Memorandum and Order — No. 4:21-cr-00532 (Dkt. 301, E.D. Mo.)

Summary

A Memorandum and Order, Doc. #: 301, filed July 29, 2024 in United States v. Christopher Lee Carroll, et al., Case No. 4:21-cr-00532-SEP, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, signed by United States District Judge Sarah E. Pitlyk. The defendants moved to dismiss Counts 13-34 of the superseding indictment, which charge a conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act and tampering with Clean Air Act monitoring devices, arguing that Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo released the court from deferring to the EPA's interpretation of the statute. The court denies the motion as untimely without good cause.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Full text

 Case: 4:21-cr-00532-SEP           Doc. #: 301 Filed: 07/29/24           Page: 1 of 4 PageID #:
                                             2823



                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
                                  EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         )
                                                  )
       Plaintiff,                                 )
v.                                                )   Case No. 4:21-cr-00532-SEP
                                                  )
CHRISTOPHER LEE CARROLL, et al.,                  )
                                                  )
       Defendants.                                )
                                MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
       Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts 13-34 of the superseding
indictment, Doc. [290]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
                                      FACTS AND BACKGROUND
       A grand jury indicted Defendants on one count of Conspiracy to Violate the Clean Air
Act (Count 13) and 21 counts of Tampering with Clean Air Act Monitoring Device (Counts
14-34). See Doc. [162]. Defendants now move to dismiss the “EPA counts in the Superseding
Indictment” because it charges “criminal offenses under the Clean Air Act which are not in fact
criminal offenses.” Doc. [290] at 1, 6. Defendants argue that the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024)—which overruled
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)—
released the Court of its obligation to defer to the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act.
And they argue that, unbound by Loper Bright, the Court is “free to interpret [the Clean Air Act]
according to [its] plain meaning” and find that the charged offenses are civil, not criminal. Doc.
[290] at 1. The United States disagrees with Defendants’ interpretation of the Clean Air Act and
argues that the motion is untimely.
                                        LEGAL STANDARD
       Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) distinguishes between pretrial motions that
may be made at any time and those that must be made before trial. “A motion that the court
lacks jurisdiction may be made at any time while the case is pending.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2).
But a motion based on “a defect in the indictment or information, including . . . failure to state an
offense,” “must be raised by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably
available.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). “The court may, at the arraignment or as soon afterward


                                                  1
 Case: 4:21-cr-00532-SEP             Doc. #: 301 Filed: 07/29/24           Page: 2 of 4 PageID #:
                                               2824



as practicable, set a deadline for the parties to make pretrial motions . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(c)(1). “If a party does not meet the deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the motion is
untimely. But a court may consider the defense, objection, or request if the party shows good
cause.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).
                                              DISCUSSION
          Defendants’ motion is untimely without good cause; therefore, it is denied.
          Jurisdiction is “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). “[D]efects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to
adjudicate a case.” Id. And “[t]he objection that the indictment does not charge a crime against
the United States goes only to the merits of the case.” Id. at 631 (alteration in original) (quoting
Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 36 (1916)).
          “The circuits are split on the proper interpretation of Cotton.” United States v. Muresanu,
951 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2020). Some have taken a “broad” reading of Cotton, holding that
“defects in an indictment—of whatever kind—are not jurisdictional,” even if the “indictment
fails to state an offense.” Id.; see also United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1148-49
(10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 2002). But the Eleventh
Circuit has held that “[i]f an indictment fails to charge such an offense [against the laws of the
United States], then a court has no basis for exercising jurisdiction.” United States v. McIntosh,
704 F.3d 894, 902 (11th Cir. 2013). But see Muresanu, 951 F.3d at 838-39 (explaining why the
narrow reading of Cotton is wrong).
          The Eighth Circuit seems to have endorsed the broader reading of Cotton. In United
States v. Harcevic, the Eighth Circuit considered whether an unconditional guilty plea waived
Harcevic’s immunity defense. 999 F.3d 1172, 1177 (8th Cir. 2021). The court found that
Harcevic’s immunity argument did not affect the Court’s jurisdiction and had been waived by the
unconditional plea agreement because the argument was “nothing more than a claim ‘that the
indictment does not charge a crime against the United States,’ which does not deprive the district
court of jurisdiction to decide the issue.” Id. at 1180 (citation omitted) (quoting Lamar, 240 U.S.
at 65).
          The indictment charges “offenses against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231. If some of the counts in the indictment are defective because they fail to state an



                                                    2
    Case: 4:21-cr-00532-SEP       Doc. #: 301 Filed: 07/29/24            Page: 3 of 4 PageID #:
                                            2825



offense, Defendants could have challenged them in a pretrial motion. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3).
But a claim that the offenses charged are not criminal violations does not deprive the Court of its
power to hear the case. The only Eighth Circuit case Defendants cite to support the argument
that the defect is jurisdictional, United States v. Parkhurst, does not show otherwise. 24 F.
App’x 631, 632 (8th Cir. 2001). Parkhurst was decided before Cotton and dealt with a
“constitutional, not jurisdictional” challenge to the indictment. Id.
        Because Defendants’ challenge is not jurisdictional, it “must [have been] raised by
pretrial motion.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). As authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(c), the Court set the deadline for pretrial motions on August 15, 2023. See Docs.
[171], [172]. Defendants’ motion was filed almost a year after that deadline, so it is untimely
unless Defendants can show good cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3). Defendants argue that their
new argument was not “reasonably available” until Chevron was overruled and the Court was
free to interpret the Clean Air Act according to its plain meaning. See Doc. [293] at 2-3. That
argument is meritless.
        Chevron did not prevent Defendants from making their argument in a timely pretrial
motion. Other than the general principle of Chevron deference, Defendants cite nothing that
would have bound the Court to follow the EPA’s allegedly atextual interpretation of the Clean
Air Act. If the Supreme Court or Eighth Circuit had already decided that onboard diagnostic
systems are monitoring devices by deferring to the EPA’s interpretation of the statute,
Defendants’ argument might have some merit. 1 But Defendants cite no Chevron-based
precedent that might have been called into question by Loper Bright. And they argue that the
statutory text is unambiguous, relying on Eighth Circuit precedent that held that “[w]hen a
statute is unambiguous, interpretation both begins and ends with the text.” Doc. [290] at 4
(quoting United States ex rel. Cairns v. D.S. Med. LLC, 42 F.4th 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2022)). That
was true even under Chevron. See Voigt v. EPA, 46 F.4th 895, 901 (8th Cir. 2022) (“If the
statute is unambiguous, we simply apply the statute.”) (quoting Andrade-Zamora v. Lynch, 814
F.3d 945, 951 (8th Cir. 2016)). If Defendants are correct that the statutory text unambiguously
supports dismissal, then Chevron would have posed no obstacle to their motion, and the fact that
Chevron was only recently overruled provides no good cause for their failure to timely file it.


1
  Even then, Defendants would be on shaky ground: “By [overruling Chevron], however, we do not call
into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework.” Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2273.


                                                  3
 Case: 4:21-cr-00532-SEP         Doc. #: 301 Filed: 07/29/24   Page: 4 of 4 PageID #:
                                           2826



       Accordingly,
       IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts 13-34 of the
superseding indictment, Doc. [290], is DENIED.
       Dated this 29th day of July, 2024.



                                             SARAH E. PITLYK
                                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE




                                             4


File and source

File

301.pdf

Size

205,713 bytes

SHA-256

44917e39ea5e97ec1acf176ccc5c8118589a1d08ad283d56b2d81c9e16c28eb1

Our copy

301.pdf

Original

No public link identified.