Objection to Findings Concerning Plea Agreement — United States v. Jon M. Hallford, No. 24-cr-00113-NYW (Dkt. 83, D. Colo.)

Summary

Jon M. Hallford, through Assistant Federal Public Defender Laura H. Suelau, objects to the court's finding that the Plea Agreement is 'not in the public interest.' Hallford entered a plea of guilt on October 24, 2024 under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement calling for a sentence between 78 months and 15 years (180 months); the presentence reports found a guidelines range of 78 to 97 months but recommended 180 months. On February 24, 2025 the court indicated that it intends to reject the agreement and set a status conference for March 4, 2025. The objection argues that the court must set forth the prosecution's reasons for framing the bargain, must weigh all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and that relying on the presentence report deprives Hallford of the assistance of counsel at sentencing. It was filed on March 2, 2025.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

CASE NO. 24-cr-00113-NYW

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

1. JON M. HALLFORD,

Defendants.

OBJECTION TO FINDINGS CONCERNING PLEA AGREEMENT

Jon M. Hallford, through his attorney, Laura H. Suelau, objects to the Court’s finding that the

Plea Agreement, Doc. 52, is “not in the public interest.”

I. Relevant Procedural Background

On October 24, 2024, Mr. Hallford entered a plea of guilt pursuant to a Plea Agreement. Docs.

51-53. That Plea Agreement was made pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A)

and (C). The parties acknowledged that, were the Court to accept the plea agreement, the Court would

be required to enter a sentence between 78 months (the bottom of the estimated applicable guideline

range) and 15 years (180 months). Doc. 52. The initial and final presentence reports filed in this case

found the applicable guidelines range is 78 to 97 months but recommended a sentence of 180 months.

Docs. 64-1, 73-1.

On February 24, 2025, this Court Ordered, sua sponte, a Status Conference for March 4, 2025.

Docs. 79 and 80. In that Order, the Court indicated that it intends to reject the proposed Plea

Agreement and ordered Mr. Hallford to “be prepared to either withdraw from the Plea Agreement or

proceed pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B).” Id. and Docs. 49 and 52. The Court explained that, having
considered the Plea Agreement, the Presentence Investigation Report, Mr. Hallford’s Objections to

that Report, and “the entire docket,” the Plea Agreement “is not in the public interest.”

II. The Court’s finding that Mr. Hallford’s plea agreement is not in the “public
interest,” is inconsistent with applicable sentencing law.

Mr. Hallford objects to this Court’s finding that the plea agreement is “not in the public

interest.” Such a finding, at this time, is inconsistent with prosecutorial independence, inconsistent

with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis this Court must undertake, and violates Mr. Hallford’s right to

assistance of counsel at sentencing.

a. This Court must allow the government to state their basis for the plea
agreement.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) allows the government and a defendant to

agree to a specific sentence range and, if accepted by the court, the court is bound to impose a sentence

within the agreed upon range. Rule 11(c)(1)(A) allows the United States not to bring, or move to

dismiss, other charges. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A). Because “sentencing is within the exclusive

purview of the district court,” a court has “a wide range of discretion to either accept or reject sentence

bargains, as contemplated by Rule 11(c)(1)(B) and (C).” United States v. Macias-Gonzalez, 219 F. App'x

814, 817 (10th Cir. 2007). The Federal Rules, the Tenth Circuit, and the Supreme Court all give courts

discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement. See United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1427 (10th

Cir. 1995). However, that discretion is not unfettered and is bound by “sound judicial discretion.”

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).

Neither statute nor case law define “sound judicial discretion,” nor provide specific criteria

to apply in making such decisions. (“While Rule 11 vests district courts with the discretion to accept

or reject plea agreements, the rule does not define the criteria to be applied in doing so”). Robertson,

45 F.3d at 1437. Nonetheless, discretion to reject an agreement “is not without limit and varies

depending on the content of such a bargain.” Id. Therefore, “in order to insure district courts exercise

sound judicial discretion and adequately respect the principle of prosecutorial independence,” courts
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must set forth, on the record, “the prosecution's reasons for framing the bargain and the court's

justification for rejecting it.” Id. at 1438; see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 793-94

(1977)(discussing deference to prosecutorial discretion in initiating charges, allocating resources, etc.).

Here, the Court’s Minute Order, without additional justification, or proffer by the government,

is insufficient justification for the Court’s rejection of the plea agreement. Without inquiring about the

government’s reasoning for framing the plea agreement, this Court cannot properly determine

whether the agreement should be rejected.

b. This Court has made a finding as to Mr. Hallford’s sentence without
considering all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

Implicit in the Court’s Order is that a sentence between 78 and 180 months is not appropriate.

More likely, this Court finds a sentence less than 180 months not sufficient and is less than necessary

to effectuate the sentencing directives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). However, such a finding, without the

consideration of all the § 3553(a) factors, and without the benefit of evidence and argument by the

parties, may lead to the imposition of a substantively unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Crosby,

119 F.4th 1239, 1249 (10th Cir. 2024)(“the district court did not discuss several of the §

3553(a) factors…that failure…compels the conclusion that the sentence is not substantively

reasonable.”).

Again, although it is within a court’s power to reject an agreement that hampers its sentencing

discretion, that discretion must comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In determining what sentence to

impose, a court “shall consider”:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed--
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for--
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(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category
of defendant as set forth in the guidelines--
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title
28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act
of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by
the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title
28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced; or
[…]
(5) any pertinent policy statement--
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of
title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy
statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be
incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section
994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

Importantly, courts must analyze each of the § 3553(a) factors, and the Tenth Circuit has

repeatedly “cautioned against excessive reliance on a single factor in sentencing.” United States v.

Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1093 (10th Cir. 2019). Without explanation from a court on the weight

afforded to each 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor, a sentence is considered substantively unreasonable. Id. at

1094.

As a matter of process, a sentencing judge “begins by considering the presentence report and

its interpretation of the Guidelines.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). When determining

whether the Guidelines should (or should not) apply, perhaps because the Guidelines do not properly

reflect the other § 3553(a) considerations, the sentencing court must “subject[] the defendant's

sentence to the thorough adversarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure.” Id. at

351. Therefore, while Rita allows that “[a] presumption that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable does

not require the sentencing judge to impose that sentence…[or] prohibit the sentencing judge from

imposing a sentence higher than the Guidelines provide for the jury-determined facts standing alone,”

a court can only do so after hearing from the parties.
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Here, because the contemplated 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement includes the applicable guideline

range (78 to 97 months) and allows for a sentence as much as 102 months above the applicable range,

the rejection of that agreement signals that the Court finds the guidelines insufficient. However,

“public interest” is not a 3553(a) factor and not an appropriate basis for fashioning a sentence.

Therefore, the Court has essentially made a finding that a sentence of 180 months is required without

consideration and “careful analysis” of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Nor can that analysis be

properly undertaken at this point. Neither Mr. Hallford nor the government have submitted to this

Court evidence or argument on those factors.

c. The Court’s finding deprives Mr. Hallford of the assistance of counsel at
sentencing.

Sentencing, like all aspects of a criminal case, is an adversarial process. Because of the

adversarial nature of sentencing, “the right to counsel…applies at critical stages in the sentencing

phase of a criminal prosecution.” United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993); see also

Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (“[our precedent] illustrates the critical nature of sentencing in a criminal

case and might well be considered to support by itself a holding that the right to counsel applies at

sentencing.”). Recognizing the same, Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i) requires the court to provide the attorney for

a defendant an opportunity to speak on the defendant's behalf. Unlike the attorney for a defendant

and the government, “the probation officer has no adversarial role in the sentencing proceedings,”

and instead should be “a neutral information gatherer” for the court. Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1571.

Here, Mr. Hallford’s right to assistance of counsel, and the adversarial process, has been

shortcut by the Court’s reliance on the presentence report and the probation officer’s advocacy for a

variant sentence. While counsel filed objections to the presentence report, that filing was not intended

to, nor did it, address the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, nor advocate for the appropriate

sentence in this cause. The Court’s finding, without consideration of counsel’s advocacy on Mr.

Hallford’s behalf, deprives him of assistance of counsel at the critical sentencing stage.

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For the forgoing reasons, Mr. Hallford objects to the Court’s finding that the proposed Plea

Agreement, Doc. 52, is not in the interest of justice. Such a conclusion cannot be reached at this time.

Respectfully submitted,

VIRGINIA L. GRADY
Federal Public Defender

s/ Laura H. Suelau
LAURA H. SUELAU
Assistant Federal Public Defender
633 17th Street, Suite 1000
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 294-7002
FAX: (303) 294-1192
laura_suelau@fd.org
Attorney for Defendant

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 2, 2025, I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the
CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following email addresses:

Craig Fansler, Assistant United States Attorney
Email: craig.fansler2@usdoj.gov

Tim Neff, Assistant United States Attorney
Email: tim.neff@usdoj.gov

Robert C. Melihercik
Email: chaz@meliherciklaw.com
Attorney for Carie Hallford

I hereby certify that I have mailed or served the document or paper to the following participant
in the manner (mail, hand-delivery, etc.) indicated next to the participant’s name:

Jon M. Hallford (via U.S. Mail)

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