, Treasury OIG provided a report to OCC.
Substantiated
FinCEN-20-0011-I Treasury OIG substantiated an allegation that a senior
Government official at the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN) was hired before the bureau received a
required drug test in violation of bureau policy. On April 6,
2021, Treasury OIG provided its report of investigation to the
Departmental Offices (DO) and FinCEN. The senior Government
official resigned.
Substantiated
DO-19-0025-I Upon receipt of information from DO, Treasury OIG initiated an
investigation regarding suspicious financial activity between
unknown foreign individuals and a senior Government official.
The employee allegedly received, laundered, and structured
significant funds from foreign sources. The investigation did
not substantiate structuring banking transactions to evade
reporting requirements; however, Treasury OIG found the
senior Government official did not handle and store classified
documents properly. Prosecution of this senior Government
official was declined by the USAO for the District of Columbia.
On June 16, 2021, a report was provided to Departmental
Offices for their information and appropriate administrative
action.
Substantiated
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 45
Statistical Summary
BFS-21-0001-I Treasury OIG initiated an investigation upon notification from
the Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Fiscal Service), alleging a
senior Government official used their position to hire their
spouse. The investigation did not substantiate these
allegations; however, the investigation revealed that the senior
Government official used official Government email to conduct
business for an outside business activity. Fiscal Service
management counseled the employee on the proper use of
Government email and the prohibition on conducting an outside
business activity while on Government time. This matter was
not referred to DOJ.
Substantiated
Summary of Instances of Whistleblower Retaliation
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
There were no cases of possible whistleblower retaliation opened or established to
report for the period.
Summary of Attempts to Interfere With Treasury OIG
Independence, Including Instances Where Information or
Assistance Request was Refused
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
There were no attempts made to resist, delay, or restrict Treasury OIG access to
records or other information and no instances where an information or assistance
request was refused during this reporting period.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 46
Statistical Summary
Listing of Audit Products Issued
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
Office of Audit
BILL AND COIN MANUFACTURING: Audit of Physical Security at U.S. Mint Production
Facilities (OIG-21-026, 04/07/2021) Sensitive But Unclassified, Not Publicly Disclosed
CRF Prime Recipient Quarterly GrantSolutions Submissions Monitoring and Review
Procedures Guide (Revised April 19, 2021) (OIG-CA-20-029R, 4/19/2021)
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Audit of the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council's
Compliance with PIIA of 2019 for Fiscal Year 2020 (OIG-21-027, 05/14/2021)
American Rescue Plan - Application of Lessons Learned From the Coronavirus Relief
Fund (OIG-CA-21-020, 05/17/2021)
Quarterly Summary Memorandum for the Lead Inspector General, Department of
Defense: Operation Inherent Resolve - Summary of Work Performed by the Department
of the Treasury Related to Terrorist Financing, ISIS, and Anti-Money Laundering for
Second Quarter Fiscal Year 2021 (OIG-CA-21-021, 05/19/2021)
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Audit of Treasury's Compliance with PIIA Requirements
for Fiscal Year 2020 (OIG-21-028, 05/28/2021)
Memorandum for the Honorable Richard K. Delmar, Treasury Deputy Inspector
General: Joint Purchase and Integrated Card Violation Report (October 1, 2020–
March 31, 2021) (OIG-CA-21-022, 07/14/2021) Internal Memorandum, Not Publicly
Disclosed
Survey Results Memorandum – Survey of Project Management at the United States
Mint (OIG-CA-21-023, 07/20/2021)
Termination Memorandum – Audit of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s
Supervision Related to Banks’ Compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money
Laundering Regulations, Office of Foreign Assets Control Sanctions and Other
Applicable Laws and the Impact on the De-risking Trend (OIG-CA-21-024, 7/27/2021)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 47
Statistical Summary
Apache Tribe of Oklahoma’s Use of Coronavirus Relief Fund Payment
(OIG-CA-21-025, 7/28/2021) Not Publicly Disclosed
Termination Memo - Audit of Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's Human
Capital Policies and Resource Planning (OIG-CA-21-026, 8/12/2021)
Quarterly Summary Memorandum for the Lead Inspector General, Department of
Defense: Overseas Contingency Operations - Summary of Work Performed by the
Department of the Treasury Related to Terrorist Financing and Anti-Money Laundering
for Third Quarter Fiscal Year 2021(OIG-CA-21-027, 8/17/2021)
Termination Memorandum – Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support Certifications – West
Air, Inc. (Redacted) (OIG-CA-21-028, 9/9/2021)
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Financial Management: Report on the Enterprise Business
Solutions’ Description of its HRConnect System and on the Suitability of the Design
and Operating Effectiveness of its Controls for the Period July 1, 2020, to June 30,
2021 (OIG-21-029, 9/17/2021)
Termination Memorandum – Audit of the Community Development Financial
Institutions Fund’s Administration of the Healthy Food Financing Initiative
(OIG-CA-21-029, 9/21/2021)
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: Report on the Bureau of the Fiscal Service Administrative
Resource Center’s Description of its Shared Services and the Suitability of the Design
and Operating Effectiveness of its Controls for the Period July 1, 2020 to June 30,
2021 (OIG-21-030, 9/27/2021)
Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight
Annual Report of the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight
(07/30/2021)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 48
Statistical Summary
Audit Reports Issued With Questioned Costs
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
Total Total
Total No. Questioned Unsupported
C a t e g or y o f R e p o rt s Costs Costs
For which no management decision had been made by
beginning of reporting period 1 $2,550 $0
Which were issued during the reporting period 0 $0 $0
Subtotals 1 $2,550 $0
For which a management decision was made during the
reporting period 0 $0 $0
Dollar value of disallowed costs 0 $0 $0
Dollar value of costs not disallowed 0 $0 $0
For which no management decision was made by the
end of the reporting period 1 $2,550 $0
For which no management decision was made within 6
months of issuance 1 $2,550 $0
Questioned costs include expenditures: (1) that are questioned because of an alleged violation of a provision of a
law, regulation, contract, or other requirement governing the expenditure of funds; (2) that, at the time of the
audit, are not supported by adequate documentation (i.e., unsupported costs); or (3) used for the intended
purpose that are unnecessary or unreasonable.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 49
Statistical Summary
Audit Reports Issued With Recommendations that Funds Be Put
to Better Use
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
Total
No. of Revenue
Category Reports Total Savings Enhancement
For which no management decision had been
made by beginning of reporting period 0 $0 $0 $0
Which were issued during the reporting
period 0 $0 $0 $0
Subtotals 0 $0 $0 $0
For which a management decision was made
during the reporting period 0 $0 $0 $0
Dollar value of recommendations agreed to
by management 0 $0 $0 $0
Dollar value based on proposed
management action 0 $0 $0 $0
Dollar value based on proposed
legislative action 0 $0 $0 $0
Dollar value of recommendations not
agreed to by management 0 $0 $0 $0
For which no management decision was
made by the end of the reporting period 0 $0 $0 $0
For which no management decision was
made within 6 months of issuance 0 $0 $0 $0
A recommendation that funds be put to better use denotes funds could be used more efficiently if management took
actions to implement and complete the recommendation including: (1) reduction in outlays; (2) de-obligations of
funds from programs or operations; (3) costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to
operations; (4) avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in pre-award review of contract or grant agreements;
(5) any other savings which are specifically identified; or (6) enhancements to revenues of the Federal Government.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 50
Statistical Summary
Reports for Which No Management Comment was Returned
Within 60 Days
As of September 30, 2021
There were no such reports issued for comment over 60 days as of the end of the
reporting period.
Reports Issued Over 6 Months for Which No Management
Decision Has Been Made
As of September 30, 2021
There was one report as of the end of this reporting period with no management
decision, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: Audit of the Department of the Treasury
Departmental Offices Executive Pay Adjustment, Bonuses, and Awards, OIG-20-027,
issued on February 5, 2020, with $2,550 in questioned cost. Management agreed
with our recommendations, but has not entered the planned corrective actions in the
audit follow-up system, JAMES, to address the 10 recommendations made in the
report.
Significant Revised Management Decisions
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
There were no significant revised management decisions during the reporting period.
Significant Disagreed Management Decisions
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
There were no significant disagreed management decisions during the reporting period.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 51
Statistical Summary
Peer Reviews
April 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021
Office of Audit
Audit organizations that perform audits and attestation engagements of Federal
Government programs and operations are required by generally accepted government
auditing standards to undergo an external peer review every 3 years. The objectives of
an external peer review are to determine, during the period under review, whether the
audit organization was complying with its quality control system to provide the audit
organization with reasonable assurance that it was conforming to applicable
professional standards. Federal audit organizations can receive a peer review rating of
Pass, Pass with Deficiencies, or Fail.
The most recent peer review of our office was performed by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) OIG. In its report dated September 27, 2021, HHS
OIG rendered a Pass rating for our system of quality control in effect for the year
ended March 31, 2021. External audit peer review reports of our office are available
on Treasury OIG’s website. Treasury OIG did not perform any peer reviews of other
Federal audit organizations during this reporting period.
Office of Investigations
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) mandates that the
investigative law enforcement operations of all OIGs undergo peer reviews every
3 years to ensure compliance with (1) CIGIE’s investigations quality standards and
(2) the relevant guidelines established by the Office of the Attorney General of the
United States.
In its report dated January 5, 2021, the Federal Housing Finance Agency OIG found
our office to be in compliance with all relevant guidelines for fiscal year 2020. During
this reporting period, our office did not perform a peer review of another OIG.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 52
Other Reporting Requirements and Requests
This section addresses certain reporting requirements of our office that are separate
from the reporting requirements in the Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended).
Reviews of Bank Failures with Nonmaterial Losses
We conduct reviews of failed banks supervised by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) with losses to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s (FDIC) Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) that do not meet the
definition of a material loss in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The reviews
are performed to fulfill the requirements found in 12 U.S.C. §1831o(k). The
term “material loss” triggers a material loss review if a loss to the DIF exceeds
$50 million (with provisions to increase that trigger to a loss that exceeds
$75 million under certain circumstances). For losses that are not material, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act requires that, each 6-month period, the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) of the Federal banking agency must (1) identify the
estimated losses that have been incurred by the DIF during that 6-month period
and (2) determine the grounds identified by the failed institution’s regulator for
appointing the FDIC as receiver, and whether any unusual circumstances exist
that might warrant an in-depth review of the loss. For each 6-month period, we
are also required to prepare a report to the failed institutions’ regulator and the
Congress that identifies (1) any loss that warrants an in-depth review, together
with the reasons why such a review is warranted and when the review will be
completed; and (2) any losses where we determine no in-depth review is
warranted, together with an explanation of how we came to that determination.
There were no banks supervised by the OCC that failed during this reporting
period.
Operation Inherent Resolve and Overseas Contingency Operations
Quarterly Summary Memoranda to the Department of Defense OIG
During this reporting period, we issued two summary memoranda to the
Department of Defense OIG regarding information we obtained on the
Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury or the Department) activities with
respect to disrupting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) finances. The
memoranda included specific examples of activities to disrupt ISIS’s financing,
information on Treasury programs that combat terrorist financing, and work we
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 53
Other Reporting Requirements and Requests
performed or plan to perform to review these programs. (OIG-CA-21-021,
OIG-CA-21-027)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 54
References to the Inspector General Act
Section Requirement Page
Section 4(a)(2) Review of legislation and regulations 21
Section 5(a)(1) Significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies 7-17
Section 5(a)(2) Recommendations with respect to significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies 7-17
Section 5(a)(3) Significant unimplemented recommendations described in previous semiannual 22-43
reports
Section 5(a)(4) Matters referred to prosecutive authorities 21
Section 5(a)(5) Summary of instances where information was refused 46
Section 5(a)(6) List of audit reports 47-48
Section 5(a)(7) Summary of significant reports 7-17
Section 5(a)(8) Audit reports with questioned costs 49
Section 5(a)(9) Recommendations that funds be put to better use 50
Section Summary of each audit, inspection, and evaluation report issued before the 51
5(a)(10)(A) beginning of the reporting period for which no management decision was made
Section Summary of each audit, inspection, and evaluation report issued for which no 51
5(a)(10)(B) management comment was returned within 60 days
Section Summary of each audit, inspection, and evaluation report issued before the 22-43
5(a)(10)(C) beginning of the reporting period for which there are outstanding unimplemented
recommendations, including the aggregate potential cost savings
Section Significant revised management decisions made during the reporting period 51
5(a)(11)
Section Management decisions with which the Inspector General is in disagreement 51
5(a)(12)
Section Instances of unresolved Federal Financial Management Improvement Act 12
5(a)(13) noncompliance
Section Results of peer reviews conducted of Treasury OIG by another OIG 52
5(a)(14)
Section List of outstanding recommendations from peer reviews 52
5(a)(15)
Section List of peer reviews conducted by Treasury OIG, including a list of outstanding 52
5(a)(16) recommendations from those peer reviews
Section Statistics for the period related to the number of (A) investigative reports issued, 21
5(a)(17)(A-D) (B) persons referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution,
(C) persons referred to state and local authorities for criminal prosecution, and
(D) criminal indictments/informations
Section Description of metrics used to develop investigative statistics in Section 5(a)(17) 21
5(a)(18)
Section 5a(19) Summary of each investigation involving a senior Government employee where 44-46
allegation of misconduct was substantiated
Section 5a(20) Instances of whistleblower retaliation 46
Section 5a(21) Summary of attempts to interfere with Treasury OIG independence 46
Section Description of each inspection, evaluation, and audit that was closed and not 47-48
5a(22)(A) publicly disclosed
Section Description of each investigation closed, involving a senior Government employee, 44-46
5a(22)(B) that was not publicly disclosed
Section 5(d) Serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies N/A
Section 6(b)(2) Report to Secretary when information or assistance is unreasonably refused 46
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 55
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Abbreviations
ARP American Rescue Plan Act of 2021
BEP Bureau of Engraving and Printing
BLSR Baseline Security Requirements
CARES Act Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
CBP Customs and Border Protection
CIGIE Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Council Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
CRF Coronavirus Relief Fund
DASHR/CHCO Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human
Resources and Chief Human Capital Officer
DATA Act Digital Accountability and Transparency Act
DE&I Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
DO Departmental Offices
DOJ Department of Justice
Fiscal Service Bureau of the Fiscal Service
FY fiscal year
IRS Internal Revenue Service
JFICS Judgment Fund Internet Claim System
KPMG KPMG LLP
Mint United States Mint
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control
OIG Office of Inspector General
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPM Office of Personnel Management
PGPD Prince Georges County Police Department
PIIA Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019
PIR Payment Information Repository
PMIAA Program Management Improvement Accountability Act
PRAC Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
RESTORE Act Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist
Opportunities, and Revived Economies of the Gulf Coast
States Act of 2012
RMA RMA Associates
SES Senior Executive Service
SSP system security plan
SOP standard operating procedures
TCVS Treasury Check Verification System
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 57
Abbreviations
TIGTA Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
Treasury or
the Department Department of the Treasury
Trust Fund Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund
USAO U.S. Attorney’s Office
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2021 58
View From Above of the Treasury Building at Night, Washington, DC
Source: Treasury Graphics
Treasury Office of Inspector General Locations
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 4436
Washington, DC 20220
875 15th Street, N.W., Suite 200
Washington, DC 20005
408 Atlantic Avenue, Room 330
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Report Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Submit a complaint regarding Treasury OIG Treasury Programs and Operations and Gulf Coast Restoration using our
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Treasury Whistleblower Ombudsman
For information about whistleblowing and reprisal and about your rights and responsibilities as a Treasury employee or
contractor, please contact the OIG Whistleblower Ombudsman Program at 202-927-0650 or Email:
OIGCounsel@oig.treas.gov
Treasury OIG Website
Access Treasury OIG reports and other information online: https://oig.treasury.gov/
File and source
- File
- OIG-CA-22-004-semiannual-report-to-congress-sep-2021.pdf
- Size
- 2,090,391 bytes
- SHA-256
- a971bf25d9f6e6d88b85bc2ef48999e98837e746d1a2f5c92ceb1c5cba88c81e
- Original
- No public link identified.