Treasury OIG: Semiannual Report to Congress, April 1, 2020 – September 30, 2020 (OIG-CA-21-007)
Summary
The Department of the Treasury Office of Inspector General's Semiannual Report to Congress OIG-CA-21-007 covers April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020. It states that the Office of Audit issued 35 products and identified $93.4 million in questioned costs, and that work by the Office of Investigations resulted in 18 indictments and 8 convictions. The message from Deputy Inspector General Richard K. Delmar describes CARES Act oversight of the Coronavirus Relief Fund, including a recipient reporting portal with GrantSolutions. It reports that investigative staff received 364 CARES Act complaints, opened 36 investigations and referred 283 cases outside its jurisdiction to other agencies.
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“Treasury OIG: Semiannual Report to Congress, April 1, 2020 – September 30, 2020 (OIG-CA-21-007).”
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Semiannual Report to Congress
April 1, 2020 – September 30, 2020
OIG-CA-21-007
Office of Inspector General
Department of the Treasury
Highlights
During this semiannual reporting period, our Office of Audit issued 35 products. The
office also identified $93.4 million in questioned costs. Work by our Office of
Investigations resulted in 18 indictments and 8 convictions. Some of our more
significant results for the period are described below:
• Our Office of Audit relayed concerns to the Director of the Department of
Treasury of American Samoa over its uses of Coronavirus Relief Fund proceeds
and requested that funds be returned to the American Samoa government for
future uses related to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
• In our audit of the United States Mint’s (Mint) controls over raw materials and
coin exchange programs, we found that the Mint’s controls over the coins
returned to the Mint from the public and the Federal Reserve Banks were deficient
and exposed the Mint to the risk of paying out tens of millions of dollars for
non-genuine U.S. coinage, as well as not being able to ensure that these coins are
being melted and recycled, as required by law.
• In an examination overseen by our office, the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA) identified $93.4 million in questioned costs related to a price proposal
submitted in response to a Bureau of Engraving and Printing contract solicitation.
Due to the proprietary nature of contractor bid and proposal information, this
report is designated Sensitive But Unclassified.
• Our joint investigation with the Department of the Interior (Interior) Office of
Inspector General identified leaks of confidential tribal data by Interior employees
and identified a Department of the Treasury (Treasury) employee who mishandled
emails containing confidential tribal data. Criminal prosecution of the employees
was presented on June 4, 2020, and declined by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for
the District of Columbia. We have provided responses to concerned Members of
Congress and opened an investigation into the Treasury employee.
• Our investigation revealed an Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) employee
mishandled a foreign government’s classified information and accepted gifts from
a prohibited source. The Report of Investigation was provided to OFAC for
information.
• Our investigation determined a regional sewer authority in Kentucky requested
redemption of certain securities in a manner contrary to the purposes of the State
and Local Government Securities Program and Treasury regulations. The sewer
authority paid $1.3 million as part of a civil settlement agreement with the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Kentucky.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 i
Message from the Deputy Inspector General
During this reporting period, Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Office of Inspector
General (OIG) staff have implemented new oversight projects and addressed complex
Treasury programs established by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act (CARES Act). Our staff has performed an extraordinary amount of work in carrying
out these new responsibilities and has continued to produce quality products
organization-wide, while engaging in full-time telework during the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
The CARES Act, signed into law March 27, 2020, provides over $2 trillion of
economic relief to workers, families, small businesses, industry sectors, and other
levels of government that have been hit hard by the public health crisis created by
COVID-19. Title IV, Subtitle B of the CARES Act provides up to $32 billion of direct
financial assistance to passenger air carriers, cargo air carriers, and certain contractors
that must exclusively be used for the continuation of payments of employees’ wages,
salaries, and benefits. Title IV, Subtitle B also authorizes Treasury OIG to audit
certifications made by passenger and cargo air carriers and contractors that do not
report to the Department of Transportation under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 241. Title VI of the Social Security Act, as amended by Title V of the CARES Act
established the Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) (hereinafter referred to as Title V) for
the purpose of providing $150 billion in direct assistance to States, qualified units of
local government, the District of Columbia, U.S. Territories, and Tribal Governments.
Under Title V, Treasury OIG is responsible for conducting monitoring and oversight of
the receipt, disbursement, and uses of CRF payments. Treasury OIG also has authority
to recoup funds in the event that it is determined a recipient of a CRF payment failed
to comply with requirements.
To carry out these responsibilities, we stood up two CARES Act audit teams during
the reporting period. Working together, these teams established a CRF recipient
reporting portal with GrantSolutions 1 into which prime recipients of CRF proceeds
must report quarterly on CRF obligations and expenditures. To assist CRF recipients
with their quarterly reporting requirements, the teams published the Coronavirus Relief
Fund Reporting and Records Retention Requirements, the Department of the Treasury
Office of Inspector General Coronavirus Relief Fund Frequently Asked Questions
1
GrantSolutions, a grant and program management Federal shared service provider under the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, developed a customized and user-friendly reporting
solution to capture the use of CRF payments from prime recipients.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 ii
Message From the Deputy Inspector General
Related to Reporting and Recordkeeping, the Coronavirus Relief Fund Prime Recipient
Quarterly GrantSolutions Submission Monitoring and Review Procedures Guide, and
the Coronavirus Relief Fund Recipient Reporting Portal Data Dictionary. The teams held
multiple webinars for five stakeholder groups, informing over 500 participants of the
reporting and record retention requirements. Each prime recipient must report
COVID-19 related obligations and costs incurred during the covered period beginning
on March 1, 2020, and ending on December 30, 2020. By September 21, 2020,
prime recipients certified and submitted, via the GrantSolutions portal, their first
detailed quarterly report, covering the period of March 1 through June 30, 2020. On
October 13, 2020, prime recipients certified and submitted their second detailed
quarterly report, covering the period of July 1 through September 30, 2020. Quarterly
reporting is generally due no later than 10 calendar days after the end of each calendar
quarter. The teams have reviewed two quarters of recipient reporting, and have
extracted the data to the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC). PRAC will display the CRF data
on its website, PandemicOversight.gov.
Under Title IV, Subtitle B, the team is conducting an audit of Treasury’s
implementation of the Air Carrier Payroll Support Program, and 16 audits of
certifications made by passenger air carriers, cargo air carriers, and contractors. The
team is also conducting two audits related to Title V; the first is an audit on Treasury’s
implementation of the CRF and the second is an audit of American Samoa’s use of
CRF funds. In addition to this ongoing work, in this Semiannual report we provide
summaries of work completed including Interim Audit Update – Coronavirus Relief
Fund Recipient Reporting and the first of two projects on American Samoa, American
Samoa Uses of Coronavirus Relief Fund Payment.
Also during the period, our investigative staff received 364 CARES Act complaints,
opened 36 investigations and referred 283 cases outside our jurisdiction to other
agencies. The majority of these cases were Title V, CRF-related. Out of the
364 complaints, 6 of the complaints were associated with Title IV. Our investigative
staff also collaborated with the Department of Justice and many Federal law
enforcement agencies, developing strategies to proactively detect and prevent
fraudulent and improper payments and to safeguard CARES Act funds for intended
recipients. The majority of CARES Act payments were issued by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), and the IRS determined that payment data transmitted to the Bureau of
the Fiscal Service was return information, as defined in 26 U.S.C. 6103. While this
determination limits the sharing of information between our agencies for criminal
investigations, we continue to share information using an ex parte order when
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 iii
Message From the Deputy Inspector General
available and appropriate. 2 In this Semiannual report we summarized our joint, Title V
investigation with the Department of Interior OIG that was closed during the period.
In addition, our staff assisted the PRAC to establish its website,
PandemicOversight.gov, and implemented a hotline for the public to report waste,
fraud, and abuse related to the CARES Act. Our role in the stand-up of the website is
discussed in this report and the hotline information is provided on the back cover of
this report. We also coordinated closely with the Special Inspector General for
Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR) on oversight reporting for the period, and will continue to
coordinate with the SIGPR in the future.
I am grateful to all of our staff for this exceptional body of work, and am proud of
what Treasury OIG has accomplished in service to Treasury and to the country during
this challenging time.
Richard K. Delmar
Deputy Inspector General
2
The Internal Revenue Code generally prohibits use of Federal tax information for non-tax
administration purposes. However, under 26 U.S.C. Section 6103(i), the Government can obtain an
ex parte order from a judge allowing use of Federal tax information for certain specified non-tax
administration law enforcement purposes.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 iv
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Contents
Highlights .......................................................................................... i
Message from the Deputy Inspector General......................................... ii
Treasury Office of Inspector General Overview .....................................1
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products.........................5
CARES Act Oversight ...............................................................................................5
CARES Act Compliance Monitoring ............................................................................6
Manufacturing .........................................................................................................7
Domestic Assistance Programs ................................................................................11
Financial Regulation and Oversight ...........................................................................12
Financial Management ............................................................................................13
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations............................. 17
CARES Act Investigation.........................................................................................17
Other Significant Investigations................................................................................17
Treasury OIG Accomplishments and Activities .................................... 21
Statistical Summary......................................................................... 23
Summary of Treasury OIG Activities.........................................................................23
Metrics Used for Office of Investigations Activities ....................................................23
Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations ........................................................24
Closed Investigations of Senior Government Employees Not Publicly Disclosed .............45
Summary of Instances of Whistleblower Retaliation ...................................................46
Summary of Attempts to Interfere With Treasury OIG Independence, Including Instances
Where Information or Assistance Request was Refused ..............................................46
Listing of Audit Products Issued...............................................................................47
Audit Reports Issued With Questioned Costs.............................................................51
Audit Reports Issued With Recommendations that Funds Be Put to Better Use..............52
Reports for Which No Management Comment was Returned Within 60 Days................53
Reports Issued Over 6 Months for Which No Management Decision Has Been Made......53
Significant Revised Management Decisions ...............................................................53
Significant Disagreed Management Decisions ............................................................53
Peer Reviews .........................................................................................................54
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 vi
Contents
Other Reporting Requirements and Requests ...................................... 57
References to the Inspector General Act ............................................ 59
Abbreviations.................................................................................. 61
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 vii
Treasury Office of Inspector General Overview
The Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was
established pursuant to the 1988 amendments to the Inspector General Act of 1978.
Treasury OIG is headed by an Inspector General appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
Treasury OIG performs independent, objective reviews of Treasury programs and
operations, except for those of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP), and of Treasury programs and activities authorized by
Subtitle A, Coronavirus Economic Stabilization Act of 2020, Division A of the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). Treasury OIG also
keeps the Secretary of the Treasury and Congress fully informed of problems,
deficiencies, and the need for corrective action. The Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration (TIGTA) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) perform
oversight related to IRS. A Special Inspector General and GAO perform oversight
related to TARP. A Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR) performs
oversight related to Treasury programs and activities authorized by Subtitle A,
Coronavirus Economic Stabilization Act of 2020, Division A of the CARES Act.
Treasury OIG also performs independent oversight of programs and operations funded
by the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund (Trust Fund) established within Treasury by
the Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived
Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act of 2012 (RESTORE Act). In addition to
performing oversight of Treasury-related activities, Treasury OIG performs oversight of
programs and operations administered by the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration
Council (Council), established as an independent Federal entity, and the Gulf Coast
Ecosystem Restoration Science, Observation, Monitoring, and Technology Program
(Science Program) administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA). With regard to the Council and the Science Program, Treasury
OIG keeps the appointed Chairperson of the Council, the NOAA Science Program
Administrator, and Congress fully informed of problems, deficiencies, and the need for
corrective actions.
Treasury OIG has four components: (1) Office of Audit; (2) Office of Investigations;
(3) Office of Counsel; and (4) Office of Management. Treasury OIG is headquartered in
Washington, DC. Treasury OIG also has an audit office in Boston, Massachusetts.
Treasury OIG closed its investigative office in Greensboro, North Carolina, in June
2020.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 1
Treasury Office of Inspector General Overview
The Office of Audit, under the leadership of the Assistant Inspector General for Audit,
performs and supervises financial and performance audits, attestation engagements,
and evaluations. The Assistant Inspector General for Audit also serves as the Special
Deputy Inspector General for Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) Program Oversight.
Under the Assistant Inspector General for Audit, there are three deputies. The first
deputy is primarily responsible for financial sector audits to include audits of banking
supervision, manufacturing of currency and coins, resource management,
procurement, and alcohol and tobacco excise tax revenue collection activities. The
second deputy is primarily responsible for financial management and transparency
audits to include financial audits of Treasury and the Council performed by Treasury
OIG staff and contractors; audits of Government-wide collection, payment, and debt
programs and operations; and audits of anti-money laundering/terrorist financing,
foreign sanctions, and audits of intelligence programs and operations. The third deputy
is primarily responsible for the CARES Act, cybersecurity, and financial assistance
audits to include audits of Treasury and the Council information systems performed by
Treasury OIG staff and contractors, audits of the SBLF program, and RESTORE Act
programs and operations.
The Office of Investigations, under the leadership of the Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations, performs investigations and conducts initiatives to detect and
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in programs and operations across Treasury OIG’s
jurisdictional boundaries; and to investigate threats against Treasury personnel and
assets in designated circumstances as authorized by the Inspector General Act. The
Office of Investigations also manages the Treasury OIG Hotline to facilitate reporting
of allegations involving these programs and operations.
The Office of Counsel, under the leadership of the Counsel to the Inspector General,
provides legal advice to the Inspector General and all Treasury OIG components. The
office represents Treasury OIG in administrative legal proceedings and provides a
variety of legal services, including (1) processing Freedom of Information Act and
Giglio 3 requests; (2) conducting ethics training; (3) ensuring compliance with financial
disclosure requirements; (4) reviewing proposed legislation and regulations;
(5) reviewing administrative subpoena requests; and (6) preparing for the Inspector
General’s signature, cease and desist letters and monetary assessments against
persons and entities misusing the Treasury seal and name. The Office of Counsel also
3
Giglio information refers to material that may call into question the character or testimony of a
prosecution witness in a criminal trial.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 2
Treasury Office of Inspector General Overview
responds to media and Congressional inquiries and serves as the Whistleblower
Protection Coordinator for Treasury.
The Office of Management, under the leadership of the Assistant Inspector General for
Management, provides administrative services to maintain the Treasury OIG
administrative infrastructure, including facilities, human resources, information
technology, procurement, records management, and security.
Treasury OIG’s fiscal year 2020 appropriation was $41 million. Treasury OIG received
a separate no-year appropriation of $35 million in Title V of the CARES Act. Treasury
OIG’s oversight of the SBLF program is funded on a reimbursable basis. As of
September 30, 2020, Treasury OIG had 154 full-time staff.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 3
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Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
CARES Act Oversight
Title VI of the Social Security Act, as amended by Title V of the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), (hereinafter referred to as Title V)
established the Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) for the Department of the Treasury
(Treasury) to make $150 billion in payments to each of the 50 States, qualifying units
of local government, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories, and Tribal Governments
for necessary expenditures incurred between March 1, 2020, and December 30,
2020, due to the public health emergency with respect to the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19). Under Title V, Treasury Office of Inspector General (OIG) is
assigned responsibility to conduct monitoring and oversight of the receipt,
disbursement, and use of CRF payments. Treasury OIG also was assigned authority to
recoup CRF proceeds in the event that it is determined a recipient of a CRF payment
failed to comply with requirements of subsection 601(d) of the Social Security Act, as
amended, (42 U.S.C. 801(d)). As part of our ongoing oversight of CRF payments, we
issued the following reports during this semiannual period.
Interim Audit Update – Coronavirus Relief Fund Recipient Reporting
Treasury disbursed initial CRF payments to recipients in the form of direct
payments rather than financial assistance (i.e., grants) and without agreements
or terms and conditions notifying recipients of the reporting requirements
outlined in Section 15011 of the CARES Act, Reporting on the Use of Funds.
Furthermore, as required by the CARES Act, Treasury did not provide user-
friendly means for recipients to meet reporting requirements. Without the use of
an agreement with terms and conditions requiring recipient reporting and
reporting mechanisms, there is risk that reporting will not be done as required
by the CARES Act resulting in the lack of accountability and transparency
surrounding recipients’ use of funds. While Treasury Counsel’s position that
reporting requirements of Section 15011 under Division B of the CARES Act do
not apply to the CRF under Division A, management expressed its commitment,
among other things, to ensuring transparency, accountability, and adherence to
all statutory requirements in connection with the CARES Act.
Accordingly, we recommended that Treasury management support our office in
accomplishing our monitoring and oversight responsibilities in the following
ways: (1) assist in communications with CRF recipients on matters that include,
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 5
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
but are not limited to, communications of reporting and record keeping
requirements and other audit inquiries, as needed; (2) ensure that Treasury
maintains communication channels with recipients to obtain and address post-
payment inquiries regarding specific payments; and (3) continue to update CRF
guidance and disseminate to recipients as needed. Management welcomed the
opportunity to consider a more specific proposal from us concerning its recipient
reporting needs and is confident that both Treasury and Treasury OIG can
develop an approach that meets shared objectives and responsibilities.
Management’s response met the intent of our recommendations. (OIG-20-036)
American Samoa Uses of Coronavirus Relief Fund Payment
We issued a letter to the Director of the Department of Treasury of American
Samoa related to concerns over uses of its CRF proceeds to make direct
payments to members of its Fono (Legislature) of $20,000 to the Senate
President and Speaker of the House and $10,000 to other members to support
teleworking from their homes. Since Fono members were already teleworking
prior to COVID-19 due to ongoing construction of its legislature building, we
requested that funds be returned to the American Samoa government for future
uses related to COVID-19. The letter also clarified the allowability of other
proposed uses related to a hotel lease and payments to villages. We did not
make any formal recommendations in our letter. (OIG-CA-20-023)
CARES Act Compliance Monitoring
As part of our compliance monitoring of CRF payments, we developed a portal via
GrantSolutions, a grants management system under U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, for CRF recipients to report expenditure data on a quarterly basis
starting September 1, 2020. We issued the following memoranda pertaining to CRF
reporting: (1) the Coronavirus Relief Fund Reporting and Records Retention
Requirements (OIG-CA-20-021), (2) Coronavirus Relief Fund Reporting Requirements
Update (OIG-CA-20-025), (3) the Department of the Treasury Office of Inspector
General Coronavirus Relief Fund Frequently Asked Questions Related to Reporting and
Recordkeeping (OIG-CA-20-028), (4) the Coronavirus Relief Fund Prime Recipient
Quarterly GrantSolutions Submission Monitoring and Review Procedures Guide
(OIG-CA-20-029), and (5) the Coronavirus Relief Fund Recipient Reporting Portal Data
Dictionary (OIG-CA-20-030).
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 6
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
We also conducted outreach to five stakeholder groups, informing over
500 participants of the CRF recipient reporting and record retention requirements and
of our monitoring and oversight responsibilities. In these webinars, we introduced
recipients to GrantSolutions.gov as the portal for quarterly CRF reporting.
Presentations to Prime Recipients Coronavirus Relief Fund Reporting and Record
Retention Requirements (OIG-CA-20-027) was the product used to conduct the
webinars.
CARES Act oversight reports, CRF guidance, and a recording of the webinar are
available on the Treasury OIG CARES Act web page.
Manufacturing
We conduct audits of Treasury’s coin and currency programs. During this semiannual
period, we issued the following reports on these programs.
Mint Controls Over Raw Materials and Coin Exchange Programs
Need Improvement
We reviewed the United States Mint’s (Mint) controls over the quality assurance
of raw materials used in the production of U.S. circulating coinage, including the
quality assurance of raw materials that the Mint acquires from all its circulating
coinage material suppliers, and coins returned to the Mint from the public and
the Federal Reserve Banks (FRB) through the Mint’s coin exchange programs
which are recycled back into circulating coinage raw materials. We found that
the Mint and material suppliers had mature processes in place which yield
minimal quality issues. However, the Mint relied mainly on its material suppliers’
systems and certifications to ensure the quality of the circulating coin raw
materials. Additionally, the Mint’s inspections and testing to validate the quality
of raw materials were limited and inconsistent between the Mint facilities, and
there were opportunities for the Mint to improve controls over quality.
We also found that the Mint’s controls over the coins returned to the Mint from
the public and the FRBs were deficient and exposed the Mint to the risk of
paying out tens of millions of dollars for non-genuine U.S. coinage, as well as
not being able to ensure that these coins are being melted and recycled, as
required by law. The Mint suspended its Mutilated Coin Redemption Program,
which allows the public to exchange bent and partial coins, in 2015, to develop
additional safeguards. The Mint resumed the program in January 2018, without
finalizing or following its draft standard operating procedures (SOP), without
having the capability to authenticate coins returned, and without formal
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 7
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
procedures over the uncurrent coin redemption process, which includes coins
returned to the Mint through FRBs.
Accordingly, we recommended that the Director of the Mint ensures the Mint
(1) conducts regular reviews of the suppliers’ quality systems to ensure that the
suppliers are acting in the best interest of the Mint. This includes regular site
visits or periodic reviews of the suppliers’ quality system documentation;
(2) develops and implements SOPs that are consistent among Mint facilities to
ensure quality assurance processes over sampling, inspection, and testing of
materials for circulating coinage are standardized and documented; and that
materials received meet the specifications required in the contracts and by
U.S. law; (3) considers sampling and testing the material after blanking 4 to
assess the material quality throughout the coil; (4) verifies incoming raw
material weights to ensure that the Mint is receiving the raw materials paid for;
(5) considers improving raw materials traceability by using a unique number to
identify each coil rather than a group lot number; (6) strengthens and finalizes
SOPs for all coin exchange programs before accepting any redemptions. This
would include using tests and subject matter experts to authenticate the
genuineness of coins redeemed, as well as working with the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System to develop appropriate interagency procedures to
assure the integrity of the coin redemption process for uncurrent coins;
(7) follows all SOPs, including but not limited to, procedures related to
sampling, inspecting, and testing coins, and appropriately documenting
redemptions. Additionally, ensure that adequate background investigations are
conducted on bulk redeemers and decisions to allow participation into the
Mutilated Coin Redemption Program are based on relevant data from the
background investigation. The Mint should add criteria such as obtaining
financial statements for analyses of the potential bulk redeemers and performing
site visits at their premises as part of the background investigation process for
entry into the program. The Mint should document how this criteria was met,
and if these steps were not performed, the reasons why and; (8) ensures that
all coins returned to the Mint and removed from circulation are destroyed timely
and sufficiently accounted for. Mint management concurred with our
recommendations and outlined planned and taken corrective actions that met
the intent of our recommendations. (OIG-20-042)
Mint Human Resources Practices Need Improvement
We initiated an audit of human resources practices at the Mint in response to
four complaints received by our office that alleged, among other things,
unethical and unfair hiring and promotion practices at the Mint. We found that
4
The term blanking refers to the process that makes the rough shape of a coin.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 8
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
although the Mint generally conducted its human resources activities in
accordance with Federal and Treasury requirements, some improvements were
needed. Specifically, we found that the Mint (1) misassigned a reemployed
annuitant when it hired an annuitant for one position but then assigned the
employee to another role outside the scope of the reemployed annuitant hiring
authority, and (2) did not consistently maintain documentation of personnel
actions and the related decision-making processes for new appointments,
reassignments, and realignments.
We recommended that the Director of the Mint (1) ensure that reemployed
annuitants are assigned to positions consistent with the scope and limitations of
the authority under which they are appointed; (2) work with the Bureau of the
Fiscal Service’s (Fiscal Service) Administrative Resource Center to ensure all
required records are included in the e-electronic Official Personnel Folders; and
(3) establish internal controls to ensure all records related to the hiring and
promotion processes are properly managed and maintained. Mint management
agreed with our recommendations and outlined planned and taken corrective
actions that met the intent of our recommendations. (OIG-20-041)
Bureau of Engraving and Printing’s Implementation of Security
Features and Meaningful Access for the Blind and Visually Impaired
into New Note Design
The Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) implemented security features and
incorporated meaningful access for the blind and visually impaired into currency
through its newly structured note development governance and processes.
These efforts and activities are under the multi-agency effort referred to as the
United States Currency Program (USCP). We found that BEP was following the
Technology Development Process (TDP) and Banknote Development Process
(BDP) structured processes for note development which support BEP’s ability to
implement new security and raised tactile features in the next redesign of
currency; and there was a formal process that documented stakeholder
requirements, which included documenting security and meaningful access
feature requirements. However, further refinement to the processes’ guidance
to reflect lessons learned would improve effectiveness in note redesign and
development. BEP was also using an Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) to track
the progress of BEP’s redesign efforts; however, the IMS was still lacking
detailed schedules which identify risks and a more defined critical path. The IMS
combines major project milestones for security features development, note
development, equipment scheduling, new facility construction, and engineering.
We also noted that product managers have been using the BDP as a detailed
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 9
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
plan and activities schedule, but that these schedules had not been built into
IMS. Also, the IMS should incorporate detail for technical and key activities and
milestones for each redesign effort. In addition, we found that certain members
of the Advanced Counterfeit Deterrence Steering Committee (ACD) were not
attending committee meetings as was intended by the ACD charter, which in
turn, could impact the effectiveness of the ACD. The ACD charter does not
specify a timeline for updates or amendments, and it has not been updated for
15 years.
As part of this audit and in response to Congressional concerns, we also
reviewed the circumstances surrounding Treasury’s timeline for unveiling of new
design concepts for the $20 note. The former Secretary of the Treasury made
an April 2016 announcement proposing the release of the $5, $10 and $20
note designs in 2020. We confirmed that the design concept for the $20 note
will not be released in 2020, as this note has not yet entered the BDP where
the design concept is finalized. Rather, the current plan is for the $20 note to be
production-ready in 2030.
We recommended the Director of BEP in collaboration, as necessary, with
members of the USCP (1) continue to improve the BDP and TDP guidance,
including refining procedures to reflect lessons learned during its Catalyst note
series redesign; (2) review and implement actions within the IMS program to
improve the decision making process and help identify issues that may impact
the schedule of planned note redesign activities. This includes ensuring that
technical and key milestones are incorporated into the IMS at a detailed level;
and (3) ensure the ACD charter is updated in a timely manner, and as needed,
to ensure roles, responsibilities, and current practices such as the attendance of
ACD monthly meetings by appropriate personnel are clearly defined and
communicated to its members. BEP management agreed with our
recommendations and outlined corrective actions, both planned and taken, that
met the intent of our recommendations. (OIG-20-040)
Cost Proposal in Response to a BEP Solicitation
In an examination overseen by our office, the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA) reviewed a price proposal submitted in response to a BEP contract
solicitation. In its report, DCAA identified $93.4 million in questioned costs and
made one recommendation. Its examination results were submitted to BEP. Due
to the proprietary nature of contractor bid and proposal information, this report
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 10
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
is designated Sensitive But Unclassified. (OIG-20-043, Questioned Costs
$93,424,652)
Domestic Assistance Programs
We conduct audits of Treasury’s domestic assistance programs. During this reporting
period, we assessed the Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) Fund’s
administration of Technical Assistance (TA) awards under the CDFI Program.
Improvements Are Needed in the CDFI Fund’s Administration of
Technical Assistance Awards
We found that 41 of the 105 non-certified Technical Assistance awardees
(39 percent) from fiscal years 2006 through 2012 did not achieve CDFI
certification by the end of the 2-year performance period, or by another date
specified, in accordance with their Assistance Agreement(s). We also found that
Certification, Compliance Monitoring, and Evaluation (CCME) staff did not
(1) follow up on delinquent annual reports, (2) review awardees’ annual reports
timely and close out TA awards after the final performance period ends, and
(3) monitor awardees’ progress towards achieving CDFI certification.
We recommended that the Director of the CDFI Fund, (1) consider requiring a
reasonable CDFI Certification Application deadline for awardees in the
Assistance Agreement(s) that will allow CCME staff sufficient time to review
and make certification decisions within the 90 calendar day timeline outlined in
the CDFI Certification Procedures; (2) reassess CCME staff resources necessary
to review CDFI Certification Application(s) and make certification decisions
within the 90 calendar day timeline; (3) reassess the significance given to TA
awardees’ non-compliance with the CDFI certification requirement when making
a determination of default or no-default; (4) ensure that CCME staff fully
document the reasons for determinations of default or no-default when TA
awardees are non-compliant with their Assistance Agreement(s); (5) establish in
SOP a reasonable timeline for follow up on TA awardees’ delinquent annual
reports; (6) reassess information technology capabilities to determine if system
users can be automatically alerted of delinquent reports; (7) assess CCME
staffing levels for making awardee compliance determinations and closing out
awards within the timeline established in the updated SOP; (8) ensure the
closeout of all 315 TA awards within the fiscal years 2006 through 2012 scope
of this report; and (9) establish and implement procedures that require
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 11
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
monitoring of TA awardees’ progress toward meeting CDFI certification
requirements prior to submitting a CDFI Certification Application. CDFI Fund
management concurred with the 9 recommendations. (OIG-20-037)
Financial Regulation and Oversight
We conduct audits of Treasury offices responsible for financial regulation and
oversight. During this reporting period, we assessed the Office of Financial Research’s
(OFR) hiring practices between August 2017 and October 2018.
Review of the Office of Financial Research’s Hiring Practices
We found that OFR’s administration of the recruitment and selection process for
filling vacancies complied with applicable Office of Personnel Management,
Treasury, OFR, and other federal requirements. For example, OFR vacancy
announcements included all required items for a job announcement to attract job
seekers. Also, OFR gave members of the public an opportunity to compete for
vacant positions in their agency by publicly announcing most job opportunities
on USAJOBS for a minimum of five calendar days. Additionally, eligible
applicants were rated and ranked appropriately and were referred to the OFR
selecting official for consideration. Through our review of all selectees, we
found no instances of veterans being passed over by OFR for the selection of
non-preference eligibles. Accordingly, we made no recommendations.
(OIG-20-033)
Prior to 2015, OCC Missed Opportunities to Analyze and Address
Inappropriate Sales Practices at Wells Fargo Bank
We assessed the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) supervision
of incentive-based compensation structures within Wells Fargo and the
timeliness and adequacy of OCC’s supervisory and other actions taken related
to Wells Fargo’s sales practices, including the opening of accounts. We
concluded that OCC examiners missed opportunities from 2010 to 2014 to
analyze and address issues within Wells Fargo’s incentive-based compensation
structures. More specifically, although OCC assessed Wells Fargo’s governance
and risk management practices related to compliance and operational risk during
this period; it did not assess the bank’s oversight and governance of sales
practices until 2015. We believe this was due, in part, to OCC examiners not
sufficiently reviewing Wells Fargo’s internal complaint data. We also determined
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 12
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
that OCC lacked a formal complaint process for tracking “whistleblower-related”
referrals made to OCC from initiation through resolution. Specifically, OCC’s
former complaint process did not adequately record and track the research and
resolution of matters that were whistleblower-related.
In order to improve its supervisory process, OCC’s Enterprise Governance
Supervision (EGS) division performed an independent review of the Wells Fargo
supervisory record and summarized the findings of that review in its “Lessons-
Learned Review of Supervision of Sales Practices at Wells Fargo” report, dated
April 2017. In its review, EGS identified significant issues relating to OCC’s
supervisory actions regarding complaint management and sales practices which
align with our conclusion that prior to 2015, OCC examiners missed
opportunities to analyze and address issues within Wells Fargo’s incentive-based
compensation structures. EGS made nine recommendations for OCC to address
these and other supervisory issues. As of June 2018, all nine recommendations
have been addressed by OCC. Based on OCC taking corrective actions to
implement the nine recommendations identified in its lessons-learned review, we
did not make any recommendations to OCC. (OIG-20-046)
Financial Management
IPERA
As required by the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA),
we reported on Treasury’s and the Council’s overall compliance with IPERA for fiscal
year 2019. We also assessed compliance with additional improper payment reporting
requirements set forth in Executive Order (EO) 13520, “Reducing Improper Payments
and Eliminating Waste in Federal Programs,” and the Improper Payments Elimination
and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA).
Treasury Compliance with IPERA Fiscal Year 2019
We determined that Treasury met many requirements of IPERA but was not in
compliance for fiscal year 2019 because the Internal Revenue Service did not
report an overall improper payment rate of less than 10 percent for its Earned
Income Tax Credit, Additional Child Tax Credit, and American Opportunity Tax
Credit programs. In addition, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
found that authorities provided by the Internal Revenue Code were not
effectively used to address erroneous refundable credits; that increased
Correctable Error Authority could reduce the number of potentially erroneous
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 13
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
refundable credit payments; and that revising the Nonwork Social Security
Number case selection could increase revenue protected. We made no
recommendations in our report. (OIG-20-034)
Gulf Coast Compliance with IPERA Fiscal Year 2019
We determined that the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council was
compliant with all of the applicable requirements of IPERA for fiscal year 2019.
Accordingly, we made no recommendations in our report. (OIG-20-035)
Attestation Engagements
Independent certified public accounting firms, Sagger & Rosenberg, P.C. (S&R) and
KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contracts monitored by our office, completed the reports
described below in support of the audit of Treasury’s fiscal year 2020 consolidated
financial statements and the financial statement audits of certain other Federal
agencies.
Reports on the Processing of Transactions by Fiscal Service
KPMG examined the accounting and procurement processing and general
computer controls related to financial management services provided to various
Federal agencies by Fiscal Service’s Administrative Resource Center for the
period beginning July 1, 2019, and ending June 30, 2020. KPMG found, in all
material respects, that the controls were fairly presented in the description of
controls for these activities and suitably designed. KPMG also found that
controls tested operated effectively throughout the period. (OIG-20-044)
Reports on the Processing of Transactions by Treasury Enterprise
Business Solutions
S&R examined Treasury Enterprise Business Solutions’ description of controls
for processing user entities’ human resource transactions in its HRConnect
system; and the suitability of the design and effectiveness of these controls for
the period beginning July 1, 2019, and ending June 30, 2020. S&R found, in all
material respects, the controls were fairly presented in the description of
controls for this system, suitably designed, and controls tested operated
effectively throughout the period. (OIG-20-045)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 14
Office of Audit – Significant Audits and Other Products
Financial Audit
KPMG, an independent certified public accounting firm under a contract monitored by
our office, completed the report described below.
BEP’s Financial Statements
KPMG issued an unmodified opinion on BEP's financial statements for fiscal
years 2019 and 2018. The audit did not identify any matters involving internal
control and its operation that were considered material weaknesses or any
instances of reportable noncompliance with laws, regulations, and contracts
tested. However, the audit did identify deficiencies in BEP's internal control
determined to be significant deficiencies. (OIG-20-031) In connection with BEP’s
fiscal year 2019 financial statement audit, the auditors issued a management
letter on other matters involving internal control. (OIG-20-032)
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act
The following instances of noncompliance with the Federal Financial Management
Improvement Act of 1996, were reported in connection with the audit of Treasury’s
fiscal year 2019 consolidated financial statements.
Type of
C o n d it i on n o n c o m p li a n c e
Treasury continues to have deficiencies in IRS financial management systems. Federal financial
Specifically, Treasury did not consistently design, implement, and operate information management system
system controls and security programs over its financial systems in accordance with the requirements
Federal financial management system requirements. (first reported in fiscal year 1997)
Treasury has deficiencies in Fiscal Service Government-wide cash and Federal debt Federal financial
management information systems. Specifically, Fiscal Service did not consistently design, management system
implement, and operate information system controls and security programs over its cash requirements
and federal debt systems in accordance with the Federal financial management system
requirements. (first reported in fiscal year 2018)
The status of these instances of noncompliance, including progress in implementing
remediation plans, will be evaluated as part of the audit of Treasury’s fiscal year 2020
consolidated financial statements.
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Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 16
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations
CARES Act Investigation
Finding of Misconduct by Interior and Treasury employees for
Unauthorized Disclosure of Tribal Data Collected for CARES Act, Title V,
Coronavirus Relief Fund Administration
We initiated a joint investigation with the Department of the Interior (Interior) Office of
Inspector General (OIG) upon receipt of information from six Members of Congress,
regarding the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and Interior’s administration of
the CARES Act, Title V, Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) Tribal Government payments.
The letters from Members of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives
addressed concerns that the tribal data submitted to the Treasury’s CRF portal was
disseminated outside of the Executive Branch. One letter raised ethics concerns
associated with an Assistant Secretary at Interior. In our joint investigation, we
identified leaks of confidential tribal data by Interior employees and identified a
Treasury employee who mishandled emails containing confidential tribal data. Criminal
prosecution of the employees was presented on June 4, 2020, and declined by the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. We have provided responses to the
concerned Members of Congress and opened an investigation into the Treasury
employee. Interior OIG is providing an additional response that will also address the
ethics allegations.
Other Significant Investigations
Misconduct by OFAC Employee for Mishandled Foreign Government
Classified Information and Accepted Gifts from a Prohibited Source
Our investigation revealed an Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) employee
mishandled a foreign government’s classified information and accepted gifts from a
prohibited source. The case was initiated upon receipt of allegations from the
Government of Colombia that the OFAC employee improperly removed an entity from
the Specially Designated Nationals list and leaked investigative information regarding a
separate foreign entity. The Government of Colombia’s allegations were
unsubstantiated. The Report of Investigation was provided to OFAC for information.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 17
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations
CPA Used Treasury Payments to Embezzle and Launder over $15 Million
Our joint investigation with the U.S. Secret Service and Internal Revenue Service,
Criminal Investigation was initiated upon receipt of information from the
U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the Middle District of Florida, regarding a Certified
Public Accountant (CPA) and son who embezzled more than $15 million from elderly
clients. The CPA and son laundered scheme proceeds using estimated tax payments
and tax refunds from the Treasury, numerous shell companies, and the purchase of
assets. Over $6 million was forfeited, but criminal prosecution of the CPA was
declined due to his death and prosecution of the son was declined for insufficient
evidence by the USAO.
Regional Sewer Authority Paid $1.3 Million as Part of Settlement
Agreement
Our investigation determined a regional sewer authority in Kentucky participated in the
Treasury’s State and Local Government Securities (SLGS) Program, which offers
special low yield securities to state and local governments and other issuers of tax-
exempt bonds for investment. The sewer authority conducted a series of SLGS
transactions pursuant to a trading strategy where the sewer authority requested
redemption of certain SLGS securities in a manner contrary to the purposes of the
Program and Treasury regulations. The sewer authority paid $1.3 million as part of a
civil settlement agreement with the USAO for the Western District of Kentucky.
Prosecution Declined for Subject Linked to the Receipt of Unentitled
Government Funds
Our investigation was initiated from information provided by the District of Columbia
Retirement Board that pension payments for a deceased beneficiary continued
13 years after the beneficiary’s death, and resulted in an over payment of $790,000.
The investigation determined there was an individual linked to the deceased
beneficiary’s account, but that individual was also deceased. An additional individual
was identified and linked to approximately $95,000 of unentitled funds. Criminal
prosecution was presented and declined by the USAO and the Attorney General for
the District of Columbia.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 18
Office of Investigations – Significant Investigations
Unsubstantiated Allegations of TTB Agents who Improperly Disclosed Tax
Information
Our investigation was initiated after receiving allegations that Alcohol and Tobacco
Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) agents improperly disclosed tax information to the New
York State Liquor Authority. TTB has agreements with many state and local
authorities, and it is not uncommon for TTB and state and local authorities to visit
locations together and conduct parallel investigations. The investigation determined
that no inappropriate dissemination of tax information occurred.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 19
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Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 20
Treasury OIG Accomplishments and Activities
2020 Continuing Professional Education Symposium
The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) Office
of Audit held its 2020 continuing professional education symposium May 19 to
May 21, 2020. In attendance were 96 Treasury OIG staff members. The symposium
provided 24 hours of online, quality training in the areas of (1) data analysis,
(2) coaching effective writing, (3) developing effective relationships, (4) managing
projects, and (5) working with Congress.
Treasury OIG Leadership Roles
Treasury OIG professionals serve on various important public and private professional
organizations supporting the Federal audit community. Examples of participation in
these organizations follow:
Deborah Harker, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, serves as the Co-Chair of the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Federal Audit
Executive Council’s (FAEC) Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014
(DATA Act) Working Group Governance Committee. Ms. Harker also represents CIGIE
on the Chief Financial Officers Council, Leveraging Data as a Strategic Asset Working
Group. Ms. Harker also represents Treasury OIG on the National Association of State
Auditors, Comptrollers, and Treasurers Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Accountability Work Group.
Pauletta Battle, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Financial Management and
Transparency Audits, chairs the FAEC’s DATA Act Working Group, which educates
Inspectors General and Government financial communities on the DATA Act oversight
process. The Working Group consists of approximately 200 members representing at
least 48 OIGs. Other OIG representatives that contributed to this effort were
Andrea Smith, Audit Director; Maria McLean, Auditor-In-Charge; and Herb Addy,
Auditor-In-Charge.
Donna Joseph, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Cyber, Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), and Financial Assistance Audits, serves as
the National Single Audit Coordinator for Treasury, and is a member of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) National Governmental Accounting
and Auditing Update planning committee. The committee coordinated its annual
conference in Washington, DC.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 21
Treasury OIG Accomplishments and Activities
James Hodge, Audit Director, serves with Ms. Joseph on the AICPA National
Governmental Accounting and Auditing Update Conference planning committee.
Andrea Smith, Audit Director, led a virtual half-day workshop the OIG hosted for the
National Association of Black Accountants, Inc. Accounting Career Awareness
Program (ACAP) on July 15, 2020. ACAP’s primary objective is to increase the
understanding of accounting and business career opportunities among high school
students from underrepresented ethnic groups. ACAP, a one-week residency program
at Howard University, introduces students to accounting, finance, economics, and
management through a focused, undergraduate-level program taught by college faculty
and guest lecturers from business and Government. During the week, students had the
opportunity to attend virtual classes on careers in accounting and business, personal
development, college preparation. The OIG’s workshop encouraged students to learn
about auditing and other career disciplines in the Federal sector through technical
sessions and team building exercises.
Chereeka Straker, Audit Manager, Alicia Weber, Audit Manager, and Robert Hong,
Auditor-In-Charge, are participating on CIGIE’s Quality Assurance Working Group. The
Working Group is identifying good practices for implementing quality assurance across
the OIG community.
Andrew Berke, Audit Manager, assisted CIGIE’s Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee with the development of the new PandemicOversight.gov website.
Mr. Berke reconciled Treasury Appropriation Warrants to COVID-19 funding data
obtained from over 35 Inspectors General offices. The reconciled funding data is
displayed publicly on the PandemicOversight.gov website.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 22
Statistical Summary
Summary of Treasury OIG Activities
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
Number or
OIG Activity Dollar Value
Office of Counsel Activities
Regulation and legislation reviews 6
Instances where information was refused 0
Office of Audit Activities
Reports issued and other products 35
Disputed audit recommendations 0
Significant revised management decisions 0
Management decision in which the Inspector General disagrees 0
Monetary benefits (audit)
Questioned costs $93,424,652
Funds put to better use $0
Total monetary benefits $93,424,652
Office of Investigations Activities*
Criminal and judicial actions (including joint investigations)
Investigative reports issued 107
Cases referred for prosecution and/or litigation 15
Individuals referred for criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice 33
Individuals referred for criminal prosecution to state and local authorities 3
Cases accepted for prosecution and/or litigation 8
Arrests 8
Indictments/informations 18
Convictions (by trial and plea) 8
*During the reporting period, defendants were sentenced to 26 months of prison time, 204 months of
probation, 6 months of home detention, ordered to pay fines, restitution, and court fees in the amount
of $885,930, seizures and forfeitures in the amount of $146,035, and civil judgements, civil
settlements, and civil recoveries in the amount of $948,516.
Metrics Used for Office of Investigations Activities
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigative
statistics listed above were obtained through reports drawn from Treasury OIG’s
Office of Investigations case management system.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 23
Statistical Summary
Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations
Issued prior to April 1, 2020
The following list of Treasury OIG reports with unimplemented recommendations is
based on information in Treasury’s automated audit recommendation tracking system,
which is maintained by Treasury management officials, and recommendations tracked
by other Federal organizations related to Treasury OIG’s oversight of the Resources
and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Operations, and Revived Economies of the Gulf
Coast States Act of 2012 (RESTORE Act) programs and activities of the Gulf Coast
Ecosystem Restoration Council (Council) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Science, Observation, Monitoring,
and Technology Program.
Treasury OIG is reporting 129 open and unimplemented recommendations for
21 reports issued prior to April 1, 2020 with $12,471,856 in potential cost savings.
Treasury OIG considers all unimplemented recommendations for reports issued over
6 months to be significant.
Treasury Programs and Operations
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2016 OIG-16-059 General Management: Treasury Has Policies 09/16
and Procedures to Safeguard Classified
Information but They Are Not Effectively
Implemented
1. The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis should direct the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security to update the Treasury Security
Manual to include procedures requiring the Office of Security Programs to
follow up and obtain all bureau self-inspection reports. Management agreed
with the recommendation.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 24
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2017 OIG-17-044 Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering: Federal 05/17
Agencies Are Generally Satisfied with TFFC's
Collaboration Efforts, but Enhancements Can
Be Made
1. The Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing should develop policies and
procedures to ensure continuity and consistency in collaboration efforts
with interagency task forces and workgroups.
2. Develop and implement a mechanism to monitor, evaluate, and report on
the effectiveness of the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes'
(TFFC) interagency collaboration.
3. Develop meaningful performance measures specific to TFFC collaboration.
4. Address areas of concern expressed by Federal agencies regarding TFFC’s
collaboration that includes feedback, intersessional meetings, and invitations
to participate in bilateral meetings with foreign countries during the
Financial Action Task Force Plenary. Management agreed with the
recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2018 OIG-18-018 Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering: OFAC 11/17
Human Resources Practices Need
Improvement
1. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Director should ensure that
legacy employees' current position descriptions are evaluated to ensure that
the documented promotion potential of these non-supervisory employees is
consistent with OFAC's current promotion practices. Management agreed
with the recommendation.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 25
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2018 OIG-18-043 Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering: 04/18
OFAC’s Licensing Program Would Benefit
From System Enhancements
1. The Director of OFAC should develop performance measures specific for the
licensing division. Management agreed with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2018 OIG-18-044 Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering: Audit 04/18
of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis’
Authorities and Actions Related to U.S.
Persons’ Financial Information
1. The Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, as
expeditiously as possible, should ensure that the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis’s (OIA) U.S. Persons Procedures are finalized and submitted for
approval to the Attorney General of the United States.
2. Implements a compliance monitoring program to assess whether intelligence
analysts' activities are conducted in accordance with OIA authorities, and
electronic searches and other queries are performed in a manner that fully
protects the rights of U.S. persons. Management agreed with the
recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2019 OIG-19-007 Information Technology: Department of the 10/18
Treasury Federal Information Security
Modernization Act Fiscal Year 2018
Performance Audit
1. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) management
should develop a plan that incorporates and takes into account interruptions
in TIGTA System funding.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 26
Statistical Summary
The recommendation is closed in Treasury’s audit follow-up system, the
Joint Audit Management Enterprise System (JAMES), however, the auditors
consider the recommendation to be unimplemented.
2. TIGTA management should obtain and issue full Authority to Operate to
include the following: a. Ensure that the TIGTA System's current System
Security Plan is finalized and updated to include the system architecture and
all security controls based on system categorization are implemented
according with Treasury Directive Publication 85-01, Department of the
Treasury Information Technology Security Program and National Institute of
Standards (TD P 85-01) and Technology Special Publication 800-53
Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations (NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 4), guidance. b. Develop Plan of
Action and Milestones for the 144 out of 159 TIGTA System NIST
SP 800-53, Rev. 4, security controls that were not implemented or were
partially implemented. c. Complete the Security Assessment and
Authorization package for the TIGTA System in accordance with NIST SP
800-37 Revision 1, Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to
Federal Information Systems.
3. Establish a current enterprise baseline of software and related
configurations for the TIGTA System.
4. Develop and disseminate to TIGTA personnel a TIGTA System Information
System Contingency Plan that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination, and compliance to
facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy and
associated contingency planning controls. TIGTA should conduct disaster
recovery and business continuity testing for the TIGTA System on the
frequency stipulated by a Business Impact Analysis. Management agreed
with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2019 OIG-19-038 Domestic and International Assistance 07/19
Programs: Audit of ASI Federal Credit Union’s
CDFI Program Awards
1. The Director of the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI)
Fund should determine whether ASI Federal Credit Union (ASI) was in
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 27
Statistical Summary
default of its 2006 through 2009, 2011, and 2012 Assistance
Agreements as a result of submitting invalid information in its Certification
Application and Assistance Applications for fiscal years 2006 through
2009, 2011, and 2012 and its failure to deploy all Healthy Food
Financing Initiative Financial Assistance (HFFI-FA) awards; and as such,
take appropriate action which may include requiring ASI to reimburse the
CDFI Fund all Financial Assistance and HFFI-FA awards, and suspending
or revoking ASI's CDFI certification.
2. Re-evaluate ASI’s fiscal year 2013 Certification Application and fiscal
year 2013 Assistance Application to determine if the information
submitted was valid and complete and if ASI met all eligibility
requirements to be re-certified as a CDFI and to receive its $1,347,000
Financial Assistance award. Management agreed with the
recommendations.
Questioned $12,298,806
Cost
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2019 OIG-19-039 Domestic Assistance - Recovery Act: Audit of 07/19
Georgia Department of Community Affairs'
Payment Under 1602 Program
1. Treasury's Fiscal Assistant Secretary should ensure that the Georgia
Department of Community Affairs (DCA) provides sufficient support of
other eligible costs used to offset the $170,500 of excess 1602 Program
payments made to 14 subawardees for unallowable legal fees. For any
costs that cannot be sufficiently supported, ensure that DCA reimburses
Treasury. Management agreed with the recommendations.
Questioned $170,500
Cost
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 28
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2019 OIG-19-040 DATA Act: Treasury's Efforts to Increase 07/19
Transparency Into Federal Spending Continue,
But Further Refinement is Needed
1. The Fiscal Assistant Secretary should update the Digital Accountability and
Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) Program Management Office's
resource documentation to give prompt attention to staffing and succession
planning for DATA Act implementation efforts to mitigate against resource
gaps.
2. Develop an internal reference document for the DATA Act Program
Management Office development team that explains why a designation of
warning versus fatal error was assigned to each rule.
3. Incorporate sub-rules that already appear in Broker output (i.e.,C23.1,
C23.2, C23.3) and an explanation of potential formatting violations (with
appropriate error designations) into the DATA Act Information Model
Schema (DAIMS) Validation Rules v1.1.2 and Financial Assistance Broker
Submission Validation Checklist v1.1 (or the most updated versions of
these).
4. Either develop an instruction guide to interpret DATA Act Broker output or
incorporate mechanisms in the output itself to aid user interpretation when
multiple fields are impacted by the same rule.
5. Perform testing and provide documentation assuring that the limited
validation rules identified as having inconsistencies operate as intended in
the DATA Act Broker with accurately displayed output.
6. Develop procedures to ensure changes to rules implemented during coding
are subsequently captured in official DAIMS documentation.
7. Enhance generic disclaimers on USAspending.gov and expand the use of
limitation statements on pages with known and potential display issues so
that the public has a clear understanding of known limitations when using
the data as displayed and available for download.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 29
Statistical Summary
8. Either expand the Interface Definition Document or create a complementary
document that includes all elements used for validation, derivation, and
display purposes from external tables that interface with the Broker and
USAspending.gov. Documentation should include the cadence on which the
tables are pulled or referenced by the DATA Act Broker. Management
agreed with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2019 OIG-19-041 Interim Audit Update - Matters for 07/19
Consideration Prior to Fiscal Service's
Selection of the Direct Express® Debit Card
Program Financial Agent
1. The Commissioner of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Fiscal Service) should
periodically request access to the Regulation E compliance reviews related
to Direct Express conducted by the banking regulators under the provisions
outlined in 12 CFR 261 or other relevant provisions related to the regulator.
This information should be used by the Fiscal Service to monitor the
financial agent's compliance with the Federal Agency Agreement and
Service Level Requirements or to improve Direct Express. Management
agreed with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-002 Information Technology: Department of the 10/19
Treasury Federal Information Security
Modernization Act Fiscal Year 2019
Performance Audit for Collateral National
Security Systems (Sensitive but Unclassified)
1. This recommendation is Sensitive But Unclassified.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented. Management agreed with the
recommendation.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 30
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-003 Information Technology: Department of the 10/19
Treasury Federal Information Security
Modernization Act Fiscal Year 2019
Performance Audit
1. Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) management should assess and
remediate vulnerabilities identified during Security Content Automation
Protocol (SCAP) configuration baseline compliance and vulnerability
scanning within the required timeframes specified in the BEP Minimum
Standard Parameters.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented.
2. Departmental Offices (DO) management should develop and implement a
process to ensure that periodic user access reviews are completed for DO
System 2, documented, and all unnecessary access is removed in
accordance with NIST SP 800-53 and TD P 85-01.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented.
3. United States Mint (Mint) management should establish a quality control
process to ensure that user access to Mint System 1 and other Mint
information systems follow the access management process requiring the
completed background investigations, signed non-disclosure agreements
(NDA), signed rules of behavior (ROB), and completion of the security
awareness training.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented.
4. Mint management should clearly document and formally approve
exemptions to the Mint's access authorization process when a business
justification exists.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 31
Statistical Summary
5. Mint management should update the Mint Information Security Policy to
meet TD P 85-01 and NIST requirements related to access agreements and
ROB.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented.
6. Mint management should finalize and implement its bureau-wide privacy
program that includes a strategic organizational privacy plan for
implementing applicable privacy control and procedures in accordance with
NIST 800-53.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented.
7. Mint management should implement mechanisms to monitor and audit on a
regular basis the effectiveness of its privacy controls and internal privacy
policy at the bureau-level.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented.
8. Mint management should establish sufficient controls to ensure
supervisors/managers are held accountable for the completion of the role-
based specialized information technology security training by their
employees with security roles and responsibilities.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented.
9. Fiscal Service management should protect the confidentiality and integrity
of transmissions by encrypting Fiscal Service System 2 data in transit as
required by NIST 800-53, Rev. 4.
The recommendation is closed in JAMES, however, the auditors consider
the recommendation to be unimplemented.
10. Fiscal Service management should enforce encryption of databases to
protect the confidentiality of Fiscal Service Systems 1 and 2 as required by
NIST 800-53, Rev. 4. Management agreed with the recommendations.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 32
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-007 DATA Act: Treasury Continues to Make 11/19
Progress in Meeting its DATA Act Reporting
Requirements
1. Treasury's Assistant Secretary for Management (ASM), working as needed
with Treasury's Senior Accountable Official, the Senior Procurement
Executive, reporting entities, the Program Management Office (PMO), and
the Office of Management and Budget should request that Treasury's PMO
ensures File D2 data is properly extracted from appropriate sources within
System for Award Management (SAM) for publication on USAspending.gov.
2. Develop and implement a method and procedures to submit Treasury
Forfeiture Fund financial assistance award data to the Financial Assistance
Broker Submission in accordance with the reporting submission
specifications established by DAIMS. Management agreed with the
recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-012 Financial Management: Audit of the 11/19
Department of the Treasury's Consolidated
Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2019
and 2018
1. The ASM and Deputy Chief Financial Officer should ensure that Fiscal
Service implements requisite corrective actions to resolve control
deficiencies over its cash management and debt information systems.
2. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) implements corrective actions to resolve the
control deficiencies at IRS.
3. IRS and Fiscal Service develop and implement remediation plans outlining
actions to be taken to resolve noncompliance with the federal financial
management system requirements and the resources and responsible
organizational units for such planned actions. Management agreed with the
recommendations.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 33
Statistical Summary
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-015 Financial Management: Management Letter for 12/19
the Audit of the Department of the Treasury's
Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal
Years 2019 and 2018
1. DO management should communicate the timeframe required to disable or
remove the access of terminated employees and contractors from DO
systems to the appropriate staff, and communicate the timeframe required
to disable or remove the access of terminated employees and contractors
from the Treasury-wide Financial Analysis and Reporting System (FARS)
application, which includes the Treasury Information Executive Repository
(TIER) and TIER Financial Statements (TFS), to the appropriate staff.
Management agreed with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-017 Financial Management: Management Letter for 12/19
the Audit of the United States Mint's Financial
Statements for Fiscal Years 2019 and 2018
1. United States Mint (Mint) management should design and implement
controls to ensure that expenses and related accruals are accounted for and
reported in the Mint's financial statements in accordance with U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Management agreed with
the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-022 Financial Management: Management Report 12/19
for the Audit of the Department of the
Treasury's Consolidated Financial Statements
for Fiscal Years 2019 and 2018
1. Fiscal Service management should address the mainframe operating system
vulnerabilities noted in the condition as soon as possible.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 34
Statistical Summary
2. Develop a tailored mainframe operating system security configuration
baseline that specifies how security configuration options are to be set
based on the selected industry guidance.
3. Ensure that the chief information security officer assign specific
responsibility for providing controls over operating system security,
including access permissions to all system datasets and all security-related
option settings.
4. Develop and document controls over changes and monitor update access to
all key system datasets.
5. Develop and document controls to prevent unauthorized, unnecessary read
access to system datasets containing sensitive information.
6. Develop and document controls and baseline documentation of mainframe
operating system options specified in the configuration files.
7. Establish which techniques are to be used to control update access to key
system datasets and to control read access to sensitive system datasets
(such as the security software database and the page files), whether a
third-party tool is to be used, or tailored change control mechanisms, and
develop procedures and documentation to support their use.
8. Provide for annual review of all techniques that permit a program to obtain
the privileges of the operating system.
9. Develop procedures to provide assurance that programs installed with the
privileges of the operating system (whether purchased from software
vendors or internally developed) do not introduce security.
10. Develop, document, and implement policies, procedures, and controls to
conduct periodic reviews of actual mainframe security software settings
against the security baseline weaknesses.
11. Develop a mainframe security software risk assessment process using the
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical
Implementation Guide (STIG) as a guideline.
12. Develop a tailored mainframe security software configuration baseline that
specifies how security configuration options should be set based on the
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 35
Statistical Summary
industry guidance. As part of this action, management should develop and
document a baseline specifying for each possible setting in the security
software control file how the option should be set and who is responsible
for approving the setting.
13. Use the mainframe security software configuration baseline to harden the
mainframe environment, including the Payment Authorization Manager
(PAM) and Payments, Claims, and Enhanced Reconciliations (PACER)
production.
14. Remove duplicate and excessive permissions in the mainframe security
software database.
15. Perform an annual comparison of each actual setting in the mainframe
security software control file to each setting specified in the baseline to
verify compliance with the baseline.
16. Develop and document procedures for controlling updates to the mainframe
security software control file.
17. Define and document the segregation of functions and privileges based on
the principle of least privilege for mainframe security software and operating
system.
18. Review and establish access permissions to the mainframe system and
security software based on the principle of least privilege access.
19. Identify and document the person responsible for approving each access
permission.
20. Review and re-assess each access permission in the mainframe security
software dataset and resource rules on a periodic basis.
21. Develop procedures and documentation to establish the following for each
dataset permission, resource permission, and mainframe security software
privilege: a. Responsibility for approving access and enforcing compliance
with the principle of least privilege; b. Actual access meets the principle of
least privilege; and c. Any discrepancy from approved access will be
identified and corrected.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 36
Statistical Summary
22. Develop, document and implement policies, procedures, and controls for
comprehensive logging and monitoring of events. Procedures and controls
should include an annual re-assessment of whether logging and reporting is
adequate.
23. Review and determine which profiles, applications, databases, and other
processes on the mainframe will be logged and reviewed.
24. Assess all mainframe logs to determine which logs should be evaluated by
the incident management tool.
25. Establish appropriate alerts and event thresholds for those mainframe logs
required to be evaluated by the external tracking.
26. Develop and implement data and analysis tools and processes for identifying
event trends, patterns, spikes, and exceptions tool.
27. Identify non-security related purposes for logging and monitoring (including
performance tuning, problem management, capacity planning, and
management of service level agreements); assign responsibility for
addressing them and for integrating them with security uses of logging and
monitoring.
28. Identify the possible sources of log information; determine how each is to
be used for security monitoring; and develop procedures to ensure that each
type of logging which is necessary for effective security monitoring is
activated.
29. Annually assess the effectiveness of security logging and monitoring,
ensuring that the volume of logged events is limited to just those that are
needed for security, and ensuring that monitoring results include effective
identification and response for any violations and for any significant trends
(such as an increase in the number of password resets for a given group of
users or repetition of the same attempted but failed attempt to access a
productions dataset or resource).
30. Identify, document, and assess the mainframe security controls affecting
the system software, to fully describe how mainframe security is provided.
These Fiscal Service management controls should include: a. Specific
assignment of responsibility for maintaining operating security, b. Skill
assessment and remediation for operating system security maintenance,
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 37
Statistical Summary
c. Baseline documents for mainframe configuration files, d. Standard
procedures for review and maintenance of operating system security, and
e. Standard procedures to compare actual configuration settings to baseline
documents.
31. Develop, approve, and promulgate control standards that address the
purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
coordination among organizational entities, and compliance processes.
32. Update mainframe documentation to be consistent with Fiscal Service and
TD P 85-01.
33. Develop procedures and documentation to establish who is responsible and
how effective security is achieved for controls requirements.
34. Implement an oversight process to determine that designated Fiscal Service
personnel reviews and reevaluates privileges associated with the UNIX
production environment semiannually for privileged accounts.
35. Configure the systems-management software agents to include all UNIX
servers, databases, and users' accounts within the UNIX environment when
generating the users' lists for the semiannual review and recertification
process so that all privileged and non-privileged users' access is reviewed.
36. Update UNIX semiannual account review and recertification procedures to
include quality control steps to validate that systems-management software
is generating complete and accurate account listings for all UNIX servers
and databases privileged and non-privileged user accounts within the UNIX
environment prior to completing the review and recertification process.
37. Finalize policies and procedures to review audit logs of production DB2
servers.
38. Implement an oversight process to ensure that designated Fiscal Service
personnel: a. Reviews the security logs for the UNIX and DB2 servers
hosting the Payment Information Repository (PIR), Judgment Fund Internet
Claim System (JFICS), and Security Payment System (SPS) applications on
a pre-defined frequency, as indicated in the Fiscal Service Baseline Security
Requirements (BLSR). b. Formally documents completion of their reviews
and any escalations to the Information System Security Office, and
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 38
Statistical Summary
c. Retains the audit logs and documentation of its reviews for 18 months,
as required by the BLSR.
39. Periodically review Fiscal Service management's implementation and
operation of the review the security audit logs for the UNIX and DB2
servers hosting the PIR, JFICS, and SPS applications to determine that
Fiscal Service management completes the reviews on a pre-defined basis,
documents completion of the reviews and escalations, and maintains such
documentation.
40. Establish an effective enforcement process or mechanism to ensure that
(a) UNIX and DB2 events and monitoring controls are followed, and
(b) Fiscal Service management has confidence it consistently reviews for
potential unauthorized or inappropriate activity.
41. Update its current PIR security procedures to require that management
obtain current PIR developer access requirement listings from the service
provider and use them when validating the appropriateness of PIR developer
access during the semiannual access reviews and recertification of the PIR
and UNIX environments.
42. Maintain the documentation used to review and recertify the access of the
known PIR service provider developers evidencing that their access to the
UNIX environments is commensurate with their job functions and
responsibilities.
43. Ensure that developers do not have the ability to make changes to the PIR
production environment.
44. Remove users' access once validated by the Federal Program Agency (FPA),
during the SPS annual user access review.
45. Retain evidence of recertification of all users.
46. Oversee the recertification process and ensure that access corrections are
processed once received from the FPA.
47. Review and enhance the manual processes and procedures to ensure that
user access to all resources as defined for Treasury Web Application
Infrastructure (TWAI) users are accurately and completely identified and
evaluated during the course of the General Support System 1 (GSS1) and
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 39
Statistical Summary
General Support System 2 (GSS2) TWAI User Privilege Recertification
cycles.
48. Complete the GSS1 TWAI User Access Recertification cycle within the time
intervals set by Fiscal Service BLSR requirements.
49. Create a policy to require a formal review, approval, and documentation of
the results for the Segregation of Duties (SD) matrix review on an annual
basis or when there is a significant change.
50. Document in an SD or Access Management Matrix the Treasury Managed
Accounts (TMA) SD responsibilities for Fiscal Accounting Operations and
maintain the supporting documentation used to review and approve the SD
matrix in accordance with the policy.
51. Maintain the supporting documentation used to review and document the
results, as well as approve SD responsibility matrices for DO and
Government-Wide Cash (GWC) TMA in accordance with the policy.
52. Identify conflicting roles and privileges in the DO GWC, and TMA
responsibilities matrices that should not be assigned to an Oracle Financials
user when access is granted and reviewed on an annual basis.
53. Remove and disable the two users' access immediately.
54. Implement a quality control process to ensure that PIR application accounts
defined to the PIR production environment that have been inactive for over
120 days are disabled.
55. Review and update the Enterprise Information Technology Infrastructure
System Security Plans, Attachment A-Security Control Matrix, to be
consistent with the Fiscal Service BLSR and the Chief Information Officer
Publication Information System Security Internal Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP) 8.3.6.60 UNIX/LINUX Account Management.
56. Configure the six UNIX servers to enforce the minimum password as stated
in the Fiscal Service BLSR and ensure that the default password
configuration settings for the production Unix environments comply with the
minimum requirements specified in the BLSR.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 40
Statistical Summary
57. Develop and implement a policy and a control to ensure the complete and
accurate transfer of user account information from Identity and Access
Management (IDAM) to Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) on an
ongoing basis for the Collections Information Repository, Treasury Check
Information System, and JFICS.
58. Perform an analysis for all financial system, mixed systems, and supporting
general support systems to identify instances where user account
information in IDAM and LDAP do not match and implement corrective
actions to remediate these instances.
59. Prioritize and reevaluate its procedures to outline a process to complete the
application security log reviews over the SPS application and establish a
process to perform the review at a defined frequency and update the
procedures when changes occur.
60. Include provisions in their process oversight so that at no time the weekly
SPS log reviews are not assigned.
61. Develop and implement a quality control process to ensure that PIR
emergency change approvals are consistently obtained, documented, and
retained by the Change Control Board prior to implementing changes into
the PIR production environment.
62. Develop and implement documentation to assign responsibility for ensuring
adequacy of UNIX and database security and baseline settings.
63. Update existing UNIX and database configuration security baseline
documents to ensure that these documents fully incorporate and enforce
the components of the DISA STIG. Management should document any
deviations from the STIGs and note compensating controls that mitigate the
security risk to an acceptable level.
64. Develop, document, and implement policies, procedures, and controls to
conduct periodic reviews of actual UNIX and database settings against the
security configuration baselines.
65. Provide logging and monitoring of security related events to include the
retention of evidence of reviews performed.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 41
Statistical Summary
66. Develop a baseline of essential security settings and specifying that baseline
as the standard to be observed.
67. Implement corrective actions to address all vulnerabilities associated with
the baseline enforcement to include removing the three default user
accounts on UNIX servers. Management agreed with the recommendations.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-023 Bill and Coin Manufacturing: BEP Improved 12/19
Governance and Oversight over Note
Development and Production But Challenges
Remain
1. The Director of BEP should finalize the required 5-year update of the
memorandum of understanding with the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Board) to formalize BEP and the Board's responsibilities
and authorities related to notes including activities, procedures, and
obligations related to the annual production, destruction, and research and
development of notes. Management agreed with the recommendation.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-027 Resource Management: Audit of the 02/20
Department of the Treasury Departmental
Offices Executive Pay Adjustments, Bonuses,
and Awards
1. The ASM should ensure that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Human Resources and Chief Human Capital Officer (DASHR/CHCO)
and the Office of Executive Resources (OER) develop, implement, and
include effective internal controls within its policies and SOP to ensure
Treasury's Senior Executive Service (SES) basic pay rates are in
compliance with 5 CFR 534.403(a)(3)(b), Suspension of certification of
performance appraisal system; and 5 CFR 534.404 (h)(2), Setting pay
upon transfer.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 42
Statistical Summary
2. DASHR/CHCO and OER calculate the overpayment amounts for the two
DO SES members whose pay was set higher than allowed by regulation.
3. DASHR/CHCO and OER seek recovery of the overpayment amounts or
exercise the authority to waive any claim in accordance with applicable
Federal regulations and Treasury's Directive 34-01, Waiving Claims
Against Treasury Employees for Erroneous Payments.
4. DASHR/CHCO and OER complete Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
data calls in accordance with OPM's applicable instructions and guidance
to ensure all required employees, such as those who have left Treasury,
are properly reported.
5. DASHR/CHCO finalizes and approves Treasury's SES Pay and Awards
policy, and then periodically reviews it for continued relevance,
effectiveness, and transparency in making pay decisions and awarding
bonuses, assesses staffing levels, workforce skills, and respective
budgets to determine whether additional personnel should and can
plausibly be incorporated into future strategic planning to ensure OER can
meet its goals and mission.
6. DASHR/CHCO finalizes and approves Treasury's SES Pay and Awards
policy, and then periodically reviews it for continued relevance,
effectiveness, and transparency in making pay decisions and awarding
bonuses.
7. OER documents the processes and SOP, with appropriate detail, followed
in administering Treasury DO SES member performance ratings, pay
adjustments, and bonuses.
8. OER oversees the process regarding exceptions to the 12-month rule.
9. OER includes information regarding the approval process for waiver
requests for exceptions to the 12-month rule in the instructions provided
to bureau heads and DO policy offices. This information should be
consistent with Federal regulations and Treasury's SES Pay and Awards
policy.
10. OER submits Treasury's respective data call report to OPM by the due
dates established by 5 CFR 534.405, Performance awards, and before
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 43
Statistical Summary
any established deadlines per OPM's annual data call memorandum.
Management agreed with the recommendations.
Questioned $2,550
Cost
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-029 Gulf Coast Restoration: Jefferson Parish's 03/20
Internal Control over Federal Awards
1. & 2. The Fiscal Assistant Secretary should ensure that deficiencies identified in
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana's (Jefferson Parish) controls over Federal awards
are considered as part of the Treasury's oversight of future awards as well
as risk assessments of Jefferson Parish as required by the Uniform
Administrative Requirements, Cost Principals, and Audit Requirements for
Federal Awards (2 CFR Part 200) (Uniform Guidance). Management agreed
with the recommendation. This recommendation is counted as two
recommendations because it applies to both findings in the report.
Fiscal Report Number Report Title Date
Year Issued
2020 OIG-20-030 Bill and Coin Manufacturing: The United 03/20
States Mint Numismatic Order Management
System is Meeting User Needs But
Improvements to Oversight are Needed
1. The Mint Director should ensure the Numismatic and Bullion Directorate
periodically reviews Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP)
performance measures to determine necessary adjustments and develop
corrective action plans, as required by the QASP with the contractor, where
needed.
2. Retains evidence of its monitoring activities outlined in the contract's QASP
to better document the Mint's oversight of the contractor's compliance with
contract requirements.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 44
Statistical Summary
3. Obtains and validates contractor's supporting documentation against
monthly performance reports and retains this as part of the Mint's monthly
monitoring documentation.
4. Assesses the need to include, the loss of the Mint's Order Management
System (OMS-II) contractor as a potential risk to the numismatic program as
part of the Mint's Risk Management Program.
5. Performs an assessment regarding the impact of not having language
accessibility for Mint's numismatic program services and considers adding
these services to OMS-II.
6. Performs analyses to determine the feasibility and potential impact of
proposed actions to improve numismatic sales, performs additional studies
to enhance future sales, and reports the results to stakeholders.
Management agreed with the recommendations.
Closed Investigations of Senior Government Employees Not
Publicly Disclosed
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
Treasury OIG closed two investigations involving senior Government employees during
the period that were not publicly disclosed. In both of these investigations, an instance
of misconduct was substantiated against a senior Government employee.
Case Number Allegation/Disposition
DO-19-0044-I Treasury OIG received a complaint from DO that one of its
employees traveled to the Middle East to attend and speak at a
conference without providing notification or obtaining proper
clearance and allegedly received payment from the foreign
sponsors of the conference. The investigation did not
substantiate the receipt of payment from the foreign entity, but
determined that the employee failed to seek proper Treasury
approval prior to accepting a speaking engagement as required
by policy. This matter was not referred to the Department of
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 45
Statistical Summary
Justice, but a report was provided to DO. On May 28, 2020,
DO advised that no action was taken against the employee,
citing lack of information from the Department of State.
Substantiated
FinCEN-19-0042-I Treasury OIG received information from the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, alleging that a Senior Employee was
falsifying hours worked. The investigation substantiated the
allegation; however, the employee resigned before adverse
action was taken. This matter was presented to the
U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Columbia, but prosecution
was declined.
Substantiated
Summary of Instances of Whistleblower Retaliation
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
In the previous five semiannual periods we reported that Treasury OIG was
investigating two instances of possible whistleblower retaliation. During this
reporting period, the two investigations were closed and the allegations in both
investigations were unsubstantiated. There were no other closed investigations
of whistleblower retaliation to report for the period.
Summary of Attempts to Interfere With Treasury OIG
Independence, Including Instances Where Information or
Assistance Request was Refused
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
There were no attempts made to resist, delay, or restrict Treasury OIG access to
records or other information and no instances where an information or assistance
request was refused during this reporting period.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 46
Statistical Summary
Listing of Audit Products Issued
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
In the list of 35 audit products below we identified 3 products that were issued during
the reporting period that were not publicly disclosed.
Office of Audit
Termination Memorandum – Audit of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade
Bureau’s Network and Information System Security (OIG-CA-20-015, 4/2/2020)
Operation Inherent Resolve – Summary of Work Performed by the Department of the
Treasury Related to Terrorist Financing, ISIS, and Anti-Money Laundering for Second
Quarter Fiscal Year 2020 (OIG-CA-20-016, 4/7/2020)
Financial Management: Audit of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing’s Financial
Statements for Fiscal Years 2019 and 2018 (OIG-20-031, 4/20/2020)
Financial Management: Management Letter for the Audit of the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing’s Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2019 and 2018 (OIG-20-032,
4/20/2020)
Financial Regulation and Oversight: OFR's Hiring Practices Complied with Federal
Requirements (OIG-20-033, 5/1/2020)
Termination Memorandum – Audit of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service's Administration
of Delinquent Debt Referrals (OIG-CA-20-018, 5/4/2020)
Financial Management: Audit of Treasury’s Compliance With the IPERA Requirements
for Fiscal Year 2019 (OIG-20-034, 5/15/2020)
Financial Management: Audit of the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council's
Compliance with IPERA for Fiscal Year 2019 (OIG-20-035, 5/15/2020)
U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General, System of
Quality Control Review Report (OIG-CA-20-019, 5/27/2020)
Interim Audit Update – Coronavirus Relief Fund Recipient Reporting (OIG-20-036,
5/27/2020)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 47
Statistical Summary
Domestic and International Assistance Programs: Improvements Are Needed In CDFI
Fund's Administration of Technical Assistance Awards (OIG-20-037, 6/12/2020)
Termination Memorandum – Audit of the Department of the Treasury's Use of
Permanent and Indefinite Appropriations Funds (OIG-CA-20-020, 6/16/2020)
Financial Regulation and Oversight–Safety and Soundness: Failed Bank Limited Review
– Resolute Bank (OIG-20-038, 6/24/20)
Financial Regulation and Oversight–Safety and Soundness: Failed Bank Limited Review
– City National Bank of New Jersey (OIG-20-039, 6/24/2020)
Bill and Coin Manufacturing: Audit of Bureau of Engraving and Printing’s
Implementation of Security Features and Meaningful Access for the Blind and Visually
Impaired into New Note Design (OIG-20-040, 6/30/2020)
Memorandum for Coronavirus Relief Fund Recipients: Coronavirus Relief Fund
Reporting and Record Retention Requirements (OIG-CA-20-021, 7/2/2020)
Operation Inherent Resolve – Summary of Work Performed by the Department of the
Treasury Related to Terrorist Financing, ISIS, and Anti-Money Laundering for Third
Quarter Fiscal Year 2020 (OIG-CA-20-022, 7/8/2020)
Memorandum for Mr. Ueligitone, Director, Department of Treasury American Samoa
Government: American Samoa Uses of Coronavirus Relief Fund Payment
(OIG-CA-20-023, 7/14/2020)
Bill and Coin Manufacturing: Mint Human Resources Practices Need Improvement
(OIG-20-041, 7/17/2020)
Memorandum for the Honorable Richard K. Delmar, Treasury Deputy Inspector
General: Joint Purchase and Integrated Card Violation Report (October 1, 2019–
March 31, 2020) (OIG-CA-20-024, 7/23/2020) Internal Memorandum, Not Publicly
Disclosed
Memorandum for Coronavirus Relief Fund Recipients: Coronavirus Relief Fund
Reporting Requirements Update (OIG-CA-20-025, 7/31/2020)
Memorandum for Bureau of Engraving and Printing: Review of Crane & Co., Inc.’s
Cost Accounting Standards Disclosure Statement (OIG-CA-20-026, 8/10/2020)
Sensitive But Unclassified, Not Publicly Disclosed
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 48
Statistical Summary
Presentation to Coronavirus Relief Fund Prime Recipients: Coronavirus Relief Fund
Reporting and Record Retention Requirements (OIG-CA-20-027, 8/10/2020)
Manufacturing and Revenue: Mint Controls Over Raw Materials and Coin Exchange
Programs Need Improvement (OIG-20-042, 8/18/2020)
Department of the Treasury Office of Inspector General Coronavirus Relief Fund
Frequently Asked Questions Related to Reporting and Recordkeeping (OIG-CA-20-028,
8/28/2020, Revised 9/21/2020)
Coronavirus Relief Fund Prime Recipient Quarterly GrantSolutions Submissions
Monitoring and Review Procedures Guide (OIG-CA-20-029, 8/31/2020)
Coronavirus Relief Fund Recipient Reporting Portal Data Dictionary (OIG-CA-20-030,
9/2/2020)
Risk Assessment of the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council's Charge Card and
Convenience Check Program (OIG-CA-20-031, 9/2/2020)
Sensitive But Unclassified Report (OIG-20-043, 9/2/2020) Sensitive But Unclassified,
Not Publicly Disclosed, Questioned Costs $93,424,652
Risk Assessment of the Department of the Treasury’s Charge Card and Convenience
Check Program (OIG-CA-20-032, 9/9/2020)
Financial Management: Report on the Bureau of the Fiscal Service’s Description of
Administrative Resource Center’s Financial Management Services and the Suitability of
the Design and Operating Effectiveness of its Controls for the Period July 1, 2019 to
June 30, 2020 (OIG-20-044, 9/17/2020)
Financial Management: Report on the Enterprise Business Solutions’ Description of its
HRConnect System and on the Suitability of the Design and Operating Effectiveness of
its Controls for the Period July 1, 2019 to June 30, 2020 (OIG-20-045, 9/25/2020)
Financial Regulation and Oversight: Prior to 2015, OCC Missed Opportunities to
Analyze and Address Inappropriate Sales Practices at Wells Fargo Bank (OIG-20-046,
9/28/2020)
Survey Results: Department of the Treasury’s Compliance with the Geospatial Data
Act of 2018 (OIG-CA-20-033, 9/30/2020)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 49
Statistical Summary
Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight
Annual Report of the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight (7/31/2020)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 50
Statistical Summary
Audit Reports Issued With Questioned Costs
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
Total Total
Total No. Questioned Unsupported
C a t e g or y o f R e p o rt s Costs Costs
For which no management decision had been made by
beginning of reporting period 1 $2,550 $0
Which were issued during the reporting period 1 $93,424,652 $93,424,652
Subtotals 2 $93,427,202 $93,424,652
For which a management decision was made during the
reporting period 0 $0 $0
Dollar value of disallowed costs 0 $0 $0
Dollar value of costs not disallowed 0 $0 $0
For which no management decision was made by the
end of the reporting period 2 $93,427,202 $93,424,652
For which no management decision was made within 6
months of issuance 1 $2,550 $0
Questioned costs include expenditures: (1) that are questioned because of an alleged violation of a provision of a
law, regulation, contract, or other requirement governing the expenditure of funds; (2) that, at the time of the
audit, are not supported by adequate documentation (i.e., unsupported costs); or (3) used for the intended
purpose that are unnecessary or unreasonable.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 51
Statistical Summary
Audit Reports Issued With Recommendations that Funds Be Put
to Better Use
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
Total
No. of Revenue
Category Reports Total Savings Enhancement
For which no management decision had been
made by beginning of reporting period 0 $0 $0 $0
Which were issued during the reporting
period 0 $0 $0 $0
Subtotals 0 $0 $0 $0
For which a management decision was made
during the reporting period 0 $0 $0 $0
Dollar value of recommendations agreed to
by management 0 $0 $0 $0
Dollar value based on proposed
management action 0 $0 $0 $0
Dollar value based on proposed
legislative action 0 $0 $0 $0
Dollar value of recommendations not
agreed to by management 0 $0 $0 $0
For which no management decision was
made by the end of the reporting period 0 $0 $0 $0
For which no management decision was
made within 6 months of issuance 0 $0 $0 $0
A recommendation that funds be put to better use denotes funds could be used more efficiently if management took
actions to implement and complete the recommendation including: (1) reduction in outlays; (2) de-obligations of
funds from programs or operations; (3) costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to
operations; (4) avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in pre-award review of contract or grant agreements;
(5) any other savings which are specifically identified; or (6) enhancements to revenues of the Federal Government.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 52
Statistical Summary
Reports for Which No Management Comment was Returned
Within 60 Days
As of September 30, 2020
There were no such reports issued for comment over 60 days as of the end of the
reporting period.
Reports Issued Over 6 Months for Which No Management
Decision Has Been Made
As of September 30, 2020
There was one report as of the end of this reporting period with no management
decision, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: Audit of the Department of the Treasury
Departmental Offices Executive Pay Adjustment, Bonuses, and Awards, OIG-20-027,
issued on February 5, 2020, with $2,550 in questioned cost. Management agreed
with our recommendations, but has not entered its’ planned corrective actions, in its’
audit follow-up system, JAMES, to address the 10 recommendations made in the
report.
Significant Revised Management Decisions
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
There were no significant revised management decisions during the reporting period.
Significant Disagreed Management Decisions
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
There were no significant disagreed management decisions during the reporting period.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 53
Statistical Summary
Peer Reviews
April 1, 2020 through September 30, 2020
Office of Audit
Audit organizations that perform audits and attestation engagements of Federal
Government programs and operations are required by generally accepted government
auditing standards to undergo an external peer review every 3 years. The objectives of
an external peer review are to determine, during the period under review, whether the
audit organization was complying with its quality control system to provide the audit
organization with reasonable assurance that it was conforming to applicable
professional standards. Federal audit organizations can receive a peer review rating of
Pass, Pass with Deficiencies, or Fail.
The most recent peer review of our office was performed by the Department of
Education (Education) OIG. In its report dated September 24, 2018, Education OIG
rendered a Pass rating for our system of quality control in effect for the year ended
March 31, 2018. External audit peer review reports of our office are available on
Treasury OIG’s website. On May 27, 2020, our office rendered a Pass rating to the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG for its system of quality
control in effect for the year ended September 30, 2019.
Office of Investigations
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) mandates that the
investigative law enforcement operations of all OIGs undergo peer reviews every
3 years to ensure compliance with (1) CIGIE’s investigations quality standards and
(2) the relevant guidelines established by the Office of the Attorney General of the
United States.
In its report dated October 16, 2017, the Department of Energy (DOE) OIG found our
office to be in compliance with all relevant guidelines for the period of April 2014 to
July 2017. In addition, the peer review team identified best practices that increased
the efficiency and effectiveness of our office. Best practices identified were the
Treasury OIG policy for Certified Forensic Examiners and a process used in obtaining
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 54
Statistical Summary
Inspector General Subpoenas. Treasury OIG did not perform any peer reviews of other
Federal investigative law enforcement organizations during the period.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 55
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Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 56
Other Reporting Requirements and Requests
This section addresses certain reporting requirements of our office that are separate
from the reporting requirements in the Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended).
Survey of Treasury’s Compliance with the Geospatial Data Act of
2018
As required by the Geospatial Data Act of 2018, we submitted to Congress a
report on the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) collection, production,
acquisition, maintenance, distribution, use, and preservation of geospatial data.
The report was a survey on Treasury’s progress towards meeting the agency’s
responsibilities under Section 759(a) with the objective of gaining an
understanding of Treasury’s current and planned activities to meet geospatial
data requirements. The results of this survey will assist us in planning for our
audit due in October 2022. (OIG-CA-20-033)
Reviews of Bank Failures with Nonmaterial Losses
We conduct reviews of failed banks supervised by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) with losses to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s (FDIC) Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) that do not meet the
definition of a material loss in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The reviews
are performed to fulfill the requirements found in 12 U.S.C. §1831o(k). The
term “material loss” triggers a material loss review if a loss to the DIF exceeds
$50 million (with provisions to increase that trigger to a loss that exceeds
$75 million under certain circumstances). For losses that are not material, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act requires that each 6-month period, the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) of the Federal banking agency must (1) identify the
estimated losses that have been incurred by the DIF during that 6-month period
and (2) determine the grounds identified by the failed institution’s regulator for
appointing the FDIC as receiver, and whether any unusual circumstances exist
that might warrant an in-depth review of the loss. For each 6-month period, we
are also required to prepare a report to the failed institutions’ regulator and the
Congress that identifies (1) any loss that warrants an in-depth review, together
with the reasons why such a review is warranted and when the review will be
completed; and (2) any losses where we determine no in-depth review is
warranted, together with an explanation of how we came to that determination.
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 57
Other Reporting Requirements and Requests
There were no banks supervised by OCC that failed during this reporting period.
Operation Inherent Resolve Quarterly Summary Memorandums to the
Department of Defense OIG
During this reporting period, we issued two summary memorandums to the
Department of Defense OIG regarding information we obtained on Treasury’s
activities with respect to disrupting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS)
finances. The memorandums included specific examples of activities to disrupt
ISIS’s financing, information on Treasury programs that combat terrorist
financing, and work we performed or plan to perform to review these programs.
(OIG-CA-20-016, OIG-CA-20-022)
Risk Assessments of the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration
Council’s and Treasury’s Charge Card and Convenience Check
Programs
As required by the Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012, we
conducted risk assessments of the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council’s
(Council) and Treasury’s charge card (collectively, purchase cards, travel cards,
and centrally billed accounts) and convenience check programs to identify and
analyze the risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments to
determine the scope, frequency, and number of periodic audits of charge card
and/or convenience check transactions. We assessed the overall risk of illegal,
improper, or erroneous purchases and payments in Council’s charge card
program as low and convenience check program as very low. As such, we
determined that an audit of Council’s charge card and convenience check
program is not necessary at this time. (OIG-CA-20-031) We assessed the overall
risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments in Treasury’s
charge card and convenience check programs as low. However, at the
component entity level, the risk of illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and
payments in charge card programs were assessed as moderate at the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing (BEP) for its purchase card and at the Bureau of the
Fiscal Service (Fiscal Service) for its convenience checks. As such, future audits
of BEP’s purchase cards and Fiscal Service’s convenience checks will be
incorporated into our annual audit planning in fiscal year 2021.
(OIG-CA-20-032)
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 58
References to the Inspector General Act
Section Requirement Page
Section 4(a)(2) Review of legislation and regulations 23
Section 5(a)(1) Significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies 5-19
Section 5(a)(2) Recommendations with respect to significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies 5-19
Section 5(a)(3) Significant unimplemented recommendations described in previous semiannual 24-45
reports
Section 5(a)(4) Matters referred to prosecutive authorities 23
Section 5(a)(5) Summary of instances where information was refused 46
Section 5(a)(6) List of audit reports 47-50
Section 5(a)(7) Summary of significant reports 5-19
Section 5(a)(8) Audit reports with questioned costs 51
Section 5(a)(9) Recommendations that funds be put to better use 52
Section Summary of each audit, inspection, and evaluation report issued before the 53
5(a)(10)(A) beginning of the reporting period for which no management decision was made
Section Summary of each audit, inspection, and evaluation report issued for which no 53
5(a)(10)(B) management comment was returned within 60 days
Section Summary of each audit, inspection, and evaluation report issued before the 24-45
5(a)(10)(C) beginning of the reporting period for which there are outstanding unimplemented
recommendations, including the aggregate potential cost savings
Section Significant revised management decisions made during the reporting period 53
5(a)(11)
Section Management decisions with which the Inspector General is in disagreement 53
5(a)(12)
Section Instances of unresolved Federal Financial Management Improvement Act 15
5(a)(13) noncompliance
Section Results of peer reviews conducted of Treasury OIG by another OIG 54-55
5(a)(14)
54-55Section List of outstanding recommendations from peer reviews 54-55
5(a)(15)
Section List of peer reviews conducted by Treasury OIG, including a list of outstanding 54-55
5(a)(16) recommendations from those peer reviews
Section Statistics for the period related to the number of (A) investigative reports issued, 23
5(a)(17)(A-D) (B) persons referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution,
(C) persons referred to state and local authorities for criminal prosecution, and
(D) criminal indictments/informations
Section Description of metrics used to develop investigative statistics in Section 5(a)(17) 23
5(a)(18)
Section 5a(19) Summary of each investigation involving a senior Government employee where 45-46
allegation of misconduct was substantiated
Section 5a(20) Instances of whistleblower retaliation 46
Section 5a(21) Summary of attempts to interfere with Treasury OIG independence 46
Section Description of each inspection, evaluation, and audit that was closed and not 47-50
5a(22)(A) publicly disclosed
Section Description of each investigation closed, involving a senior Government employee, 45-46
5a(22)(B) that was not publicly disclosed
Section 5(d) Serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies N/A
Section 6(b)(2) Report to Secretary when information or assistance is unreasonably refused 46
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 59
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Abbreviations
ACAP Accounting Career Awareness Program
ACD Advance Counterfeit Deterrence Steering Committee
ASI ASI Federal Credit Union
BEP Bureau of Engraving and Printing
BDP Banknote Development Process
BLSR Baseline Security Requirements
CARES Act Coronavirus, Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
CCME Certification, Compliance Monitoring, and Evaluation
CDFI Community Development Financial Institution
CIGIE Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Council Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPA Certified Public Accountant
CRF Coronavirus Relief Fund
DAIMS DATA Act Information Model Schema
DASHR/CHCO Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Resources and Chief
Human Capital Officer
DATA Act Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014
DO Departmental Offices
DIF Deposit Insurance Fund
EGS Enterprise Governance Supervision
Fiscal Service Bureau of the Fiscal Service
FRB Federal Reserve Bank
IMS Integrated Master Schedule
Interior Department of the Interior
IPERA Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010
IRS Internal Revenue Service
Jefferson Parish Jefferson Parish, Louisiana
JFICS Judgment Fund Internet Claim System
KPMG KPMG LLP
Mint United States Mint
NIST SP 800-53 Technology Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4, Security
and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OER Office of Executive Resources
OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control
OFR Office of Financial Research
OIG Office of Inspector General
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 61
Abbreviations
OPM Office of Personnel Management
QASP Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan
PIR Payment Information Repository
PRAC Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
RESTORE Act Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist
Opportunities, and Revived Economies of the Gulf Coast States
Act of 2012
SBLF Small Business Lending Fund
SD Segregation of Duties
SES senior executive service
SLGS State and Local Government Securities Program
SOP standard operating procedure
SPS Security Payment System
S&R Sagger & Rosenberg P.C.
STIG Security Technical Implementation Guide
TA Technical Assistance
TD P 85-01 Treasury Directive Publication 85-01, Department of the
Treasury Information Technology Security Program and
National Institute of Standards
TFFC Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes
TIGTA Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
TMA Treasury Managed Accounts
Treasury Department of the Treasury
TTB Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
TWAI Treasury Web Application Infrastructure
USAO U.S. Attorney’s Office
Treasury Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report—September 2020 62
The Treasury Building in Washington, DC
Source: Treasury Graphics
Treasury Office of Inspector General Locations
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 4436
Washington, DC 20220
875 15th Street, N.W., Suite 200
Washington, DC 20005
408 Atlantic Avenue, Room 330
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Treasury OIG Website
Access Treasury OIG reports and other information online:
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Pages/default.aspx
Report Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Treasury Whistleblower Ombudsman – For information about whistleblowing and reprisal
and about your rights and responsibilities as a Treasury employee or contractor, please
contact the OIG Whistleblower Ombudsman Program at 202-927-0650 or Email:
OIGCounsel@oig.treas.gov
Treasury OIG Hotline for Treasury Programs and Operations – Call toll free: 1-800-359-3898
Email: Hotline@oig.treas.gov or Submit a complaint using our online form:
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/ig/Pages/OigOnlineHotlineForm.aspx
CARES Act Title V and Coronavirus Relief Fund Hotline – Call toll free: 1-855-584-4853 or
Email: CARES@oig.treas.gov
Gulf Coast Restoration Hotline
Email: GulfCoastRestorationHotline@oig.treas.gov
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