Moody's Analytics, "Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic" (Feb. 24, 2022)
Summary
Moody's Analytics paper of February 24, 2022, Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic, by Bernard Yaros, Jesse Rogers, Ross Cioffi and Mark Zandi. It uses the Moody's Analytics Global Macroeconomic Model to compare a baseline with a counterfactual in which governments of the world's 10 largest economies provide no fiscal support to households and businesses during the pandemic. The paper finds that without that support global real GDP would have fallen twice as much in 2020 and there would have been 40 million additional unemployed workers in 2021. The document closes with Moody's legal and regulatory disclosures.
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ANALYSIS
FEBRUARY 24, 2022 Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
Introduction
Prepared by
Bernard Yaros The U.S. and global economies have recovered surprisingly quickly
Bernard.YarosJr@moodys.com
Assistant Director from the debilitating COVID-19 pandemic. Two years after the
pandemic first struck, much of the world has recovered the output
Jesse Rogers
Jesse.Rogers@moodys.com and employment lost during the severe recession suffered at the
Assistant Director start of the pandemic and is well on the way to returning to full
Ross Cioffi employment. This strong performance is due in significant part
Ross.Cioffi@moodys.com
Economist to the vaccines and other therapies rapidly developed to fight the
virus, but also to the quick and massive global monetary and fiscal
Mark Zandi
Mark.Zandi@moodys.com policy response.
Chief Economist
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MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 1
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
T
he U.S. and global economies have recovered surprisingly quickly from the debilitating
COVID-19 pandemic. Two years after the pandemic first struck, much of the world has
recovered the output and employment lost during the severe recession suffered at the start
of the pandemic and is well on the way to returning to full employment. This strong performance
is due in significant part to the vaccines and other therapies rapidly developed to fight the virus,
but also to the quick and massive global monetary and fiscal policy response.
In this paper, we focus on the contribution of the global fiscal policy response to the pandemic. We
use the Moody’s Analytics Global Macroeconomic Model to construct a counterfactual scenario in
which governments in the world’s 10 largest economies—accounting for more than two-thirds of
global GDP—do not provide economic support to households and businesses during the pandemic
(see Chart 1). We compare this counterfactual scenario to our baseline, most likely, scenario, which
includes the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policies implemented by governments.
Chart 1: Governments Step Up
Fiscal support during COVID-19 pandemic, % of 2019 GDP
U.S.
U.K.
Canada
Germany
Italy
Japan
France
Brazil
China
India
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27
Source: Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 1
The macroeconomic consequences of governments failing to help their economies during the
pandemic would have been devastating. Global real GDP would have fallen twice as much in
2020, and while the economy would have begun to recover in 2021, growth would have been half
of what it actually was (see Chart 2). There would have been 40 million additional unemployed
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 2
workers in 2021 and stubbornly high joblessness thereafter (see Chart 3). And the global economy
would forever be diminished, never fully recovering the output lost during the pandemic.1
Chart 2: Deeper Fall, Weaker Recovery
Global real GDP, 2012$ tril, SAAR
100
Baseline forecast
95 Counterfactual scenario
90
85
80
75
19 20 21 22 23 24
Source: Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 2
Chart 3: Severe Contractions Everywhere
Peak impact on real GDP, %
N/A
<-10
-10 to <-7
-7 to <-5
-5 to <-3
World avg=-7.4
-3 to <0
Source: Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 3
What if?
The counterfactual scenario we have constructed assumes national governments never imple-
mented the emergency discretionary fiscal measures they have actually put in place since the
pandemic hit at the start of 2020. This includes a wide range of policies that broadly encompass
1 This is known as hysteresis, which is a reduction in the economy’s potential due to a significant economic shock such as a pandemic. This occurs
because of the large number of business failures and bankruptcies, permanent job loss, credit problems, and reduced mobility of labor and capi-
tal. Once hysteresis sets in, it is difficult to reverse. Hysteresis effects are built into the Moody’s Analytics model of the global economy.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 3
transfer payments to households and businesses, tax cuts, aid to subnational governments, and
public infrastructure and other direct spending.
To quantify this counterfactual scenario, we have simulated the Moody’s Analytics Global Mac-
roeconomic Model.2 The model links more than 70 countries through international trade, global
financial markets, exchange rates, consumer sentiment, and capital flows. The model is simulated
assuming an absence of fiscal support for each country by itself, and for all 10 countries at once.
By so doing, we are able to determine the spillover effects from one country’s policies on the rest
of the world. Nearly half the countries benefited more from fiscal support provided by other coun-
tries than they did from their own fiscal support (see Chart 4).
Chart 4: Fiscal Policy Knows No Borders
Cumulative real GDP impact, % of GDP, 2020-2024
U.S.
Brazil
Canada
U.K.
Germany
China
Italy
Japan Domestic fiscal support
France External fiscal support
India
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Source: Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 4
We make several simplifying assumptions in these simulations. First, we assume the course of the
pandemic and the development and rollout of vaccines proceeded as they did. Second, monetary
policy is determined endogenously in the model. That is, global central banks set interest rate and
balance sheet policies based on their reaction functions that account for the economy’s perfor-
mance, inflation, inflation expectations, and financial conditions.3 Finally, we restrict the scope of
fiscal measures to include only those that explicitly address the fallout from the pandemic.4
United States
No other nation responded more aggressively to the pandemic than the U.S. (see Table 1). In total,
the fiscal support was well over $5 trillion, equal to nearly 25% of GDP. This compares with less
2 This analysis is based on the February 2022 vintage of the Moody’s Analytics global macroeconomic forecasts.
3 A central bank’s reaction function is the estimated historical relationship between the bank’s monetary policy and the economic, financial and
other variables that monetary authorities use to set monetary policy.
4 Fiscal legislation that broadly seeks to invest in an economy’s long-run potential was excluded. Some examples are the Build Back Better agenda
in the U.S. and the Recovery and Resilience Facility in Europe. We even left out a handful of measures from pandemic-era legislation in Japan
that were not explicitly tied to the virus. Additionally, our analysis includes only fiscal measures that have a direct impact on budget deficits.
Liquidity supports, which were substantial in many countries, for example, were excluded.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 4
Table 1: U.S. Fiscal Response to COVID-19
Legislation Actions $ bil
Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Funding for healthcare agencies and testing, funding for vaccine and other therapies across various 8.3
Supplemental Appropriations Act agencies, subsidized SME loans.
Families First Coronavirus Response Act Tax credits to firms for COVID-19-related paid sick leave and paid family medical leave; food assis- 192.0
tance via Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and Special Supplemental Nutrition Program
for Women, Infants, and Children; federal assistance for increased state unemployment insurance
benefits; expand Medicare and Medicaid coverage to COVID-19 tests.
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Household cash transfers, federal assistance to expand state unemployment insurance benefits, 1,756.0
Security Act grant-convertible loans to SMEs under the Paycheck Protection Program, grants to states and munic-
ipalities via $150 bil Coronavirus Relief Fund, student loan deferrals, expand Medicaid coverage to
telehealth services, various tax deferrals and credits.
Paycheck Protection Program and Health Addition of $320 bil to Paycheck Protection Program, loans to smaller financial institutions, grants 484.0
Care Enhancement Act for hospitals, additional funding for states/municipalities for COVID-19 testing.
President Trump’s Executive Orders Extension of plus-up to federal unemployment insurance benefits amounting to $300 per week, with 174.0
an additional $100 to be provided by states. Additional executive orders extend student loan deferral
for loans held by Department of Education, declare temporary payroll tax holiday, instruct govern-
ment agencies to assist renters and homeowners with eviction orders.
Coronavirus Response and Relief Supple- Extension of unemployment insurance benefits by $300 per week through March 14; second round of 915.0
mental Appropriations Act stimulus checks; additional funds allocated for Paycheck Protection Program, virus-combat and vacci-
nation efforts, supplemental nutrition programs, emergency grants to entertainment venues, relief for
airline workers, increased federal spending on transportation.
American Rescue Plan Act Stimulus checks of up to $1,400, extends weekly unemployment insurance top-ups through the 1,821.0
beginning of September, additional provisions for renter and homeowner relief, increased outlays for
state and local governments, expansion of tax credits, financial assistance to businesses and healthcare
providers.
U.S. total 5,350.3
Sources: CBO, CRFB, JCT, Moody’s Analytics
than 18% of GDP in the U.K., the country that provided the next most fiscal support, and the ap-
proximately 10% of GDP provided by all countries across the globe on average.
The unrivaled U.S. fiscal response was motivated in part by the nation’s meaningfully weaker
automatic fiscal stabilizers—tax and spending policies that automatically counteract declines in
economic activity without direct action by lawmakers—compared with those in other advanced
economies.5 It was likely also motivated by lessons learned during the financial crisis a little over
a decade ago, when the policy response was slower in coming and much smaller, contributing to
what was a painfully slow economic recovery.6 7
The U.S. economy’s rapid recovery was due to not just the scale of the fiscal support by fiscal pol-
icymakers but also how quickly they responded to the pandemic. The pandemic slammed the U.S.
in February 2020, the massive CARES Act was passed into law in late March, and no more than one
month later over $1 trillion in fiscal support was already disbursed to households and businesses.
5 N. Girouard and C. André (2005), “Measuring Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balances for OECD Countries,” OECD Economics Department
Working Papers, No. 434, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/measuring-cyclically-adjusted-budget-balanc-
es-for-oecd-countries_787626008442. M. Dolls, C. Fuest and A. Peichl (2012), “Automatic stabilizers and economic crisis: US vs. Europe,” Jour-
nal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 96(3), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272711001642.
6 U.S. discretionary fiscal support during the financial crisis, including the Recovery Act that was passed into law in February 2009 and some mod-
est additional support, totaled less than 10% of U.S. GDP.
7 See “Blinder and Zandi: Policy Responses to Great Recession a Resounding Success,” white paper for Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
October 2015.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 5
There was a similar ramp-up in fiscal support in early 2021, largely via the American Rescue Plan,
which was passed into law in March 2021 (see Chart 5).
Chart 5: Rapid Ramp-Up in U.S. Support
Cumulative U.S. pandemic relief, $ tril
4.0
Rental Assistance
3.5 Air Carrier Worker Support
Advanced Child Tax Credit
3.0 SNAP
Provider Relief Fund
2.5 Coronavirus Relief Fund
Enhanced UI
2.0 Stimulus Checks
Paycheck Protection Program
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Apr-20 Jul-20 Nov-20 Feb-21 Jun-21 Sep-21 Jan-22
Sources: BEA, CRFB, HHS, SBA, U.S. Treasury, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 5
In the counterfactual scenario where this fiscal support was not provided, real GDP falls by a stun-
ning 11% in calendar 2020, more than three times its actual decline. The economy would have also
succumbed to a double-dip recession in early 2021 (see Chart 6). A recovery begins in earnest in
the second half of 2021, but even then, the economy never fully returns to its pre-pandemic path,
as real GDP is permanently reduced.
Chart 6: Double-Dip Recession in the U.S.
U.S. real GDP, 2012$ tril, SAAR
22
Baseline forecast
21
Counterfactual scenario
20
19
18
17
16
19 20 21 22 23 24
Sources: BEA, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 6
The impact on the U.S. job market would have been equally grim. The economy is currently on track
to recoup all the jobs lost during the pandemic recession by late this year. Without government
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 6
support, this milestone would not have been achieved until summer 2026. Low-wage workers, who
have suffered most financially during the pandemic, would have been set back even further, since
they work in industries that have desperately needed government support during the pandemic.
This includes administrative and support services, healthcare, retail trade, and leisure and hospi-
tality (see Chart 7). The weaker job market means that unemployment remains stuck in the double
digits through 2021, declines only slowly thereafter, and ultimately never returns to its pre-pan-
demic full-employment unemployment rate (see Chart 8).8 Moreover, with the economy operating
with high unemployment for an extended period, wage growth sharply slows to an all-time low.9
Chart 7: Low-Wage Industries Most Hurt
U.S., jobs lost without government support, mil, 2021
Admin. & support & waste srvcs $48K
Healthcare $56K
Construction $69K
Retail trade $38K
Manufacturing $74K
Leisure & hospitality $28K
Prof., scientific & technical srvcs $109K
State & local government $58K
Financial activities $108K
Transportation & warehousing $59K
Wholesale trade $86K
Other services $54K
Education $50K
-2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0
Sources: BEA, BLS, Moody’s Analytics Note: Figures are avg industry wage in 2020. Avg for all industries was $66K.
Presentation Title, Date 7
Chart 8: Stubbornly High Unemployment
U.S. unemployment rate, %, SA
18
Baseline forecast
15
Counterfactual scenario
12
9
6
3
19 20 21 22 23 24
Sources: BLS, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 8
8 We estimate the full-employment unemployment rate, or nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment, at 3.5%.
9 Wages as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment Cost Index.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 7
In the counterfactual scenario, inflation picks up in early 2021 as the distribution of vaccines
prompts a reopening of the economy and a surge in consumer demand. However, it falls back be-
low the Federal Reserve’s inflation target by the second half of 2022. The Fed is not struggling with
uncomfortably high inflation as it is now. Rather, it contends with uncomfortably low inflation, as
in the decade after the financial crisis (see Chart 9).
Chart 9: Return of Too-Low Inflation
U.S. core PCE deflator, % change yr ago
5
4
3
2
Baseline forecast
1
Counterfactual scenario
Federal Reserve's target
0
19 20 21 22 23 24
Sources: BEA, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 9
Household finances have benefited enormously from government support. Thanks mostly to stim-
ulus checks, enhanced unemployment insurance, and rental and food assistance, personal incomes
declined only briefly at the very start of the pandemic (see Chart 10). If households had not re-
ceived this help, real disposable income would have plunged in 2020 and would not fully recover
until summer 2023.
Chart 10: Household Incomes Get Boost
U.S. personal income, $ tril, SAAR, change from 2019Q4
5
Rental and interest income Dividend income
4 Proprietors' income Labor income
Advance Child Tax Credit Enhanced UI benefits
Stimulus checks Net effect
3
2
1
0
-1
20Q1 20Q2 20Q3 20Q4 21Q1 21Q2 21Q3 21Q4
Sources: BEA, U.S. Treasury, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 10
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 8
Household wealth would also have been significantly diminished, as the Standard & Poor’s 500
stock price index would have plunged, cut in half peak to trough (see Chart 11). Consumers are
dour now despite the strong economic recovery, but confidence would be at an all-time low if fis-
cal policymakers had not stepped up.
Chart 11: Stock Prices Get Crushed
S&P 500 composite, 1941-1943=10
5,000
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
Baseline forecast
2,000
Counterfactual scenario
1,500
19 20 21 22 23 24
Sources: S&P, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 11
American Rescue Plan
Arguably the most controversial of the U.S. fiscal support packages was the nearly $2 trillion
American Rescue Plan that became law in March 2021. The ARP has been criticized as being too
large, overstimulating an already fast-improving economy and significantly contributing to the
currently uncomfortably high inflation.
This perspective is not consistent with our results. Without the ARP, the U.S. economy would have
come close to suffering a double-digit recession in spring 2021. Based on a simulation of our mac-
ro model assuming no ARP, real GDP declines in the second quarter of 2021 and ekes out only a
small gain in the third (see Table 2). Because of the weakened economy, unemployment rises back
over 7% in summer 2021 and remains materially higher after that (see Chart 12).10
The ARP is responsible for adding well over 4 million more jobs in 2021, and the economy is cur-
rently on track to recovering all the jobs lost in the pandemic by the second quarter of this year.
If there had been no ARP, it would have taken another year for the economy to recover all of
these jobs.
The ARP has contributed to the acceleration in inflation by supporting increased consumer de-
mand, but this occurred almost entirely in the first half of 2021 when higher inflation was not
considered a problem (see Chart 13). Indeed, at the time it was even viewed positively, as many
businesses were simply re-establishing the prices they had previously cut when the pandemic
10 Because of the much weaker economy, the Fed keeps the federal funds rate target at the zero lower bound and engages in quantitative easing
through the end of 2022.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 9
Chart 12: More Unemployment Without ARP
U.S. unemployment rate, %, SA
13
Baseline forecast
11
No American Rescue Plan
9
7
5
Full employment
3
19 20 21 22 23 24
Sources: BLS, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 12
Chart 13: Don’t Blame ARP For High Inflation
Consumer price inflation, annualized % change
12
10
8 Federal Reserve Target
6 Omicron
4 Wave
2
0
-2
-4
Pandemic Vaccine ARP Delta
-6 Recession Rollout Wave
-8
-10
2019 2020 2021 2022
Sources: BLS, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 13
caused the economy to shut down. Moreover, inflation had been much too low for comfort since
the global financial crisis more than a decade earlier. The Federal Reserve and other global central
banks had been struggling to lift inflation back up to their targets.
Inflation only became uncomfortably high when the Delta wave of the pandemic hit in late sum-
mer last year. This inflation was a surprise, but so too was the Delta variant, as it came immediate-
ly on the heels of the vaccine rollout and widespread optimism that the pandemic was more-or-
less behind us.
Delta slammed consumer demand, as it prompted renewed self-quarantining and border restric-
tions, which by itself would moderate inflation, but it also severely disrupted supply. Global supply
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 10
Table 2: The Macroeconomic Impact of the American Rescue Plan
Real GDP Nonfarm employment Unemployment rate Consumer price inflation
MOODY’S ANALYTICS
No American
Baseline Difference Baseline No ARP Difference Baseline No ARP Difference Baseline No ARP Difference
Rescue Plan
Ann. Ann. Change, Change, 1982- Ann. 1982- Ann.
2012$ bil growth 2012$ bil growth 2012$ bil Mil mil Mil mil Ths % % Ppt 1984=100 growth 1984=100 growth %
2020Q1 18,952 (5.1) 18,952 (5.1) 0 151.9 0.308 151.9 0.308 0 3.8 3.8 0.0 258.5 1.0 258.5 1.0 0.0
2020Q2 17,258 (31.2) 17,258 (31.2) 0 133.8 (18.103) 133.8 (18.103) 0 13.0 13.0 0.0 256.5 (3.1) 256.5 (3.1) 0.0
2020Q3 18,561 33.8 18,561 33.8 0 140.5 6.688 140.5 6.688 0 8.8 8.8 0.0 259.4 4.7 259.4 4.7 0.0
2020Q4 18,768 4.5 18,768 4.5 0 142.5 1.998 142.5 1.998 0 6.8 6.8 0.0 261.0 2.4 261.0 2.4 -0.0
2021Q1 19,056 6.3 18,864 2.1 -191 143.7 1.262 142.7 0.219 -1,043 6.2 6.8 0.6 263.4 3.7 263.3 3.6 -0.0
2021Q2 19,368 6.7 18,828 (0.8) -540 145.2 1.453 142.1 (0.622) -3,118 5.9 7.7 1.8 268.8 8.4 268.5 8.0 -0.1
2021Q3 19,479 2.3 18,835 0.2 -644 146.9 1.695 142.8 0.714 -4,099 5.1 7.3 2.2 273.1 6.6 272.6 6.3 -0.2
2021Q4 19,806 6.9 19,185 7.7 -621 148.6 1.733 144.5 1.678 -4,154 4.2 6.3 2.1 278.6 8.2 277.8 8.0 -0.3
2022Q1 19,829 0.5 19,327 3.0 -503 150.4 1.757 146.8 2.302 -3,609 3.9 5.5 1.6 281.8 4.6 280.8 4.4 -0.3
2022Q2 20,123 6.1 19,757 9.2 -367 151.7 1.371 148.9 2.172 -2,808 3.7 4.8 1.1 284.1 3.3 282.9 3.0 -0.4
2022Q3 20,266 2.9 19,959 4.1 -308 152.6 0.842 150.2 1.231 -2,418 3.5 4.3 0.8 286.0 2.7 284.6 2.4 -0.5
2022Q4 20,390 2.5 20,082 2.5 -308 153.2 0.640 150.8 0.622 -2,436 3.4 4.2 0.8 287.7 2.5 286.2 2.2 -0.5
2023Q1 20,537 2.9 20,228 2.9 -309 153.8 0.607 151.3 0.526 -2,517 3.4 4.2 0.8 289.4 2.3 287.6 2.1 -0.6
2023Q2 20,685 2.9 20,379 3.0 -306 154.3 0.470 151.8 0.453 -2,534 3.4 4.1 0.8 290.9 2.2 289.1 2.0 -0.6
2023Q3 20,835 2.9 20,532 3.0 -303 154.7 0.383 152.2 0.413 -2,504 3.4 4.1 0.7 292.6 2.3 290.6 2.1 -0.7
2023Q4 20,984 2.9 20,688 3.1 -296 155.1 0.376 152.6 0.448 -2,431 3.4 4.0 0.6 294.2 2.3 292.0 2.1 -0.7
2024Q1 21,141 3.0 20,856 3.3 -285 155.4 0.326 153.1 0.441 -2,316 3.4 4.0 0.6 295.8 2.1 293.5 2.0 -0.8
2024Q2 21,288 2.8 21,015 3.1 -273 155.6 0.272 153.5 0.393 -2,195 3.5 4.0 0.5 297.5 2.3 295.0 2.1 -0.8
2024Q3 21,427 2.6 21,164 2.9 -263 155.9 0.229 153.8 0.339 -2,085 3.5 4.0 0.5 299.2 2.3 296.6 2.2 -0.9
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
2024Q4 21,569 2.7 21,312 2.8 -257 156.0 0.164 154.0 0.242 -2,008 3.6 4.1 0.5 300.9 2.3 298.3 2.2 -0.9
2025Q1 21,706 2.6 21,452 2.6 -254 156.2 0.115 154.2 0.161 -1,961 3.7 4.1 0.4 302.6 2.3 299.9 2.2 -0.9
2025Q2 21,834 2.4 21,582 2.4 -252 156.3 0.099 154.3 0.138 -1,922 3.8 4.2 0.4 304.4 2.3 301.6 2.2 -0.9
2025Q3 21,964 2.4 21,713 2.5 -250 156.4 0.102 154.5 0.143 -1,882 3.8 4.3 0.4 306.2 2.4 303.3 2.3 -0.9
2025Q4 22,098 2.5 21,851 2.6 -247 156.5 0.103 154.6 0.146 -1,839 3.9 4.3 0.4 307.9 2.4 305.0 2.3 -1.0
0
2020 18,385 (3.4) 18,385 (3.4) -0 142.1 (8.748) 142.1 (8.748) 0 8.1 8.1 0.0 258.8 1.2 258.8 1.2 0.0
2021 19,427 5.7 18,928 3.0 -499 146.1 3.950 143.0 0.846 -3,104 5.4 7.0 1.7 271.0 4.7 270.5 4.5 -0.2
2022 20,152 3.7 19,781 4.5 -371 152.0 5.877 149.2 6.163 -2,818 3.6 4.7 1.1 284.9 5.1 283.6 4.8 -0.4
2023 20,760 3.0 20,457 3.4 -303 154.5 2.489 152.0 2.810 -2,497 3.4 4.1 0.7 291.8 2.4 289.8 2.2 -0.7
2024 21,356 2.9 21,087 3.1 -270 155.7 1.276 153.6 1.622 -2,151 3.5 4.0 0.5 298.4 2.3 295.8 2.1 -0.8
2025 21,900 2.5 21,649 2.7 -251 156.3 0.571 154.4 0.821 -1,901 3.8 4.2 0.4 305.3 2.3 302.4 2.2 -0.9
Sources: BEA, BLS, Moody’s Analytics
11
chains were badly scrambled, as this wave of the pandemic was especially hard on Southeast Asia,
which was lightly vaccinated at the time, and where most supply chains begin.
The job market was also roiled by the Delta wave, as some 8 million people told the Bureau of
Census’ Pulse Survey last September that they weren’t working because they were either sick, tak-
ing care of someone who was sick or fearful of getting sick. This is largely why so many open posi-
tions have gone unfilled, particularly for lower-wage jobs in industries where workers are in close
contact with their patrons, such as retailing, restaurants, healthcare and education and childcare
services. Wage growth has sharply accelerated, as employers struggled to keep their businesses
staffed, especially for these type of jobs. The Omicron wave further complicated efforts to get
workers back on the job, as in January at the peak of that wave, some 12 million people told Cen-
sus they weren’t working because of the virus.
Although the ARP was costly to U.S. taxpayers, without it, the ultimate cost to. them would have
been equally as large. Because of the weaker economy and automatic fiscal stabilizers, tax reve-
nues would have been lower and government outlays higher. By the end of this decade, the na-
tion’s debt burden would have been as large as it will end up being with the ARP (see Chart 14).
Chart 14: Debt Burdens As Heavy Without ARP
U.S. public debt outstanding, % of GDP, fiscal year
110
Baseline forecast
90
No American Rescue Plan
70
50
30
00 04 08 12 16 20 24 28
Sources: BEA, U.S. Treasury, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 14
Canada and Mexico
Canada’s and Mexico’s economies have benefited enormously from the massive fiscal support
provided by the U.S. The Canadian and Mexican economies are closely linked to the U.S. economy
through trade, investment and immigration flows. These links are particularly important for the
North American vehicle industry, because autos dominate trade between the U.S. and the rest of
the continent. Without the fiscal support provided in the U.S., nearly 6 million fewer new vehicles
would have been sold in the U.S. in 2021, which, combined with an overall reduction in U.S. goods
consumption, would have slammed the Canadian and Mexican economies.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 12
Without pandemic-related fiscal support in the U.S., real GDP in 2021 would have been 8% lower
in Mexico and 6% lower in Canada (see Chart 15).
Chart 15: Spillovers From U.S. Fiscal Policy
Real GDP, 2019Q4=100
110 110
Canada Mexico
105 105
100
100
95
95
90
90 85
Baseline forecast Baseline forecast
No U.S. fiscal support No U.S. fiscal support
85 80
19 20 21 22 23 24 19 20 21 22 23 24
Source: Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 15
Advanced economies
Governments in other advanced economies have also marshaled substantial fiscal support in re-
sponse to the pandemic (see Table 3). Job retention schemes have been an especially favored poli-
cy. These schemes helped cover the wages paid to workers who, instead of being laid off, were put
on furlough or had their hours cut. Germany, France, Italy and Japan already had short-time work
schemes but either increased eligibility or boosted the generosity of benefits, or did both. The pan-
demic spurred the U.K. government to stand up a new scheme, while Canadian policymakers intro-
duced a new wage subsidy covering a fixed percentage of wages regardless of hours not worked.
These job retention schemes not only maintained incomes and supported consumer demand but
also significantly limited the rise in unemployment. With the exception of Canada, jobless rates
increased meaningfully less in these advanced economies than in the U.S., where expanded unem-
ployment insurance benefits were the primary mechanism to support beleaguered workers.11
Keeping more workers on payrolls also ensured fewer difficulties getting people back to work as
economies reopened, limiting disruptive labor shortages and the resulting wage and price pres-
sures. Though inflation has increased substantially in most advanced economies, this helps explain
why it has been less than in the U.S.
Advanced economies also did not hold back in buttressing household incomes via other social
safety net programs. Most notably, the Japanese government issued cash payments to residents
and an extra child allowance.
11 U.S. small businesses, those with 500 or fewer employees, did receive grants to maintain their payrolls through the Paycheck Protection Program.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 13
Table 3: Fiscal Response to COVID-19 in Other Advanced Economies
Euro Zone Provisions USD bil
Germany Supports for firms and workers (STW benefits, grands, transfers, etc.) 283.5
Supports for public agencies and services 143.1
Tax cuts and deferrals 63.7
Public investment 15.9
Germany total 506.2
France Supports for firms and workers (STW benefits, grands, transfers, etc.) 117.6
Public investment 87.2
Tax cuts and deferrals 30.1
France total 234.9
Italy Supports for firms and workers (STW benefits, grants, transfers, etc.) 142.1
Tax cuts and deferrals 32.5
Public investment 24.6
Supports for public agencies and services 16.8
Italy total 216.0
Japan Provisions USD bil
Cash payment of ¥100K to Japanese residents and extra child allowance of ¥10K per child 138.5
Employment adjustment subsidies 97.4
Containment measures for COVID-19 51.7
Revitalization to cope with COVID-19 and other business supports 42.3
Support affected sectors in the form of discounts and vouchers 30.5
Supporting medical treatment providers 27.6
Measures to prevent the spread, build out medical treatment, and develop pharmaceuticals 23.1
Cash payments to SMEs and sole proprietors 21.2
Establishing rent support grant for SMEs 18.7
Additional payments to low-income single parent households 1.3
Deferred taxes and social security contributions and easing of property taxes for SMEs -0.0
Japan total 452.2
U.K. Provisions USD bil
Funding for National Health Service 207.9
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme 101.7
Self-Employment Income Support Scheme 37.0
Additional transfers to devolved administrations 35.2
Direct grants to small businesses in most affected sectors 25.2
Property tax (business rate) holiday for firms in affected sectors 24.2
Expanded Universal Credit and Working Tax Credit Schemes 13.4
VAT reduced at 5% for hospitality, accommodation, and attractions until the end of Sep 2021, at 12.5% until Mar 2022 9.6
Temporary cut on stamp duty land tax until June 2021 6.6
Fuel Duty: one year freeze in 2021-22 5.6
Rent support by increasing the Local Housing Allowance 5.6
Public sector and social housing decarbonization and Green Homes Grant 5.3
Bring forward public infrastructure spending to FY2020/21 5.3
Boost of active labour market policies 3.8
Waiver of VAT and customs duties on critical medical imports 2.9
Support for culture, charities and sport 2.9
Funding to cover the National Minimum Wage for 25 hrs a wk for 6 mos 2.7
Alcohol Duty: one year freeze in 2021-22 2.1
Deferral of VAT for 2020Q2 until June 21 2.0
Eat Out to Help Out 1.1
Deferral of income tax (self-assessment) of the self-employed until the end of January 2021 0.9
Extension the window for starting deferred payments through the VAT New Payment Scheme by up to 3 mos 0.6
Funding of 40,000 traineeships and 27,000 job coaches 0.6
Statutory Sick Pay Rebate Scheme 0.5
U.K. total 502.7
Canada Provisions USD bil
Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy 76.9
Canada Emergency Response Benefit 64.0
Support to Health System 46.5
Canada Recovery Benefits 17.7
Canada Emergency Business Account 11.2
Enhancements to Employment Insurance 7.9
Enhanced GST Credit 4.3
Canada Emergency Rent Subsidy and Lockdown Support 3.4
Other Measures to Support Vulnerable Canadians (Transfers) 2.9
Other Direct Support Measures 2.8
Canada Emergency Student Benefit 2.3
Wage Top-Up for Essential Workers 2.3
Income Tax, Sales Tax, and Customs Duty Payment Deferrals 2.3
Other Support for Businesses (Direct Govt Outlays) 2.0
Other Support for Businesses (Transfers) 2.0
10% Temporary Wage Subsidy 1.9
One-Time Payment for Seniors Eligible for OAS and GIS 1.9
Canada Emergency Commercial Rent Assistance for Small Business 1.6
Enhanced Canada Child Benefit 1.5
Regional Relief and Recovery Fund 1.1
Air Sector 1.0
Other Measures to Support Vulnerable Canadians (Direct Govt Outlays) 0.8
Support for Persons with Disabilities 0.7
Supporting Community Service Organizations 0.6
Support for Innovative Businesses 0.5
Support for Workers in the Live Events and Arts Sectors 0.2
Canada total 260.4
Sources: Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Department of Finance Canada, HM Treasury, IMF, Kantei, Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, Ministero dell’economia e delle Finanze, Moody’s Analytics
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 14
Some advanced economies were somewhat hampered by budget constraints in providing support.
Italy, for example, had less fiscal space for direct spending and therefore relied more heavily on
loan guarantees. The EU was able to work around budgetary constraints through joint stimulus
measures that were funded by mutualized debt obligations. Our analysis does not include the im-
pact of Europe’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, but these plans supported market confidence,
which in turn kept interest rates low and allowed countries to spend more than would have other-
wise been the case.
Advanced economies also benefited from fiscal support in other countries. In Europe, these spill-
over effects were most evident in Germany, where the country’s fiscal measures were not much
greater, as a share of GDP, than those in France and Italy. German exports, particularly of vehicles,
have been significantly buoyed by global demand that would have been substantially diminished
without the fiscal help provided around the world (see Chart 16).
Chart 16: German Exports Are Crushed
Real German exports, 2015€ bil, SAAR
1,700
1,600
1,500
1,400
1,300
Baseline forecast
1,200
Counterfactual scenario
1,100
19 20 21 22 23 24
Sources: Destatis, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 16
The fiscal support has also helped Japan avoid a much more serious bout of deflation. Like the U.S.
dollar, the Japanese yen is a safe-haven currency that generally appreciates when global investors
are nervous. In the counterfactual scenario without government support, investors are substantial-
ly more skittish and thus flock to the yen, pushing up its value by over 10% on a trade-weighted
basis. This puts severe downward pressure on Japanese prices (see Chart 17).
Emerging markets
Emerging markets have been hit hard by successive waves of the virus, and a world without fiscal
stimulus would have been far less kind. Although the three largest emerging economies—China,
India and Brazil—traced different paths with respect to the magnitude and composition of fiscal
support, the consequences of not providing fiscal support are similarly clear: weaker economic re-
coveries, higher unemployment, and diminished long-run growth (see Table 4).
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 15
Chart 17: Deflation for Longer in Japan
Japanese consumer price index, % change yr ago
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
Baseline forecast
-1.0
Counterfactual scenario
-1.5
-2.0
-2.5
19 20 21 22 23 24
Sources: Japan Statistics Bureau, Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 17
Table 4: Fiscal Response to COVID-19 in Emerging Markets
China Provisions USD bil
Support for employment, incomes, reductions in taxes and fees for small businesses 299.7
Infrastructure spending 239.7
Exemptions from social insurance payments, reduction or exemption of value-added tax 74.9
Waiving of toll roads, reduction in commerical electricity tariffs 50.5
China total 664.8
India Provisions USD bil
Food aid and cooking gas 30.8
Fertilizer subsidy 10.8
Financial assistance for construction workers 4.3
Cash transfers to female heads of household 4.1
Increase in cash transfers for rural households 3.7
Infrastructure investment 3.4
Additional spending on public health 3.1
Travel and consumption vouchers 2.6
Subsidies for construction industry 2.4
Advance payments to farmers 2.4
Job support for rural economy 1.4
Supplemental health insurance for hospital workers exposed to COVID-19 1.3
Cash transfers to senior citizens 0.4
Payroll support program 0.3
Research and development funding for vaccine 0.1
India total 71.0
Brazil Provisions USD bil
Emergency family income 67.1
Aid for state and local governments 14.8
Additional spending on public health 13.0
Payroll support program 9.1
Vaccine procurement 4.6
Credits for machinery and equipment 0.9
Aid to tourism industry 0.7
Aid to energy sector 0.2
Expansion of Bolsa Familia 0.1
Brazil total 110.4
Sources: Government of India’s Ministry of Finance, National People’s Congress, Tesouro Nacional, Moody’s Analytics
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 16
For China, the severe hit to global trade in the counterfactual scenario precipitates a double-dip
recession, with the economy contracting again in the first half of 2021. The subsequent economic
recovery is also materially slower. Global trade is a critical driver of China’s recovery, and with less
trade, the Chinese economy would have stumbled well into 2021.
Though Chinese officials spent less on direct fiscal support than they did during the global finan-
cial crisis, the timing and composition of spending were critical. Most of the support was delivered
in the third quarter of 2020, when the recovery in global trade was nascent. While a large share
of spending went toward infrastructure, almost half of the support was directed toward relief for
consumers and businesses in a departure from China’s traditional infrastructure-heavy playbook.
Without this boost, the economic recovery would have been cut short.
As in the rest of Latin America, the pandemic ripped through Brazil. But Brazil spent more on direct
fiscal support to its economy than almost any other emerging economy. Without this support,
public health and economic outcomes would have been substantially worse. The Brazilian econo-
my would have fallen back into recession in the first half of 2021 and would not have recouped its
pre-pandemic peak until the second half of 2024.
India’s economy benefits the least from fiscal support, since overall government spending was
limited. Even with the extension of cash transfer programs during the Delta wave of the pan-
demic, which hit India especially hard, cumulative spending in the past two years was just over
2% of GDP. Global fiscal support also played a role in India’s recovery, though to a lesser extent
than in China and Brazil. This is because India’s economy is less reliant on trade overall and global
fiscal policy was more effective at reviving trade in goods than in services, for which India has a
comparative advantage.
Conclusion
The massive global fiscal policy response to the pandemic deserves significant credit for limiting
the severity and length of the recession that occurred when the pandemic struck, and for the sub-
sequently strong global economic recovery (see Table 5).
There has been criticism of global policymakers for going overboard on the fiscal support, with crit-
ics pointing to recent concerns over high inflation and bigger government deficits and debt loads.
But as we show, even without the fiscal support, inflation would still be a worry. Not because in-
flation would have been too high, but too low—as it had been since the financial crisis. Many glob-
al central banks would have nervously watched as their economies flirted with or suffered outright
deflation in 2020. Though global inflation would have picked up in 2021 because of base effects of
prices being depressed a year earlier, its rebound would have been slower.
Further, the fiscal situation of most countries already would have been even worse if they had not
provided the fiscal support, as their much-weakened economies would have caused tax revenues
to plummet and government expenditures to automatically increase (see Chart 18). The case is the
same for the U.S., although it will take a bit longer for this to become clear.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 17
Chart 18: More Debt Was Unavoidable
Debt-to-GDP ratio, ppt increase from 2019Q4 to 2021Q4
Brazil
China Baseline forecast
Germany Counterfactual scenario
India
Italy
France
Canada
U.K.
U.S.
Japan
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Source: Moody’s Analytics
Presentation Title, Date 18
Thus, second-guessing the aggressive fiscal policy response of governments to the pandemic is
misplaced. Governments had no choice but to act quickly and massively. Perhaps some of the
specific policy steps taken during the crisis could have been better designed, at least in hindsight.
However, policymakers’ decisiveness in pushing forward with substantial government support has
been an economic game changer.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 18
Table 5: Macroeconomic Impact of Government Pandemic Aid in 10 Largest Economies
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Real GDP, local currency, SAAR
World U.S. China Japan Germany U.K.
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
2012USD Ann. 2012USD Ann. 2012USD Ann. 2012USD Ann. 2015CNY Ann. 2015CNY Ann. 2015JPY Ann. 2015JPY Ann. 2015EUR Ann. 2015EUR Ann. 2018GBP Ann. 2018GBP Ann.
bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth
2020Q1 84,775 (10.9) 84,389 (12.5) 18,952 (5.1) 18,780 (8.5) 81,671 (35.2) 81,262 (36.5) 545,000 1.2 544,736 1.0 3,194 (6.9) 3,170 (9.6) 2,201 (10.1) 2,196 (10.9)
2020Q2 78,792 (25.4) 75,759 (35.0) 17,258 (31.2) 16,106 (45.9) 91,388 56.8 85,874 24.7 501,140 (28.5) 494,290 (32.2) 2,874 (34.4) 2,775 (41.3) 1,773 (57.9) 1,641 (68.8)
2020Q3 84,916 34.9 80,228 25.8 18,561 33.8 16,521 10.7 94,553 14.6 90,564 23.7 526,742 22.1 505,644 9.5 3,134 41.4 2,842 10.0 2,084 91.1 1,898 78.9
2020Q4 86,328 6.8 81,089 4.4 18,768 4.5 16,482 (0.9) 96,869 10.2 92,496 8.8 538,909 9.6 510,521 3.9 3,158 3.0 2,753 (12.0) 2,116 6.1 1,943 9.7
2021Q1 86,996 3.1 80,952 (0.7) 19,056 6.3 16,239 (5.8) 97,028 0.7 91,971 (2.3) 535,012 (2.9) 502,474 (6.2) 3,099 (7.3) 2,788 5.1 2,089 (5.0) 1,916 (5.3)
2021Q2 87,791 3.7 81,267 1.6 19,368 6.7 16,481 6.1 98,160 4.7 91,597 (1.6) 537,631 2.0 502,912 0.3 3,161 8.3 2,942 24.0 2,202 23.6 1,997 18.0
2021Q3 88,747 4.4 82,750 7.5 19,479 2.3 17,096 15.8 98,721 2.3 92,376 3.4 532,778 (3.6) 501,821 (0.9) 3,215 7.0 3,008 9.2 2,226 4.3 2,033 7.5
2021Q4 90,070 6.1 84,687 9.7 19,806 6.9 17,829 18.3 100,178 6.0 94,105 7.7 541,302 6.6 515,120 11.0 3,191 (2.9) 3,002 (0.7) 2,236 1.8 2,077 8.9
2022Q1 90,540 2.1 85,826 5.5 19,829 0.5 18,217 9.0 101,442 5.1 95,710 7.0 540,490 (0.6) 518,252 2.5 3,196 0.5 3,024 2.9 2,258 4.0 2,128 10.2
2022Q2 91,568 4.6 87,403 7.6 20,123 6.1 18,748 12.2 102,834 5.6 97,454 7.5 545,895 4.1 526,654 6.6 3,241 5.8 3,081 7.8 2,277 3.5 2,166 7.4
2022Q3 92,428 3.8 88,650 5.8 20,266 2.9 19,027 6.1 104,332 6.0 99,096 6.9 550,808 3.6 533,739 5.5 3,280 4.9 3,137 7.5 2,294 2.9 2,194 5.2
2022Q4 93,219 3.5 89,649 4.6 20,390 2.5 19,181 3.3 105,875 6.0 100,634 6.4 555,215 3.2 539,903 4.7 3,307 3.3 3,178 5.3 2,307 2.4 2,218 4.5
2023Q1 94,006 3.4 90,558 4.1 20,537 2.9 19,324 3.0 107,373 5.8 102,171 6.2 557,807 1.9 543,915 3.0 3,338 3.7 3,217 5.0 2,318 1.9 2,237 3.5
2023Q2 94,779 3.3 91,414 3.8 20,685 2.9 19,483 3.3 108,852 5.6 103,650 5.9 559,226 1.0 546,409 1.8 3,360 2.7 3,245 3.5 2,329 1.8 2,253 2.8
2023Q3 95,534 3.2 92,239 3.7 20,835 2.9 19,659 3.7 110,327 5.5 105,140 5.9 560,615 1.0 548,672 1.7 3,381 2.5 3,270 3.1 2,338 1.6 2,265 2.2
2023Q4 96,285 3.2 93,042 3.5 20,984 2.9 19,829 3.5 111,774 5.3 106,616 5.7 561,961 1.0 550,864 1.6 3,401 2.4 3,293 2.8 2,346 1.5 2,275 1.8
2024Q1 97,047 3.2 93,835 3.5 21,141 3.0 20,003 3.6 113,303 5.6 108,141 5.8 563,275 0.9 552,693 1.3 3,421 2.3 3,314 2.6 2,358 2.0 2,287 2.3
2024Q2 97,789 3.1 94,593 3.3 21,288 2.8 20,169 3.4 114,803 5.4 109,614 5.6 564,556 0.9 553,690 0.7 3,438 2.1 3,333 2.3 2,369 1.8 2,298 1.9
2024Q3 98,504 3.0 95,328 3.1 21,427 2.6 20,332 3.3 116,231 5.1 111,039 5.3 565,804 0.9 554,301 0.4 3,454 1.9 3,351 2.1 2,378 1.6 2,308 1.7
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
2024Q4 99,202 2.9 96,059 3.1 21,569 2.7 20,506 3.5 117,618 4.9 112,437 5.1 567,020 0.9 555,056 0.5 3,468 1.7 3,367 1.9 2,386 1.3 2,316 1.4
2025Q1 99,881 2.8 96,794 3.1 21,706 2.6 20,683 3.5 118,990 4.7 113,852 5.1 568,204 0.8 556,008 0.7 3,480 1.4 3,381 1.7 2,392 1.1 2,323 1.2
2025Q2 100,545 2.7 97,522 3.0 21,834 2.4 20,853 3.3 120,352 4.7 115,241 5.0 569,350 0.8 557,197 0.9 3,491 1.2 3,395 1.6 2,400 1.3 2,331 1.5
2025Q3 101,206 2.7 98,249 3.0 21,964 2.4 21,022 3.3 121,708 4.6 116,610 4.8 570,457 0.8 558,520 1.0 3,501 1.2 3,408 1.6 2,408 1.3 2,340 1.5
2025Q4 101,875 2.7 98,985 3.0 22,098 2.5 21,198 3.4 123,063 4.5 117,942 4.6 571,528 0.8 559,832 0.9 3,511 1.1 3,421 1.6 2,417 1.5 2,350 1.8
2020 83,703 (3.5) 80,366 (7.4) 18,385 (3.4) 16,972 (10.8) 91,121 2.3 87,549 (1.7) 527,948 (4.5) 513,798 (7.1) 3,090 (4.9) 2,885 (11.2) 2,043 (9.4) 1,920 (14.9)
2021 88,401 5.6 82,414 2.5 19,427 5.7 16,911 (0.4) 98,522 8.1 92,512 5.7 536,681 1.7 505,582 (1.6) 3,167 2.5 2,935 1.7 2,188 7.1 2,006 4.5
2022 91,939 4.0 87,882 6.6 20,152 3.7 18,793 11.1 103,621 5.2 98,224 6.2 548,102 2.1 529,637 4.8 3,256 2.8 3,105 5.8 2,284 4.4 2,177 8.5
2023 95,151 3.5 91,813 4.5 20,760 3.0 19,574 4.2 109,582 5.8 104,394 6.3 559,902 2.2 547,465 3.4 3,370 3.5 3,256 4.9 2,333 2.1 2,257 3.7
2024 98,135 3.1 94,954 3.4 21,356 2.9 20,252 3.5 115,489 5.4 110,308 5.7 565,163 0.9 553,935 1.2 3,445 2.2 3,341 2.6 2,373 1.7 2,302 2.0
2025 100,877 2.8 97,888 3.1 21,900 2.5 20,939 3.4 121,028 4.8 115,911 5.1 569,885 0.8 557,889 0.7 3,496 1.5 3,401 1.8 2,404 1.3 2,336 1.5
Sources: National statistical agencies, Moody’s Analytics
19
Table 5: Macroeconomic Impact of Government Pandemic Aid in 10 Largest Economies (Cont.)
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Real GDP, local currency, SAAR
India France Italy Brazil Canada
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
2011- Ann. 2011- Ann. 2015EUR Ann. 2015EUR Ann. 2015EUR Ann. 2015EUR Ann. 1995BRL Ann. 1995BRL Ann. 2012CAD Ann. 2012CAD Ann.
2012INR bil growth 2012INR bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth bil growth
2020Q1 148,162 10.1 147,222 7.4 2,198 (20.9) 2,192 (21.8) 1,622 (21.4) 1,616 (22.5) 1,203 (8.8) 1,180 (15.3) 2,077 (8.4) 2,077 (8.4)
2020Q2 110,208 (69.4) 108,147 (70.9) 1,902 (44.0) 1,867 (47.3) 1,415 (42.0) 1,345 (52.0) 1,096 (31.0) 991 (50.3) 1,848 (37.4) 1,806 (42.9)
2020Q3 133,337 114.3 129,884 108.0 2,256 98.0 2,167 81.4 1,639 79.8 1,543 73.2 1,181 34.9 1,044 23.2 2,014 41.1 1,905 23.9
2020Q4 145,259 40.9 141,288 40.0 2,231 (4.3) 2,138 (5.1) 1,611 (6.6) 1,556 3.2 1,218 13.0 1,146 45.1 2,058 9.1 1,906 0.2
2021Q1 150,601 15.5 146,309 15.0 2,234 0.6 2,159 3.9 1,616 1.3 1,544 (2.9) 1,234 5.5 1,157 3.7 2,083 4.9 1,907 0.2
2021Q2 132,428 (40.2) 127,857 (41.7) 2,264 5.4 2,186 5.1 1,661 11.4 1,575 8.1 1,230 (1.4) 1,148 (3.0) 2,066 (3.2) 1,857 (10.1)
2021Q3 144,512 41.8 139,624 42.2 2,335 13.2 2,258 14.0 1,704 10.9 1,612 9.7 1,229 (0.4) 1,142 (2.0) 2,094 5.4 1,891 7.5
2021Q4 155,206 33.1 151,006 36.8 2,352 2.9 2,277 3.3 1,714 2.5 1,619 1.9 1,227 (0.5) 1,141 (0.3) 2,118 4.6 1,941 11.0
2022Q1 156,262 2.7 152,782 4.8 2,361 1.5 2,288 1.9 1,725 2.5 1,633 3.4 1,229 0.5 1,149 2.6 2,125 1.3 1,971 6.4
2022Q2 157,824 4.1 154,968 5.8 2,378 3.0 2,310 4.0 1,742 4.0 1,654 5.2 1,239 3.2 1,159 3.5 2,157 6.2 2,021 10.5
2022Q3 158,929 2.8 156,621 4.3 2,399 3.5 2,334 4.2 1,754 2.8 1,668 3.4 1,248 3.0 1,168 3.2 2,188 5.9 2,064 8.8
2022Q4 160,677 4.5 158,788 5.6 2,414 2.6 2,353 3.2 1,765 2.5 1,679 2.7 1,256 2.6 1,177 3.2 2,209 4.0 2,091 5.3
2023Q1 163,023 6.0 161,337 6.6 2,427 2.2 2,367 2.5 1,774 2.2 1,688 2.3 1,263 2.4 1,186 3.0 2,226 3.1 2,109 3.4
2023Q2 166,121 7.8 164,478 8.0 2,439 2.0 2,380 2.2 1,784 2.1 1,698 2.3 1,270 2.4 1,193 2.6 2,240 2.4 2,121 2.3
2023Q3 169,177 7.6 167,455 7.4 2,450 1.8 2,392 2.0 1,793 2.2 1,708 2.5 1,278 2.3 1,200 2.3 2,252 2.2 2,133 2.2
2023Q4 172,798 8.8 170,931 8.6 2,461 1.8 2,403 1.9 1,803 2.2 1,719 2.6 1,285 2.3 1,208 2.5 2,263 2.1 2,144 2.1
2024Q1 175,482 6.4 173,483 6.1 2,473 1.9 2,415 2.0 1,811 1.8 1,728 2.2 1,294 2.8 1,217 3.1 2,274 1.9 2,154 1.9
2024Q2 178,332 6.7 176,186 6.4 2,485 2.0 2,428 2.1 1,818 1.6 1,737 2.0 1,303 2.9 1,226 3.2 2,284 1.8 2,164 1.8
2024Q3 181,154 6.5 178,871 6.2 2,497 1.9 2,440 2.1 1,825 1.6 1,746 2.1 1,313 2.9 1,235 2.9 2,294 1.7 2,173 1.8
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
2024Q4 183,989 6.4 181,571 6.2 2,508 1.8 2,452 2.0 1,833 1.7 1,756 2.3 1,322 2.9 1,245 3.0 2,304 1.7 2,183 1.8
2025Q1 186,752 6.1 184,206 5.9 2,519 1.8 2,465 2.0 1,841 1.8 1,766 2.4 1,331 2.8 1,254 3.1 2,313 1.7 2,194 1.9
2025Q2 189,428 5.9 186,751 5.6 2,528 1.4 2,475 1.7 1,850 1.8 1,777 2.4 1,341 2.8 1,264 3.2 2,323 1.7 2,204 2.0
2025Q3 192,009 5.6 189,203 5.4 2,537 1.4 2,485 1.7 1,857 1.7 1,787 2.3 1,350 2.9 1,274 3.3 2,333 1.7 2,215 1.9
2025Q4 194,603 5.5 191,667 5.3 2,546 1.4 2,496 1.7 1,865 1.5 1,797 2.2 1,360 2.9 1,285 3.4 2,343 1.7 2,225 1.9
2020 134,242 (7.1) 131,636 (8.9) 2,147 (8.0) 2,091 (10.4) 1,572 (9.0) 1,515 (12.3) 1,174 (4.2) 1,090 (11.0) 1,999 (5.2) 1,923 (8.8)
2021 145,687 8.5 141,199 7.3 2,297 7.0 2,220 6.2 1,674 6.5 1,587 4.8 1,230 4.7 1,147 5.2 2,090 4.5 1,899 (1.3)
2022 158,423 8.7 155,790 10.3 2,388 4.0 2,321 4.6 1,746 4.3 1,658 4.5 1,243 1.0 1,163 1.4 2,170 3.8 2,037 7.3
2023 167,780 5.9 166,050 6.6 2,445 2.4 2,386 2.8 1,789 2.4 1,703 2.7 1,274 2.5 1,197 2.9 2,245 3.5 2,127 4.4
2024 179,739 7.1 177,528 6.9 2,491 1.9 2,434 2.0 1,822 1.9 1,742 2.3 1,308 2.7 1,231 2.8 2,289 1.9 2,168 2.0
2025 190,698 6.1 187,957 5.9 2,533 1.7 2,480 1.9 1,853 1.7 1,782 2.3 1,345 2.9 1,269 3.1 2,328 1.7 2,209 1.9
Sources: National statistical agencies, Moody’s Analytics
20
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Table 5: Macroeconomic Impact of Government Pandemic Aid in 10 Largest Economies (Cont.)
Employment, SA
World U.S. China Japan Germany U.K.
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change,
Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil
2020Q1 2,565.5 (9.104) 2,563.8 (10.807) 157.7 (0.838) 156.9 (1.666) 774.3 (0.307) 774.3 (0.316) 67.4 (0.110) 67.4 (0.123) 43.3 (0.051) 43.3 (0.075) 33.0 0.078 32.9 (0.038)
2020Q2 2,406.2 (159.277) 2,395.7 (168.045) 137.6 131.4 (25.460) 774.3 0.043 774.3 0.013 66.3 (1.057) 66.3 (1.103) 42.9 (0.372) 42.8 (0.483) 32.6 (0.407) 32.4 (0.521)
2020Q3 2,486.6 80.363 2,464.8 69.082 146.2 8.584 134.6 3.197 772.3 (2.077) 771.6 (2.657) 66.6 0.203 66.4 0.102 42.9 0.002 42.5 (0.333) 32.4 (0.255) 32.0 (0.384)
2020Q4 2,511.7 25.171 2,483.4 18.556 149.8 3.630 136.0 1.424 770.0 (2.252) 767.3 (4.313) 66.8 0.203 66.5 0.081 42.9 (0.037) 42.0 (0.500) 32.1 (0.201) 31.7 (0.316)
2021Q1 2,526.3 14.622 2,490.6 7.269 150.4 0.649 133.6 (2.402) 770.9 0.892 765.9 (1.463) 66.9 0.163 66.5 0.044 43.2 0.268 42.0 0.015 32.2 0.032 31.6 (0.074)
2021Q2 2,531.8 5.474 2,489.6 (0.995) 151.5 1.037 134.0 0.393 770.3 (0.578) 762.7 (3.121) 66.6 (0.353) 66.1 (0.453) 43.4 0.212 42.2 0.240 32.3 0.095 31.6 (0.020)
2021Q3 2,536.0 4.173 2,491.7 2.117 153.2 1.752 138.1 4.100 769.9 (0.430) 759.5 (3.266) 66.8 0.210 66.2 0.161 43.4 0.011 42.3 0.113 32.5 0.247 31.8 0.201
2021Q4 2,546.2 10.165 2,502.5 10.792 155.2 1.952 142.4 4.299 770.0 0.082 758.3 (1.177) 66.4 (0.370) 65.9 (0.362) 43.3 (0.058) 42.3 (0.010) 32.5 (0.055) 31.8 (0.030)
2022Q1 2,560.3 14.134 2,518.8 16.306 157.0 1.827 146.2 3.736 770.2 0.207 757.9 (0.436) 66.9 0.537 66.4 0.578 43.5 0.170 42.5 0.191 32.5 0.027 31.8 0.080
2022Q2 2,572.2 11.865 2,533.4 14.533 157.5 0.530 148.0 1.882 770.0 (0.160) 757.3 (0.584) 67.2 0.271 66.8 0.328 43.5 0.037 42.6 0.058 32.5 0.006 31.9 0.057
2022Q3 2,581.5 9.299 2,545.1 11.708 158.1 0.537 149.3 1.204 769.7 (0.319) 756.7 (0.571) 67.4 0.140 67.0 0.190 43.6 0.040 42.6 0.080 32.5 0.042 32.0 0.091
2022Q4 2,588.3 6.815 2,554.1 8.983 158.6 0.498 149.9 0.621 769.0 (0.660) 756.1 (0.642) 67.4 0.098 67.1 0.132 43.6 0.043 42.7 0.100 32.6 0.066 32.1 0.126
2023Q1 2,592.2 3.936 2,560.0 5.950 159.0 0.459 150.3 0.450 767.0 (2.016) 754.5 (1.606) 67.5 0.065 67.2 0.087 43.7 0.043 42.8 0.087 32.7 0.059 32.2 0.115
2023Q2 2,597.0 4.757 2,566.5 6.516 159.4 0.409 150.9 0.576 766.2 (0.823) 754.0 (0.433) 67.6 0.065 67.3 0.078 43.7 0.037 42.9 0.070 32.7 0.043 32.3 0.085
2023Q3 2,602.3 5.304 2,573.4 6.864 159.8 0.375 151.6 0.690 765.4 (0.795) 753.6 (0.382) 67.6 0.063 67.3 0.072 43.7 0.029 43.0 0.051 32.7 0.025 32.4 0.054
2023Q4 2,608.4 6.096 2,580.8 7.404 160.2 0.353 152.3 0.670 764.7 (0.736) 753.3 (0.304) 67.7 0.062 67.4 0.068 43.7 0.020 43.0 0.036 32.8 0.017 32.4 0.037
2024Q1 2,614.8 6.470 2,588.4 7.580 160.5 0.333 152.9 0.630 763.9 (0.720) 753.0 (0.293) 67.8 0.056 67.5 0.060 43.8 0.012 43.0 0.024 32.8 0.018 32.4 0.033
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
2024Q2 2,621.0 6.143 2,595.5 7.094 160.8 0.268 153.5 0.581 763.2 (0.793) 752.6 (0.418) 67.8 0.052 67.5 0.053 43.8 0.007 43.0 0.016 32.8 0.020 32.5 0.030
2024Q3 2,626.7 5.730 2,602.0 6.501 161.0 0.234 154.0 0.493 762.3 (0.829) 752.1 (0.490) 67.9 0.048 67.6 0.046 43.8 0.003 43.0 0.010 32.8 0.021 32.5 0.029
2024Q4 2,632.1 5.355 2,608.1 6.088 161.2 0.155 154.4 0.444 761.5 (0.848) 751.6 (0.532) 67.9 0.046 67.6 0.041 43.8 0.001 43.0 0.009 32.8 0.022 32.5 0.027
2025Q1 2,637.1 5.077 2,613.9 5.832 161.3 0.121 154.9 0.450 760.6 (0.860) 751.0 (0.561) 68.0 0.045 67.6 0.039 43.8 0.002 43.1 0.010 32.9 0.020 32.5 0.025
2025Q2 2,641.9 4.755 2,619.4 5.517 161.4 0.093 155.3 0.424 759.8 (0.860) 750.5 (0.573) 68.0 0.045 67.7 0.041 43.8 0.001 43.1 0.011 32.9 0.019 32.6 0.025
2025Q3 2,646.6 4.708 2,624.9 5.456 161.5 0.097 155.7 0.409 758.9 (0.842) 749.9 (0.571) 68.0 0.044 67.7 0.043 43.8 (0.001) 43.1 0.010 32.9 0.018 32.6 0.024
2025Q4 2,651.2 4.565 2,630.2 5.313 161.6 0.089 156.1 0.393 758.1 (0.823) 749.3 (0.566) 68.1 0.043 67.8 0.044 43.8 (0.004) 43.1 0.008 32.9 0.019 32.6 0.025
2020 2,492.5 (65.820) 2,476.9 (81.393) 147.8 (9.724) 139.7 (17.792) 772.7 (1.993) 771.9 (2.830) 66.8 (0.477) 66.6 (0.605) 43.0 (0.201) 42.6 (0.592) 32.5 (0.270) 32.2 (0.564)
2021 2,535.1 42.596 2,493.6 16.726 152.6 4.772 137.1 (2.681) 770.3 (2.452) 761.6 (10.291) 66.7 (0.099) 66.2 (0.470) 43.3 0.298 42.2 (0.413) 32.4 (0.167) 31.7 (0.556)
2022 2,575.5 40.466 2,537.8 44.209 157.8 5.217 148.3 11.278 769.7 (0.536) 757.0 (4.616) 67.2 0.574 66.8 0.647 43.6 0.244 42.6 0.408 32.5 0.175 32.0 0.273
2023 2,600.0 24.407 2,570.2 32.345 159.6 1.816 151.3 2.932 765.8 (3.909) 753.9 (3.110) 67.6 0.372 67.3 0.475 43.7 0.152 42.9 0.303 32.7 0.180 32.3 0.369
2024 2,623.6 23.694 2,598.5 28.287 160.9 1.245 153.7 2.415 762.7 (3.097) 752.4 (1.512) 67.8 0.225 67.5 0.240 43.8 0.057 43.0 0.113 32.8 0.085 32.5 0.153
2025 2,644.2 20.556 2,622.1 23.615 161.4 0.563 155.5 1.796 759.3 (3.380) 750.2 (2.167) 68.0 0.183 67.7 0.168 43.8 0.005 43.1 0.041 32.9 0.080 32.6 0.104
Sources: National statistical agencies, Moody’s Analytics
21
Table 5: Macroeconomic Impact of Government Pandemic Aid in 10 Largest Economies (Cont.)
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Employment, SA
India France Italy Brazil Canada
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change,
Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil Mil mil
2020Q1 442.8 (1.736) 442.8 (1.736) 27.7 0.046 27.7 0.032 22.8 (0.165) 22.8 (0.229) 93.0 (0.859) 92.6 (1.321) 18.8 (0.251) 18.7 (0.313)
2020Q2 369.7 (73.164) 369.6 (73.231) 26.8 (0.925) 26.7 (0.983) 22.0 (0.785) 21.9 (0.865) 84.1 (8.960) 81.7 (10.930) 16.7 (2.127) 16.5 (2.243)
2020Q3 418.3 48.635 417.9 48.298 27.2 0.390 26.9 0.240 22.2 0.192 21.9 0.034 83.7 (0.417) 78.6 (3.070) 18.1 1.388 17.7 1.172
2020Q4 435.0 16.660 434.1 16.197 27.4 0.221 27.1 0.114 22.3 0.056 21.9 (0.073) 86.1 2.469 81.5 2.912 18.5 0.435 17.9 0.208
2021Q1 441.1 6.120 439.6 5.507 27.3 (0.106) 26.9 (0.136) 22.1 (0.191) 21.6 (0.293) 87.2 1.109 83.1 1.595 18.6 0.067 17.8 (0.104)
2021Q2 433.9 (7.164) 431.2 (8.390) 27.6 0.279 27.1 0.195 22.4 0.343 21.8 0.202 90.2 2.937 85.6 2.505 18.7 0.114 17.7 (0.030)
2021Q3 429.9 (4.057) 426.0 (5.192) 27.8 0.220 27.2 0.131 22.6 0.112 21.8 0.054 93.2 3.047 88.9 3.318 19.0 0.310 18.0 0.266
2021Q4 431.8 1.907 427.3 1.277 27.7 (0.081) 27.1 (0.095) 22.6 0.028 21.8 (0.034) 90.3 (2.896) 86.2 (2.678) 19.3 0.289 18.3 0.341
2022Q1 437.8 5.984 433.4 6.065 27.7 (0.039) 27.1 (0.029) 22.8 0.185 21.9 0.125 89.3 (1.038) 85.6 (0.622) 19.3 (0.009) 18.4 0.089
2022Q2 443.9 6.100 439.9 6.504 27.7 (0.002) 27.1 0.012 22.9 0.174 22.0 0.119 89.2 (0.130) 85.8 0.218 19.4 0.117 18.6 0.210
2022Q3 448.4 4.536 444.9 5.020 27.7 0.019 27.2 0.051 23.1 0.156 22.1 0.107 89.4 0.202 86.3 0.446 19.4 0.048 18.8 0.123
2022Q4 451.1 2.698 448.1 3.204 27.7 0.027 27.3 0.068 23.2 0.143 22.2 0.096 89.6 0.276 86.8 0.502 19.5 0.035 18.9 0.087
2023Q1 452.5 1.449 449.9 1.820 27.7 0.035 27.3 0.068 23.4 0.134 22.3 0.089 89.9 0.285 87.3 0.492 19.5 0.030 18.9 0.061
2023Q2 453.9 1.339 451.5 1.629 27.8 0.037 27.4 0.065 23.5 0.112 22.4 0.069 90.3 0.338 87.8 0.517 19.5 0.017 18.9 0.034
2023Q3 455.9 1.996 453.8 2.235 27.8 0.036 27.4 0.057 23.6 0.092 22.4 0.051 90.7 0.389 88.3 0.546 19.5 0.016 19.0 0.028
2023Q4 458.6 2.726 456.7 2.924 27.8 0.033 27.5 0.050 23.7 0.078 22.5 0.039 91.1 0.435 88.9 0.586 19.5 0.021 19.0 0.032
2024Q1 461.6 3.031 459.9 3.190 27.9 0.030 27.5 0.045 23.7 0.065 22.5 0.029 91.6 0.477 89.6 0.631 19.6 0.026 19.0 0.037
2024Q2 464.5 2.866 462.9 2.990 27.9 0.029 27.6 0.042 23.8 0.056 22.5 0.023 92.1 0.506 90.2 0.657 19.6 0.027 19.1 0.038
2024Q3 467.0 2.475 465.4 2.574 27.9 0.029 27.6 0.042 23.8 0.049 22.5 0.019 92.6 0.520 90.9 0.650 19.6 0.028 19.1 0.039
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
2024Q4 469.1 2.134 467.7 2.220 28.0 0.030 27.7 0.043 23.9 0.043 22.6 0.016 93.1 0.524 91.5 0.644 19.7 0.028 19.2 0.040
2025Q1 471.1 1.970 469.7 2.051 28.0 0.032 27.7 0.045 23.9 0.039 22.6 0.015 93.6 0.516 92.1 0.633 19.7 0.029 19.2 0.041
2025Q2 473.0 1.975 471.8 2.054 28.0 0.033 27.8 0.047 23.9 0.035 22.6 0.015 94.1 0.500 92.8 0.615 19.7 0.029 19.2 0.041
2025Q3 475.1 2.031 473.9 2.107 28.1 0.033 27.8 0.047 24.0 0.032 22.6 0.015 94.6 0.479 93.3 0.588 19.7 0.028 19.3 0.041
2025Q4 477.1 2.042 476.0 2.113 28.1 0.031 27.8 0.045 24.0 0.028 22.6 0.014 95.1 0.450 93.9 0.553 19.8 0.028 19.3 0.041
2020 416.4 (14.929) 416.1 (15.264) 27.3 (0.210) 27.1 (0.369) 22.3 (0.667) 22.1 (0.902) 86.7 (6.634) 83.6 (9.788) 18.0 (0.974) 17.7 (1.287)
2021 434.2 17.717 431.0 14.927 27.6 0.322 27.1 0.013 22.4 0.072 21.7 (0.377) 90.2 3.514 86.0 2.380 18.9 0.867 18.0 0.273
2022 445.3 11.113 441.5 10.518 27.7 0.095 27.2 0.067 23.0 0.593 22.1 0.343 89.4 (0.880) 86.1 0.167 19.4 0.512 18.7 0.711
2023 455.2 9.949 453.0 11.429 27.8 0.118 27.4 0.238 23.5 0.513 22.4 0.331 90.5 1.118 88.1 1.954 19.5 0.136 19.0 0.288
2024 465.5 10.328 464.0 10.992 27.9 0.126 27.6 0.190 23.8 0.274 22.5 0.131 92.3 1.854 90.5 2.451 19.6 0.096 19.1 0.142
2025 474.1 8.532 472.8 8.874 28.0 0.126 27.8 0.179 24.0 0.159 22.6 0.065 94.4 2.023 93.0 2.499 19.7 0.113 19.3 0.162
Sources: National statistical agencies, Moody’s Analytics
22
Table 5: Macroeconomic Impact of Government Pandemic Aid in 10 Largest Economies (Cont.)
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Unemployment rate, %, SA
World U.S. China Japan Germany U.K.
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
2020Q1 6.2 6.3 3.8 4.3 3.6 3.6 2.4 2.5 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.3
2020Q2 9.3 9.7 13.0 16.8 3.7 3.7 2.7 2.8 6.1 6.4 4.1 4.8
2020Q3 8.0 8.8 8.8 15.9 4.0 4.2 3.0 3.2 6.3 7.2 4.8 5.8
2020Q4 7.5 8.5 6.8 15.0 4.3 4.7 3.0 3.4 6.2 8.0 5.2 6.6
2021Q1 7.1 8.4 6.2 16.1 4.1 4.9 2.8 3.4 6.0 8.4 4.9 6.6
2021Q2 7.3 8.8 5.9 15.9 4.0 5.2 2.9 3.6 5.9 8.3 4.7 6.7
2021Q3 7.3 8.8 5.1 13.3 4.0 5.5 2.8 3.6 5.5 7.8 4.3 6.4
2021Q4 7.1 8.6 4.2 10.7 4.0 5.6 2.7 3.5 5.3 7.5 4.2 6.3
2022Q1 6.9 8.2 3.9 9.0 3.9 5.6 2.8 3.5 5.1 7.2 4.5 6.4
2022Q2 6.7 7.9 3.7 7.7 3.9 5.6 2.7 3.3 5.1 7.2 4.6 6.4
2022Q3 6.5 7.7 3.5 7.0 3.9 5.6 2.7 3.2 5.0 7.1 4.6 6.2
2022Q4 6.5 7.6 3.4 6.7 4.0 5.6 2.6 3.1 5.0 6.9 4.5 6.0
2023Q1 6.5 7.5 3.4 6.5 4.0 5.6 2.6 3.1 5.0 6.8 4.4 5.8
2023Q2 6.5 7.4 3.4 6.3 4.0 5.5 2.5 3.0 5.0 6.7 4.4 5.6
2023Q3 6.5 7.4 3.4 6.1 4.0 5.5 2.5 3.0 5.0 6.7 4.4 5.5
2023Q4 6.5 7.3 3.4 5.9 4.0 5.4 2.5 2.9 4.9 6.6 4.5 5.5
2024Q1 6.4 7.2 3.4 5.8 4.0 5.4 2.4 2.9 4.9 6.6 4.5 5.5
2024Q2 6.4 7.2 3.5 5.6 4.0 5.3 2.4 2.9 4.9 6.5 4.5 5.5
2024Q3 6.4 7.1 3.5 5.6 4.0 5.3 2.4 2.8 4.9 6.5 4.5 5.5
2024Q4 6.4 7.1 3.6 5.5 4.0 5.2 2.4 2.8 4.9 6.5 4.5 5.5
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
2025Q1 6.4 7.0 3.7 5.4 4.0 5.2 2.3 2.8 4.9 6.5 4.5 5.5
2025Q2 6.3 7.0 3.8 5.3 4.0 5.2 2.3 2.8 5.0 6.5 4.5 5.4
2025Q3 6.3 7.0 3.8 5.2 4.0 5.1 2.3 2.7 5.0 6.5 4.6 5.4
2025Q4 6.3 6.9 3.9 5.1 4.0 5.1 2.2 2.7 5.0 6.4 4.6 5.4
2020 7.8 8.3 8.1 13.0 3.9 4.1 2.8 3.0 5.9 6.7 4.5 5.4
2021 7.2 8.6 5.4 14.0 4.0 5.3 2.8 3.5 5.7 8.0 4.5 6.5
2022 6.6 7.9 3.6 7.6 3.9 5.6 2.7 3.3 5.0 7.1 4.5 6.2
2023 6.5 7.4 3.4 6.2 4.0 5.5 2.5 3.0 5.0 6.7 4.4 5.6
2024 6.4 7.1 3.5 5.6 4.0 5.3 2.4 2.8 4.9 6.5 4.5 5.5
2025 6.3 7.0 3.8 5.2 4.0 5.1 2.3 2.7 5.0 6.5 4.5 5.4
Sources: National statistical agencies, Moody’s Analytics
23
Table 5: Macroeconomic Impact of Government Pandemic Aid in 10 Largest Economies (Cont.)
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Unemployment rate, %, SA
India France Italy Brazil Canada
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
2020Q1 9.1 9.1 7.8 7.8 9.0 9.3 11.6 12.0 6.4 6.7
2020Q2 20.8 20.8 7.2 7.4 8.6 9.2 13.2 15.7 12.9 13.8
2020Q3 13.2 13.2 9.1 9.8 10.0 11.2 14.9 20.1 10.1 12.0
2020Q4 10.3 10.4 8.0 9.1 9.8 11.5 14.9 19.5 8.9 11.8
2021Q1 9.3 9.5 8.1 9.3 10.1 12.2 14.3 18.4 8.4 12.0
2021Q2 11.1 11.4 8.0 9.5 9.8 12.4 14.1 18.4 7.9 12.1
2021Q3 12.2 12.6 8.1 9.8 9.1 12.0 12.7 16.7 7.2 11.5
2021Q4 12.1 12.7 8.0 9.8 9.1 12.2 12.7 16.7 6.3 10.2
2022Q1 11.3 11.9 8.0 9.8 9.3 12.5 12.9 16.4 6.3 9.7
2022Q2 10.5 11.0 8.0 9.8 9.3 12.8 12.7 16.0 5.9 8.9
2022Q3 10.0 10.5 8.0 9.6 9.3 13.0 12.6 15.6 5.8 8.4
2022Q4 9.9 10.3 8.0 9.5 9.3 13.1 12.4 15.2 5.8 8.2
2023Q1 10.0 10.4 8.0 9.3 9.2 13.2 12.2 14.8 5.9 8.0
2023Q2 10.2 10.5 7.9 9.2 9.1 13.3 12.0 14.4 5.9 8.0
2023Q3 10.2 10.5 7.9 9.1 9.1 13.4 11.8 14.0 6.0 8.0
2023Q4 10.1 10.4 7.9 9.0 9.0 13.5 11.5 13.6 6.1 8.0
2024Q1 10.0 10.3 7.9 9.0 9.0 13.6 11.2 13.1 6.1 7.9
2024Q2 9.9 10.2 7.9 8.9 9.0 13.7 10.8 12.6 6.1 7.9
2024Q3 9.9 10.2 7.8 8.8 9.0 13.8 10.4 12.1 6.1 7.8
2024Q4 9.9 10.2 7.8 8.8 9.0 13.9 10.1 11.6 6.1 7.8
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
2025Q1 9.9 10.2 7.8 8.7 8.9 13.9 9.7 11.2 6.1 7.7
2025Q2 9.9 10.2 7.8 8.6 8.9 14.0 9.4 10.7 6.1 7.6
2025Q3 9.9 10.2 7.8 8.6 8.9 14.0 9.0 10.2 6.2 7.6
2025Q4 9.9 10.2 7.7 8.5 8.9 14.1 8.7 9.8 6.2 7.5
2020 13.4 13.4 8.0 8.6 9.3 10.3 13.6 16.8 9.6 11.1
2021 11.2 11.5 8.1 9.6 9.5 12.2 13.4 17.6 7.4 11.5
2022 10.4 10.9 8.0 9.7 9.3 12.8 12.6 15.8 6.0 8.8
2023 10.1 10.5 7.9 9.2 9.1 13.3 11.9 14.2 6.0 8.0
2024 9.9 10.2 7.8 8.9 9.0 13.7 10.6 12.4 6.1 7.8
2025 9.9 10.2 7.8 8.6 8.9 14.0 9.2 10.5 6.2 7.6
Sources: National statistical agencies, Moody’s Analytics
24
Table 5: Macroeconomic Impact of Government Pandemic Aid in 10 Largest Economies (Cont.)
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Consumer price index, SA
World U.S. China Japan Germany U.K.
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann.
Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth
2020Q1 133.3 3.0 133.3 2.9 258.5 1.0 258.4 0.9 112.2 3.5 112.2 3.4 100.4 0.1 100.4 0.1 106.0 (0.0) 106.0 0.0 108.8 2.1 108.6 1.4
2020Q2 133.2 (0.5) 133.0 (0.9) 256.5 (3.1) 255.8 (4.0) 111.2 (3.3) 111.1 (3.7) 100.1 (1.2) 100.1 (1.3) 105.8 (0.5) 105.6 (1.5) 108.5 (1.3) 108.2 (1.7)
2020Q3 134.4 3.7 133.0 0.0 259.4 4.7 255.7 (0.1) 111.8 1.9 110.1 (3.5) 100.0 (0.4) 99.8 (1.2) 105.7 (0.6) 104.6 (3.8) 108.9 1.5 107.8 (1.2)
2020Q4 135.4 3.1 132.9 (0.2) 261.0 2.4 255.4 (0.5) 111.2 (2.2) 107.9 (7.8) 99.5 (1.9) 98.9 (3.5) 105.9 1.0 103.9 (2.4) 108.9 0.3 107.5 (1.3)
2021Q1 137.2 5.4 133.7 2.4 263.4 3.7 256.3 1.4 112.1 3.3 107.2 (2.6) 99.9 1.5 98.8 (0.3) 107.2 4.9 104.5 2.1 109.4 1.9 107.8 1.0
2021Q2 139.2 5.8 134.9 3.6 268.8 8.4 260.3 6.4 112.5 1.5 106.3 (3.5) 99.3 (2.2) 97.9 (3.6) 108.2 3.7 105.2 2.9 110.6 4.4 108.8 4.1
2021Q3 141.1 5.7 136.5 4.8 273.1 6.6 263.8 5.5 112.7 0.8 105.9 (1.2) 99.8 1.8 98.1 0.8 109.8 6.3 106.8 6.1 111.9 4.5 110.2 4.9
2021Q4 143.6 7.4 138.8 6.9 278.6 8.2 268.6 7.4 113.1 1.5 106.0 0.2 100.0 1.1 98.2 0.4 111.3 5.4 108.1 5.0 114.3 8.9 112.6 9.0
2022Q1 145.6 5.6 140.6 5.3 281.8 4.6 271.3 4.1 113.8 2.6 106.5 2.0 100.3 1.2 98.4 0.6 112.6 4.8 109.4 4.7 115.7 5.1 114.0 5.1
2022Q2 147.1 4.2 142.0 4.2 284.1 3.3 273.6 3.4 114.7 2.9 107.4 3.3 100.5 0.8 98.4 0.3 113.4 2.7 110.1 2.6 118.2 8.9 116.4 9.0
2022Q3 148.3 3.4 143.3 3.5 286.0 2.7 275.4 2.7 115.5 2.9 108.6 4.5 100.7 0.8 98.5 0.3 114.0 2.4 110.6 2.2 119.4 4.1 117.6 4.1
2022Q4 149.5 3.1 144.4 3.2 287.7 2.5 276.9 2.3 116.4 3.1 109.9 5.0 100.9 0.8 98.6 0.4 114.4 1.1 110.9 0.9 120.3 3.3 118.5 3.3
2023Q1 150.6 3.0 145.5 3.1 289.4 2.3 278.3 2.0 117.4 3.5 111.3 5.1 101.1 0.6 98.6 0.2 114.9 1.7 111.3 1.4 121.0 2.2 119.2 2.2
2023Q2 151.7 2.9 146.6 2.9 290.9 2.2 279.6 1.8 118.5 3.7 112.7 5.0 101.2 0.6 98.7 0.1 115.1 1.0 111.4 0.6 121.7 2.2 119.8 2.2
2023Q3 152.8 3.0 147.6 2.9 292.6 2.3 280.8 1.8 119.6 3.8 113.9 4.5 101.4 0.6 98.7 0.1 115.4 1.0 111.6 0.5 122.2 1.9 120.4 1.9
2023Q4 153.9 2.9 148.6 2.8 294.2 2.3 282.0 1.8 120.7 3.7 115.1 4.1 101.5 0.5 98.7 0.1 115.7 1.1 111.7 0.5 122.8 1.9 121.0 1.8
2024Q1 155.0 2.9 149.6 2.8 295.8 2.1 283.3 1.8 121.7 3.5 116.1 3.8 101.6 0.5 98.7 0.1 116.1 1.2 111.9 0.7 123.4 2.0 121.5 1.9
2024Q2 156.1 3.0 150.6 2.7 297.5 2.3 284.5 1.8 122.7 3.3 117.1 3.4 101.8 0.5 98.7 0.1 116.5 1.4 112.1 0.8 124.0 2.0 122.1 1.8
2024Q3 157.2 2.9 151.6 2.6 299.2 2.3 285.7 1.8 123.7 3.3 118.0 3.2 101.9 0.6 98.8 0.0 116.9 1.5 112.4 0.9 124.7 2.1 122.7 1.9
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
2024Q4 158.4 2.9 152.5 2.5 300.9 2.3 287.0 1.8 124.7 3.2 119.0 3.1 102.1 0.6 98.8 (0.0) 117.4 1.6 112.6 1.0 125.3 2.1 123.2 1.9
2025Q1 159.5 2.9 153.5 2.5 302.6 2.3 288.3 1.8 125.7 3.2 119.9 3.0 102.2 0.6 98.7 (0.0) 117.9 1.7 112.9 1.0 126.0 2.1 123.8 1.9
2025Q2 160.6 2.9 154.4 2.5 304.4 2.3 289.7 1.9 126.6 3.1 120.7 3.0 102.3 0.6 98.7 (0.1) 118.4 1.8 113.2 1.1 126.6 2.1 124.4 1.8
2025Q3 161.8 2.9 155.4 2.5 306.2 2.4 291.1 2.0 127.6 3.1 121.6 3.0 102.5 0.6 98.7 (0.1) 119.0 1.9 113.6 1.2 127.3 2.1 124.9 1.8
2025Q4 162.9 2.8 156.4 2.5 307.9 2.4 292.6 2.1 128.6 3.0 122.5 2.9 102.6 0.6 98.7 (0.1) 119.5 1.9 113.9 1.2 127.9 2.0 125.5 1.8
2020 134.1 2.8 133.0 2.0 258.8 1.2 256.3 0.3 111.6 2.5 110.3 1.4 100.0 0.0 99.8 (0.2) 105.9 0.5 105.0 (0.3) 108.8 0.9 108.0 0.2
2021 140.3 4.6 136.0 2.2 271.0 4.7 262.3 2.3 112.6 0.9 106.4 (3.6) 99.8 (0.2) 98.3 (1.5) 109.1 3.1 106.2 1.1 111.6 2.6 109.8 1.7
2022 147.6 5.2 142.6 4.9 284.9 5.1 274.3 4.6 115.1 2.2 108.1 1.6 100.6 0.9 98.5 0.2 113.6 4.1 110.2 3.8 118.4 6.1 116.6 6.2
2023 152.2 3.1 147.1 3.2 291.8 2.4 280.2 2.1 119.0 3.4 113.2 4.8 101.3 0.7 98.7 0.2 115.3 1.5 111.5 1.2 121.9 3.0 120.1 3.0
2024 156.7 2.9 151.1 2.7 298.4 2.3 285.1 1.8 123.2 3.5 117.6 3.8 101.8 0.6 98.7 0.1 116.7 1.2 112.3 0.7 124.4 2.0 122.4 1.9
2025 161.2 2.9 154.9 2.5 305.3 2.3 290.5 1.9 127.1 3.2 121.2 3.1 102.4 0.6 98.7 (0.0) 118.7 1.7 113.4 1.0 126.9 2.1 124.6 1.8
Sources: National statistical agencies, Moody’s Analytics
25
Table 5: Macroeconomic Impact of Government Pandemic Aid in 10 Largest Economies (Cont’d)
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Consumer price index, SA
India France Italy Brazil Canada
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann. Ann.
Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth Index growth
2020Q1 150.0 6.3 149.1 3.9 104.8 0.7 104.9 0.7 103.0 (0.0) 103.0 0.0 5335.0 4.1 5335.5 4.1 137.0 0.2 137.1 0.4
2020Q2 152.2 6.0 150.5 3.9 104.5 (1.3) 104.3 (2.2) 102.8 (0.7) 102.6 (1.6) 5319.3 (1.2) 5323.2 (0.9) 136.0 (2.9) 136.2 (2.6)
2020Q3 154.5 6.2 152.3 4.8 104.8 1.1 103.5 (2.9) 102.5 (1.1) 101.7 (3.4) 5375.0 4.3 5300.1 (1.7) 136.9 2.7 136.6 1.1
2020Q4 157.0 6.8 153.4 3.0 104.7 (0.3) 102.7 (3.1) 102.8 1.3 101.2 (1.7) 5499.4 9.6 5326.0 2.0 138.0 3.2 137.1 1.6
2021Q1 157.7 1.7 152.4 (2.5) 105.6 3.3 103.0 1.2 103.5 2.6 101.0 (0.8) 5608.4 8.2 5381.8 4.3 139.0 3.0 137.8 2.2
2021Q2 160.7 7.8 153.6 3.3 105.9 1.3 103.0 (0.1) 103.9 1.7 100.7 (1.4) 5735.2 9.4 5483.3 7.8 140.4 4.2 139.0 3.4
2021Q3 162.3 4.3 155.0 3.5 106.7 3.1 103.6 2.5 104.7 3.0 100.9 1.0 5893.0 11.5 5602.5 9.0 142.3 5.5 140.4 4.0
2021Q4 164.6 5.7 156.8 4.9 107.6 3.2 104.4 3.2 106.5 6.8 102.3 5.7 6075.9 13.0 5744.1 10.5 144.4 5.8 141.8 4.1
2022Q1 167.4 7.0 159.2 6.2 109.0 5.3 105.8 5.4 107.6 4.2 103.2 3.4 6163.4 5.9 5801.4 4.0 145.7 3.6 142.4 1.7
2022Q2 169.9 6.1 161.3 5.3 109.6 2.4 106.5 2.6 108.1 1.9 103.5 1.2 6223.2 3.9 5844.1 3.0 146.6 2.7 142.6 0.5
2022Q3 172.0 5.0 163.0 4.5 110.0 1.4 106.9 1.4 108.3 0.9 103.6 0.2 6285.5 4.1 5892.0 3.3 147.5 2.4 142.7 0.5
2022Q4 173.9 4.5 164.7 4.1 110.1 0.5 107.0 0.4 108.3 0.1 103.4 (0.6) 6348.9 4.1 5938.3 3.2 148.3 2.2 143.0 0.6
2023Q1 175.8 4.5 166.4 4.2 110.6 1.6 107.3 1.3 108.7 1.1 103.5 0.3 6413.1 4.1 5984.7 3.2 149.1 2.1 143.3 0.9
2023Q2 177.7 4.5 168.2 4.2 110.8 0.8 107.4 0.5 108.8 0.5 103.4 (0.4) 6478.5 4.1 6032.5 3.2 149.9 2.0 143.6 1.0
2023Q3 179.5 4.0 169.7 3.8 111.1 1.0 107.6 0.4 108.9 0.6 103.3 (0.5) 6544.6 4.1 6079.4 3.1 150.6 2.0 144.0 1.1
2023Q4 181.3 4.1 171.3 3.7 111.4 1.1 107.7 0.5 109.2 0.8 103.2 (0.3) 6611.3 4.1 6126.4 3.1 151.5 2.3 144.5 1.4
2024Q1 183.2 4.3 172.9 3.9 111.7 1.3 107.9 0.7 109.4 1.0 103.1 (0.1) 6678.7 4.1 6174.9 3.2 152.4 2.4 145.1 1.6
2024Q2 185.2 4.4 174.7 4.1 112.2 1.6 108.1 0.8 109.7 1.2 103.1 0.0 6746.9 4.1 6223.4 3.2 153.3 2.4 145.6 1.5
2024Q3 187.2 4.5 176.4 4.1 112.6 1.7 108.4 0.9 110.1 1.4 103.2 0.2 6815.7 4.1 6273.2 3.2 154.2 2.4 146.2 1.5
Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic
2024Q4 188.9 3.7 177.9 3.3 113.2 1.9 108.7 1.1 110.6 1.6 103.3 0.3 6884.5 4.1 6323.7 3.3 155.2 2.5 146.7 1.6
2025Q1 190.7 3.7 179.3 3.2 113.7 2.0 109.0 1.2 111.0 1.7 103.4 0.4 6954.1 4.1 6375.0 3.3 156.1 2.4 147.3 1.5
2025Q2 192.4 3.7 180.7 3.2 114.3 2.0 109.3 1.3 111.5 1.8 103.5 0.6 7024.3 4.1 6427.9 3.4 157.0 2.4 147.9 1.5
2025Q3 194.1 3.7 182.1 3.1 114.9 2.1 109.7 1.4 112.1 1.9 103.7 0.7 7094.5 4.1 6482.1 3.4 158.0 2.4 148.4 1.6
2025Q4 195.9 3.6 183.5 3.1 115.5 2.1 110.1 1.4 112.6 2.0 103.9 0.8 7165.5 4.1 6538.4 3.5 158.9 2.4 149.0 1.6
2020 153.4 6.6 151.3 5.1 104.7 0.5 103.8 (0.4) 102.8 (0.1) 102.1 (0.8) 5382.2 3.2 5321.2 2.1 137.0 0.7 136.7 0.5
2021 161.3 5.2 154.5 2.1 106.5 1.7 103.5 (0.3) 104.7 1.8 101.2 (0.8) 5828.2 8.3 5552.9 4.4 141.5 3.3 139.7 2.2
2022 170.8 5.9 162.1 4.9 109.7 3.0 106.5 2.9 108.1 3.3 103.4 2.1 6255.3 7.3 5868.9 5.7 147.0 3.9 142.7 2.1
2023 178.6 4.6 168.9 4.2 111.0 1.2 107.5 0.9 108.9 0.7 103.3 (0.1) 6511.8 4.1 6055.7 3.2 150.3 2.2 143.8 0.8
2024 186.1 4.2 175.5 3.9 112.4 1.3 108.3 0.7 110.0 1.0 103.2 (0.1) 6781.5 4.1 6248.8 3.2 153.8 2.3 145.9 1.4
2025 193.3 3.8 181.4 3.4 114.6 1.9 109.5 1.2 111.8 1.7 103.6 0.4 7059.6 4.1 6455.8 3.3 157.5 2.4 148.1 1.5
Sources: National statistical agencies, Moody’s Analytics
26
About the Authors
Bernard Yaros is an assistant director and economist at Moody’s Analytics focused primarily on federal fiscal policy.
He is responsible for maintaining the Moody’s Analytics forecast models for federal government fiscal conditions and
presidential elections, as well as providing real-time economic analysis on fiscal policy developments coming out of
Capitol Hill. Besides fiscal policy, Bernard covers the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico and develops forecasts for
Switzerland.
Bernard holds an MSc in international trade, finance and development from the Barcelona Graduate School of Eco-
nomics and a BA in political economy from Williams College.
Jesse Rogers is an economist at Moody’s Analytics covering Latin America and Emerging Asia. His research spans trade
policy, international capital flows, commodity markets, and economic development. Jesse holds a master’s degree
in economics and international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. While
completing his degree, he interned with the U.S. Treasury and Institute of International Finance. Previously, he was a
finance and politics reporter for El Diario New York and worked in Mexico City for the Center for Research and Teach-
ing in economics (CIDE). He received his bachelor’s degree in Hispanic studies at the University of Pennsylvania.
Ross Cioffi is an associate economist at the Moody’s Analytics Prague office. He is responsible for forecasting and
providing research and analysis on key European economies. Ross holds a master’s degree in international economics
from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He also has a master’s degree in international rela-
tions from the University of Bologna. Prior to joining Moody’s Analytics, Ross was a research assistant in the Economic
Research Department of the Central Bank of Luxembourg.
Mark Zandi is chief economist of Moody’s Analytics, where he directs economic research. Moody’s Analytics, a subsid-
iary of Moody’s Corp., is a leading provider of economic research, data and analytical tools. Dr. Zandi is a cofounder of
Economy.com, which Moody’s purchased in 2005.
Dr. Zandi’s broad research interests encompass macroeconomics, financial markets and public policy. His recent
research has focused on mortgage finance reform and the determinants of mortgage foreclosure and personal
bankruptcy. He has analyzed the economic impact of various tax and government spending policies and assessed the
appropriate monetary policy response to bubbles in asset markets.
A trusted adviser to policymakers and an influential source of economic analysis for businesses, journalists and the
public, Dr. Zandi frequently testifies before Congress on topics including the economic outlook, the nation’s daunting
fiscal challenges, the merits of fiscal stimulus, financial regulatory reform, and foreclosure mitigation.
Dr. Zandi conducts regular briefings on the economy for corporate boards, trade associations and policymakers at
all levels. He is on the board of directors of MGIC, the nation’s largest private mortgage insurance company, and The
Reinvestment Fund, a large CDFI that makes investments in disadvantaged neighborhoods. He is often quoted in
national and global publications and interviewed by major news media outlets, and is a frequent guest on CNBC, NPR,
Meet the Press, CNN, and various other national networks and news programs.
Dr. Zandi is the author of Paying the Price: Ending the Great Recession and Beginning a New American Century, which
provides an assessment of the monetary and fiscal policy response to the Great Recession. His other book, Financial
Shock: A 360º Look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion, and How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis, is described by The
New York Times as the “clearest guide” to the financial crisis.
Dr. Zandi earned his BS from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and his PhD at the University of
Pennsylvania. He lives with his wife and three children in the suburbs of Philadelphia.
MOODY’S ANALYTICS Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic 27
About Moody’s Analytics
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