Memorandum and Order, U.S. v. Terrell Alexander, No. 4:22-cr-00169, Dkt. 130 (E.D. Mo.)
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A Memorandum and Order in United States of America v. Terrell Alexander, No. 4:22-CR-00169-JAR-1, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Document 130, denying five motions by self-represented Defendant Terrell Alexander that challenge the financial parts of the sentence. It recounts that Alexander pled guilty in November 2022 to 18 counts of a 23-count indictment tied to fraudulent business loans through the Small Business Administration, and was sentenced to 65 months in prison, later reduced to 57 months, with restitution of $511,600. The court rejects the claim that Ellingburg v. United States makes the restitution order unconstitutional, and denies the stay motions as moot. It also refuses an accounting and refund of $216,066.31 seized beyond the restitution, finding that forfeiture and restitution are separate remedies and the balance remains forfeited.
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“Memorandum and Order, U.S. v. Terrell Alexander, No. 4:22-cr-00169, Dkt. 130 (E.D. Mo.).”
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Case: 4:22-cr-00169-JAR Doc. #: 130 Filed: 03/26/26 Page: 1 of 5 PageID #:
562
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:22-CR-00169-JAR-1
)
TERRELL ALEXANDER, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on five related motions filed by self-represented
Defendant Terrell Alexander challenging the financial components of his sentence. For the
reasons set forth below, the motions will be denied.
Background
In November 2022, Defendant Alexander pled guilty to 18 counts of a 23-count
indictment on charges of wire fraud, identity theft, unlawful transfer of identification documents,
and theft of government property in connection with multiple fraudulent business loans he
obtained through the Small Business Administration during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. 30).
In March 2023, the Court sentenced Alexander to a total of 65 months in prison,1 followed by
five years of supervised release. (Doc. 48). The Court also imposed restitution of $511,600 plus a
special assessment of $1,800. In September 2023, the Court entered an order of forfeiture
identifying 24 bank accounts holding $725,836.82 and a cryptocurrency account of unspecified
value. (Doc. 61). The record reflects that those assets, ultimately totaling $729,466.31, were
1
In August 2024, the Court reduced Alexander’s sentence to 57 months pursuant to Amendment
821 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. (Doc. 97). According to the Bureau of Prisons inmate locator,
Alexander’s projected release date is August 2, 2026.
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disposed on October 13, 2023, to be held pending restitution. (Doc. 64-88).2
In February and March 2026, Alexander filed the instant motions and related
supplements seeking to (1) vacate the Court’s restitution order as unconstitutional (Doc. 116,
124); (2) stay enforcement of the order pending a ruling on the merits (Doc. 115, 123); and (3)
review the Government’s accounting records for overpayment (Doc. 118, 120, 128). The
Government timely filed a response addressing all five motions. (Doc. 127).
Restitution Order
In the principal motion, Alexander contends that the Court’s restitution order is
unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ellingburg v. United States,
146 S. Ct. 564 (2026), holding that restitution constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Alexander asserts that Ellingburg overturned decades of precedent
treating restitution as a civil remedy such that now the factual basis for restitution must satisfy
Sixth Amendment requirements. Specifically, facts supporting a criminal penalty must be
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490 (2000).
As a preliminary matter, post-judgment motions seeking to vacate a sentence cannot be
brought in a closed criminal case but instead must be brought in a separate civil action under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Mills, No. 4:04-CR-00060-SEP, 2025 WL 2417739, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 21, 2025). Alexander’s motions fail on that basis alone.
Even entertaining the merits, in the short time since Ellingburg was decided, another
district court has rejected Alexander’s theory, reasoning that Apprendi applies to “determinate”
2
The Court notes a typographical discrepancy regarding the Electro Savings account ending in
5206. The forfeiture order reflects a value of $20,506.23 (Doc. 61 at 3 ¶ w), but the Marshals’ return
reflects a value of $20,806.23 (Doc. 66). This discrepancy is immaterial to the Court’s disposition here.
2
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punishment (i.e., having discernable limits) but not to restitution, which has no statutory
maximum. United States v. Zafaranchi, 2026 WL 658435, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2026).
This Court agrees. “The ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (italics added). Eighth Circuit
precedent instructs that Apprendi and Blakely don’t prohibit judicial fact-finding for restitution
orders (as opposed to prison sentences) because there is no statutory maximum for restitution.
United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, Alexander admitted in his plea agreement that he unlawfully collected over
$740,000 through his criminal conduct. (Doc. 30 at 8). The presentencing investigation report
(PSR) itemized ten fraudulent loan applications totaling roughly $1 million, with disbursements
of $511,600, the amount of the restitution order. (Doc. 37 at 10). Alexander accepted the factual
representations set forth in the PSR, explicitly confirming that he had no objections. (Doc. 45).
Thus, even if Apprendi and Blakely did apply to restitution (which they don’t), Alexander still
wouldn’t be entitled to relief here because he admitted the facts supporting the Court’s restitution
order. “[T]he Sixth Amendment was not written for the benefit of those who choose to forgo its
protection.” Blakely 542 U.S. at 312.
For the foregoing reasons, Alexander’s motions to vacate the Court’s restitution order
will be denied, and his corresponding motions to stay enforcement will be denied as moot.
Forfeiture Order
In two other motions, Alexander notes that the total value of funds seized by the
Government ($729,466.31) exceeds the amount he owed for restitution and the special
assessment ($511.600 + $1,800 = $513,400). Alexander asks the Court to order a financial
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accounting and a refund of the surplus seized ($216,066.31). The Government confirms that
Alexander has paid the money judgment and has a $0 balance, but it fails to address Alexander’s
real inquiry.
Alexander mistakenly believes that he is entitled to recover the $216,066.31 seized in
excess of his restitution obligation because he conflates forfeiture and restitution. They are
separate remedies. Restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A,
aims to compensate victims in the full amount of their losses. United States v. Luna, 968 F.3d
922, 931 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A)). By contrast, forfeiture is intended to
dispossess a defendant of all proceeds obtained as a result of the offense. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 982). Pursuant to section 8(f) of the plea agreement, Alexander agreed to pay full restitution to
the victims of his offenses. (Doc. 30 at 15.) Pursuant to section 8(g), he forfeited all right, title,
and interest in seized assets. (Id.) Section 8(g) specifically contemplates a forfeiture judgment of
approximately $740,000, to be determined at the time of sentencing. (Id. at 16). The Court’s
subsequent forfeiture order applied to all 25 accounts containing proceeds obtained as a result of
the offenses. (Doc. 61). Alexander’s restitution obligation was satisfied from those funds, but the
balance remains forfeited.
For these reasons, Alexanders motions seeking an accounting and refund will be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motions to vacate the Court’s restitution
order are DENIED. (Doc. 116, 124).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motions to stay enforcement of the
Court’s restitution order pending a ruling on the merits of his motion to vacate are DENIED as
moot. (Doc. 115, 123).
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IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for review and modification of the
restitution order is DENIED. (Doc. 118).
Dated this 26th day of March 2025.
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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