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Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Unclassified Summary of Assessment on COVID-19 Origins" (2021)

Summary

An unclassified summary of an assessment on COVID-19 origins from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, dated 2021. Its Key Takeaways state that the IC assesses SARS-CoV-2 probably emerged and infected humans through an initial small-scale exposure no later than November 2019, with the first known cluster of cases arising in Wuhan, China in December 2019. It states that the IC remains divided on the most likely origin and that all agencies assess natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident to be plausible. Four IC elements and the National Intelligence Council assess natural exposure with low confidence; one IC element assesses with moderate confidence a laboratory-associated incident.

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“Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Unclassified Summary of Assessment on COVID-19 Origins’ (2021).” Original at www.dni.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence-unclassified-summary-o-7c42283a38/, SHA-256 51b0e98fddadc3dbf5c763363d9914da806a66eb1e0bc54be13ab00491eb4a24.

Full text

                                        UNCLASSIFIED




Key Takeaways
The IC assesses that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, probably emerged and
infected humans through an initial small-scale exposure that occurred no later than November
2019 with the first known cluster of COVID-19 cases arising in Wuhan, China in December
2019. In addition, the IC was able to reach broad agreement on several other key issues. We
judge the virus was not developed as a biological weapon. Most agencies also assess with low
confidence that SARS-CoV-2 probably was not genetically engineered; however, two agencies
believe there was not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way. Finally, the IC
assesses China’s officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus before the initial outbreak of
COVID-19 emerged.

After examining all available intelligence reporting and other information, though, the IC
remains divided on the most likely origin of COVID-19. All agencies assess that two hypotheses
are plausible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident.
          Four IC elements and the National Intelligence Council assess with low confidence
           that the initial SARS-CoV-2 infection was most likely caused by natural exposure to
           an animal infected with it or a close progenitor virus—a virus that probably would be
           more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2. These analysts give weight to China’s
           officials’ lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other
           factors.
          One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that the first human infection with
           SARS-CoV-2 most likely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident, probably
           involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of
           Virology. These analysts give weight to the inherently risky nature of work on
           coronaviruses.
          Analysts at three IC elements remain unable to coalesce around either explanation
           without additional information, with some analysts favoring natural origin, others a
           laboratory origin, and some seeing the hypotheses as equally likely.
          Variations in analytic views largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh
           intelligence reporting and scientific publications, and intelligence and scientific gaps.

The IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of
COVID-19 unless new information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial
natural contact with an animal or to determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS-
CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.




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          The IC—and the global scientific community—lacks clinical samples or a complete
           understanding of epidemiological data from the earliest COVID-19 cases. If we
           obtain information on the earliest cases that identified a location of interest or
           occupational exposure, it may alter our evaluation of hypotheses.

China’s cooperation most likely would be needed to reach a conclusive assessment of the origins
of COVID-19. Beijing, however, continues to hinder the global investigation, resist sharing
information and blame other countries, including the United States. These actions reflect, in
part, China’s government’s own uncertainty about where an investigation could lead as well as
its frustration the international community is using the issue to exert political pressure on China.




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odni-2021-08-summary.pdf
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odni-2021-08-summary.pdf
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www.dni.gov
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