Memorandum Opinion — No. 2:21-cr-00389 (Dkt. 84, W.D. Pa.)

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A Memorandum Opinion, Document 84, filed October 10, 2024 in United States v. Devon White, Criminal No. 21-389 (Case 2:21-cr-00389-JFC), in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, signed by Joy Flowers Conti, Senior United States District Judge. The defendant, who pleaded guilty on September 23, 2021 to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced on March 4, 2022 to 1 year and 1 day followed by 3 years of supervised release, filed a pro se motion for early termination of supervised release (ECF No. 80). The court denies the motion for lack of jurisdiction, because jurisdiction over his supervision was transferred to the Southern District of Texas, without prejudice to filing a motion there.

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Case 2:21-cr-00389-JFC Document 84 Filed 10/10/24 Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

United States of America, )
)
v. ) Criminal No. 21-389
)
DEVON WHITE, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Pending before the court is a pro se motion for early termination of supervised release 1

filed by defendant Devon White (“White”) (ECF No. 80). White argues that his term of

supervised release should be terminated because he: (1) complied with his conditions of release,

including negative drug tests; (2) actively participated in community activities, tried to be a good

influence and is committed to his rehabilitation; (3) is genuinely remorseful; and (4) is finding it

difficult to find a job in the medical field.

The government filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 83), contending that early

termination of White’s term of supervised release is not in the interest of justice or warranted by

the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). White’s motion for early termination of supervised

release is fully briefed.

II. Procedural History

On September 23, 2021, White pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute a quantity of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine in

1
White captioned his motion as one for early termination of “probation,” but it is clear that he is now
serving a 3-year term of supervised release after completing the term of imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day
imposed on March 4, 2022 (Judgment, ECF No. 72).
Case 2:21-cr-00389-JFC Document 84 Filed 10/10/24 Page 2 of 5

January 2021, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 846. White’s advisory

guideline range of imprisonment was 30-37 months. On March 4, 2022, this court sentenced White

to a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day, followed by a term of supervised release of 3 years.

The prison term represented a substantial downward variance from the guideline range. The term

of supervised release of 3 years was the statutory mandatory minimum pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(C). White has completed roughly half his term of supervised release, which expires on

December 29, 2025.

White was released from prison in December 2022. Jurisdiction over his supervised

release was transferred from this court to the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Texas (“Southern District of Texas”) on October 31, 2023 (ECF No. 78). On

November 17, 2023, the Southern District of Texas accepted and assumed jurisdiction over

White (ECF No. 79). The transfer order provided, in relevant part: “This Court hereby

expressly consents that the period of probation or supervised release may be changed by the

District Court to which this transfer is made without further inquiry of this Court.” (ECF No.

79).

III. Jurisdiction

The court must first determine, sua sponte, whether the motion for early termination of

supervision is properly before this court. There was an actual transfer of jurisdiction over

White’s supervised release in this case, which was accepted by the Southern District of Texas

(ECF Nos. 78, 79). See United States v. Johnson, 861 F.3d 474, 480 n. 18 (3d Cir. 2017)

(explaining the distinctions between “courtesy supervision”; longer-term “transfer of

supervision” without transfer of jurisdiction; and official transfer and acceptance of jurisdiction).

2
Case 2:21-cr-00389-JFC Document 84 Filed 10/10/24 Page 3 of 5

The government, in its response to White’s motion, did not contest this court’s exercise of

jurisdiction.

The transfer of jurisdiction over White’s supervised release was made pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3605. That statute provides, in relevant part: “A court to which jurisdiction is

transferred under this section is authorized to exercise all powers over the probationer or releasee

that are permitted by this subchapter or subchapter B or D of chapter 227.” Motions for early

termination of supervised release are analyzed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which is in

chapter 227, subchapter D.

In United States v. Adams, 723 F.3d 687, 689 (6th Cir. 2013), the court explained that §

3605 “was intended to permit the transferee court ‘to exercise all the powers over the ... releasee

that are permitted’ by the statutes dealing with supervised releasees.” Id. at 689 (citing United

States v. Fernandez, 379 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98–225, at 132

(1984)). The court concluded that transferee courts possess “power to terminate or reduce the

conditions of supervised release.” Id. The Southern District of Texas, therefore, has jurisdiction

to consider White’s request for early termination of his supervised release pursuant to § 3605.

The court concludes that this court no longer has jurisdiction over White’s request. In

United States v. Goddard, No. CR 5:07-134-DCR, 2021 WL 4189606 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 14, 2021),

the court explained: “Once the transfer is effected, the transferor court no longer has jurisdiction

to exercise the powers that may be exercised by the transferee court.” Id. at *1 (quoting United

States v. El Herman, 971 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 2020)). The court held in Goddard that the

defendant was required to seek early termination of his supervised release from the court to

which supervision was transferred.

3
Case 2:21-cr-00389-JFC Document 84 Filed 10/10/24 Page 4 of 5

In El Herman (holding that a First Step Act motion must be resolved by the transferee

court), the court explained:

That the First Step Act gives “[a] court that imposed a sentence” authority to reduce
a sentence does not mean that only that court may exercise the authority. If that
were so, then the transfer authority of § 3605 would be largely a nullity. The powers
granted to a transferee court by § 3605 are powers granted by other statutes to a
court that imposes sentence. The powers in subchapter B and D of chapter 227—
such as the power to modify, reduce, or enlarge conditions of probation or
supervised release, and to revoke a term of probation or supervised release, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3563(c), 3565, 3583(e)(2), (3)—are granted to “the court.” This term,
using the definite article, consistently refers back within those subchapters to “the
court” that imposed a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3562(a), 3582(a), 3583(a). Yet
when a sentencing court transfers jurisdiction over a person on probation or
supervised release, the transferee court assumes the powers that subchapters
B and D give to the court that imposed sentence. A transferee court likewise may
exercise power that the First Step Act grants to a court that imposed sentence,
because that power is subject to transfer under § 3605.

971 F.3d at 786 (emphasis added).

This court, in its independent research, did not locate any decisions of courts within the

Third Circuit interpreting § 3605 under these precise circumstances. In United States v. Kaetz,

No. 24-1605, 2024 WL 3717090, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 2024), the transferee court did not accept

jurisdiction. In United States v. Gatling, No. 23-1112, 2023 WL 6617936, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 11,

2023), defendant challenged his conviction and sentence, which occurred before the case was

transferred. In United States v. Jones, 628 F. App'x 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2015), the court affirmed

that the transferee court had jurisdiction under § 3605 to revoke the defendant’s supervised

release, even though the transfer occurred after the violations.

In United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49 (3d Cir. 2020), the court stated: “[g]enerally,

early termination of supervised release under § 3583(e)(1) will be proper only when the

sentencing judge is satisfied that new or unforeseen circumstances warrant it.” Id. at 53 (bold

added, punctuation omitted). Melvin did not, however, involve a defendant whose supervision

4
Case 2:21-cr-00389-JFC Document 84 Filed 10/10/24 Page 5 of 5

had been transferred to another jurisdiction. This court is persuaded by the analysis in El

Herman that the powers of the sentencing court are transferred pursuant to § 3605. In this case,

jurisdiction to consider White’s motion for early termination of supervised release was

transferred to the Southern District of Texas.

IV. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, the court will deny the motion for early termination of

supervised release (ECF No. 2) for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice for White to file an

appropriate motion in the Southern District of Texas.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: October 10, 2024 BY THE COURT:

/s/ JOY FLOWERS CONTI
Joy Flowers Conti
Senior United States District Judge

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