Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Updated Assessment on COVID-19 Origins" (declassified version, 2021)
Summary
The declassified version (2021) of an Office of the Director of National Intelligence document titled "Updated Assessment on COVID-19 Origins". Its scope note states that it responds to the President's request that the Intelligence Community (IC) update its previous judgments on the origins of COVID-19 and is based on information through August 2021. Key Takeaways state that the IC assesses SARS-CoV-2 probably emerged and infected humans through an initial small-scale exposure no later than November 2019, that the IC remains divided on the most likely origin, and that all agencies assess natural exposure and a laboratory-associated incident to be plausible. Annex D describes four rounds of outside review by the NIC; Annex E lists questions about the earliest cases and wildlife in Wuhan markets.
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“Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Updated Assessment on COVID-19 Origins’ (declassified version, 2021).”
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Updated Assessment on COVID-19 Origins
Key Takeaways
Scope Note: This assessment responds to the President’s request that the Intelligence Community (IC) update its previous judgments
on the origins of COVID-19. It also identifies areas for possible additional research. Annexes include a lexicon, additional details on
methodology, and comments from outside experts. This assessment is based on information through August 2021.
The IC assesses that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, probably emerged and infected humans
through an initial small-scale exposure that occurred no later than November 2019 with the first known cluster of
COVID-19 cases arising in Wuhan, China in December 2019. In addition, the IC was able to reach broad
agreement on several other key issues. We judge the virus was not developed as a biological weapon. Most
agencies also assess with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 probably was not genetically engineered; however, two
agencies believe there was not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way. Finally, the IC assesses
China’s officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus before the initial outbreak of COVID-19 emerged.
After examining all available intelligence reporting and other information, though, the IC remains divided on the
most likely origin of COVID-19. All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an
infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident.
Four IC elements and the National Intelligence Council assess with low confidence that the initial SARS-CoV-2
infection was most likely caused by natural exposure to an animal infected with it or a close progenitor virus—a
virus that probably would be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2. These analysts give weight to
China’s officials’ lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other factors.
One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most
likely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident, probably involving experimentation, animal
handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology. These analysts give weight to the inherently risky
nature of work on coronaviruses.
Analysts at three IC elements remain unable to coalesce around either explanation without additional
information, with some analysts favoring natural origin, others a laboratory origin, and some seeing the
hypotheses as equally likely.
Variations in analytic views largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh intelligence reporting and
scientific publications and intelligence and scientific gaps.
The IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless new
information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to determine
that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.
The IC—and the global scientific community—lacks clinical samples or a complete understanding of
epidemiological data from the earliest COVID-19 cases. If we obtain information on the earliest cases that
identified a location of interest or occupational exposure, it may alter our evaluation of hypotheses.
[1]
China’s cooperation most likely would be needed to reach a conclusive assessment of the origins of COVID-19.
Beijing, however, continues to hinder the global investigation, resist sharing information, and blame other
countries, including the United States. These actions reflect, in part, China’s government’s own uncertainty about
where an investigation could lead as well as its frustration the international community is using the issue to exert
political pressure on China.
[2]
[3]
Introduction could have plausibly served as a backbone if
SARS-CoV-2 had been genetically engineered.
The IC has prepared several assessments examining the
origins of COVID-19. Analysts have focused on whether Our growing understanding of the similarities of
SARS-CoV-2, the causative virus of COVID-19, was SARS-CoV-2 to other coronaviruses in nature and
genetically engineered—particularly as a biological the ability of betacoronaviruses—the genus to which
weapon—was transmitted to humans naturally or SARS-CoV-2 belongs—to naturally recombine
transmitted due to a laboratory-associated incident, suggests SARS-CoV-2 was not genetically
perhaps during sampling or experimentation. China’s engineered. For instance, academic literature has
reaction to and handling of the pandemic have given noted that in some instances betacoronaviruses have
analysts insights into these issues, but Beijing’s actions recombined with other viruses in nature and that
have also impeded the global scientific community and furin cleavage sites (FCS)—a region in the spike
our ability to confidently determine how the virus first protein that enhances infection—have been
infected humans. identified in naturally occurring coronaviruses in the
same genetic location as the FCS in SARS-CoV-2.
SARS-CoV-2 Probably Not a This suggests that SARS-CoV-2 or a progenitor virus
Biological Weapon could have acquired its FCS through natural
recombination with another virus.
The IC assesses China did not develop SARS-CoV-2 as a
biological weapon. IC analysts do not have higher confidence that SARS-
CoV-2 was not genetically engineered because some
We remain skeptical of allegations that SARS-CoV-2 genetic engineering techniques can make modifications
was a biological weapon because they are supported difficult to identify and we have gaps in our knowledge of
by scientifically invalid claims, their proponents do naturally occurring coronaviruses.
not have direct access to the Wuhan Institute of
Virology (WIV), or their proponents are suspected of Some genetic engineering techniques may make
spreading disinformation. [See appendix B.] genetically modified viruses indistinguishable from
natural viruses, according to academic journal
Most Analysts Assess SARS-CoV-2 Not articles. For instance, a 2017 dissertation by a
Genetically Engineered WIV student showed that reverse genetic cloning
techniques—which are standard techniques used in
Most IC analysts assess with low confidence that SARS- advanced molecular laboratories—left no trace of
CoV-2 was not genetically engineered. Their assessment genetic modification of SARS-like coronaviruses.
is based on technical analysis of SARS-CoV-2 and the
IC’s growing understanding of traits and the potential for It will be difficult to increase our confidence that
recombination in other coronaviruses. Two agencies the distinguishing features in SARS-CoV-2
believe there is not sufficient evidence to make an emerged naturally without a better understanding
assessment either way. of the diversity of coronaviruses in nature and how
often recombination occurs during co-infection of
As of August 2021, we still have not observed multiple coronaviruses within a particular host.
genetic signatures in SARS-CoV-2 that would be For example, academic literature has indicated that
diagnostic of genetic engineering, according to the a FCS had previously been inserted into
IC’s understanding of the virus. Similarly, we have SARS-CoV-1, the causative agent of SARS,
not identified any existing coronavirus strains that complicating differentiation of how such a feature
may have appeared.
[4]
The WIV previously created chimeras, or some features of SARS-CoV-2, according to publicly
combinations, of SARS-like coronaviruses, but available information. However, it probably would take
this information does not provide insight into years of laboratory adaptation using the appropriate cell
whether SARS-CoV-2 was genetically engineered types and a virus that is more closely related to SARS-
by the WIV. CoV-2 than ones currently known to generate the number
of mutations separating SARS-CoV-2 from any known
No IC analysts assess that SARS-CoV-2 was the result of coronavirus strains, judging from scientific journal
laboratory adaptation, although some analysts do not articles. Such processes would require differentiation and
have enough information to make this determination. maintenance of primary cells and the development of
Repeated passage of a closely related virus through appropriate animal models.
animals or cell culture—which we consider laboratory
adaptation and not genetic engineering—could result in
[5]
China’s Lack of Foreknowledge Four IC elements, the National Intelligence Council,
of SARS-CoV-2 and some analysts at elements that are unable to
coalesce around either explanation are among this
The IC assesses China’s officials probably did not have group. Analysts at these agencies give weight to China’s
foreknowledge that SARS-CoV-2 existed before WIV officials' lack of foreknowledge and highlight the
researchers isolated it after public recognition of the virus precedent of past novel infectious disease outbreaks
in the general population. Accordingly, if the pandemic having zoonotic origins, the wide diversity of animals
originated from a laboratory-associated incident, they that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, and the
probably were unaware in the initial months that such an range of scenarios—to include animal trafficking,
incident had occurred. farming, sale, and rescue—in China that enable zoonotic
transmission. Although no confirmed animal source of
Early in the pandemic, the WIV identified that a SARS-CoV-2 has been identified, to include a reservoir or
new virus was responsible for the outbreak in intermediate species, analysts that assess the pandemic
Wuhan. It is therefore assessed that WIV was due to natural causes note that in many previous
researchers pivoted to COVID-19-related work to zoonotic outbreaks, the identification of animal sources
address the outbreak and characterize the virus. has taken years, and in some cases, animal sources have
These activities suggest that WIV personnel were not been identified.
unaware of the existence of SARS-CoV-2 until the
outbreak was underway. These analysts assess that WIV’s activities in early
2020 related to SARS-CoV-2 are a strong indicator
Two Plausible Hypotheses of that the WIV lacked foreknowledge of the virus.
Pandemic Origin
They also see the potential that a laboratory worker
IC analysts assess that a natural origin and a laboratory- inadvertently was infected while collecting
associated incident are both plausible hypotheses for unknown animal specimens to be less likely than
how SARS-CoV-2 first infected humans. Analysts, an infection occurring through numerous hunters,
however, disagree on which is more likely, or whether farmers, merchants, and others who have frequent,
an assessment can be made at all, given the lack of natural contact with animals.
diagnosticity of the available information. Most
agencies are unable to make higher than low confidence Given China’s poor public health infrastructure
assessments for these reasons, and confidence levels are and the potential for asymptomatic infection,
tempered by plausible arguments for the opposing some analysts that lean towards a natural origin
hypothesis. For these hypotheses, IC analysts consider argue that China’s infectious disease surveillance
an exposure that occurs during animal sampling activity system would not have been able to detect the
that supports biological research to be a laboratory- SARS-CoV-2 exposure as quickly as a suspected
associated incident and not natural contact. What exposure in a laboratory setting.
follows is a look at the cases that can be made for these
competing hypotheses. History of Zoonotic Pathogen Emergence,
Conditions in China Ripe for Zoonotic Spillover
The Case for the Natural Origin Hypothesis
Analysts that find the natural zoonotic spillover
Some IC analysts assess with low confidence that the hypothesis the most likely explanation for the pandemic
first human COVID-19 infection most likely was caused also note the wide diversity of animals that are
by natural exposure to an animal that carried SARS- susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, range of
CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus—a virus that would scenarios—to include animal trafficking, farming, sale,
likely be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2. and rescue—in China that would enable zoonotic
[6]
transmission, and precedent of novel human infectious Academic literature has revealed Wuhan markets
disease outbreaks originating from zoonotic sold live mammals and dozens of species—including
transmission. Previous human coronavirus outbreaks, to raccoon dogs, masked palm civets, and a variety of
include SARS-CoV-1 and Middle East Respiratory other mammals, birds, and reptiles—often in poor
Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), occurred naturally conditions where viruses can jump among species,
and were linked to animal reservoirs with zoonotic facilitating recombination events and the acquisition
transmission to humans, according to scientific literature. of novel mutations. SARS-CoV-2 can infect a range
of mammals, including cats, dogs, pangolins, minks,
Extensive wildlife and livestock farming, wildlife raccoon dogs, and a variety of wild and domestic
trafficking, and live animal markets in China and animals, according to academic literature.
historically lax government regulation—and even
promotion—of these activities increase the Wider Hubei Province has extensive farming and
probability that initial transmission occurred along breeding of animals that are susceptible to
one of these routes. SARS-CoV-2, including minks and raccoon dogs.
[7]
These analysts note that there is a precedent for viral
vectors to travel long distances in China and cause WIV Illnesses in Fall 2019 Not Diagnostic
infection elsewhere because of transportation and trade
nodes, thereby widening and complicating the search for The IC assesses that information indicating that
the specific zoonotic spillover incident. For instance, the several WIV researchers reported symptoms
bat coronavirus that is currently the closest known consistent with COVID-19 in autumn 2019 is not
relative to the original SARS-CoV-1 was identified in diagnostic of the pandemic’s origins. Even if
Yunnan Province, even though the first SARS outbreak confirmed, hospital admission alone would not be
detected in humans occurred in Guangdong Province, diagnostic of COVID-19 infection.
hundreds of kilometers away.
The Case for the Laboratory-Associated
that WIV research involved SARS-CoV-2 or a close
Incident Hypothesis
progenitor virus, these analysts note that it is plausible
One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that that researchers may have unwittingly exposed
COVID-19 most likely resulted from a laboratory- themselves to the virus without sequencing it during
experiments or sampling activities, possibly resulting in
associated incident involving WIV or other
researchers—either through exposure to the virus during asymptomatic or mild infection. Academic literature
experiments or through sampling. Some analysts at indicates that WIV researchers conducted research with
bat coronaviruses or collected samples from species that
elements that are unable to coalesce around either
explanation also assess a laboratory origin with low are known to carry close relatives of SARS-CoV-2.
confidence. These analysts place emphasis on academic
Based on currently available information, the closest
articles authored by WIV employees indicating that WIV
known relatives to SARS-CoV-2 in bats have been
scientists conducted research on other coronaviruses
identified in Yunnan Province, and researchers
under what these analysts consider to be inadequate
bringing samples to laboratories provide a plausible
biosafety conditions that could have led to opportunities
link between these habitats and the city.
for a laboratory-associated incident. These analysts also
take into account SARS-CoV-2’s genetic epidemiology
These analysts also note that China’s investigations
and that the initial recorded COVID-19 clusters occurred
into the pandemic’s origin might not uncover
only in Wuhan—and that WIV researchers who
evidence of a laboratory-associated incident if it
conducted sampling activity throughout China provided
involved only a small number of researchers who
a node for the virus to enter the city.
did not acknowledge or have knowledge of a
potential infection.
WIV Research Includes Work With Animals That
Carry Relatives of SARS-CoV-2 Biosafety Conditions for Specific Work Could
Have Led to an Incident
The analysts that find the laboratory-associated origin
theory most likely assess that WIV researchers’ inherently
The analysts that assess COVID-19 most likely
risky work with coronaviruses provided numerous
originated from a laboratory-associated incident also
opportunities for them to unwittingly become infected
place emphasis on information suggesting researchers in
with SARS-CoV-2. Although the IC has no indications
China used biosafety practices that increased the risk of
exposure to viruses. Academic publications suggest that
WIV researchers did not use adequate biosafety
precautions at least some of the time, increasing the risk
of a laboratory-associated incident.
[8]
the initial cases in Wuhan—or potentially elsewhere in
The Role of the Huanan Seafood China—that would allow it to better understand
Wholesale Market potential sources of infection or conduct phylogenetic
analysis that would help validate both hypotheses.
Some scientists and China’s public health officials
have shifted their view on the role of the Huanan Information That Would Confirm Natural Outbreak:
Seafood Wholesale Market in the pandemic since Searching for a natural reservoir or potential
early 2020. Some now view the market as a intermediate host requires collecting, isolating, and
potential site of community spread rather than sequencing viruses from samples taken from potential
where the initial human infection may have occurred. host species and environments to search for viruses
related to SARS-CoV-2, endeavors that require
On January 1, 2020, China’s security international collaboration, resources, and time.
authorities shut down the market after several
workers fell ill in late December 2019. China Information that the earliest confirmed COVID-19
focused early source tracing on the market and cases were in individuals or families who spent
Hubei Province; association with the market time in rural regions or who were involved in
was included as part of the early case definition. animal trade or environments that facilitate close
human-to-animal interactions could indicate that
In January 2020, a scientific article that the virus was circulating within an animal reservoir
described clinical features of initial and a zoonotic spillover event caused the first
COVID-19 infections in China found that COVID-19 case in humans.
some COVID-19 patients did not have any
known association with the market. However, some transmission pathways are
Furthermore, there continues to be conflicting fleeting, meaning an animal acquires a virus and
data with some academic articles and preprints evidence of infection vanishes, particularly if the
noting that phylogenetic analysis of the animals are reared and harvested for agricultural
available data on the earliest cases suggests or commercial purposes.
that the progenitor virus may not have
originated from the market. Information That Would Confirm Laboratory-
Associated Incident: China’s coronavirus research or
related information from origins investigations by
Beijing or international organizations could provide
China’s Transparency Key to Determining clear indications of a laboratory-associated incident or at
COVID-19 Origin least yield some new insights.
The IC judges that closing persistent information gaps on
the origins of COVID-19 is very likely to require greater
transparency and collaboration from Beijing. The
scientific community lacks technical data on a reservoir
species, possible intermediate species, and closer
relatives to SARS-CoV-2.
Data and Samples From Initial Cases: The global
scientific community does not know exactly where,
when, or how the first human infection with
SARS-CoV-2 occurred. It lacks a complete picture of
[9]
saying Beijing would not allow the WHO to engage
WIV’s Publicly Available in the “conspiracy theory.”
Coronavirus Research
China is also pushing its narrative that the virus originated
IC analysts are examining published research from outside China.
China for any indicators that would inform our
understanding of COVID-19’s origins. The WIV Public statements from China’s Government have
and other research groups in China published continued to claim the virus originated from
coronavirus articles in 2020 and 2021, including the imported frozen food, an extremely unlikely theory.
discovery of the closest known relative of
China’s Government continues to spread allegations
SARS-CoV-2, but at least some relevant data on
that the United States created or intentionally spread
coronaviruses of interest has either been unavailable
SARS-CoV-2 to divert attention away from Beijing.
or has not been published.
Although the WIV described the sampling trip to
the mineshaft in Mojiang in Yunnan Province
where it collected RaTG13 in 2016, it did not
explicitly state that RaTG13 was collected from
that mine until 2020. Similarly, the WIV collected
eight other coronaviruses from the same mine in
2015 that it did not fully disclose until 2021. In
some of these instances, however, the WIV has
described unpublished work in webinars and
interviews prior to publishing.
China Likely To Impede Investigation
The IC judges they will be unable to provide a more
definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless
new information allows them to determine the specific
pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to
determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling
SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before
COVID-19 emerged.
For instance, Beijing limited the World Health
Organization (WHO) investigation team’s access
to sites.
In late July, China denounced a WHO plan for
future investigations into COVID-19 origins,
claiming that the proposal for future investigations
was politicized. China’s officials publicly rebuked
the WHO’s plans for a future study of labs in China,
[ 10 ]
Annex A: Definitions
Antibody: A protein produced during an immune Epidemiology: The study of the distribution and
response to a part of an infectious agent called an antigen. determinants of health-related events in specified
populations, and the application of this study to prevent
Backbone: A genetic sequence used as a chassis upon and control health problems.
which to build synthetic constructs, such as those used
for cloning, protein expression, and production. Furin cleavage site (FCS): A region in the spike protein
of SARS-CoV-2 that enhances infection.
Biological weapon: A weapon that uses bacteria,
viruses, toxins, fungi, and biochemical/biomolecule Gain-of-function: The IC considers this as a research
agents that can cause death or injury to humans, plants, method that involves manipulating an organism’s
or animals or destroy materials. genetic material to impart new biological functions that
could enhance virulence or transmissibility (e.g.,
Biosafety: The application of knowledge, techniques, genetically modifying a virus to expand its host range,
and equipment to prevent personal, laboratory, and transmissibility, or severity of illness). The IC assesses
environmental exposure to potentially infectious agents that genetic engineering, genetic modification, and
or biohazards. Four Biosafety levels (BSL) define the laboratory-adaptation can all be used for gain-of-function
containment conditions under which biological agents experiments, but are not inherently so. We address both
can be safely manipulated. These standards range from genetic engineering and laboratory-adaptation in the
moderate safety requirements for low-risk agents body of this assessment; the IC is unaware of an agreed,
(BSL-1), to the most stringent controls for high-risk international definition.
agents (BSL-4). China’s standards range from P1–4.
Genetically engineered or genetically modified viruses
Biosecurity: The protection, control of, and are intentionally altered, created, or edited using
accountability for biological agents, toxins, and biotechnologies, such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced
biological materials and information to prevent Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR), DNA
unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse, diversion, recombination, or reverse genetics. These viruses have
and accidental or intentional release. intentional, targeted edits to the genome designed to
achieve specific results, but unintentional genomic
Coronavirus: A common type of virus that can infect changes may also occur.
humans and/or animals. The human illness caused by
most coronaviruses usually last a short time and presents Genome: The genetic material of an organism. It
symptoms consistent with the “common cold,” such as a consists of DNA (and sometimes RNA for viruses).
runny nose, sore throat, cough, and a fever.
Genome sequencing: The process of determining the
COVID-19: An infectious disease caused by the DNA or RNA sequence of an organism’s genome, or its
SARS-CoV-2 virus, which is a betacoronavirus. “genetic code.” An organism’s genetic code is the order
in which the four nucleotide bases—adenine, cytosine,
Diagnostic information: Information that allows IC guanine, and thymine—are arranged to direct the
analysts to distinguish between hypotheses—in this case, sequence of the 20 different amino acids in the proteins
the laboratory origin and natural origin theories. that determine inherited traits.
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid): A molecule that carries Intermediate species/host: An organism that can be
an organism’s genetic blueprint for growth, infected with a pathogen from a resevoir species and
development, function, and reproduction.
[ 11 ]
passes the pathogen to another host species; infection is Progenitor virus: A virus that is closely related
not sustained in this population. enough—probably more than 99 percent—to
SARS-CoV-2 to have been its direct ancestor or plausible
Laboratory-adapted viruses have undergone natural, immediate origin of the outbreak. The closest known
random mutations through human-enabled processes in relative to SARS-CoV-2 is only around 96 percent
a laboratory—such as repeated passage through animals similar; to put this into context, humans and chimps are
or cells—that put pressure on the virus to more rapidly around 99 percent similar, demonstrating the signficant
evolve. Specific changes to the viral genome are not differences even at this similarity.
necessarily anticipated in these processes, though the
virus can be expected to gain certain characteristics, like RaTG13: A coronavirus with the closest known whole
the ability to infect a new species. This is a common genome to SARS-CoV-2, although it is widely believed
technique used in public health research of viruses. We to not be a direct ancestor of SARS-CoV-2.
consider directed evolution to be under laboratory
adaptation. Resevoir species/host: An organism that harbors a
pathogen, which is endemic within the population.
Laboratory-associated incidents include incidents that
happen in biological research facilities or during RNA (ribonucleic acid): A molecule essential for gene
research-related sampling activities. coding, decoding, regulation, and expression. Certain
viruses use RNA as a genetic blueprint.
Molecular biology: Study of the molecular basis of
activities in and between cells. This includes techniques Transmissibility: The measure of new infections
to amplify or join genetic sequences. initiated by an existing infection.
Naturally occurring viruses have not been altered in a Virus: A replicating piece of genetic material—DNA or
laboratory. Viruses commonly undergo random RNA—and associated proteins that use the cellular
mutations as part of the evolutionary process and can machinery of a living cell to reproduce.
continue to change over time; mutations may enable a
virus to adapt to its environment, such as evading host Wet market: A market where fresh food and live and
immune responses and promoting viral replication. dead animals, including wildlife, are sold.
Outbreak: A sudden increase in occurrences of a disease Zoonosis: An infection or a disease that is transmissible
in a particular time and place. Outbreaks include from animals to humans under natural conditions. A
epidemics, which is a term that is reserved for infectious zoonotic pathogen may be viral, bacterial, or parasitic,
diseases that occur in a confined geographical area. and can sometimes be transmitted through insects, such
Pandemics are near-global disease outbreaks. as mosquitoes.
Pangolin: An African and Asian mammal that has a Zoonotic spillover: An initial infection or disease that is
body covered in overlapping scales. Pangolins are a caused by contact between an animal and human under
natural reservoir of coronaviruses and researchers are natural conditions.
investigating their potential role as an intermediate host
for SARS-CoV-2.
Pathogen: A bacterium, virus, or other microorganism
that can cause disease.
Phylogenetics: The study of the evolutionary
relationships among groups of organisms.
[ 12 ]
Annex B: IC Examination of Open-Source Theories
IC analysts have examined a number of open-source Theory That SARS-CoV-2 Was
articles from a variety of sources that have raised Genetically Engineered
theories about SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19’s origin.
The IC assesses that these theories generally do not The IC assesses that public claims that some
provide diagnostic information on COVID-19 origins, distinguishing features in SARS-CoV-2 are the result of
and in some cases, are not supported by the information genetic engineering are not diagnostic of genetic
available to us. However, several have drawn on engineering. The IC has been evaluating how
insightful methods or identified potential leads. SARS-CoV-2 could have developed these features and
notes that the furin cleavage site (FCS)—a region in the
Theory of Abnormal Activity at the WIV in spike protein that enables infection and has been the
Fall 2019 topic of open-source debate—can also be consistent with
a natural origin of the virus.
The IC assesses that an assessment about abnormal
activity at the WIV in fall 2019 lacks support and does We do not fully understand the diversity of natural
not offer diagnostic insight. The Multi-Agency coronaviruses or how often they recombine, suggesting
Collaboration Environment (MACE) published a report that there are plausible natural means by which these
assessing that the pandemic began in October 2019 features in SARS-CoV-2 could have emerged beyond
because of a release at the WIV. what we currently understand.
Although the methodology is insightful, the IC For example, the author of an article in April notes
has concerns with the small data set and analytic the SARS-CoV-2’s FCS is unique among known
rigor used to derive the group’s findings, and our betacoronaviruses. The author argues that such
review of information directly contradicts some of features are rare and so well-adapted for human
its findings. infection that they are more likely emerged from
laboratory work than from natural selection.
Theory That SARS-CoV-2 Was a
Biological Weapon Although an IC review of scientific literature has
indicated that no known betacoronaviruses in the
The IC assesses that public claims from a Hong Kong same subgenus have this FCS in the same region of
virologist that Beijing created SARS-CoV-2 as a the spike protein as SARS-CoV-2, similar FCSs are
biological weapon are inconsistent with available present in the same region of the spike protein as
technical information on coronaviruses. We assess that other naturally occurring coronaviruses, according
the articles contain several technical inaccuracies and to scientific articles.
omit key data points.
We also do not find credible a now-withdrawn preprint
Since September 2020, a virologist who worked in article from two Indian educational institutes posted in
a WHO-affiliated laboratory in Hong Kong has January 2020 that asserted SARS-CoV-2 was genetically
publicly stated that Beijing created SARS-CoV-2 engineered using sequences from the human
from bat coronaviruses and that China’s immunodeficiency virus. We assess it is unlikely that
researchers intentionally released it. The scientific scientists would have chosen to intentionally engineer
community did not peer review these articles and the specific sequences that were the focus of the
some publicly rejected the articles’ claims as scientific article.
scientifically unsound.
[ 13 ]
Theory That SARS-CoV-2 Originated
Outside China
We are aware of scientific studies claiming to have
found SARS-CoV-2 viral fragments or antibodies in
samples taken before November 2019 outside China.
However, technical flaws in some of these studies,
uncertainties in the methodologies, and in some cases,
the lack of a credible review process make us skeptical of
their utility in determining the pandemic’s origin.
We assess that the first cluster of confirmed
COVID-19 cases arose in Wuhan, China, in late
2019, but we lack insight—and may never have
it—on where the first SARS-CoV-2 infection
occurred. Although all of the earliest confirmed
cases of COVID-19 were documented in China’s
Hubei Province, where Wuhan is located,
according to Western and China’s press reports, it
is plausible that a traveler came in contact with the
virus elsewhere and then went to Wuhan.
We continue to monitor scientific publications and
discuss these issues with experts. Even if the virus
is found to have existed outside China before the
Wuhan outbreak, credible evidence of human
infection would also be necessary to determine if
the first COVID-19 outbreak began there.
[ 14 ]
Annex C: IC Approach to 90-Day Study
The NIC collaborated closely with the National
Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the National
Intelligence Management Council (NIMC), IC agencies,
and other USG entities and departments on this
assessment. The IC kicked off the 90-day study by
outlining the core intelligence questions that would be
addressed over lines of effort—collection and analysis.
These questions included:
Did the outbreak begin through contact with
infected domestic or wild animals or was it the
result of a laboratory-associated incident?
Was the virus genetically engineered?
Is SARS-CoV-2 a biological weapon?
Collection: At the kick-off meeting for the 90-day study,
the IC discussed core intelligence gaps to drive collection
moving forward.
Analysis: The NIC had two separate structured analytic
exercises to discuss both the underlying reporting and to
strengthen argumentation moving into the drafting
phase. Analysts at individual agencies also pursued
various structured analytic techniques to build their own
assessments.
During a two-day-long in-person IC-wide Analysis
of Competing Hypothesis (ACH) analytic exercise
in June, analysts determined whether existing
reporting was consistent or inconsistent with
information in individual reports. This exercise
allowed analysts to determine that most reporting
was consistent with both hypotheses and the
reporting that was inconsistent was deemed to be
not credible.
Before the start of drafting, the NIC hosted an IC-
wide Team A/Team B analytic exercise to explore
how the IC could strengthen either hypothesis
through a debate style format. Agencies pulled
from these conversations—along with the work
conducted during and before the study—to solidify
their consensus positions.
[ 15 ]
Annex D: Outside Review
The NIC conducted four rounds of outside review of the
draft assessment. These sessions provided valuable
feedback that we incorporated into the assessment. The
NIC made some organizational changes in response to
comments; comments included:
Emphasize points of agreement.
Provide additional definitions in the lexicon and
ensure technical or intelligence jargon is explicitly
explained.
[ 16 ]
Annex E: Questions
Answers to the following questions would help us better
evaluate hypotheses related to the origins of COVID-19:
What additional information—to include timing,
location, relevant animal exposures, occupational
information, and clinical samples—is there on the
earliest cases of COVID-19?
How were early cases investigated? What questions or
tools were utilized for tracing contacts and contacts of
those contacts?
What direct or indirect indicators of COVID-19 clusters
is China aware of from early in the outbreak? This may
include things like hospital occupancy rates or efforts to
triage medical care outside of hospital facilities.
What insight can China provide on the search for the
reservoir and potential intermediate species of the
COVID-19 virus?
What insight can China provide on the search for the
identification of a progenitor virus? Have any leading
candidates or regions for spillover been identified?
What information, data, and/or samples does China
have on wildlife or other animals present in the
following markets in Wuhan:
Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market
Qiyimen Live Animal Market
Baishazhou Market
Dijiao Outdoor Pet Market
What information, data, and/or samples does China
have on wildlife present in the other markets, wildlife
rescue centers, and/or farms in Wuhan, across Hubei, in
neighboring provinces, or in locations where live
animals in Hubei Province are sourced from?
[ 17 ]
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