OECD, "OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2020" (overview)
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Overview extracted from the OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2020, published under the responsibility of the OECD Economic and Development Review Committee. Its key policy insights chapter states that the economy will recover gradually from the COVID-19 crisis amid exceptionally high uncertainty, that inflation remains below the 2% target and that strong public finances allow stimulus. It also covers the financial system, inequality, well-being, labour and innovation, the fight against corruption and environmental quality. Annexes address government measures to address the COVID-19 crisis and economic co-operation with North Korea.
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OECD Economic Surveys
Korea
http://www.oecd.org/economy/korea-economic-snapshot/
This Overview is extracted from the 2020 Economic Survey of Korea. The Survey is published
on the responsibility of the Economic and Development Review Committee of the OECD, which
is charged with the examination of the economic situation of member countries.
This document, as well as any data and any map included herein, are without prejudice to the status
of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries
and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli
authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan
Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international
law.
OECD Economic Surveys: Korea© OECD 2020
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3
Table of contents
Executive summary 8
1 Key policy insights 13
The economy will recover gradually from the COVID-19 crisis 13
The recovery will probably be slow and uncertainty is exceptionally high 16
Monetary policy is accommodative but inflation remains below the 2% target 20
Strong public finances allow stimulating the economy 21
The financial system remains solid, but the COVID-19 crisis raises vulnerability 23
The fruits of Korea’s past economic performance have not been equally distributed 26
Korea’s economic achievements have not fully translated into well-being 30
Better use of labour resources and innovation can support growth 30
The fight against corruption has been stepped up but challenges remain 40
Environmental quality remains low by OECD standards 42
References 46
Annex 1.A. Progress in other structural reform areas 49
Annex 1.B. Government measures to address the COVID-19 crisis 50
Annex 1.C. Economic co-operation with North Korea 53
References 57
FIGURES
Figure 1. GDP falls less than in the OECD 9
Figure 2. Inflation is set to remain very low 10
Figure 3. Inequality is relatively high 10
Figure 4. The old age dependency ratio will soar 11
Figure 5. Service sector productivity is lagging 11
Figure 1.1. Mobility for retail and recreation has remained relatively high 13
Figure 1.2. The COVID-19 crisis has hit employment hard, albeit less than in most other countries 16
Figure 1.3. Employment drops in services and among non-regular workers 17
Figure 1.4. Exports are fairly concentrated in terms of countries and product types (%), 2018 18
Figure 1.5. The outlook for global semi-conductors remains uncertain 19
Figure 1.6. Inflation is well below the 2% target 20
Figure 1.7. Monetary policy has been eased and the won has depreciated somewhat 21
Figure 1.8. Sound public finances leave room for fiscal stimulus 22
Figure 1.9. Potential impact of the COVID-19 crisis on gross government debt 22
Figure 1.10. The unweighted leverage ratio is close to the OECD average 23
Figure 1.11. Aggregate corporate debt is moderate but rising and household debt is high 24
Figure 1.12. At the national level, housing prices have been stable 25
Figure 1.13. Income inequality is relatively high 27
Figure 1.14. The minimum wage is high relative to the median wage, 2018 28
Figure 1.15. Permanent workers’ employment protection is relatively strong 29
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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Figure 1.16. Well-being scores remain relatively low in many dimensions 30
Figure 1.17. Korea has scope to raise both employment and productivity 31
Figure 1.18. Fewer individuals work very long hours as time limits were tightened towards OECD norms 34
Figure 1.19. Low-productivity sectors account for a high share of total employment 36
Figure 1.20. Digital gaps between large and small firms remain high 38
Figure 1.21. Product market regulations are stringent 39
Figure 1.22. Corruption is perceived as relatively high 40
Figure 1.23. Korea is compliant on tax transparency 41
Figure 1.24. Environmental performance remains weak 43
Annex Figure 1.C.1. North Korea’s recorded foreign trade 54
Annex Figure 1.C.2. Estimated GDP level and growth rate 55
TABLES
Table 1. The recovery will be slow 9
Table 1.1. Policies to support the Korean economy 15
Table 1.2. Macroeconomic indicators and projections under two epidemiological scenarios 18
Table 1.3. Events that could lead to major changes in the outlook 19
Table 1.4. Past recommendations on fiscal policy 23
Table 1.5. Past recommendations on financial policy 25
Table 1.6. Past recommendations on the labour market and inclusiveness 29
Table 1.7. Past recommendations on promoting female employment 32
Table 1.8. Overview of the Korean New Deal projects 37
Table 1.9. Past recommendations on regulation and support for SMEs and innovation 39
Table 1.10. Past recommendations on corruption 41
Table 1.11. Past recommendations on environmental policy 44
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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This Survey is published on the responsibility of the Economic and
Development Review Committee of the OECD, which is charged with the
examination of the economic situation of member countries.
The economic situation and policies of Korea were reviewed by the
Committee on 23 June 2020. The draft report was then revised in light of
the discussions and given final approval as the agreed report of the whole
Committee on 27 July 2020.
The Secretariat’s draft report was prepared for the Committee by
Christophe André, Jinwoan Beom and Mathilde Pak, under the supervision
of Vincent Koen. Alexander Hijzen and Stefan Thewissen, from the
Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (ELS), provided
sections on the labour market and the OECD’s new Jobs Strategy. Yvan
Guillemette and Andrés Fuentes Hutfilter also contributed to the report.
Research assistance was provided by Lutécia Daniel, Natia Mosiashvili and
Agnès Puymoyen, and editorial support by Sisse Nielsen and Michelle
Ortiz.
The previous Survey of Korea was issued in June 2018.
Information about the latest as well as previous Surveys and more details
about how Surveys are prepared is available at www.oecd.org/eco/surveys.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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BASIC STATISTICS OF KOREA, 2018
(Numbers in parentheses refer to the OECD average) 1, 2
LAND, PEOPLE AND ELECTORAL CYCLE
Population (million) 51.6 Population density per km² 529.7 (37.8)
Under 15 (%) 13.0 (17.8) Life expectancy at birth (years, 2017) 82.6 (80.1)
Over 65 (%) 14.4 (17.1) Men (2017) 79.7 (77.5)
International migrant stock (% of
2.6 (10.1) Women (2017) 85.7 (82.9)
population, 2015)
Latest 5-year average growth (%) 0.5 (0.6) Latest general election April 2020
ECONOMY
Gross domestic product (GDP) Value added shares (%)
In current prices (billion USD) 1 725.2 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.9 (2.5)
In current prices (trillion KRW) 1 898.2 Industry including construction 37.2 (26.6)
Latest 5-year average real growth (2014-
3.0 (2.3) Services 60.9 (70.9)
18,%)
Per capita (000 USD PPP) 42.1 (47.3)
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
Per cent of GDP
Expenditure 30.3 (40.3) Gross financial debt (2017) 40.8 (109.5)
Revenue 33.4 (37.4)
EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS
Exchange rate (KRW per USD) 1099.6 Main exports (% of total merchandise exports)
PPP exchange rate (USA = 1) 870.8 Machinery and transport equipment 57.4
In per cent of GDP Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 13.4
Exports of goods and services 41.6 (55.5) Manufactured goods 12.3
Imports of goods and services 37.0 (51.3) Main imports (% of total merchandise imports)
Current account balance 4.5 (0.3) Machinery and transport equipment 31.2
Net international investment position 24.0 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 27.2
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 10.3
LABOUR MARKET, SKILLS AND INNOVATION
Unemployment rate, Labour Force Survey (aged 15 and
Employment rate (aged 15 and over, %) 60.7 (57.3) 3.8 (5.3)
over, %)
Men 70.8 (65.5) Youth (aged 15-24, %) 10.5 (11.1)
Women 50.9 (49.6) Long-term unemployed (1 year and over, %) 0.1 (1.5)
Participation rate (aged 15 and over, %) 63.1 (60.5) Tertiary educational attainment (aged 25-64, %) 49.0 (36.9)
Average hours worked per year 1 993 (1734) Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP, 2017) 4.6 (2.6)
ENVIRONMENT
Total primary energy supply per capita (toe) CO2 emissions from fuel combustion per capita
5.6 (4.1) 12.1 ( 8.9)
(tonnes)
Renewables (%) 1.9 (10.5) Water abstractions per capita (1 000 m³, 2016) 0.5
Exposure to air pollution (more than 10 g/m³ of
99.2 (58.7) Municipal waste per capita (tonnes, 2016, OECD: 2017) 0.4 (0.5)
PM 2.5, % of population, 2017)
SOCIETY
Income inequality (Gini coefficient, 2017,
0.355 (0.310) Education outcomes (PISA score)
OECD: 2016)
Relative poverty rate (%, 2017, OECD: 2016) 17.4 (11.6) Reading 514 (489)
Median disposable household income (000
27.5 (23.6) Mathematics 526 (492)
USD PPP, 2017, OECD: 2016)
Public and private spending (% of GDP) Science 519 (491)
Health care 8.1 (8.8) Share of women in parliament (%) 17.0 (29.7)
Pensions (2017, OECD: 2015) 3.1 (8.5) Net official development assistance (% of GNI, 2017) 0.1 (0.4)
Education (public, 2017) 4.6 (4.5)
1. The year is indicated in parenthesis if it deviates from the year in the main title of this table.
2. Where the OECD aggregate is not provided in the source database, a simple OECD average of latest available data is calculated where data
exist for at least 80% member countries.
Source: Calculations based on data extracted from databases of the following organisations: OECD, International Energy Agency, International
Labour Organisation, International Monetary Fund, World Bank.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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Executive summary
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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A permanent slump in world trade is a
COVID-19 triggered a deep recession downside risk. As an export-oriented economy,
Korea is vulnerable to further weakness in foreign
Economic activity has fallen sharply. The demand and to lasting disruptions in global value
Korean authorities have reacted promptly to chains.
contain the spread of the virus and to support the
economy. Even so, GDP is contracting, albeit Table 1. The recovery will be slow
markedly less than in other OECD countries Single-hit Double-hit
(Figure 1). 2019 2020 2021 2020 2021
Gross domestic product 2.0 -0.8 3.1 -2.0 1.4
Travel and leisure-related sectors have been hit Private consumption 1.7 -3.6 3.7 -5.0 1.7
particularly hard and are recovering only Gross fixed capital -2.8 2.9 1.4 2.3 1.0
gradually. Manufacturing is affected by the global formation
collapse in demand, notably for petrochemicals and Exports 1.7 -5.7 4.4 -7.6 0.7
cars. The crisis will leave durable scars and will Imports -0.6 -3.3 5.0 -4.3 2.9
Unemployment rate 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5
heighten the need to tackle challenges associated
Consumer price index 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1
with population ageing and low productivity to boost
Current account balance
growth. 3.6 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.1
(% of GDP)
Employment is shrinking. The recession is General government
budget balance (% of 0.9 -2.8 -2.8 -3.1 -3.6
driving down employment, particularly for non-
GDP)
regular workers. The government will need to
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 107 projections updated to take
invest further in active labour market policies to into account incoming data through 23 July 2020.
ensure an employment-rich and high-productivity
recovery. Fiscal policy is very expansionary. The
government is appropriately using the fiscal space
Figure 1. GDP falls less than in the OECD offered by strong public finances, with general
104 Korea, Single-hit Korea, Double-hit government gross debt at around 40% of GDP, to
OECD, Single-hit OECD, Double-hit damp the impact of the crisis. The budget balance
102
is projected to move from a surplus in 2019 to a
100 deficit of more than 3% of GDP in 2020 in the
98 double-hit scenario and 2.8% of GDP in the single-
hit scenario. Fiscal policy needs to continue
96 supporting the economy. Additional stimulus
94 through growth-enhancing investments could
strengthen the recovery.
92
Monetary policy is accommodative. The Bank of
90
Korea cut its policy rate by 50 basis points in March
88 2020 and by another 25 basis points in May, to
2019 2020 2021
0.50%, and implemented a range of measures to
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database.
increase liquidity in response to the crisis. With
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156485 inflation projected to remain very low (Figure 2),
The global recession will slow the recovery. monetary policy should remain accommodative. As
While domestic-oriented activity will normalise there is limited room left for significant policy rate
gradually, the global recession will hold back cuts, the Bank of Korea should be prepared to
exports and investment, even assuming no consider unconventional monetary policy
resurgence of the pandemic (single-hit scenario). A measures, going beyond liquidity support.
second global wave of infections (double-hit The crisis raises financial vulnerability. The
scenario) would delay the recovery in consumption magnitude of the COVID-19 crisis creates risks for
and exports, further depress investment and push financial stability, especially corporate debt, as
up unemployment (Table 1). some businesses, notably SMEs, are heavily
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
10
indebted. Some households will also struggle to Old-age poverty is still high. More than 40% of
repay their debt. Nevertheless, Korea’s financial people aged 65 or over live in relative poverty, the
system is protected by a number of buffers. The highest rate in the OECD, albeit on a declining
financial authorities have taken determined action trend. Old-age poverty is driven by limited pension
to address financial risks and now appear to have income, partly due to the immature pension
stabilised financial markets. system, and low earnings for many of those still
working, despite often long working hours.
Figure 2. Inflation is set to remain very low
Figure 3. Inequality is relatively high
%
0.8 0.5
CPI, Single-hit
0.7 CPI, Double-hit
0.4
Core inflation¹, Single hit
0.6 Core inflation¹ , Double-hit
0.3
0.5 0.2
0.4 0.1
0.3 0
SVK DNK FRA OECD KOR GBR USA CHL
0.2 Note: The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 1
0.1 (maximum inequality). For the OECD, unweighted average.
Source: OECD, Income Distribution Database.
0
2019 2020 2021 StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156523
1. Excluding food and energy. Air pollution is a major issue. Most of the
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database.
population is exposed to high levels of small
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156504 particle air pollution, with detrimental impacts on
health and well-being. Although the government
Well-being and inclusiveness need has taken significant steps to curb air pollution,
more is needed.
strengthening
Renewable energy investments will help green
Korea scores poorly in some well-being the recovery. Energy generation is still
dimensions. The country’s outstanding income overwhelmingly reliant on fossil fuels, and low oil
growth over the past decades has yet to fully prices risk delaying the transition to cleaner energy
translate into high well-being, notably in terms of sources. The government has set ambitious
perceived health, environmental quality and work- targets for the share of renewables in electricity
life balance. generation, which should rise from about 8.3% in
2018 to 20% by 2030 and 30-35% by 2040.
Income inequality is relatively high, due to
Boosting investment in renewable energy and
wage dispersion and limited redistribution
clean technologies would help achieve a
(Figure 3). A dual labour market and partly related
sustainable recovery.
large differences in productivity between large firms
and SMEs, and between industry and services,
Ageing and digitalisation create
generate strong wage inequality. Redistribution
through taxes and benefits is weaker than in most challenges and opportunities
other OECD countries. Female employment is
relatively low and the gender wage gap is the Korea’s population is ageing rapidly, but
highest in the OECD. Inequalities are exacerbated digitalisation could raise productivity. The old-
by the COVID-19 crisis, which affects age dependency ratio will be the highest in the
disproportionately those with the weakest labour OECD by 2060 (Figure 4). Korea has potential to
market positions. build on its advanced IT technology to foster
innovation and raise productivity. The recently
announced Korean New Deal, which will boost
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
11
digital, green and skills investments, has the While social protection schemes have been
potential to support a green and inclusive recovery. gradually extended, compliance remains a
challenge.
Figure 4. The old age dependency ratio will
soar Shifting the focus of active labour market policy
% 2020 2060 from direct job creation, which accounted for about
90
half of spending before the crisis, to training and job
80
70
counselling, along with enhanced adult education,
60 would enhance job quality. The crisis-time public
50 job creations need to be complemented by further
40 investments in human capital.
30
20 Productivity varies widely across economic
10 sectors. Productivity is outstanding in IT
0 manufacturing and strong in other manufacturing,
MEX KOR OECD SWE JPN
but lagging in services, including IT services
Note: Ratio of population aged 65 and over to population aged 15-64. (Figure 5). The gap is also wide between big firms
Unweighted average for the OECD and SMEs. Narrowing those gaps is key to raising
Source: United Nations and OECD calculations.
aggregate productivity.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156542 Technology diffusion is uneven. Use of
advanced IT technologies like cloud computing and
The shrinking labour supply tends to lower the big data is lagging in SMEs, which face difficulties
economy’s growth potential. According to the in recruiting skilled workers and managers and
OECD long-term model, Korea’s annual GDP per training their workforce. Scale-up success is
capita growth was set to slow to a pace similar to limited, despite extensive government R&D
that of other OECD countries. The COVID-19 crisis support.
is likely to pull down Korean and global growth
further. However, there is scope for raising Product market regulations remain stringent,
employment rates and productivity to lift GDP per holding back competition and productivity growth.
capita growth by one to almost two percentage The government has introduced a programme to
points. shift the burden of proof from the regulated to the
regulator and regulatory sandboxes to allow firms
The new OECD Jobs Strategy suggests ways to in new technologies and new industries to test their
boost employment and foster inclusive growth. products and business models without being
Raising the employment rate and quality of jobs of subject to all existing legal requirements.
Korean women, who are on average highly skilled,
should be a priority. Moreover, there is a need to Figure 5. Service sector productivity is lagging
enhance the quality of jobs for older workers, who %
350
tend to retire late but often end their working lives OECD Korea
300
in low-quality jobs, and to facilitate youth’s access
250
to employment, especially through enhanced
200
vocational training and career guidance.
150
Social protection should be strengthened. The 100
COVID-19 crisis illustrates the vulnerability of non- 50
regular workers to economic shocks, despite 0
ICT manufacturing Other manufacturing ICT services Other business
emergency measures to support households and services
businesses. Along with stronger social protection, Note: Sectors' productivity relative to total productivity.
easing labour market regulations once the COVID- Source: OECD STAN Database.
19 crisis is overcome would promote the
reallocation of workers towards their most StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156561
productive use and reduce labour market duality.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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MAIN FINDINGS KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
Policies to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
The government has taken a wide range of measures to support households and Continue to provide support to households and businesses until the economy is
businesses during the crisis. Prolonging some current temporary measures and/or recovering, targeting any additional income support towards low-income
providing additional support may be necessary if the crisis lingers. households.
Ensure that fiscal plans preserve long-term fiscal sustainability.
Sound public finances allow further stimulus to strengthen the recovery. Support growth-enhancing investments, notably in digital fields, such as 5G
infrastructure and artificial intelligence.
Perform cost-benefit analysis of investments.
Inflation is set to remain very low over the coming years, the economic recovery Maintain accommodative monetary policy and consider unconventional measures
is likely to be slow and macro-prudential tools are in place to ensure financial going beyond liquidity support.
stability.
Raising employment and enhancing job quality in the face of COVID-19 and rapid ageing
Social protection for non-regular workers and workers in small companies remains Strengthen protection and coverage for non-regular workers and workers in new
weak, exposing them more to the COVID-19 shock, and significant coverage gaps forms of employment (e.g. platform workers) and increase compliance with social
in Employment Insurance remain. insurance through more effective enforcement.
About half of spending on active labour market policy is for direct job creation. Adjust resources for the public employment service and training programmes to
Public employment service resources are limited. Funding for training maintain effective support for jobseekers.
programmes has increased in response to the COVID-19 crisis.
Korea has no statutory (or coherent privately-regulated) cash sickness benefit, Match the introduction of a cash sickness benefit planned in the New Deal with a
causing hardship and complicating return to work. However, crisis measures were strong focus on rehabilitation and return to work.
taken in the context of COVID-19. The New Deal includes a sickness benefit
implementation study in 2021 and a pilot project for households, including low-
income families, in 2022.
Workers are often forced to retire from their career job in their fifties for various Expand incentives for workers and employers to ensure that workers stay longer
reasons, leading to a waste of human resources and worsening old-age poverty. in their career jobs, including through more flexibility in wages, with the view to
The mandatory retirement age was increased to 60 in 2016-17. raising the minimum mandatory retirement age further over time.
Increasing inclusiveness during the COVID-19 crisis and after
The old-age poverty rate is the highest in the OECD, partly due to the immature Further increase the Basic Pension and focus it on the elderly in absolute
pension system, but also to low and restricted means-tested support, despite poverty.
recent improvements. As planned under the New Deal, phase out the family support obligation from the
Basic Livelihood Security Programme.
The gender wage gap is the largest in the OECD. Regularly publish a national-level analysis of wage difference determinants to
promote fairer wages across genders.
Promoting the diffusion of technology to tackle the COVID-19 shock and to boost productivity and well-being
Product market regulations remain tight. However, the government has introduced Use regulatory sandboxes to identify excessive regulation and revise or abolish it.
a programme to shift the burden of proof from the regulated to the regulator and Facilitate telemedicine, as long as it is compatible with preserving patient safety
regulatory sandboxes are allowing firms in new technologies and new industries and quality of care.
to test their products and business models without being subject to all existing
legal requirements. The temporary lifting of the ban on telemedicine during the
COVID-19 outbreak illustrates the potential benefits of a timely review of
regulations.
Subsidies to SMEs have limited effects on promoting growth and boosting Subsidies to SMEs should focus more on promoting growth and boosting
innovation and productivity. Despite the efforts of the Korean government to better innovation and productivity. Provide SMEs in manufacturing and services with
target subsidies, the latter still allow the survival of low-productivity companies. innovation vouchers that can be used to commission R&D and studies on potential
for new technology introduction.
SMEs face a lack of skilled workers, notably in digital fields, and their employees Provide more basic ICT courses to SME employees and older persons, reduce
have limited access to training. Managers’ awareness of the potential of digital training costs for SMEs and provide targeted adult learning programmes to SME
technologies is insufficient. The digital skills gap between youth and older managers.
generations is the highest in the OECD.
Environmental policies post-COVID-19
Notwithstanding an ephemeral improvement as the COVID-19 crisis depressed Tighten caps for air pollutant emissions and strengthen vehicle emission
activity, air pollution is a major challenge, with detrimental impacts on health and standards.
well-being.
Effective carbon prices are low and vary across sectors and fuels. Price CO2 emissions evenly across sectors and fuels and raise pricing according
to a predictable schedule.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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1 Key policy insights
The economy will recover gradually from the COVID-19 crisis
Korea was among the first countries hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, but a swift and effective policy
response allowed to contain the spread of the virus (Box 1.1). Korea was able to avoid the extensive
lockdowns of many other countries (Figure 1.1). Along with a range of government measures to protect
households and businesses, this limited the damage to the domestic economy and output is shrinking less
than in any other OECD country.
Figure 1.1. Mobility for retail and recreation has remained relatively high
% deviation from baseline
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
-70
Low point 25 July 2020
-80
-90
-100
KOR JPN USA CAN DEU GBR FRA ITA
Note: Mobility trends for places like restaurants, cafes, shopping centers, theme parks, museums, libraries, and movie theatres.
Source: Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Report (27 July 2020).
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156580
Box 1.1. COVID-19 Korea’s strategy to contain the spread of the virus1
Korea was one of the first countries hit by COVID-19, with its first case confirmed on 20 January.
Infections surged in the Daegu region in mid-February. However, a prompt reaction and an effective
containment strategy allowed to limit the spread of the disease, with the number of new cases declining
sharply from early March and the number of daily deaths falling since 24 March to around zero by late
April. As of 3 August, 14 389 cases had been confirmed, and 301 deaths. Even though numbers are
difficult to compare across countries due to differences in data collection and the varying timing of the
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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epidemic, and notwithstanding the resurgence of some local clusters in recent weeks, Korea has been
among the most successful countries in the world in limiting the spread of the disease and the number
of deaths. Moreover, this was achieved without locking down any city or region, which minimised the
economic impact of the outbreak.
The containment strategy has been based on foreign entry controls, testing, tracing and treating:
Entry ban and quarantine: ban on the entry of travellers coming from the Hubei province in
China from early February 2020. As from 1 April, all persons arriving in Korea are subject to a
14-day self-quarantine and, as from 11 May, all persons arriving in Korea, regardless of
nationality, undergo a mandatory COVID-19 test.
Testing: innovative methods, such as drive-through and walk-through testing facilities, along
with the rapid development of tests, allowed extensive testing. As of 3 August, close to 1.6
million persons had been tested, among which 0.9% proved positive.
Tracing: rigorous epidemiological investigations are conducted, using credit card transactions,
CCTV recordings and GPS data on mobile phones when necessary. Anonymised information
on contacts is disclosed to the public and close contacts of positive cases are put under self-
quarantine, with their health condition monitored remotely.
Treatment: patients are classified according to severity and directed towards appropriate
treatment paths at hospitals for severe cases and residential treatment centres for milder cases.
Health care resources and organisation were adjusted in response to the pandemic.
Digital tools, notably mobile apps, artificial intelligence and devices allowing remote work and service
provision (including telemedicine) have played a key role in the strategy to contain the spread of COVID-
19 (Chapter 3).
1. For further details, see Annex 1.B.
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Government of the Republic of Korea (2020).
The government has taken appropriate and prompt measures to support the economy and alleviate
hardship (Table 1.1). In the first phase of the recovery, temporary support for households and businesses
will need to be adjusted gradually according to the pace of the recovery, taking into account the relatively
low level and incomplete coverage of unemployment insurance, as well as sectoral specificities. If the crisis
lingers, some temporary tax and social security deferrals and reductions will need to be prolonged and
additional support for SMEs and firm restructuring may be necessary. Further investment in training and
upskilling, along with increased support for the transition towards renewable energy and clean technologies
would strengthen the second phase of the recovery, in which fiscal multipliers will be higher. Against this
background, the main messages of this Survey are:
Government support should be provided to households and businesses until the economy is
recovering. Low government debt allows for public growth-enhancing investments to spur the
recovery and raise productivity. Monetary policy should remain accommodative, and if necessary,
unconventional monetary policy measures should be considered to expand the degree of monetary
accommodation.
The government should continue supporting workers after the crisis, especially with help to reskill,
so as to facilitate the reallocation across sectors. Lifting labour participation and improving job
quality for women and older workers will also remain crucial to mitigate the impact of ageing on
labour inputs, and to reduce gender inequality and old age poverty.
Regulatory reforms to enhance competition and encourage innovation, especially by young firms,
and further investments in training and upskilling, notably in digital fields, would facilitate the
diffusion of technology and lift productivity.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
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Table 1.1. Policies to support the Korean economy
Date Measure Amount Main items
Total support of more Three supplementary budgets: KRW 59.2 trillion (3.1% of GDP)
than KRW 277 trillion Financing support (loans and guarantees): over KRW 200 trillion
(14.4 % of GDP) (10.6% of GDP)
Other: tax reduction, deferral of social security contributions
5-20 Support for the quarantine KRW 4.3 trillion KRW 0.1 trillion for preemptive quarantine (budget)
February system, affected families (Budget KRW 0.3 trillion, KRW 2.0 trillion for SMEs (loans and guarantees)
and businesses financing KRW 4.0 KRW 0.3 trillion for low cost carriers (fee reduction)
trillion) Policy preparation for worse-hit sectors, such as automobile, aviation,
shipping, tourism and export industries
28 February Support for households and KRW 16 trillion KRW 2.8 trillion for consumption coupons and support for family care
reinforcing the financial (Budget KRW 2.8 trillion, leave
sector financing KRW 11.7 KRW 2.5 trillion for low interest rates loans and guarantees to SMEs.
trillion, tax benefit KRW KRW 0.5 trillion for support to local credit guarantee funds
1.7 trillion) (guarantees)
KRW 8.2 trillion for liquidity support to the financial sector (liquidity)
KRW 1.7 trillion for tax credit for reduction of rents and cut in
individual consumption tax on cars (tax benefits)
16 March Bank of Korea policy rate cut 50 basis point policy rate cut to 0.75%
Interest rate cut on the Bank Intermediated Lending Support Facility
to 0.25%
Passed 17 First supplementary budget KRW 11.7 trillion (0.6% KRW 2.1 trillion for virus prevention, diagnosis and treatment
March of GDP) KRW 4.1 trillion for loans to SMEs and small merchants
-Expansion expenditure KRW 3.5 trillion for emergency livelihood support including gift
of KRW 10.9 trillion vouchers and deduction in national health insurance
-Revenue adjustment of KRW 1.2 trillion for aid to employees and severely affected provinces,
KRW 0.8 trillion including expanded employment retention subsidy and financial
support
Support of epidemic prevention and treatment for designated
coronavirus disaster areas
19 March Plan to provide financing to Initially KRW 50 trillion KRW 22.5 trillion for lending to SMEs, small merchants and self-
24 March companies and stabilise Raised to KRW 100 employed (loans and guarantees)
financial markets (bonds and trillion (5.1% of GDP)1 KRW 29.1 trillion to support large and mid-sized companies (loans
securities) and guarantees)
KRW 17.8 trillion to avoid a credit crunch (loans and guarantees)
KRW 20.0 trillion: Bond Market Stabilization Fund to perform financial
functions (liquidity provision funded by financial institutions)
KRW 10.7 trillion: Securities Market Stabilization Fund (liquidity
provision funded by financial institutions)
Expansion of foreign currency liquidity by raising ceilings on the
foreign-exchange derivatives positions of banks and easing foreign-
exchange market stability rules (26 and 28 March)
19 March Currency swap agreement USD 60 billion Bilateral currency swap agreement between the Bank of Korea and
with the US the US Federal reserve for 6 months (dollar liquidity)
20 March, Purchase of treasury bonds KRW 4.5 trillion KRW 4.5 trillion (KRW 1.5 trillion on 20 March, 10 April and 2 July,
10 April, 2 by the Bank of Korea respectively) purchases of treasury bonds for market stabilisation.
July
8 April Support for exports and KRW 10.4 trillion KRW 10.4 trillion for financial support to export companies and start-
start-ups ups and ventures (loans and guarantees)
16 April Support for non-bank KRW 10 trillion KRW 10 trillion: loans to bank and non-bank financial institutions such
financial institutions as securities and insurance companies for 3 months
22 April Plan to support key KRW 85.1 trillion KRW 40 trillion: Key Industry Relief Fund guaranteed by government
industries and additional to purchase corporate debt and equity
financing to SMEs and KRW 35 trillion for additional financing to SMEs (loans and
households guarantees)
KRW 10.1 trillion for special employment security measures
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Passed 30 Second supplementary KRW 12.2 trillion (0.6% Emergency relief grants of up to KRW 1 million (USD 814) to all 21
April budget of GDP) million households
* KRW 3.4 trillion - 2.7 million lower income households can receive grants in cash
financed by debt - The remaining 19 million households receive grants in voucher or
issuance (the remaining credit card points for incentive to consumption.
by spending cuts) A total of KRW 14.3 trillion, including a KRW 2.1 trillion of local
government funds, is allocated for the relief program.
28 May Bank of Korea policy rate cut 25 basis point policy rate cut to 0.50%
3 July Third supplementary budget KRW 35.1 trillion - Creation of about 550 000 jobs in publicly-initiated programmes and
strengthening social safety nets (KRW 10.0 trillion).
- Emergency loans to struggling small merchants, SMEs and large
businesses (KRW 5 trillion).
- New Deal projects investments (KRW 4.8 trillion).
1. More detailed information can be found in Annex 1.B.
The recovery will probably be slow and uncertainty is exceptionally high
The COVID-19 crisis has led to falls in GDP of respectively 1.3% and 3.3% in the first and second quarters
of 2020 (quarter on quarter, seasonally adjusted). The upswing in employment was abruptly interrupted in
March (Figure 1.2, Panel A). The contraction is much smaller than in Canada and the United States, and
comparable to the decline in Japan – in Europe, short-time work schemes damped the impact of lockdowns
on employment (Panel B). The fall in employment in Korea affects most economic sectors, but is
particularly severe in wholesale and retail trade, accommodation and food. Employment falls most among
temporary and daily workers, as well as small business owners (Figure 1.3).
Figure 1.2. The COVID-19 crisis has hit employment hard, albeit less than in most other countries
A. Net job creations in Korea (thousands, y-o-y) B. Employment in June 2020
(Y-o-y percentage change)
800 0
-1
600
-2
400 -3
-4
200
-5
0 -6
-7
-200 -8
-400 -9
-10
-600 Japan Korea Germany United Italy Canada United
2017M01 2017M04 2017M07 2017M10 2018M01 2018M04 2018M07 2018M10 2019M01 2019M04 2019M07 2019M10 2020M01 2020M04
Kingdom States
Note: For the United Kingdom, Office for National Statistics experimental monthly estimates of paid employees; For the United States, nonfarm
employment.
Source: National statistical offices.
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For an export-dependent economy like Korea, further disruptions in world trade and global value chains
would be particularly harmful (Table 1.3). Exports are fairly concentrated both geographically and in terms
of products (Figure 1.4). China and the United States combined account for nearly 40% of exports and
Korea is deeply integrated in global value chains (GVCs), particularly for electronic goods. The outlook for
semiconductor exports remains uncertain despite encouraging developments before the outbreak of the
COVID-19 crisis (Figure 1.5). The increasing diversification of Korea’s trade relations will increase its
resilience over time. Several bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have been signed, most recently with
Indonesia, Israel and the United Kingdom (to preserve bilateral trade relations after Brexit). Korea aims at
pursuing FTAs with more partners and is also part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) under negotiation with the ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
Figure 1.3. Employment drops in services and among non-regular workers
Year-on-year percentage change (unless otherwise specified), June 2020
Employment rate* -1.3
Unemployment rate* 0.3
Participation rate* -1.0
Total Employment -1.3
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 3.4
Manufacturing -1.5
Construction -3.0
Wholesale & retail trade, accommodation & food -6.0
Electricity, transport, communication & finance 0.6
Business, personal, public service & others 0.6
Temporary employees -8.3
Daily workers -5.8
Employers -11.3
Own account workers 0.4
Unpaid family workers -4.6
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5
* Percentage points.
Note: The self-employed are divided between employers and own-account workers.
Source: Statistics Korea.
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The projected contraction in GDP in 2020 is considerably milder than in other OECD countries, both in the
single-hit scenario, which assumes no resurgence of the pandemic and in the double-hit scenario, which
posits a global second wave of infections (OECD, 2019a). Private consumption will pick up as distancing
recommendations are eased, albeit at a moderate pace as households exercise caution and suffer from
income losses and relatively high unemployment. Industrial production will also normalise, but global
supply chains will continue to experience disruptions for some time. The global recession is bound to have
a durable impact on Korean exports and investment, especially in the double-hit scenario (Table 1.2).
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Table 1.2. Macroeconomic indicators and projections under two epidemiological scenarios
Single-hit scenario Double-hit scenario
2019 2020 2021 2020 2021
Percentage changes, volume
GDP at market prices 2.0 -0.8 3.1 -2.0 1.4
Private consumption 1.7 -3.6 3.7 -5.0 1.7
Government consumption 6.6 7.1 5.9 7.3 6.0
Gross fixed capital formation -2.8 2.9 1.4 2.3 1.0
Final domestic demand 1.1 0.4 3.4 -0.5 2.3
Stockbuilding1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Total domestic demand 1.1 0.3 3.4 -0.5 2.4
Exports of goods and services 1.7 -5.7 4.4 -7.6 0.7
Imports of goods and services -0.6 -3.3 5.0 -4.3 2.9
Net exports1 1.0 -1.1 -0.1 -1.5 -0.8
Consumer price index 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5
General government financial balance (% of GDP) 2 0.9 -2.8 -2.8 -3.1 -3.6
Current account balance (% of GDP) 3.6 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.1
1. Contributions to changes in real GDP.
2. The structural general government financial balance has not been estimated in OECD Economic Outlook 107.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 107 projections updated to take into account incoming data through 23 July 2020.
Figure 1.4. Exports are fairly concentrated in terms of countries and product types (%), 2018
By destination By product type
14.2
26.8 3.9
31.6
39.5 6.3
9.3
12.1
10.9 23.8
5.0 9.0
1.5
1.6 2.6
1.9
China United States European Union Electronics Chemicals Motor vehicles
Japan India Mexico Metals Electrical Other transport
Other
Australia Indonesia Other
Source: OECD Quarterly International Trade Statistics; OECD Bilateral Trade in Goods by Industry and End-use (BTDIxE).
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Figure 1.5. The outlook for global semi-conductors remains uncertain
Index, Jan 2013=100
300
Global semiconductor sales (value)
Korean semiconductor exports value
250
Korean semiconductor exports volume
200
150
100
50
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source: World Semi-Conductors Statistics and Korea Customs Service.
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Even though the economic downturn is milder than in other OECD countries and the government has taken
extensive measures to support households and businesses (Table 1.1), the COVID-19 crisis creates new
vulnerabilities. Household debt is relatively high and losses in income and rising unemployment will make
reimbursement more difficult, although low interest rates help and further forbearance and debt deferral
measures can be introduced if needed. Some households, notably self-employed, as well as some heavily
indebted SMEs, already faced higher risks than ordinary homebuyers before the crisis (Bank of Korea,
2019a). The persistent concentration of economic power in the large business groups – the chaebols –
may reduce the ability of the economy to adapt to an increasingly volatile global environment (2018 OECD
Economic Survey of Korea).
Table 1.3. Events that could lead to major changes in the outlook
Vulnerability Possible outcomes
A more protracted global depression than expected. A very sluggish recovery from the COVID-19 crisis in trading
partners would drag exports and investment down, with a major
impact on Korean GDP growth.
The COVID-19 crisis could trigger further disruptions in global value Disruptions and related uncertainty in global value chains would
chains and an intensification of global trade tensions. Korea is deeply affect both exports and investment. They could trigger a fall in the
integrated in global value chains. value of the won and capital outflows.
The deterioration in economic conditions associated with the COVID- The financial system is resilient, but some institutions may be
19 crisis weakens the ability to repay of some heavily indebted vulnerable to large shocks, which could lead to credit contraction
households, notably self-employed and SMEs, despite broad-based during the recession. Household distress would amplify the
government support. downturn, notably through a further reduction in consumption and
employment.
Geo-political tension in the Korean peninsula intensifies further. Although financial markets and capital flows have not been affected
by the recent incidents, further escalation of tensions could create
financial turbulence and weigh on economic growth and stability.
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Monetary policy is accommodative but inflation remains below the 2% target
Inflation is undershooting its medium-term target (Figure 1.6), which prompted the Bank of Korea to cut its
policy rate by 25 basis points already twice in 2019, in July and October to 1.25% (Figure 1.7, Panel A).
The COVID-19 crisis brings further disinflationary pressures, to which the Bank of Korea responded swiftly
by cutting its policy rate by 50 basis points and introducing a range of measures to provide liquidity and
support financial markets in March 2020. The policy rate was cut further by 25 basis points to 0.5% in May
2020 (Table 1.1). The Won depreciated somewhat (Figure 1.7, Panel B). If low inflation and sluggish
activity persist longer than expected, further monetary policy accommodation needs to be considered.
Because little space is left for further policy rate cuts, the Bank of Korea should stand ready to adopt
unconventional monetary policy measures going beyond liquidity support, like the purchase of government
bonds to lower long-term interest rates.
Figure 1.6. Inflation is well below the 2% target
5.0
CPI CPI excluding food and energy
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0 3 +/- 1% 2.5 -3.5%
2.5 2%
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
-0.5
Note: In boxes, the medium-term consumer price inflation target.
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
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The Bank of Korea Act stipulates that “the Bank shall contribute to the sound development of the national
economy through ensuring price stability, while giving due consideration to financial stability in carrying out
its monetary policy” (Bank of Korea, 2019b). The inclusion of financial stability considerations in the central
bank’s mandate has merits, since monetary and macro-prudential policies can be complementary (Bruno
et al., 2017). At the current juncture, economic growth is expected to be sluggish and inflationary pressures
on the demand-side are forecast to remain weak due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the Bank of
Korea should maintain its accommodative monetary policy stance. Meanwhile, concerns about financial
imbalance risks are intensifying as housing prices have been rising in an increasing number of areas, and
lending to households has accelerated again recently under the accommodative financial conditions. The
Bank of Korea should continue to pay close attention to changes in macroeconomic conditions and
developments of the COVID-19 pandemic and financial stability risks, such as an over-concentration of
capital in the real-estate market, while maintaining its accommodative policy stance to support the
economy.
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Figure 1.7. Monetary policy has been eased and the won has depreciated somewhat
A. Policy rates Index 2010 = 100
B. Exchange rates
%
3.5 Korea United States 120
Japan Euro Area Real effective exchange rate Dollar per KRW
3.0
115
2.5
110
2.0
1.5 105
1.0
100
0.5
95
0.0
-0.5 90
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
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Strong public finances allow stimulating the economy
The government has appropriately responded to the COVID-19 crisis by providing additional fiscal support
to the economy. The budget balance will move from a surplus of 0.9% of GDP in 2019 to a deficit of around
3% of GDP in 2020 (Figure 1.8, Panel A), reflecting in particular a fiscal stimulus of 3.1% of GDP.
Government debt was less than 40% in 2019, lower than in all G7 countries and far below the OECD
average of over 100% (Panel B). Sound public finances provide room to increase spending in the current
downturn, even though the medium-term implications should be monitored carefully, especially when
permanent spending measures are implemented. Temporary fiscal support should remain in place in the
first phase of the recovery, before shifting towards more investment spending in the second phase. In the
longer run, public spending is set to increase due to population ageing, which will require government
revenue increases to ensure fiscal sustainability. Total tax revenue amounted to 28.4% of GDP in 2018,
compared to an OECD average of 34.3% (OECD, 2019b), despite defence spending of over 2% of GDP,
a share only surpassed in the OECD by Israel and the United States.
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Figure 1.8. Sound public finances leave room for fiscal stimulus
A. Government fiscal balance B. Gross government debt (National Accounts
% of GDP definition) 2019
5.0 Single-hit scenario Double-hit scenario
250
4.0
3.0
200
2.0
1.0 150
0.0
100
-1.0
-2.0
50
-3.0
-4.0 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 KOR DEU CAN USA OECD GBR FRA ITA JPN
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
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The decline in government revenue and massive fiscal support to the economy will push up government
debt. At the current juncture, uncertainty is extremely high and any longer-term extrapolation is purely
illustrative. Here, gross government debt is posited to increase through 2021 in line with the budget deficit,
as projected in the event of a double-COVID-19 hit, with the deficit then assumed to be reduced gradually
and to revert to its pre-crisis path by 2025. In that case, debt jumps to more than 48% of GDP in 2023
(Figure 1.9). Thereafter debt grows in parallel to its pre-crisis path, where the increase in spending due to
ageing and increased demand for public services is derived from the OECD long-term model estimates
(Guillemette et al., 2017).
Figure 1.9. Potential impact of the COVID-19 crisis on gross government debt
% of GDP
58
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
53
48
43
38
33
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040
Note: This figure is based on the Economic Outlook 107 double-hit scenario updated to take into account incoming data through 23 July 2020.
The increase in debt after 2021 in the pre-crisis scenario is driven by rising spending due to ageing and rising demand for public services, as
derived from the OECD long-term model estimates (Guillemette et al., 2017).
Source: OECD calculations.
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Table 1.4. Past recommendations on fiscal policy
Main recent OECD recommendations Action taken since the 2018 Survey or planned
Control spending in line with the Fiscal Management Plan to help The government set fiscal balance and government debt targets,
ensure a sustainable fiscal balance in the long run. and makes sure that total expenditure lies close to the target set
out in the five-year National Fiscal Management Plan.
Allow public spending as a share of GDP to increase in the face of Government spending has been increasing much faster than
population ageing in the long run. nominal GDP since 2018.
Use taxes that are relatively less harmful to economic growth, VAT is applied on cloud services provided by multinational
notably the VAT, to finance rising social spending. companies in Korea since December 2018.
Reallocate public spending to social welfare as planned. Public spending for health, welfare, and employment sector
increased significantly (+11.3% in the 2019 budget).
The financial system remains solid, but the COVID-19 crisis raises vulnerability
The COVID-19 crisis generates liquidity risks, which are mitigated by the measures taken by the
government and the Bank of Korea (Table 1.1). Some businesses in the sectors most affected by the
pandemic are likely to suffer persistently low activity, which increases solvency risks, all the more as the
crisis lingers. Regulatory Tier 1 capital is well above mandatory requirements albeit in the lower part of the
OECD distribution (Figure 1.10, Panel A). Delinquency rates are low, even though they edged up for some
regional banks already in the pre-crisis period for the self-employed, as business conditions deteriorated.
The overall leverage ratio is close to the OECD average (Panel B). Corporate credit growth has been
relatively strong (Figure 1.11, Panel A) and corporate debt relative to GDP is slightly higher than the G7
average, although somewhat lower than in Japan and the European Union (Panel B). Household credit
growth slowed following the introduction of a debt service ratio limit in 2018 and a tightening of regulations
for non-bank financial institutions since 2017, but remains higher than household income growth (Panel
C). The ratio of household debt to disposable income is above the OECD average, but below levels
reached in Northern Europe (Panel D).
Figure 1.10. The unweighted leverage ratio is close to the OECD average
A. Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets B. Total capital relative to unweighted assets
2018 or latest year available 2018 or latest year available %
%
30 16
14
25
12
20 10
15 8
6
10
4
5 2
0 CHL
AUS
KOR
CAN
ESP
USA DNK
CAN
FRA
SWE
GBR
NLD 0
ITA
PRT
GRC
FRA
AUT
POL AUS
ESP
ITA
BEL
CZE
AUT
BEL
DEU
HUN
OECD
GBR
CZE PRT
SVK
ISR
KOR
OECD
LUX
CHE
SWE
NLD
NOR
FIN
DNK CHL
CHE
MEX
USA
POL
GRC
LVA
ISL
IRL
LUX
EST TUR
EST
IRL
ISL
Source: OECD, Resilience database.
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Real housing prices have been stable at the national level over the past decade (Figure 1.12, Panel A),
thanks to more responsive supply than in most OECD countries and prudent financial policy. The price-to-
rent ratio is also close to its historical average (Panel B). Self-employed borrowers, however, are facing
higher risks, notably in wholesale and retail trade, and in accommodation and restaurants, where the
COVID-19 crisis has curtailed activity (Bank of Korea, 2019a). Moreover, housing prices in some parts of
the Seoul metropolitan area and the provinces have increased. The government has recently announced
additional measures to curb housing price increases, including tighter mortgage lending rules, higher
capital gains tax rates, property tax increases for homeowners holding several dwellings, and regulatory
revision to boost housing supply.
Korean finance has made efforts to become greener, for example through the issuance of green bonds
and the commitment of several Korean companies to follow the Task Force on Climate-related Financial
Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations. However, disclosure remains limited in Korea despite requirements
from the 2012 Greenhouse Gas and Energy Target Management Scheme and the 2014 National Pension
Act (Cambridge Centre for Sustainable Finance, 2018).
Figure 1.11. Aggregate corporate debt is moderate but rising and household debt is high
A. Corporate credit growth B. Non-financial corporation debt1
Y-o-y % change % of GDP
12 160
140
10
120
8
100
6 80
60
4
40
2
20
0 0
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 DEU ITA USA GBR G7 KOR JPN EA19 CAN FRA
C. Household credit growth D. Household debt, % of household disposable income1
Y-o-y % change
12 300
10 250
8 200
6 150
4 100
2 50
0 0
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
HUN
SVN
CZE
ITA
EST
SVK
AUT
DEU
USA
GRC
ESP
JPN
BEL
FRA
PRT
OECD
FIN
IRL
GBR
CAN
KOR
SWE
CHE
AUS
NLD
NOR
DNK
1. 2018 or latest year available.
Source: Bank of Korea, Bank for International Settlements and OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
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Figure 1.12. At the national level, housing prices have been stable
A. Real housing prices (1986Q1=100) B. Price-to-rent ratio (1986-2019 average=100)
180 130
160
120
Korea OECD
140
110
120
100 100
80 90
Korea OECD
60
80
40
70
20
0 60
1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018
Note: In Panel A, real housing prices are deflated using the private consumption deflator.
Source: OECD, House Price database.
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Financial authorities need to consider taking into account climate-related risks in financial markets, as done
for instance by the Bank of England (Carney, 2015). Climate events, such as droughts, generate aggregate
supply shocks and depreciate assets. Decarbonisation has impacts on the asset prices of long-lived
energy-related infrastructure. Because of market imperfections, financial markets will not on their own
respond adequately to these risks (Krogstrup and Oman, 2019).
Table 1.5. Past recommendations on financial policy
Main recent OECD recommendations Action taken since the 2018 Survey or planned
Consider further tightening loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income The cap on LTV was tightened to 0~40% for homebuyers to buy a
(DTI) regulations on mortgage lending depending on the impact of the house in “overheated” or “bubble-prone” areas, depending on the
recent changes. housing price. The cap was also tightened to 30~50% in the
adjustment-targeted areas. Further regulations are imposed on a
homeowner holding multiple houses in the regulated areas. The
DSR (debt service ratio) regulation in the “overheated” or “bubble-
prone” areas was tightened as well.
The Bank of Korea joined the Network for Greening the Financial System, a voluntary network of central
banks promoting sustainable growth and joint management of climate change-related financial risks, in
November 2019. The Network’s recommendations are non-binding, but will help incorporate climate-
related risks into financial stability monitoring and supervision (NGFS, 2019). Korea could consider
following the United Kingdom, where the financial supervisor requires financial intermediaries to report
their climate-related exposures since April 2019, or France, where the Law for the Energy Transition and
Green Growth requires listed companies to disclose financial risks and institutional investors to report how
investment policies align with the national energy and ecological transition.
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The fruits of Korea’s past economic performance have not been equally
distributed
The COVID-19 crisis increases inequality, despite income support, job retention measures and the creation
of public jobs for the elderly and other low-income groups. The duality of the Korean labour market – the
large gap in wages, working conditions and social coverage between regular and non-regular workers –
implies that non-regular workers, with insecure jobs and in many cases insufficient social insurance, are
most vulnerable to shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic. Many older workers work in small businesses in
the service sector particularly affected by the virus outbreak. In addition, physical distancing measures
have tended to isolate them from work and social activities. Korea’s relative poverty rate is the third highest
OECD-wide, driven by the worst old-age relative poverty rate in the OECD, even though the country
achieved one of the world’s most impressive economic performances over the past half century,
sometimes referred to as the “Miracle on the Han River” (Koen, 2019). While early phases of
industrialisation generated strong income growth for most of the population, growth has become less
inclusive since the 1997 financial crisis (Kim, 2011). Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient
after taxes and transfers, is the seventh highest in the OECD (Figure 1.13, Panel A), reflecting wide wage
dispersion (Panel B) and limited redistribution, compared with most other OECD countries. Population
ageing and skill-biased technological change threaten to increase inequality further unless labour market
duality is reduced, skills are upgraded, older workers get access to better jobs, pension adequacy improves
and the social safety net is strengthened.
The government has taken several measures in recent years to tackle income inequality. The minimum
wage was raised by 16.4% in 2018, bringing it to a relatively high level in relation to the median wage
(Figure 1.14). In 2019, the minimum wage was raised by 10.9%, the third highest increase in the OECD,
behind Lithuania (38.8%) and Spain (22.3%). While the rapid increase contributed to reducing wage
inequality, it may have affected the employment of low-skilled workers, as suggested by weakness in
employment developments in labour-intensive sectors, even before the COVID-19 crisis, although weak
demand has also contributed. SMEs are affected by higher labour costs, despite subsidies to help them
adjust (Choi, 2018). Accordingly, the minimum wage was raised by 2.9% for 2020 and, in the context of
the COVID-19 crisis, by 1.5% for 2021. The government has more than tripled the amount spent on the
earned income tax credit (EITC) in 2019 and doubled the number of recipients, through lower qualification
requirements and higher asset and income ceilings, allowing nearly one household in five to receive an
EITC, with a total cost of around 0.2% of GDP. The EITC is an efficient tool to increase low-paid workers’
income, especially in countries with high wage disparities (OECD, 2018a; Immervoll et al., 2007).
As shown above, non-regular workers have suffered much larger job losses than regular employees since
the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis, highlighting the need to strengthen the social safety net, both in crisis
time, as is being done during the COVID-19 crisis (Table 1.1), and on a more permanent basis. Social
protection remains weaker than in most other OECD countries, despite the gradual extension of
Employment Insurance to most workers, as compliance remains insufficient, notably for non-regular and
small company workers. Their rights should be better enforced. Employers that employ workers eligible for
Employment Insurance, but fail to report their employees’ insured status are subject to a fine for
negligence. In 2018, a fine for failure to report workers eligible for the insurance was imposed in about
85 000 cases. Introducing a degree of statutory employer liability for all workers and a cash sickness
benefit should also be considered, building on the crisis measures taken in the context of COVID-19.
Employees who are (self-) quarantined or hospitalised due to COVID-19 are entitled to paid leave from the
employer or living allowance from the government (Chapter 2). The New Deal includes a sickness benefit
implementation study in 2021 and a pilot project for households, including low-income families, in 2022.
Strong focus should be on rehabilitation and return to work, including clear protocols defining the rights
and duties of workers, employers, doctors and insurance authorities, and regular work capacity
assessments (OECD, 2018b).
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
27
Figure 1.13. Income inequality is relatively high
2017 or latest
A. Gini after taxes and transfers
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00 SVK
SVN
CZE
DNK
NORISL
BEL
FIN
HUN
SWE
AUT
POL
NLD
FRA
DEU
CHE
LUX
IRL
CAN
EST
OECD
ITA
AUS
PRT
GRC
JPN
ESP
ISR
LVA
NZL
KOR
GBR
LTU
USA
TUR
MEX
CHL
B. Dispersion of gross earnings of full-time dependent employees
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
SWE ITA BEL NOR DNK FIN CHE NZL FRA JPN ISL NLD ESP AUS LUX GRC AUT SVN DEU MEX CZE GBR SVK TUR CAN HUN LTU EST POL PRT CHL LVA IRL KOR ISR USA
OECD
Note: Whole population. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (maximum inequality). The dispersion of gross earnings refers to
the ratio of the top to the bottom decile of the wage distribution.
Source: OECD, Income Distribution Database and Decile ratios of gross earnings dataset.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156808
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
28
Figure 1.14. The minimum wage is high relative to the median wage, 2018
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Note: Refers to gross wages.
Source: OECD, Minimum relative to average wages of full-time workers dataset.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156827
Several other measures are being implemented to reduce inequalities, including extensions of social and
health insurance coverage, the creation of public sector jobs, in particular for older workers, investments
in vocational education, and increases in basic pensions. The pension system has yet to mature and
means-tested support is low. The Basic Pension should be raised further and more focussed on the elderly
in absolute poverty, access to the Basic Livelihood Security Programme should be facilitated and National
Pension Scheme contributions and future replacement rates should be raised (Chapter 2). Late retirement
is not preventing old-age poverty, as older workers tend to be employed in low-paid and insecure jobs (see
below).
Lowering wage inequality will also require enhancing competition in product markets, as concentration and
economic rents generally widen earning gaps between firms (Furman and Orszag, 2018). Employees in
big business groups (chaebols) benefit from much higher wages and social protection than in SMEs (2018
OECD Economic Survey of Korea). Hence, reinforcing social protection should go hand in hand with
loosening barriers to competition in product markets and labour mobility. Employment protection legislation
is flexible regarding collective dismissals, but is relatively strict compared to other OECD countries
regarding individual dismissals of regular workers (Figure 1.15). This contributes to labour market duality
and hampers labour reallocation towards the most productive uses.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
29
Table 1.6. Past recommendations on the labour market and inclusiveness
Main recent OECD recommendations Action taken since the 2018 Survey or planned
Break down dualism by relaxing employment protection for regular The coverage of industrial accident compensation insurance is
workers and making it more transparent, while expanding social extended to apprentices from universities from September 2018,
insurance coverage and training for non-regular workers. construction equipment operators (about 110 000 persons) from
January 2019 and to visiting service workers and cargo truck
drivers (about 199 000 persons) from July 2020. The government
plans to expand the coverage of employment insurance to
dependent self-employed and freelance artists.
In 2020, the government will introduce the National Learning Card
to integrate learning account systems for the unemployed and the
employed.
Assess the impact of the 16.4% hike in the minimum wage in 2018 Some studies show that raising the minimum wage has reduced
before raising it further. wage inequality. Further studies on the impact on the employment
are needed. The Minimum Wage Commission is studying ways to
improve analyses and research on the effects of the minimum
wage. The minimum wage increase was set to 2.9% in 2020 and
1.5% in 2021, taking into account prevailing economic conditions.
Increase the quality and availability of vocational education to reduce The number of specialised high schools participating in industry-
labour market mismatch and labour shortages in SMEs. academia apprenticeship partnerships has increased markedly
and the government plans to develop training in Fourth Industrial
Revolution sectors. Since 2014, 15 369 businesses and 91 195
workers have participated in the “(work-study) dual system”.
Further increase the Basic Pension and focus it on the elderly in The government increased the Basic Pension for all beneficiaries
absolute poverty. (around 5 million) to up to KRW 250 thousand per month from
KRW 200 thousand in September 2018. From April 2019, low-
income elderlies (bottom 20%) receive an increased monthly basic
pension of up to KRW 300 thousand.
Figure 1.15. Permanent workers’ employment protection is relatively strong
Index of protection of permanent workers against individual dismissals, 2013
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
USA CAN GBR NZL HUN CHE IRL AUS JPN EST SVK MEX ESP SVN ISL GRC DNK AUT BEL POL TUR NOR LUX KOR ISR FIN SWE CHL DEU ITA LVA FRA NLD CZE PRT
Note: The index ranges from 0 (no regulation) to 6 (detailed regulation).
Source: OECD, Employment Protection Database.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156846
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30
Korea’s economic achievements have not fully translated into well-being
Korea’s income per capita has risen spectacularly over the past decades and is now close to the European
Union average. However, looking at the well-being dimensions monitored by the OECD, Korea is among
the top 20% OECD performers only on housing, although scores on education and skills, and civic
engagement, are also fairly high (Figure 1.16). Korea ranks particularly low on social connections,
perceived health status, environmental quality and work-life balance, highlighting the need to foster a more
inclusive society. Meanwhile, the government submitted again the revision package of labour-related laws
based on the recommendations of public interest members of the Economic, Social and Labour Council,
together with the ratification proposal of the three International Labour Organization fundamental
Conventions No. 87 on freedom of association, No. 98 on the right to organise and collective bargaining,
and No. 29 on the prohibition of forced labour to the National Assembly. The approval by the National
Assembly of the revision package and the ratification proposal would significantly improve Korea’s worker
fundamental rights.
Figure 1.16. Well-being scores remain relatively low in many dimensions
Better Life Index, country rankings from 1 (best) to 35 (worst), 2017
20% top performers 60% middle performers 20% bottom performers Korea
5
10 10
19
25 23
27
35 34 32
34
Social Health status Environmental Work-life Subjective Personal Income and Jobs and Civic Education and Housing
connections quality balance well-being security wealth earnings engagement skills
Note: Each well-being dimension is measured by one to four indicators from the OECD Better Life Index set. Normalised indicators are averaged
with equal weights.
Source: OECD (2017), OECD Better Life Index, www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156865
Better use of labour resources and innovation can support growth
Korea’s employment rate is relatively low, even before the COVID-19 crisis (Figure 1.17, Panel A), largely
reflecting low female employment, although delayed labour market entry of youth also contributes.
Employment of older workers is high, but often concentrated in low-paid, low productivity jobs. Working
time is among the highest in the OECD, but labour productivity is low (Panel B), whether measured per
employee or per hour worked, mostly reflecting weak performance in SMEs and services. Hence policies
should aim at raising employment and productivity, while promoting better work-life balance (Fernandez et
al., 2020).
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
31
Figure 1.17. Korea has scope to raise both employment and productivity
2018 or latest
A. Employment rate, population aged 15-64 (%)
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
B. Labour productivity (OECD=100)
200
GDP per person employed GDP per hour worked
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Source: OECD (2019c), OECD Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b2774f97-en.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156884
Boosting female and youth employment, prolonging careers and enhancing adult skills
is essential
The gender employment gap for people aged 15-64 is nearly 18 percentage points, the fourth largest in
the OECD. Relatively low wages and weak career prospects discourage many women from working. Even
when working, many women are in non-regular employment, which prevents them from making the most
of their generally high level of qualification. This may contribute to the gender wage gap, which is the widest
in the OECD, at about 34% in 2018, as against an OECD average of about 13%. A number of recent
measures, in particular to enhance childcare quality, improve work-life balance and facilitate return to work
after career breaks could help reduce the gender gap. More broadly, a culture of gender equality needs to
be promoted in the workplace and at home. The take-up of parental leave is still low, especially for fathers
(OECD, 2019d). Recent measures to extend paid maternity leave to groups of workers not previously
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
32
covered (self-employed and atypical workers) are welcome, but Korea should consider applying similar
extensions to its paternity and parental leave entitlements. Introducing options to take parental leave for
shorter periods at higher payment rates, as in Germany, could also help encourage take-up, especially by
fathers. The gender wage gap should be addressed, for instance, by regularly publishing a national-level
analysis of wage difference determinants to promote fairer wages. Gender-friendly policies could also have
a positive impact on the fertility rate, which has fallen to around one, the lowest level in the OECD
(Chapter 2).
Table 1.7. Past recommendations on promoting female employment
Main recent OECD recommendations Action taken since the 2018 Survey or planned
Upgrade accreditation standards in early childhood education and From June 2019, the Assessment and Accreditation system is
care and make them mandatory. mandatory and applied to all day-care centres. To achieve a 40%
share of public childcare by 2021, the government is expanding
the number of public day care centres (574 in 2018 and 654 in
2019). From September 2019, residential compounds with 500 or
more households are required to establish a public day care
centre.
Raise qualification standards for teachers. From March 2020, teachers at day-care centres with a long-term
employment gap (two years or more) are required to receive
preliminary job training. The government plans to introduce a
system to enhance teachers’ expertise.
Relax fee ceilings on private childcare institutions and entry barriers. The government pays for the tuition for all children including in
private childcare centres. A price ceiling applies for certain
expenses such as field trips. The accreditation of public day-care
centres, highly preferred by parents, is not restricted. The
government implements policies to turn private daycare centres
into public centres by signing lease agreements.
The elderly in Korea tend to work longer than in most other OECD countries for several reasons, including
a still immature National Pension Scheme. After being forced to leave their career job at a relatively early
age for various reasons, including poor business performance, business suspension and family care,
Koreans tend to move to jobs with lower pay. This generates old-age poverty, lowers well-being and
productivity, and encourages working long hours (Hijzen and Thewissen, 2020). Expanding incentives for
workers and employers to ensure that workers stay longer in their career jobs, promoting more flexibility
in wages, better work-life balance and lifelong learning could boost the level and quality of employment of
older workers. The mandatory retirement age was raised to 60 in 2016-17 and should be reviewed to
increase it further over time, as companies move away from the seniority-based wage system. This needs
to be complemented by further investments in adult education and enhancing its governance, notably
through better coordination between ministries and with regional authorities and other stakeholders
(OECD, 2020a, b). More broadly, a gradual rebalancing of active labour market policy from direct job
creation, which currently accounts for about half of spending, to training and job counselling will be
necessary to enhance job quality and employability. Public employment service resources need to be
increased, along with second-career guidance for mid-career and older workers. The contributions of youth
and immigrants to the Korean economy could also be enhanced by speeding labour market entry through
further developing vocational training and career guidance, and gradually adapting the job mobility system
for foreign workers, while continuing to shield local workers from undue competition (Chapter 2).
Less than half of youth aged 15-29 were employed before the COVID-19 crisis, the fifth lowest share in
the OECD, reflecting long studies, as more than two-thirds of youth obtain tertiary degrees, but also slow
transition from education to employment. The crisis is exacerbating this problem, with youth employment
having declined rapidly since February 2020, particularly in the service sector, and further contraction
expected over the coming months (Han, 2020). Labour market duality encourages young people to extend
formal or informal education in the hope of joining large firms or the public sector, rather than SMEs, which
often suffer from a shortage of skilled workers. To address skills mismatches, the government has stepped
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
33
up career counselling, developed apprenticeships and vocational education (notably Meister schools) and
introduced incentives for tertiary education institutions to propose more market-relevant degrees.
Nevertheless, career guidance and counselling will need to be developed further, in particular through
increased resources for the public employment service and stronger involvement of employers (Chapter 2).
Changing Korea’s long working-hour culture requires more than lower legal working
time limits
The current government is seeking to reduce the high incidence of very long working hours in an effort to
improve job quality, health and productivity. Korean workers work a total of 1 967 hours per year, the third
highest in the OECD and 300 hours longer than the OECD average (as of 2018). About 12% of workers
work longer than 52 hours per week. Working very long hours increases the risk of burnout and work
accidents, a major concern in Korea, promotes unhealthy lifestyles and undermines labour productivity
(Saint-Martin et al., 2018).
A preliminary assessment of the ongoing working time reform to decrease the limit from 68 to 52 weekly
working hours shows that this reduced the incidence of working more than 52 weekly hours by five
percentage points or about a fifth of its pre-reform level among employees working overtime in large firms
(Figure 1.18 Panel A). With the reform, Korea’s statutory working time limits have become in line with
dominant OECD practice (Figure 1.18 Panel B, Box 1.2). The current reform builds on a previous reform
implemented between 2004 and 2011 that reduced the regular working week from 44 to 40 hours. While it
is too early to tell whether the ongoing reform will improve labour market outcomes beyond actual hours
worked, worker health, productivity and wellbeing, several evaluations credit the previous reform with
positive outcomes like fewer work accidents, healthier lifestyles and enhanced labour productivity (Lee and
Lee, 2016; Ahn, 2016; Park and Park, 2019). Strikingly, labour productivity not only increased in hourly
terms but also on a per person basis, meaning that hourly productivity improved sufficiently to offset the
decrease in the number of working hours.
Box 1.2. Working-time reforms in Korea
The current government is gradually implementing a working time reform with the following elements:
The maximum number of total weekly working hours has been reduced from 68 to 52 by
lowering the cap on overtime from 28 to 12. The new maximum applies to firms with 300 or
more employees as of July 2018 and to firms with 50 or more employees as of January 2020
and will be extended to firms with five or more employees in July 2021, to give smaller firms
more time to adjust. Firms with 5 to 29 employees are temporarily allowed an additional eight
hours of overtime until December 2022, provided there is a written agreement with an employee
representative.
The number of sectors exempt from total hours limits has been reduced from 26 to 5 as of July
2018. Sectors such as consumer goods sales, hotels and restaurants and finance now have to
abide by the maximum limit. Exemptions still apply to certain types of transportation services
and healthcare.
Firms will be obliged to offer the 15 public holidays as paid days off, or offer an alternative day
off in agreement with an employee representative. Previously, firms were not obliged to provide
(paid) leave on public holidays, although most larger firms did. This reform is also being
implemented in a staggered fashion by firm size between 2020 and 2022.
A tripartite agreement was signed on a plan to extend the reference period of the flexible working hours
system from three to six months, and a reform bill reflecting the agreement is currently pending at the
National Assembly.
Source: Hijzen and Thewissen (2020).
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
34
Figure 1.18. Fewer individuals work very long hours as time limits were tightened towards OECD
norms
A. Effect of the working time reform on the share of employees working overtime who work more
than 52 weekly hours among firms with more than 300 employees
0.12
Implementation of the 52-hour
0.08 limit for large firms
0.04
0.00
-0.04
-0.08
-0.12
Q3 before Q2 before Q1 before Implementation Q2 after Q3 after Q4 after Q5 after Remaining
(Oct-Dec '17) (Jan-Mar '18) (Apr-Jun '18) (Jul-Sep '18) (Oct-Dec '18) (Jan-Mar '19) (Apr-Jun '19) (Jul-Sep '19) months
(Oct-Nov '19)
Time relative to the implementation of the reform
B. Legal maximum weekly working hours
90
80
Normal hours Overtime hours Total hours 2018-2021 reform
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 FRA
AUT
BEL
CAN
CZE
DNK
EST
FIN
DEU
GRC
HUN
ISL*
IRL
ITA
LVA
LTU
LUX
NLD
NOR
POL
PRT
SVK
SVN
ESP
SWE
GBR
OECD
KOR since '18
CHL*
MEX*
CHE*
KOR before
JPN
AUS
NZL
TUR
USA
Note: Panel A illustrates the effect of the reform, by showing the difference in the difference in the incidence of working more than 52 hours
between large firms affected by the reform (with 300 or more employees) and slightly smaller firms not yet affected (with 100-299 employees),
relative to the quarter before the reform (April-June 2018). Vertical bands indicate the 95% confidence intervals of each point estimate. It shows
that the probability to work more than 52 hours decreased by about five percentage points in affected firms since the implementation relative to
the quarter before the implementation, compared to the change in probability over the same period in slightly smaller firms. The sample consists
of employees aged 18 and older working overtime in a non-exempt private sector and non-exempt occupation on a permanent contract.
Panel B: Normal working hours are those not subject to overtime regulation. Overtime working hours are those where overtime regulation
applies. Total working hours are the sum of normal and overtime working hours. Data refer to 2018 (2019 for Japan) or 2011-12 for the countries
with an asterisk (2010 for Israel). Dashed bars and grey diamonds indicate that no legislative maximum exists. Korea before 2018 refers to the
situation just before the reform, while after refers to the situation in 2021 when the reform will be fully implemented. In European countries with
only maximum total (and not normal) working hours, common collectively agreed maxima are used for maximum normal working hours
(Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, United Kingdom).
Source: Hijzen and Thewissen (2020), using Economically Active Population Survey micro data, Eurofound (2019), ILO Working Conditions
Laws Database (2013) and the OECD Working Time Questionnaire (2010).
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35
While having more stringent working time limits is an important step in the right direction, more is needed
to effectively change Korea’s long working-hour culture. A first concern is that small firms with fewer than
five employees as well as firms in some sectors (e.g. transportation and storage, health care) remain
exempt from working time regulations. Second, incentives to supply and demand long working hours
should be mitigated. Important supply factors include low skills, low wages and concerns about future
pensions, and demand factors relate to limited flexibility for employers to adjust employment according to
business conditions and productivity (Hijzen and Thewissen, 2020).
The diffusion of technology can boost productivity and well-being
Technology and digital tools offer vast opportunities to boost productivity (Chapter 3). The temporary lifting
of the ban on telemedicine services during the COVID-19 crisis, which allowed patients to consult their
doctors without risking mutual exposure to the virus, illustrates the benefits services based on new
technologies can bring to the population (Box 1.3). Korea is one of the top players in emerging digital
technologies (OECD, 2019e), with a large and growing ICT sector, outstanding digital infrastructure, almost
generalised access to high-speed internet and the first nationwide introduction of 5G worldwide (OECD,
2017b; OECD, 2019f). However, while productivity is outstanding in ICT manufacturing and relatively high
in other manufacturing, it is much weaker in services, including ICT services, which account for a large
share of employment (Figure 1.19).
Box 1.3. Telemedicine: friend or foe?
Telemedicine is increasingly used across OECD countries, delivering health care in a wide range of
specialties like neurology and psychiatry, using diverse techniques from remote monitoring to real-time
video-consultations. Amid the COVID-19 outbreak, Korea has temporarily lifted its ban on telemedicine,
allowing doctors to treat patients with mild symptoms on the phone. Between 24 February and 26 July,
about 566 000 telemedicine bills were issued by 6 830 hospitals. While telemedicine helps limiting risks
of infection between patients and doctors, it also meets high resistance among doctors who question
the reliability of the diagnoses and data security.
Amid the COVID-19 outbreak, telemedicine services were made available in 23 other OECD countries.
In Norway, the share of digital consultations in primary health care increased from 5% before the
outbreak to 60% by March 2020. In the United States, teleconsultations increased from 6% to 50-70%
of total consultations by March 2020 for some providers. In France, they increased from around 40 000
to almost 500 000 in March 2020. Evidence in other OECD countries (Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the Nordics) shows that health care can be tele-delivered in a safe and effective way,
and can even lead to better outcomes than conventional face-to-face care, for instance for patients with
diabetes or chronic heart conditions. It can also improve quality, timeliness, coordination and continuity
of care, as well as knowledge sharing and reduced use of costly hospital care. Patients also tend to
report high satisfaction and a sense of reassurance. Policymakers can encourage good practices of
telemedicine through clear regulation and guidance, sustained financing and payment, and sound
governance, in addition to appropriate training of both patients and health care professionals. They
should also ensure telemedicine services are compatible with preserving patient safety and quality of
care.
Source: Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service; OECD (2020b); Oliveira Hashiguchi (2020).
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
36
Figure 1.19. Low-productivity sectors account for a high share of total employment
A. Sectors' productivity relative to total productivity B. Sectors' share of employment
% %
350 45
OECD Korea OECD Korea
40
300
35
250
30
200 25
150 20
15
100
10
50
5
0 0
ICT Other ICT services Other business ICT Other ICT services Other business
manufacturing manufacturing services manufacturing manufacturing services
Note: Data refer to 2015. ‘ICT manufacturing’ includes manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products. ‘ICT services’ include
publishing, telecommunication and IT services. ‘Other business services’ excludes the housing sector.
Source: OECD STAN Database.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156922
The diffusion of advanced digital technology is uneven (Figure 1.20). Korean firms have margins for
improvement in the adoption of sophisticated digital technologies (Chapter 3). The lack of adequate skills
and knowledge is the main barrier to the diffusion of digital technologies, especially in SMEs and among
older workers. People lacking adequate digital skills are particularly disadvantaged as the COVID-19
pandemic has encouraged the “untact”, or contactless, economy, with remote work and many services
provided via on-line platforms to limit physical contact. SME employees have limited access to training
(OECD, 2020c). The digital skills gap between generations is the highest among OECD countries and
exacerbates social inequality. Teachers are key to ensure students develop digital skills, but most
teachers, feel they are not sufficiently prepared for the use of ICT for teaching. Improving access to and
quality of training for SME employees, older workers and teachers is necessary to allow them to adapt to
more digitalised production systems and raise managers’ awareness of the potential of digital technologies.
Promoting further collaboration between innovative companies, especially between SMEs and large
enterprises, would facilitate the diffusion of digital technology, for instance through an open collaborative
network to design new products and services, and exchange data (Fourth Industrial Revolution Committee,
2019). Amid the COVID-19 outbreak, Korea contained the spread of the virus, using advanced digital tools
based on artificial intelligence and mobile apps, as well as remote access to daily life services (e.g.
telework, online classes, e-commerce and telemedicine). The Korean authorities recently announced a
Korean New deal to revive the economy, by facilitating the convergence of new and old industries through
enhanced use of digitalisation. The New deal focusses on projects exploiting synergies between the
government and the business sector, including strengthening data infrastructures, expanding data
collection and usage, establishing 5G network infrastructure early and developing artificial intelligence. The
New Deal also includes measures aimed at greening the economy and reinforcing the social safety net
(Table 1.8). Building on the success of Korea’s COVID-19 containment strategy, a “K-quarantine model”
will be systemised and exported.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
37
Table 1.8. Overview of the Korean New Deal projects
Type Field Project Target Budget Job
(2020-25, creation
KRW trillion)
Digital New Data, 1. Open data systems related to people’s Create data markets worth 6.4 295 000
Deal Network, lives KRW 43 trillion in 2025 14.8 172 000
AI (D.N.A) 2. Diffusion of 5G and AI to all industries Increase the number of AI 9.7 91 000
ecosystem 3. Smart government based on 5G and AI enterprises to 150 in 2025 1.0 9 000
4. Korean-style cyber-security system from 56 in 2020
Digitalisation 5. Extend digital education infrastructure to Increase Wifi coverage to all 0.3 4 000
of education all schools schools by 2022 0.5 5 000
infrastructure 6. Strengthen online education for Build a digital education
universities and vocational training platform using big data
institutions
“Untact” (non- 7. Smart medical and care infrastructure Build 18 smart hospitals 0.4 5 000
face-to-face) 8. Diffusion of remote work culture in equipped with 5G and IoT 0.7 9 000
industries SMEs Increase the share of remote 1.0 120 000
9. Support online business of SMEs work to up to 40%
Digitalisation 10. Establish a digital management system Install intelligent transport 8.5 124 000
of social for core social overhead capital (e.g. systems for major 1.2 14 000
overhead transport and water networks) expressways and railroads 0.3 55 000
capital 11. Digital transformation of urban and Install disaster warning
industrial complex spaces systems in risk areas
12. Establish smart logistics systems
Green New Green 13. Build zero-energy public facilities Eco-friendly remodeling of 6.2 243 000
Deal transformation 14. Restore land, ocean and urban 225 000 public rental units 2.5 105 000
of city, space ecosystems Create 723 hectares of urban 3.4 39 000
and living 15. Establish a clean and safe water forests to reduce fine dust
infrastructure management system levels
Diffusion of 16. Build an energy-efficient intelligent Extend the use of smart grids 2.0 20 000
low carbon smart grid to cover 5 million households 9.2 38 000
and 17. Lay the foundations to support the Raise the number of electric 13.1 151 000
renewable transition towards renewable energy and hydrogen cars to 1 130
energy 18. Expand green mobility such as electric 000 and 200 000,
vehicles and hydrogen fuel cell cars respectively
Innovative 19. Foster leading green companies and Transform 1 750 factories 3.6 47 000
ecosystem of create low-carbon and green industrial into clean factories 2.7 16 000
green complexes Construct 10 smart energy
industries 20. Create green innovation infrastructure platforms
such as R&D and finance
Social safety Employment 21. Extend the employment safety net to Increase the number of 3.2 -
net and social most employees (e.g. employment beneficiaries of Employment 10.4 -
reinforcement safety net insurance, industrial accident Insurance to up to 21 million 7.2 39 000
compensation insurance) Extend Basic Livelihood 1.2 118 000
22. Reinforce the social safety net (Basic Security Programme benefits 0.6 2 000
Livelihood Security Programme, sickness to an additional 1.13 million
benefit) households
23. Strengthen assistance for the
unemployed (e.g. Job search allowance,
vocational training)
24. Strengthen assistance to enter the job
market
25. Strengthen industrial and work
environment safety
Human 26. Foster digital and green talents Internet access in all rural 1.1 25 000
resources 27. Reorganise the vocational training areas 2.3 126 000
system 70% of the elderly aged 70 0.6 29 000
28. Strengthen digital access in rural areas and over will enjoy mobile
and for vulnerable groups internet
Total 114.1 1 901 000
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
38
The government supports R&D through the Korea Small Business Innovation Research (KOSBIR)
programme and R&D grants to SMEs, which have contributed to lift corporate R&D investment, registration
of intellectual property rights and investment in tangible and human capital. Nevertheless, results in terms
of creation of value added and commercialisation have been disappointing (Lee and Jo, 2018; Yang, 2018).
Support programmes should be reviewed and Innovation vouchers should be introduced to better direct
R&D subsidies towards innovative SMEs, in manufacturing and in services, and boost their productivity.
Providing SMEs with innovation vouchers would encourage them to engage in innovative projects, for
instance by purchasing studies from universities and research institutions assessing the potential for new
technology introduction to raise their productivity (Kim et al., 2018).
Rapid technological development entails challenges like cyber-security, which is crucial to ensure trust in
economic transactions and well-being. Korea has the second highest share of internet users experiencing
privacy violations in the OECD, after Chile (OECD, 2019e) and youth aged 10-29 are at much higher risk
of internet or smartphone addiction than other age categories. This calls for reinforcing ICT education at
schools and in firms to raise awareness of digital dangers, such as cyberbullying, privacy violation and
addiction to ICT technologies.
Figure 1.20. Digital gaps between large and small firms remain high
As a percentage of enterprises with ten or more persons employed, 2018 or latest year
100
Large firms Small firms
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
OECD Korea OECD Korea OECD Korea OECD Korea OECD Korea
Cloud computing Big data RFID CRM ERP
Note: RFID stands for Radio frequency identification; CRM for Customer relationship management; ERP for Enterprise resource planning.
Source: OECD (2019f); OECD ICT Access and Usage by Businesses Database.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156941
Product market regulations are among the most stringent in the OECD (Figure 1.21). Reducing these
regulatory barriers to competition and reallocation, as well as providing easier financing for young
innovative firms, can boost the diffusion of digital tools like cloud computing and artificial intelligence and
maximise their impact on productivity (Sorbe et al., 2019). A programme to shift the burden of proof from
the regulated to the regulator established in 2019 has led to the overhaul of around two thousand
regulations. In 2020, the scope of the programme is being expanded, with priority given to areas related to
the response to the COVID-19 and other crises. The administration is to be more proactive in reviewing
regulations to solve the regulatory difficulties faced by the private sector, conflict resolution is to be
improved and the programme is to be expanded to local government and public institutions. Further
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
39
participation of stakeholders in the programme is to be facilitated. The government has also introduced
regulatory sandboxes to allow firms in new technologies and new industries to test their products and
business models without being subject to all existing legal requirements. Follow up on this strategy should
allow identifying regulation breaches and reviewing regulations, notably in the case of telemedicine.
Figure 1.21. Product market regulations are stringent
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
GBR ESP DNK DEU LTU SWE NOR AUS NLD LVA CZE NZL SVN HUN ITA PRT FIN IRL CHL ISR JPN POL ISL AUT SVK CHE GRC FRA MEX KOR BEL LUX CAN TUR
OECD
Source: OECD 2018 PMR database.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156960
Table 1.9. Past recommendations on regulation and support for SMEs and innovation
Main recent OECD recommendations Action taken since the 2018 Survey or planned
Strengthen product market competition by relaxing barriers to imports The government seeks to incentivise foreign investment by
and inward foreign direct investment and liberalising product market revising the Foreign Investment Promotion Act to expand cash
regulation. grants for high-tech and product investment.
Introduce a comprehensive negative-list regulatory system and allow The government has launched regulatory sandboxes in ICT
firms in new technologies and new industries to test their products convergence, industrial convergence, financial innovation and
and business models without being subject to all existing legal regional innovation since January 2019. In 2019, 195 projects
requirements (i.e. a regulatory sandbox). were approved by the regulatory sandbox system.
Increase lending based on firms’ technology by expanding public Lending based on firms’ technology amounted to KRW 205 trillion
institutions that provide technological analysis to private lending in 2019, up from KRW 163 trillion for 2018 and from KRW 128
institutions. trillion in 2017. The banks plan to improve their capacity to lend
based on firms’ technology by securing experts, developing
assessment models and enhancing credit rating systems.
Ensure that support provided to SMEs improves their productivity by The government is monitoring SME support policies and analysing
carefully monitoring their performance and introducing a graduation their results to improve their effectiveness and financial efficiency.
system.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
40
The fight against corruption has been stepped up but challenges remain
The Korean government has taken significant steps to fight corruption recently. However, corruption still
remains in Korean society, with relatively low scores both on the Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index and the World Bank Control of corruption indicator, even though both have improved
over the past three years (Figure 1.22). Korea’s rankings on the Index of Public Integrity, developed by the
European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building with support of the European Union,
and the TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix, developed by TRACE International in collaboration with the RAND
Corporation, have also improved. Corruption of low-level public officials has been almost eradicated, in
particular thanks to the establishment of the Korean Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC)
in 2002, which was integrated in a broader agency, the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission
(ACRC) in 2008.
Figure 1.22. Corruption is perceived as relatively high
A. Corruption Perceptions Index B. Control of corruption
Scale: 0 (worst) to 100 (best), 2019 Scale: -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best), 2018
100 2.5
90
80 1.5
70
60 0.5
50
40 -0.5
30
20 -1.5
10
0 MEX
TUR
HUN
GRC
SVK
ITA
LVA
KOR
ISR
MEX
TUR
GRC
HUN
ITA
LVA
SVK
KOR -2.5
ESP
FRA
USA
JPN
AUS
CAN ESP
ISR
FRA
USA
JPN
AUS
GBR
DEU
CHE
SWE
FIN
NZL GBR
CAN
DEU
CHE
SWE
DNK
DNK NZL
FIN
C. Evolution of "Control of Corruption" D. Corruption by sector, "Control of Corruption"
Scale: -2.5 (higher) to 2.5 (lower corruption), 2018 Scale: 0 (worst) to 1 (best)
1.4
Worst performer OECD KOR
1.2 Best performer OECD OECD
Executive bribery
1.00
1.0
OECD KOR 0.75
0.8 Executive
Judicial corruption 0.50 embezzlement
0.6 0.25
0.4 0.00
0.2
Legislature corruption Public sector bribery
0.0
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Public sector
embezzlement
Note: Panel B shows the point estimate and the margin of error. Panel D shows sector-based subcomponents of the “Control of Corruption”
indicator by the Varieties of Democracy Project.
Source: World Bank; Transparency International; Varieties of Democracy Institute; University of Gothenburg, and University of Notre Dame.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156979
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
41
High-level corruption involving politicians and top private company executives remains problematic, as
illustrated by a number of high-profile cases in recent years. Also here, significant progress has been made
on some issues. An amendment to the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management
of the ACRC, which came into force in October 2019, reinforces the protection of whistleblowers, by
severely punishing retaliatory measures (e.g. dismissal). The Public Finance Recovery Act, which came
into force on 1st January 2020 aims at recovering illegitimate profits derived from abusive claims for public
funds (subsidies, compensation and contributions), which amount to an estimated KRW 214 trillion (about
$ 180 billion or 11% of annual GDP). New provisions were added to the Code of Conduct of Public Officials
to prevent conflicts of interest. Recently a number presidential pardons were denied to politicians, business
executives or public officials involved in corruption. In late December 2019, the National Assembly passed
a bill to set up a special anti-corruption investigation unit tasked with looking into wrongdoing by high-
ranking government officials, which includes senior prosecutors, judges and police officers.
Korea’s OECD Anti-Bribery Convention enforcement record has declined between the 2011 and 2018
assessments. Coordination mechanisms between Korea’s police and prosecutors’ offices and reporting
requirements of suspected bribery to relevant law enforcement agencies need to be clarified. Nevertheless,
high tax transparency helps fight corruption (Figure 1.23).
Figure 1.23. Korea is compliant on tax transparency
Exchange of Information on Request
Compliant
Largely
Compliant
Partially
Non-
Compliant TUR
AUS
CAN
CHE
DEU
DNK
GBR
GRC
HUN
ISR
JPN
LVA
SVK
USA
ESP
FIN
FRA
ITA
KOR
MEX
NZL
SWE
Note: The graph summarises the overall assessment on the exchange of information in practice from peer reviews by the Global Forum on
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. Peer reviews assess member jurisdictions' ability to ensure the transparency of
their legal entities and arrangements and to co-operate with other tax administrations in accordance with the internationally agreed standard.
The figure shows first-round results; a second round is ongoing.
Source: OECD Secretariat’s own calculation based on the materials from the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for
Tax Purposes, OECD, and Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934156998
Table 1.10. Past recommendations on corruption
Main recent OECD recommendations Action taken since the 2018 Survey or planned
Follow through on the government’s pledge to not grant Under the Moon Administration, group presidential pardons
presidential pardons to business executives convicted of were granted only twice, and did not concern politicians,
corruption. business executives or public officials involved in corruption.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
42
Environmental quality remains low by OECD standards
Rapid industrial growth over decades has taken its toll on the environment and a shift towards greener
growth is essential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and improve the population’s living
environment, not least air quality (OECD, 2017a). In recent years, CO2 and energy intensity have fallen
only slightly, and low oil prices in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis may generate further headwinds to the
energy transition. The share of renewables in primary energy supply remains modest
(Figure 1.24, Panels A-C). Renewables contribute 8.3% to the country’s electricity generation, one of the
lowest shares OECD-wide. Fossil fuels account for 80% of primary energy supply, of which coal represents
31%, more than in most other OECD countries (Panel D). Nuclear accounts for 10.5% of primary energy
supply and 23.4% of electricity generation, but is to be phased out by 2083.
Notwithstanding a temporary improvement during the first half of 2020, with the positive effects of the
seasonal fine dust control system, favourable weather conditions, and the COVID-19 crisis that depressed
activity, most of the population is exposed to small particle air pollution well above the critical threshold of
the World Health Organisation (10 µg/m³; Panel E). Small particle concentration in Seoul is about twice
the WHO ceiling (Trnka, 2020), raising premature mortality substantially (Roy and Braathen, 2017) and
affecting children’s health most (World Health Organization, 2018). Education outcomes for young children
attending schools exposed to higher air pollution are substantially and lastingly lower (Heissel et al., 2019).
Moreover, air pollution likely worsens the impact of the pandemic (UBC, 2020). About half of the total level
of fine particles stem from domestic sources, notably industry, power plants and diesel vehicles. The
remainder comes from neighbouring countries. Korea has signed a number of bilateral agreements to
address the fine dust issue with China since 1993, which have led in particular to cooperation on
demonstration projects, research and information sharing (Jung, 2019; OECD, 2019g). One of the main
tasks of Korea’s National Council on Climate and Air Quality (NCCA), an independent body launched in
April 2019, is to reinforce cooperation with neighbouring countries to tackle air pollution and climate
change. In 2019, air pollution was declared a “social disaster”, which allows the release of emergency
funds, and KRW 1.3 trillion (about 0.1% of GDP) extra funding was allocated to anti-pollution measures,
in addition to the KRW 2.0 trillion (about 0.1% of GDP) main budget dedicated to anti-pollution measures.
Measures include subsidies for replacing old diesel cars and buying air purifiers, as well as support for
renewables. Public transport is being developed further, notably in the capital area. The government is
implementing additional measures, including shutting down coal power plants, with the aim of reducing
locally-generated small particle air pollution (PM 2.5) by 35% by 2024 relative to 2016, but sustained
efforts will be required to reduce exposure to below the WHO limit.
The government has committed to reducing GHG emissions by 37% relative to business-as-usual by 2030
– equivalent to about 20% relative to the 2010 level. Worldwide, containing global warming will require
moving to net zero GHG emissions in the long run (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018).
An increasing number of high-income countries, have announced net zero GHG production-based
emission targets for 2050 or earlier, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Research suggests that reaching net zero emissions,
while requiring broad and deep economic transformations, may have modest overall social costs (1-2% of
GDP), which would at least in part be offset by well-being gains, in particular from lasting reductions in air
pollution (UK Committee on Climate Change, 2019; OECD, 2019h).
Reaching Korea’s emission targets will require substantial policy measures (OECD, 2017a). The strategy
will need to tackle a broad range of sectors, including electricity generation, buildings, transport, industry
and agriculture. Investment in energy efficiency is also essential to keep costs low (IEA, 2018).
Decarbonisation of electricity is key, as switching to electricity in energy end-use is a major way to lower
emissions. The government’s pledge not to build new coal power plants is welcome. Four ageing coal
power plants were closed recently and six will be closed soon, and others converted to cleaner resources.
Phasing out coal altogether by 2030 would be in line with the commitments of countries in the Powering
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
43
Past Coal Alliance (2017), which argues that ending unabated coal use by 2030 would be a cost-effective
way to align policies with the Paris Agreement. The government’s goal is raising the share of renewables
in electricity generation from about 8.3% in 2018 to 20% by 2030 and 30-35% by 2040. Part of the fiscal
stimulus in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis ought to be oriented towards speeding up the energy transition.
This is all the more important insofar as digitalisation may increase electricity consumption.
Figure 1.24. Environmental performance remains weak
A. CO2 intensity B. Energy intensity C. Renewable energy share
CO2 per GDP Primary energy supply per GDP % of primary energy supply
kg/USD, 2010 PPP Korea (demand-based) ktoe/USD (2010 PPP)
OECD (demand-based) 0.20 12%
0.5
Korea (production-based) Korea OECD
OECD (production-based)
10%
0.4 0.15
8%
0.3
0.10 6%
0.2
Korea OECD 4%
0.05
0.1 2%
0 0.00 0%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
D. Energy supply by source, 2017 1 E. Population exposure to PM2.5
Coal, peat, oil shale Oil Natural gas Nuclear Renewables Other
100%
Korea (2000)
80%
Korea (2017)
60%
OECD (2000)
From inland
40%
OECD (2017)
20%
0% 50% 100%
[ 0-10] µg/m³ [10-15] µg/m³ [15-25] µg/m³
0%
[25-35] µg/m³ [>35] µg/m³
F. Environment-related taxes G. CO2 emissions priced above EUR60 H. Environment-related inventions
% of GDP % of total CO2 emissions from energy use, EUR per tCO2, 2018 2014-16 average
% of all technologies
4% 60% 12%
Energy, 2014 average_2000_2002
Motor vehicles, 2014 10%
3% Other, 2014
Total, 2000 40% 8%
2% 6%
20% 4%
1%
2%
0% 0% 0%
Korea OECD (median) Norway Italy Switzerland France United Korea Korea OECD
Kingdom
1. Data may include provisional figures and estimates.
Source: OECD Green Growth Indicators database, IEA (2018), World energy balances, IEA World Energy Statistics and Balances database.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934157017
Korea could consider reviewing its regulatory policies, which may favour coal over renewables through
high capacity and carbon compensation payments for coal-fired plants (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2019).
Low regulated electricity prices hamper the entry of renewables, as well as investment in technologies
facilitating flexible demand response, which are key to integrating high intermittent renewable supply,
especially in Korea, where there is no international interconnection of the electricity grid. Hence, electricity
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
44
prices should be gradually raised to reflect costs once the economy is recovering, providing targeted
support decoupled from energy use to vulnerable households affected by price increases. Korea could
also take inspiration from the United Kingdom, where carbon taxes and air pollution standards were major
contributing factors in reducing the coal share in electricity from around 40% in 2012 to close to zero.
Revenue from environmental taxation amounts to a greater share of GDP than the OECD median
(Panel F). However, petrol is taxed more than diesel. Korea introduced the world’s second largest emission
trading scheme (ETS) in 2015, which covers around 70% of national direct GHG emissions and plays a
major role in climate change mitigation. Most emissions are priced below EUR 60 per tonne of CO2, a
midrange estimate of climate costs in 2020 (OECD, 2018c) (Panel G). A commitment to gradually rising
carbon pricing in line with emission reduction targets, would minimise adjustment cost. The government
has allocated 3% of ETS permits through auctioning in the second phase of the scheme (2018-20), a
proportion which will increase to at least 10% in the third phase (2021-25). Free allocation harms incentives
to reduce emissions, as permits need to be allocated according to criteria, such as production, which relate
to emissions (Flues and van Dender, 2017), with adverse impacts on government finances and
inclusiveness. Korea could consider following the European Union in fully auctioning permits to electricity
generation which is not subject to direct international competition.
The Seoul Metropolitan Area management system to cap air pollutant emissions put in place in 2008 has
contributed to a trend reduction in air pollution, and there are plans to extend it to other areas of the country.
Allocations for NOx and SOx have been gradually reduced and could be cut further. Compliance monitoring
of industrial emissions needs to improve through better targeting of inspections, more independent
inspectors and better evaluation of regulation (OECD, 2019g). Provincial and local governments’ capacity
to carry out related tasks also needs strengthening, including more funding.
The NCCA recommends further tax incentives to reduce business emissions and tighter regulations on
coal power plants, diesel cars and machinery. Implementation already started in some areas, for example,
old diesel cars are banned from central Seoul from December 2019. Ministries will submit action plans to
implement the recommendations in 2020. Korea could emulate Chile and Sweden, which tax air pollutants
from large industrial sources nation-wide.
Korea is a world leader in overall R&D and its share of environment-related inventions is slightly over the
OECD average and rising (Panel H), with current priorities including hydrogen, renewable energy and
intelligent power systems. The government has set an ambitious hydrogen agenda for road transport
emissions. Digital-based shared mobility can achieve emissions reductions at low cost, as well as
complement the roll-out of zero-carbon passenger transport, reducing investment needs and other
transport-related externalities. Against the backdrop of increased use of single-use plastic as part of
sanitary precautions in the face of the COVID-19 crisis, the government recently announced an agreement
with the packaging and delivery sectors to cut their plastic use by 20%, by standardising containers, making
them thinner and facilitating reuse and recycling.
Table 1.11. Past recommendations on environmental policy
Main recent OECD recommendations Action taken since the 2018 Survey or planned
Steadily increase the share of permits auctioned and the stringency The government has allocated 3% of the allowance through
of the total emission cap in the emissions trading system. auctioning in 2018-20 and will expand this share to over 10% in
2021-25. To achieve the Nationally Determined Contribution by
2030, the total emission cap will be consistent with annual
emission targets under the Korean emissions trading system.
Raise environmentally-related taxes, in part to close the gap between In November 2019, the government announced the
diesel and petrol taxes, and boost electricity prices. comprehensive fine dust management initiative, including a plan to
review diesel and gasoline prices. The government intends to
review related policies, on the basis of studies from experts. In
order to reduce pollution, the tax on soft coal has increased and
tax benefits for replacing old diesel vehicle have been introduced
in December 2018.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
45
Key policy insights recommendations
Key recommendations in bold
MAIN FINDINGS RECOMMENDATIONS
Policies to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
The government has taken a wide range of measures to support
Continue to provide support to households and businesses until
households and businesses during the crisis. Prolonging some current
the economy is recovering, targeting any additional income
temporary measures and/or providing additional support may be
support towards low-income households.
necessary if the crisis lingers.
Sound public finances allow fiscal stimulus to prop up the economy. Support growth-enhancing investments, notably in digital fields,
such as 5G infrastructure and artificial intelligence.
Inflation is set to remain very low over the coming years, the economic
Consider unconventional monetary policy measures going beyond
recovery is likely to be slow and macro-prudential tools are in place to
liquidity support and cutting policy rates further.
ensure financial stability.
Financial and monetary authorities need to take into account climate- Require financial intermediaries to report their climate-related
related risks in financial markets. exposures to the financial supervisor.
Environmental policies
Air pollution is a major challenge, with detrimental impacts on health and Tighten caps for air pollutant emissions and strengthen vehicle
well-being. emission standards.
Low regulated electricity prices do not reflect production, distribution and Once the economy is recovering, raise electricity prices gradually,
environmental costs and hamper the entry of renewables, as well as providing targeted support decoupled from energy use to vulnerable
investment in technologies facilitating flexible demand response. households. Increase government support for the transition towards
renewable energy.
Only 3% of ETS permits are auctioned, increasing to 10% in 2021-25. Increase the share of permits auctioned and the stringency of the total
emission cap of the emissions trading system.
Effective carbon prices are low and vary across sectors and fuels. Price CO2 emissions evenly across sectors and fuels and raise
pricing according to a predictable schedule.
Petrol is taxed more than diesel and road transport fuel taxation has Raise the excise tax on diesel to at least match that on petrol and index
fallen in real terms. rates to inflation.
Fighting corruption
Coordination between Korea’s police and prosecutors’ offices and Clarify coordination mechanisms between Korea’s police and
reporting requirements of suspected bribery are insufficient. prosecutors’ offices and reporting requirements of suspected bribery to
relevant law enforcement agencies.
Bribery sanctions for natural and legal persons are not dissuasive Increase sanctions for bribery of natural and legal persons in law and in
enough. practice.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KOREA 2020 © OECD 2020
46
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Annex 1.A. Progress in other structural reform
areas
Progress in other structural reform areas
(Main recommendations from the 2018 OECD Economic Survey not in body of the KPI)
Main recent OECD recommendations Action taken since the 2018 Survey or planned
Reinforce the role of outside directors by enhancing the criteria for The Ministry of Justice amended in January 2020 the Enforcement
independence, reducing the role of management in nominating Rule of the Commercial Act, which requires disclosure of
outside directors and requiring that outside directors comprise more information that allows judging a director or auditor candidate’s
than half of the boards in all listed firms. level of independence and expertise, and includes tighter
disqualification rules for outside directors or auditors.
Phase out existing circular shareholding by firms belonging to the The number of circular shareholdings decreased by 85% to 13 in 3
same business group. business groups in 2019 from 282 in 10 business groups in 2017.
Make cumulative voting (which would allow minority shareholders The relevant draft amendment of the Commercial Act including
to elect directors) and electronic voting (which would help minority electronic voting and multi representative lawsuit, is under
shareholders to vote their shares) mandatory. discussion at the National Assembly.
Meanwhile, to facilitate electronic voting, the draft amendment of
the Enforcement Rule of the Commercial Act, which includes the
diversification of authentication means, among others, has taken
effect since January 2020.
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Annex 1.B. Government measures to address the
COVID-19 crisis
The government has implemented many measures to mitigate the pandemic’s impact on employment,
output and business investment. Korea has imposed quarantine and strong distancing measures to contain
the initial outbreak of the virus and prevent massive infection. The government has so far introduced
measures for a total of KRW 277 trillion (14.4% of GDP). Three supplementary budgets totalling KRW 59.0
trillion were passed by the National Assembly. Loans and guarantees of over KRW 200 trillion have been
supplied to households, SMEs and affected industries.
Border measures and quarantine measures
Early February the government banned the entry of travellers coming from Wuhan city and the Hubei
province in China. Since then the Korean authorities have strengthened special quarantine measures for
people entering Korea in accordance with the evolution of the pandemic. As of May, all persons arriving in
Korea, regardless of nationality, undergo a mandatory COVID-19 test, paid by the government (USD 120
per person) and are subject to a 14 day self-quarantine at home or government designated facilities.
While the government introduced enhanced physical distancing so as to prevent diffusion of the virus,
Korea did not introduce a lockdown on any city or region. The authorities recommended to suspend the
operation of religious meetings, indoor sports and entertainment facilities temporarily to avoid community
infections, and also urged citizens to stay at home and work remotely. The new semester for schools,
which was supposed to start on 2 March, was postponed. On 6 May, the government started to lift those
enhanced distancing requirements and shift towards softer distancing measures, so-called “distancing in
daily life”. However, the strong distancing guidelines were reinstated in some local areas in late May
following the emergence of new infection clusters. The schools, which started online class on 9 April, have
opened in phases from 20 May to 8 June. Meanwhile, universities, which opened online class on the
second week of March, are likely to extend their non-face-to-face class periods to the end of spring
semester.
Fiscal policy and financial support
Over the 5-28 February period, when the virus outbreak started to hit the economy, the government
announced emergency support plans of about KRW 20 trillion for households, small companies and
damaged industries, including automobile parts, low-cost carriers, shipping, tourism, and export sectors:
Support for pre-emptive quarantine and treatment (KRW 0.1 trillion)
Guarantees and loans with low interest rates for SMEs and low-cost carriers (KRW 4.8 trillion)
Consumption coupons and support for family care leave (KRW 2.8 trillion)
Support for local credit guarantee funds (KRW 0.5 trillion)
Liquidity provision to the financial sector (KRW 8.2 trillion)
Double the deduction of credit card use and reduction of individual consumption tax on cars to
boost consumption (KRW 1.7 trillion)
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On 17 March, the national Assembly approved a supplementary budget of KRW 11.7 trillion (USD 10
billion, 0.6% of GDP), consisting of KRW 10.9 trillion for new expenditure and KRW 0.8 trillion for revenue
adjustment. New spending includes:
Support to the healthcare sector for virus prevention, diagnosis and treatment (KRW 2.1 trillion).
Loans for small and medium businesses and small merchants (KRW 4.1 trillion).
Emergency livelihood support and day-care vouchers (KRW 3.5 trillion).
Support to severely affected industries and employees in the form of expanded employment
retention subsidy and financial support (KRW 1.2 trillion).
On 19 and 24 March, the government announced an additional financial support package of KRW 100
trillion (5.1% of GDP) to ease the financial burden on small businesses and vulnerable households:
Expansion of financial support for SMEs, small merchants and self-employed (KRW 29.2 trillion)
Support loans and guarantees for mid-sized enterprises – a class of enterprises in between SMEs
and large enterprises (KRW 29.1 trillion).
Stabilisation of the corporate bond and money markets through various policy tools worth KRW
31.1 trillion, including the establishment of a Bond Market Stabilisation Fund (KRW 20 trillion).
Securities Market Stabilisation Fund liquidity provision funded by financial institutions (KRW 10.7
trillion).
On 8 April, the government announced a 10.4 trillion financial support package for export companies, start-
ups and ventures, including:
Loans and guarantees for export companies (KRW 6.0 trillion) and for start-ups and ventures (KRW
2.2 trillion).
Expanded government support for lowering R&D costs (KRW 2.2 trillion).
On 22 April, the government announced a KRW 75 trillion (4.0% of GDP) support plan for strategic
industries and additional financing for SMEs and households:
Establishment of a Key Industry Relief Fund guaranteed by the government to provide liquidity and
purchase corporate debt and equity for the country’s backbone industries – airlines, shipping,
(KRW 40 trillion). Large corporate recipients must retain at least 90% of their employees for six
months and some conditions are imposed on management, such as a ban on dividend payments
and stock buybacks.
Additional financing for SMEs and households with low credit ratings (KRW 35 trillion).
Strengthening employment security measures to support those workers who are not enrolled in the
Employment Insurance scheme and to create jobs in the public sector (KRW 10.1 trillion).
On 30 April, the National Assembly passed the second supplementary budget of KRW 12.2 trillion (USD
10 billion) for emergency relief grants. A total of KRW 14.3 trillion (0.6% of GDP) including KRW 2.1 trillion
of local government funds is allocated to the relief programme. The central government will finance KRW
3.4 trillion with debt issuance and the remaining KRW 8.8 trillion from spending restructuring. The
government has distributed the relief grants of up to KRW 1 million (USD 814) in the form of cash or
coupons to all 21 million households in accordance with the size of the family:
About 2.7 million households in the lowest income bracket (13% of the total) will receive the grants
in cash.
The remaining 19 million households can apply for the grants in the form of coupon or credit card
points.
The coupons or points will have to be spent by 31 August or will be considered a donation to the
state.
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The government gives a tax benefit to those who donate their relief handouts.
On 3 July, the National Assembly passed the third supplementary budget, of KRW 35.1 trillion (1.8 % of
GDP). The budget will be funded through the issuance of KRW 23.7 trillion won in national bonds and
KRW 11.4 trillion in spending readjustments. It aims at:
Creating about 550 000 jobs in publicly initiated programmes and strengthening social safety nets
(KRW 10 trillion).
Providing emergency loans to struggling small merchants, SMEs and large businesses (KRW 5
trillion).
KRW 4.8 trillion investment in 2020 on big data platforms, artificial intelligence and fifth-generation
telecommunication services, so called New Deal projects.
Monetary policy and macro prudential measures
On 27 February, the Bank of Korea (BOK) increased the ceiling of the Bank Intermediated Lending Support
Facility by KRW 5 trillion to KRW 30 trillion (further increased to KRW 35 trillion on 14 May) to support
SMEs and small merchants.
On 13 March, the Financial Services Commission introduced a six-month (from 16 March to 15 September)
ban on short-selling in the stock market to contain volatility.
On 16 March, the Bank of Korea cut the policy rate by 50 basis points to 0.75%. It also lowered the interest
rate on the Bank Intermediated Lending Support Facility from 0.50%-0.75% to 0.25% to encourage bank
lending to SMEs. The BOK broadened the eligible collateral and institutions for open market operations
and the acceptable collateral for lending facilities to inject more liquidity in the financial markets.
On 19 March, the Bank of Korea conducted repo operations to inject KRW 1 trillion (followed by an
additional KRW 2.5 trillion on 24 March) to ensure that financial institutions retain access to short-term
credit.
On 19 March, the BOK announced the establishment of a USD 60 billion bilateral currency swap agreement
with the US Federal Reserve, for 6 months. The Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Financial Services
Commission, the Bank of Korea and the Financial Supervisory Service eased the macroprudential
measures to expand foreign currency liquidity:
Raising ceilings on the foreign exchange derivatives positions of local banks (from 40% to 50% of
their equity capital) and foreign bank branches in Korea (from 200% to 250% of their equity capital).
Temporarily lifting the levy on non-deposit foreign exchange liabilities of financial institutions.
Temporarily lowering the foreign exchange liquidity coverage ratio by 10 percentage points to 70%.
On 20 March, to ease the stress on the bond market, the Bank of Korea purchased KRW 1.5 trillion (with
further purchases of KRW 1.5 trillion on both 10 April and 2 July) of treasury bonds.
On 26 March, the Bank of Korea introduced an unlimited repo purchase facility for three months starting
in April (further extended for one more month on 25 June) to ensure financial market stability.
On 16 April the BOK decided to provide loans of KRW 10 trillion to bank and non-bank financial institutions,
such as securities companies and insurance companies, for three months.
In order to expand financial institutions’ collateral capacity, the Bank of Korea lowered the ratio of collateral
for guaranteeing net settlements on 10 April and broadened the eligible collateral for the same on 25 May.
On 28 May, the Bank of Korea cut the policy rate by 25 basis points to 0.50%.
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Annex 1.C. Economic co-operation with North
Korea
This annex provides an overview of recent developments with respect to economic co-operation between
the two Koreas, and information on economic developments in North Korea, against the backdrop of an
evolving and highly uncertain geopolitical context. More information is provided in Koen and Beom (2020).
Geopolitical developments
In the face of continued nuclear tests, United Nations and other international sanctions on North Korea
were gradually stepped up in the course of the past decade, especially from 2016. Tighter sanctions have
contributed to a sharp decline in recorded international trade and in estimated domestic activity (see
below).
At the same time, however, a number of steps towards de-escalating tensions and a rapprochement
between the two Koreas were taken:
In July 2017, South Korea launched the Berlin initiative aiming at peaceful coexistence and
common prosperity through dialogue and cooperation but without renouncing sanctions and
pressure, with the following goals: establishing permanent peace through the denuclearisation of
North Korea; developing sustainable inter-Korean relations; and pursuing a new economic initiative
with an East Coast Belt, a West Coast Belt and a DMZ Belt.
In February 2018, North Korea took part in the Winter Olympics held in Pyeongchang, South Korea.
In April 2018, the leaders of South and North Korea held a summit in Panmunjom, the third such
meeting since 2000. They signed a declaration that called for the complete denuclearisation of the
Korean Peninsula, for a peace treaty to replace the armistice in place since the end of the Korean
War, for steps to ease military tensions, for expanded economic co-operation between the two
Koreas and for increased humanitarian exchanges.
In May 2018, the leaders of South and North Korea met again in Panmunjom.
In June 2018, the US President met with the North Korean leader in Singapore, the first-ever such
meeting. They signed a joint statement, agreeing to security guarantees for North Korea, new
peaceful relations, the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, the recovery of soldiers’ remains,
and follow-up negotiations between high-level officials.
In September 2018, the South Korean President visited Pyongyang and Mount Baekdu. The
leaders of South and North Korea signed a Military Agreement and a declaration calling for civilian
exchanges and cooperation in many areas, and conditions to denuclearise North Korea.
In February 2019, the US President met with the North Korean leader in Hanoi but the summit was
cut short without an agreement.
In June 2019, the US President met with the leaders of South and North Korea in the Demilitarised
Zone, and became the first sitting US President to set foot on North Korean soil.
In the course of 2019, however, these negotiations gradually lost momentum even as North Korea stepped
up missile testing and gave signs of reorienting diplomatic efforts towards China and Russia, which
supported a loosening of the international sanctions regime. With no progress in lifting sanctions and in
advancing inter-Korean projects, North Korea blamed South Korea and the United States while escalating
tensions. In June 2020, it blew up the inter-Korean joint liaison office built by South Korea in the Gaeseong
Industrial Complex, ostensibly by way of retaliation against propaganda leaflets which North Korean
defectors had sent toward the North using balloons.
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Economic developments and the COVID-19 crisis
Estimates of external trade and domestic economic activity in North Korea are very crude and unreliable.
The country has published virtually no national account statistics nor any budget information in level terms
in recent decades. Trade data are based on imperfect mirror statistics published by North Korea’s trading
partners (which sometimes confuse North and South Korea), and thus fail to capture a substantial share
of actual trade flows, notably small and large-scale smuggling across land borders and illegal ship-to-ship
oil transfers on the open seas, which routinely circumvent international sanctions (UN Panel of Experts,
2020). Estimates of domestic economic activity in North Korea are produced by the Bank of Korea in Seoul,
based on an eclectic array of information sources.
Keeping those very strong caveats in mind, North Korea’s recorded trade has shrunk dramatically since
2015. Trade between the two Koreas essentially stopped, with only USD 6.7 million worth of goods shipped
from the South to the North in 2019, and USD 0.2 million in the opposite direction. The volume of trade
with China dropped sharply but the share of trade with China has risen and exceeded 95% in 2019
(Figure 1.C.1). The trade squeeze contributed to a large contraction in estimated real GDP in 2017 and
2018 (Figure 1.C.2). Real GDP inched up in 2019 but will likely shrink in 2020 in the context of the COVID-
19 crisis (see below).
Accounting for over a fifth of GDP, agriculture remains a large and poorly performing sector,
notwithstanding the objective to promote the adoption of high-yielding seed varieties and advanced crop
cultivation and management techniques enshrined in the 2016-20 Strategy for National Economic
Development. The sector has suffered considerably in recent years from the combination of droughts and
floods, whose impact is amplified by poor irrigation and drainage systems, and economic sanctions, which
have restricted the imports of fuel, machinery and spare parts (FAO/WFP, 2019).
Annex Figure 1.C.1. North Korea’s recorded foreign trade
Exports plus imports of goods
USD billion
7
China Japan Thailand Russia South Korea
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Note: Based on trading partners’ mirror statistics.
Source: Korea International Trade Association.
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934157036
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Annex Figure 1.C.2. Estimated GDP level and growth rate
KRW Trillion %
35 Real GDP (left scale) Real GDP growth (right scale) 8.0
30 6.0
4.0
25
2.0
20
0.0
15
-2.0
10
-4.0
5 -6.0
0 -8.0
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
Note: Estimated at 2010 constant prices (using South Korea relative prices).
Source: Bank of Korea
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934157055
Among the main sectors of the economy, services stand out as still expanding, albeit at a modest pace.
This likely reflects inter alia the regime’s efforts to spur tourism, in particular from China (Yoon, 2019), but
also vibrant formal wholesale and retail markets, whose number stood around 500 by early 2019 – not
counting the many informal markets (Lee, 2019).
Tourism is one important source of foreign currency in North Korea. Another are the North Korean workers
dispatched abroad. Under the international sanctions, they were required to return to their home country
by late December 2019, but a number of them most probably continue to work abroad, either with a
different visa status or undeclared (Fromer, 2019). A third source are the fast expanding sales of
smartphones and associated call plans, which are payable only in hard currency: around 6 million people,
or close to one quarter of North Korea’s total population, were recently deemed to carry a smartphone
(Park, 2019).
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has substantially affected many of the aforementioned sectors
of the economy, even though North Korea claims not to have recorded any case domestically (see the NK
Pro tracker for details). One of the consequences is that it may exacerbate food shortages, notwithstanding
political calls for achieving self-reliance in this area. In this context, the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has developed a preparedness and response plan, in conjunction
with the Government, aiming to ensure that humanitarian impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on vulnerable
people and communities are mitigated through continual prioritisation of food security, nutrition, health,
water, sanitation and hygiene interventions (OCHA, 2020).
The North Korean authorities acted swiftly in the face of the COVID-19 threat. Air China flights between
Beijing and Pyongyang were suspended on 20 January and so were national carrier Air Koryo flights soon
thereafter and Chinese tourism more generally. On 21 January, North Korea was reportedly already
working with the World Health Organisation to try and prevent the spread of the virus in the country, whose
health system is ill-equipped to cope with such a pandemic, as the country’s ranking on the Global Health
Security Index illustrates (Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, 2019). Quarantine measures followed,
including school and university closures, as well as mass disinfection campaigns.
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The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the country’s high dependence on China, cutting off some of North
Korea’s major sources of supply and the main market for its products – a situation that is hard to sustain
for an economy with limited buffers and stretched resources. Indeed, while North Korea closed its border
with China in January 2020, some traffic has reportedly resumed, with exemptions provided by the Chinese
authorities to North Korean traders in late March (Gi, 2020), container trucks seen to again cross the Sino-
North Korean Friendship Bridge by early April (Ha, 2020) and a freight train loaded up in Dandong with
foodstuffs and construction supplies spotted in Pyongyang in May (Mun, 2020). The supply chain
disruptions and work stoppages entailed by the COVID-19 crisis have put pressure on State finances.
Reportedly, this has led to the first issuance of public bonds since 2003 (Kim, 2020), with the new
entrepreneurial class (donju) being forced to buy them with foreign currency, and another portion of the
bonds to be used by State institutions and companies to pay their suppliers.
Economic cooperation between the two Koreas has not progressed much since the suspension of all
activity in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in February 2016. One area envisaged in 2018 was to help
improve the North’s vast but antiquated rail network. With the approval of the United Nations, the two
Koreas jointly conducted a field study on two main railways in 2018 (the Gaeseong to Sinuiju line and the
Geumgang to Tuman River line), but progress on the ground is impeded by the prohibition, under the
international sanctions, to bring in machinery and construction materials. The South Korean government
has also offered humanitarian support. Last year, it proposed 50 000 tonnes of rice via the World Food
Programme to address food shortages, which by mid-2020 had not been accepted, however. It has
furthermore decided to contribute USD 4.9 million to a multi-year project run by the United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific to help improve statistical literacy in North Korea.
In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, South Korea has offered to cooperate in the area of health, and in
particular to launch a joint response system against infectious diseases, to help cope with growing threats
from global pandemics.
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NK Pro, 12 December.
Ha, Yoon Ah (2020) “Chinese trucks cross the Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge”, Daily NK, 6 April.
Hutton, M. (2019), “Chinese tourists in North Korea: ‘almost a necessary evil’”, South China Morning
Post, 6 November.
Jang, Seul Gi (2020), “China exempts N. Korean traders from ban on foreign arrivals”, Daily NK, 1 April.
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