Memorandum Opinion and Order — No. 5:24-cr-00022 (Dkt. 46, E.D. Ky.)

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A Memorandum Opinion and Order, Doc #: 46, filed August 8, 2024 in United States v. Vonnie J. McDaniels, Criminal Action No. 5: 24-022-DCR (Case: 5:24-cr-00022-DCR-MAS), in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division (at Lexington). The defendant moved for leave to file a pretrial defensive motion, on vindictive prosecution, outside the deadline set by the court's Pretrial and Discovery Order, which gave him until April 25, 2024 after his March 26, 2024 arraignment. The court denies the motion [Record No. 45], concluding that he failed to demonstrate good cause for the untimely filing.

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Case: 5:24-cr-00022-DCR-MAS Doc #: 46 Filed: 08/08/24 Page: 1 of 4 - Page ID#: 286

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Criminal Action No. 5: 24-022-DCR
)
V. )
)
VONNIE J. MCDANIELS, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
) AND ORDER
Defendant. )

*** *** *** ***

Defendant Vonnie J. McDaniels has moved for leave of the Court to file a pretrial

defensive motion outside the deadline established by the Court’s Pretrial and Discovery Order.

[See Record No. 45; see also Record No. 16, ¶ 4.] Having failed to demonstrate the requisite

good cause, McDaniels’ motion will be denied.

Per this Court’s Pretrial and Discovery Order, defensive motions “must be filed within

thirty days after arraignment . . . or within fifteen days of [a] subsequent arraignment” on a

superseding indictment. [Record No. 16, ¶ 4] McDaniels was arraigned in the instant matter

on March 26, 2024—giving him until April 25, 2024, to file any defensive motions. [Record

No. 13] More than two months after the deadline had passed, McDaniels submitted a letter to

the Court requesting permission to proceed pro se due to dissatisfaction with his CJA-

appointed counsel. [Record No. 38] In relevant part, his letter noted that counsel “declined to

file several pretrial motions” and maintained her position despite McDaniels’ repeated requests

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for her to reconsider. One of the defensive motions McDaniels highlights in his letter

addresses vindictive prosecution—the defense he seeks to raise through the instant motion.

A Motion Hearing to address McDaniels’ request to proceed pro se was held on July 3,

2024, before Magistrate Judge Matthew A. Stinnett. [Record No. 43] At the hearing,

McDaniels elected not to proceed pro se and instead sought new counsel. After concluding

that there had been “a complete breakdown of trust and communication” between McDaniels

and his attorney, Magistrate Judge Stinnett granted McDaniels’ request for new counsel. [Id.]

McDaniels’ new counsel filed the instant motion on August 2, 2024—thirty days after being

appointed to represent McDaniels and almost one hundred days after the Court’s deadline for

filing defensive motions had passed. [Record No. 45]

II.

A defendant who seeks to raise vindictive prosecution as a defense or objection in a

criminal prosecution must do so through a pretrial motion. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(iv).

The deadline for filing such a pretrial motion may be set by the Court at or following the

defendant’s arraignment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). Failing to meet the Court’s deadline

renders the motion untimely. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3); see Local Rule 47.1 (noting that

“motions must be filed within the time period ordered by the Court”) (emphasis added).

Nevertheless, a court may consider an untimely motion upon a showing of good cause. 1 Fed.

R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).

1
“The party seeking relief must show ‘good cause’ for failure to raise a claim by the
deadline, a flexible standard that requires consideration of all interests in the particular case.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment.

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Case: 5:24-cr-00022-DCR-MAS Doc #: 46 Filed: 08/08/24 Page: 3 of 4 - Page ID#: 288

In McDaniels’ letter requesting to proceed pro se, he indicates that his counsel at that

time “declined to file several pretrial motions” that McDaniels believes “are crucial for [his]

defense strategy.” [Record No. 38] He further asserts that “[d]espite [his] repeated requests

and attempts to discuss these motions with [counsel], she [] maintained her position.” [Id.]

This statement highlights the fact that McDaniels’ prior counsel was mindful of a potential

vindictive prosecution defense and opted not to pursue it. “Trial management is the lawyer’s

province: Counsel provides his or her assistance by making decisions such as ‘what arguments

to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the

admission of evidence.’” McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 422 (2018) (quoting Gonzalez

v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248 (2008)).

McDaniels’ motion for leave is premised on the claim that the appointment of new

counsel constitutes good cause for extending the deadline for pretrial motions. [See Record

No. 45.] While that may prove true in some instances, it is not a default justification for

extending deadlines. Demonstrating good cause requires “an explanation for both the delay

and the potential prejudice.” United States v. Trujillo-Molina, 678 F. App’x 335, 338 (6th Cir.

Feb. 2, 2017). In this instance, missing the defensive motions deadline was neither an accident

nor the result of subsequent case development. Rather, it was an intentional decision made by

McDaniels’ prior counsel. It is well-established that strategic decisions made by counsel are

afforded the presumption of “sound trial strategy,” Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101

(1955), and “are virtually unchallengeable” when made on an informed basis, Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).

The Sixth Circuit has held that “good cause to excuse non-compliance with a court-

ordered deadline is absent if the failure to timely file resulted from the lawyer’s decision not
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to file a pretrial motion before the deadline.” United States v. Gulley, 780 F. App’x 275, 283

(6th Cir. July 11, 2019) (citing United States v. Turner, 602 F.3d 778, 787 (6th Cir. 2010)).

Inviting McDaniels’ new counsel to revisit and indirectly challenge the strategic decisions

made by competent prior counsel without offering a substantial justification for doing so would

be improper. See United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 591 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that “trial

tactics and strategy . . . should not be subjected to second guessing and hindsight”).

Having failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of good cause, the Court need not

explore the potential prejudice faced by the United States if McDaniels’ untimely motion were

to be accepted. Similarly, the Court does not reach any conclusions respecting the attached

Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.

III.

Based on the foregoing analysis, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant McDaniels’ Motion for Leave to File Pretrial Defensive

Motion [Record No. 45] is DENIED.

Dated: August 8, 2024.

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