Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court — United States v. Samson A. Raji, No. 14-po-650 (Dkt. 41, D. Md.)
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U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas M. DiGirolamo of the District of Maryland dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the third pro se petition by Samson A. Raji to expunge criminal convictions, in a memorandum opinion and order dated May 29, 2019 (Case No. 14-po-650). With no statute providing for expungement in such a case, the order says the only possible basis is ancillary jurisdiction. Relying on United States v. Wahi (7th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Mettetal (4th Cir. 2017), it finds neither ground applies: a request for equitable expungement turns on facts arising after the case is over, and the power to expunge is not needed for the court to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority or effectuate its decrees. The order quotes Wahi that ancillary jurisdiction does not include a general equitable power to expunge judicial records in a criminal case. The court ruled without a hearing.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *
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* Case No. 14-po-650
v. *
*
*
SAMSON A. RAJI, *
*
*
Defendant *
************
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s third pro se petition to expunge his
criminal convictions. ECF No. 40. No hearing is necessary. L.R. 105.6. Because there is no
applicable statute providing for expungement in a case such as this one, the only available
jurisdictional basis is the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. United States v. McKnight, 33 F.
Supp. 3d 577, 580 (D. Md. 2014). “The term ‘ancillary jurisdiction’ refers to the court’s power
to hear claims that are closely linked to other claims over which the court’s jurisdiction is
otherwise secure.” United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 2017). “‘Ancillary’
jurisdiction applies to related proceedings that are technically separate from the initial case that
invoked federal subject-matter jurisdiction.” United States v. Mettetal, 714 F. App’x 230, 233
n.1 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2014)).
[F]ederal courts generally may invoke the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in two
circumstances: (1) where necessary to permit disposition by a single court of
claims that are factually interdependent; and (2) “to enable a court to function
successfully, that is, to manage its proceeding, vindicate its authority, and
effectuate its decrees.”
McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 580 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 379-80 (1994)); see Mettetal, 714 F. App’x at 234.
Neither circumstance applies to petitions for equitable expungement, however. Mettetal,
714 F. App’x at 235. First, “a request for equitable expungement is not factually dependent on
the underlying criminal case in any sense that matters. Instead, it will always turn on facts
collateral to or arising after the case is over—in short, matters external to the criminal case
itself.” Wahi, 850 F.3d at 302. Thus, the facts underlying Defendant’s convictions are not
interdependent with any equitable circumstances that he may claim justify expungement. See
Mettetal, 714 F. App’x at 235 (“Here, the reasons Mettetal gives to support his petition for
equitable expungement [of his criminal record of his arrest and overturned convictions] are that
he has not run afoul of the law since he was arrested in 1995 and that his criminal record has had
adverse professional and personal consequences. These matters, however, arose after he was
arrested and involve facts quite separate and distinct from the criminal proceedings themselves.
As such, Mettetal’s petition is not ‘interdependent’ with anything that was properly before the
federal court. It therefore ‘requires its own basis for jurisdiction.’” (quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S.
at 378)); Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2016).
Second, “the power to expunge judicial records on equitable grounds is not incidental to
the court’s ability to function successfully as a court. Equitable expungement is not needed to
enable the court to ‘manage its proceedings’ for the simple reason that the criminal proceedings
are over.” Wahi, 850 F.3d at 302 (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380). “Nor is expungement
authority needed to enable the court to ‘vindicate its authority’ or ‘effectuate its decrees.’” Id.
(citing same). Moreover, “[e]quitable considerations which arise after the termination of court
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proceedings do not operate to vitiate decrees that went into effect years earlier.” Mettetal, 714 F.
App’x at 235; see Doe, 833 F.3d at 198. Thus, Kokkonen’s second prong is not satisfied.
In short, “ancillary jurisdiction does not include a general equitable power to expunge
judicial records in a criminal case.” Wahi, 850 F.3d at 302-03; see Mettetal, 714 F. App’x at
235. Defendant’s third pro se petition to expunge his criminal convictions is, therefore,
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Date: May 29, 2019 /s/
Thomas M. DiGirolamo
United States Magistrate Judge
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