Memorandum and Order — No. 4:21-cr-00532 (Dkt. 588, E.D. Mo.)

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A Memorandum and Order, Doc. #: 588, filed September 15, 2025 in United States v. Christopher Carroll, et al., Case No. 4:21-cr-00532-SEP, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, signed by United States District Judge Sarah E. Pitlyk. The court denies Christopher and Kimberly Carroll's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and Approval of Supersedeas Bond/Security in the Form of the Property at Issue, Doc. [586]. It applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 and states that greater security than the property itself, such as a bond based on a well-substantiated estimate of the likely sale proceeds plus expenses and interest, would be needed to warrant a stay.

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Case: 4:21-cr-00532-SEP Doc. #: 588 Filed: 09/15/25 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #:
7742

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) Case No. 4:21-cr-00532-SEP
)
CHRISTOPHER CARROLL, et al., )
)
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
After careful consideration of both parties’ briefing, the Court denies Christopher and
Kimberly Carroll’s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and Approval of Supersedeas Bond/Security
in the Form of the Property at Issue, Doc. [586].
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were revised in 2018 to make explicit the
opportunity to “obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b)
(emphasis added), such a stay only “takes effect when the court approves the bond or other
security,” id., and “[a]ny other form of security . . . must also provide ‘sufficient protection for
the judgment creditor.’” United States v. I-44 Truck Ctr. & Wrecker Serv., LLC, 2025 WL
1489488, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 23, 2025) (quoting State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sigismondi
Foreign Car Specialists, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 3d 328, 330 (E.D. Pa. 2022). 1 The Court does not

1
The parties dispute whether the Court should consider the Carrolls’ request under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 62 or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 38. Unfortunately, neither party produces any
decisive legal authority on that question. There is substantial persuasive authority favoring the treatment
of the Government’s writ of execution as a civil procedure, even within the context of a criminal case.
See, e.g., United States v. Behrens, 656 F. App'x 789, 790 (8th Cir. 2016) (unpublished per curiam)
(upholding denial of appointment of counsel for garnishment proceedings) (citing United States v. Cohan,
798 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2015) (“a writ of garnishment hearing is a civil proceeding collateral to the
underlying criminal conviction”)); United States v. Lee, 504 F. App'x 505, 506–07 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“garnishment proceedings remain a civil matter, even when brought under a criminal case number”)
(citing United States v. Lee, 659 F.3d 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2011)). And the Government offers no
authority for its argument that the Court should treat the Carrolls’ motion to quash a writ of execution
against a specific piece of property as an untimely challenge to the Court’s sentencing order. See Doc.
[587] at 2-3. The Court therefore elects to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 but hastens to note—
as the Government concedes, id. at 4-5—that it appears to have discretion to grant or deny the requested
stay under either rule. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 38(e)(1) (allowing district court to “stay—on any terms
considered appropriate—any sentence providing for restitution . . .”).

1
Case: 4:21-cr-00532-SEP Doc. #: 588 Filed: 09/15/25 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #:
7743

agree with the Government that only a bond in the amount of the entire restitution amount—a far
greater amount than the Government has ever expressed any expectation of earning from the sale
of the property at issue—would suffice to secure its interest in executing the writ. But the Court
also cannot accept the Carrolls’ argument that the mere existence of the property justifies a
finding that their “ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond would be a waste
of money,” Doc. [586] at 6 (paraphrasing Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 296 F.3d 13, 17 (1st
Cir. 2002)), and that the property itself is sufficient security to protect the Government’s interest
in executing the writ. Greater security than that offered in the Carrolls’ motion—for example, a
bond in the amount of a well-substantiated estimate of the likely proceeds from the sale of the
property, plus expenses and interest—would be necessary to warrant a stay of the Court’s denial
of the motion to quash in this matter, even under Rule 62(b). See, e.g., United States v. Peters,
2014 WL 4979287 at *3 (E.D.Mo. Oct. 6, 2014); United States v. I-44 Truck Ctr. & Wrecker
Serv., LLC, 2025 WL 1489488, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 23, 2025).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Christopher and Kimberly Carroll’s Motion for Stay
Pending Appeal and Approval of Supersedeas Bond/Security in the Form of the Property at
Issue, Doc. [586], is DENIED.

Dated this 15th day of September, 2025.

SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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